company:yandex

  • Yandex : quand le « Google russe » se fait cyberespionner par les agences du « Five Eyes »
    https://cyberguerre.numerama.com/1521-yandex-quand-le-google-russe-se-fait-cyberespionner-par-l

    Le moteur de recherche et portail russe connu sous le nom de Yandex a été piraté par une ou plusieurs agences de renseignement appartenant à l’alliance Five Eyes. Confirmée par un porte-parole de l’entreprise, l’opération de cyberespionnage visait avant tout à dérober des informations techniques relatives aux processus d’authentification des utilisateurs. Google aux quatre coins du globe, Baidu en Chine et Yandex en Russie. Voilà comment se résume la répartition des moteurs de recherche sur notre (...)

    #Yandex #données #Five_Eyes #hacking

    //c2.lestechnophiles.com/cyberguerre.numerama.com//content/uploads/sites/2/2019/07/russia-3005269_1920.jpg

  • #bem should not exist
    https://hackernoon.com/bem-should-not-exist-6414005765d6?source=rss----3a8144eabfe3---4

    There is a lot of reasons for not using this methodology, but because of its simplicity and misunderstanding of work of HTML and #css, this methodology has spread wildly among frontend developers around the world; in most cases among developers from CIS countries. BEM is used now in large Russian-language projects (Yandex, Habr) and in several frameworks (react-md). In this article, a detailed review of the pros and cons of this development approach will be conducted. All examples will be shown from the official BEM site.Acronym “BEM” — block/element/modifier. Every design or layout can be visually parted on blocks, for example — sidebar. Each block can contain one or several elements. Elements can have modifiers of states (active, disabled),additional classes for changes of borders, width, (...)

    #oocss #smacss #block-element-modifier

  • Jawad Bendaoud propose une hausse des salaires de 3,1% et une prime de 1500 euros.
    Total condamné pour « menaces de mort » contre une victime des attentats du 13 novembre

    Amiante : vingt-deux enquêtes ouvertes par l’IGPN après les dernières manifestations
    Violences policières : la cour de cassation annule les mises en examen pour homicides et blessures involontaires.

    Prison à perpétuité pour Sarkozy après les violences de Charlottesville
    Un néonazi américain conseiller de l’ombre de Macron

    Smic et prime d’activité, des parents en détresse se forment à la non violence
    Face aux enfants tyrans : les annonces d’Emmanuel Macron en huit questions

    Affaire Fillon, le moteur de recherche Yandex révèle plus que ce qu’il veut cacher
    En floutant ses images satellites, Ladreit de Lacharrière condamné à huit mois de prison avec sursis.

    Brexit : il faut engager une révolution morale
    #UrgenceClimat : tout comprendre aux différents scénarios de validation de l’accord de sortie de l’UE.

    #de_la_dyslexie_créative

  • Widespread Blurring of Satellite Images Reveals Secret Facilities – Federation Of American Scientists
    https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/12/widespread-blurring-of-satellite-images-reveals-secret-facilities

    Yandex Maps—Russia’s foremost mapping service—has also agreed to selectively blur out specific sites beyond recognition; however, it has done so for just two countries: Israel and Turkey. The areas of these blurred sites range from large complexes—such as airfields or munitions storage bunkers—to small, nondescript buildings within city blocks.

    (...) By complying with requests to selectively obscure military facilities, the mapping service has actually revealed their precise locations, perimeters, and potential function to anyone curious enough to find them all.

    #satellite #flou #secret #armée

    • Le billet de Matt Korda est fort intéressant.

      Although blurring out specific sites is certainly unusual, it is not uncommon for satellite imagery companies to downgrade the resolution of certain sets of imagery before releasing them to viewing platforms like Yandex or Google Earth; in fact, if you trawl around the globe using these platforms, you’ll notice that different locations will be rendered in a variety of resolutions. Downtown Toronto, for example, is always visible at an extremely high resolution; looking closely, you can spot my bike parked outside my old apartment. By contrast, imagery of downtown Jerusalem is always significantly blurrier; you can just barely make out cars parked on the side of the road.

      As I explained in my previous piece about geolocating Israeli Patriot batteries, a 1997 US law known as the Kyl-Bingaman Amendment (KBA) prohibits US companies from publishing satellite imagery of Israel at a Ground Sampling Distance lower than what is commercially available. This generally means that US-based satellite companies like DigitalGlobe and viewing platforms like Google Earth won’t publish any images of Israel that are better than 2m resolution.

      Foreign mapping services like Russia’s Yandex are legally not subject to the KBA, but they tend to stick to the 2m resolution rule regardless, likely for two reasons. Firstly, after 20 years the KBA standard has become somewhat institutionalized within the satellite imagery industry. And secondly, Russian companies (and the Russian state) are surely wary of doing anything to sour Russia’s critical relationship with Israel.
      […]
      My complete list of blurred sites in both Israel and Turkey totals over 300 distinct buildings, airfields, ports, bunkers, storage sites, bases, barracks, nuclear facilities, and random buildings—prompting several intriguing points of consideration:

      • Included in the list of Yandex’s blurred sites are at least two NATO facilities: Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir, and Incirlik Air Base, which hosts the largest contingent of US B61 nuclear gravity bombs at any single NATO base.
      • Strangely, no Russian facilities have been blurred—including its nuclear facilities, submarine bases, air bases, launch sites, or numerous foreign military bases in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, or the Middle East.
      • Although none of Russia’s permanent military installations in Syria have been blurred, almost the entirety of Syria is depicted in extremely low resolution, making it nearly impossible to utilize Yandex for analyses of Syrian imagery. By contrast, both Crimea and the entire Donbass region are visible at very high resolutions, so this blurring standard applies only selectively to Russia’s foreign adventures.
      • All four Israeli Patriot batteries that I identified using radar interference in my previous post have been blurred out, confirming that these sites do indeed have a military function.

      lien vers le billet mentionné dans le dernier paragraphe : repérage des sites de batteries de Patriot en Israel https://seenthis.net/messages/743998

  • Faire des recherches sur Internet en ligne de commande - Informatique générale - ShevArezo`Blog
    https://blog.shevarezo.fr/post/2018/10/31/faire-recherches-internet-ligne-de-commande

    Lancer des recherches Internet depuis son terminal permet de gagner quelques précieuses secondes et d’être plus efficace. L’utilitaire s permet de s’affranchir d’ouvrir un site particulier et d’ensuite lancer sa recherche. Il le fait pour vous ! Découvrez s et ses fonctionnalités !

    s permet d’effectuer des recherches sur plus de 100 sites ! Parmi eux, on retrouve forcément des moteurs de recherche tels que Google, DuckDuckGo, Bing, Yandex, des sites dédiés aux développeurs (codepen, php.net, packagist, python, cplusplus, go, etc...) ou encore AliExpress, Amazon, Wikipedia, Flickr, Reddit, IMDB, Netflix, etc, etc...

    Pour utiliser s, vous devez avoir Go installé sur votre machine.

  • #clickhouse, an #analytics #database for the 21st century
    https://hackernoon.com/clickhouse-an-analytics-database-for-the-21st-century-82d3828f79cc?sourc

    Clickhouse is a fairly new column store database. It’s developed by the guys over at Yandex (the Google of Russia), made to scale horizontally reasonably well and run high speed aggregate queries on hundreds of billions of rows of data.It uses it’s own #sql dialect and it matches pl/pgSQL in terms of expressivity and simplicity. It even includes higher order functions for working with nested object within rows, such as arrayMap and arrayFilter.What is Clickhouse used for ?In short, Clickhouse is used to run fast analytics on very large amount of data. It’s rather bad as a transactional database, but it can run aggregate queries on billions of rows in sub second times.It fills the ever increasing niche that technologies like Hadoop, Spark, Druid, Big Query, Redshift, Athena and MonetDb aim (...)

    #analytics-database

  • CppCast Episode 132: Boost Application Development with Antony Polukhin
    http://isocpp.org/feeder/?FeederAction=clicked&feed=All+Posts&seed=http%3A%2F%2Fisocpp.org%2Fblog%2F2

    Episode 132 of CppCast the only podcast for C++ developers by C++ developers. In this episode Rob and Jason are joined by Antony Palukhin to talk about some of the Boost libraries he’s contributed to including Any, Conversion, DLL, LexicalCast, Stacktrace, TypeTraits and Variant; as well as his Boost Application Development book.

    CppCast Episode 132: Boost Application Development with Antony Polukhin by Rob Irving and Jason Turner

    About the interviewee:

    Antony Polukhin was born in Russia. Since university days he started contributing to Boost and became a maintainer of the Boost.LexicalCast library. Today, he works for Yandex, helps Russian speaking people with C++ standardization proposals, consults Russian companies in C++, continues to contribute to the open source (...)

    #News,Video&_On-Demand,

  • Boost Application Development with Antony Polukhin
    http://cppcast.libsyn.com/boost-application-development-with-antony-polukhin

    Rob and Jason are joined by Antony Palukhin to talk about some of the Boost libraries he’s contributed to including Any, Conversion, DLL, LexicalCast, Stacktrace, TypeTraits and Variant; as well as his Boost Application Development book. Antony Polukhin was born in Russia. Since university days he started contributing to Boost and became a maintainer of the Boost.LexicalCast library. Today, he works for Yandex, helps Russian speaking people with C++ standardization proposals, consults Russian companies in C++, continues to contribute to the open source and to the C++ language in general. You may find his code in Boost libraries such as Any, Conversion, DLL, LexicalCast, Stacktrace, TypeTraits, Variant, and others. News Clang Running in Browser (Web Assembly) Kate Gregory - It’s (...)

    http://traffic.libsyn.com/cppcast/cppcast-132.mp3?dest-id=282890

  • Data release: list of websites that have third-party “session replay” scripts
    https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/no_boundaries/session_replay_sites.html

    In a recent study we analyzed seven “session replay” services and revealed how they exfiltrate sensitive user data. Here we release the data behind our study, specifically, the list of websites from the Alexa top 1 million which embed scripts from analytics providers that offer session recording services. The appearance of a website on this list DOES NOT necessarily mean that session recordings occur, as website developers may choose not enable session recording functionality.

    For some sites, we do have evidence of session recordings occurring. We mark these with the tag “evidence of session recording”. For these sites, our measurement bots were able to detect a recording in progress, as detailed in our detection methodology below. For sites not marked with this tag, it does not mean that recordings don’t occur, simply that we don’t know if they do. That’s because many of the recording services activate their functionality only for a sample of users, either as explicitly defined by the publisher site or enforced as part of a daily recording limit. Thus, it is possible that our bot that visited the site was not included in the sample, but other users might be.

    As such, this list provides both an upper and lower bound of the presence of session recording companies on the web. Two of the 14 companies included in the data release, Yandex and Hotjar, have a diverse set of analytics services — many of which have no overlap with session recording. The remaining companies mostly offer similar services which include: session replay, heat maps, click maps, and form analytics.

    The list below contains sites that are ranked in the top 10,000 according to Alexa. Download the zipped CSV file for the full list.

    #surveillance #WWW

  • “Sites log your keystrokes and mouse movements in real time, before you click submit.”
    https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/an-alarming-number-of-sites-employ-privacy-invading-session-replay-scri

    Another example: the account page for clothing store Bonobos leaked full credit card details—character by character as they were typed—to FullStory. Adding insult to injury, Yandex, Hotjar, and Smartlook all offer dashboards that use unencrypted HTTP when subscribing publishers replay visitor sessions, even when the original sessions were protected by HTTPS.

    #privacy

  • The Geopolitical Economy of the Global Internet Infrastructure on JSTOR
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jinfopoli.7.2017.0228

    Article très intéressant qui repositionne les Etats dans la gestion de l’infrastructure globale de l’internet. En fait, une infrastructure globale pour le déploiement du capital (une autre approche de la géopolitique, issue de David Harvey).

    According to many observers, economic globalization and the liberalization of telecoms/internet policy have remade the world in the image of the United States. The dominant roles of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google have also led to charges of US internet imperialism. This article, however, argues that while these internet giants dominate some of the most popular internet services, the ownership and control of core elements of the internet infrastructure—submarine cables, internet exchange points, autonomous system numbers, datacenters, and so on—are tilting increasingly toward the EU and BRICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries and the rest of the world, complicating views of hegemonic US control of the internet and what Susan Strange calls the knowledge structure.

    This article takes a different tack. It argues that while US-based internet giants do dominate some of the middle and top layers of the internet—for example, operating systems (iOS, Windows, Android), search engines (Google), social networks (Facebook), online retailing (Amazon), over-the-top TV (Netflix), browsers (Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Microsoft Explorer), and domain names (ICANN)—they do not rule the hardware, or material infrastructure, upon which the internet and daily life, business, governments, society, and war increasingly depend. In fact, as the article shows, ownership and control of many core elements of the global internet infrastructure—for example, fiber optic submarine cables, content delivery networks (CDNs), autonomous system numbers (ASN), and internet exchange points (IXPs)—are tilting toward the rest of the world, especially Europe and the BRICS (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). This reflects the fact that the United States’ standing in the world is slipping while an ever more multipolar world is arising.

    International internet backbone providers, internet content companies, and CDNs interconnect with local ISPs and at one or more of the nearly 2000 IXPs around the world. The largest IXPs are in New York, London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Seattle, Chicago, Moscow, Sao Paulo, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. They are core elements of the internet that switch traffic between all the various networks that comprise the internet system, and help to establish accessible, affordable, fast, and secure internet service.

    In developed markets, internet companies such as Google, Baidu, Facebook, Netflix, Youku, and Yandex use IXPs to interconnect with local ISPs such as Deutsche Telecoms in Germany, BT or Virgin Media in Britain, or Comcast in the United States to gain last-mile access to their customers—and vice versa, back up the chain. Indeed, 99 percent of internet traffic handled by peering arrangements among such parties occurs without any money changing hands or a formal contract.50 Where IXPs do not exist or are rare, as in Africa, or run poorly, as in India, the cost of bandwidth is far more expensive. This is a key factor that helps to explain why internet service is so expensive in areas of the world that can least afford it. It is also why the OECD and EU encourage developing countries to make IXPs a cornerstone of economic development and telecoms policy work.

    The network of networks that make up the internet constitute a sprawling, general purpose platform upon which financial markets, business, and trade, as well as diplomacy, spying, national security, and war depend. The world’s largest electronic payments system operator, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications’ (SWIFT) secure messaging network carries over 25 million messages a day involving payments that are believed to be worth over $7 trillion USD.59 Likewise, the world’s biggest foreign currency settlement system, the CLS Bank, executes upward of a million trades a day worth between $1.5 and $2.5 trillion over the global cable systems—although that is down by half from its high point in 2008.60 As Stephen Malphrus, former chief of staff to the US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, observed, when “communications networks go down, the financial services sector does not grind to a halt, rather it snaps to a halt.”61

    Governments and militaries also account for a significant portion of internet traffic. Indeed, 90 to 95 percent of US government traffic, including sensitive diplomatic and military orders, travels over privately owned cables to reach officials in the field.62 “A major portion of DoD data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial vehicle video,” notes a study done for the Department of Homeland Security by MIT scholar Michael Sechrist.63 Indeed, the Department of Defense’s entire Global Information Grid shares space in these cables with the general public internet.64

    The 3.6 billion people as of early 2016 who use the internet to communicate, share music, ideas and knowledge, browse, upload videos, tweet, blog, organize social events and political protests, watch pornography, read sacred texts, and sell stuff are having the greatest influence on the current phase of internet infrastructure development. Video currently makes up an estimated two-thirds of all internet traffic, and is expected to grow to 80 percent in the next five years,69 with US firms leading the way. Netflix single-handedly accounts for a third of all internet traffic. YouTube is the second largest source of internet traffic on fixed and mobile networks alike the world over. Altogether, the big five internet giants account for roughly half of all “prime-time” internet traffic, a phrasing that deliberately reflects the fact that internet usage swells and peaks at the same time as the classic prime-time television period, that is, 7 p.m. to 11 p.m.

    Importance des investissements des compagnies de l’internet dans les projets de câbles.

    Several things stand out from this analysis. First, in less than a decade, Google has carved out a very large place for itself through its ownership role in four of the six projects (the SJC, Faster, Unity, and Pacific Cable Light initiatives), while Facebook has stakes in two of them (APG and PLCN) and Microsoft in the PLCN project. This is a relatively new trend and one that should be watched in the years ahead.

    A preliminary view based on the publicly available information is that the US internet companies are important but subordinate players in consortia dominated by state-owned national carriers and a few relatively new competitors. Keen to wrest control of core elements of the internet infrastructure that they perceive to have been excessively dominated by United States interests in the past, Asian governments and private investors have joined forces to change things in their favor. In terms of the geopolitical economy of the internet, there is both a shift toward the Asia-Pacific region and an increased role for national governments.

    Return of the State as Regulator of Concentrated Markets

    In addition to the expanded role of the state as market builder, regulator, and information infrastructure policy maker, many regulators have also rediscovered the reality of significant market concentration in the telecom-internet and media industries. Indeed, the US government has rejected several high-profile telecoms mergers in recent years, such as AT&T’s proposal to take over T-Mobile in 2011, T-Mobile’s bid for Sprint in 2014, and Comcast’s attempt to acquire Time Warner Cable last year. Even the approval of Comcast’s blockbuster takeover of NBC Universal in 2011, and Charter Communications acquisition of Time Warner Cable last year, respectively, came with important strings attached and ongoing conduct regulation designed to constrain the companies’ ability to abuse their dominant market power.87 The FCC’s landmark 2016 ruling to reclassify broadband internet access as a common carrier further indicated that US regulators have been alert to the realities of market concentration and telecoms-internet access providers’ capacity to abuse that power, and the need to maintain a vigilant eye to ensure that their practices do not swamp people’s rights to freely express themselves, maintain control over the collection, retention, use, and disclosure of their personal information, and to access a diverse range of services over the internet.88 The 28 members of the European Union, along with Norway, India, and Chile, have adopted similar “common carriage/network neutrality/open network”89 rules to offset the reality that concentration in core elements of these industries is “astonishingly high”90 on the basis of commonly used indicators (e.g., concentration ratios and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index).

    These developments indicate a new phase in internet governance and control. In the first phase, circa the 1990s, technical experts and organizations such as the Internet Engineers Task Force played a large role, while the state sat relatively passively on the sidelines. In the second phase, circa the early to mid-2000s, commercial forces surged to the fore, while internet governance revolved around the ICANN and the multi-stakeholder model. Finally, the revelations of mass internet surveillance by many states and ongoing disputes over the multi-stakeholder, “internet freedom” agenda on the one side, versus the national sovereignty, multilateral model where the ITU and UN system would play a larger role in internet governance all indicate that significant moves are afoot where the relationship between states and markets is now in a heightened state of flux.

    Such claims, however, are overdrawn. They rely too heavily on the same old “realist,” “struggle for control” model where conflict between nation-states has loomed large and business interests and communication technologies served mainly as “weapons of politics” and the handmaidens of national interests from the telegraph in the nineteenth century to the internet today. Yet, nation-states and private business interests, then and now, not only compete with one another but also cooperate extensively to cultivate a common global space of economic accumulation. Communication technologies and business interests, moreover, often act independent of the nation-state and via “private structures of cooperation,” that is, cartels and consortia, as the history and contemporary state of the undersea cable networks illustrate. In fact, the internet infrastructure of the twenty-first century, much like that of the industrial information infrastructure of the past 150 years, is still primarily financed, owned, and operated by many multinational consortia, although more than a few submarine communications cables are now owned by a relatively new roster of competitive players, such as Tata, Level 3, Global Cloud Xchange, and so forth. They have arisen mostly in the last 20 years and from new quarters, such as India in the case of Tata, for example.

    #Economie_numérique #Géopolitique #Câbles_sous_marins