company:nsa

  • (20+) Cinq ans de prison pour la lanceuse d’alerte Reality Winner - Libération
    http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/08/24/cinq-ans-de-prison-pour-la-lanceuse-d-alerte-reality-winner_1674202

    Elle est la première lanceuse d’alerte de l’ère Trump jugée au titre de l’Espionage Act, cette loi désormais centenaire utilisée sous Obama pour poursuivre Chelsea Manning, la source des documents confidentiels de l’armée américaine publiés en 2010 par WikiLeaks, et Edward Snowden, l’ancien consultant qui a révélé l’ampleur de la surveillance en ligne pratiquée par la NSA, l’Agence nationale de sécurité américaine. Ce jeudi, Reality Winner, 26 ans, a été condamnée à cinq ans et trois mois de prison par un tribunal d’Augusta (Géorgie) pour avoir transmis à la presse un document classifié sur des tentatives de piratage à l’encontre de l’infrastructure électorale, attribuées à la Russie. Soit « la sentence la plus lourde jamais prononcée contre la source d’un média dans un tribunal fédéral », relève la Freedom of the Press Foundation.

    En juin dernier, alors que Reality Winner était en détention depuis plus d’un an, son équipe de défense a négocié un accord de plaider coupable. Ce jeudi lors de l’audience, la jeune femme a dit assumer « l’entière responsabilité » de ce qu’elle a qualifié devant le juge d’« erreur incontestable ». Les procureurs, de leur côté, l’ont accusée d’avoir agi par « mépris des Etats-Unis », et ont affirmé que ses révélations avaient « causé un dommage exceptionnellement grave à la sécurité nationale ». Une assertion que les soutiens de Winner ne sont pas les seuls à réfuter. « Personne n’a été mis en danger, personne n’a vu son identité révélée, les Russes ont juste appris que lorsqu’ils s’introduisent dans nos systèmes, nous sommes capables de les repérer, ce qu’ils savaient déjà, estime un ancien avocat au département de la Justice, Robert Cattanach, cité par le New York Times. En tout état de cause, ce genre de condamnation est destiné à avoir un effet dissuasif. »

    Début mai, un rapport du Sénat américain a reproché au département de la Sécurité intérieure d’avoir eu une réponse « inadéquate » face à la « menace contre l’infrastructure électorale », et relevé que les administrations des différents Etats avaient commencé à se préoccuper de la sécurité de leurs réseaux notamment suite aux articles de presse sur le sujet… « Reality Winner est une lanceuse d’alerte qui a averti le public d’une menace grave sur la sécurité des élections, déclarait jeudi soir Trevor Timm, le directeur exécutif de la Freedom of the Press Foundation. Que le département de la Justice continue à poursuivre des sources de journalistes au titre de l’Espionage Act, une loi qui ne permet pas de se défendre en faisant valoir l’intérêt public, est une mascarade. »

    Amaelle Guiton

    #Lanceur_alerte #Presse #Médias #Journalisme


  • Google’s true origin partly lies in CIA and NSA research grants for mass surveillance — Quartz
    https://qz.com/1145669/googles-true-origin-partly-lies-in-cia-and-nsa-research-grants-for-mass-surveill

    Le titre est un peu « clickbait », mais les infos sont intéressantes, quoique parfois elliptiques.

    C’est écrit par : Jeff Nesbit, Former director of legislative and public affairs, National Science Foundation
    Quelqu’un qui doit savoir de quoi il cause.

    In the mid 1990s, the intelligence community in America began to realize that they had an opportunity. The supercomputing community was just beginning to migrate from university settings into the private sector, led by investments from a place that would come to be known as Silicon Valley.

    The intelligence community wanted to shape Silicon Valley’s efforts at their inception so they would be useful for homeland security purposes. A digital revolution was underway: one that would transform the world of data gathering and how we make sense of massive amounts of information. The intelligence community wanted to shape Silicon Valley’s supercomputing efforts at their inception so they would be useful for both military and homeland security purposes. Could this supercomputing network, which would become capable of storing terabytes of information, make intelligent sense of the digital trail that human beings leave behind?

    Intelligence-gathering may have been their world, but the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) had come to realize that their future was likely to be profoundly shaped outside the government. It was at a time when military and intelligence budgets within the Clinton administration were in jeopardy, and the private sector had vast resources at their disposal. If the intelligence community wanted to conduct mass surveillance for national security purposes, it would require cooperation between the government and the emerging supercomputing companies.

    Silicon Valley was no different. By the mid 1990s, the intelligence community was seeding funding to the most promising supercomputing efforts across academia, guiding the creation of efforts to make massive amounts of information useful for both the private sector as well as the intelligence community.

    They funded these computer scientists through an unclassified, highly compartmentalized program that was managed for the CIA and the NSA by large military and intelligence contractors. It was called the Massive Digital Data Systems (MDDS) project.
    The Massive Digital Data Systems (MDDS) project

    MDDS was introduced to several dozen leading computer scientists at Stanford, CalTech, MIT, Carnegie Mellon, Harvard, and others in a white paper that described what the CIA, NSA, DARPA, and other agencies hoped to achieve. The research would largely be funded and managed by unclassified science agencies like NSF, which would allow the architecture to be scaled up in the private sector if it managed to achieve what the intelligence community hoped for.

    “Not only are activities becoming more complex, but changing demands require that the IC [Intelligence Community] process different types as well as larger volumes of data,” the intelligence community said in its 1993 MDDS white paper. “Consequently, the IC is taking a proactive role in stimulating research in the efficient management of massive databases and ensuring that IC requirements can be incorporated or adapted into commercial products. Because the challenges are not unique to any one agency, the Community Management Staff (CMS) has commissioned a Massive Digital Data Systems [MDDS] Working Group to address the needs and to identify and evaluate possible solutions.”

    In 1995, one of the first and most promising MDDS grants went to a computer-science research team at Stanford University with a decade-long history of working with NSF and DARPA grants. The primary objective of this grant was “query optimization of very complex queries that are described using the ‘query flocks’ approach.” A second grant—the DARPA-NSF grant most closely associated with Google’s origin—was part of a coordinated effort to build a massive digital library using the internet as its backbone. Both grants funded research by two graduate students who were making rapid advances in web-page ranking, as well as tracking (and making sense of) user queries: future Google cofounders Sergey Brin and Larry Page.

    The research by Brin and Page under these grants became the heart of Google: people using search functions to find precisely what they wanted inside a very large data set. The intelligence community, however, saw a slightly different benefit in their research: Could the network be organized so efficiently that individual users could be uniquely identified and tracked?

    The grants allowed Brin and Page to do their work and contributed to their breakthroughs in web-page ranking and tracking user queries. Brin didn’t work for the intelligence community—or for anyone else. Google had not yet been incorporated. He was just a Stanford researcher taking advantage of the grant provided by the NSA and CIA through the unclassified MDDS program.
    Left out of Google’s story

    The MDDS research effort has never been part of Google’s origin story, even though the principal investigator for the MDDS grant specifically named Google as directly resulting from their research: “Its core technology, which allows it to find pages far more accurately than other search engines, was partially supported by this grant,” he wrote. In a published research paper that includes some of Brin’s pivotal work, the authors also reference the NSF grant that was created by the MDDS program.

    Instead, every Google creation story only mentions just one federal grant: the NSF/DARPA “digital libraries” grant, which was designed to allow Stanford researchers to search the entire World Wide Web stored on the university’s servers at the time. “The development of the Google algorithms was carried on a variety of computers, mainly provided by the NSF-DARPA-NASA-funded Digital Library project at Stanford,” Stanford’s Infolab says of its origin, for example. NSF likewise only references the digital libraries grant, not the MDDS grant as well, in its own history of Google’s origin. In the famous research paper, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine,” which describes the creation of Google, Brin and Page thanked the NSF and DARPA for its digital library grant to Stanford. But the grant from the intelligence community’s MDDS program—specifically designed for the breakthrough that Google was built upon—has faded into obscurity.

    Google has said in the past that it was not funded or created by the CIA. For instance, when stories circulated in 2006 that Google had received funding from the intelligence community for years to assist in counter-terrorism efforts, the company told Wired magazine founder John Battelle, “The statements related to Google are completely untrue.”

    Did the CIA directly fund the work of Brin and Page, and therefore create Google? No. But were Brin and Page researching precisely what the NSA, the CIA, and the intelligence community hoped for, assisted by their grants? Absolutely.

    In this way, the collaboration between the intelligence community and big, commercial science and tech companies has been wildly successful. When national security agencies need to identify and track people and groups, they know where to turn – and do so frequently. That was the goal in the beginning. It has succeeded perhaps more than anyone could have imagined at the time.


  • EXCLUSIVE: Documents expose how Hollywood promotes war on behalf of the Pentagon, CIA and NSA
    US military intelligence agencies have influenced over 1,800 movies and TV shows
    https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/exclusive-documents-expose-direct-us-military-intelligence-influence-on-1-80

    We have recently acquired 4,000 new pages of documents from the #Pentagon and CIA through the Freedom of Information Act. For us, these documents were the final nail in the coffin.

    These documents for the first time demonstrate that the US government has worked behind the scenes on over 800 major #movies and more than 1,000 TV titles.

    The previous best estimate, in a dull-as-dishwater academic book way back in 2005, was that the Pentagon had worked on less than 600 #films and an unspecified handful of television shows.

    The CIA’s role was assumed to be just a dozen or so productions, until very good books by Tricia Jenkins and Simon Willmetts were published in 2016. But even then, they missed or underplayed important cases, including Charlie Wilson’s War and Meet the Parents.

    [...]

    #Vietnam is evidently another sore topic for the US military, which also removed a reference to the war from the screenplay for Hulk (2003). While the military are not credited at the end of the film, on IMDB or in the DOD’s own database of supported movies, we acquired a dossier from the US Marine Corps detailing their ‘radical’ changes to the script.

    This included making the laboratory where the #Hulk is accidentally created into a non-military facility, making the director of the lab an ex-military character, and changing the code name of the military operation to capture the Hulk from ‘ #Ranch_Hand ’ to ‘Angry Man’.

    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opération_Ranch_Hand

    ‘Ranch Hand’ is the name of a real military operation that saw the #US_Air_Force dump millions of gallons of pesticides and other poisons onto the Vietnamese countryside, rendering millions of acres of farmland poisoned and infertile.

    They also removed dialogue referring to ‘all those boys, guinea pigs, dying from radiation, and germ warfare’, an apparent reference to covert military experiments on human subjects.

    [...]

    The #CIA has also managed to #censor scripts, removing or changing sequences that they didn’t want the public to see. On #Zero_Dark_Thirty screenwriter Mark Boal ‘verbally shared’ his script with CIA officers, and they removed a scene where a drunk CIA officer fires an AK-47 into the air from a rooftop in #Islamabad, and removed the use of dogs from the #torture scenes.

    [...]

    While very little is known about the NSA’s activities in the entertainment industry we did find indications that they are adopting similar tactics to the CIA and DOD.

    Internal #NSA emails show that the producers of #Enemy_of_the_State were invited on multiple tours of NSA headquarters. When they used a helicopter to film aerial footage of Fort Meade, the NSA did not prevent them from using it in the movie.

    According to a 1998 interview with producer Jerry Bruckheimer, they changed the script at the NSA’s request so that the wrongdoings were the actions of one bad apple NSA official, and not the agency in general.

    Bruckheimer said:

    ‘I think the NSA people will be pleased. They certainly won’t come out as bad as they could have. NSA’s not the villain.’

    This idea of using cinema to pin the blame for problems on isolated rogue agents or bad apples, thus avoiding any notion of systemic, institutional or criminal responsibility, is right out of the CIA/DOD’s playbook.

    #Censure #Propagande #censorship


  • Dutch-Russian cyber crime case reveals how the police taps the internet
    http://electrospaces.blogspot.be/2017/06/dutch-russian-cyber-crime-case-reveals.html

    About how signals intelligence agencies, like NSA and GCHQ, are intercepting communications, we learned a lot from the Snowden revelations and the German parliamentary inquiry, but also from new legislation in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Much less is known about the practice of tapping by law enforcement, like for example the FBI and police forces. Now, a case from the Netherlands provides some interesting insights in how Dutch police intercepts internet communications (...)

    #FBI #écoutes #web #surveillance



  • La NSA suspend la collecte de certains messages des Etats-Unis vers l’étranger
    http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2017/04/29/la-nsa-suspend-la-collecte-de-certains-messages-des-etats-unis-vers-l-etrang

    L’agence de renseignement a affirmé qu’elle prenait cette initiative pour protéger la vie privée des citoyens américains. L’agence de renseignement américaine NSA a annoncé, vendredi 28 avril, qu’elle mettait un terme à sa pratique controversée de passer au crible les e-mails et les SMS envoyés par les Américains à l’étranger qui feraient référence à une personne sous sa surveillance. Soulignant qu’elle pourrait toujours le faire en toute légalité, l’Agence de sécurité nationale a affirmé qu’elle prenait (...)

    #NSA #écoutes #web #surveillance


  • Former NSA Whistleblower: “Trump Is Absolutely Right, Everything Was Being Monitored” | Zero Hedge
    http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-07/former-nsa-whistleblower-trump-absolutely-right-everything-was-being-moni
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bg3BeYy5drk

    As we noted previously, Binney is the NSA executive who created the agency’s mass surveillance program for digital information, who served as the senior technical director within the agency, who managed six thousand NSA employees, the 36-year NSA veteran widely regarded as a “legend” within the agency and the NSA’s best-ever analyst and code-breaker, who mapped out the Soviet command-and-control structure before anyone else knew how, and so predicted Soviet invasions before they happened (“in the 1970s, he decrypted the Soviet Union’s command system, which provided the US and its allies with real-time surveillance of all Soviet troop movements and Russian atomic weapons”). Binney is the real McCoy.

    #USA #NSA #politique #surveillance


  • A Demand for Russian ‘Hacking’ Proof
    http://www.dedefensa.org/article/a-demand-for-russian-hacking-proof

    Les VIPS à BHO : montrez les preuves

    Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS), un groupement hautement qualifié d’anciens officiers du renseignement US communique un mémorandum au président Obama sur laquestion brûlante du “omplot russe” dans les élections présidentielles US. Le VIPS demande que des preiuves de ce “complot” soient produites aujourd’hui par Obama, lorsdesa defnières conférence de opresse de président. L’argument s’appuie sur l’évidence de jurispridence, montrée à plusieurs reprises par divers présidents,qu’en cas d’urgence de nationale, il est du devoir d’un président d’ignorer les règles de non-divulgation d’éléments obtenus par des moyens secrets par les services de renseignement, pour effectivement démontrer ce que ces servicxes avancent. Les VIPS, dont le mémo a été d’abord publié (...)

    • As President for a few more days, you have the power to demand concrete evidence of a link between the Russians and WikiLeaks, which published the bulk of the information in question. Lacking that evidence, the American people should be told that there is no fire under the smoke and mirrors of recent weeks.

      We urge you to authorize public release of any tangible evidence that takes us beyond the unsubstantiated, “we-assess” judgments by the intelligence agencies. Otherwise, we – as well as other skeptical Americans – will be left with the corrosive suspicion that the intense campaign of accusations is part of a wider attempt to discredit the Russians and those – like Mr. Trump – who wish to deal constructively with them.

      Remember the Maine?

      (NB : une petite relecture du billet ne ferait pas de mal…)

    • Everyone Hacks
      There is a lot of ambiguity – whether calculated or not – about “Russian hacking.” “Everyone knows that everyone hacks,” says everyone: Russia hacks; China hacks; every nation that can hacks. So do individuals of various nationalities. This is not the question.

      Comme on le voit dans l’affaire Bauer, le mot « piratage » devient un fourre-tout qui permet d’accuser n’importe qui ou de camoufler n’importe quoi.

    • Our VIPS colleague William Binney, who was Technical Director of NSA and created many of the collection systems still in use, assures us that NSA’s “cast-iron” coverage – particularly surrounding Julian Assange and other people associated with WikiLeaks – would almost certainly have yielded a record of any electronic transfer from Russia to WikiLeaks. Binney has used some of the highly classified slides released by Edward Snowden to demonstrate precisely how NSA accomplishes this using trace mechanisms embedded throughout the network.

      We strongly suggest that you ask NSA for any evidence it may have indicating that the results of Russian hacking were given to WikiLeaks. If NSA can produce such evidence, you may wish to order whatever declassification may be needed and then release the evidence. This would go a long way toward allaying suspicions that no evidence exists. If NSA cannot give you that information – and quickly – this would probably mean it does not have any.

    • In all candor, the checkered record of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper for trustworthiness makes us much less confident that anyone should take it on faith that he is more “trustworthy than the Russians,” as you suggested on Dec. 16. You will probably recall that Clapper lied under oath to the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 12, 2013, about NSA dragnet activities; later apologizing for testimony he admitted had been “clearly erroneous.

    • #Hacks_or_Leaks?
      Not mentioned until now is our conclusion that leaks are the source of the WikiLeaks disclosures in question – not hacking. Leaks normally leave no electronic trace. William Binney has been emphasizing this for several months and suggesting strongly that the disclosures were from a leaker with physical access to the information – not a hacker with only remote access.

      (allez, un dernier…)


  • En trois ans, qu’a-t-on appris des documents Snowden ?
    http://www.lemonde.fr/surveillance-NSA-France/article/2016/12/07/en-trois-ans-qu-a-t-on-appris-des-documents-snowden_5044874_4660509.html

    Trois ans après la décision d’Edward Snowden d’exfiltrer des documents de la NSA, l’agence nationale de sécurité américaine, les révélations n’ont pas cessé. Plus de trois ans ont passé depuis qu’Edward Snowden, sous-traitant de l’agence nationale de sécurité américaine (NSA) et ancien agent de la CIA, a quitté les Etats-Unis pour Hongkong. C’est là qu’il a rencontré plusieurs journalistes à qui il a confié un énorme stock de documents appartenant à la NSA, l’agence américaine chargée de l’espionnage (...)

    #NSA #Apple #Google #Microsoft #Facebook #écoutes #surveillance #web #Five_Eyes #PRISM #Yahoo ! #Yahoo (...)

    ##Yahoo_ !


  • Feu vert du parlement britannique à une loi de surveillance controversée - RipouxBlique des CumulardsVentrusGrosQ
    http://slisel.over-blog.com/2016/11/feu-vert-du-parlement-britannique-a-une-loi-de-surveillance-contro

    Le parlement britannique a adopté une loi donnant des pouvoirs de surveillance très étendus à la police et aux services de renseignement de Sa Majesté, s’attirant notamment les critiques d’Edward Snowden, le donneur d’alerte américain qui a révélé les écoutes de la NSA.

    Avec le vote favorable de la chambre des Lords cette semaine, après celui des députés de la chambre des Communes, ce projet de loi lancé par Theresa May en mars, alors qu’elle n’était encore que ministre de l’Intérieur, n’attend plus que le sceau royal pour entrer en application.

    « Le Royaume-Uni vient de voter la loi de surveillance la plus extrême dans l’histoire des démocraties occidentales », « allant plus loin que beaucoup d’autocraties », a dénoncé sur son compte Twitter Edward Snowden, cet ancien agent de l’agence de sécurité américaine NSA qui avait révélé en 2013 comment celle-ci écoutait les communications dans le monde entier.

    Avec les nouveaux pouvoirs qui leur sont confiés par cette loi, les services de renseignement ou les policiers britanniques pourront par exemple exiger d’un site internet qu’il leur fournisse l’historique des consultations de n’importe utilisateur, historique qui pourrait remonter à un an.

     

    Ce projet de loi « sur les pouvoirs d’investigation » déposé par Theresa May alors qu’elle n’était pas encore première ministre, avant le « oui » des électeurs britanniques au Brexit, donne une base légale au piratage des ordinateurs ou des téléphones portables, tout en fixant quelques garde-fou, comme l’obligation d’obtenir le feu vert d’un juge pour placer une ligne téléphonique sur écoute.

    Qualifié de « loi des fouineurs » par ses critiques, ce texte a déjà fait l’objet d’un appel devant la Cour de justice européenne, qui devrait rendre son verdict courant 2017.

    « Le vote de cette loi des fouineurs est un triste jour pour la liberté en Grande-Bretagne », a dénoncé Bella Sankey, directrice de l’association de défense des droits civiques Liberty : « Sous le prétexte de lutter contre le terrorisme, l’État a mis au point des pouvoirs de surveillance dignes d’un régime totalitaire, le système le plus intrusif jamais vu dans une démocratie ».

    « Il est vraisemblable que d’autres pays, y compris certains régimes autoritaires peu connus pour leur respect des droits de l’Homme, vont utiliser ce texte pour justifier leurs propres législations intrusives en matière de surveillance », a craint de son côté Jim Killock, directeur exécutif de l’association Open Rights Group.                                                                                            Agence France-Presse

    http://www.lapresse.ca


  • D’anciens hauts responsables américains reconnaissent l’apport des révélations de Snowden

    http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/05/31/d-anciens-hauts-responsables-americains-reconnaissent-l-apport-des-revelatio

    « On peut discuter de la manière dont il l’a fait, mais je pense qu’Edward Snowden a rendu un service public en ouvrant le débat. » Cette déclaration, qui émane de l’ancien ministre de la justice des Etats-Unis Eric Holder, est loin d’être anodine. En 2013, lorsque M. Snowden avait révélé l’existence du système de surveillance de masse d’Internet mis en place par la NSA, l’agence gouvernementale américaine chargée de la sécurité intérieure, et par ses alliés, Eric Holder était en poste, et avait mené les négociations avec la Russie pour tenter d’obtenir l’extradition d’Edward Snowden.

    Etonnamment, l’ancien directeur de la NSA et de la CIA (l’agence gouvernementale américaine chargée du renseignement extérieur) entre 1999 et 2009, Michael Hayden, semble partager la même analyse. Dans son livre Playing to the Edge (non traduit en français), publié en février, il explique que « d’une certaine manière, et de façon limitée, Snowden a aussi été un cadeau. Je ne lui souhaite pas le sort réservé aux canaris dans les mines, mais il a eu le même rôle – il est la conséquence visible (mais pas la cause) d’un changement culturel majeur qui a redéfini la légitimité du secret, les nécessités de la transparence, et les fondements du consentement des gouvernés ».

    Aux Etats-Unis, de nombreux responsables administratifs et politiques – dont Hillary Clinton – expliquaient depuis trois ans que, quelle que soit la portée des révélations d’Edward Snowden, ce dernier aurait dû passer par la voie hiérarchique pour dénoncer les débordements qu’il avait constatés. Cet argument a été mis à mal ces dernières semaines, après les révélations d’un ancien responsable du programme encadrant les lanceurs d’internes au Pentagone : John Crane. Cet ancien responsable du Pentagone, qui s’est exprimé pour la première fois à visage découvert, a expliqué dans le détail comment le lanceur d’alerte Thomas Drake, cité en exemple par Edward Snowden, avait été trahi par l’administration et poursuivi en justice. Thomas Drake avait finalement été innocenté après de longues années de procédures judiciaires.

    http://seenthis.net/messages/492309


  • The bigger the haystack, the harder the terrorist is to find | Coleen Rowley | Comment is free | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/28/bigger-haystack-harder-terrorist-communication-future-attacks

    Un article de Novembre 2014 : d’un point de vue prévention contre le #terrorisme, #métadonnées, mégaerreurs

    ... as an FBI whistleblower and witness for several US official inquiries into 9/11 intelligence failures, I fear that terrorists will succeed in carrying out future attacks – not despite the massive collect-it-all, dragnet approach to intelligence implemented since 9/11, but because of it. This approach has made terrorist activity more difficult to spot and prevent.

    Almost no one now remembers the typical response of counter-terrorism agency officials when asked why, in the spring and summer of 2001 in the lead-up to 9/11, they had failed to read and share intelligence or take action when “the system was blinking red” (the actual title of chapter eight of the US’s 9/11 commission’s report) and when the US director of central intelligence and other counter-terrorism chiefs were said to have had “their hair on fire”.

    The common refrain back then was that, pre 9/11, intelligence had been flowing so fast and furiously, it was like a fire hose, “and you can’t get a sip from a fire hose”. Intelligence such as the Phoenix memo – which warned in July 2001 that terrorist suspects had been in flight schools and urgently requested further investigation – went unread.

    Although “can’t get a sip” was a somewhat honest excuse, it was undercut when the Bush administration, days after the attacks, secretly turned on their illegal “Presidential Surveillance Program” to collect more, by a factor of thousands, of the communications of innocent American citizens, as well as those of billions of people around the globe.

    So the “fire hose” turned into a tsunami of non-relevant data, flooding databases and watch lists. The CIA had only about 16 names on its terrorist watch list back in September 2001 and probably most were justified, but there’s no way the million names reportedly now on the “terrorist identities datamart environment” list can be very accurate. The decision to elevate quantity over quality did nothing to increase accuracy, unblock intelligence stovepipes or prevent terrorist attacks.

    In fact, years ago a study commissioned by Homeland Security and conducted by the National Academy of Sciences found that no existing computer program was able to distinguish the real terrorists – those who would go on to commit violent acts – from all the “false positives” .

    This was corroborated when NSA director Keith Alexander and others, under great pressure to justify their (illegal) “bulk” collection of metadata, pressed underlings to produce 54 examples to prove that “total information awareness” type collection “worked” to identify and stop real terrorism, only to have the proffered NSA examples fall apart under scrutiny, leaving only one flimsy case of a taxi driver in San Diego who had donated a few thousand dollars to al-Shabab-connected Somalians.

    Governments rely on costly “security theatre” – the practice of investing in countermeasures to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it. But it seems to do more to dupe fearful taxpayers into believing that massive, unwieldy “intelligence” systems will protect them, than to intimidate would-be attackers or reduce terrorist organisation recruitment.

    After Edward Snowden described just how massive and irrelevant the US and UK monitoring had become, people started to grasp the significance of the saying: “If you’re looking for a needle in a haystack, how does it help to add hay?”

    The fearful citizen may not realise how difficult it is to search and analyse content due to sheer volume. They want to believe in the magic of data-mining to somehow predict future criminal behaviour. If only more contractors are hired and more money is spent to increase monitoring, if only laws can be passed forcing internet companies to constantly surveil every post and kitten image, coded and uncoded, in a multitude of languages, for signs of danger, the Orwellian argument goes, we will find the enemies.

    But the real purpose in the egregiously stupid push to assign Facebook the fool’s errand of monitoring everything seems to be to spread the blame. Leaving aside the privacy implications, what people need to grasp is that this is the kind of security thinking that doesn’t just fail to protect us, it makes us less safe.


  • Laurent Fabius espionné par le renseignement allemand - Libération
    http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/11/laurent-fabius-espionne-par-le-renseignement-allemand_1412602

    Les services secrets allemands ont espionné le ministre français des Affaires étrangères Laurent Fabius, affirme mercredi la radio publique allemande Berlin-Brandebourg (rbb), qui apporte de nouveaux détails dans l’affaire d’espionnage qui embarrasse depuis plusieurs mois la chancellerie allemande.

    « Laurent Fabius a été mis sur écoute par le BND » (les services de renseignement extérieurs allemands) depuis 2012 souligne sans préciser ses sources rbb, qui évoque une situation « explosive » politiquement. Elle cite également parmi les cibles des écoutes allemandes la Cour internationale de justice de la Haye, l’Unicef, l’organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), le FBI, la radio financée par les Etats-Unis Voice of America ou encore « de nombreuses d’entreprises européennes et américaines, dont l’entreprise d’armement Lockheed aux Etats-Unis ».

    D’autres médias allemands avaient déjà révélé ces derniers mois que les services de renseignement extérieurs allemands avaient espionné des pays alliés pour le compte de son équivalent aux Etats-Unis, la NSA, ainsi que pour son propre compte. Le BND avait notamment été accusé d’avoir écouté pour le compte de l’agence de renseignement américaine NSA des responsables du ministère français des Affaires étrangères, de la présidence française et de la Commission européenne.

    La radio berlinoise évoque une liste de 900 pages de « sélecteurs » (numéros de téléphone, emails, adresses IP) utilisés par le BND et à laquelle ont eu accès des députés allemands membres de la commission d’enquête chargée de faire la lumière sur les opérations de surveillance. « L’examen des sélecteurs du BND va encore durer des mois afin de clarifier pourquoi, quand et combien de temps étaient branchés les sélecteurs et qui a été dans le détail mis sur écoute », précise le média allemand.


    • L’occasion une fois de plus de ricaner : les « spécialistes » français étaient persuadés, eux, qu’il s’agissait d’un règlement de compte intérieur au régime syrien. (Y a-t-il au moins un seul point sur lequel la diplomatie française ne se soit pas trompée en Syrie ?)

      WikiLeaks : France Said Syrian General Killed in Regime Feud
      http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/13646-wikileaks-france-said-syrian-general-killed-in-regime-feud

      Alternatively, he could have been a victim of a struggle for influence and access to corrupt wealth between rival members of the business elite linked to Assad’s ruling clan, Sarkozy’s adviser Boris Boillon told U.S. officials.

      “When asked how he interpreted the killing, Boillon said several theories presented themselves, the only common denominator of which was internecine rivalry in the entourage close to Bashar al-Assad,” the cable said.

      “He flatly rejected the notion that the Israelis had taken out Suleiman, particularly the theory that a sniper had shot him,” it continued

      “French information was that the hit was more ’classic’ and ’mafia-like’ with police stopping traffic in the immediate vicinity, bodyguards looking the other way, and the assailant pumping a slug into Suleiman’s head.”

      The official floated a theory the killing could have been ordered by Assad’s powerful brother, Maher al-Assad, a military commander and regime insider — sometimes referred to as the second most powerful man in Syria.

      “Boillon described Maher as ambitious, a bit of a wild man, and determined to increase his power and influence within the inner circle,” the cable said.

      The envoys said “Boillon’s rundown of the various theories sounded like he had recently read a finished French intelligence assessment of the situation.”

      Ludovic Pouille, a senior Middle East expert at the French foreign ministry, was “less forthcoming” about his theories in a separate 2008 meeting with U.S. officials, but he agreed the killing looked like an inside job.

    • Un général syrien, proche de Bachar Al-Assad, avait été tué en 2008 par Israël
      http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2015/07/16/un-general-syrien-proche-de-bachar-al-assad-avait-ete-tue-en-2008-par-un-com
      Le Monde.fr avec AFP | 16.07.2015

      Israël est bien responsable de l’assassinat en 2008 du général syrien Mohammed Sleiman, un homme de l’ombre très proche de Bachar Al-Assad, selon un document de l’agence de renseignement américaine NSA cité par le site Internet The Intercept. L’attribution à Israël figure dans un document interne de la NSA, fourni par Edward Snowden, selon The Intercept.

      Le document de la NSA, un extrait d’Intellipedia, une base de données interne au service de renseignement, indique que l’assassinat a été commis par des commandos de marine israéliens, dans la ville côtière de Tartous. Cet assassinat est le premier exemple connu d’une attaque d’Israël contre « un responsable d’un gouvernement légitime », ajoute le document de la NSA.

      En 2010, WikiLeaks avait déjà publié un câble américain affirmant que la Syrie soupçonnait Israël d’être responsable de l’assassinat du général.

      Le général Sleiman a été tué dans la nuit du 1er août 2008 par des snipers dans sa villa au bord de l’eau à Tartous, alors qu’il recevait des invités. Bachar Al-Assad se trouvait ce jour-là en visite officielle à Téhéran. Le gouvernement syrien avait mis plusieurs jours pour confirmer la mort de cet homme de l’ombre, peu connu mais très proche du dirigeant syrien.

    • Le général syrien Suleiman éliminé en 2008 par Israël (rapport secret américain)
      Publié 15 Juillet 2015 19:05
      http://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/israel/diplomatie-defense/78515-150715-le-general-syrien-suleiman-elimine-en-2008-par-israel-rapport-s

      (...) Il y a un an, le secrétaire-générale du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah a déclaré à des journalistes qu’il savait qu’Israël était responsable de l’élimination de Suleiman en raison de son implication dans le Seconde Guerre du Liban.

      Le président syrien Bachar al-Assad, qui était un ami proche, a été profondément affecté par la mort de Suleiman, selon un cable diplomatique émanant à l’époque de l’ambassade américaine à Damas et révélé lors de l’affaire WikiLeaks.

      « Les Israéliens avaient beaucoup de bonnes raisons d’éliminer Suleiman », a confié Mary Ellen O’Connell, professeur de droit international au site The Intercept.

      « Mais d’après la loi internationale, il est absolument clair qu’en Syrie en 2008, ils n’avaient aucun droit, selon les lois de la guerre, puisqu’il n’y avait aucun conflit armé. Ils n’avaient pas le droit de tuer le général Suleiman ».

      Selon une autre correspondance diplomatique révélée par WikiLeaks, le régime d’Assad n’aurait jamais véritablement enquêté sur les circonstances de la mort de Suleiman, car 80 millions de dollars en espèces auraient été découverts dans sa maison.


    • Perhaps most costly to the attackers was their failure to renew some of the domains used by these servers. Out of the 300 or so domains used, about 20 were allowed to expire. Kaspersky quickly registered the domains and, over the past ten months, has used them to “sinkhole” the command channels, a process in which researchers monitor incoming connections from Equation Group-infected machines.

      One of the most severe renewal failures involved a channel that controlled computers infected by “EquationLaser,” an early malware platform abandoned around 2003 when antivirus programs began to detect it. The underlying domain name remained active for years until one day, it didn’t; Kaspersky acquired it and EquationLaser-infected machines still report to it.

      “It’s really surprising to see there are victims around the world infected with this malware from 12 years ago,” Raiu said. He continues to see about a dozen infected machines that report from countries that include Russia, Iran, China, and India.

    • Update: Reuters reporter Joseph Menn said the hard-drive firmware capability has been confirmed by two former government employees. He wrote:

      A former NSA employee told Reuters that Kaspersky’s analysis was correct, and that people still in the intelligence agency valued these spying programs as highly as Stuxnet. Another former intelligence operative confirmed that the NSA had developed the prized technique of concealing spyware in hard drives, but said he did not know which spy efforts relied on it.

      Update: Several hours ater this post went live, NSA officials e-mailed the following statement to Ars:

      We are aware of the recently released report. We are not going to comment publicly on any allegations that the report raises, or discuss any details. On January 17, 2014, the President gave a detailed address about our signals intelligence activities, and he also issued Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28). As we have affirmed publicly many times, we continue to abide by the commitments made in the President’s speech and PPD-28. The U.S. Government calls on our intelligence agencies to protect the United States, its citizens, and its allies from a wide array of serious threats - including terrorist plots from al-Qaeda, ISIL, and others; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; foreign aggression against ourselves and our allies; and international criminal organizations.


  • Snowden Documents Indicate NSA Has Breached Deutsche Telekom

    http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html

    According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.

    When it comes to choosing code names for their secret operations, American and British agents demonstrate a flare for creativity. Sometimes they borrow from Mother Nature, with monikers such as “Evil Olive” and “Egoistic Giraffe.” Other times, they would seem to take their guidance from Hollywood. A program called Treasure Map even has its own logo, a skull superimposed onto a compass, the eye holes glowing in demonic red, reminiscent of a movie poster for the popular “Pirates of the Caribbean” series, starring Johnny Depp.

    Treasure Map is anything but harmless entertainment. Rather, it is the mandate for a massive raid on the digital world. It aims to map the Internet, and not just the large traffic channels, such as telecommunications cables. It also seeks to identify the devices across which our data flows, so-called routers.

    #nsa #spiegel #snowden #Norvège


  • La liste, de terroristes et soupçonnés, de la NSA explose
    http://www.argotheme.com/organecyberpresse/spip.php?article2241

    Mardi 5 août, une nouvelle fuite d’un plus d’un million de documents relevant de la NSA, l’agence américaine de surveillance d’Internet, a été mise en ligne. Cette nouvelle livraison, disponible au public, est réalisée par un site-Web appelé INTERCEPT. Elle concerne l’augmentation depuis 2009, surplus quasi explosif, du nombre de noms d’individus soupçonnés de terrorisme et inscrits sur la liste utilisée au niveau des aéroports internationaux. D’après les 1èrs détails établis par des enquêteurs (...)

    #TECHNOLOGIE,_INTERNET,_PERFORMANCES_INCLASSABLES

    / #diplomatie,_sécurité,_commerce,_économie_mondiale, Terrorisme , islamisme , Al-Qaeda , politique , , #technologie,_drone,_citoyen,_USA,_google,_High_Tech, Obama, USA, Israël, Proche-Orient, (...)

    #Terrorisme_,islamisme,Al-Qaeda,politique, #Obama,_USA,_Israël,_Proche-Orient,_Palestine


  • Leaked classified memo reveals U.S.-Israeli intel cooperation on Egypt, Iran
    Top-secret memo, published by Glenn Greenwald, describes deep exchange of information between NSA and IDF Unit 8200; takes pride in ’success stories.’
    By Amir Oren | Aug. 5, 2014
    Haaretz
    http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.608802

    After Mohammed Morsi became Egypt’s president in June 2012 with backing from the Muslim Brotherhood, the intelligence communities of the United States and Israel expanded their cooperation to keep an eye on what was happening in Egypt.

    With approval from U.S. National Intelligence Director Lt. Gen. (ret.) James R. Clapper, the National Security Agency’s signals intelligence agency gave the Israel Defense Forces’ intelligence Unit 8200 the task of providing information about “select strategic issues, specifically terrorist elements in the Sinai.”

    This information is included in a highly classified NSA memo from April 2013 published Monday morning on The Intercept, the website run by Glenn Greenwald, a partner of Edward Snowden. Snowden had worked in the service of the NSA, during which he gathered American intelligence documents that he subsequently leaked.

    Since the memo was written during Morsi’s term in office, before the military coup that overthrew him and led to the presidency of Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi, it does not tell us whether the exchanges of information about the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel, and about which Israel’s intelligence-gathering capabilities have been restricted — still continue.

    When the document in question was written, General Keith Alexander was in charge of the NSA, and Brig. Gen. Nadav Zafrir was commander of Unit 8200.

    The memo was only distributed to the two countries that had signed it, and not to other members of the Anglo-Saxon Five Eyes alliance: Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It details the intelligence relationship between the NSA and Israel, and updates a previous version of a document that Snowden published last year.

    The depth of the bilateral cooperation is reflected, among other things, in a term used to describe Unit 8200’s task to carry out espionage in Egypt: “tasking” – meaning collection of vital information, as is usual among agencies belonging to the same intelligence community.

    According to the document, which describes significant, joint intelligence successes such as those involving the Iranian nuclear program, “NSA maintains a far-reaching technical and analytic relationship with the Israeli SIGINT National Unit [i.e., Unit 2800], sharing information on access, intercept, targeting, language, analysis and reporting. This SIGINT relationship has increasingly been the catalyst for a broader intelligence relationship between the United States and Israel. Significant changes in the way NSA and ISNU have traditionally approached SIGINT have prompted an expansion to include other Israeli and U.S. intelligence organizations such as CIA, Mossad, and Special Operation Division (SOD)" – the latter is evidently a reference to the Pentagon term for the special operations department of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate.

    Most of the bilateral intelligence cooperation, if not all of it, concentrates on “targets in the Middle East which constitute strategic threats to U.S. and Israeli interests. Building upon a robust analytic exchange, NSA and ISNU also have explored and executed unique opportunities to gain access to high priority targets. The mutually agreed upon geographic targets include the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, South Asia, and the Islamic republics of the Former Soviet Union," according to the memo.

    "Within that set of countries, cooperation covers the exploitation of internal government, military, civil, and diplomatic communications; and external security/intelligence organizations. Regional Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and ’Stateless’/International Terrorism comprise the exchanged transnational target set. A dedicated communications line between NSA and ISNU supports the exchange of raw material, as well as daily analytic and technical correspondence. Both NSA and ISNU have liaison officers, who conduct foreign relations functions, stationed at their respective embassies [Washington and Tel Aviv].”

    The memo continues: “The Israeli side enjoys the benefits of expanded geographic access to world-class NSA cryptanalytic and SIGINT engineering expertise, and also gains controlled access to advanced U.S. technology and equipment via accommodation buys and foreign military sales.

    “Benefits to the U.S. include expanded geographic access to high priority SIGINT targets, access to world-class Israeli cryptanalytic and SIGINT engineering expertise, and access to a large pool of highly qualified analysts.”

    The author of the memo — the country desk officer of the NSA’s Foreign Affairs Directorate — took pride in what he called “success stories.” First among them was “the Iranian nuclear development program, followed by Syrian nuclear efforts, Lebanese Hezbollah plans and intentions, Palestinian terrorism, and Global Jihad. Several recent and successful joint operations between NSA and ISNU have broadened both organizations’ ability to target and exploit Iranian nuclear efforts. In addition, a robust and dynamic crypanalytic relationship has enabled breakthroughs on high priority Iranian targets.

    “NSA and ISNU continue to initiate joint targeting of Syrian and Iranian leadership and nuclear development programs with CIA, ISNU, SOD and Mossad. This exchange has been particularly important as unrest in Syria continues, and both sides work together to identify threats to regional stability. NSA’s cyber partnerships expanded beyond ISNU to include Israeli Defense Intelligence’s SOD and Mossad, resulting in unprecedented access and collection breakthroughs that all sides acknowledge would not have been possible to achieve without the others.”

    In September 2011, NSA and Unit 8200 also signed a memo of understanding for cooperation in communications and cyber realms. In January 2012, one of Gen. Alexander’s deputies visited Tel Aviv and specified the NSA’s targets in those fields: cyber threats from Iran, Hezbollah and other elements in the region. In exchange, the NSA would provide Israel with “limited, focused support on specific Russian and Chinese cyber threats.” Additional talks “to further develop this partnership” were held in May and December 2012.

    Moreover, under the heads of NSA and Unit 8200, encrypted video communication was inaugurated between both intelligence communities “that allows both sides to broaden and accelerate the pace of collaboration against targets’ use of advanced telecommunications. Target sets include, but are not limited to, Iran nuclear, Syrian foreign fighter movements, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps activities.”

    According to the section of the memo entitled “Problems/Challenges:” “The three most common concerns raised by ISNU regarding the partnership with NSA is NSA’s reluctance to share on technology that is not directly related to a specific target, the ISNU’s perceived reduction in the amount and degree of cooperation in certain areas, and the length of time NSA takes to decide on ISNU proposals. Efforts in these three areas have been addressed with the partner and NSA continues to work to increase cooperation with ISNU, where appropriate and mindful of U.S. policy and equity concerns.”


  • Affaire Snowden : la politique du troupeau d’autruches
    http://www.politis.fr/Affaire-Snowden-la-politique-du,27616.html

    Un an après qu’Edward Snowden ait lancé l’alerte sur les pratiques excessives, hors-la-loi et anti-démocratiques des agences de renseignement, États-Unis en tête, le message qui domine est : « Dormez bien, la NSA and Co (sur)veillent. »

    Un groupe d’experts indépendants issus de dix huit pays, sous la houlette de Privacy Surgeon (le site de Simon Davies, universitaire et fondateur de l’ONG Privacy International et des Big Brother Awards) a publié le 10 juin un rapport intitulé Crise de la responsabilité analysant l’après-affaire Snowden. Le propos de ce document est de faire le point sur les réactions des médias, des États, et sur les mesures prises (ou non) pour protéger les libertés des citoyens (eux compris). Nul ne peut plus l’ignorer, depuis les révélations des documents rendus publics par le jeune Edward Snowden, nous vivons tous dans un monde où chacun est « écouté » et potentiellement espionné. Non seulement les services de renseignement d’Amérique, de Gaule, de Navarre, de Germanie et d’ailleurs se permettent de surveiller qui ils veulent quand ils veulent, mais, à la faveur des attentats de New York en 2001, ils ont obligé les intermédiaires techniques et les opérateurs de réseaux à répondre à leurs réquisitions de données de communication. Ils interceptent, collectent, archivent et partagent ainsi de manière systématique, proactive, et sans vergogne, tous les échanges, qu’ils soient privés, professionnels, économiques ou diplomatico-politiques....

    #snowden #écoutes #flicage_mondial #RAS #dormez_bien_braves_gens


  • A consortium of interested groups launched a giant #airship to fly over the #NSA's new snooping repository in Bluffdale, Utah. A 135 foot long thermal airship flew over the snoop headquarters last Friday with the message: “NSA Illegal Spying Below” with an arrow pointing downwards at the #panopticon.


    http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/06/29/EFF-NSA-Utah

    • Le site de Bluffdale avait déjà été mentionné ici il y a plus de 2 ans (mars 2012 par @Fil) http://seenthis.net/messages/63027 avec un compte-rendu de démêlés dus à des prises de photo.

      Il me semblait aussi l’avoir vu pour leurs soucis d’essuyages de plâtre, en fait des courts-circuits avec arc électrique (10 fois en 13 mois) qui empêchait un fonctionnement normal (oct. 2013).

      Meltdowns Hobble NSA Data Center - WSJ
      http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304441404579119490744478398?mod=wsj_nview_latest&mg=reno

      There have been 10 meltdowns in the past 13 months that have prevented the NSA from using computers at its new Utah data-storage center, slated to be the spy agency’s largest, according to project documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

      One project official described the electrical troubles—so-called arc fault failures—as “a flash of lightning inside a 2-foot box.” These failures create fiery explosions, melt metal and cause circuits to fail, the official said.

      The causes remain under investigation, and there is disagreement whether proposed fixes will work, according to officials and project documents. One Utah project official said the NSA planned this week to turn on some of its computers there.
      (…)
      This summer [2013], the Army Corps of Engineers dispatched its Tiger Team, officials said. In an initial report, the team said the cause of the failures remained unknown in all but two instances.

      The team said the government has incomplete information about the design of the electrical system that could pose new problems if settings need to change on circuit breakers. The report concluded that efforts to “fast track” the Utah project bypassed regular quality controls in design and construction.

    • J’oubliais : puissance électrique consommée 65 MW…

      But without a reliable electrical system to run computers and keep them cool, the NSA’s global surveillance data systems can’t function. The NSA chose Bluffdale, Utah, to house the data center largely because of the abundance of cheap electricity. It continuously uses 65 megawatts, which could power a small city of at least 20,000, at a cost of more than $1 million a month, according to project officials and documents.

      Pour le refroidissement, malgré les appels libertariens à couper l’eau (novembre 2013)
      The Salt Lake Tribune
      http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/57120093-82/nsa-power-facility-utah.html.csp

      Op-Ed: Utahns should deny water to NSA center

      la municipalité a conclu un contrat d’approvisionnement à un tarif préférentiel (juillet 2014)

      Utah town gave NSA a deal on water | The Salt Lake Tribune
      http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/57181642-90/bluffdale-utah-center-nsa.html.csp

      Bluffdale agreed to sell water to the National Security Agency at a rate below its own guidelines and the Utah average in order to secure the contract and spur economic development in the town, according to records and interviews.

      The deal could mean savings of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year for the NSA and federal taxpayers, but is more of a gamble for Bluffdale, which had to issue a $3.5 million bond to help pay for new water lines. Bluffdale leaders consider that section of the city, now covered with sagebrush, ripe for new businesses.

      Without the influx of NSA revenue, it would have been 15 years before Bluffdale could have afforded to bring water to that area, said Bluffdale City Manager Mark Reid.

      pour des quantités astronomiques

      Bluffdale allowed the NSA to redact large portions of the correspondence, but the emails still demonstrate how Bluffdale persuaded the NSA to buy what eventually may be more than 1 million gallons of water a day from the city rather than from four other bidders.

      Mais à la suite des révélations de 2013 et de nouveaux appels à couper l’eau par des votes au niveau des états, la municipalité a fait savoir (mai 2014) qu’elle envisageait de recycler l’eau de refroidissement, dont pour l’instant, une petite partie sert à arroser la pelouse d’un parc et des terrains de football.

      Bluffdale to recycle millions of gallons of water used by NSA | FOX13Now.com
      http://fox13now.com/2014/05/12/bluffdale-to-recycle-some-nsa-water

      Timothy said at maximum capacity, the Utah Data Center could use as much as 1.2 million gallons of water a day. That water is purchased in shares from the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District. The NSA pays about $2 per 1,000 gallons.

      Bluffdale built a two million gallon tank to reuse water. Currently, it is being used to water a park outside city hall where soccer fields are set up for youth games. Timothy said the water reclamation will be expanded to include residential lawns and accommodate future growth in the south end of the city.

      “Eventually, as more water is returned to us, we’ll be able to add residents to the reuse project,” he said, adding it could reduce residents’ water bills.

      The NSA declined to comment on what is done with the water, or Bluffdale’s plans to reclaim it. The agency also would not answer questions about whether the facility is fully operational.

      Not even the mayor knows.

      “I have no idea,” he said. “We don’t ask that question because they wouldn’t even tell us.”


  • Des mercenaires américains en Ukraine
    http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2014/05/11/97001-20140511FILWWW00036-des-mercenaires-americains-presents-en-ukraine.ph

    Environ 400 mercenaires d’une entreprise américaine opérent en Ukraine aux côtés des soldats et de la police ukrainienne dans des opérations contre les séparatistes pro-russes, affirme le journal allemand Bild am Sonntag. Selon des informations, basées sur des communications radio entre des centres de commandement de l’armée russe, interceptées par l’agence de surveillance américaine NSA et transmises ensuite aux services secrets allemands (BND), les mercenaires américains coordonnent et dirigent des opérations de guerilla contre les séparatistes pro-russes autour de l’enclave de Sloviansk.

    Ces 400 mercenaires travaillent pour Academi, plus connu sous son ancien nom de Blackwater, une entreprise de sécurité qui avait été privée de contrat par l’armée américaine en Irak après une fusillade sur des civils en 2007, précise le Bild. Le journal précise toutefois ne pas savoir qui a passé le contrat avec Academi. Le Bild am Sonntag rappelle que la Russie avait dénoncé il y a quelques semaines la présence de mercenaires américains aux côtés des troupes gouvernementales ukrainiennes, ce que l’ambassadeur américain à Kiev, Geoffrey Pyatt avait démenti mi-mars.

    Après, Bild, je n’irais pas déclencher une guerre mondiale sur le foi d’un de ses articles. En tout cas l’information, vraie ou fausse, est assez largement reprise un peu partout.

    • L’information n’est pas issue que de Bild. Et elle a déjà pas mal circulée sur seenthis.

      http://www.dedefensa.org/article-les_myst_res_de_bild_12_05_2014.html

      C’est ZeroHedge.com qui, le premier, a levé le lièvre, dès le 4 mai 2014 : comment se fait-il que la presse allemande publie des détails de cette sorte (CIA et FBI en Ukraine), – les “révélations” elles-mêmes ne surprenant personne, bien entendu, – alors que l’Allemagne est en principe alignée sur les USA, partageant la narrative selon laquelle les agents russes pullulent en Ukraine, organisant l’affreux désordre qu’on y voit, tandis que le bloc BAO s’abstient de toute intervention , sauf un week-end de détente de Brennan à Kiev ? (Escapade reconnue en toute innocence par lui-même [voir le 11 mai 2014], nous affirmant en outre, Brennan, que la Russie n’est pas “une ennemie”, ce qui contredit le département d’État [voir l’ambassadeur Alexander Vershbow, le 5 mai 2014]. On n’est pas à un désordre près dans le bordel washingtonien où chacun joue son jeu.)


  • "Extended Random" further weakens “Dual Elliptic Curve”
    NSA pays for two backdoors weakening RSA

    http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/31/us-usa-security-nsa-rsa-idUSBREA2U0TY20140331

    Elliptic Curve was already an NSA-sponsored random generator, but researchers at John Hopkins University now discovered Extended Random is part of the “BSafe” security toolkit which uses Elliptic Curve. RSA has not acknowledged nor declined this.

    The academic researchers said it took about an hour to crack a free version of BSafe for Java using about $40,000 worth of computer equipment. It would have been 65,000 times faster in versions using Extended Random, dropping the time needed to seconds, according to Stephen Checkoway of Johns Hopkins.

    #NSA
    #RSA
    #privacy
    #security
    #BSafe

    • Exclusive: NSA infiltrated RSA security more deeply than thought - study | Reuters

      Ce sont des gentils garçons les spécialistes de RSA. Tant que les clients sont naïfs, pas de souci…

      The company said it had not intentionally weakened security on any product and noted that Extended Random did not prove popular and had been removed from RSA’s protection software in the last six months.

      We could have been more skeptical of NSA’s intentions,” RSA Chief Technologist Sam Curry told Reuters. “We trusted them because they are charged with security for the U.S. government and U.S. critical infrastructure.

      Curry declined to say if the government had paid RSA to incorporate Extended Random in its BSafe security kit, which also housed Dual Elliptic Curve.

      (…)

      If using Dual Elliptic Curve is like playing with matches, then adding Extended Random is like dousing yourself with gasoline,” Green said.

      The NSA played a significant role in the origins of Extended Random. The authors of the 2008 paper on the protocol were Margaret Salter, technical director of the NSA’s defensive Information Assurance Directorate, and an outside expert named Eric Rescorla.

      Rescorla, who has advocated greater encryption of all Web traffic, works for Mozilla, maker of the Firefox web browser. He and #Mozilla declined to comment. Salter did not respond to requests for comment.

    • L’info de décembre http://seenthis.net/messages/209922

      La présentation du papier
      On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC in TLS Implementations
      http://dualec.org

      Summary of our results

      We analyzed the use of Dual EC in four recent TLS/SSL library implementations: RSA BSAFE Share for C/C++, RSA BSAFE Share for Java, Microsoft SChannel, and OpenSSL. Our major findings are as follows:

      • The RSA BSAFE implementations of TLS make the Dual EC back door particularly easy to exploit compared to the other libraries we analyzed. The C version of BSAFE makes a drastic speedup in the attack possible by broadcasting long contiguous strings of random bytes and by caching the output from each generator call. The Java version of BSAFE includes fingerprints in connections, making it relatively easy to identify them in a stream of network traffic.
      • SChannel does not implement the current Dual EC standard: it omits one step of the Dual EC algorithm. We show that this omission does not prevent attacks; in fact, it makes them slightly faster.
      • We discovered in OpenSSL a previously unknown bug that prevented the library from running when Dual EC is enabled. It is still conceivable that someone is using Dual EC in OpenSSL, since the bug has an obvious and very easy fix, so we applied this fix and evaluated the resulting version of OpenSSL, which we call “OpenSSL-fixed.” OpenSSL-fixed turns out to provide additional entropy (“additional input”) with each call to the library. In practice, this additional input can make attacks significantly more expensive than for the other libraries.

      Avec lien vers le papier technique http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf


  • #USA = La NSA collecterait six milliards de données par jour
    http://www.brujitafr.fr/article-usa-la-nsa-collecterait-six-milliards-de-donnees-par-jour-12317132

    Siège de la NSA © getty. L’agence de renseignement américaine NSA (National Security Agency) collecte chaque jour six milliards de métadonnées, affirment Holger Stark et Marcel Rosenbach, deux journalistes de l’hebdomadaire allemand d’investigation Der Spiegel, dans leur livre paru lundi et intitulé ’Le complexe NSA’ (Der NSA-Komplex). Ils fondent leur affirmation sur une présentation jusqu’ici secrète utilisée lors d’une conférence en 2010. Ces métadonnées comportent des informations telles que les échanges téléphoniques, les messages instantanés ou les messages électroniques entre deux personnes. De la sorte, la NSA peut ainsi se faire une image plus ou moins précise des contacts dont dispose une personne. Les deux (...)


  • Plus de 300 responsables allemands toujours espionnés par la NSA
    http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2014/02/23/plus-de-300-responsables-allemands-toujours-espionnes-par-la-nsa_4371992_651

    L’agence américaine de renseignement NSA, qui a mis en place un système d’espionnage à l’échelle planétaire et a notamment été montrée du doigt pour avoir espionné le portable de la chancelière Angela Merkel, écoute encore 320 responsables politiques et économiques allemands, dont le ministre de l’intérieur Thomas de Maizière, affirme le quotidien Bild dimanche 23 février.

    « Nous avons pour ordre d’éviter toute déperdition d’informations depuis que nous n’avons plus le droit d’espionner directement les communications de la chancelière », affirme un « employé de haut rang des services secrets américains », cité dans le Bild am Sonntag (en abonnés).
    Selon les informations de l’édition dominicale du journal le plus lu d’Allemagne, 297 employés de la NSA sont stationnés en Allemagne pour espionner 320 personnes, « principalement des décideurs politiques, mais aussi économiques ».

    Parmi eux, le ministre de l’intérieur, et proche de la chancelière, Thomas de Maizière. « Nous voulions nous assurer que c’est un allié fiable », a commenté le responsable américain auprès du Bild à son sujet.

    RELATION ETATS-UNIS-ALLEMAGNE PROFONDÉMENT AFFECTÉE

    La NSA est au cœur d’un vaste scandale d’espionnage depuis l’été 2013, les révélations de son ancien collaborateur Edward Snowden ayant mis en lumière des pratiques d’espionnage à grande échelle, notamment de dirigeants étrangers dont la chancelière allemande.....

    #Allemagne
    #espionnage
    #NSA
    #Angela-Merkel
    #libre-échange ?
    #toujourspartant ?


  • Le recrutement de #Snowden raconté par son ancien employeur
    Ex-NSA Chief Details Snowden’s Hiring at Agency, Booz Allen - WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304626804579363651571199832?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F

    Mr. Snowden was a security guard with the NSA, moved into its information-technology department and was sent overseas, Mr. McConnell [vice chairman of Booz Allen and former NSA director] said. He then left the agency, joined another company and moved to Japan. But Mr. Snowden wanted back in with the NSA. He then broke into the agency’s system and stole the admittance test with the answers, Mr. McConnell said. Mr. Snowden took the test and aced it, Mr. McConnell said. “He walked in and said you should hire me because I scored high on the test.

    The NSA then offered Mr. Snowden a position but he said didn’t think the level—called GS-13—was high enough and asked for a higher-ranking job. The NSA refused. In early 2013, Booz Allen hired Mr. Snowden.

    He targeted my company because we enjoy more access than other companies,” Mr. McConnell said. “Because of the nature of the work we do…he targeted us for that purpose.

    Évidemment, il est entré par effraction…

    En plus, en vérité, il ne sait rien…

    Inside the NSA are four levels of information. Level 1 is of basic administrative. The next level consists of reports, written in a way that give information without revealing sources. Levels 3 and 4 “gets into how we do what we do,” Mr. McConnell said. He said that Mr. Snowden had very limited access to the third tier and almost no access to the fourth.