city:riyadh

    • The truth about the Saudi meeting with Assad envoy - Al Arabiya News
      http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/08/07/Saudi-official-uncovers-the-details-of-a-meeting-with-al-Assad-en

      These leaks, denied by Saudis, revealed that this meeting with the representative of the Syrian regime aims to form a quadruple alliance involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan to fight terrorism.

      The Saudi source denied those claims clarifying that this meeting was initiated by Riyadh after another Saudi-Russian meeting during which Moscow accused Riyadh of obstructing a political solution and fueling terrorism through supporting the opposition. However, Saudi officials denied these accusations back then and invited the Russians to find a new solution to end the crisis.

      The Saudi source further said that Riyadh informed Moscow of an initiative aiming to bring peace and satisfy the Syrians or show the true face of al-Assad to its Russian allies.

      The tripartite meeting was held in Jeddah, and both planes, Russian and Syrian, arrived each alone and not on one single Russian plane as al-Akhbar reported. The Saudi source also stated that the Russian delegation made sure the Syrian delegation does not join them on their plane so Russians do not appear as a guarantor of al-Assad but serve only as a witness.

  • Riyadh’s shifting Beirut policy - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East
    http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/lebanon-saudi-arabia-foreign-relations-ambassador-asiri.html

    Senior diplomatic sources spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity and revealed that a series of Saudi decisions indicates a change in the Saudi way of dealing with Lebanon. First and foremost is Salman’s royal decree demanding the Saudi defense minister inform the Lebanese authorities that the $3 billion grant Saudi Arabia pledged to donate in December 2013 for upgrades to the Lebanese army, under the rule of the late King Abdullah, was canceled.

    According to the same sources, Lebanon was told that this military donation was a personal gift from Abdullah’s own money and is not included or even mentioned in the Saudi Defense Ministry’s documents, which was later notified about it for follow-up protocols. The grant was approved in coordination between Khalid al-Tuwaijri, former head of the Royal Court, who is currently under house arrest and is being questioned since June 20, about financial transfers that were made under the rule of the late King Abdullah and three of his sons, in the time of former Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. The sources added that the Saudi authorities expect any inquiry about the donation to take place with Abdullah’s family. The source also said Salman requested that French President Francois Hollande halt all steps related to the donation, as it was not considered part of the Saudi Ministry of Economy’s expenses.

    Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/lebanon-saudi-arabia-foreign-relations-ambassador-asiri.html#ixzz3eeE9Nl

  • Leaks reveal how Ottawa cultivated ties before $15-billion Saudi arms deal
    http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/leaks-reveal-how-ottawa-cultivated-ties-before-15-billion-saudi-arms-deal/article25105844

    The Canadian government carefully courted Saudi Arabia in the years leading up to an unprecedented $15-billion arms sale to Riyadh brokered by Ottawa that remains shrouded in secrecy, documents show.

    Secret Saudi government documents made public last week by Wikileaks offer a glimpse of how the Harper Conservatives sought closer relations with the Saudis – an effort that paid off in 2014 with a massive deal to sell made-in-Canada armoured fighting vehicles to the Arab state.

    #saudileaks

  • Army officers among 8 jailed for terrorism | Arab News
    http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/766166

    Condamné avant tout pour « takfirisme » (sic) et accessoirement pour avoir essayée de tuer le « prince héritier » Ben Nayef,

    RIYADH: The Special Criminal Court here has sentenced eight people, including two army officers, to jail terms of between one and 17 years for terror-related activities.

    The court found the defendants guilty of forming a terrorist cell inside the Kingdom, supporting Al-Qaeda’s aims to attack private and public property, and adopting Takfiri ideas.

    The court decided that the first defendant, an army officer, had rebelled against the government by meeting with terrorists, adopting Takfiri ideas and supporting Al-Qaeda, a local publication reported.

    He was also found guilty of supporting the terrorist attack targeting Crown Prince Mohammad bin Naif, deputy premier and interior minister, and entering the Yanbu refinery to launch an attack.

    #d'une_pierre_deux_coups (de #fumistes)

  • Interview: Iraq’s Sadr says Saudis, US stoking sectarian tension
    http://m.france24.com/en/f24-interview/20150615-exclusive-moqtada-al-sadr-says-saudis-obstacle-regional-peace

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPOBjVnxhNk

    Moqtada al-Sadr, head of a powerful Shiite movement in Iraq, has called on Saudi Arabia to end its military intervention in Yemen. In an exclusive interview with FRANCE 24, the cleric accused both Riyadh and the US of worsening sectarian tensions.

    […]

    Sadr was interviewed by FRANCE 24’s Michel Kik on June 13, 2015, in the cleric’s office in the Iraqi city of Najaf, in the Shiite heartland of southern Iraq.

    In characteristic form, Sadr also lashed out against Washington for “sowing divisions” in the Middle East. “America gives arms to Sunnis, to Shiites, to Kurds, heightening sectarianism and ethnic tensions,” he said.

  • The Guardian view on the flogging of Raif Badawi: Saudi Arabia is in the dock | Editorial | The Guardian

    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/07/guardian-view-flogging-raif-badawi-saudi-arabia-in-dock

    The cruel and unjust sentence passed on the Saudi blogger Raif Badawi, 10 years in jail and 1,000 lashes, has been upheld by the supreme court in Riyadh. Hopes that the court might reduce or even commute the sentence, particularly as the holy fast of Ramadan begins next week, have been dashed. The only remaining appeal now is to the Saudi monarch, King Salman. From Quebec, where she has been granted asylum with their children, Mr Badawi’s wife Ensaf Haidar has said that she fears the public flogging – 50 lashes at a time every Friday after prayers – might resume as soon as this Friday. Mr Badawi had been whipped only once after his sentence was passed, and prison doctors deemed that he was too ill to be flogged again before his appeal was heard. Britain and its allies, conveniently meeting together at the G7 in Germany, must unite and condemn what is almost certainly a life-threatening sentence. They should stand together in defence of their shared values and demand his release.

    #badawi #arabie_saoudite

  • Saudi-led naval blockade leaves 20m Yemenis facing humanitarian disaster | World news | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/saudi-led-naval-blockade-worsens-yemen-humanitarian-disaster

    Riad avait été remercié (sic) d’avance par l’ONU pour sa générosité (sic)

    Despite western and UN entreaties, Riyadh has also failed to disburse any of the $274m it promised in funding for humanitarian relief. According to UN estimates due to be released next week 78% of the population is in need of emergency aid, an increase of 4 million over the past three months.

    #mascarade #crimes_légalisés #Saoud #Yemen

    • Et voici pour les wahabites en Irak et au pays de Cham:
      “Isis use water as a weapon in Iraq, by shutting dam on the Euphrates River”
      http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-use-water-as-a-weapon-in-iraq-by-shutting-dam-on-the-euphrates-r

      Water has become the latest weapon in Isis’ arsenal, after militants closed the gates of a dam in western Iraq - allowing them easier access to government forces.
      In a move that could expose residents in southern provinces to drought, Isis fighters have redirected the flow of the Euphrates River, to give them better access to government fighters on the southern bank, according to local officials.
      The Euphrates has acted as a geographical barrier between Isis fighters who have seized the river’s northern bank, and pro-government forces who are attempting to move closer to Ramadi from the other side.

  • Report: Saudi Arms Grant Stalled over Remarks on Yemen War
    http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/180744-report-saudi-arms-grant-stalled-over-remarks-on-yemen-war

    A Saudi grant to the Lebanese army to purchase French weapons is reportedly frozen over stances by some Lebanese officials regarding Riyadh’s war against Shiite Huthi rebels in Yemen.

    French diplomatic sources said in comments published in As Safir newspaper Tuesday that France’s chief of Staff General Jean-Pierre Bosser expressed belief that Saudi Arabia is delaying the accomplishment of the second delivery of French arms.

    The chief of staff reportedly informed Lebanese authorities that Saudi Arabia “could have decided to freeze the grant over stances by Lebanese officials regarding its war on Yemen (in particular, Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah),” the sources pointed out.

    Saudi Arabia is leading an Arab coalition that launched an air war on the Huthi rebels and their allies in Yemen on March 26.

    Nasrallah had slammed Saudi Arabia as the source of the “takfiri ideology” in the world, vowing that it will suffer a “major defeat” in the Yemeni conflict.

    The French diplomatic sources expressed pessimism over the deal, hinting that Saudi Arabia froze the grant in an indirect manner.

    According to As Safir, Lebanese officials were supposed to schedule a new arms delivery with French counterparts to ship the second batch of arms. However, Army chief General Jean Qahwaji, who visited Paris at the end of May, was surprised that French officials stalled the signing ceremony.

  • Returning jihadis: At luxurious rehab center, a Saudi cure for extremism - CSMonitor.com

    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0517/Returning-jihadis-At-luxurious-rehab-center-a-Saudi-cure-for-extremism

    Riyadh, Saudi Arabia — At the Mohammad bin Naif Counseling and Care Center, some 250 patients have daily access to art therapy, water aerobics classes, ping-pong, Jacuzzis, and gourmet chefs.

    In several palm-shaded, private chalets, complete with air-conditioned sitting rooms and private pools, Saudi psychologists, imams, and sociologists help prepare the patients for their reintroduction to the outside world.

    #is #ISIS #irak #syrie #arabie_saoudite

  • Shakeup in the Saudi Royal Family - The New Yorker
    http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/25/saudi-shakeup

    The U.S.-Saudi alliance is a self-enriching bargain between the two countries’ élites, sustained without mutual understanding or sympathy between their publics. Wall Street bankers fly to Riyadh regularly, seeking cash for private equity and hedge funds. U.S. arms manufacturers profit from Saudi anxiety about Iran by selling the kingdom planes, missiles, radar systems, and spy gear. Last October, the Administration announced another big deal: a $1.75 billion missile contract. Meanwhile, Obama’s envoys negotiated in secret with Tehran, without looping in the Saudis. It’s not very surprising that princes who are regularly lobbied by Lockheed Martin Corporation salesmen about the Iranian threat would be displeased.

    The Saudis buy American F-18s for the same reason that bank owners hire Brinks guards: to protect their loot—in this case, huge pools of oil sitting in a region that is descending into what looks to be a long, intimately violent war. Obama has introduced novel honesty into U.S.-Saudi discourse, though the younger royals present the same dilemma as their elders. They show no sign that they are willing to embrace democratic values, act compliantly, or become less sectarian, but, to secure promises of protection from the world’s most powerful military, they likely will accommodate American bases and arms sales, up to a point. For now, the alliance remains a strange pact of mutually complicit, resentful #hypocrisies.

  • Voilà qui devrait répondre à la question : « I mean, who “likes” Saudi foreign policy ?! » : le Telegraph ne semble pas très gêné de publier d’ignobles saloperies de ce genre : Saudi Arabia is emerging as the new Arab superpower
    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/11583598/Saudi-Arabia-is-emerging-as-the-new-Arab-superpower.html

    In this context the kingdom is now emerging as the Arab world’s most powerful state, with the result that the new government in Riyadh is giving serious consideration as to how it should respond to the many new challenges that have arisen in the region.

    A key element of this new Saudi defence doctrine is to bolster Riyadh’s relationships with key strategic partners in the Arab world. For example, when Iran-supported insurgents sought to overthrow the government of Bahrain in 2011, the Saudis were quick to spearhead a Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) contingent that moved in to secure critical state infrastructure and preserve the sovereignty of the Bahraini state.

    (via Angry Arab)

  • Kerry in Riyadh: A meeting of war criminals - World Socialist Web Site

    http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/05/08/pers-m08.html

    Kerry in Riyadh: A meeting of war criminals
    8 May 2015

    US Secretary of State John Kerry appeared side by side with his Saudi counterpart, Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, in Saudi Arabia’s capital of Riyadh Thursday and praised the monarchical oil regime for its role in the bloody nearly two-month-old war against Yemen, the most impoverished nation in the Arab world.

    The Saudi royals were to be commended, he said, for their “initiative to bring about a peaceful resolution through the announcement of their intent to establish a full, five-day, renewable ceasefire and humanitarian pause.”

    #arabie_saoudite

  • Saudi Arabia burns through foreign reserves - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/01948d2c-ef49-11e4-a6d2-00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=crm/email/2015430/nbe/WorldNews/product#axzz3Z3zwPLBu

    The central bank’s foreign reserves have dropped by $36bn, or 5 per cent, over the past two months, as newly crowned King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud dips into Riyadh’s rainy-day fund and increases domestic borrowing to fund public sector salaries and large development projects.

    The latest data show Saudi’s foreign reserves dropped by $16bn to $708bn in March, driven by public sector bonuses paid by King Salman after he assumed power in January. This follows a fall of $20bn in February. Saudi Arabia has spent $47bn of foreign reserves since October.

  • Sudan maintains balancing act with Saudi, Iran

    Reuters http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews

    By Shadi Bushra KHARTOUM, April 30 (Reuters) -

    The war in Yemen has given Omar Hassan al-Bashir, a skilled political operator who has ruled Sudan for a quarter-century, an opportunity to show wealthy Sunni powers that he can be an asset against Iranian influence - if the price is right.

    Bashir has maintained power amid region wide unrest in part by navigating a shifting patchwork of alliances that has seen Khartoum at different times draw close to Osama bin Laden, the United States, and Iran.

    Now it appears that Bashir and many of his countrymen hope that supporting a month-old Saudi-led bombing campaign against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen will encourage Gulf powers to pour aid and investment into Sudan’s struggling economy.

    If Bashir, who this week won another five-year term, pulls off yet another juggling act by winning Arab cash without completely alienating Iran, it will strengthen his argument at home and abroad that only he can steer his fractious country through an increasingly complicated region.

    Since the military operation in Yemen began, Saudi Arabia has pledged fresh investments in Sudan’s key agricultural sector, and bankers say there is more willingness for Gulf banks to do business with their Sudanese counterparts.

    But if Sudan is to see major economic support from Saudi Arabia and its allies, Bashir will have to overcome a deep distrust of his government, which analysts and diplomats say has a checkered history of switching partners at its convenience.

    “There is no trust in the Gulf for Omar al-Bashir...The leaders in the Gulf think that Bashir can betray them at any time, so they won’t give him aid until he shows he is serious about joining them and leaving Iran,” a Gulf diplomat said.

    If Khartoum commits to standing up to what Saudi Arabia sees as expanding Iranian influence, Riyadh could claim victory in prying one of Tehran’s few Arab allies out of its arch-rival’s orbit, the diplomat said.

    Analysts, however, expect Sudan to keep up its regional balancing act by voicing support to the Yemen campaign but keeping a line of communication to Tehran open.

    That would give the intervention a veneer of Arab unity, but would not satisfy Saudi and its allies enough to guarantee the flood of aid that many Sudanese have begun to expect.

    INVESTMENT MORE IMPORTANT THAN ARMS

    Sudan and Iran, both listed as state sponsors of terrorism and under sanctions by the United States, have benefited from cooperation in the face of Western attempts to isolate them.

    Sudan, which is separated from Saudi Arabia by a few hundred kilometers across the Red Sea, has helped Iran project its influence into Africa by serving as the key entry point for Iranian weapons exports to the continent, arms monitors say.

    It is also widely believed to allow covert weapons shipments destined for Iran-backed groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, to pass through its territory, at times prompting Israeli bombing of those convoys.

    In exchange, Sudan has benefited from Iranian weapons technology that has helped Sudan become one of the major arms producers in Africa, arms monitors say.

    Khartoum denies taking part in these activities.

    Sudan’s growing role as an arms exporter has helped to bolster its economy since it lost much of its oil revenue when South Sudan seceded in 2011, and Khartoum also appears to supply some allies in the region for ideological purposes, said Jonah Leff of Conflict Armaments Research.

    But with double digit inflation and high unemployment, Sudan needs Gulf investments more than it needs Iranian weapons.

    After his surprise announcement that Sudan would join the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Bashir said that Gulf states would lift banking restrictions put in place last year.

    A spokesman for Sudan’s central bank said more Saudi and Emirati banks were dealing with Sudanese financial institutions now than they had recently. A banking source confirmed that there was more activity from the Gulf in past weeks.

    Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Sudan also said his government would encourage investors to pump money into Sudan’s agriculture sector, which makes up most of Sudan’s exports.

    “There will be new investments in the agriculture sector, and they will be huge investments. We hope Sudan will be ready for this,” Ambassador Faisal bin Hamed al-Mualla told journalists this month, weeks after the Yemen campaign began.

    Sudan has balked at the suggestion that it traded its support for the Yemen campaign for the promise of economic aid.

    The foreign ministry said Sudan joined the campaign to ensure the safety of Islamic sites in Saudi Arabia, though it remains unclear if Sudanese forces have actually participated in the fighting.

    “We do not sell our positions,” Hamid Mumtaz, the ruling party’s political secretary, told Reuters during the elections, when campaign posters showed Bashir pictured with Saudi’s King Salman and foreign policy seemed to play an outsized role.

    VOTER SUPPORT

    Many voters said they supported Bashir because of the expected rapprochement with the Gulf.

    “Bashir has put us on the right side of things. The Saudis have the money to rebuild Egypt, imagine what they can do here,” said Abdulrahman Hassan, a 52-year-old voter.

    While Gulf investment could increase, it is unlikely that Saudi or its allies will move to prop up Bashir as they did President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in neighbouring Egypt.

    Saudi Arabia worries that Islamists linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes, drive policy in Bashir’s government, analysts say, and there is growing anxiety in Sudan’s ruling party that Bashir will sideline Islamists.

    “The National Congress Party has always been split, and Bashir has done a good job of balancing that split. But he has less reason to keep the Islamists in government now,” a government source said.

    But he can’t move against Brotherhood-linked politicians without jeopardizing the coalition of security commanders and Islamists that have guaranteed his rule so far, the source said.

    Despite the economic pull of Saudi Arabia, influential elements in government will resist cutting Iran ties completely.

    The military and other security services have benefited from the Iran relationship and will likely keep their own lines of communication to Tehran open, analysts said, allowing Sudan to reshuffle its ties to the regional powers in the future.

    “This game in which you try to deal with multiple suitors is a function of the weakness of the regime. The reason they have to do this, almost cap in hand, is because of failed economic policies and the need to access patronage,” said Harry Vanderhoeven at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. “It’s very pragmatic. And given Sudan’s past it’s very reversible if the regional constellation makes it necessary.” (Additional reporting by Khalid Abdelaziz)

  • Il faudrait savoir,
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/12/us-saudi-iran-yemen-idUSKBN0N30F220150412

    “How can Iran call for us to stop the fighting in Yemen ... We came to Yemen to help the legitimate authority, and Iran is not in charge of Yemen,” Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said in the Saudi capital Riyadh at a press conference with French counterpart Laurent Fabius.

  • « Tony Blinken n’est pas très intelligent » :
    http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/04/07/yemen-security-usa-blinken-idINL6N0X431220150407

    Speaking to reporters in Riyadh after talks with Gulf Arab allies and Hadi, Blinken also said Washington was stepping up intelligence sharing with the coalition, adding that Saudi Arabia was sending a “strong message to the Houthis and their allies that they cannot overrun Yemen by force”.

    Commentaire d’Angry Arab : « la déclaration la plus stupide du jour »
    http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2015/04/antony-j-blinken-dumbest-statement-of.html

    Je sais que le secrétaire d’État adjoint est très ennuyeux et peu inspiré et – comme le dire… – pas très intelligent. Aujourd’hui, il a déclaré depuis l’Arabie séoudite que le régime séoudien était en train d’envoyer le message aux Houthis qu’ils ne peuvent prendre le contrôle du Yémen par la force. Mais comment le régime séoudien fait-il passer ce message ? Par la force ou pacifiquement ? Et puis, comment le régime séoudien contrôle-t-il Bahrein ? Par la force ou pacifiquement ?

  • The three benefits of ending the U.S.’s cold war with Iran
    Nuclear deal between Iran and world powers signed Thursday is currently debated in detail. But ultimately, the details aren’t what matters.
    By Peter Beinart | Apr. 4, 2015Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.650483

    Right now, a thousand pundits and politicians are debating the details of Thursday’s framework nuclear deal with Iran. That’s fine. I think the details are far, far better than the alternative—which was a collapse of the diplomatic process, a collapse of international sanctions as Russia and China went back to business as usual with Tehran, and a collapse of the world’s ability to send inspectors into Iran. But ultimately, the details aren’t what matters. What matters is the potential end of America’s 36-year-long cold war with Iran.

    For the United States, ending that cold war could bring three enormous benefits. First, it could reduce American dependence on Saudi Arabia. Before the fall of the shah in 1979, the United States had good relations with both Tehran and Riyadh, which meant America wasn’t overly reliant on either. Since the Islamic Revolution, however, Saudi Arabia has been America’s primary oil-producing ally in the Persian Gulf. After 9/11, when 19 hijackers—15 of them Saudis—destroyed the Twin Towers, many Americans realized the perils of so great a dependence on a country that was exporting so much pathology. One of the unstated goals of the Iraq War was to give the United States a large, stable, oil-producing ally as a hedge against the uncertain future of the House of Saud.

    What George W. Bush failed to achieve militarily, Barack Obama may now be achieving diplomatically. In recent weeks, American hawks have cited Saudi anxiety about a potential Iran deal as reason to be wary of one. But a big part of the reason the Saudis are worried is because they know that as U.S.-Iranian relations improve, their influence over the United States will diminish. That doesn’t mean the U.S.-Saudi alliance will disintegrate. Even if it frays somewhat, the United States still needs Saudi oil and Saudi Arabia still needs American protection. But the United States may soon have a better relationship with both Tehran and Riyadh than either has with the other, which was exactly what Richard Nixon orchestrated in the three-way dynamic between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing in the 1970s. And today, as then, that increases America’s leverage over both countries.

  • The three benefits of ending the U.S.’s cold war with Iran - Opinion - Israel News | Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.650483
    By Peter Beinart

    Right now, a thousand pundits and politicians are debating the details of Thursday’s framework nuclear deal with Iran. That’s fine. I think the details are far, far better than the alternative—which was a collapse of the diplomatic process, a collapse of international sanctions as Russia and China went back to business as usual with Tehran, and a collapse of the world’s ability to send inspectors into Iran. But ultimately, the details aren’t what matters. What matters is the potential end of America’s 36-year-long cold war with Iran.

    For the United States, ending that cold war could bring three enormous benefits. First, it could reduce American dependence on Saudi Arabia. Before the fall of the shah in 1979, the United States had good relations with both Tehran and Riyadh, which meant America wasn’t overly reliant on either. Since the Islamic Revolution, however, Saudi Arabia has been America’s primary oil-producing ally in the Persian Gulf. After 9/11, when 19 hijackers—15 of them Saudis—destroyed the Twin Towers, many Americans realized the perils of so great a dependence on a country that was exporting so much pathology. One of the unstated goals of the Iraq War was to give the United States a large, stable, oil-producing ally as a hedge against the uncertain future of the House of Saud.

    What George W. Bush failed to achieve militarily, Barack Obama may now be achieving diplomatically. In recent weeks, American hawks have cited Saudi anxiety about a potential Iran deal as reason to be wary of one. But a big part of the reason the Saudis are worried is because they know that as U.S.-Iranian relations improve, their influence over the United States will diminish. That doesn’t mean the U.S.-Saudi alliance will disintegrate. Even if it frays somewhat, the United States still needs Saudi oil and Saudi Arabia still needs American protection. But the United States may soon have a better relationship with both Tehran and Riyadh than either has with the other, which was exactly what Richard Nixon orchestrated in the three-way dynamic between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing in the 1970s. And today, as then, that increases America’s leverage over both countries.

    Over the long term, Iran may also prove a more reliable U.S. ally than Saudi Arabia. Iranians are better educated and more pro-American than their neighbors across the Persian Gulf, and unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has some history of democracy. One of the biggest problems with America’s Mideast policy in recent years has been that, from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to Egypt, the governments the United States supports preside over populations that hate the U.S. Thursday’s nuclear deal, by contrast, may pave the way for a positive relationship with the Iranian state that is actually undergirded by a positive relationship with the Iranian people.

    Which brings us to the second benefit of ending America’s cold war with Iran: It could empower the Iranian people vis-à-vis their repressive state. American hawks, addled by the mythology they have created around Ronald Reagan, seem to think that the more hostile America’s relationship with Iran’s regime becomes, the better the United States can promote Iranian democracy. But the truth is closer to the reverse. The best thing Reagan ever did for the people of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. was to embrace Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1987, American hawks bitterly attacked Reagan for signing the INF agreement, the most sweeping arms-reduction treaty of the Cold War. But the tougher it became for Soviet hardliners to portray the United States as menacing, the tougher it became for them to justify their repression at home. And the easier it became for Gorbachev to pursue the policies of glasnost and perestroika that ultimately led to the liberation of Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.

    Iranian President Hassan Rohani, like Gorbachev, wants to end his country’s cold war with the United States because it is destroying his country’s economy. And like Gorbachev, he is battling elites who depend on that cold war for their political power and economic privilege. As Columbia University Iran expert Gary Sick recently noted, Iran’s hardline Revolutionary Guards “thrive on hostile relations with the U.S., and benefit hugely from sanctions, which allow them to control smuggling.” But “if the sanctions are lifted, foreign companies come back in, [and] the natural entrepreneurialism of Iranians is unleashed.” Thus “if you want regime change in Iran, meaning changing the way the regime operates, this kind of agreement is the best way to achieve that goal.”

    The best evidence of Sick’s thesis is the euphoric way ordinary Iranians have reacted to Thursday’s agreement. They’re not cheering because they want Iran to have 6,000 centrifuges instead of 20,000. They’re cheering because they know that opening Iran to the world empowers them, both economically and politically, at their oppressors’ expense.

    Finally, ending the cold war with Iran may make it easier to end the civil wars plaguing the Middle East. Cold wars are rarely “cold” in the sense that no one gets killed. They are usually proxy wars in which powerful countries get local clients to do the killing for them. America’s cold war with the U.S.S.R. ravaged countries like Angola and El Salvador. And today, America’s cold war with Iran is ravaging Syria and Yemen.

    When America’s relationship with the Soviet Union thawed, civil wars across the world petered out because local combatants found their superpower patrons unwilling to send arms and write checks. The dynamic in the Middle East is different because today’s cold war isn’t only between Iran and the United States, it’s also between Iran and Sunni Arab powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, neither of which seems particularly interested in winding down the civil wars in Syria and Yemen. Still, a different relationship between the United States and Iran offers a glimmer of hope. In Syria, for instance, one reason Iran has staunchly backed Bashar al-Assad is because it fears the fierce hostility of his successors. The United States cannot entirely alleviate that fear, since some of the groups battling Assad—ISIS, most obviously—are fiercely hostile to Iran and to Shiites in general. But if Iran’s leaders knew that at least the United States would try to ensure that a post-Assad government maintained good relations with
    Tehran, they might be somewhat more open to negotiating a transfer of power in Syria.

    Clearly, the United States should push for the best nuclear deal with Iran that it possibly can. But it’s now obvious, almost three decades after Reagan signed the INF deal with Gorbachev, that it’s not the technical details that mattered. What mattered was the end of a cold war that had cemented Soviet tyranny and ravaged large chunks of the world. Barack Obama has now begun the process of ending America’s smaller, but still terrible, cold war with Iran. In so doing, he has improved America’s strategic position, brightened the prospects for Iranian freedom and Middle Eastern peace, and brought himself closer to being the kind of transformational, Reaganesque president he always hoped to be.

    This article was first published in The Atlantic

  • Yemen at War - International Crisis Group
    http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/b045-yemen-at-war.aspx

    emen is at war. The country is now divided between the Huthi movement, which controls the north and is rapidly advancing south, and the anti-Huthi coalition backed by Western and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies that President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi is cobbling together. On 25 March, the Huthis captured a strategic military base north of the port city of Aden and took the defence minister hostage. That evening Saudi Arabia launched a military campaign, in coordination with nine other, mostly Arab states, to stop the Huthi advance and restore his government. Hadi left for Riyadh and will attend an Arab League summit on 28 March. No major party seems truly to want to halt what threatens to become a regional war. The slim chance to salvage a political process requires that regional actors immediately cease military action and help the domestic parties agree on a broadly acceptable president or presidential council. Only then can Yemenis return to the political negotiating table to address other outstanding issues.
    The political transition, in trouble for some time, began to unravel in September 2014, when Huthi fighters captured Sanaa, toppling the widely unpopular transitional government. Neither President Hadi nor the Huthis (a predominantly Zaydi/Shiite group, also known as Ansar Allah) honoured the soon concluded peace deal. In January, conflict over a draft constitution led the Huthis to consolidate control in the capital, precipitating the 22 January resignation of the prime minister and president; the latter subsequently fled to Aden.

    The Huthi-Hadi divide is the most explosive, but it is not the only conflict. Tensions are also unsettling the recent marriage of convenience between the Huthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who, after being deposed in 2011, has taken advantage of popular dissatisfaction and tacitly allied himself with the Huthis against their common enemies to stage a political comeback through his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and possibly his son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh. Divisions in the south, which was an independent state prior to its 1990 union with the north, are rampant as well. Southern separatists are internally split and suspicious of Hadi, a southerner who supports continued unity with the north. Then there are al-Qaeda and a nascent Islamic State (IS) movement, both determined to fight the Huthis and take advantage of the state’s collapse to claim territory.

    This combustible brew has overwhelmed the UN-led negotiations in Sanaa, a legacy of the 2011 GCC initiative and its implementation mechanisms. Initially, the political process was promising: it removed Saleh and facilitated a ten-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that reached constructive conclusions on the political future. But after three years, stakeholders have little confidence UN-sponsored talks alone will overcome the impasse or produce a lasting settlement.

    GCC countries have lost faith as well and are increasingly committed to reversing Huthi gains at virtually any cost. Saudi Arabia considers the Huthis Iranian proxies, a stance that pushes them closer to Tehran. Throwing their weight behind Hadi, the Saudis moved their embassy to Aden and reportedly bankroll anti-Huthi tribal mobilisation in the central governorate of Marib and the south. They lead efforts to isolate the Huthis diplomatically, strangle them economically and, now, weaken them militarily. In turn, the Huthis denounce Hadi as illegitimate and offer $100,000 for his capture. They have conducted military exercises on the Saudi border and likely will harden their position in response to Saudi military intervention. They are less dependent on Tehran than Hadi and his allies are on Riyadh, but on today’s trajectory, their relative self-sufficiency will not last long. They are already soliciting Iranian financial and political support.

    More than others, the GCC had the financial clout and historical ties with Yemeni stakeholders to incentivise compromise, but it ramped up pressure while pinching off the safety valve. In March, when Hadi asked Riyadh to host GCC-brokered talks, it accepted and set impossible preconditions for the Huthis: to recognise Hadi as president and withdraw all fighters from Sanaa. The Huthis and Saleh’s GPC, which the Saudis partially blame for Huthi advances, refuse to move talks from Sanaa, insisting that the UN continue its mediation there.

    Egged on by regional powerhouses Saudi Arabia and Iran, Yemenis may not be able to avoid a prolonged war. If they are to, the GCC should step back from the military path and harmonise diplomatic efforts with the UN, which still has a critical role in facilitating compromise. The UN Security Council ideally would condemn regional military involvement in Yemen and at a minimum should refrain from endorsing and promoting it.

    The immediate priority should be a UN Security Council brokered and monitored ceasefire, followed by UN-led peace talks with GCC backing, without preconditions, focusing on the presidency and leaving other power-sharing topics until basic agreement is reached on a single president with one or multiple vice presidents or a presidential council. Agreement on the executive would enable further talk on other aspects of pre-election power sharing in the government and military, and on state structure, particularly the future of the south, where separatist sentiment is strong. Both have been core drivers of conflict since the NDC ended in January 2014.

    Without minimum consensus within and beyond its borders, Yemen is headed for protracted violence on multiple fronts. This combination of proxy wars, sectarian violence, state collapse and militia rule has become sadly familiar in the region. Nobody is likely to win such a fight, which will only benefit those who prosper in the chaos of war, such as al-Qaeda and IS. But great human suffering would be certain. An alternative exists, but only if Yemenis and their neighbours choose it.
    Sanaa/Brussels, 27 March 2015

  • Riyadh enters the fray
    http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21647362-saudi-arabia-starts-bombing-its-southern-neighbour-riyadh-enters

    in Sana’a even the Houthis’ sternest critics are dismayed by the foreign bombardment. Many Yemenis believe it will only lead to more fighting. “Saudi Arabia is fucking our country,” says a Sunni tribesman who spent the night cowering with his family in Sana’a as blasts echoed through the capital.

  • Saudi Arabia, allies launch air strikes in Yemen against Houthi fighters: Saudi Arabia and Gulf region allies launched military operations including air strikes in Yemen on Thursday, officials said, to counter Iran-allied forces besieging the southern city of Aden where the U.S.-backed Yemeni president had taken refuge. Gulf broadcaster al-Arabiya TV reported that the kingdom was contributing as many as 150,000 troops and 100 warplanes to the operations. Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Pakistan were ready to take part in a ground offensive in Yemen, it said. There was no immediate confirmation of those figures from Riyadh. Al-Arabiya also said the United Arab Emirates was sending 30 warplanes to join the operation, along with 15 each from Bahrain and Kuwait, 10 from Qatar, six each from Jordan and Morocco and three from Sudan. Yemen’s slide towards civil war has made it a crucial front in mostly Sunni Saudi Arabia’s rivalry with Shi’ite Iran, which Riyadh accuses of stirring up sectarian strife throughout the region and in Yemen with its support for the Houthis. The crisis now risks spiralling into a proxy war with Iran backing the Houthis, and Saudi Arabia and the other regional Sunni Muslim monarchies supporting Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. (Reuters)

  • Saudi Arabia Consolidates its Alliance Against Iran | Al Akhbar English
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/saudi-arabia-consolidates-its-alliance-against-iran

    Saudi Arabia needs Egypt and Turkey politically and militarily in its confrontation with Iran. The relationship with Cairo is stable even if it undergoes some changes. Talk about reviving the Muslim Brotherhood under US pressure, and out of an Arab and international need to confront the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), may be greatly exaggerated. Hours before Sisi headed to Riyadh, death sentences were issued in Cairo against the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, and an Egyptian court classified Hamas as a terrorist organization.

    These rulings further angered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; and perhaps Egypt wanted to anger him on purpose. Before heading from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, he announced that he will not meet with Sisi in Riyadh, demanding serious steps from Cairo before such a meeting could take place. It is hard to imagine Erdogan and Sisi shaking hands as long as the Egyptian president continues to pursue the Muslim Brotherhood. The turkish project in the Middle East depends on the Muslim Brotherhood.

  • Saudi Foreign Minister Urges Coalition to Fight #ISIS on the Ground
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/saudi-foreign-minister-urges-coalition-fight-isis-ground

    US Secretary of State #John_Kerry (R) walks alongside Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (L), Foreign Minister of #Saudi_Arabia, before a meeting with Saudi king Salman on March 5, 2015 in Riyadh. AFP/Evan Vucci US Secretary of State John Kerry (R) walks alongside Saud bin Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (L), Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, before a meeting with Saudi king Salman on March 5, 2015 in Riyadh. AFP/Evan Vucci

    Saudi Foreign Minister Prince #Saud_al-Faisal called Thursday on the US-led coalition conducting airstrikes against the Islamic State of #Iraq and #syria (ISIS) group in Syria and Iraq to fight the jihadists on the ground. The kingdom, part of the coalition, "stresses the need to provide the military means (...)

    #Iran

  • Saudi King Unleashes a Torrent of Money as Bonuses Flow to the Masses - NYTimes.com
    http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/world/middleeast/saudi-king-unleashes-a-torrent-as-bonuses-flow-to-the-masses.html?rref=world/middleeast&module=Ribbon&version=context&region=Header&action=click&content

    “It is party time for Saudi Arabia right now,” said John Sfakianakis, the Riyadh-based Middle East director of the Ashmore Group, an investment company, who estimates that the king’s post-coronation giveaway will ultimately cost more than $32 billion.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=UAVkknyLFC4

  • Saudi Arabia has ’no problem’ with Muslim Brotherhood: Foreign Minister
    http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/saudi-foreign-minister-no-problem-muslim-brotherhood-230201904

    Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister has said publicly that Riyadh has “no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood,” in the wake of the accession of a new Saudi king expected to be more tolerant towards the group than his predecessor.

    Saud bin Faisal made the comments during a two-hour interview with veteran Saudi journalist Samar al-Mogren, who was personally requested to interview Faisal.

    “We do not have a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood; our problem is with a small group affiliated to this organisation,” said the world’s longest-serving Foreign Minister, who is recovering in the US after successful spinal surgery last month.

    […]

    Faisal’s comments came as a surprise to many, in a country where the Muslim Brotherhood was designated a “terrorist organisation” last March alongside groups including Islamic State.

    Despite the designation, a poll run late last year by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy found that 31 percent of Saudi respondents were supportive of the Brotherhood.

    Faisal’s remarks are seen by some as signalling a policy shift under the new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, who came to power last month after the death of his half-brother Abdullah.