city:kandahar

  • Afghan Migration to Germany: History and Current Debates

    In light of the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, Afghan migration to Germany accelerated in recent years. This has prompted debates and controversial calls for return.

    Historical Overview
    Afghan migration to Germany goes back to the first half of the 20th century. To a large extent, the arrival of Afghan nationals occurred in waves, which coincided with specific political regimes and periods of conflict in Afghanistan between 1978 and 2001. Prior to 1979 fewer than 2,000 Afghans lived in Germany. Most of them were either businesspeople or students. The trade city of Hamburg and its warehouses attracted numerous Afghan carpet dealers who subsequently settled with their families. Some families who were among the traders that came to Germany at an early stage still run businesses in the warehouse district of the city.[1]

    Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the number of Afghans seeking refuge and asylum in Germany increased sharply. Between 1980 and 1982 the population grew by around 3,000 persons per year. This was followed by a short period of receding numbers, before another period of immigration set in from 1985, when adherents of communist factions began facing persecution in Afghanistan. Following a few years with lower immigration rates, numbers started rising sharply again from 1989 onwards in the wake of the civil war in Afghanistan and due to mounting restrictions for Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan. Increasing difficulties in and expulsions from these two countries forced many Afghans to search for and move on to new destinations, including Germany.[2] Throughout the 1990s immigration continued with the rise of the Taliban and the establishment of a fundamentalist regime. After reaching a peak in 1995, numbers of incoming migrants from Afghanistan declined for several years. However, they began to rise again from about 2010 onwards as a result of continuing conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan on the one hand and persistently problematic living conditions for Afghans in Iran and Pakistan on the other hand.

    A particularly sharp increase occurred in the context of the ’long summer of migration’[3] in 2015, which continued in 2016 when a record number of 253,485 Afghan nationals were registered in Germany. This number includes established residents of Afghan origin as well as persons who newly arrived in recent years. This sharp increase is also mirrored in the number of asylum claims of Afghan nationals, which reached a historical peak of 127,012 in 2016. Following the peak in 2016 the Afghan migrant population has slightly decreased. Reasons for the numerical decrease include forced and voluntary return to Afghanistan, onward migration to third countries, and expulsion according to the so-called Dublin Regulation. Naturalisations also account for the declining number of Afghan nationals in Germany, albeit to a much lesser extent (see Figures 1 and 2).

    The Afghan Migrant Population in Germany
    Over time, the socio-economic and educational backgrounds of Afghan migrants changed significantly. Many of those who formed part of early immigrant cohorts were highly educated and had often occupied high-ranking positions in Afghanistan. A significant number had worked for the government, while others were academics, doctors or teachers.[4] Despite being well-educated, professionally trained and experienced, many Afghans who came to Germany as part of an early immigrant cohort were unable to find work in an occupational field that would match their professional qualifications. Over the years, levels of education and professional backgrounds of Afghans arriving to Germany became more diverse. On average, the educational and professional qualifications of those who came in recent years are much lower compared to earlier cohorts of Afghan migrants.

    At the end of 2017, the Federal Statistical Office registered 251,640 Afghan nationals in Germany. This migrant population is very heterogeneous as far as persons’ legal status is concerned. Table 1 presents a snapshot of the different legal statuses that Afghan nationals in Germany held in 2017.

    Similar to other European countrie [5], Germany has been receiving increasing numbers of unaccompanied Afghan minors throughout the last decade.[6] In December 2017, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) registered 10,453 persons of Afghan origin under the age of 18, including asylum seekers, holders of a temporary residence permit as well as persons with refugee status. The situation of unaccompanied minors is specific in the sense that they are under the auspices of the Children and Youth support services (Kinder- und Jugendhilfe). This implies that unaccompanied Afghan minors are entitled to specific accommodation and the support of a temporary guardian. According to the BAMF, education and professional integration are priority issues for the reception of unaccompanied minors. However, the situation of these migrants changes once they reach the age of 18 and become legally deportable.[7] For this reason, their period of residence in Germany is marked by ambiguity.

    Fairly modest at first, the number of naturalisations increased markedly from the late 1980s, which is likely to be connected to the continuous aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan.[8]

    With an average age of 23.7 years, Germany’s Afghan population is relatively young. Among Afghan residents who do not hold German citizenship there is a gender imbalance with males outweighing females by roughly 80,390 persons. Until recently, most Afghans arrived in Germany with their family. However, the individual arrival of Afghan men has been a dominant trend in recent years, which has become more pronounced from 2012 onwards with rising numbers of Afghan asylum seekers (see Figure 2).[9]

    The Politicization of Afghan Migration
    Prior to 2015, the Afghan migrant population that had not received much public attention. However, with the significant increase in numbers from 2015 onwards, it was turned into a subject of increased debate and politicization. The German military and reconstruction engagement in Afghanistan constitutes an important backdrop to the debates unfolding around the presence of Afghan migrants – most of whom are asylum seekers – in Germany. To a large extent, these debates revolved around the legitimacy of Afghan asylum claims. The claims of persons who, for example, supported German troops as interpreters were rarely questioned.[10] Conversely, the majority of newly arriving Afghans were framed as economic migrants rather than persons fleeing violence and persecution. In 2015, chancellor Angela Merkel warned Afghan nationals from coming to Germany for economic reasons and simply in search for a better life.[11] She underlined the distinction between “economic migrants” and persons facing concrete threats due to their past collaboration with German troops in Afghanistan. The increasing public awareness of the arrival of Afghan asylum seekers and growing skepticism regarding the legitimacy of their presence mark the context in which debates on deportations of Afghan nationals began to unfold.

    Deportations of Afghan Nationals: Controversial Debates and Implementation
    The Federal Government (Bundesregierung) started to consider deportations to Afghanistan in late 2015. Debates about the deportation of Afghan nationals were also held at the EU level and form an integral part of the Joint Way Forward agreement between Afghanistan and the EU. The agreement was signed in the second half of 2016 and reflects the commitment of the EU and the Afghan Government to step up cooperation on addressing and preventing irregular migration [12] and encourage return of irregular migrants such as persons whose asylum claims are rejected. In addition, the governments of Germany and Afghanistan signed a bilateral agreement on the return of Afghan nationals to their country of origin. At that stage it was estimated that around five percent of all Afghan nationals residing in Germany were facing return.[13] To back plans of forced removal, the Interior Ministry stated that there are “internal protection alternatives”, meaning areas in Afghanistan that are deemed sufficiently safe for people to be deported to and that a deterioration of security could not be confirmed for the country as such.[14] In addition, the BAMF would individually examine and conduct specific risk assessments for each asylum application and potential deportees respectively.

    Country experts and international actors such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) agree on the absence of internal protection alternatives in Afghanistan, stating that there are no safe areas in the country.[15] Their assessments are based on the continuously deteriorating security situation. Since 2014, annual numbers of civilian deaths and casualties continuously exceed 10,000 with a peak of 11,434 in 2016. This rise in violent incidents has been recorded in 33 of 34 provinces. In August 2017 the United Nations changed their assessment of the situation in Afghanistan from a “post-conflict country” to “a country undergoing a conflict that shows few signs of abating”[16] for the first time after the fall of the Taliban. However, violence occurs unevenly across Afghanistan. In 2017 the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), registered the highest levels of civilian casualties in Kabul province and Kabul city more specifically. After Kabul, the highest numbers of civilian casualties were recorded in Helmand, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Faryab, Uruzgan, Herat, Paktya, Kunduz, and Laghman provinces.[17]

    Notwithstanding deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan and parliamentary, non-governmental and civil society protests, Germany’s Federal Government implemented a first group deportation of rejected asylum seekers to Afghanistan in late 2016. Grounds for justification of these measures were not only the assumed “internal protection alternatives”. In addition, home secretary Thomas de Maizière emphasised that many of the deportees were convicted criminals.[18] The problematic image of male Muslim immigrants in the aftermath of the incidents on New Year’s Eve in the city of Cologne provides fertile ground for such justifications of deportations to Afghanistan. “The assaults (sexualized physical and property offences) which young, unmarried Muslim men committed on New Year’s Eve offered a welcome basis for re-framing the ‘refugee question’ as an ethnicized and sexist problem.”[19]

    It is important to note that many persons of Afghan origin spent long periods – if not most or all of their lives – outside Afghanistan in one of the neighboring countries. This implies that many deportees are unfamiliar with life in their country of citizenship and lack local social networks. The same applies to persons who fled Afghanistan but who are unable to return to their place of origin for security reasons. The existence of social networks and potential support structures, however, is particularly important in countries marked by high levels of insecurity, poverty, corruption, high unemployment rates and insufficient (public) services and infrastructure.[20] Hence, even if persons who are deported to Afghanistan may be less exposed to a risk of physical harm in some places, the absence of social contacts and support structures still constitutes an existential threat.

    Debates on and executions of deportations to Afghanistan have been accompanied by parliamentary opposition on the one hand and street-level protests on the other hand. Non-governmental organisations such as Pro Asyl and local refugee councils have repeatedly expressed their criticism of forced returns to Afghanistan.[21] The execution of deportations has been the responsibility of the federal states (Ländersache). This leads to significant variations in the numbers of deportees. In light of a degrading security situation in Afghanistan, several governments of federal states (Landesregierungen) moreover paused deportations to Afghanistan in early 2017. Concomitantly, recognition rates of Afghan asylum seekers have continuously declined.[22]

    A severe terrorist attack on the German Embassy in Kabul on 31 May 2017 led the Federal Government to revise its assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan and to temporarily pause deportations to the country. According to chancellor Merkel, the temporary ban of deportations was contingent on the deteriorating security situation and could be lifted once a new, favourable assessment was in place. While pausing deportations of rejected asylum seekers without criminal record, the Federal Government continued to encourage voluntary return and deportations of convicted criminals of Afghan nationality as well as individuals committing identity fraud during their asylum procedure.

    The ban of deportations of rejected asylum seekers without criminal record to Afghanistan was lifted in July 2018, although the security situation in the country continues to be very volatile.[23] The decision was based on a revised assessment of the security situation through the Foreign Office and heavily criticised by the centre left opposition in parliament as well as by NGOs and churches. Notwithstanding such criticism, the attitude of the Federal Government has been rigorous. By 10 January 2019, 20 group deportation flights from Germany to Kabul were executed, carrying a total number of 475 Afghans.[24]

    Assessing the Situation in Afghanistan
    Continuing deportations of Afghan nationals are legitimated by the assumption that certain regions in Afghanistan fulfil the necessary safety requirements for deportees. But how does the Federal Government – and especially the BAMF – come to such arbitrary assessments of the security situation on the one hand and individual prospects on the other hand? While parliamentary debates about deportations to Afghanistan were ongoing, the news magazine Spiegel reported on how the BAMF conducts security assessments for Afghanistan. According to their revelations, BAMF staff hold weekly briefings on the occurrence of military combat, suicide attacks, kidnappings and targeted killings. If the proportion of civilian casualties remains below 1:800, the level of individual risk is considered low and insufficient for someone to be granted protection in Germany.[25] The guidelines of the BAMF moreover rule that young men who are in working age and good health are assumed to find sufficient protection and income opportunities in Afghanistan’s urban centres, so that they are able to secure to meet the subsistence level. Such possibilities are even assumed to exist for persons who cannot mobilise family or other social networks for their support. Someone’s place or region of origin is another aspect considered when assessing whether or not Afghan asylum seekers are entitled to remain in Germany. The BAMF examines the security and supply situation of the region where persons were born or where they last lived before leaving Afghanistan. These checks also include the question which religious and political convictions are dominant at the place in question. According to these assessment criteria, the BAMF considers the following regions as sufficiently secure: Kabul, Balkh, Herat, Bamiyan, Takhar, Samangan and Panjshir.[26]

    Voluntary Return
    In addition to executing the forced removal of rejected Afghan asylum seekers, Germany encourages the voluntary return of Afghan nationals.[27] To this end it supports the Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum Seekers in Germany which covers travel expenses and offers additional financial support to returnees. Furthermore, there is the Government Assisted Repatriation Programme, which provides financial support to persons who wish to re-establish themselves in their country of origin. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) organises and supervises return journeys that are supported by these programmes. Since 2015, several thousand Afghan nationals left Germany with the aid of these programmes. Most of these voluntary returnees were persons who had no legal residence status in Germany, for example persons whose asylum claim had been rejected or persons holding an exceptional leave to remain (Duldung).

    Outlook
    The continuing conflict in Afghanistan not only causes death, physical and psychological hurt but also leads to the destruction of homes and livelihoods and impedes access to health, education and services for large parts of the Afghan population. This persistently problematic situation affects the local population as much as it affects migrants who – voluntarily or involuntarily – return to Afghanistan. For this reason, migration out of Afghanistan is likely to continue, regardless of the restrictions which Germany and other receiving states are putting into place.

    http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/288934/afghan-migration-to-germany
    #Allemagne #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #histoire #asile #migrations #réfugiés #chiffres #statistiques #renvois #expulsions #retour_volontaire #procédure_d'asile
    ping @_kg_

  • #Giles_Duley, survivre pour mieux photographier les victimes de la guerre

    Invité par le Centre international de déminage humanitaire à l’occasion d’une conférence sur les mines à l’ONU, à Genève, le photographe britannique, triple amputé, a survécu par miracle à un engin explosif improvisé en Afghanistan. Ce tragique épisode a décuplé son empathie pour les sujets qu’il photographie et renforcé une vocation

    « Tu es un dur, tu vas vivre, buddy. » Le 7 février 2011, au cœur de l’Afghanistan. Dans l’hélicoptère qui l’emmène d’urgence à l’Hôpital des Nations unies à Kandahar, des soldats américains s’évertuent à maintenir Giles Duley en vie. Incorporé dans la 101e Division aéroportée de l’armée américaine pour photographier l’impact humanitaire de la guerre sur les civils, il vient de sauter sur une mine improvisée. Deux jambes et un bras arrachés. Transféré à Birmingham en Angleterre, il passe 46 jours aux soins intensifs. Il survit. Un miracle. Il subit 37 opérations en un an avant de pouvoir quitter l’hôpital.
    Façonner ma vie future

    Invité par le Centre international de déminage humanitaire (GICHD) à Genève à l’occasion de la 22e Conférence internationale de Mine Action réunissant plus de 300 responsables nationaux et onusiens au Palais des Nations jusqu’à vendredi, ce Britannique de 47 ans n’est pas du genre à s’apitoyer sur son sort. A l’ONU, mardi matin, équipé de ses deux prothèses, il lâchera devant un parterre plutôt rangé : « Si je n’avais plus été capable de faire de la photo, j’aurais préféré mourir en Afghanistan. »

    « J’ai d’emblée perdu mes ressources financières, ma maison, ma fiancée, poursuit Giles Duley. J’ai vécu dans une petite chambre où même ma chaise roulante ne rentrait pas. Tout le monde voulait façonner ma vie future. A moi qui avais été un sportif (boxe et athlétisme), on m’avait dit, un an après l’Afghanistan, que j’allais pouvoir désormais m’intéresser aux Jeux paralympiques de Londres de 2012. » Une remarque offensante pour lui qui voit le handicap comme l’incapacité de faire ce que l’on veut faire.

    « Or aujourd’hui, je fais ce que j’aime. Je suis un meilleur photographe qu’avant. » Dans son appartement de Hastings faisant face à la mer, ce Londonien s’en fait un point d’honneur : son appartement n’est pas aménagé spécialement pour lui. Il rappelle qu’il y a quelque temps, il posait vêtu de noir, avec les amputations visibles, sur un tronc blanc pour un autoportrait, prouvant qu’il acceptait son nouveau physique. « Au British Museum, explique-t-il, il y a bien des statues en partie abîmées qu’on continue de trouver belles. »

    Pour la seule année 2018, Giles Duley, exemple de résilience, a voyagé dans 14 pays. Avec la photo comme raison d’être, de vivre. Pour documenter les horreurs réelles de la guerre : « Je ne suis pas un reporter de guerre. Je suis anti-guerre. Je ne photographie jamais des soldats au combat. » Son empathie pour les sujets qu’il photographie est décuplée. En 2015, le Haut-Commissariat de l’ONU pour les réfugiés (HCR) lui confie un mandat pour raconter la crise des migrants de Syrie en lui donnant pour seule directive : « Suis ton cœur. » Une manière de bien cerner le personnage.

    A Lesbos, l’arrivée de migrants épuisés le touche profondément. Il le confesse au Temps : « Je n’ai pas que des blessures. Mes souffrances physiques et émotionnelles sont quotidiennes. Mais c’est précisément cela qui me connecte aux gens. » Giles Duley n’a plus la même palette de possibilités qu’auparavant. Mais il s’en accommode : « Les limites que je peux éprouver me forcent à davantage de créativité. » D’ailleurs, ajoute-t-il, « les meilleures photos ne sont pas celles qu’on prend, mais celles qu’on nous donne ».
    Une vérité, pas la vérité

    Quand, en 2014, il rencontre Khouloud dans un camp de réfugiés dans la vallée de la Bekaa au Liban, il est touché par cette Syrienne, atteinte par un sniper à la colonne vertébrale et alitée dans une tente de fortune depuis plusieurs mois. Un cliché la montre en compagnie de son mari, « une scène d’amour » davantage qu’une scène dramatique dans un camp de réfugiés, relève-t-il. Deux ans après sa première rencontre, il constate que Khouloud est toujours dans la même tente. La situation l’insupporte. Il lance une campagne de financement participatif pour lui venir en aide. Un jour, il recevra de Khouloud, médicalement traitée aux Pays-Bas, un message disant « Vous m’avez redonné ma vie. »

    Giles Duley reste honnête. Ses photos ne représentent pas la réalité, mais une réalité qu’il a choisie. Préférant le noir et blanc, il aime utiliser un drap blanc comme seul arrière-fond pour effacer tout contexte : « Si je photographie une personne dans un camp de réfugiés, on va se limiter à la voir comme une réfugiée. Or elle est bien autre chose. Elle n’est pas née réfugiée. »
    La puissance de l’esprit

    Aujourd’hui directeur de sa fondation Legacy of War, Giles Duley estime être « l’homme le plus chanceux du monde » à voir les milliers de mutilés qui croupissent dans des conditions de vie inacceptables. Dans une interview avec Giles Duley, Melissa Fleming, directrice de la communication au HCR, le relève : « Au cours de toute ma vie, je n’ai jamais rencontré une personne aussi forte, ayant été si proche de la mort et capable de recourir à la puissance de son esprit et de sa volonté pour surmonter » l’adversité.

    La vocation de Giles n’était toutefois pas une évidence. Des cinq frère et sœurs, il est le plus « difficile ». Les études ne le branchent pas, au contraire du sport. Il décroche une bourse d’études aux Etats-Unis pour la boxe, mais un accident de voiture met fin à ses espoirs. Il se lance dans la photo de groupes de rock (Oasis, Marilyn Manson, Lenny Kravitz, etc.) et de mode. Mais un jour, face à une jeune actrice en pleurs dans un hôtel londonien, il réalise que la photo de mode ne le rend plus heureux. Il abandonne, travaille dans un bar, cédant brièvement à la dépression et à l’alcool.
    A 30 ans, une nouvelle vocation

    Mais comme une bouée de sauvetage, il se souvient d’un cadeau laissé par son parrain à peine décédé quand il avait 18 ans : un appareil photo Olympus et Unreasonable Behaviour, l’ouvrage autobiographique de la légende de la photo Don McCullin. Les images du Vietnam et du Biafra le bouleversent. A 30 ans, il identifie sa nouvelle vocation : raconter par l’image l’histoire personnelle des victimes oubliées du cynisme humain à travers la planète. Pour leur donner la chance d’une nouvelle vie. Malgré les douleurs qui ne le lâchent jamais. Ou peut-être à cause d’elles.

    https://www.letemps.ch/monde/giles-duley-survivre-mieux-photographier-victimes-guerre
    #photographie #victimes_de_guerre #handicap #autonomie
    ping @albertocampiphoto @philippe_de_jonckheere

  • À lire Jean-Pierre Filiu, professeur des universités et par ailleurs esprit acéré du monde arabo-musulman, les choses semblent bien simples. Certes Raqqa doit être prise et elle le sera car c’est l’interêt de toutes les parties au conflit, mais quelle erreur de faire le parallèle avec Mossoul ou même Kandahar tellement le contexte est différent, ne serait-ce que sur le plan « juridique » d’une intervention en Syrie. Sans parler de la situation nouvelle aux USA et l’inconnue Trump.

    http://filiu.blog.lemonde.fr

    La folie de laisser Rakka aux mains de Daech

  • Canada: le sikh Harjit Sajjan, ministre de la Défense en turban - L’Express
    http://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/actualite/canada-le-sikh-harjit-sajjan-ministre-de-la-defense-en-turban_1733437.html

    Avec son turban, sa barbe grisonnante, la moustache fière et abondante, Harjit Sajjan, le tout nouveau ministre de la Défense canadien, détonne dans le paysage rectiligne et conventionnel des forces armées.

    Harjit Sajjan est l’exemple parfait d’un gouvernement que le Premier ministre Justin Trudeau a qualifié de « reflet du Canada dans sa magnifique diversité ». 

    Né au tournant des années 1970 dans un village du Penjab, dans le Nord de l’Inde, il arrive avec ses parents dès l’âge de 5 ans sur la côte ouest où il s’est ensuite installé. 

    C’est à Vancouver, où il a été élu député le 19 octobre, que Harjit Sajjan choisit l’ordre et la loi. Il a passé 11 ans dans la police de la ville, finissant même à la criminelle. 

    Il rejoint ensuite l’armée canadienne où il terminera au rang de lieutenant-colonel et bardé de médailles. Ses faits d’armes, il les a obtenus en Bosnie mais surtout, par trois fois, en Afghanistan. 

    Avec son turban sous le casque, le nouveau patron de la Défense a été le premier sikh à diriger un régiment canadien dans la région de Kandahar.

  • Reshuffling Eurasia’s energy deck — Iran, China and #Pipelineistan: Escobar

    BY PEPE ESCOBAR on JULY 31, 2015 in AT TOP WRITERS, CENTRAL ASIA, EMPIRE OF CHAOS, PEPE ESCOBAR, SOUTH ASIA
    Pipelineistan – the prime Eurasian energy chessboard — never sleeps. Recently, it’s Russia that has scored big on all fronts; two monster gas deals sealed with China last year; the launch of Turk Stream replacing South Stream; and the doubling of Nord Stream to Germany.

    Now, with the possibility of sanctions on Iran finally vanishing by late 2015/early 2016, all elements will be in place for the revival of one of Pipelineistan’s most spectacular soap operas, which I have been following for years; the competition between the IP (Iran-Pakistan) and TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipelines.

    The $7.5-billion IP had hit a wall for years now – a casualty of hardcore geopolitical power play. IP was initially IPI – connected to India; both India and Pakistan badly need Iranian energy. And yet relentless pressure from successive Bush and Obama administrations scared India out of the project. And then sanctions stalled it for good.

    Now, Pakistan’s Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources Shahid Khaqan Abbasi swears IP is a go. The Iranian stretch of the 1,800-kilometer pipeline has already been built. IP originates in the massive South Pars gas fields – the largest in the world – and ends in the Pakistani city of Nawabshah, close to Karachi. The geopolitical significance of this steel umbilical cord linking Iran and Pakistan couldn’t be more graphic.

    Enter – who else? – China. Chinese construction companies already started working on the stretch between Nawabshah and the key strategic port of Gwadar, close to the Iranian border.

    China is financing the Pakistani stretch of IP. And for a very serious reason; IP, for which Gwadar is a key hub, is essential in a much larger long game; the $46 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor, which will ultimately link Xinjiang to the Persian Gulf via Pakistan. Yes, once again, we’re right into New Silk Road(s) territory.

    Workers in Kazakhstan complete a section of a pan-Central Asian gas pipeline
    And the next step regarding Gwadar will be essential for China’s energy strategy; an IP extension all the way to Xinjiang. That’s a huge logistical challenge, implying the construction of a pipeline parallel to the geology — defying Karakoram highway.

    IP will continue to be swayed by geopolitics. The Japan-based and heavily US-influenced Asian Development Bank (ADB) committed a $30 million loan to help Islamabad build its first LNG terminal. The ADB knows that Iranian natural gas is a much cheaper option for Pakistan compared to LNG imports. And yet the ADB’s agenda is essentially an American agenda; out with IP, and full support to TAPI.

    This implies, in the near future, the strong possibility of Pakistan increasingly relying on the China-driven Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) for infrastructure development, and not the ADB.

    Recently, the IP field got even more crowded with the arrival of Gazprom. Gazprom also wants to invest in IP – which means Moscow getting closer to Islamabad. That’s part of another key geopolitical gambit; Pakistan being admitted as a full member, alongside India, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), something that will happen, soon, with Iran as well. For the moment, Russia-Pakistan collaboration is already evident in an agreement to build a gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore.

    Talk to the (new) Mullah

    So where do all these movements leave TAPI?

    The $10 billion TAPI is a soap opera that stretches all the way back to the first Clinton administration. This is what the US government always wanted from the Taliban; a deal to build a gas pipeline to Pakistan and India bypassing Iran. We all know how it all went horribly downhill.

    The death of Mullah Omar – whenever that happened – may be a game changer. Not for the moment, tough, because there is an actual Taliban summer offensive going on, and “reconciliation” talks in Afghanistan have been suspended.

    Whatever happens next, all the problems plaguing TAPI remain. Turkmenistan – adept of self-isolation, idiosyncratic and unreliable as long as it’s not dealing with China – is a mystery concerning how much natural gas it really holds (the sixth largest or third largest reserves in the world?)

    And the idea of committing billions of dollars to build a pipeline traversing a war zone – from Western Afghanistan to Kandahar, not to mention crossing a Balochistan prone to separatist attacks — is nothing short of sheer lunacy.

    Energy majors though, remain in the game. France’s Total seems to be in the lead, with Russian and Chinese companies not far behind. Gazprom’s interest in TAPI is key – because the pipeline, if built, would certainly be connected in the future to others which are part of the massive, former Soviet Union energy grid.

    To complicate matters further, there is the fractious relationship between Gazprom and Turkmenistan. Until the recent, spectacular Chinese entrance, Ashgabat depended mostly on Russia to market Turkmen gas, and to a lesser extent, Iran.

    As part of a nasty ongoing dispute, Turkmengaz accuses Gazprom of economic exploitation. So what is Plan B? Once again, China. Beijing already buys more than half of all Turkmen gas exports. That flows through the Central Asia-China pipeline; full capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year, only used by half at the moment.

    China is already helping Turkmenistan to develop Galkynysh, the second largest gas field in the world after South Pars.

    And needless to add, China is as much interested in buying more gas from Turkmenistan – the Pipelineistan way – as from Iran. Pipelineistan fits right into China’s privileged “escape from Malacca” strategy; to buy a maximum of energy as far away from the U.S. Navy as possible.

    So Turkmenistan is bound to get closer and closer, energy-wise, to Beijing. That leaves the Turkmen option of supplying the EU in the dust – as much as Brussels has been courting Ashgabat for years.

    The EU pipe dream is a Pipelineistan stretch across the Caspian Sea. It won’t happen, because of a number of reasons; the long-running dispute over the Caspian legal status – Is it a lake? Is it a sea? – won’t be solved anytime soon; Russia does not want it; and Turkmenistan does not have enough Pipelineistan infrastructure to ship all that gas from Galkynysh to the Caspian.

    Considering all of the above, it’s not hard to identify the real winner of all these interlocking Pipelineistan power plays – way beyond individual countries; deeper Eurasia integration. And so far away from Western interference.

    #énergie #gaz #Iran #Chine
    seenthisé pour @reka (hi hi hi)

  • Afghan interpreter who worked with British army refused UK asylum

    Aslam Yousaf Zai claims he has been targeted by Taliban, but Home Office says it does not believe he would be in danger if he returns to Afghanistan

    http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/apr/07/afghan-interpreter-british-army-refused-uk-asylum
    #Afghanistan #interprète #asile #réfugiés #UK #Angleterre #migration #droit_d'asile #interprètes

    v. aussi :
    La Cité | L’Occident laissera-t-il tomber « ses » interprètes en Afghanistan ?

    A l’approche de la fin prévue de la mission italienne, les interprètes afghans, « alliés » indispensables des forces armées occidentales, craignent d’être abandonnés sur place, en proie à la vengeance des talibans.

    http://www.asile.ch/vivre-ensemble/2015/01/09/la-cite-loccident-laissera-t-il-tomber-ses-interpretes-en-afghanistan

  • خليل حرب : كم كساسبة سوري؟ : : الصفحة الرئيسة | جريدة السفير
    http://assafir.com/Article/1/400191

    Article au vitriol dans le quotidien nationaliste (plutôt modéré) Al-Safir, à propos de l’exécution du pilote jordanien par Daech. En substance. On sent que l’auteur, Khalil Harb, totalement désespéré/exaspéré :

    Ce n’est pas le « croissant chiite » naguère évoqué par le roi de Jordanie qui a exécuté toutes ces victimes, mais « le croissant de la terreur », qui va de Kandahar à Benghazi. Le roi est d’autant plus frappé de stupeur qu’il n’ignore pas qu’une fraction non négligeable de sa population estime que ce châtiment est parfaitement justifié. Il faut dire que cela fait 4 ans que les autorités se taisent vis-à-vis des partisans du jihad en Syrie (alors que Jérusalem est à deux pas). Voilà le prix à payer pour ce double-langage tenu depuis si longtemps : le roi est victime aujourd’hui de ceux qu’il a soutenu depuis bien longtemps. El-Kassassbé est mort victime des manigances du régime jordanien, de ses services secrets et de son allié US avec son poste de commandement saoudien, et des tentatives pour percer un front militaire depuis le sud syrien jusqu’à la capitale Damas. Mais ce n’est pas le pire : combien de El-Kassabseh syriens anonymes sont morts depuis quatre ans, sans qu’on en parle dans les médias, sauf pour vanter les faits d’armes héroïques qui ne faisaient qu’augmenter la destruction de la Syrie.

  • Quand j’étais jeune (il y a une dizaine d’années), on disait encore « #mercenaires » ; maintenant on dit « #contractors » : 500 ou 600 privés pour assurer la sécurité de l’aéroport de Kandahar
    http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2014/10/09/kandahar-12610.html

    Elle concerne la sécurité de la totalité de l’aéroport militaire de Kandahar, le Kandahar Airfield, (tours de garde, postes d’accès et patrouilles, 24h/24). Cet aéroport figure dans la liste des bases du Bilateral Security Agreement qui seront occupées par les forces étrangères à partir de 2015.

    Le projet prévoit le déploiement de 500/600 gardes armés (encadrement compris) fournis par une société privée.

    Ces gardes doivent, à au moins 30%, provenir des 5 pays du Five Eyes International Intelligence Sharing Network Nations (USA, GB, Canada, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande), le reste venant de pays contributeurs au contingent de l’ISAF, ce qui exclut des recrutements « exotiques » et donc bon marché.

  • The Mysterious Fall of Raqqa, Syria’s Kandahar
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17550

    The Euphrates overflows with blood, and the crows caw over the corpses that the Syrian city of Raqqa sacrifices every day to the princes of death in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and al-Nusra Front, ever since the two al-Qaeda affiliates turned the city into the first official province of their Islamic emirate. The tyranny that people rose up against has now returned, more morbid than before. Today, Raqqa is Syria’s answer to Kandahar – the birthplace of the Taliban.

  • The Mysterious Fall of #Raqqa, #syria’s Kandahar (I)
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/mysterious-fall-raqqa-syria%E2%80%99s-kandahar-i

    A child looks at child look at stand selling military fatigue in the northern rebel-held Syrian city of Raqqa on October 1, 2013 as violence continues to rage in flashpoints around the country. (Photo: AFP - Mohamed Abdul Aziz) A child looks at child look at stand selling military fatigue in the northern rebel-held Syrian city of Raqqa on October 1, 2013 as violence continues to rage in flashpoints around the country. (Photo: AFP - Mohamed Abdul Aziz) (...)

    #Mideast_&_North_Africa #Al-Nusra_Front #Articles #ISIS #Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_Syria

  • Suicide #Drones, Mini Blimps and #3D Printers: Inside the New Army Arsenal | Danger Room | Wired.com
    http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/new-army-arsenal/?pid=1651&viewall=true via @opironet

    At Camp Nathan Smith outside of Kandahar, there’s a 20-foot cargo container loaded with a 3D printer, a computer-controlled machine for cutting metal, and a couple of Ph.D.s. It’s one of three REF “expeditionary labs” placed around Afghanistan that can quickly design and prototype tools for troops on the ground right now. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/printers

  • International - Nadia Rasul - Taliban Poetry: Yes, They Write Poems, and They’re Surprisingly Diverse - The Atlantic
    http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/taliban-poetry-yes-they-write-poems-and-theyre-surprisingly-diverse/258304

    Poetry of the Taliban is an English language anthology of poems written by the Afghan Taliban that give an insight into the lyrical souls of the members of this miltant group. Kandahar-based researchers and writers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn have translated and edited more than 250 poems, sourced mainly from contemporary media — specifically the Taliban’s official website. The collection also includes samples of older poetic works that date back to the 1980s and 1990s.

    Rather than presenting a cohesive ideology, the poems represent a melange of voices. Going beyond political and militant propaganda, these poems reflect a diversity of emotions such as “unrequited love, bloody vengeance and the thrill of battle, religion and nationalism, even a desire for non-violence,” that are expressed through “images of wine, powerful women, song, legend and pastoral beauty.” This anthology presents a complex image of the Taliban, one that complicates our sometimes monolithic image of the Taliban. “It was refreshing to be able to think about Afghanistan outside the usual tropes and patterns,” say the editors.

  • Madness is not the reason for this massacre (Robert Fisk)
    http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-madness-is-not-the-reason-for-this-massacre-7575737.html

    I’m getting a bit tired of the “deranged” soldier story. It was predictable, of course. The 38-year-old staff sergeant who massacred 16 Afghan civilians, including nine children, near Kandahar this week had no sooner returned to base than the defence experts and the think-tank boys and girls announced that he was “deranged”. Not an evil, wicked, mindless terrorist – which he would be, of course, if he had been an Afghan, especially a Taliban – but merely a guy who went crazy. Source: Robert Fisk

  • Robert Fisk: Madness is not the reason for this massacre - Robert Fisk - Commentators - The Independent
    http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-madness-is-not-the-reason-for-this-massacre-7575737.html

    I’m getting a bit tired of the “deranged” soldier story. It was predictable, of course. The 38-year-old staff sergeant who massacred 16 Afghan civilians, including nine children, near Kandahar this week had no sooner returned to base than the defence experts and the think-tank boys and girls announced that he was “deranged”. Not an evil, wicked, mindless terrorist – which he would be, of course, if he had been an Afghan, especially a Taliban – but merely a guy who went crazy.

    #afghanistan

  • C’est ça, la presse francophone ? Justifier l’injustifiable ? Bientôt dans le Monde : « expliquer » qu’Adolf Hitler était très « stressé » à cause des juifs, et comment il a… « craqué ».

    Le Monde: Tuerie en Afghanistan : le militaire américain aurait craqué
    http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2012/03/16/tuerie-en-afghanistan-le-militaire-americain-aurait-craque_1670558_3216.html

    Le Parisien: Tuerie en Afghanistan : le soldat a craqué après la blessure d’un camarade
    http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-monde/tuerie-en-afghanistan-le-soldat-a-craque-apres-la-blessure-d-un-camarade-

    Euronews: Stress post-traumatique pour expliquer le massacre de Kandahar ?
    http://fr.euronews.com/2012/03/16/stress-post-traumatique-pour-expliquer-le-massacre-de-kandahar

    RTBF: Un soldat tire sur des civils en Afghanistan : son avocat explique
    http://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_un-soldat-tire-sur-des-civils-en-afghanistan-son-avocat-explique?id=7731

    Cyberpresse: Tuerie afghane : le suspect avait bu de l’alcool
    http://blogues.cyberpresse.ca/hetu/2012/03/16/tuerie-afghane-le-suspect-avait-bu

    Une dépêche non signée reprise partout: Tuerie en Afghanistan : le soldat a craqué après la blessure d’un camarade
    http://www.varmatin.com/article/monde/tuerie-en-afghanistan-le-soldat-a-craque-apres-la-blessure-dun-camarade.80

  • Afghanistan : un gendarme français à la tête de la division « Police » du NTM-A : Lignes de défense
    http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2011/11/19/afghanistan-un-gendarme-francais-a-la-tete-de-la-

    C’est un gendarme français, le général Christian Dupouy (photo ISAF prise à Kandahar), qui commande actuellement la division « Police » de la NTM-A, la Nato Training Mission Afghanistan. Il a pris son poste en septembre. Son titre précis : « Commander, Combined Training Advisory Group - Police (CTAG-P) ».

  • Kandahar : le Canada savait que les talibans préparaient une insurrection | Le Canada en Afghanistan
    http://www.cyberpresse.ca/actualites/dossiers/le-canada-en-afghanistan/201110/16/01-4457810-kandahar-le-canada-savait-que-les-talibans-preparaient-une-in

    Les services de renseignement américains avaient avisé les Forces canadiennes que les talibans et Al-Qaïda rassemblaient leurs forces dans le sud de l’Afghanistan en prévision de l’arrivée des troupes de l’OTAN à Kandahar.

    À ce jour, cette étude constitue le rapport le plus complet et le plus clair de ce que savaient les dirigeants canadiens avant de déployer leurs troupes en sol afghan à l’hiver 2006.

    L’ancien gouvernement libéral, qui a ordonné l’envoi des soldats canadiens en Afghanistan, et l’actuel gouvernement conservateur ont répété à plusieurs reprises qu’ils avaient été surpris par la violence de la révolte des talibans au printemps 2006.

    Cynisme ?

    #Afghanistan #OTAN #Canda