• Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • Greece is planning a €40m automated surveillance system at borders with North Macedonia and Albania

    The European Commission wants Greece to build an automated wall to prevent some people from leaving the country. Locals are not enthusiastic, but their opinion counts for little.
    Many people holding Syrian, Afghan, Somalian, Bangladeshi or Pakistani passports seeking asylum in the European Union move out of Greece when they have the feeling that their administrative situation will not improve there. The route to other EU countries through the Balkans starts in northern Greece, onward to either North Macedonia or Albania. Greek police, it is said, are quite relaxed about people leaving the country.

    “We have many people who pass our area who want to go to Europe,” says Konstantinos Sionidis, the mayor of Paionia, a working-class municipality of 30,000 at Greece’s northern border. “It’s not a pleasant situation for us,” he adds.

    But leaving via Paionia is getting more difficult. In May 2023, Frontex guards started patrolling at North Macedonia’s border. Near the highway, one young woman from Sierra Leone said she and her friend tried to leave four times in the past month. Once, they got as far as the Serbian border. The other times, they were arrested immediately in North Macedonia at night, coming out of the forest, by Frontex officers asking “Do you want to go to Germany?” (No.) “They don’t want us here [in Greece],” she says. “Let us go!”

    However, the European Commission has plans to make it harder for people to travel through North Macedonia (and other parts of the Western Balkan route). According to a national programming document for the 2021 - 2027 EU “border management” funding for Greek authorities, €47m are budgeted to build an “automated border surveillance system” at Greece’s borders with North Macedonia and Albania. The new system shall explicitly be modeled on the one already deployed at the land border with Türkiye, along the Evros river.
    The virtual border wall

    Evros is described as a surveillance “testing ground.” (https://www.dw.com/en/is-greece-failing-to-deploy-eu-funded-surveillance-system-at-turkish-border-as-intended/a-63055306) In the early 2000s, police used thermal cameras and binoculars to spot people attempting to cross the border. As Greece and other Member-States increased their efforts to keep people out of the EU, more funding came in for drones, heartbeat detectors, more border guards – and for an “automated border surveillance system.”

    In 2021, the Greek government unveiled dozens of surveillance towers, equipped with cameras, radars and heat sensors. Officials claimed these would be able to alert regional police stations when detecting people approaching the border. At the time, media outlets raved about this 24-hour “electronic shield” (https://www.kathimerini.gr/society/561551092/ilektroniki-aspida-ston-evro-se-leitoyrgia-kameres-kai-rantar) that would “seal” (https://www.staratalogia.gr/2021/10/blog-post_79.html#google_vignette) Evros with cameras that can see “up to 15 km” into Türkiye (https://meaculpa.gr/stithikan-oi-pylones-ston-evro-oi-kamer).

    Greece is not the first country to buy into the vision of automated, omnipotent border surveillance. The German Democratic Republic installed automated rifles near the border with West-Germany, for instance. But the origin of the current trend towards automated borders lies in the United States. In the 1970s, sensors originally built for deployment in Vietnam were installed at the Mexican border. Since then, “the relationship between surveillance and law enforcement has been one between salespeople and officers who are not experts,” says Dave Maas, an investigator at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. “Somebody buys surveillance towers, leaves office and three administrations later, people are like: ‘Hey, this did not deliver as promised’, and then the new person is like: ‘Well I wasn’t the one who paid for it, so here is my next idea’.”

    At the US-Mexico border, the towers are “like a scarecrow,” says Geoff Boyce, who used to direct the Earlham College Border Studies Program in Arizona. His research showed that, in cases where migrants could see the towers, they took longer, more dangerous routes to avoid detection. “People are dying outside the visual range of the towers.”

    No data is available that would hint that the Greek system is different. While the Greek government shares little information about the system in Evros, former minister for citizen protection Takis Theodorikakos mentioned it earlier this year in a parliamentary session. He claimed that the border surveillance system in Evros had been used to produce the official statistics for people deterred at the Evros border in 2022 (https://www.astynomia.gr/2023/01/03/03-01-2022-koino-deltio-typou-ypourgeiou-prostasias-tou-politi-kai-ellinik). But thermal cameras, for example, cannot show an exact number of people, or even differentiate people from animals.

    In Evros, the automated border surveillance system was also intended to be used for search-and-rescue missions. Last year, a group of asylum-seekers were stranded on an islet on the Evros river for nearly a month. Deutsche Welle reported that a nearby pylon with heat sensors and cameras should have been able to immediately locate the group. Since then, authorities have continued to be accused of delaying rescue missions.

    “At the border, it is sometimes possible to see people stranded with your own eyes,” says Lena Karamanidou, who has been researching border violence in Evros for decades. “And [they] are saying the cameras that can see up to 15 kilometers into Türkiye can’t see them.”
    Keeping people in

    In contrast to the system in Evros, the aim of the newly planned automated border surveillance systems appears to be to stop people from leaving Greece. Current policing practices there are very different from those at Evros.

    At Greece’s border with North Macedonia, “we’ve heard reports that the police were actively encouraging people to leave the country,” says Manon Louis of the watchdog organization Border Violence Monitoring Network. “In testimonies collected by BVMN, people have reported that the Greek police dropped them off at the Macedonian border.”

    “It’s an open secret,” says Alexander Gkatsis from Open Cultural Center, a nonprofit in the center of Paionia, “everybody in this area knows.”

    Thirty years ago, lots of people came from Albania to Paionia, when there were more jobs in clothing factories and agriculture, many of which are now done by machines. These days, the region is struggling with unemployment and low wages. In 2015, it drew international media attention for hosting the infamous Idomeni camp. Sionidis, the Paionia mayor, says he didn’t know anything about plans for an automated border system until we asked him.

    “The migration policy is decided by the minister of migration in Athens,” says Sionidis. He was also not consulted on Frontex coming to Paionia a few years ago. But he readily admits that his municipality is but one small pawn in a Europe-wide negotiation. “[Brussels and Athens] have to make one decision for the whole European border,” says Sionidis, “If we don’t have the electronic wall here, then we won’t have it at Evros.”

    https://algorithmwatch.org/en/greece-is-planning-a-e40m-automated-surveillance-system-at-borders-w

    #Albanie #Macédoine_du_Nord #frontières #migrations #réfugiés #barrières #fermeture_des_frontières #Grèce #frontières_terrestres #surveillance #contrôles_frontaliers #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #Paionia #militarisation_des_frontières #Frontex #border_management #automated_border_surveillance_system #Evros #efficacité #inefficacité #caméra_thermiques #sortie #murs_anti-sortie (comme aux temps de la #guerre_froide)

  • Des treillis dans les labos. La recherche scientifique au service de l’#armée

    Dans une envolée rare, les dépenses militaires européennes ont atteint leur niveau de la fin de la Guerre froide. En #France, troisième exportateur mondial d’armes, le complexe militaro-industriel mobilise #entreprises et #chercheurs civils pour concevoir et fabriquer les armes de demain.
    Grenoble, spécialisée en #semi-conducteurs, constitue le « cerveau de l’armement » national.

    http://www.lemondealenvers.lautre.net/livres/des_treillis_dans_les_labos.html
    #armes #industrie_de_l'armement #recherche #Grenoble #complexe_militaro-industriel #exportations #livre

  • #Frontex, Cutro è un ricordo sbiadito: sorvegliare dall’alto resta la priorità

    Un anno dopo la strage, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera investe ancora su velivoli per sorvolare il Mediterraneo. Dal 2016 a oggi la spesa supera mezzo miliardo di euro. Una strategia dagli esiti noti: più respinti e più morti

    Frontex è pronta a investire altri 158 milioni di euro per sorvegliare dall’alto il Mediterraneo. A un anno dal naufragio di Steccato di Cutro (KR), costato la vita a 94 persone, la strategia dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee non cambia. Anzi, si affina con “occhi” sempre più efficaci per rintracciare e osservare dall’alto le imbarcazioni in difficoltà. “Si continua a pensare che Frontex sia un’innocua gregaria degli Stati, senza responsabilità -spiega Laura Salzano, docente di diritto dell’Ue presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Ma in mare, sempre di più, le sue attività hanno conseguenze dirette sulla vita delle persone”.

    Lo racconta, in parte, anche la strage di Cutro del 26 febbraio 2023. Alle 22.26 della sera prima infatti fu l’Agenzia, attraverso il velivolo “Eagle 1”, a individuare per prima la “Summer love” e a segnalarla, quand’era a circa 40 miglia delle coste crotonesi, al Frontex coordination centre. Da Varsavia le coordinate della nave furono girate alle autorità competenti: tra queste anche l’International coordination centre (ICC) di Pratica di mare (RM) in cui, allo stesso tavolo, siedono le autorità italiane e la stessa Agenzia che ha il dovere di monitorare quello che succede. “Nonostante fosse noto che c’erano persone nella ‘pancia della nave’ e il meteo stesse peggiorando, si è deciso di attivare un’operazione di polizia e non di ‘ricerca e soccorso’ -spiega Salzano-. Questa classificazione a mio avviso errata è responsabilità anche dell’Agenzia”. Un errore che potrebbe aver inciso anche sul ritardo nei soccorsi.

    Lo stabilirà la Procura di Crotone che, a metà gennaio 2024, non ha ancora chiuso le indagini sulla strage. Qualcosa di quanto successo quella sera, però, si sa già, perché il processo contro i presunti manovratori dell’imbarcazione è già in fase di dibattimento. “La prima barca della Guardia costiera -spiega Francesco Verri, avvocato di decine di familiari delle vittime- arriva sul luogo del naufragio alle 6.50, quasi tre ore dopo il naufragio: salva due persone ma recupera anche il cadavere di un bambino morto di freddo. Perché ci hanno impiegato così tanto tempo per percorrere poche miglia nautiche? Sulla spiaggia la pattuglia è arrivata un’ora e 35 minuti dopo il naufragio. Da Crotone a Cutro ci vogliono dieci minuti di macchina”. Domande a cui dovranno rispondere le autorità italiane.

    Al di là delle responsabilità penali, però, quanto successo quella notte mostra l’inadeguatezza del sistema dei soccorsi di cui la sorveglianza aerea è un tassello fondamentale su cui Frontex continua a investire. Con importi senza precedenti.

    Quando Altreconomia va in stampa, a metà gennaio, l’Agenzia sta ancora valutando le offerte arrivate per il nuovo bando da 158 milioni di euro per due servizi di monitoraggio aereo: uno a medio raggio, entro le 151 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza (budget di 100 milioni), l’altro a lungo raggio che può superare le 401 miglia di distanza (48 milioni).

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/i/web/post/658926323750966119

    Documenti di gara alla mano, una delle novità più rilevanti riguarda i cosiddetti “Paesi ospitanti” delle attività di monitoraggio: si prevede infatti espressamente che possano essere anche Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea. In sostanza: il velivolo potrebbe partire da una base in Tunisia o Libia; e, addirittura, si prevede che un host country liaison officer, ovvero un agente di “contatto” delle autorità di quel Paese, possa salire a bordo dell’aeromobile. “Bisogna capire se sarà fattibile operativamente -sottolinea Salzano-. Ma non escludere questa possibilità nel bando è grave: sono Paesi che non sono tenuti a rispettare gli standard europei”.

    Mentre lavora per dispiegare la sua flotta anche sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo, Frontex investe sulla “qualità” dei servizi richiesti. Nel bando si richiede infatti che il radar installato sopra il velivolo sia in grado di individuare (per poi poter fotografare) un oggetto di piccole dimensioni a quasi dieci chilometri di distanza e uno “medio” a quasi 19. Prendendo ad esempio il caso delle coste libiche, più la “potenza di fuoco” è elevata più il velivolo potrà essere distante dalle coste del Nordafrica ma comunque individuare le imbarcazioni appena partite.

    La distanza, in miglia nautiche, che l’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex nel novembre 2023 prevede tra l’aeroporto di partenza del velivolo e l’area di interesse da sorvolare è di 401 miglia. Nella prima gara riguardante questi servizi, pubblicata dall’agenzia nell’agosto 2016, la distanza massima prevista era di 200 miglia

    Frontex sa che, oltre alla componente meccanica, l’efficienza “tecnica” dei suoi droni è fondamentale. Per questo il 6 e 7 settembre 2023 ha riunito a Varsavia 16 aziende del settore per discutere delle nuove frontiere tecnologiche dei “velivoli a pilotaggio remoto”. A presentare i propri prodotti c’era anche l’italiana Leonardo Spa, leader europeo nel settore aerospaziale e militare, che già nel 2018 aveva siglato un accordo da 1,6 milioni di euro per fornire droni all’Agenzia.

    L’ex Finmeccanica è tra le 15 aziende che hanno vinto i bandi pubblicati da Frontex per la sorveglianza aerea. Se si guarda al numero di commesse aggiudicate, il trio formato da DEA Aviation (Regno Unito), CAE Aviation (Stati Uniti) ed EASP Air (Spagna) primeggia con oltre otto contratti siglati. Valutando l’importo delle singole gare, a farla da padrone sono invece due colossi del settore militare: la tedesca Airbus DS e la Elbit System, principale azienda che rifornisce l’esercito israeliano, che si sono aggiudicate in cordata due gare (2020 e 2022) per 125 milioni di euro. Dal 2016 a oggi, il totale investito per questi servizi supera i cinquecento milioni di euro.

    “La sorveglianza è una delle principali voci di spesa dell’Agenzia -spiega Ana Valdivia, professoressa all’Oxford internet institute che da anni analizza i bandi di Frontex- insieme a tutte le tecnologie che trasformano gli ‘eventi reali’ in dati”. E la cosiddetta “datificazione” ha un ruolo di primo piano anche nel Mediterraneo. “La fotografia di una barca in distress ha un duplice scopo: intercettarla ma anche avere un’evidenza digitale, una prova, che una determinata persona era a bordo -aggiunge Valdivia-. Questa è la ‘sorveglianza’: non un occhio che ci guarda giorno e notte, ma una memoria digitale capace di ricostruire in futuro la nostra vita. Anche per i migranti”. E per chi è su un’imbarcazione diretta verso l’Europa è vitale a chi finiscono le informazioni.

    Nell’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex, si prevede che “il contraente trasferirà i dati a sistemi situati in un Paese terzo se è garantito un livello adeguato di protezione”. “Fanno finta di non sapere che non possono farlo -aggiunge Salzano- non potendo controllare che Paesi come la Tunisia e la Libia non utilizzino quei dati, per esempio, per arrestare le persone in viaggio una volta respinte”. Quello che si sa, invece, è che quei dati -nello specifico le coordinate delle navi- vengono utilizzate per far intervenire le milizie costiere libiche. Per questo motivo i droni si avvicinano sempre di più alla Libia. Se nel 2016 l’Agenzia, nella prima gara pubblicata per questa tipologia di servizi, parlava di area operativa nelle “vicinanze” con le coste italiane e greche, fino a 200 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza, dal 2020 in avanti questa distanza ha superato le 401 miglia.

    Lorenzo Pezzani, professore associato di Geografia all’università di Bologna, ha esaminato giorno per giorno i tracciati di “Heron”, il più importante drone della flotta di Frontex: nel 2021 l’attività di volo si è concentrata tra Zuara e Tripoli, il tratto di costa libica da cui partiva la maggior parte delle barche.

    “Il numero di respingimenti delle milizie libiche -spiega Pezzani autore dello studio “Airborne complicity” pubblicato a inizio dicembre 2022- cresce all’aumentare delle ore di volo del drone e allo stesso tempo la mortalità non diminuisce, a differenza di quanto dichiarato dall’Agenzia”. Che tramite il suo direttore Hans Leijtens, entrato in carica a pochi giorni dal naufragio di Cutro, nega di avere accordi o rapporti diretti con la Libia. “Se è così, com’è possibile che un drone voli così vicino alle coste di uno Stato sovrano?”, si chiede Salzano. Chi fornirà il “nuovo” servizio per Frontex dovrà cancellare le registrazioni video entro 72 ore. Meglio non lasciare troppe tracce in giro.

    https://altreconomia.it/frontex-cutro-e-un-ricordo-sbiadito-sorvegliare-dallalto-resta-la-prior
    #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Cutro #surveillance_aérienne #Leonardo #Elbit_System #Airbus #host_country_liaison_officer #radar #technologie #DEA_Aviation #CAE_Aviation #EASP_Air #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens

  • EU grants €87m to Egypt for migration management in 2024

    Over 2024, the EU will provide €87 million and new equipment to Egypt for a migration management project started in 2022, implemented by the UN migration agency and the French Interior Ministry operator Civipol, three sources close to the matter confirmed to Euractiv.

    The €87 million may increase up to €110 million after the next EU-Egypt Association Council meeting on 23 January, two sources confirmed to Euractiv.

    The European Commission is also conducting parallel negotiations with Cairo to make a raft of funding for other projects which regards a wide range of sectors, including migration, conditional under the International Monetary Fund requests for reforms, a source close to the negotiations told Euractiv.

    The €87 million will be dedicated to increasing the operation capacity of the Egyptian navy and border guards for border surveillance and search and rescue operations at sea.

    The EU-Egypt migration management project started in 2022 with an initial €23 million, with a further €115 million approved for 2023, one of the three sources confirmed to Euractiv.

    The funds for 2022 and 2023 were used for border management, anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking activities, voluntary returns and reintegration projects.

    “With these EU funds, IOM [the UN’s migration agency, the International Organisation of Migration] is supporting Egyptian authorities through capacity building activities which promote rights-based border management and the respect of international law and standards, also with regard to search and rescue operations,” an official source from IOM told Euractiv. IOM is involved in the training and capacity building of the Egyptian authorities.

    French operator Civipol is working on the tendering, producing and delivering the search new rescue boats for 2024, one of the three sources confirmed to Euractiv.

    However, according to the EU’s asylum agency’s (EUAA) 2023 migration report, there have been almost no irregular departures from the Egyptian coasts since 2016, with most Egyptian irregular migrants to the EU having departed from Libya.

    At the same time, there has been a significant increase in Egyptian citizens applying for visas in EU countries in recent years, the EUAA report said, mainly due to the deteriorating domestic situation in the country.
    Deepening crisis in Egypt

    Egypt, a strategic partner of the EU, is experiencing a deepening economic and political crisis, with the country’s population of 107 million facing increasing instability and a lack of human rights guarantees.

    In a letter to heads of state and EU institutions last December, the NGO Human Rights Watch asked the EU to “ensure that any recalibration of its partnership with Egypt and related macro-financial assistance provide[s] an opportunity to improve the civil, political, and economic rights of the Egyptian people”.

    “Its impact will only be long-lasting if linked to structural progress and reforms to address the government’s abuses and oppression, that have strangled people’s rights as much as the country’s economy,” the NGO wrote.

    The human rights crisis cannot be treated as separate from the economic crisis, Timothy E. Kaldas, deputy director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, told Euractiv. “Political decisions and political practices of the regime play a central role in why Egypt’s economy is the way that it is,” he said.

    “The regime, in an exploitative manner, leverages the Egyptian state. For instance, it forces the making of contracts to regime-owned companies to do infrastructure projects that are extremely costly, and not necessarily contributing to the public good,” Kaldas argued, citing the construction of wholly new cities, or “new palaces for the president”.

    While such projects are making the Egyptian elites richer, the Egyptian people are increasingly poor, and in certain cases, forced to leave the country, Kaldas explained.

    With food and beverage inflation exceeding 70% in Egypt in 2023, the currency facing multiple shocks and collapses reducing Egyptians’ purchasing power and private investors not seeing the North African country as a good place to invest, “the situation is very bleak”, the expert said.

    The independence of the private sector was slammed in a report by Human Rights Watch in November 2018. In the case of Juhayna Owners, two Egyptian businessmen were detained for months after refusing to surrender their shares in their company to a state-owned business.

    Recent events at the Rafah crossing in Gaza, frictions in the Red Sea with Houthi rebels in Yemen and war in the border country of Sudan have compounded the instability.
    Past EU-Egypt relations

    During the last EU-Egypt Association Council in June 2022, the two partners outlined a list of partnership priorities “to promote joint interests, to guarantee long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean and to reinforce the cooperation and realise the untapped potential of the relationship”.

    The list of priorities regards a wide range of sectors that the EU is willing to help Egypt. Among others, the document which outlines the outcomes of the meeting, highlights the transition to digitalisation, sustainability and green economy, trade and investment, social development and social justice, energy, environment and climate action, the reform of the public sector, security and terrorism, and migration.

    https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/eu-grants-e87m-to-egypt-for-migration-management-in-2024

    #Egypte #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #EU #aide_financière #Europe #UE #équipement #Civipol #gardes-frontières #surveillance #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #réintégration #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM

    • L’UE offre à l’Egypte une aide économique contre un meilleur contrôle des migrants

      Les représentants de l’Union européenne signeront dimanche au Caire un partenariat avec le gouvernement d’Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. Il apportera un soutien de plus de 7 milliards d’euros en échange d’une plus grande surveillance des frontières.

      Après la Tunisie, l’Egypte. Trois premiers ministres européens – Giorgia Meloni, la présidente du conseil italien, Alexander De Croo et Kyriakos Mitsotakis, les premiers ministres belge et grec – et Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission européenne, sont attendus dimanche 17 mars au Caire. Ils doivent parapher une « #déclaration_commune » avec Abdel Fattah #Al-Sissi, le président égyptien, pour la mise en place d’un #partenariat global avec l’Union européenne (UE). A la clé pour l’Egypte un chèque de 7,4 milliards d’euros, comme l’a révélé le Financial Times le 13 mars.

      Cet accord survient après l’annonce, au début de mars, d’un #prêt de 8 milliards de dollars (plus de 7,3 milliards d’euros) du #Fonds_monétaire_international à l’Egypte et, surtout, à la mi-février d’un vaste plan d’investissements de 35 milliards de dollars des #Emirats_arabes_unis. A cette aune, l’aide européenne semble plutôt chiche.

      Pour Bruxelles, l’urgence est d’éviter un écroulement de l’économie égyptienne, très dépendante de l’extérieur. Depuis le Covid-19 et la guerre en Ukraine, elle est plongée dans le marasme et les déficits budgétaires s’enchaînent. De surcroît, le pays doit faire face aux conséquences de la guerre à Gaza et, notamment, aux attaques houthistes en mer Rouge, qui ont entraîné une réduction du nombre de cargos dans le canal de Suez et fait chuter les revenus du pays. Enfin, le tourisme, qui avait atteint des records en 2023 avec plus de quinze millions de visiteurs, pourrait pâtir de la guerre aux portes du pays.

      Crainte d’une arrivée massive de Palestiniens

      Dans le détail, la Commission européenne devrait apporter 5 milliards d’euros de soutien budgétaire à l’Egypte, dont 1 milliard déboursé d’ici au mois de juin, selon une procédure d’urgence. Les 4 autres milliards suivront à plus long terme. Le ministre des finances égyptien, Mohamed Maait, a confirmé cette somme, évoquant une aide de « 5 milliards à 6 milliards de dollars » (4,5 milliards à 5,5 milliards d’euros).

      (#paywall)
      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/03/16/l-ue-offre-a-l-egypte-une-aide-economique-contre-un-meilleur-controle-des-mi

  • EU’s AI Act Falls Short on Protecting Rights at Borders

    Despite years of tireless advocacy by a coalition of civil society and academics (including the author), the European Union’s new law regulating artificial intelligence falls short on protecting the most vulnerable. Late in the night on Friday, Dec. 8, the European Parliament reached a landmark deal on its long-awaited Act to Govern Artificial Intelligence (AI Act). After years of meetings, lobbying, and hearings, the EU member states, Commission, and the Parliament agreed on the provisions of the act, awaiting technical meetings and formal approval before the final text of the legislation is released to the public. A so-called “global first” and racing ahead of the United States, the EU’s bill is the first ever regional attempt to create an omnibus AI legislation. Unfortunately, this bill once again does not sufficiently recognize the vast human rights risks of border technologies and should go much further protecting the rights of people on the move.

    From surveillance drones patrolling the Mediterranean to vast databases collecting sensitive biometric information to experimental projects like robo-dogs and AI lie detectors, every step of a person’s migration journey is now impacted by risky and unregulated border technology projects. These technologies are fraught with privacy infringements, discriminatory decision-making, and even impact the life, liberty, and security of person seeking asylum. They also impact procedural rights, muddying responsibility over opaque and discretionary decisions and lacking clarity in mechanisms of redress when something goes wrong.

    The EU’s AI Act could have been a landmark global standard for the protection of the rights of the most vulnerable. But once again, it does not provide the necessary safeguards around border technologies. For example, while recognizing that some border technologies could fall under the high-risk category, it is not yet clear what, if any, border tech projects will be included in the final high-risk category of projects that are subject to transparency obligations, human rights impact assessments, and greater scrutiny. The Act also has various carveouts and exemptions in place, for example for matters of national security, which can encapsulate technologies used in migration and border enforcement. And crucial discussions around bans on high-risk technologies in migration never even made it into the Parliament’s final deal terms at all. Even the bans which have been announced, for example around emotion recognition, are only in place in the workplace and education, not at the border. Moreover, what exactly is banned remains to be seen, and outstanding questions to be answered in the final text include the parameters around predictive policing as well as the exceptions to the ban on real-time biometric surveillance, still allowed in instances of a “threat of terrorism,” targeted search for victims, or the prosecution of serious crimes. It is also particularly troubling that the AI Act explicitly leaves room for technologies which are of particular appetite for Frontex, the EU’s border force. Frontex released its AI strategy on Nov. 9, signaling an appetite for predictive tools and situational analysis technology. These tools, which when used without safeguards, can facilitate illegal border interdiction operations, including “pushbacks,” in which the agency has been investigated. The Protect Not Surveil Coalition has been trying to influence European policy makers to ban predictive analytics used for the purposes of border enforcement. Unfortunately, no migration tech bans at all seem to be in the final Act.

    The lack of bans and red lines under the high-risk uses of border technologies in the EU’s position is in opposition to years of academic research as well as international guidance, such as by then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, E. Tendayi Achiume. For example, a recently released report by the University of Essex and the UN’s Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (OHCHR), which I co-authored with Professor Lorna McGregor, argues for a human rights based approach to digital border technologies, including a moratorium on the most high risk border technologies such as border surveillance, which pushes people on the move into dangerous terrain and can even assist with illegal border enforcement operations such as forced interdictions, or “pushbacks.” The EU did not take even a fraction of this position on border technologies.

    While it is promising to see strict regulation of high-risk AI systems such as self-driving cars or medical equipment, why are the risks of unregulated AI technologies at the border allowed to continue unabated? My work over the last six years spans borders from the U.S.-Mexico corridor to the fringes of Europe to East Africa and beyond, and I have witnessed time and again how technological border violence operates in an ecosystem replete with the criminalization of migration, anti-migrant sentiments, overreliance on the private sector in an increasingly lucrative border industrial complex, and deadly practices of border enforcement, leading to thousands of deaths at borders. From vast biometric data collected without consent in refugee camps, to algorithms replacing visa officers and making discriminatory decisions, to AI lie detectors used at borders to discern apparent liars, the roll out of unregulated technologies is ever-growing. The opaque and discretionary world of border enforcement and immigration decision-making is built on societal structures which are underpinned by intersecting systemic racism and historical discrimination against people migrating, allowing for high-risk technological experimentation to thrive at the border.

    The EU’s weak governance on border technologies will allow for more and more experimental projects to proliferate, setting a global standard on how governments will approach migration technologies. The United States is no exception, and in an upcoming election year where migration will once again be in the spotlight, there does not seem to be much incentive to regulate technologies at the border. The Biden administration’s recently released Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence does not offer a regulatory framework for these high-risk technologies, nor does it discuss the impacts of border technologies on people migrating, including taking a human rights based approach to the vast impacts of these projects on people migrating. Unfortunately, the EU often sets a precedent for how other countries govern technology. With the weak protections offered by the EU AI act on border technologies, it is no surprise that the U.S. government is emboldened to do as little as possible to protect people on the move from harmful technologies.

    But real people already are at the centre of border technologies. People like Mr. Alvarado, a young husband and father from Latin America in his early 30s who perished mere kilometers away from a major highway in Arizona, in search of a better life. I visited his memorial site after hours of trekking through the beautiful yet deadly Sonora desert with a search-and-rescue group. For my upcoming book, The Walls have Eyes: Surviving Migration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, I was documenting the growing surveillance dragnet of the so-called smart border that pushes people to take increasingly dangerous routes, leading to increasing loss of life at the U.S.-Mexico border. Border technologies as a deterrent simply do not work. People desperate for safety – and exercising their internationally protected right to asylum – will not stop coming. They will instead more circuitous routes, and scholars like Geoffrey Boyce and Samuel Chambers have already documented a threefold increase in deaths at the U.S.-Mexico frontier as the so-called smart border expands. In the not so distant future, will people like Mr. Alvarado be pursued by the Department of Homeland Security’s recently announced robo-dogs, a military grade technology that is sometimes armed?

    It is no accident that more robust governance around migration technologies is not forthcoming. Border spaces increasingly serve as testing grounds for new technologies, places where regulation is deliberately limited and where an “anything goes” frontier attitude informs the development and deployment of surveillance at the expense of people’s lives. There is also big money to be made in developing and selling high risk technologies. Why does the private sector get to time and again determine what we innovate on and why, in often problematic public-private partnerships which states are increasingly keen to make in today’s global AI arms race? For example, whose priorities really matter when we choose to create violent sound cannons or AI-powered lie detectors at the border instead of using AI to identify racist border guards? Technology replicates power structures in society. Unfortunately, the viewpoints of those most affected are routinely excluded from the discussion, particularly around areas of no-go-zones or ethically fraught usages of technology.

    Seventy-seven border walls and counting are now cutting across the landscape of the world. They are both physical and digital, justifying broader surveillance under the guise of detecting illegal migrants and catching terrorists, creating suitable enemies we can all rally around. The use of military, or quasi-military, autonomous technology bolsters the connection between immigration and national security. None of these technologies, projects, and sets of decisions are neutral. All technological choices – choices about what to count, who counts, and why – have an inherently political dimension and replicate biases that render certain communities at risk of being harmed, communities that are already under-resourced, discriminated against, and vulnerable to the sharpening of borders all around the world.

    As is once again clear with the EU’s AI Act and the direction of U.S. policy on AI so far, the impacts on real people seems to have been forgotten. Kowtowing to industry and making concessions for the private sector not to stifle innovation does not protect people, especially those most marginalized. Human rights standards and norms are the bare minimum in the growing panopticon of border technologies. More robust and enforceable governance mechanisms are needed to regulate the high-risk experiments at borders and migration management, including a moratorium on violent technologies and red lines under military-grade technologies, polygraph machines, and predictive analytics used for border interdictions, at the very least. These laws and governance mechanisms must also include efforts at local, regional, and international levels, as well as global co-operation and commitment to a human-rights based approach to the development and deployment of border technologies. However, in order for more robust policy making on border technologies to actually affect change, people with lived experiences of migration must also be in the driver’s seat when interrogating both the negative impacts of technology as well as the creative solutions that innovation can bring to the complex stories of human movement.

    https://www.justsecurity.org/90763/eus-ai-act-falls-short-on-protecting-rights-at-borders

    #droits #frontières #AI #IA #intelligence_artificielle #Artificial_Intelligence_Act #AI_act #UE #EU #drones #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #droits_humains #technologie #risques #surveillance #discrimination #transparence #contrôles_migratoires #Frontex #push-backs #refoulements #privatisation #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #morts_aux_frontières #biométrie #données #racisme #racisme_systémique #expérimentation #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #pouvoir #murs #barrières_frontalières #terrorisme

    • The Walls Have Eyes. Surviving Migration in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

      A chilling exposé of the inhumane and lucrative sharpening of borders around the globe through experimental surveillance technology

      “Racism, technology, and borders create a cruel intersection . . . more and more people are getting caught in the crosshairs of an unregulated and harmful set of technologies touted to control borders and ‘manage migration,’ bolstering a multibillion-dollar industry.” —from the introduction

      In 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced it was training “robot dogs” to help secure the U.S.-Mexico border against migrants. Four-legged machines equipped with cameras and sensors would join a network of drones and automated surveillance towers—nicknamed the “smart wall.” This is part of a worldwide trend: as more people are displaced by war, economic instability, and a warming planet, more countries are turning to A.I.-driven technology to “manage” the influx.

      Based on years of researching borderlands across the world, lawyer and anthropologist Petra Molnar’s The Walls Have Eyes is a truly global story—a dystopian vision turned reality, where your body is your passport and matters of life and death are determined by algorithm. Examining how technology is being deployed by governments on the world’s most vulnerable with little regulation, Molnar also shows us how borders are now big business, with defense contractors and tech start-ups alike scrambling to capture this highly profitable market.

      With a foreword by former U.N. Special Rapporteur E. Tendayi Achiume, The Walls Have Eyes reveals the profound human stakes, foregrounding the stories of people on the move and the daring forms of resistance that have emerged against the hubris and cruelty of those seeking to use technology to turn human beings into problems to be solved.

      https://thenewpress.com/books/walls-have-eyes
      #livre #Petra_Molnar

  • The State of #Chihuahua Is Building a 20-Story Tower in #Ciudad_Juarez to Surveil 13 Cities–and Texas Will Also Be Watching

    Chihuahua state officials and a notorious Mexican security contractor broke ground last summer on the #Torre_Centinela (Sentinel Tower), an ominous, 20-story high-rise in downtown Ciudad Juarez that will serve as the central node of a new AI-enhanced surveillance regime. With tentacles reaching into 13 Mexican cities and a data pipeline that will channel intelligence all the way to Austin, Texas, the monstrous project will be unlike anything seen before along the U.S.-Mexico border.

    And that’s saying a lot, considering the last 30-plus years of surging technology on the U.S side of the border.

    The Torre Centinela will stand in a former parking lot next to the city’s famous bullring, a mere half-mile south of where migrants and asylum seekers have camped and protested at the Paso del Norte International Bridge leading to El Paso. But its reach goes much further: the Torre Centinela is just one piece of the Plataforma Centinela (Sentinel Platform), an aggressive new technology strategy developed by Chihuahua’s Secretaria de Seguridad Pública Estatal (Secretary of State Public Security or SSPE) in collaboration with the company Seguritech.

    With its sprawling infrastructure, the Plataforma Centinela will create an atmosphere of surveillance and data-streams blanketing the entire region. The plan calls for nearly every cutting-edge technology system marketed at law enforcement: 10,000 surveillance cameras, face recognition, automated license plate recognition, real-time crime analytics, a fleet of mobile surveillance vehicles, drone teams and counter-drone teams, and more.

    If the project comes together as advertised in the Avengers-style trailer that SSPE released to influence public opinion, law enforcement personnel on site will be surrounded by wall-to-wall monitors (140 meters of screens per floor), while 2,000 officers in the field will be able to access live intelligence through handheld tablets.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKPuur6s4qg

    Texas law enforcement will also have “eyes on this side of the border” via the Plataforma Centinela, Chihuahua Governor Maru Campos publicly stated last year. Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed a memorandum of understanding confirming the partnership.

    Plataforma Centinela will transform public life and threaten human rights in the borderlands in ways that aren’t easy to assess. Regional newspapers and local advocates–especially Norte Digital and Frente Político Ciudadano para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (FPCDDH)—have raised significant concerns about the project, pointing to a low likelihood of success and high potential for waste and abuse.

    “It is a myopic approach to security; the full emphasis is placed on situational prevention, while the social causes of crime and violence are not addressed,” FPCDDH member and analyst Victor M. Quintana tells EFF, noting that the Plataforma Centinela’s budget is significantly higher than what the state devotes to social services. “There are no strategies for the prevention of addiction, neither for rebuilding the fabric of society nor attending to dropouts from school or young people at risk, which are social causes of insecurity.”

    Instead of providing access to unfiltered information about the project, the State of Chihuahua has launched a public relations blitz. In addition to press conferences and the highly-produced cinematic trailer, SSPE recently hosted a “Pabellón Centinel” (Sentinel Pavillion), a family-friendly carnival where the public was invited to check out a camera wall and drones, while children played with paintball guns, drove a toy ATV patrol vehicle around a model city, and colored in illustrations of a data center operator.

    Behind that smoke screen, state officials are doing almost everything they can to control the narrative around the project and avoid public scrutiny.

    According to news reports, the SSPE and the Secretaría de Hacienda (Finance Secretary) have simultaneously deemed most information about the project as classified and left dozens of public records requests unanswered. The Chihuahua State Congress also rejected a proposal to formally declassify the documents and stymied other oversight measures, including a proposed audit. Meanwhile, EFF has submitted public records requests to several Texas agencies and all have claimed they have no records related to the Plataforma Centinela.

    This is all the more troubling considering the relationship between the state and Seguritech, a company whose business practices in 22 other jurisdictions have been called into question by public officials.

    What we can be sure of is that the Plataforma Centinela project may serve as proof of concept of the kind of panopticon surveillance governments can get away with in both North America and Latin America.
    What Is the Plataforma Centinela?

    High-tech surveillance centers are not a new phenomenon on the Mexican side of the border. These facilities tend to use “C” distinctions to explain their functions and purposes. EFF has mapped out dozens of these in the six Mexican border states.

    https://www.eff.org/files/2023/09/14/c-centers_map.png
    https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1W73dMXnuXvPl5cSRGfi1x-BQAEivJH4&ll=25.210543464111723%2C-105.379

    They include:

    - C4 (Centro de Comunicación, Cómputo, Control y Comando) (Center for Communications, Calculation, Control, and Command),
    - C5 (Centro de Coordinación Integral, de Control, Comando, Comunicación y Cómputo del Estado) (Center for Integral Coordination for Control, Command, Communications, and State Calculation),
    - C5i (Centro de Control, Comando, Comunicación, Cómputo, Coordinación e Inteligencia) (Center for Control, Command, Communication, Calculation, Coordination and Intelligence).

    Typically, these centers focus as a cross between a 911 call center and a real-time crime center, with operators handling emergency calls, analyzing crime data, and controlling a network of surveillance cameras via a wall bank of monitors. In some cases, the Cs may be presented in different order or stand for slightly different words. For example, some C5s might alternately stand for “Centros de Comando, Control, Comunicación, Cómputo y Calidad” (Centers for Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Quality). These facilities also exist in other parts of Mexico. The number of Cs often indicate scale and responsibilities, but more often than not, it seems to be a political or marketing designation.

    The Plataforma Centinela however, goes far beyond the scope of previous projects and in fact will be known as the first C7 (Centro de Comando, Cómputo, Control, Coordinación, Contacto Ciudadano, Calidad, Comunicaciones e Inteligencia Artificial) (Center for Command, Calculation, Control, Coordination, Citizen Contact, Quality, Communications and Artificial Intelligence). The Torre Centinela in Ciudad Juarez will serve as the nerve center, with more than a dozen sub-centers throughout the state.

    According to statistics that Gov. Campos disclosed as part of negotiations with Texas and news reports, the Plataforma Centinela will include:

    - 1,791 automated license plate readers. These are cameras that photograph vehicles and their license plates, then upload that data along with the time and location where the vehicles were seen to a massive searchable database. Law enforcement can also create lists of license plates to track specific vehicles and receive alerts when those vehicles are seen.
    - 4,800 fixed cameras. These are your run-of-the-mill cameras, positioned to permanently surveil a particular location from one angle.
    - 3,065 pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras. These are more sophisticated cameras. While they are affixed to a specific location, such as a street light or a telephone pole, these cameras can be controlled remotely. An operator can swivel the camera around 360-degrees and zoom in on subjects.
    - 2,000 tablets. Officers in the field will be issued handheld devices for accessing data directly from the Plataforma Centinela.
    - 102 security arches. This is a common form of surveillance in Mexico, but not the United States. These are structures built over highways and roads to capture data on passing vehicles and their passengers.
    - 74 drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/UAVs). While the Chihuahua government has not disclosed what surveillance payload will be attached to these drones, it is common for law enforcement drones to deploy video, infrared, and thermal imaging technology.
    - 40 mobile video surveillance trailers. While details on these systems are scant, it is likely these are camera towers that can be towed to and parked at targeted locations.
    - 15 anti-drone systems. These systems are designed to intercept and disable drones operated by criminal organizations.
    - Face recognition. The project calls for the application of “biometric filters” to be applied to camera feeds “to assist in the capture of cartel leaders,” and the collection of migrant biometrics. Such a system would require scanning the faces of the general public.
    - Artificial intelligence. So far, the administration has thrown around the term AI without fully explaining how it will be used. However, typically law enforcement agencies have used this technology to “predict” where crime might occur, identify individuals mostly likely to be connected to crime, and to surface potential connections between suspects that would not have been obvious to a human observer. However, all these technologies have a propensity for making errors or exacerbating existing bias.

    As of May, 60% of the Plataforma Centinela camera network had been installed, with an expected completion date of December, according to Norte Digital. However, the cameras were already being used in criminal investigations.

    All combined, this technology amounts to an unprecedented expansion of the surveillance state in Latin America, as SSPE brags in its promotional material. The threat to privacy may also be unprecedented: creating cities where people can no longer move freely in their communities without being watched, scanned, and tagged.

    But that’s assuming the system functions as advertised—and based on the main contractor’s history, that’s anything but guaranteed.
    Who Is Seguritech?

    The Plataforma Centinela project is being built by the megacorporation Seguritech, which has signed deals with more than a dozen government entities throughout Mexico. As of 2018, the company received no-bid contracts in at least 10 Mexican states and cities, which means it was able to sidestep the accountability process that requires companies to compete for projects.

    And when it comes to the Plataforma Centinela, the company isn’t simply a contractor: It will actually have ownership over the project, the Torre Centinela, and all its related assets, including cameras and drones, until August 2027.

    That’s what SSPE Secretary Gilberto Loya Chávez told the news organization Norte Digital, but the terms of the agreement between Seguritech and Chihuahua’s administration are not public. The SSPE’s Transparency Committee decided to classify the information “concerning the procedures for the acquisition of supplies, goods, and technology necessary for the development, implementation, and operation of the Platforma Centinela” for five years.

    In spite of the opacity shrouding the project, journalists have surfaced some information about the investment plan. According to statements from government officials, the Plataforma Centinela will cost 4.2 billion pesos, with Chihuahua’s administration paying regular installments to the company every three months (Chihuahua’s governor had previously said that these would be yearly payments in the amount of 700 million to 1 billion pesos per year). According to news reports, when the payments are completed in 2027, the ownership of the platform’s assets and infrastructure are expected to pass from Seguritech to the state of Chihuahua.

    The Plataforma Centinela project marks a new pinnacle in Seguritech’s trajectory as a Mexican security contractor. Founded in 1995 as a small business selling neighborhood alarms, SeguriTech Privada S.A de C.V. became a highly profitable brand, and currently operates in five areas: security, defense, telecommunications, aeronautics, and construction. According to Zeta Tijuana, Seguritech also secures contracts through its affiliated companies, including Comunicación Segura (focused on telecommunications and security) and Picorp S.A. de C.V. (focused on architecture and construction, including prisons and detention centers). Zeta also identified another SecuriTech company, Tres10 de C.V., as the contractor named in various C5i projects.

    Thorough reporting by Mexican outlets such as Proceso, Zeta Tijuana, Norte Digital, and Zona Free paint an unsettling picture of Seguritech’s activities over the years.

    Former President Felipe Calderón’s war on drug trafficking, initiated during his 2006-2012 term, marked an important turning point for surveillance in Mexico. As Proceso reported, Seguritech began to secure major government contracts beginning in 2007, receiving its first billion-peso deal in 2011 with Sinaloa’s state government. In 2013, avoiding the bidding process, the company secured a 6-billion peso contract assigned by Eruviel Ávila, then governor of the state of México (or Edomex, not to be confused with the country of Mexico). During Enrique Peña Nieto’s years as Edomex’s governor, and especially later, as Mexico’s president, Seguritech secured its status among Mexico’s top technology contractors.

    According to Zeta Tijuana, during the six years that Peña Nieto served as president (2012-2018), the company monopolized contracts for the country’s main surveillance and intelligence projects, specifically the C5i centers. As Zeta Tijuana writes:

    “More than 10 C5i units were opened or began construction during Peña Nieto’s six-year term. Federal entities committed budgets in the millions, amid opacity, violating parliamentary processes and administrative requirements. The purchase of obsolete technological equipment was authorized at an overpriced rate, hiding information under the pretext of protecting national security.”

    Zeta Tijuana further cites records from the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property showing that Seguritech registered the term “C5i” as its own brand, an apparent attempt to make it more difficult for other surveillance contractors to provide services under that name to the government.

    Despite promises from government officials that these huge investments in surveillance would improve public safety, the country’s number of violent deaths increased during Peña Nieto’s term in office.

    “What is most shocking is how ineffective Seguritech’s system is,” says Quintana, the spokesperson for FPCDDH. By his analysis, Quintana says, “In five out of six states where Seguritech entered into contracts and provided security services, the annual crime rate shot up in proportions ranging from 11% to 85%.”

    Seguritech has also been criticized for inflated prices, technical failures, and deploying obsolete equipment. According to Norte Digital, only 17% of surveillance cameras were working by the end of the company’s contract with Sinaloa’s state government. Proceso notes the rise of complaints about the malfunctioning of cameras in Cuauhtémoc Delegation (a borough of Mexico City) in 2016. Zeta Tijuana reported on the disproportionate amount the company charged for installing 200 obsolete 2-megapixel cameras in 2018.

    Seguritech’s track record led to formal complaints and judicial cases against the company. The company has responded to this negative attention by hiring services to take down and censor critical stories about its activities published online, according to investigative reports published as part of the Global Investigative Journalism Network’s Forbidden Stories project.

    Yet, none of this information dissuaded Chihuahua’s governor, Maru Campos, from closing a new no-bid contract with Seguritech to develop the Plataforma Centinela project.
    A Cross-Border Collaboration

    The Plataforma Centinela project presents a troubling escalation in cross-border partnerships between states, one that cuts out each nation’s respective federal governments. In April 2022, the states of Texas and Chihuahua signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on reducing “cartels’ human trafficking and smuggling of deadly fentanyl and other drugs” and to “stop the flow of migrants from over 100 countries who illegally enter Texas through Chihuahua.”

    https://www.eff.org/files/2023/09/14/a_new_border_model.png

    While much of the agreement centers around cargo at the points of entry, the document also specifically calls out the various technologies that make up the Plataforma Centinela. In attachments to the agreement, Gov. Campos promises Chihuahua is “willing to share that information with Texas State authorities and commercial partners directly.”

    During a press conference announcing the MOU, Gov. Abbot declared, “Governor Campos has provided me with the best border security plan that I have seen from any governor from Mexico.” He held up a three-page outline and a slide, which were also provided to the public, but also referenced the existence of “a much more extensive detailed memo that explains in nuance” all the aspects of the program.

    Abbott went on to read out a summary of Plataforma Centinela, adding, “This is a demonstration of commitment from a strong governor who is working collaboratively with the state of Texas.”

    Then Campos, in response to a reporter’s question, added: “We are talking about sharing information and intelligence among states, which means the state of Texas will have eyes on this side of the border.” She added that the data collected through the Plataforma Centinela will be analyzed by both the states of Chihuahua and Texas.

    Abbott provided an example of one way the collaboration will work: “We will identify hotspots where there will be an increase in the number of migrants showing up because it’s a location chosen by cartels to try to put people across the border at that particular location. The Chihuahua officials will work in collaboration with the Texas Department of Public Safety, where DPS has identified that hotspot and the Chihuahua side will work from a law enforcement side to disrupt that hotspot.”

    In order to learn more about the scope of the project, EFF sent public records requests to several Texas agencies, including the Governor’s Office, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Texas Attorney General’s Office, the El Paso County Sheriff, and the El Paso Police Department. Not one of the agencies produced records related to the Plataforma Centinela project.

    Meanwhile, Texas is further beefing up its efforts to use technology at the border, including by enacting new laws that formally allow the Texas National Guard and State Guard to deploy drones at the border and authorize the governor to enter compacts with other states to share intelligence and resource to build “a comprehensive technological surveillance system” on state land to deter illegal activity at the border. In addition to the MOU with Chihuahua, Abbott also signed similar agreements with the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila in 2022.
    Two Sides, One Border

    The Plataforma Centinela has enormous potential to violate the rights of one of the largest cross-border populations along the U.S.-Mexico border. But while law enforcement officials are eager to collaborate and traffic data back and forth, advocacy efforts around surveillance too often are confined to their respective sides.

    The Spanish-language press in Mexico has devoted significant resources to investigating the Plataforma Centinela and raising the alarm over its lack of transparency and accountability, as well as its potential for corruption. Yet, the project has received virtually no attention or scrutiny in the United States.

    Fighting back against surveillance of cross-border communities requires cross-border efforts. EFF supports the efforts of advocacy groups in Ciudad Juarez and other regions of Chihuahua to expose the mistakes the Chihuahua government is making with the Plataforma Centinela and call out its mammoth surveillance approach for failing to address the root social issues. We also salute the efforts by local journalists to hold the government accountable. However, U.S-based journalists, activists, and policymakers—many of whom have done an excellent job surfacing criticism of Customs and Border Protection’s so-called virtual wall—must also turn their attention to the massive surveillance that is building up on the Mexican side.

    In reality, there really is no Mexican surveillance and U.S. surveillance. It’s one massive surveillance monster that, ironically, in the name of border enforcement, recognizes no borders itself.

    https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/state-chihuahua-building-20-story-tower-ciudad-juarez-surveil-13-cities-and-sta
    #surveillance #tour #surveillance_de_masse #cartographie #visualisation #intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #technologie #Plataforma_Centinela #données #reconnaissance_faciale #caméras_de_surveillance #drones #Seguritech #complexe_militaro-industriel #Mexique

  • La chute du Heron blanc, ou la fuite en avant de l’agence #Frontex

    Sale temps pour Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières : après le scandale des pushbacks dans les eaux grecques, qui a fait tomber son ex-directeur, l’un de ses drones longue portée de type Heron 1, au coût faramineux, s’est crashé fin août en mer ionienne. Un accident qui met en lumière la dérive militariste de l’Union européenne pour barricader ses frontières méridionales.

    Jeudi 24 août 2023, un grand oiseau blanc a fait un plongeon fatal dans la mer ionienne, à 70 miles nautiques au large de la Crète. On l’appelait « Heron 1 », et il était encore très jeune puisqu’il n’avait au compteur que 3 000 heures de vol. Son employeur ? Frontex, l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes chargée depuis 2004 de réguler les frontières européennes, avec un budget sans cesse en hausse.

    Le Heron 1 est désigné dans la terminologie barbare du secteur de l’armement comme un drone MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) de quatrième génération, c’est-à-dire un engin automatisé de grande taille capable de voler sur de longues distances. Frontex disposait jusqu’au crash de seulement deux drones Heron 1. Le premier a été commandé en octobre 2020, quand l’agence a signé un contrat de 50 millions d’euros par an avec Airbus pour faire voler cet appareil en « leasing » – Airbus passant ensuite des sous-contrats, notamment avec le constructeur israélien IAISystem
    1
    – pour un total de 2 400 heures de vol, et avec des dépassements qui ont fait monter la facture annuelle. En clair, le coût de fonctionnement de ce drôle d’oiseau est abyssal. Frontex rechigne d’ailleurs à entrer dans les détails, arguant de « données commerciales sensibles », ainsi que l’explique Matthias Monroy, journaliste allemand spécialisé dans l’aéronautique : « Ils ne veulent pas donner les éléments montrant que ces drones valent plus cher que des aéroplanes classiques, alors que cela semble évident. »
    2

    La nouvelle de la chute de l’onéreux volatile n’a pas suscité beaucoup de réactions publiques – il n’en est quasiment pas fait mention dans les médias autres que grecs, hormis sur des sites spécialisés. On en trouve cependant une trace sur le portail numérique du Parlement européen, en date du 29 août 2023. Ce jour-là, Özlem Demirel, députée allemande du parti de gauche Die Linke, pose la question « E-002469/2023 » (une interpellation enregistrée sous le titre : « Crash of a second long-range drone operated on Frontex’s behalf »), dans laquelle elle interroge la fiabilité de ces drones. Elle y rappelle que, déjà en 2020, un coûteux drone longue distance opéré par Frontex s’était crashé en mer – un modèle Hermes 900 cette fois-ci, tout aussi onéreux, bijou de l’israélien Elbit Systems. Et la députée de demander : « Qui est responsable ? »

    Une question complexe. « En charge des investigations, les autorités grecques détermineront qui sera jugé responsable, explique Matthias Monroy. S’il y a eu une défaillance technique, alors IAI System devra sans doute payer. Mais si c’est un problème de communication satellite, comme certains l’ont avancé, ou si c’est une erreur de pilotage, alors ce sera à Airbus, ou plutôt à son assureur, de payer la note. »
    VOL AU-DESSUS D’UN NID D’EMBROUILLES

    Le Heron 1 a la taille d’un grand avion de tourisme – presque un mini-jet. D’une envergure de 17 mètres, censé pouvoir voler en autonomie pendant 24 heures (contre 36 pour le Hermes 900), il est équipé de nombreuses caméras, de dispositifs de vision nocturne, de radars et, semble-t-il, de technologies capables de localiser des téléphones satellites
    3
    . Détail important : n’étant pas automatisé, il est manœuvré par un pilote d’Airbus à distance. S’il est aussi utilisé sur des théâtres de guerre, notamment par les armées allemande et israélienne, où il s’est également montré bien peu fiable
    4
    , sa mission dans le cadre de Frontex relève de la pure surveillance : il s’agit de fournir des informations sur les embarcations de personnes exilées en partance pour l’Europe.

    Frontex disposait de deux drones Heron 1 jusqu’au crash. Airbus était notamment chargé d’assurer le transfert des données recueillies vers le quartier général de Frontex, à Varsovie (Pologne). L’engin qui a fait un fatal plouf se concentrait sur la zone SAR(Search and Rescue
    5
    ) grecque et avait pour port d’attache la Crète. C’est dans cette même zone SAR que Frontex a supervisé plus ou moins directement de nombreux pushbacks (des refoulements maritimes), une pratique illégale pourtant maintes fois documentée, ce qui a provoqué un scandale qui a fini par contraindre le Français Fabrice Leggeri à démissionner de la tête de l’agence fin avril 2022. Il n’est pas interdit de penser que ce Heron 1 a joué en la matière un rôle crucial, fournissant des informations aux gardes-côtes grecs qui, ensuite, refoulaient les embarcations chargées d’exilés.

    Quant à son jumeau, le Heron positionné à Malte, son rôle est encore plus problématique. Il est pourtant similaire à celui qui s’est crashé. « C’est exactement le même type de drone », explique Tamino Bohm, « tactical coordinator » (coordinateur tactique) sur les avions de Sea-Watch, une ONG allemande de secours en mer opérant depuis l’île italienne de Lampedusa. Si ce Heron-là, numéro d’immatriculation AS2132, diffère de son jumeau, c’est au niveau du territoire qu’il couvre : lui survole les zones SAR libyennes, offrant les informations recueillies à ceux que la communauté du secours en mer s’accorde à désigner comme les « soi-disant gardes-côtes libyens »
    6
    – en réalité, des éléments des diverses milices prospérant sur le sol libyen qui se comportent en pirates des mers. Financés en partie par l’Union européenne, ils sont avant tout chargés d’empêcher les embarcations de continuer leur route et de ramener leurs passagers en Libye, où les attendent bien souvent des prisons plus ou moins clandestines, aux conditions de détention infernales
    7
    .

    C’est ainsi qu’au large de Lampedusa se joue une sorte de guerre aérienne informelle. Les drones et les avions de Frontex croisent régulièrement ceux d’ONG telles que Sea-Watch, dans un ballet surréaliste : les premiers cherchant à renseigner les Libyens pour qu’ils arraisonnent les personnes exilées repérées au large ; les seconds s’acharnant avec leurs maigres moyens à documenter et à dénoncer naufrages et refoulements en Libye. Et Tamino d’asséner avec malice : « J’aurais préféré que le drone crashé soit celui opérant depuis Malte. Mais c’est déjà mieux que rien. »
    BUDGET GONFLÉ, MANDAT ÉLARGI

    Tant que l’enquête sur le crash n’aura pas abouti, le vol de drones Heron 1 est suspendu sur le territoire terrestre et maritime relevant des autorités grecques, assure Matthias Monroy (qui ajoute que cette interdiction s’applique également aux deux drones du même modèle que possède l’armée grecque). Le crash de l’un de ses deux Heron 1 est donc une mauvaise nouvelle pour Frontex et les adeptes de la forteresse Europe, déjà bien éprouvés par les arrivées massives à Lampedusa à la mi-septembre et l’hospitalité affichée sur place par les habitants. À l’image de ces murs frontaliers bâtis aux frontières de l’Europe et dans l’espace Schengen – un rapport du Parlement européen, publié en octobre 2022 « Walls and fences at EU borders » (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733692), précise que l’on en est à 2 035 kilomètres de barrières frontalières, contre 315 en 2014 –, matérialisation d’un coûteux repli identitaire clamant une submersion fantasmée, il est évident que la démesure sécuritaire ne freine en rien les volontés de rejoindre l’Europe.

    Ce ne sont pourtant pas les moyens qui manquent. Lors de sa première année d’opérations, en 2005, Frontex disposait d’un budget de 6 millions d’euros. Depuis, celui-ci n’a cessé d’enfler, pour atteindre la somme de 845,4 millions d’euros en 2023, et un effectif de plus de 2 100 personnels – avec un budget prévisionnel 2021-2027 de 11 milliards d’euros et un objectif de 10 000 gardes d’ici à 2027 (dont 7 000 détachés par les États membres).

    Depuis 2019, Frontex dispose d’un mandat élargi qui autorise l’acquisition et la possession d’avions, de drones et d’armes à feu. L’agence s’est aussi géographiquement démultipliée au fil de temps. Ses effectifs peuvent aussi bien patrouiller dans les eaux de Lampedusa que participer à des missions de surveillance de la frontière serbo-hongroise, alors que son rôle initial était simplement d’assister les pays européens dans la gestion de leurs frontières. L’agence européenne joue aussi un rôle dans la démesure technologique qui se développe aux frontières. Rien que dans les airs, l’agence se veut novatrice : elle a déjà investi plusieurs millions d’euros dans un projet de #zeppelin automatisé relié à un câble de 1 000 mètres, ainsi que dans le développement de drones « #quadcopter » pesant une dizaine de kilos. Enfin, Frontex participe aussi à la collecte généralisée de #données migratoires dans le but d’anticiper les refoulements. Elle soutient même des projets visant à gérer les flux humains par #algorithmes.

    Traversée comme les armées par une culture du secret, l’agence s’est fait une spécialité des zones grises et des partenariats opaques, tout en prenant une place toujours plus importante dans la hausse de la létalité des frontières. « Frontex est devenue l’agent de la #militarisation_des_frontières européennes depuis sa création, résume un rapport de la Fondation Jean-Jaurès sorti en juillet 2023. Fondant son fonctionnement sur l’#analyse_des_risques, Frontex a contribué à la perception des frontières européennes comme d’une forteresse assiégée, liant le trafic de drogue et d’êtres humains à des mouvements migratoires plus larges. »

    « VOUS SURVEILLEZ LES FRONTIÈRES, NOUS VOUS SURVEILLONS »

    Dans sa volonté d’expansion tous azimuts, l’agence se tourne désormais vers l’Afrique, où elle œuvre de manière plus ou moins informelle à la mise en place de politiques d’#externalisation des frontières européennes. Elle pèse notamment de tout son poids pour s’implanter durablement au #Sénégal et en #Mauritanie. « Grâce à l’argent des contribuables européens, le Sénégal a construit depuis 2018 au moins neuf postes-frontières et quatre antennes régionales de la Direction nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants. Ces sites sont équipés d’un luxe de #technologies de #surveillance_intrusive : outre la petite mallette noire [contenant un outil d’extraction des données], ce sont des #logiciels d’#identification_biométrique des #empreintes_digitales et de #reconnaissance_faciale, des drones, des #serveurs_numériques, des lunettes de vision nocturne et bien d’autres choses encore », révèle une enquête du journal étatsunien In These Times. Très impopulaire sur le continent, ce type de #néocolonialisme obsidional se déploie de manière informelle. Mais il porte bien la marque de Frontex, agence agrippée à l’obsession de multiplier les murs physiques et virtuels.

    Au Sénégal, pour beaucoup, ça ne passe pas. En août 2022, l’association #Boza_Fii a organisé plusieurs journées de débat intitulées « #Pushback_Frontex », avec pour slogan : « Vous surveillez les frontières, nous vous surveillons ». Une manifestation reconduite en août 2023 avec la mobilisation « 72h Push Back Frontex ». Objectif : contrer les négociations en cours entre l’Union européenne et le Sénégal, tout en appelant « à la dissolution définitive de l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières ». Sur RFI, son porte-parole #Saliou_Diouf expliquait récemment son point de vue : « Nous, on lutte pour la #liberté_de_circulation de tout un chacun. […] Depuis longtemps, il y a beaucoup d’argent qui rentre et est-ce que ça a arrêté les départs ? »

    Cette politique « argent contre muraille » est déployée dans d’autres États africains, comme le #Niger ou le #Soudan. Frontex n’y est pas directement impliquée, mais l’Europe verse des centaines de millions d’euros à 26 pays africains pour que des politiques locales visant à bloquer les migrations soient mises en place.

    « Nous avons besoin d’aide humanitaire, pas d’outils sécuritaires », assure Mbaye Diop, travailleur humanitaire dans un camp de la Croix-Rouge situé à la frontière entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie, dans l’enquête de In These Times. Un constat qui vaut de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée : dans un tweet publié après le crash du Heron 1, l’ONG Sea-Watch observait qu’avec les 50 millions alloués à Airbus et à ses sous-traitants pour planter son Heron dans les flots, « on pourrait faire voler pendant 25 ans nos avions de secours Seabird 1 et Seabird 2 ».

    https://afriquexxi.info/La-chute-du-Heron-blanc-ou-la-fuite-en-avant-de-l-agence-Frontex

    #drones #Heron_1 #frontières #surveillances_des_frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #asile #réfugiés #drone_MALE (#Medium_Altitude_Long_Endurance) #crash #Airbus #complexe_militaro-industriel #IAI_System #coût #prix #budget #chute #fiabilité #Hermes_900 #Elbit_Systems #données #push-backs #refoulements #AS2132 #Libye #guerre_aérienne_informelle #biométrie

  • Human rights violations: German Federal Police equips Coast Guard in Tunisia

    The German Ministry of the Interior gives indications that border troops from Tunisia are using German equipment for their crimes in the Mediterranean. Organisations report stolen engines and drowned refugees. These troops received dozens of engines, inflatable boats and training from Germany.

    More than 130,000 people are reported to have crossed the Mediterranean to Italy in small boats this year to seek refuge in Europe. Most departures are now no longer from Libya, but from Tunisia. There, the refugees, most of whom come from sub-Saharan countries, are driven into the desert by the state and persecuted by the population in pogroms.

    Human rights organisations regularly report that the Tunisian coast guard steals the engines of migrant boats on the high seas, thus exposing the occupants to drowning. The Federal Ministry of the Interior, in its answer to a parliamentary question, gives indications that maritime equipment from Germany is used for these crimes.

    In the last two years, the Federal Police has donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors to the Tunisian border troops, according to the answer of the German Ministry of the Interior. In addition, the Federal Police has sent trainers to train the authorities in the use of “fast control boats”. This measure was repeated this year as a “further qualification”. In addition, there was a “basic and advanced training course” on repairing Yamaha engines.

    Already in 2019, the German government supported the coast guard in Tunisia by providing them with equipment for a boat workshop. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police and the coast guard. These trainings were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats”.

    Tunisia has also received dozens of rigid-hull inflatable boats as well as patrol vessels from the USA since 2012. Several larger ships for the coast guard also come from Italy, and these donations are financed from EU funds. Germany could also be indirectly involved in these measures: according to the answer from the Ministry of the Interior, the German Federal Police has supplied Tunisia with six special tool kits for engines of 35-metre-class ships.

    By supporting the Tunisian coast guard, the German Federal Police is “actively aiding and abetting the wanton drowning of people”, comments Clara Bünger, the refugee policy spokesperson of the Left Party in the Bundestag, who is responsible for the enquiry. “The equipment and training for the coast guard serve to prevent people from fleeing in violation of international law,” Felix Weiss from the organisation Sea-Watch, which rescues refugees in the Mediterranean, also says in response to a question from “nd”. The German government is thus partly responsible for the atrocities committed by the Tunisian counterpart, which recently claimed dozens of lives in the desert.

    Tunisia also receives support from Germany in the desert region where the state crimes took place. The Ministry of Defence has financed an enhancement initiative” along the border with Libya, using surveillance technology worth millions of euros from the arms companies Airbus and later Hensoldt. This technology includes, among other things, radar systems and high-value sensors. The project was led by the US military.

    During the same period, the Federal Police began its support in Tunisia and opened a “Project Office” in the capital in 2015. A year later, a “security agreement” was concluded, after which Germany donated dozens of all-terrain vehicles, binoculars, thermal imaging equipment and other material to Tunisian authorities as part of a “Border Police Project”. The Federal Police also installed body scanners at the airport in Tunis and trained the officers there in their operation. In addition, training was provided on “information gathering from the population”.

    Other measures taken by the Federal Police include the construction and expansion of three police stations and barracks with control rooms. The funds for this project, which was carried out with France, the Netherlands, Italy and Switzerland, came from EU development aid.

    According to the answer now available from the Ministry of the Interior, 449 Federal Police officers have been deployed in Tunisia over the past eight years. A total of 3395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and the border police have been trained, including in Germany.

    The German government said it had “condemned the reported disappearance of refugees into the desert in the summer and demanded that these practices be stopped and clarified”. Most recently, the Minister of State of the Federal Foreign Office, Katja Keul, urged the observance of “general principles of the rule of law” during a visit to Tunis in August.

    The office of the Green MP did not answer a question from “nd” on whether these repeated requests were successful from her point of view. The Foreign Office subsequently wrote: “Due to Tunisia’s geographical location on the southern edge of the Mediterranean, it follows that we must try to cooperate with Tunisia.”

    After concluding a “Migration Pact”, the EU wants to provide the government in Tunis with a further €255 million from two financial pots for migration control. Despite known human rights abuses by the beneficiary authorities, the first €67 million of this will now be disbursed, the EU Commission announced on Friday. The package, announced in June, includes new vessels and thermal imaging cameras and other “operational tools”, as well as necessary training.

    In a project already launched in 2017, the EU is also funding the development of a modern surveillance system along the Tunisian coast. By connecting to EU systems, the Tunisian border police and navy will exchange information with other EU Member States and Frontex.

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/09/27/human-rights-violations-german-federal-police-equips-coast-guard-in-tu

    #Tunisie #migrations #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #gardes-frontière #Allemagne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #accord #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #équipement #équipement_maritime #formation #Italie #techonologie #radar #Airbus #Hensoldt #accord #Border_Police_Project #Trust_Fund #migration_pact #bateaux #caméras_thermiques

  • Telling the story of EU border militarization

    Addressing and preventing European border violence is a huge but necessary strategic challenge. This guide offers framing messages, guiding principles, and suggested language for people and organisations working on this challenge. It emerges from a process of discussion online and in-person between over a dozen organisations working in the European migrant justice space.

    The European Union’s external borders are rapidly becoming more expansive and more dangerous. Europe’s border regime is costing lives, destabilising countries beyond European borders, and driving widespread abuse - and its budget and power is increasing. Meanwhile, the migration justice movement is under-resourced and often necessarily composed of organisations working on a single significant element of the vast EU border regime.

    A key part of successfully challenging Europe’s border regime is being able to describe and expose it, by telling the same story about the dangers it poses across the continent. For the last few months, a number of organisations involved in human rights and migration have worked together to produce this guide; which provides that story, as part of a narrative guide to communicating about border militarisation and its consequences.

    https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/telling-the-story-of-eu-border-militarization
    #ressources_pédagogiques #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #brochure #manuel #guide #justice_migratoire #narration #externalisation #Frontex #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #lobby #industrie_militaire #technologie #morts_aux_frontières #mourir_aux_frontières #menace #violence #justification #catégorisation #récit #contre-récit

  • Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’#Afrique le contrôle des #migrations (1/4) : « #Frontex menace la #dignité_humaine et l’#identité_africaine »

    Pour freiner l’immigration, l’Union européenne étend ses pouvoirs aux pays d’origine des migrants à travers des partenariats avec des pays africains, parfois au mépris des droits humains. Exemple au Sénégal, où le journaliste Andrei Popoviciu a enquêté.

    Cette enquête en quatre épisodes, publiée initialement en anglais dans le magazine américain In These Times (https://inthesetimes.com/article/europe-militarize-africa-senegal-borders-anti-migration-surveillance), a été soutenue par une bourse du Leonard C. Goodman Center for Investigative Reporting.

    Par une brûlante journée de février, Cornelia Ernst et sa délégation arrivent au poste-frontière de Rosso. Autour, le marché d’artisanat bouillonne de vie, une épaisse fumée s’élève depuis les camions qui attendent pour passer en Mauritanie, des pirogues hautes en couleur dansent sur le fleuve Sénégal. Mais l’attention se focalise sur une fine mallette noire posée sur une table, face au chef du poste-frontière. Celui-ci l’ouvre fièrement, dévoilant des dizaines de câbles méticuleusement rangés à côté d’une tablette tactile. La délégation en a le souffle coupé.

    Le « Universal Forensics Extraction Device » (UFED) est un outil d’extraction de données capable de récupérer les historiques d’appels, photos, positions GPS et messages WhatsApp de n’importe quel téléphone portable. Fabriqué par la société israélienne Cellebrite, dont il a fait la réputation, l’UFED est commercialisé auprès des services de police du monde entier, notamment du FBI, pour lutter contre le terrorisme et le trafic de drogues. Néanmoins, ces dernières années, le Nigeria et le Bahreïn s’en sont servis pour voler les données de dissidents politiques, de militants des droits humains et de journalistes, suscitant un tollé.

    Toujours est-il qu’aujourd’hui, une de ces machines se trouve au poste-frontière entre Rosso-Sénégal et Rosso-Mauritanie, deux villes du même nom construites de part et d’autre du fleuve qui sépare les deux pays. Rosso est une étape clé sur la route migratoire qui mène jusqu’en Afrique du Nord. Ici, cependant, cette technologie ne sert pas à arrêter les trafiquants de drogue ou les terroristes, mais à suivre les Ouest-Africains qui veulent migrer vers l’Europe. Et cet UFED n’est qu’un outil parmi d’autres du troublant arsenal de technologies de pointe déployé pour contrôler les déplacements dans la région – un arsenal qui est arrivé là, Cornelia Ernst le sait, grâce aux technocrates de l’Union européenne (UE) avec qui elle travaille.

    Cette eurodéputée allemande se trouve ici, avec son homologue néerlandaise Tineke Strik et une équipe d’assistants, pour mener une mission d’enquête en Afrique de l’Ouest. Respectivement membres du Groupe de la gauche (GUE/NGL) et du Groupe des Verts (Verts/ALE) au Parlement européen, les deux femmes font partie d’une petite minorité de députés à s’inquiéter des conséquences de la politique migratoire européenne sur les valeurs fondamentales de l’UE – à savoir les droits humains –, tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de l’Europe.

    Le poste-frontière de Rosso fait partie intégrante de la politique migratoire européenne. Il accueille en effet une nouvelle antenne de la Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT), fruit d’un « partenariat opérationnel conjoint » entre le Sénégal et l’UE visant à former et équiper la police des frontières sénégalaise et à dissuader les migrants de gagner l’Europe avant même qu’ils ne s’en approchent. Grâce à l’argent des contribuables européens, le Sénégal a construit depuis 2018 au moins neuf postes-frontières et quatre antennes régionales de la DNLT. Ces sites sont équipés d’un luxe de technologies de surveillance intrusive : outre la petite mallette noire, ce sont des logiciels d’identification biométrique des empreintes digitales et de reconnaissance faciale, des drones, des serveurs numériques, des lunettes de vision nocturne et bien d’autres choses encore…

    Dans un communiqué, un porte-parole de la Commission européenne affirme pourtant que les antennes régionales de la DNLT ont été créées par le Sénégal et que l’UE se borne à financer les équipements et les formations.

    « Frontex militarise la Méditerranée »

    Cornelia Ernst redoute que ces outils ne portent atteinte aux droits fondamentaux des personnes en déplacement. Les responsables sénégalais, note-t-elle, semblent « très enthousiasmés par les équipements qu’ils reçoivent et par leur utilité pour suivre les personnes ». Cornelia Ernst et Tineke Strik s’inquiètent également de la nouvelle politique, controversée, que mène la Commission européenne depuis l’été 2022 : l’Europe a entamé des négociations avec le Sénégal et la Mauritanie pour qu’ils l’autorisent à envoyer du personnel de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, Frontex, patrouiller aux frontières terrestres et maritimes des deux pays. Objectif avoué : freiner l’immigration africaine.

    Avec un budget de 754 millions d’euros, Frontex est l’agence la mieux dotée financièrement de toute l’UE. Ces cinq dernières années, un certain nombre d’enquêtes – de l’UE, des Nations unies, de journalistes et d’organisations à but non lucratif – ont montré que Frontex a violé les droits et la sécurité des migrants qui traversent la Méditerranée, notamment en aidant les garde-côtes libyens, financés par l’UE, à renvoyer des centaines de milliers de migrants en Libye, un pays dans lequel certains sont détenus, torturés ou exploités comme esclaves sexuels. En 2022, le directeur de l’agence, Fabrice Leggeri, a même été contraint de démissionner à la suite d’une cascade de scandales. Il lui a notamment été reproché d’avoir dissimulé des « pushbacks » : des refoulements illégaux de migrants avant même qu’ils ne puissent déposer une demande d’asile.

    Cela fait longtemps que Frontex est présente de façon informelle au Sénégal, en Mauritanie et dans six autres pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, contribuant au transfert de données migratoires de ces pays vers l’UE. Mais jamais auparavant l’agence n’avait déployé de gardes permanents à l’extérieur de l’UE. Or à présent, Bruxelles compte bien étendre les activités de Frontex au-delà de son territoire, sur le sol de pays africains souverains, anciennes colonies européennes qui plus est, et ce en l’absence de tout mécanisme de surveillance. Pour couronner le tout, initialement, l’UE avait même envisagé d’accorder l’immunité au personnel de Frontex posté en Afrique de l’Ouest.

    D’évidence, les programmes européens ne sont pas sans poser problème. La veille de leur arrivée à Rosso, Cornelia Ernst et Tineke Strik séjournent à Dakar, où plusieurs groupes de la société civile les mettent en garde. « Frontex menace la dignité humaine et l’identité africaine », martèle Fatou Faye, de la Fondation Rosa Luxemburg, une ONG allemande. « Frontex militarise la Méditerranée », renchérit Saliou Diouf, fondateur de l’association de défense des migrants Boza Fii. Si Frontex poste ses gardes aux frontières africaines, ajoute-t-il, « c’est la fin ».

    Ces programmes s’inscrivent dans une vaste stratégie d’« externalisation des frontières », selon le jargon européen en vigueur. L’idée ? Sous-traiter de plus en plus le contrôle des frontières européennes en créant des partenariats avec des gouvernements africains – autrement dit, étendre les pouvoirs de l’UE aux pays d’origine des migrants. Concrètement, cette stratégie aux multiples facettes consiste à distribuer des équipements de surveillance de pointe, à former les forces de police et à mettre en place des programmes de développement qui prétendent s’attaquer à la racine des migrations.

    Des cobayes pour l’Europe

    En 2016, l’UE a désigné le Sénégal, qui est à la fois un pays d’origine et de transit des migrants, comme l’un de ses cinq principaux pays partenaires pour gérer les migrations africaines. Mais au total, ce sont pas moins de 26 pays africains qui reçoivent de l’argent des contribuables européens pour endiguer les vagues de migration, dans le cadre de 400 projets distincts. Entre 2015 et 2021, l’UE a investi 5 milliards d’euros dans ces projets, 80 % des fonds étant puisés dans les budgets d’aide humanitaire et au développement. Selon des données de la Fondation Heinrich Böll, rien qu’au Sénégal, l’Europe a investi au moins 200 milliards de francs CFA (environ 305 millions d’euros) depuis 2005.

    Ces investissements présentent des risques considérables. Il s’avère que la Commission européenne omet parfois de procéder à des études d’évaluation d’impact sur les droits humains avant de distribuer ses fonds. Or, comme le souligne Tineke Strik, les pays qu’elle finance manquent souvent de garde-fous pour protéger la démocratie et garantir que les technologies et les stratégies de maintien de l’ordre ne seront pas utilisées à mauvais escient. En réalité, avec ces mesures, l’UE mène de dangereuses expériences technico-politiques : elle équipe des gouvernements autoritaires d’outils répressifs qui peuvent être utilisés contre les migrants, mais contre bien d’autres personnes aussi.

    « Si la police dispose de ces technologies pour tracer les migrants, rien ne garantit qu’elle ne s’en servira pas contre d’autres individus, comme des membres de la société civile et des acteurs politiques », explique Ousmane Diallo, chercheur au bureau d’Afrique de l’Ouest d’Amnesty International.

    En 2022, j’ai voulu mesurer l’impact au Sénégal des investissements réalisés par l’UE dans le cadre de sa politique migratoire. Je me suis rendu dans plusieurs villes frontalières, j’ai discuté avec des dizaines de personnes et j’ai consulté des centaines de documents publics ou qui avaient fuité. Cette enquête a mis au jour un complexe réseau d’initiatives qui ne s’attaquent guère aux problèmes qui poussent les gens à émigrer. En revanche, elles portent un rude coup aux droits fondamentaux, à la souveraineté nationale du Sénégal et d’autres pays d’Afrique, ainsi qu’aux économies locales de ces pays, qui sont devenus des cobayes pour l’Europe.

    Des politiques « copiées-collées »

    Depuis la « crise migratoire » de 2015, l’UE déploie une énergie frénétique pour lutter contre l’immigration. A l’époque, plus d’un million de demandeurs d’asile originaires du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique – fuyant les conflits, la violence et la pauvreté – ont débarqué sur les côtes européennes. Cette « crise migratoire » a provoqué une droitisation de l’Europe. Les leaders populistes surfant sur la peur des populations et présentant l’immigration comme une menace sécuritaire et identitaire, les partis nationalistes et xénophobes en ont fait leurs choux gras.

    Reste que le pic d’immigration en provenance d’Afrique de l’Ouest s’est produit bien avant 2015 : en 2006, plus de 31 700 migrants sont arrivés par bateau aux îles Canaries, un territoire espagnol situé à une centaine de kilomètres du Maroc. Cette vague a pris au dépourvu le gouvernement espagnol, qui s’est lancé dans une opération conjointe avec Frontex, baptisée « Hera », pour patrouiller le long des côtes africaines et intercepter les bateaux en direction de l’Europe.

    Cette opération « Hera », que l’ONG britannique de défense des libertés Statewatch qualifie d’« opaque », marque le premier déploiement de Frontex à l’extérieur du territoire européen. C’est aussi le premier signe d’externalisation des frontières européennes en Afrique depuis la fin du colonialisme au XXe siècle. En 2018, Frontex a quitté le Sénégal, mais la Guardia Civil espagnole y est restée jusqu’à ce jour : pour lutter contre l’immigration illégale, elle patrouille le long des côtes et effectue même des contrôles de passeports dans les aéroports.

    En 2015, en pleine « crise », les fonctionnaires de Bruxelles ont musclé leur stratégie : ils ont décidé de dédier des fonds à la lutte contre l’immigration à la source. Ils ont alors créé le Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique (EUTF). Officiellement, il s’agit de favoriser la stabilité et de remédier aux causes des migrations et des déplacements irréguliers des populations en Afrique.

    Malgré son nom prometteur, c’est la faute de l’EUTF si la mallette noire se trouve à présent au poste-frontière de Rosso – sans oublier les drones et les lunettes de vision nocturne. Outre ce matériel, le fonds d’urgence sert à envoyer des fonctionnaires et des consultants européens en Afrique, pour convaincre les gouvernements de mettre en place de nouvelles politiques migratoires – des politiques qui, comme me le confie un consultant anonyme de l’EUTF, sont souvent « copiées-collées d’un pays à l’autre », sans considération aucune des particularités nationales de chaque pays. « L’UE force le Sénégal à adopter des politiques qui n’ont rien à voir avec nous », explique la chercheuse sénégalaise Fatou Faye à Cornelia Ernst et Tineke Strik.

    Une mobilité régionale stigmatisée

    Les aides européennes constituent un puissant levier, note Leonie Jegen, chercheuse à l’université d’Amsterdam et spécialiste de l’influence de l’UE sur la politique migratoire sénégalaise. Ces aides, souligne-t-elle, ont poussé le Sénégal à réformer ses institutions et son cadre législatif en suivant des principes européens et en reproduisant des « catégories politiques eurocentrées » qui stigmatisent, voire criminalisent la mobilité régionale. Et ces réformes sont sous-tendues par l’idée que « le progrès et la modernité » sont des choses « apportées de l’extérieur » – idée qui n’est pas sans faire écho au passé colonial.

    Il y a des siècles, pour se partager l’Afrique et mieux piller ses ressources, les empires européens ont dessiné ces mêmes frontières que l’UE est aujourd’hui en train de fortifier. L’Allemagne a alors jeté son dévolu sur de grandes parties de l’Afrique de l’Ouest et de l’Afrique de l’Est ; les Pays-Bas ont mis la main sur l’Afrique du Sud ; les Britanniques ont décroché une grande bande de terre s’étendant du nord au sud de la partie orientale du continent ; la France a raflé des territoires allant du Maroc au Congo-Brazzaville, notamment l’actuel Sénégal, qui n’est indépendant que depuis soixante-trois ans.

    L’externalisation actuelle des frontières européennes n’est pas un cas totalement unique. Les trois derniers gouvernements américains ont abreuvé le Mexique de millions de dollars pour empêcher les réfugiés d’Amérique centrale et d’Amérique du Sud d’atteindre la frontière américaine, et l’administration Biden a annoncé l’ouverture en Amérique latine de centres régionaux où il sera possible de déposer une demande d’asile, étendant ainsi de facto le contrôle de ses frontières à des milliers de kilomètres au-delà de son territoire.

    Cela dit, au chapitre externalisation des frontières, la politique européenne en Afrique est de loin la plus ambitieuse et la mieux financée au monde.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/06/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-1-4-fron

    #réfugiés #asile #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #Sénégal #Rosso #fleuve_Sénégal #Mauritanie #Universal_Forensics_Extraction_Device (#UFED) #données #technologie #Cellebrite #complexe_militaro-industriel #Division_nationale_de_lutte_contre_le_trafic_de_migrants (#DNLT) #politique_migratoire_européenne #UE #EU #Union_européenne #partenariat_opérationnel_conjoint #dissuasion #postes-frontières #surveillance #technologie_de_surveillance #biométrie #identification_biométrie #reconnaissance_faciale #empreintes_digitales #drones #droits_fondamentaux #militarisation_des_frontières #Boza_Fii #externalisation #expériences_technico-politiques #Hera #opération_Hera #mobilité_régionale

    • Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (2/4) : « Nous avons besoin d’aide, pas d’outils sécuritaires »

      Au Sénégal, la création et l’équipement de postes-frontières constituent des éléments clés du partenariat avec l’Union européenne. Une stratégie pas toujours efficace, tandis que les services destinés aux migrants manquent cruellement de financements.

      Par une étouffante journée de mars, j’arrive au poste de contrôle poussiéreux du village sénégalais de #Moussala, à la frontière avec le #Mali. Des dizaines de camions et de motos attendent, en ligne, de traverser ce point de transit majeur. Après avoir demandé pendant des mois, en vain, la permission au gouvernement d’accéder au poste-frontière, j’espère que le chef du poste m’expliquera dans quelle mesure les financements européens influencent leurs opérations. Refusant d’entrer dans les détails, il me confirme que son équipe a récemment reçu de l’Union européenne (UE) des formations et des équipements dont elle se sert régulièrement. Pour preuve, un petit diplôme et un trophée, tous deux estampillés du drapeau européen, trônent sur son bureau.

      La création et l’équipement de postes-frontières comme celui de Moussala constituent des éléments clés du partenariat entre l’UE et l’#Organisation_internationale_pour_les_migrations (#OIM). Outre les technologies de surveillance fournies aux antennes de la Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), chaque poste-frontière est équipé de systèmes d’analyse des données migratoires et de systèmes biométriques de reconnaissance faciale et des empreintes digitales.

      Officiellement, l’objectif est de créer ce que les fonctionnaires européens appellent un système africain d’#IBM, à savoir « #Integrated_Border_Management » (en français, « gestion intégrée des frontières »). Dans un communiqué de 2017, le coordinateur du projet de l’OIM au Sénégal déclarait : « La gestion intégrée des frontières est plus qu’un simple concept, c’est une culture. » Il avait semble-t-il en tête un changement idéologique de toute l’Afrique, qui ne manquerait pas selon lui d’embrasser la vision européenne des migrations.

      Technologies de surveillance

      Concrètement, ce système IBM consiste à fusionner les #bases_de_données sénégalaises (qui contiennent des données biométriques sensibles) avec les données d’agences de police internationales (comme #Interpol et #Europol). Le but : permettre aux gouvernements de savoir qui franchit quelle frontière et quand. Un tel système, avertissent les experts, peut vite faciliter les expulsions illégales et autres abus.

      Le risque est tout sauf hypothétique. En 2022, un ancien agent des services espagnols de renseignement déclarait au journal El Confidencial que les autorités de plusieurs pays d’Afrique « utilisent les technologies fournies par l’Espagne pour persécuter et réprimer des groupes d’opposition, des militants et des citoyens critiques envers le pouvoir ». Et d’ajouter que le gouvernement espagnol en avait parfaitement conscience.

      D’après un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, « tous les projets qui touchent à la sécurité et sont financés par l’UE comportent un volet de formation et de renforcement des capacités en matière de droits humains ». Selon cette même personne, l’UE effectue des études d’impact sur les droits humains avant et pendant la mise en œuvre de ces projets. Mais lorsque, il y a quelques mois, l’eurodéputée néerlandaise Tineke Strik a demandé à voir ces études d’impact, trois différents services de la Commission lui ont envoyé des réponses officielles disant qu’ils ne les avaient pas. En outre, selon un de ces services, « il n’existe pas d’obligation réglementaire d’en faire ».

      Au Sénégal, les libertés civiles sont de plus en plus menacées et ces technologies de surveillance risquent d’autant plus d’être utilisées à mauvais escient. Rappelons qu’en 2021, les forces de sécurité sénégalaises ont tué quatorze personnes qui manifestaient contre le gouvernement ; au cours des deux dernières années, plusieurs figures de l’opposition et journalistes sénégalais ont été emprisonnés pour avoir critiqué le gouvernement, abordé des questions politiques sensibles ou avoir « diffusé des fausses nouvelles ». En juin, après qu’Ousmane Sonko, principal opposant au président Macky Sall, a été condamné à deux ans d’emprisonnement pour « corruption de la jeunesse », de vives protestations ont fait 23 morts.

      « Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi »

      Alors que j’allais renoncer à discuter avec la police locale, à Tambacounda, autre grand point de transit non loin des frontières avec le Mali et la Guinée, un policier de l’immigration en civil a accepté de me parler sous couvert d’anonymat. C’est de la région de #Tambacounda, qui compte parmi les plus pauvres du Sénégal, que proviennent la plupart des candidats à l’immigration. Là-bas, tout le monde, y compris le policier, connaît au moins une personne qui a tenté de mettre les voiles pour l’Europe.

      « Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi », me confie-t-il par l’entremise d’un interprète, après s’être éloigné à la hâte du poste-frontière. Les investissements de l’UE « n’ont rien changé du tout », poursuit-il, notant qu’il voit régulièrement des personnes en provenance de Guinée passer par le Sénégal et entrer au Mali dans le but de gagner l’Europe.

      Depuis son indépendance en 1960, le Sénégal est salué comme un modèle de démocratie et de stabilité, tandis que nombre de ses voisins sont en proie aux dissensions politiques et aux coups d’Etat. Quoi qu’il en soit, plus d’un tiers de la population vit sous le seuil de pauvreté et l’absence de perspectives pousse la population à migrer, notamment vers la France et l’Espagne. Aujourd’hui, les envois de fonds de la diaspora représentent près de 10 % du PIB sénégalais. A noter par ailleurs que, le Sénégal étant le pays le plus à l’ouest de l’Afrique, de nombreux Ouest-Africains s’y retrouvent lorsqu’ils fuient les problèmes économiques et les violences des ramifications régionales d’Al-Qaida et de l’Etat islamique (EI), qui ont jusqu’à présent contraint près de 4 millions de personnes à partir de chez elles.

      « L’UE ne peut pas résoudre les problèmes en construisant des murs et en distribuant de l’argent, me dit le policier. Elle pourra financer tout ce qu’elle veut, ce n’est pas comme ça qu’elle mettra fin à l’immigration. » Les sommes qu’elle dépense pour renforcer la police et les frontières, dit-il, ne servent guère plus qu’à acheter des voitures climatisées aux policiers des villes frontalières.

      Pendant ce temps, les services destinés aux personnes expulsées – comme les centres de protection et d’accueil – manquent cruellement de financements. Au poste-frontière de Rosso, des centaines de personnes sont expulsées chaque semaine de Mauritanie. Mbaye Diop travaille avec une poignée de bénévoles du centre que la Croix-Rouge a installé du côté sénégalais pour accueillir ces personnes expulsées : des hommes, des femmes et des enfants qui présentent parfois des blessures aux poignets, causées par des menottes, et ailleurs sur le corps, laissées par les coups de la police mauritanienne. Mais Mbaye Diop n’a pas de ressources pour les aider. L’approche n’est pas du tout la bonne, souffle-t-il : « Nous avons besoin d’aide humanitaire, pas d’outils sécuritaires. »

      La méthode de la carotte

      Pour freiner l’immigration, l’UE teste également la méthode de la carotte : elle propose des subventions aux entreprises locales et des formations professionnelles à ceux qui restent ou rentrent chez eux. La route qui mène à Tambacounda est ponctuée de dizaines et de dizaines de panneaux publicitaires vantant les projets européens.

      Dans la réalité, les offres ne sont pas aussi belles que l’annonce l’UE. Binta Ly, 40 ans, en sait quelque chose. A Tambacounda, elle tient une petite boutique de jus de fruits locaux et d’articles de toilette. Elle a fait une année de droit à l’université, mais le coût de la vie à Dakar l’a contrainte à abandonner ses études et à partir chercher du travail au Maroc. Après avoir vécu sept ans à Casablanca et Marrakech, elle est rentrée au Sénégal, où elle a récemment inauguré son magasin.

      En 2022, Binta Ly a déposé une demande de subvention au Bureau d’accueil, d’orientation et de suivi (BAOS) qui avait ouvert la même année à Tambacounda, au sein de l’antenne locale de l’Agence régionale de développement (ARD). Financés par l’UE, les BAOS proposent des subventions aux petites entreprises sénégalaises dans le but de dissuader la population d’émigrer. Binta Ly ambitionnait d’ouvrir un service d’impression, de copie et de plastification dans sa boutique, idéalement située à côté d’une école primaire. Elle a obtenu une subvention de 500 000 francs CFA (762 euros) – soit un quart du budget qu’elle avait demandé –, mais peu importe, elle était très enthousiaste. Sauf qu’un an plus tard, elle n’avait toujours pas touché un seul franc.

      Dans l’ensemble du Sénégal, les BAOS ont obtenu une enveloppe totale de 1 milliard de francs CFA (1,5 million d’euros) de l’UE pour financer ces subventions. Mais l’antenne de Tambacounda n’a perçu que 60 millions de francs CFA (91 470 euros), explique Abdoul Aziz Tandia, directeur du bureau local de l’ARD. A peine de quoi financer 84 entreprises dans une région de plus d’un demi-million d’habitants. Selon un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, la distribution des subventions a effectivement commencé en avril. Le fait est que Binta Ly a reçu une imprimante et une plastifieuse, mais pas d’ordinateur pour aller avec. « Je suis contente d’avoir ces aides, dit-elle. Le problème, c’est qu’elles mettent très longtemps à venir et que ces retards chamboulent tout mon business plan. »

      Retour « volontaire »

      Abdoul Aziz Tandia admet que les BAOS ne répondent pas à la demande. C’est en partie la faute de la bureaucratie, poursuit-il : Dakar doit approuver l’ensemble des projets et les intermédiaires sont des ONG et des agences étrangères, ce qui signifie que les autorités locales et les bénéficiaires n’exercent aucun contrôle sur ces fonds, alors qu’ils sont les mieux placés pour savoir comment les utiliser. Par ailleurs, reconnaît-il, de nombreuses régions du pays n’ayant accès ni à l’eau propre, ni à l’électricité ni aux soins médicaux, ces microsubventions ne suffisent pas à empêcher les populations d’émigrer. « Sur le moyen et le long termes, ces investissements n’ont pas de sens », juge Abdoul Aziz Tandia.

      Autre exemple : aujourd’hui âgé de 30 ans, Omar Diaw a passé au moins cinq années de sa vie à tenter de rejoindre l’Europe. Traversant les impitoyables déserts du Mali et du Niger, il est parvenu jusqu’en Algérie. Là, à son arrivée, il s’est aussitôt fait expulser vers le Niger, où il n’existe aucun service d’accueil. Il est alors resté coincé des semaines entières dans le désert. Finalement, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) l’a renvoyé en avion au Sénégal, qualifiant son retour de « volontaire ».

      Lorsqu’il est rentré chez lui, à Tambacounda, l’OIM l’a inscrit à une formation de marketing numérique qui devait durer plusieurs semaines et s’accompagner d’une allocation de 30 000 francs CFA (46 euros). Mais il n’a jamais touché l’allocation et la formation qu’il a suivie est quasiment inutile dans sa situation : à Tambacounda, la demande en marketing numérique n’est pas au rendez-vous. Résultat : il a recommencé à mettre de l’argent de côté pour tenter de nouveau de gagner l’Europe.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/07/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-2-4-nous
      #OIM #retour_volontaire

    • Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (3/4) : « Il est presque impossible de comprendre à quoi sert l’argent »

      A coups de centaines de millions d’euros, l’UE finance des projets dans des pays africains pour réduire les migrations. Mais leur impact est difficile à mesurer et leurs effets pervers rarement pris en considération.

      Vous pouvez partager un article en cliquant sur les icônes de partage en haut à droite de celui-ci.
      La reproduction totale ou partielle d’un article, sans l’autorisation écrite et préalable du Monde, est strictement interdite.

      Au chapitre migrations, rares sont les projets de l’Union européenne (UE) qui semblent adaptés aux réalités africaines. Mais il n’est pas sans risques de le dire tout haut. C’est ce que Boubacar Sèye, chercheur dans le domaine, a appris à ses dépens.

      Né au Sénégal, il vit aujourd’hui en Espagne. Ce migrant a quitté la Côte d’Ivoire, où il travaillait comme professeur de mathématiques, quand les violences ont ravagé le pays au lendemain de l’élection présidentielle de 2000. Après de brefs séjours en France et en Italie, Boubacar Sèye s’est établi en Espagne, où il a fini par obtenir la citoyenneté et fondé une famille avec son épouse espagnole. Choqué par le bilan de la vague de migration aux Canaries en 2006, il a créé l’ONG Horizons sans frontières pour aider les migrants africains en Espagne. Aujourd’hui, il mène des recherches et défend les droits des personnes en déplacement, notamment celles en provenance d’Afrique et plus particulièrement du Sénégal.

      En 2019, Boubacar Sèye s’est procuré un document détaillant comment les fonds des politiques migratoires de l’UE sont dépensés au Sénégal. Il a été sidéré par le montant vertigineux des sommes investies pour juguler l’immigration, alors que des milliers de candidats à l’asile se noient chaque année sur certaines des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Lors d’entretiens publiés dans la presse et d’événements publics, il a ouvertement demandé aux autorités sénégalaises d’être plus transparentes sur ce qu’elles avaient fait des centaines de millions d’euros de l’Europe, qualifiant ces projets de véritable échec.

      Puis, au début de l’année 2021, il a été arrêté à l’aéroport de Dakar pour « diffusion de fausses informations ». Il a ensuite passé deux semaines en prison. Sa santé se dégradant rapidement sous l’effet du stress, il a fait une crise cardiaque. « Ce séjour en prison était inhumain, humiliant, et il m’a causé des problèmes de santé qui durent jusqu’à aujourd’hui, s’indigne le chercheur. J’ai juste posé une question : “Où est passé l’argent ?” »

      Ses intuitions n’étaient pas mauvaises. Les financements de la politique anti-immigration de l’UE sont notoirement opaques et difficiles à tracer. Les demandes déposées dans le cadre de la liberté d’information mettent des mois, voire des années à être traitées, alors que la délégation de l’UE au Sénégal, la Commission européenne et les autorités sénégalaises ignorent ou déclinent les demandes d’interviews.

      La Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), la police des frontières, le ministère de l’intérieur et le ministère des affaires étrangères – lesquels ont tous bénéficié des fonds migratoires européens – n’ont pas répondu aux demandes répétées d’entretien pour réaliser cette enquête.
      « Nos rapports doivent être positifs »

      Les rapports d’évaluation de l’UE ne donnent pas de vision complète de l’impact des programmes. A dessein ? Plusieurs consultants qui ont travaillé sur des rapports d’évaluation d’impact non publiés de projets du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’UE_pour_l’Afrique (#EUTF), et qui s’expriment anonymement en raison de leur obligation de confidentialité, tirent la sonnette d’alarme : les effets pervers de plusieurs projets du fonds sont peu pris en considération.

      Au #Niger, par exemple, l’UE a contribué à élaborer une loi qui criminalise presque tous les déplacements, rendant de fait illégale la mobilité dans la région. Alors que le nombre de migrants irréguliers qui empruntent certaines routes migratoires a reculé, les politiques européennes rendent les routes plus dangereuses, augmentent les prix qu’exigent les trafiquants et criminalisent les chauffeurs de bus et les sociétés de transport locales. Conséquence : de nombreuses personnes ont perdu leur travail du jour au lendemain.

      La difficulté à évaluer l’impact de ces projets tient notamment à des problèmes de méthode et à un manque de ressources, mais aussi au simple fait que l’UE ne semble guère s’intéresser à la question. Un consultant d’une société de contrôle et d’évaluation financée par l’UE confie : « Quel est l’impact de ces projets ? Leurs effets pervers ? Nous n’avons pas les moyens de répondre à ces questions. Nous évaluons les projets uniquement à partir des informations fournies par des organisations chargées de leur mise en œuvre. Notre cabinet de conseil ne réalise pas d’évaluation véritablement indépendante. »

      Selon un document interne que j’ai pu me procurer, « rares sont les projets qui nous ont fourni les données nécessaires pour évaluer les progrès accomplis en direction des objectifs généraux de l’EUTF (promouvoir la stabilité et limiter les déplacements forcés et les migrations illégales) ». Selon un autre consultant, seuls les rapports positifs semblent les bienvenus : « Il est implicite que nos rapports doivent être positifs si nous voulons à l’avenir obtenir d’autres projets. »

      En 2018, la Cour des comptes européenne, institution indépendante, a émis des critiques sur l’EUTF : ses procédures de sélection de projets manquent de cohérence et de clarté. De même, une étude commanditée par le Parlement européen qualifie ses procédures d’« opaques ». « Le contrôle du Parlement est malheureusement très limité, ce qui constitue un problème majeur pour contraindre la Commission à rendre des comptes, regrette l’eurodéputée allemande Cornelia Ernst. Même pour une personne très au fait des politiques de l’UE, il est presque impossible de comprendre où va l’argent et à quoi il sert. »

      Le #fonds_d’urgence pour l’Afrique a notamment financé la création d’unités de police des frontières d’élite dans six pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, et ce dans le but de lutter contre les groupes de djihadistes et les trafics en tous genres. Or ce projet, qui aurait permis de détourner au moins 12 millions d’euros, fait actuellement l’objet d’une enquête pour fraude.
      Aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains

      En 2020, deux projets de modernisation des #registres_civils du Sénégal et de la Côte d’Ivoire ont suscité de vives inquiétudes des populations. Selon certaines sources, ces projets financés par l’EUTF auraient en effet eu pour objectif de créer des bases de #données_biométriques nationales. Les défenseurs des libertés redoutaient qu’on collecte et stocke les empreintes digitales et images faciales des citoyens des deux pays.

      Quand Ilia Siatitsa, de l’ONG britannique Privacy International, a demandé à la Commission européenne de lui fournir des documents sur ces projets, elle a découvert que celle-ci n’avait réalisé aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains. En Europe, aucun pays ne possède de base de données comprenant autant d’informations biométriques.

      D’après un porte-parole de la Commission, jamais le fonds d’urgence n’a financé de registre biométrique, et ces deux projets consistent exclusivement à numériser des documents et prévenir les fraudes. Or la dimension biométrique des registres apparaît clairement dans les documents de l’EUTF qu’Ilia Siatitsa s’est procurés : il y est écrit noir sur blanc que le but est de créer « une base de données d’identification biométrique pour la population, connectée à un système d’état civil fiable ».

      Ilia Siatitsa en a déduit que le véritable objectif des deux projets était vraisemblablement de faciliter l’expulsion des migrants africains d’Europe. D’ailleurs, certains documents indiquent explicitement que la base de données ivoirienne doit servir à identifier et expulser les Ivoiriens qui résident illégalement sur le sol européen. L’un d’eux explique même que l’objectif du projet est de « faciliter l’identification des personnes qui sont véritablement de nationalité ivoirienne et l’organisation de leur retour ».

      Quand Cheikh Fall, militant sénégalais pour le droit à la vie privée, a appris l’existence de cette base de données, il s’est tourné vers la Commission de protection des données personnelles (CDP), qui, légalement, aurait dû donner son aval à un tel projet. Mais l’institution sénégalaise n’a été informée de l’existence du projet qu’après que le gouvernement l’a approuvé.

      En novembre 2021, Ilia Siatitsa a déposé une plainte auprès du médiateur de l’UE. En décembre 2022, après une enquête indépendante, le médiateur a rendu ses conclusions : la Commission n’a pas pris en considération l’impact sur la vie privée des populations africaines de ce projet et d’autres projets que finance l’UE dans le cadre de sa politique migratoire.

      Selon plusieurs sources avec lesquelles j’ai discuté, ainsi que la présentation interne du comité de direction du projet – que j’ai pu me procurer –, il apparaît que depuis, le projet a perdu sa composante biométrique. Cela dit, selon Ilia Siatitsa, cette affaire illustre bien le fait que l’UE effectue en Afrique des expériences sur des technologies interdites chez elle.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/08/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-3-4-il-e

  • Se il contrasto ai flussi via mare diventa un mercato dalle “ottime prospettive”

    A dieci anni dalla strage di Lampedusa del 3 ottobre 2013, il Mediterraneo è la rotta più fatale del Pianeta con oltre 30mila morti tra 2014 e metà 2023 (le stime ufficiali sono fortemente al ribasso). I Paesi però non investono su ricerca e soccorso ma sul “contrasto ai flussi”. Un giro d’affari d’oro. Il caso di #Cantiere_Navale_Vittoria.

    Le prospettive economiche del contrasto al “fenomeno della immigrazione illegale” per mare nei prossimi anni sono “ottime”, scrive nel suo ultimo bilancio Cantiere Navale Vittoria, azienda del settore della nautica civile, militare e paramilitare con sede ad Adria (Rovigo), partner strategico del ministero dell’Interno, della Guardia costiera, della Marina militare nonché fornitore, come riporta, dei “principali ministeri e marine del bacino del Mediterraneo”.

    Un mercato dalle “notevoli opportunità” che potrebbe portare a una “pipeline commerciale” superiore a 1,5 miliardi di euro solo per le nuove costruzioni previste nei prossimi anni, sommando commesse nazionali (della Marina, soprattutto) ed estere, tipo Tunisia, Grecia, Oman, Israele, Qatar, Malta, Libia, Romania, Croazia, Algeria.

    Là fuori, intanto, la stagione è terribile, segnata ancora una volta da mancati od ostacolati soccorsi e migliaia di morti nel Mediterraneo: 2.652 solo quelli registrati ufficialmente tra gennaio e metà agosto 2023 dalle Nazioni Unite, che schizzano a oltre 31mila se si fa il conto dal 2014 e si allarga lo sguardo alle diverse direttrici (dalla Libia, dalla Tunisia, dalla Turchia, dal Libano, dall’Egitto, dalla Siria, dai Paesi dell’Africa occidentale, etc.). Una strage -e le cifre dell’Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni sono solo la punta dell’iceberg– che fa in pezzi il “mai più” promesso dai governi dell’Unione europea dieci anni fa, poche ore dopo il naufragio di Lampedusa del 3 ottobre 2013, divenuto poi per legge la Giornata nazionale in memoria delle vittime dell’immigrazione.

    Scorrere l’ultima relazione sulla gestione del cantiere di Adria adiacente al Canal Bianco, un ramo del Po, fa capire meglio dove vanno le politiche (e gli affari). “L’evoluzione del mercato di riferimento in cui opera la società -scrivono infatti gli amministratori- vede la decisa tendenza da parte di tutte le maggiori marine sovrane del Sud Europa nel volersi dotare di nuove unità destinate al pattugliamento d’altura e sotto costa oltre che a mezzi veloci necessari per contrastare efficacemente il fenomeno della immigrazione illegale”.

    Ecco perché la “linea di business” chiamata “#Fast_patrol_vessel” -cioè le navi da pattugliamento veloci- pesa sui ricavi del 2022 (circa 100 milioni di euro) per quasi il 50%. Un esempio sono i quattro pattugliatori da 38 metri consegnati nel biennio 2021-2022 alla guardia costiera greca, con altri due che potrebbero essere opzionati nel corso del 2023. La stessa guardia costiera che è finita di nuovo sotto accusa per la strage di Pylos del giugno scorso avendo, secondo i testimoni, imprudentemente trainato il peschereccio partito dalla Libia con a bordo oltre 700 persone e provocato così il suo inabissamento.

    La “linea” della ricerca e soccorso non arriva al 20% del fatturato, tallonata da quella del “#refitting”, ovvero la riparazione e rinnovo di assetti già esistenti. “La necessità di provvedere efficacemente al controllo costiero dei mari richiede anche l’ammodernamento delle unità già possedute -si legge ancora nel bilancio- e questo genera aperture molto interessanti nel mercato del refitting che Cantiere Navale Vittoria ha venduto ai propri clienti in anni precedenti”.

    Tipo le cosiddette guardie costiere libiche, che poi con quelle imbarcazioni, cedute con risorse pubbliche italiane ed europee, intercettano e riportano indietro i naufraghi verso il “cimitero più grande” che è il Nord Africa, per usare le parole di papa Francesco, in alcuni casi anche sparando contro le navi delle Ong. O la Guardia nazionale tunisina, per la quale l’azienda sta sistemando sei pattugliatori da 35 metri costruiti nel 2014. Ci sono poi veri e propri prototipi, come la serie di “#intercettori_fluviali_in_alluminio” lunghi dieci metri scarsi studiati per le “dure” condizioni affrontate dalla polizia romena o i due “#innovativi_intercettori” da 20 metri in grado di superare i 70 nodi (130 chilometri all’ora) commissionati dalla polizia reale omanita. Anche se la consegna più importante nell’ultimo anno è stata l’ammiraglia per le “forze armate maltesi”: 75 metri, un ponte di volo e 51,4 milioni di euro di valore. L’ipocrisia è in mezzo al mare.

    https://altreconomia.it/se-il-contrasto-ai-flussi-via-mare-diventa-un-mercato-dalle-ottime-pros

    Les fast patrol vessels (#FPV) :

    The patrol boat is excellent for navies and maritime police today strength: more than 43 knots of maximum sustainable speed, with negligible speed loss up to Beaufort 3, combined with high-level accommodations to maximize crew comfort even on extended missions. Built in a series of four sister ships for the Cyprus Navy and the Maritime Police, the high speed allows rapid deployment even at great distances from the base, while the excellent hull design and motion control capabilities minimize the loss of speed in the open sea.


    https://www.vittoria.biz/en/categoria-nave/defence-and-security-en//#section169

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #contrôles_frontaliers #technologie #navires #frontières #Italie

  • #Pre-frontier_information_picture

    Je découvre dans un billet de blog que j’ai lu ce matin, cette info :

    From the information gathered, Frontex produces, in addition to various dossiers, an annual situation report, which the agency calls an “Pre-frontier information picture.”

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/27/what-is-frontex-doing-in-senegal-secret-services-also-participate-in-t
    https://seenthis.net/messages/997841#message1014789

    ... et du coup, ce terme de « pre-frontier information picture ».

    ça me rappelle, évidemment, la carte de @reka de la #triple_frontière européenne (où une « pré-frontière » est dessinée au milieu du désert du Sahara) :


    https://visionscarto.net/mourir-aux-portes-de-l-europe

    Je découvre ainsi, en faisant un peu de recherches, qu’il y a un #projet_de_recherche financé par #Horizon_2020 dédié à cette #pré-frontière, #NESTOR :

    aN Enhanced pre-frontier intelligence picture to Safeguard The EurOpean boRders

    Un système intégré de #surveillance des #frontières de l’UE

    Les frontières de l’Europe sont soumises à une pression considérable en raison des flux migratoires, des conflits armés dans les territoires avoisinants, du trafic de biens et de personnes, et de la criminalité transnationale. Toutefois, certains obstacles géographiques, tels que les forêts denses, les hautes montagnes, les terrains accidentés ou les zones maritimes et fluviales entravent la surveillance des itinéraires empruntés par les réseaux criminels. Le projet NESTOR, financé par l’UE, fera la démonstration d’un #système_global_de_surveillance des frontières de nouvelle génération, entièrement fonctionnel et proposant des #informations sur la situation #en_amont des frontières et au-delà des frontières maritimes et terrestres. Ce système repose sur le concept de la gestion européenne intégrée des frontières et recourt à des #technologies d’analyse d’#images_optiques et du spectre de fréquences radio alimentées par un réseau de #capteurs_interopérables.

    Objectif

    For the past few years, Europe has experienced some major changes at its surrounding territories and in adjacent countries which provoked serious issues at different levels. The European Community faces a number of challenges both at a political and at a tactical level. Irregular migration flows exerting significant pressure to the relevant authorities and agencies that operate at border territories. Armed conflicts, climate pressure and unpredictable factors occurring at the EU external borders, have increased the number of the reported transnational crimes. Smuggling activity is a major concern for Eastern EU Borders particularly, as monitoring the routes used by smugglers is being hindered by mountainous, densely forested areas and rough lands aside with sea or river areas. Due to the severity and the abrupt emergence of events, the relevant authorities operate for a long-time interval, under harsh conditions, 24 hours a day. NESTOR aims to demonstrate a fully functional next generation holistic border surveillance system providing pre-frontier situational awareness beyond maritime and land border areas following the concept of the European Integrated Border Management. NESTOR long-range and wide area surveillance capabilities for detection, recognition classification and tracking of moving targets (e.g. persons, vessels, vehicles, drones etc.) is based on optical, thermal imaging and Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum analysis technologies fed by an interoperable sensors network including stationary installations and mobile manned or unmanned vehicles (aerial, ground, water, underwater) capable of functioning both as standalone, tethered and in swarms. NESTOR BC3i system will fuse in real-time border surveillance data combined with web and social media information, creating and sharing a pre-frontier intelligent picture to local, regional and national command centers in AR environment being interoperable with CISE and EUROSUR.

    https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101021851/fr

    Projet de 6 mio. d’euro et coordonné par la #police_grecque (#Grèce) :

    Les participants (#complexe_militaro-industriel) au projet :


    #business

    #données #technologie #interopérabilité #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #surveillance_des_frontières #_Integrated_Border_Management #fréquence_radio #NESTOR_BC3i_system #CISE #EUROSUR

  • Conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    On 28 March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol will jointly hold a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area.


    The conference will provide a platform for dialogue between policy decision-makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference will include discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    The conference target participants are ‘chief technology officers’ and lead managers from each Member State’s law enforcement and border guard authorities responsible for border management, security of border regions and internal security related activities, senior policy-makers and EU agencies. With regards to the presentation of innovative technological solutions, a dedicated call for industry participation will be published soon.

    https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/events/conference-innovative-technologies-for-strengthening-schengen-area

    Le rapport est téléchargeable ici:
    Report from the conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area

    In March 2023, the European Commission (DG HOME), Frontex and Europol jointly hosted a conference on innovative technologies for strengthening the Schengen area. The event brought together policy makers, senior technology project managers, and strategic industry leaders, essential actors who contribute to making the Schengen area more secure and resilient. The conference included discussions on the current situation and needs in Member States, selected innovative technology solutions that could strengthen Schengen as well as selected technology use cases relevant for police cooperation within Schengen.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/innovation/announcements/report-from-the-conference-on-innovative-technologies-for-strengtheni
    Lien pour télécharger le pdf:
    https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/EUresearchprojects/2023/Conference_on_innovative_technologies_for_Schengen_-_Report.pdf

    #technologie #frontières #Frontex #Europol #conférence #Schengen #UE #EU #commission_européenne #droits #droits_fondamentaux #biométrie #complexe_militaro-industriel #frontières_intérieures #contrôles_frontaliers #interopérabilité #acceptabilité #libre-circulation #Advanced_Passenger_Information (#API) #One-stop-shop_solutions #données #EU_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security #Personal_Identification_system (#PerIS) #migrations #asile #réfugiés #vidéosurveillance #ePolicist_system #IDEMIA #Grant_Detection #OptoPrecision #Airbus_Defense_and_Space #Airbus #border_management #PNR #eu-LISA #European_Innovation_Hub_for_Internal_Security

  • #Texas prepares to deploy #Rio_Grande buoys in governor’s latest effort to curb border crossings

    Texas began rolling out what is set to become a new floating barrier on the Rio Grande on Friday in the latest escalation of Republican Gov. Greg Abbott’s multibillion-dollar effort to secure the U.S. border with Mexico, which already has included bussing migrants to liberal states and authorizing the National Guard to make arrests.

    But even before the huge, orange buoys were unloaded from the trailers that hauled them to the border city of Eagle Pass, there were concerns over this part of Abbott’s unprecedented challenge to the federal government’s authority over immigration enforcement. Migrant advocates voiced concerns about drowning risks and environmentalists questioned the impact on the river.

    Dozens of the large spherical buoys were stacked on the beds of four tractor trailers in a grassy city park near the river on Friday morning.

    Setting up the barriers could take up to two weeks, according to Lt. Chris Olivarez, a spokesperson for the Texas Department of Public Safety, which is overseeing the project.

    Once installed, the above-river parts of the system and the webbing they’re connected with will cover 1,000 feet (305 meter) of the middle of the Rio Grande, with anchors in the riverbed.

    Eagle Pass is part of a Border Patrol sector that has seen the second highest number of migrant crossings this fiscal year with about 270,000 encounters — though that is lower than it was at this time last year.

    The crossing dynamics shifted in May after the Biden administration stopped implementing Title 42, a pandemic era public health policy that turned many asylum seekers back to Mexico. New rules allowed people to seek asylum through a government application and set up appointments at the ports of entry, though the maximum allowed in per day is set at 1,450. The Texas governor’s policies target the many who are frustrated with the cap and cross illegally through the river.

    Earlier iterations of Abbott’s border mission have included installing miles of razor wire at popular crossing points on the river and creating state checkpoints beyond federal stops to inspect incoming commercial traffic.

    “We always look to employ whatever strategies will be effective in securing the border,” Abbott said in a June 8 press conference to introduce the buoy strategy.

    But the state hasn’t said what tests or studies have been done to determine risks posed to people who try to get around the barrier or environmental impacts.

    Immigrant advocates, including Sister Isabel Turcios, a nun who oversees a migrant shelter in Piedras Negras, Mexico, which sits just across the river from Eagle Pass, have remained vigilant about the effects of the new barrier on migration. Turcios said she met with the Texas Department of Public Safety in the days leading up to the arrival of the buoys and was told the floating barrier would be placed in deep waters to function as a warning to migrants to avoid the area.

    Turcios said she is aware that many of the nearly 200 migrants staying in her shelter on any given day are not deterred from crossing illegally despite sharp concertina wire. But that wire causes more danger because it forces migrants to spend additional time in the river.

    “That’s more and more dangerous each time ... because it has perches, it has whirlpools and because of the organized crime,” Turcios said.

    Texas Department of Public Safety Director Steven McCraw addressed the danger that migrants may face when the buoys are deployed during the June press conference when Abbott spoke: “Anytime they get in that water, it’s a risk to the migrants. This is the deterrent from even coming in the water.”

    Less than a week ago — around the Fourth of July holiday — four people, including an infant, drowned near Eagle Pass as they attempted to cross the river.

    The federal International Boundary and Water Commission, whose jurisdiction includes boundary demarcation and overseeing U.S.-Mexico treaties, said it didn’t get a heads up from Texas about the proposed floating barrier.

    “We are studying what Texas is publicly proposing to determine whether and how this impacts our mission to carry out treaties between the US and Mexico regarding border delineation, flood control, and water distribution, which includes the Rio Grande,” Frank Fisher, a spokesperson for the commission, said in a statement.

    On Friday morning, environmental advocates from Eagle Pass and Laredo, another Texas border city about 115 miles (185 kilometers) downriver, held a demonstration by the border that included a prayer for the river ahead of the barrier deployment.

    Jessie Fuentes, who owns a canoe and kayaking business that takes paddlers onto the Rio Grande, said he’s worried about unforeseen consequences. On Friday, he filed a lawsuit to stop Texas from using the buoys. He’s seeking a permanent injunction, saying his paddling business is impacted by limited access to the river.

    “I know it’s a detriment to the river flow, to the ecology of the river, to the fauna and flora. Every aspect of nature is being affected when you put something that doesn’t belong in the river,” Fuentes said.

    Adriana Martinez, a professor at Southern Illinois University who grew up in Eagle Pass, studies the shapes of rivers and how they move sediment and create landforms. She said she’s worried about what the webbing might do.

    “A lot of things float down the river, even when it’s not flooding; things that you can’t see like large branches, large rocks,” Martinez said. “And so anything like that could get caught up in these buoys and change the way that water is flowing around them.”

    https://apnews.com/article/buoys-texas-immigration-rio-grande-mexico-522e45febd880de1453460370043a25f

    https://twitter.com/clemrenard_/status/1679018421449637888

    #mur_flottant #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #USA #Etats-Unis #barrières_frontalières #barrière_flottante

    En #Grèce...
    Grèce. Le « #mur_flottant » visant à arrêter les personnes réfugiées mettra des vies en danger
    https://seenthis.net/messages/823621

    • Gov. Abbott is destroying the Rio Grande for a fearmongering photo-op.


      Miles of deadly razor-wire have been deployed to ensnare & impale border crossers. Bobcats, bear, mule deer & other wildlife will also be cut off from their main source of water.

      https://twitter.com/LaikenJordahl/status/1691158344361480194

      #fil_barbelé #barbelé

    • Un mur flottant équipé de « scies circulaires » à la frontière américano-mexicaine

      Des vidéos diffusées sur les réseaux sociaux le 8 août 2023 permettent d’observer de plus près la barrière frontalière flottante installée par le gouverneur du Texas, Greg Abbott, et destinée à empêcher les migrants clandestins d’entrer aux États-Unis. Ces installations controversées, près desquelles un corps a récemment été retrouvé, sont équipées de disques métalliques pointus fabriqués par Cochrane Global.

      Quand le gouverneur du Texas, Greg Abbott, a annoncé le 6 juin 2023 l’installation d’une « barrière marine flottante » pour dissuader les migrants de franchir illégalement la frontière sud des États-Unis, un détail important a été omis : entre les bouées orange qui composent l’ouvrage se trouvent des lames de scie circulaire aiguisées, qui rendent le franchissement presque impossible sans risque de se blesser.

      Des représentants de l’association Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) se sont rendus le 8 août 2023 à Eagle Pass, au Texas, et ont partagé de nombreuses vidéos sur leur compte X (anciennement Twitter).

      Les vidéos montrent de plus près les installations et ces disques métalliques tranchants entre les #bouées_flottantes.

      La petite ville d’#Eagle_Pass est devenue l’un des points de passage les plus dangereux de la frontière américano-mexicaine, marquée à cet endroit par le fleuve Rio Grande : les noyades de migrants y sont devenues monnaie courante.

      Le CHC a déclaré que ses membres étaient venus au Texas pour « tirer la sonnette d’alarme sur ces tactiques inhumaines mises en place par le gouverneur Abbott ».

      Une vidéo de 12 secondes, partagée par l’élue à la Chambre des représentants Sylvia Garcia, a été visionnée plus de 25 millions de fois.

      Appalled by the ongoing cruel and inhumane tactics employed by @GovAbbott at the Texas border. The situation’s reality is unsettling as these buoys’ true danger and brutality come to light. We must stop this NOW ! pic.twitter.com/XPc4C8Tnl0
      — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (@RepSylviaGarcia) August 8, 2023

      Le 21 juillet 2023, le ministère américain de la Justice a déposé une plainte contre le gouverneur Greg Abbott au sujet de la barrière frontalière flottante. L’action en justice qualifie d’"illégale" la mise en place d’une telle barrière et vise à forcer le Texas à l’enlever pour des raisons humanitaires et environnementales.

      « Ils traitent les êtres humains comme des animaux »

      La militarisation de la frontière sud des États-Unis avec le Mexique fait partie de l’#investissement de plusieurs milliards de dollars déployé par le gouverneur du Texas Greg Abbott pour stopper « de manière proactive » les arrivées de migrants par cette zone frontalière.

      La clôture flottante n’est qu’un seul des six projets de loi crédités en tout de 5,1 milliards de dollars de dotation et qui ont été annoncés le 6 juin 2023.

      La politique migratoire stricte du Texas, qui consiste notamment à transporter des personnes par car vers les États démocrates du Nord et à autoriser la Garde nationale à procéder à des arrestations, a incité d’autres États républicains à prendre des mesures similaires pour freiner l’immigration illégale.

      Contacté à plusieurs reprises par la rédaction des Observateurs, le bureau du gouverneur Abbott ne nous a pas répondu.

      Everyone needs to see what I saw in Eagle Pass today.

      Clothing stuck on razor wire where families got trapped. Chainsaw devices in the middle of buoys. Land seized from US citizens.

      Operation Lone Star is barbaric — and @GovAbbott is making border communities collateral damage. pic.twitter.com/PzKyZGWfds
      — Joaquin Castro (@JoaquinCastrotx) August 8, 2023

      « Je veux que vous regardiez ici le dispositif de type tronçonneuse qu’ils ont caché au milieu de ces bouées. Et quand vous venez ici, vous pouvez voir au loin tous ces fils de fer barbelés près du fleuve », a commenté le membre du Congrès américain Joaquin Castro, qui a également participé à la visite du CHC au Texas.

      « Le gouvernement de l’État [du Texas, NDLR] et Greg Abbott traitent les êtres humains comme des animaux », a-t-il ajouté dans une vidéo publiée le 8 août 2023 sur son compte X.

      Une frontière flottante fabriquée par Cochrane Global

      Texas began installation of its marine barrier near Eagle Pass. One pro-illegal immigration activist I met taking video elsewhere was outraged, saying it’ll never work. But… if she believes that, why get so verklempt ?Just shrug, smirk and go away. But they must think it’ll work ! pic.twitter.com/4fzdHdNJw8
      — Todd Bensman (@BensmanTodd) July 11, 2023

      Dans la vidéo de 12 secondes de Sylvia Garcia, on entend une personne dire : « Quelqu’un a fait beaucoup d’efforts ridicules pour concevoir ces installations. »

      Sur les bouées, on peut lire le mot « #Cochrane ». #Cochrane_Global est une multinationale spécialisée dans les « barrières [...] de haute sécurité » destinées à l’usage de gouvernements, d’entreprises ou de particuliers.

      Sur son site web, Cochrane Global indique que « la barrière flottante brevetée est composée de plusieurs bouées interconnectées qui peuvent être étendues à n’importe quelle longueur et personnalisées en fonction de l’objectif ».

      Le 4 août 2023, un corps a été retrouvé près du mur flottant installé sur le fleuve, en face d’Eagle Pass, au Texas.

      Il n’est pas clair à ce stade si l’ajout de lames de scie circulaire aux bouées orange a été pensé et fabriqué par Cochrane Global ou s’il a été fait à la demande des autorités de l’État.

      La rédaction des Observateurs a contacté Cochrane Global pour obtenir un commentaire, sans succès. Nous publierons sa réponse dès que nous l’aurons reçue.

      https://observers.france24.com/fr/am%C3%A9riques/20230811-un-mur-flottant-%C3%A9quip%C3%A9-de-scies-circulaires-%

      #business

    • The Floating Barrier and the Border Industrial Complex

      The Texas water wall gives a glimpse into rapidly proliferating border enforcement worldwide and the significant profit to be made from it.

      When I first came across Cochrane International, the company that built the floating barrier deployed in Eagle Pass, Texas, I watched a demonstration the company gave with detached bemusement. I was at a gun range just outside San Antonio. It was 2017, three months after Donald Trump had been sworn in and the last day of that year’s Border Security Expo, the annual gathering of Department of Homeland Security’s top brass and hundreds of companies from the border industry. Among industry insiders, the optimism was high. With Trump’s wall rhetoric at a fever pitch, the money was in the bank.

      All around me, all morning, Border Patrol agents were blasting away body-shaped cutouts in a gun competition. My ears were ringing, thanks in part to the concussion grenade I had launched—under the direction of an agent, but with great ineptitude—into an empty field as part of another hands-on demonstration. The first two days of the expo had been in the much-posher San Antonio convention center, where companies displayed their sophisticated camera systems, biometrics, and drones in a large exhibition hall. But here on the gun range we seemed to be on its raw edge.

      So when a red truck with a camo-painted trailer showed up and announced its demonstration, it wasn’t too much of a surprise. The blasting bullets still echoed all around as if they would never cease. Two men jumped out of the truck wearing red shirts and khaki pants. They frantically ran around the camo trailer, like mice scurrying around a piece of cheese trying to figure out the proper angle of attack. Then the demo began. One of the men got back in the truck, and as it lurched forward, coiling razor wire began to spill out of its rear end as if it were having a bowel movement. As the truck moved forward, more and more of Cochrane’s Rapid Deployment Barrier spilled out until it extended the length of a football field or more. It was like a microwavable insta-wall, fast-food border enforcement.

      Little did I know that six years later, this same company, Cochrane, would give us the floating barrier, with its wrecking ball–sized buoys connected side by side with circular saws. The floating barrier, as the Texas Standard put it, is the “centerpiece of #Operation_Lone_Star,” Texas governor Greg Abbott’s $4.5 billion border enforcement plan. For this barrier, which has now been linked to the deaths of at least two people, the Texas Department of Public Safety awarded Cochrane an $850,000 contract.

      While the floating wall is part of Abbott’s right-wing fear-fueled border operations, it is also a product of the broader border buildup in the United States. It embodies the deterrence strategy that has driven the buildup—via exponentially increasing budgets—for three decades, through multiple federal administrations from both sides of the aisle. In this sense, Cochrane is one of hundreds upon hundreds of companies that have received contracts, and made revenue, from border enforcement. Today, the Biden administration is giving out border and immigration enforcement contracts at a clip of 27 contracts a day, a pace that will top that of all other presidents. (Before Biden, the average was 16 contracts a day.)

      And there is no sign that this will abate anytime soon. Take the ongoing Homeland Security appropriations debate for fiscal year 2024: a detail in a statement put out by House Appropriations chair Kay Granger caught my eye: $2.1 billion will be allocated for the construction of a “physical wall along the southern border.” (This is something readers should keep a keen eye on! Cochrane certainly is.) At stake is the 2024 presidential request for CBP and ICE, at $28.2 billion. While that number is much higher than any of the Trump administration’s annual border enforcement budgets, it is less than the 2023 budget of $29.8 billion, the highest ever for border and immigration enforcement.

      But the $1.6 billion difference between 2023 and 2024 might soon disappear, thanks to supplemental funding requested by the White House, funding that would include nearly $1 billion in unrestricted funds for CBP and ICE enforcement, detention, and surveillance, and more funds for “community-based residential facilities,” among other things. While these “residential facilities” might sound nice, the National Immigrant Justice Center says they will “essentially reinstate family detention.” In other words, the White House aims to build more prisons for migrants, probably also run by private companies. The prison initiative has the support of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which has indicated that it will craft a bill that ensures the supplemental funding’s enactment.

      The tributaries of money into the broader border industrial complex are many, and all indications are that Operation Lone Star, which is drawing money from all kinds of different departments in the Texas state government, will continue as long as Abbott remains at the helm. Moreover, the Department of Homeland Security supplies local and state governments with border enforcement funding via a program called Operation Stonegarden. Under this program, Texas received $39 million in 2022, the equivalent of 47 floating barriers. Or more ambitiously the potential $2.1 billion mentioned above by Granger would amount to 2,470 of Cochrane’s water walls.

      As Cochrane project manager #Loren_Flossman testified (the Department of Justice is suing the state of Texas for building the floating barrier), the water barrier was first contracted by CBP in 2020 but shut down when Biden took office. At the time, the new president said that the administration would not build any more wall (although it has and is). Flossman would know, because he himself came to Cochrane after 17 years working in acquisitions at CBP, as he stated in his testimony. There is a trend in which CBP high brass cruise through the proverbial public-private revolving door, and Flossman is the newest well-connected former government employee peddling barriers across the globe in a world where there is a “rapid proliferation of border walls,” and there exists a border security market projected to nearly double in a decade.

      Cochrane has certainly jumped into this with full force. Besides the floating barrier, its products include an invisible wall known as ClearVu, the “finest fence you’ve never seen.” The same brochure shows this “invisible” wall around a Porsche dealership, an American Airlines building, and the Egyptian pyramids, and it says that the company’s walls can be found “across six continents” and “100 countries.” And that’s not all; such walls can be enhanced with accessories like the Cochrane Smart Coil, Electric Smart Coil, and Spike Toppings. The Smart Coil’s description reads like a menu at a fine-dining restaurant: composed of “a 730mm high Ripper Blade smart Concertina Coil, produced from the finest galvanized steel available on the market.” The “smart” part is that it will provide an “intrusion alert,” and the electric part means a potentially deadly electric current of 7,000 volts. From this menu, CBP has one contract with Cochrane from 2020 for “coil units,” but the contract doesn’t specify if it is “smart,” “electric,” or both.

      When I first saw Cochrane back in 2017 among the ear-ringing gunfire on the last day of the Border Security Expo, I had a feeling I might see them again. No matter how ludicrous the rapid barrier deployment camo truck seemed to me then, there was, indeed, plenty of money to be made.

      https://www.theborderchronicle.com/p/the-floating-barrier-and-the-border
      #complexe_militaro-industriel

  • North Africa a ’testing ground’ for EU surveillance technology

    The EU is outsourcing controversial surveillance technologies to countries in North Africa and the Sahel region with no human rights impact assessments, reports say.

    Controversial surveillance technologies are being outsourced by the European Union to countries in North Africa and the Sahel region with no transparency or regulation, according to two new reports.

    Funding, equipment and training is funnelled to third countries via aid packages, where autocratic governments use the equipment and techniques to surveil the local population.

    Beyond the borders of Europe, the movements of asylum seekers are being policed and eventually used to assess their asylum applications.

    Antonella Napolitano, author of a report for human rights group EuroMed Rights, told Middle East Eye that the implementation of these projects is opaque and lacks proper consideration for the rights of civilians and the protection of their data.

    “There aren’t enough safeguards in those countries. There aren’t data protection laws,” Napolitano said. “I think the paradox here is that border externalisation means furthering instability [in these countries].”

    The complex web of funding projects and the diversity of actors who implement them make the trails of money difficult to track.

    “This enables states to carry out operations with much less transparency, accountability or regulation than would be required of the EU or any EU government,” Napolitano told MEE.

    The deployment of experimental technologies on the border is also largely unregulated.

    While the EU has identified AI regulation as a priority, its Artificial Intelligence Act does not contain any stringent provision for the use of the technologies for border control.

    “It’s creating a two-tiered system,” Napolitano told MEE. “People on the move outside the EU don’t have the same rights by design.”
    Asylum claims

    The surveillance of migrants on the move outside of Europe is also brought to bear back inside Europe.

    A Privacy International report published in May found that five companies were operating GPS tagging of asylum seekers for Britain’s Home Office.

    “It’s been massively expanded in the past couple of years,” Lucie Audibert, legal officer at Privacy International, told MEE.

    Other, less tangible forms of surveillance are also deployed to monitor asylum seekers. “We know, for example, that the Home Office uses social media a lot… to assess the veracity of people’s claims in their immigration applications,” Audibert told MEE.

    According to the reports, surveillance equipment and training is supplied by the EU to third countries under the guise of development aid packages.

    These include the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) and now the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument.

    The reports cite multiple instances of how these funding instruments served to bolster law enforcement agencies in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, furnishing them with equipment and training that they then used against the local population.

    The EUTF for Africa allocated 15 million euros ($16.5m USD) in funding to these countries to train up a group of “cyber specialists” in online surveillance and data extraction from smart devices.

    A Privacy International investigation into the role of CEPOL, the EU law enforcement training agency, revealed that it had supplied internet surveillance training to members of Algeria’s police force.

    The investigation highlights a potential connection between these tactics, which contravened the EU’s own policies on disinformation, and the wave of online disinformation and censorship driven by pro-regime fake accounts in the aftermath of the 2019 Hirak protests in Algeria.
    A dangerous trend

    For journalist Matthias Monroy, the major development in border surveillance came after the so-called migration crisis of 2015, which fuelled the development of the border surveillance industrial complex.

    Prior to that, Europe’s border agency, Frontex, was wholly dependent on member states to source equipment. But after 2015, the agency could acquire its own.

    “The first thing they did: they published tenders for aircraft, first manned and then unmanned. And both tenders are in the hands of private operators,” Monroy told MEE.

    Frontex’s drones are now manned by the British company Airbus. “The Airbus crew detected the Crotone boat,” Monroy told MEE, referring to a shipwreck off the coast of Crotone, Italy, in February.

    “But everybody said Frontex spotted the boat. No, it was Airbus. It’s very difficult to trace the responsibility, so if this surveillance is given to private operators, who is responsible?”

    Almost 100 people died in the wreck.

    Since 2015, with the expansion of the border surveillance industrial complex, its digitisation and control has been concentrated increasingly in the hands of private actors.

    “I would see this as a trend and I would say it is very dangerous,” Monroy said.

    https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-north-africa-surveillance-technology-testing-ground

    #surveillance #technologie #test #Afrique_du_Nord #Sahel #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #intelligence_artificielle #IA #EU_Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa (#EUTF_for_Africa) #développement #Emergency_Trust_Fund #Algérie #Egypte #Tunisie #Libye #complexe_militaro-industriel #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Airbus #drones #privatisation

    ping @_kg_

    • The (human) cost of Artificial Intelligence and Surveillance technology in migration

      The ethical cost of Artificial Intelligence tools has triggered heated debates in the last few months. From chatbots to image generation software, advocates and detractors have been debating the technological pros and societal cons of the new technology.

      In two new reports, Europe’s Techno-Borders and Artificial Intelligence: The New Frontier of the EU’s Border Externalisation Strategy, EuroMed Rights, Statewatch and independent researcher Antonella Napolitano have investigated the human and financial costs of AI in migration. The reports show how the deployment of AI to manage migration flows actively contribute to the instability of the Middle East and North African region as well as discriminatory border procedures, threatening the right to asylum, the right to leave one’s country, the principle of non-refoulement as well as the rights to privacy and liberty.

      European borders and neighbouring countries have been the stage of decades-long efforts to militarise and securitise the control of migration. Huge sums of public money have been invested to deploy security and defence tools and equipment to curb arrivals towards the EU territory, both via externalisation policies in countries in the Middle East and North Africa and at the EU’s borders themselves. In this strategy of “muscling-up” the borders, technology has played a crucial role.

      EuroMed Rights’ new reports highlight how over the decades, surveillance technology has become a central asset in the EU’s migration policies with serious impacts on fundamental rights and privacy. In Artificial Intelligence: The New Frontier of the EU’s Border Externalisation Strategy we analyse how surveillance technology has been a crucial part of the European policy of externalisation of migration control. When surveillance technologies are deployed with the purpose of anti-smuggling, trafficking or counterterrorism in countries where democracies are fragile or there are authoritarian governments, they can easily end up being used for the repression of civic space and freedom of expression. What is being sold as tools to curb migrant flows, could actually be used to reinforce the security apparatus of repressive governments and fuel instability in the region.

      At the same time, Europe’s Techno-Borders highlights how this security obsession has been applied to the EU’s borders for decades, equipping them with ever-more advanced technologies. This architecture for border surveillance has been continuously expanding in an attempt to detect, deter and repel refugees and migrants. For those who manage to enter, they are biometrically registered and screened against large-scale databases, raising serious concerns on privacy violations, data protection breaches and questions of proportionality.

      Decades of “muscling-up” the EU’s borders keep showing the same thing: military, security, defence tools or technology do not stop migration, they only make it more dangerous and lethal. Nonetheless, the security and surveillance apparatus is only expected to increase: more and more money is being invested to research and develop new tech tools to curb migration, including through Artificial Intelligence.

      In a context that is resistant to public scrutiny and accountability, and where the private military and security sector has a vested interest in expanding the surveillance architecture, it is crucial to keep monitoring and denouncing the use of these technologies, in the struggle for a humane migration policy that puts the right of people on the move at the centre!

      Read our reports here:

      - Artificial Intelligence: the new frontier of the EU’s border externalisation strategy: https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf
      - Europe’s Techno-Borders: https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/EuroMed-Rights_Statewatch_Europe-techno-borders_EN-1.pdf

      https://euromedrights.org/publication/the-human-cost-of-artificial-intelligence-and-surveillance-technology
      #rapport #EuroMed_rights

  • L’agenzia europea che costruisce le frontiere in Tunisia
    https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/thebigwall-icmpd-tunisia

    A metà luglio è stato siglato il Memorandum of understanding tra Ue e Tunisia, con al centro il tema migratorio. Le esigenze di Tunisi sono rappresentate all’Europa anche da un’agenzia austriaca, l’Icmpd, di un cui un documento interno svela alcuni segreti Clicca per leggere l’articolo L’agenzia europea che costruisce le frontiere in Tunisia pubblicato su IrpiMedia.

  • Migrations : l’Union européenne, droit dans le mur

    La Commission européenne affirme que l’UE ne finance pas de « murs » anti-migrants à ses #frontières_extérieures, malgré les demandes insistantes d’États de l’est de l’Europe. En réalité, cette « ligne rouge » de l’exécutif, qui a toujours été floue, s’efface de plus en plus.

    Le 14 juin dernier, le naufrage d’un bateau entraînait la noyade de centaines de personnes exilées. Quelques jours auparavant, le 8 juin, les États membres de l’Union européenne s’enorgueillissaient d’avoir trouvé un accord sur deux règlements essentiels du « Pacte européen pour l’asile et la migration », qui multipliera les procédures d’asile express dans des centres de détention aux frontières de l’Europe, faisant craindre aux ONG une nouvelle érosion du droit d’asile.

    Dans ce contexte délétère, un groupe d’une douzaine d’États membres, surtout d’Europe de l’Est, réclame que l’Union européenne reconnaisse leur rôle de « protecteurs » des frontières de l’Union en autorisant le financement européen de murs, #clôtures et #barbelés pour contenir le « flux migratoire ». Le premier ministre grec, Kyriákos Mitsotákis, avait même estimé que son pays était en première ligne face à « l’invasion de migrants ».

    Officiellement, la Commission européenne se refuse toujours à financer les multiples projets de clôtures anti-migrants qui s’érigent le long des frontières extérieures de l’UE. « Nous avons un principe bien établi : nous ne finançons pas de murs ni de barbelés. Et je pense que cela ne devrait pas changer », avait encore déclaré Ylva Johansson, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, le 31 janvier. Pourtant, la ligne rouge semble inexorablement s’effacer.

    Le 7 octobre 2021, les ministres de douze États, dont la #Grèce, la #Pologne, la #Hongrie, la #Bulgarie ou les #Pays_baltes, demandaient par écrit à la Commission que le financement de « #barrières_physiques » aux frontières de l’UE soit une « priorité », car cette « mesure de protection » serait un outil « efficace et légitime » dans l’intérêt de toute l’Union. Une demande qu’ils réitèrent depuis à toute occasion.

    Les États membres n’ont pas attendu un quelconque « feu vert » de la Commission pour ériger des clôtures. Les premières ont été construites par l’Espagne dans les années 1990, dans les enclaves de Ceuta et Melilla. Mais c’est en 2015, après l’exil de centaines de milliers de Syrien·nes fuyant la guerre civile, que les barrières se sont multipliées. Alors que l’Union européenne comptait 315 kilomètres de fil de fer et barbelés à ses frontières en 2014, elle en totalisait 2 048 l’an passé.

    Depuis 2021, ce groupe d’États revient sans cesse à la charge. Lors de son arrivée au sommet des dirigeants européens, le 9 février dernier, Victor Orbán (Hongrie) annonçait la couleur : « Les barrières protègent l’Europe. » Les conclusions de ce sommet, ambiguës, semblaient ouvrir une brèche dans la politique européenne de financement du contrôle aux frontières. Les États demandaient « à la Commission de mobiliser immédiatement des fonds pour aider les États membres à renforcer […] les infrastructures de protection des frontières ».

    Dans ses réponses écrites aux questions de Mediapart, la Commission ne mentionne plus aucune ligne rouge : « Les États membres ont une obligation de protéger les frontières extérieures. Ils sont les mieux placés pour définir comment le faire en pratique d’une manière qui […] respecte les droits fondamentaux. »

    Si l’on en croit le ministre de l’intérieur grec, Panagiótis Mitarákis, les dernières résistances de la Commission seraient en train de tomber. Le 24 février, il affirmait, au sujet du projet grec d’#extension et de renforcement de sa clôture avec la Turquie, le long de la rivière #Evros, que la Commission avait « accepté que certaines dépenses pour la construction de la barrière soient financées par l’Union européenne ».

    Pour Catherine Woollard, de l’ONG Ecre (Conseil européen pour les réfugiés et exilés), « c’est important que la Commission résiste à ces appels de financement des murs et clôtures, car il faut respecter le droit de demander l’asile qui implique un accès au territoire. Mais cette position risque de devenir symbolique si les barrières sont tout de même construites et qu’en plus se développent des barrières d’autres types, numériques et technologiques, surtout dans des États qui utilisent la force et des mesures illégales pour refouler les demandeurs d’asile ».

    D’une ligne rouge à une ligne floue

    Au sein de l’ONG Statewatch, Chris Jones estime que « cette “ligne rouge” de la Commission européenne, c’est du grand n’importe quoi ! Cela fait des années que l’Union européenne finance des dispositifs autour ou sur ces clôtures, des #drones, des #caméras, des #véhicules, des #officiers. Dire que l’UE ne finance pas de clôtures, c’est uniquement sémantique, quand des milliards d’euros sont dépensés pour fortifier les frontières ». Même diagnostic chez Mark Akkerman, chercheur néerlandais au Transnational Institute, pour qui la « #ligne_rouge de la Commission est plutôt une ligne floue ». Dans ses travaux, il avait déjà démontré qu’en 2010, l’UE avait financé l’achat de #caméras_de_vidéosurveillance à #Ceuta et la construction d’un #mirador à #Melilla.

    Lorsqu’il est disponible, le détail des dépenses relatives au contrôle des frontières montre que la politique de non-financement des « murs » est une ligne de crête, car si la Commission ne finance pas le béton ni les barbelés, elle finance bien des #dispositifs qui les accompagnent.

    En 2021, par exemple, la #Lituanie a reçu 14,9 millions d’euros de fonds d’aide d’urgence pour « renforcer » sa frontière extérieure avec la Biélorussie, peut-on lire dans un rapport de la Commission. Une frontière qui, selon le ministère de l’intérieur lituanien, contacté par Mediapart, est « désormais longée d’une clôture de 530 km et d’une barrière surmontée de fils barbelés sur 360 kilomètres ». Si la barrière a pesé 148 millions d’euros sur le #budget de l’État, le ministère de l’intérieur affirme que la rénovation de la route qui la longe et permet aux gardes-frontières de patrouiller a été financée à hauteur de « 10 millions d’euros par des fonds européens ».

    En Grèce, le détail des dépenses du gouvernement, dans le cadre du fonds européen de sécurité intérieur, de 2014 à 2020, est éclairant. Toujours le long de la rivière Evros, là où est érigée la barrière physique, la police grecque a pu bénéficier en 2016 d’un apport de 15 millions d’euros, dont 11,2 millions financés par le fonds européen pour la sécurité intérieure, afin de construire 10 #pylônes et d’y intégrer des #caméras_thermiques, des caméras de surveillance, des #radars et autres systèmes de communication.

    Cet apport financier fut complété la même année par 1,5 million d’euros pour l’achat d’#équipements permettant de détecter les battements de cœur dans les véhicules, coffres ou conteneurs.

    Mais l’enjeu, en Grèce, c’est avant tout la mer, là où des bateaux des gardes-côtes sont impliqués dans des cas de refoulements documentés. Dans son programme d’action national du fonds européen relatif à la gestion des frontières et des visas, écrit en 2021, le gouvernement grec envisage le renouvellement de sa flotte, dont une dizaine de bateaux de #patrouille côtière, équipés de #technologies de #surveillance dernier cri, pour environ 60 millions d’euros. Et malgré les refoulements, la Commission européenne octroie les fonds.

    Technologies et barrières font bon ménage

    Les États membres de l’UE qui font partie de l’espace Schengen ont pour mission de « protéger les frontières extérieures ». Le droit européen leur impose aussi de respecter le droit d’asile. « Les exigences du code Schengen contredisent bien souvent l’acquis européen en matière d’asile. Lorsqu’un grand nombre de personnes arrivent aux frontières de l’Union européenne et qu’il existe des pressions pour faire baisser ce nombre, il est presque impossible de le faire sans violer certaines règles relatives au droit d’asile », reconnaît Atanas Rusev, directeur du programme « sécurité » du Centre pour l’étude de la démocratie, basé en Bulgarie.

    La Bulgarie est au cœur de ces tiraillements européens. En 2022, la police a comptabilisé 164 000 passages dits « irréguliers » de sa frontière, contre 55 000 l’année précédente. Des demandeurs d’asile qui, pour la plupart, souhaitent se rendre dans d’autres pays européens.

    Les Pays-Bas ou l’Autriche ont fait pression pour que la #Bulgarie réduise ce nombre, agitant la menace d’un report de son intégration à l’espace Schengen. Dans le même temps, des ONG locales, comme le Helsinki Committee Center ou le Refugee Help Group, dénoncent la brutalité qui s’exerce sur les exilé·es et les refoulements massifs dont ils sont victimes. Le pays a construit une clôture de 234 kilomètres le long de sa frontière avec la Turquie.

    Dans son plan d’action, le gouvernement bulgare détaille son intention de dépenser l’argent européen du fonds relatif à la gestion des frontières, sur la période 2021-2027, pour renforcer son « système de surveillance intégré » ; une collecte de données en temps réel par des caméras thermiques, des #capteurs_de_mouvements, des systèmes de surveillance mobiles, des #hélicoptères.

    Philip Gounev est consultant dans le domaine de la gestion des frontières. Il fut surtout ministre adjoint des affaires intérieures en Bulgarie, chargé des fonds européens, mais aussi de l’érection de la barrière à la frontière turque. Il explique très clairement la complémentarité, à ses yeux, des différents dispositifs : « Notre barrière ne fait que ralentir les migrants de cinq minutes. Mais ces cinq minutes sont importantes. Grâce aux caméras et capteurs qui détectent des mouvements ou une brèche dans la barrière, l’intervention des gardes-frontières est rapide. »

    L’appétit pour les technologies et le numérique ne fait que croître, au point que des ONG, comme l’EDRi (European Digital Rights) dénoncent la construction par l’UE d’un « #mur_numérique ». Dans ce domaine, le programme de recherche européen #Horizon_Europe et, avant lui, #Horizon_2020, tracent les contours du futur numérisé des contrôles, par le financement de projets portés par l’industrie et des centres de #recherche, au caractère parfois dystopique.

    De 2017 à 2021, « #Roborder » a reçu une aide publique de 8 millions d’euros. L’idée est de déployer une armada de véhicules sans pilotes, sur la mer ou sur terre, ainsi que différents drones, tous munis de caméras et capteurs, et dont les informations seraient croisées et analysées pour donner une image précise des mouvements humains aux abords des frontières. Dans son programme d’action national d’utilisation du fonds européen pour la gestion des frontières, la Hongrie manifeste un intérêt appuyé pour « l’adaptation partielle des résultats » de Roborder via une série de projets pilotes à ses frontières.

    Les #projets_de_recherche dans le domaine des frontières sont nombreux. Citons « #Foldout », dont les 8 millions d’euros servent à développer des technologies de #détection de personnes, à travers des #feuillages épais « dans les zones les plus reculées de l’Union européenne ». « Le développement de technologies et de l’#intelligence_artificielle aux frontières de l’Europe est potentiellement plus puissant que des murs, décrypte Sarah Chandler, de l’EDRi. Notre inquiétude, c’est que ces technologies soient utilisées pour des #refoulements aux frontières. »

    D’autres projets, développés sous l’impulsion de #Frontex, utilisent les croisements de #données et l’intelligence artificielle pour analyser, voire prédire, les mouvements migratoires. « Le déploiement de nouvelles technologies de surveillance, avec la construction de barrières pour bloquer les routes migratoires, est intimement lié à des dangers accrus et provoque davantage de morts des personnes en mouvement », peut-on lire dans un rapport de Statewatch. Dans un contexte de droitisation de nombreux États membres de l’Union européenne, Philip Gounev pense de son côté que « le financement de barrières physiques par l’UE deviendra inévitable ».

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170723/migrations-l-union-europeenne-droit-dans-le-mur
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #migrations #financement #UE #EU #Union_européenne #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel

  • Dans la Manche, l’État sous-traite le sauvetage d’exilés à une société privée

    Le ministère des armées a signé un marché avec l’entreprise #SeaOwl, qui fournit, depuis le printemps, deux #bateaux pour des missions de sauvetage au large de #Dunkerque et de #Calais. Une première. D’après nos informations, des questions émergent autour de la formation des équipages et des performances des navires.

    AccostéAccosté à un quai du port de Dunkerque, l’#Esvagt_Charlie se remarque de loin. Sa coque rouge de 40 mètres de long sur laquelle sont inscrits les mots « RESCUE ZONE » ne laisse aucun doute : il s’agit de l’un des deux nouveaux moyens de sauvetage déployés par la France dans la Manche. Sur le pont, quatre marins s’activent, avant de se murer dans le silence à la moindre question. La capitaine renvoie vers la préfecture maritime. Tous ont l’ordre de ne pas parler à la presse.

    Les deux marchés conclus en mars et en avril 2023 entre le ministère des armées et l’entreprise SeaOwl, qui fournit ces bateaux et leur équipage, sanctionnent en effet de pénalités financières toute communication sans « accord préalable de l’autorité maritime ». Ce #marché_public est une première : jamais l’État français n’avait lancé d’appel d’offres en direction du privé pour une mission entièrement dédiée au sauvetage d’exilé·es.

    Depuis 2019 et l’augmentation du nombre de passages par la mer, la préfecture maritime de la Manche et de la mer du Nord coordonne en effet les opérations de sauvetage avec les moyens de la marine nationale, des douanes, de la Société nationale de sauvetage en mer (SNSM), de la gendarmerie maritime ou des Abeilles, ces remorqueurs destinés aux bateaux de marchandises ou ferries. Parmi tous ces acteurs, seule la SNSM, une association d’utilité publique, est exclusivement dédiée au sauvetage et composée de sauveteurs bénévoles.

    En optant pour une société privée, l’État montre son incapacité à mobiliser ses propres moyens. « Dans le #Pas-de-Calais, tout le système a été conçu pour le sauvetage des biens et des gros bateaux. Jamais personne n’a vu venir la question de la mort massive en mer », analyse Vincent Guigueno, historien spécialiste des enjeux maritimes et conférencier à Sciences Po Paris.

    Deux bateaux ont ainsi été affrétés par SeaOwl : l’Esvagt Charlie, depuis début avril à Dunkerque ; et l’#Apollo_Moon, depuis début mai à Calais. #Coût du marché, d’après nos informations : 4 millions d’euros par an pour chaque bateau, renouvelable au bout de quatre années.

    Rachetée en 2021 par l’homme d’affaires #Walter_Butler, SeaOwl est spécialisée dans les technologies de défense maritime (drones flottants armés, surveillance, navire d’entraînement pour la marine) et propose des services de sécurité pour des plateformes offshore en Asie, en Afrique ou au Moyen-Orient.

    Ce recours au privé a été annoncé en décembre 2022 par la première ministre Élisabeth Borne, après qu’un naufrage a fait 27 morts et quatre disparus à la fin 2021, et dans la foulée de révélations du Monde sur l’attitude, ce jour-là, de certains militaires du centre régional opérationnel de surveillance et de sauvetage (Cross) de Gris-Nez – sept militaires ont depuis été mis en examen pour « non-assistance à personne en danger ».

    Mais si les spécialistes du monde maritime interrogés saluent le renforcement du dispositif de sauvetage, les interrogations se multiplient quant à l’efficacité opérationnelle des deux navires de SeaOwl, à l’heure où la capacité des embarcations d’exilé·es augmente jusqu’à 40 voire 60 personnes. « Il fallait vite mettre quelque chose en place. Sauf que quand on fait les choses dans l’urgence, dans le domaine du sauvetage, on fait n’importe quoi, n’importe comment », expose Jean-Paul Hellequin, marin à la retraite, porte-parole du syndicat des marins CGT du Grand Ouest et président de l’association de défense des marins Mor Glaz.

    Ainsi, à l’arrivée de l’Esvagt Charlie, à la mi-avril, « il y avait zéro personne formée à bord », témoigne sous couvert d’anonymat l’un des membres d’équipage. « Il n’y en a pas un qui ait de l’expérience dans ce que ce bateau est censé faire : sauver beaucoup de gens à la fois. » À bord, ils sont six marins recrutés par SeaOwl, à alterner tous les quinze jours avec une autre équipe.

    En plus de ces marins, les navires embarquent en permanence « des agents de sécurité, ni marins ni secouristes ». Embauchés eux aussi par SeaOwl, il s’agit d’« une équipe dite de protection, composée de trois personnes », confirme le secrétariat général de la mer, organe interministériel dirigé par l’ancien préfet de police de Paris, Didier Lallement, sous l’autorité de la première ministre. Mission : « Aider à prendre en charge et gérer les naufragés ».

    Pas de formation en sauvetage de masse prévue dans l’appel d’offres

    Mais avec quelle #formation ? « Leur métier est la sécurité, ils ne sont pas là pour prendre soin... Ils sont là pour fouiller les naufragés, fustige le marin déjà cité. Cela relève d’un fantasme entourant ces gens qui traversent, comme s’ils pouvaient représenter un danger. » « Le cas échéant, [cette équipe] est en mesure de protéger l’équipage », soutient le secrétariat général de la mer.

    Le cahier des clauses, consulté par Mediapart, reste vague quant aux exigences de formation de l’équipage. « Il n’existe pas de formation institutionnelle en matière de sauvetage de masse définie par l’organisation maritime internationale. Cela ne pouvait donc pas être intégré dans les prérequis de l’appel d’offres », justifie l’équipe de Didier Lallement. En renvoyant la balle au titulaire du marché : « Il [lui] appartient de prendre les dispositions requises pour que ses navires soient en mesure de réaliser la mission ordonnée dans de bonnes conditions. »

    Pourtant, des formations sont organisées depuis janvier 2022 auprès de plusieurs administrations intervenant dans la Manche, comme la marine, les douanes, les affaires maritimes... Elles sont délivrées par Arnaud Banos, formateur pour la SNSM, l’une des rares personnes à pouvoir former au sauvetage de masse en France. Directeur de recherche au CNRS et sauveteur auprès d’ONG en Méditerranée, Arnaud Banos affirme avoir été contacté « début juin » par la préfecture maritime afin de former les équipages de SeaOwl. Mais aucune date n’a pour l’instant été fixée.

    L’Esvagt Charlie est déjà intervenu sur quatre opérations de sauvetage (38 personnes le 18 mai, 17 dans la nuit du 27 au 28 mai, 45 le 12 juin, et 54 dans la nuit du 20 au 21 juin), et les semaines continuent donc de défiler sans équipage formé. « Le jour où un naufrage avec quelque chose de grave se passe, ça va être le gros merdier », craint un marin.

    « Les opérations de sauvetage impliquant des dizaines de naufragés sont très complexes à mener et mettent en danger aussi bien les naufragés que les équipages », complète Arnaud Banos.

    Un vieux navire censé jouer les ambulances

    Par ailleurs, pour plusieurs experts interrogés, les caractéristiques techniques des bateaux ne sont pas à la hauteur des enjeux. L’Esvagt Charlie, un bateau vieux de presque 50 ans, ne dépasse pas les 10 nœuds (18 km/h) ; pas plus que son homologue l’Apollo Moon, ex-navire de pêche. À titre de comparaison, certains canots de la Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) anglaise ou de la SNSM atteignent les 25 nœuds (46 km/h), soit plus du double.

    « On ne transforme pas en quelque temps des chalutiers ou de vieux navires en des ambulances de la mer », raille Jean-Paul Hellequin. « La rapidité d’intervention est primordiale », complète un acteur expérimenté du sauvetage dans la Manche, souhaitant pour sa part rester anonyme. « S’il y a une urgence vitale, dans une nuit très chargée, ils ne pourront pas agir dans la seconde », abonde Flore, responsable communication de l’association d’aide aux exilé·es Utopia 56. « En période hivernale, quand les personnes sont gelées, avec les risques d’hypothermie, il y a aussi un vrai enjeu à rentrer vite au port », s’inquiète-t-elle.

    L’accord-cadre exige certes un tirant d’eau maximum (partie immergée du bateau) de 4,5 mètres, afin de pouvoir opérer dans les zones de petits fonds du détroit. Ceux des deux navires atteignent 4,20 mètres... Encore trop, selon le spécialiste du sauvetage interrogé sous anonymat : « En mer du Nord, il y a des bancs de sable partout, durs comme la pierre. À 4,20 mètres ça ne passe pas : s’ils les touchent, ils s’échouent et ne peuvent pas intervenir sur les embarcations. »

    Enfin, le franc-bord (hauteur entre la ligne de flottaison sur l’eau et le pont principal) de l’Apollo Moon est très haut. « Même avec un franc-bord d’à peine un mètre, c’est déjà un défi de sortir les gens de l’eau », insiste cet acteur du sauvetage. L’Esvagt Charlie et l’Apollo Moon fonctionnent avec des zodiacs mis à l’eau par une grue. L’accord-cadre prévoit que les bateaux disposent d’une zone de sauvetage « abaissée » pour faciliter la remontée des naufragé·es depuis ces zodiacs. L’Esvagt Charlie en a une, mais pas l’Apollo Moon.

    Son pont, situé à plusieurs mètres au-dessus de l’eau, rend donc impossible la remontée sans utiliser à nouveau les grues. Avec ce système, « on ne prend que quelques naufragés à chaque fois, pas 50. Cela peut durer longtemps : le problème de l’hypothermie arrive très vite, on risque de perdre du monde », avertit l’expert interrogé. « Je pense que les armateurs français auraient pu fournir des navires plus modernes et plus adéquats », conclut pour sa part Jean-Paul Hellequin.

    « Obligation de moyens, pas de résultats »

    D’autres experts sont plus nuancés. « La question, c’est les compétences de l’équipage. Les compétences s’articulent à l’outil technique que vous avez », recentre Vincent Guigueno. Les traversées dans la Manche sont « une situation neuve. La période d’adaptation est courte. L’État fait ce qu’il peut », relève aussi le marin interrogé sous anonymat.

    En janvier dernier, lors de la présentation du bilan annuel de la préfecture maritime de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, le préfet Marc Véran a déclaré que « l’État a une obligation de moyens, pas de résultats ». Et de comparer les risques encourus par les exilé·es à ceux liés aux avalanches pour les skieurs en hors-piste : « Les sauveteurs vont tout faire pour vous sauver, mais ils n’y arriveront peut-être pas. Nous, c’est pareil. » Ces deux nouveaux bateaux permettent donc à l’État de répondre à son obligation de moyens…

    Alors que l’État va dépenser 550 millions d’euros reçus du Royaume-Uni (via un accord signé en novembre 2022) dans la sécurisation du littoral et l’interception des départs, aucun investissement n’est pour le moment prévu pour renforcer ses effectifs de sauvetage en mer. En revanche, 500 agents de police supplémentaires doivent être déployés, et un centre de rétention administrative (CRA) construit.

    « Les différentes administrations se demandent sur qui va retomber la responsabilité dans le cas d’un nouveau naufrage », conclut l’historien Vincent Guigueno. « L’idée, c’est de mettre en place le storytelling, et de pouvoir dire : “On a mis des moyens supplémentaires”, si un nouveau drame se produit. »

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/270623/dans-la-manche-l-etat-sous-traite-le-sauvetage-d-exiles-une-societe-privee
    #sous-traitance #France #sauvetage #migrations #asile #privatisation #réfugiés #frontières #Manche #complexe_militaro-industriel

  • Who profits from brutal and muderous Pushbacks?

    The podcast is in English

    Anlässlich des World Refugee Days am 20. Juni hört ihr einen Podcast von unserem Kooperationsradio Radio Mytilini auf Lesvos. Es geht um die brutalen und mörderischen Pushbacks an den Außengrenzen der EU und wer davon finanziell profitiert. Die Menschen die solche Pushbacks durchführen werden dafür bezahlt, wo das Geld herkommt erfahrt ihr in dieser Sendung.

    https://de.cba.fro.at/624115
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #push-backs #refoulements #frontières #profit #Grèce #responsabilité #mer_Egée #Evros #frontières_terrestres #frontières_maritimes #violence #complexe_militaro-industriel #integrated_border_management_fund #technologie #Thales #Frontex #european_peace_facility #visa #industrie_militaire #consultants #McKinzie #accord_UE-Turquie

    #podcast #audio

    ping @_kg_ @kaparia

  • UK provided £3m to Turkish border forces to stop migrants, FOI reveals

    Investigation shows Home Office funds ‘return and reintegration assistance’ and provides equipment and training to Turkish police

    The Home Office has provided more than £3m in funding to Turkish border forces in the last year to prevent migrants reaching the UK, an investigation for the Guardian has found.

    Funding to Turkey’s border force operations has increased substantially from 2019, when £14,000 was given to Turkish police and coastguard for maritime border security training, according to documents obtained through freedom of information (FOI) requests. That figure rose to £425,000 in 2021-22 for training and equipment and up to £3m this year for “return and reintegration assistance”, training and personnel.

    The funding was diverted from the official development assistance (ODA) budget and delivered through Home Office International Operations, part of the department’s Intelligence Directorate.

    In addition to funding, the Home Office has also supplied Turkish border forces, including the National Police and the coastguard, with equipment and training. In June 2022, nine vehicles were handed over by the UK’s deputy high commissioner to the Turkish National Police on the border with Iran.

    Last year Turkey said it “turned back” 238,448 migrants at its eastern border with Iran. Video evidence seen by the Guardian shows cases of extreme violence and force used against Afghan migrants attempting to cross the border into Turkey. This includes the authorities firing live bullet rounds as people flee, including at the feet of children; beatings using rifle butts; robberies; humiliation tactics and pushing people back to the other side of the border.

    Mahmut Kaçan, a Turkish lawyer working on asylum and human rights abuses, said the deaths and pushbacks on the border began escalating two years ago. “The UNHCR never criticises or mentions what Turkey is doing at the border. They are complicit in the deaths of these people, as are the EU and other countries that are giving money to Turkey for border security.”

    A source with knowledge of the Home Office International Operations team said Turkey had become “a country of emerging importance [to the UK government] in the last two to three years and is now seen as strategically crucial to border securitisation”.

    “We offer our expertise and provide officials [locally] with evidence, showing the routes we think illegal migrants or gangs are operating along,” the source said. “It’ll probably be along the lines of: ‘This is a route smugglers and illegal migrants use to get to the UK, we need to do more to stop it.’ The Turkish government will then respond by saying: ‘This is what we need to be able to do that’, and then we fund it, basically.”

    The source added: “We don’t tend to hold local forces to account with any targets but certainly if we say: ‘We need to bolster X area of border security’, Turkey might respond by saying they need Y in order to boost border officer numbers and we’ll help them to do that.”

    Another source familiar with the work of the Home Office International Operations unit said: “Us paying for stuff like that builds our soft power credentials in other areas, such as possible returns agreements. It’s like a mini FCDO [Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office] inside the Home Office.”

    Sources added that Home Office operations overseas involved intelligence gathering through interviews with migrants who had arrived in the UK. Information from those interviews is then passed on to border forces locally to “put an operational plan in place to stop it”.

    Documents obtained through an FOI request also show that the Home Office has increased the number of its staff deployed to work at post, with sources from the FCDO saying Home Office staff now outnumbers diplomats working in Turkey.

    “The Home Office is seen by international partners as quite hostile, quite adversarial,” said a senior government source with knowledge of the department’s operations in Turkey. “The FCDO, on the other hand, is viewed as relatively collegiate and collaborative. In this context, there are obvious tensions in the approach and the culture among staff.”

    The department’s 2025 Border Strategy states that one of its key priorities is to “improve our use of upstream illegal migration countermeasures to prevent irregular entry into the UK”.

    It also stipulates the department will “prevent entry into the UK through improved border security and through work with source and transit countries to support them in addressing irregular migration challenges within their region”.

    Mary Atkinson, campaigns and networks manager at JCWI, said: “This government has shown that it will break international law to prevent people from exercising the fundamental human right to seek safety.

    “Whether on the border between Turkey and Iran, or those of France or Belgium, this government is covertly funding others to do its dirty work, while at the same time ramping up its xenophobic rhetoric against the few that do finally make it here.”

    In response to the findings of the investigation, a spokesperson for the Home Office said: “Like many other European states, the UK works tirelessly at home and abroad on a range of priorities, including tackling illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and modern slavery. This includes mutually beneficial close working with our operational counterparts in a range of partner countries, like Turkey, to tackle these and wider socially damaging issues.”

    https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/jun/07/uk-provided-3m-to-turkish-border-forces-to-stop-migrants-foi-reveals

    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #UK #Angleterre #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #renvois #réintégration #financement #aide_financière #militarisation_des_frontières #aide_au_développement #développement #coopération_au_développement #refoulements #push-backs #complexe_militaro-industriel #2025 _Border_Strategy #Home_Office

  • UK signs contract with US startup to identify migrants in small-boat crossings

    The UK government has turned a US-based startup specialized in artificial intelligence as part of its pledge to stop small-boat crossings. Experts have already pointed out the legal and logistical challenges of the plan.

    In a new effort to address the high number of Channel crossings, the UK Home Office is working with the US defense startup #Anduril, specialized in the use of artificial intelligence (AI).

    A surveillance tower has already been installed at Dover, and other technologies might be rolled out with the onset of warmer temperatures and renewed attempts by migrants to reach the UK. Some experts already point out the risks and practical loopholes involved in using AI to identify migrants.

    “This is obviously the next step of the illegal migration bill,” said Olivier Cahn, a researcher specialized in penal law.

    “The goal is to retrieve images that were taken at sea and use AI to show they entered UK territory illegally even if people vanish into thin air upon arrival in the UK.”

    The “illegal migration bill” was passed by the UK last month barring anyone from entering the country irregularly from filing an asylum claim and imposing a “legal duty” to remove them to a third country.
    Who is behind Anduril?

    Founded in 2017 by its CEO #Palmer_Luckey, Anduril is backed by #Peter_Thiel, a Silicon Valley investor and supporter of Donald Trump. The company has supplied autonomous surveillance technology to the US Department of Defense (DOD) to detect and track migrants trying to cross the US-Mexico border.

    In 2021, the UK Ministry of Defence awarded Anduril with a £3.8-million contract to trial an advanced base defence system. Anduril eventually opened a branch in London where it states its mission: “combining the latest in artificial intelligence with commercial-of-the-shelf sensor technology (EO, IR, Radar, Lidar, UGS, sUAS) to enhance national security through automated detection, identification and tracking of objects of interest.”

    According to Cahn, the advantage of Brexit is that the UK government is no longer required to submit to the General Data Protection Regulation (RGPDP), a component of data protection that also addresses the transfer of personal data outside the EU and EEA areas.

    “Even so, the UK has data protection laws of its own which the government cannot breach. Where will the servers with the incoming data be kept? What are the rights of appeal for UK citizens whose data is being processed by the servers?”, he asked.

    ’Smugglers will provide migrants with balaclavas for an extra 15 euros’

    Cahn also pointed out the technical difficulties of identifying migrants at sea. “The weather conditions are often not ideal, and many small-boat crossings happen at night. How will facial recognition technology operate in this context?”

    The ability of migrants and smugglers to adapt is yet another factor. “People are going to cover their faces, and anyone would think the smugglers will respond by providing migrants with balaclavas for an extra 15 euros.”

    If the UK has solicited the services of a US startup to detect and identify migrants, the reason may lie in AI’s principle of self-learning. “A machine accumulates data and recognizes what it has already seen. The US is a country with a significantly more racially and ethnically diverse population than the UK. Its artificial intelligence might contain data from populations which are more ethnically comparable to the populations that are crossing the Channel, like Somalia for example, thus facilitating the process of facial recognition.”

    For Cahn, it is not capturing the images which will be the most difficult but the legal challenges that will arise out of their usage. “People are going to be identified and there are going to be errors. If a file exists, there needs to be the possibility for individuals to appear before justice and have access to a judge.”

    A societal uproar

    In a research paper titled “Refugee protection in the artificial intelligence Era”, Chatham House notes “the most common ethical and legal challenges associated with the use of AI in asylum and related border and immigration systems involve issues of opacity and unpredictability, the potential for bias and unlawful discrimination, and how such factors affect the ability of individuals to obtain a remedy in the event of erroneous or unfair decisions.”

    For Cahn, the UK government’s usage of AI can only be used to justify and reinforce its hardline position against migrants. “For a government that doesn’t respect the Geneva Convention [whose core principle is non-refoulement, editor’s note] and which passed an illegal migration law, it is out of the question that migrants have entered the territory legally.”

    Identifying migrants crossing the Channel is not going to be the hardest part for the UK government. Cahn imagines a societal backlash with, “the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom being solicited, refugees seeking remedies to legal decisions through lawyers and associations attacking”.

    He added there would be due process concerning the storage of the data, with judges issuing disclosure orders. “There is going to be a whole series of questions which the government will have to elucidate. The rights of refugees are often used as a laboratory. If these technologies are ’successful’, they will soon be applied to the rest of the population."

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/48326/uk-signs-contract-with-us-startup-to-identify-migrants-in-smallboat-cr

    #UK #Angleterre #migrations #asile #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #start-up #complexe_militaro-industriel #IA #intelligence_artificielle #surveillance #technologie #channel #Manche

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur la Bibby Stockholm:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1016683

    • Huge barge set to house 500 asylum seekers arrives in the UK

      The #Bibby_Stockholm is being refitted in #Falmouth to increase its capacity from 222 to 506 people.

      A barge set to house 500 asylum seekers has arrived in the UK as the government struggles with efforts to move migrants out of hotels.

      The Independent understands that people will not be transferred onto the Bibby Stockholm until July, following refurbishment to increase its capacity and safety checks.

      The barge has been towed from its former berth in Italy to the port of Falmouth, in Cornwall.

      It will remain there while works are carried out, before being moved onto its final destination in #Portland, Dorset.

      The private operators of the port struck an agreement to host the barge with the Home Office without formal public consultation, angering the local council and residents.

      Conservative MP Richard Drax previously told The Independent legal action was still being considered to stop the government’s plans for what he labelled a “quasi-prison”.

      He accused ministers and Home Office officials of being “unable to answer” practical questions on how the barge will operate, such as how asylum seekers will be able to come and go safely through the port, what activities they will be provided with and how sufficient healthcare will be ensured.

      “The question is how do we cope?” Mr Drax said. “Every organisation has its own raft of questions: ‘Where’s the money coming from? Who’s going to do what if this all happens?’ There are not sufficient answers, which is very worrying.”

      The Independent previously revealed that asylum seekers will have less living space than an average parking bay on the Bibby Stockholm, which saw at least one person die and reports of rape and abuse on board when it was used by the Dutch government to detain migrants in the 2000s.

      An official brochure released by owner Bibby Marine shows there are only 222 “single en-suite bedrooms” on board, meaning that at least two people must be crammed into every cabin for the government to achieve its aim of holding 500 people.

      Dorset Council has said it still had “serious reservations about the appropriateness of Portland Port in this scenario and remains opposed to the proposals”.

      The Conservative police and crime commissioner for Dorset is demanding extra government funding for the local force to “meet the extra policing needs that this project will entail”.

      A multi-agency forum including representatives from national, regional and local public sector agencies has been looking at plans for the provision of health services, the safety and security of both asylum seekers and local residents and charity involvement.

      Portland Port said it had been working with the Home Office and local agencies to ensure the safe arrival and operation of the Bibby Stockholm, and to minimise its impact locally.

      The barge is part of a wider government push to move migrants out of hotels, which are currently housing more than 47,000 asylum seekers at a cost of £6m a day.

      But the use of ships as accommodation was previously ruled out on cost grounds by the Treasury, when Rishi Sunak was chancellor, and the government has not confirmed how much it will be spending on the scheme.

      Ministers have also identified several former military and government sites, including two defunct airbases and an empty prison, that they want to transform into asylum accommodation.

      But a court battle with Braintree District Council over former RAF Wethersfield is ongoing, and legal action has also been threatened over similar plans for RAF Scampton in Lancashire.

      Last month, a barrister representing home secretary Suella Braverman told the High Court that 56,000 people were expected to arrive on small boats in 2023 and that some could be made homeless if hotel places are not found.

      A record backlog of asylum applications, driven by the increase in Channel crossings and a collapse in Home Office decision-making, mean the government is having to provide accommodation for longer while claims are considered.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/barge-falmouth-cornwall-migrants-bibby-b2333313.html
      #barge #bateau

    • ‘Performative cruelty’ : the hostile architecture of the UK government’s migrant barge

      The arrival of the Bibby Stockholm barge at Portland Port, in Dorset, on July 18 2023, marks a new low in the UK government’s hostile immigration environment. The vessel is set to accommodate over 500 asylum seekers. This, the Home Office argues, will benefit British taxpayers and local residents.

      The barge, however, was immediately rejected by the local population and Dorset council. Several British charities and church groups have condemned the barge, and the illegal migration bill it accompanies, as “an affront to human dignity”.

      Anti-immigration groups have also protested against the barge, with some adopting offensive language, referring to the asylum seekers who will be hosted there as “bargies”. Conservative MP for South Dorset Richard Drax has claimed that hosting migrants at sea would exacerbate tenfold the issues that have arisen in hotels to date, namely sexual assaults, children disappearing and local residents protesting.

      My research shows that facilities built to house irregular migrants in Europe and beyond create a temporary infrastructure designed to be hostile. Governments thereby effectively make asylum seekers more displaceable while ignoring their everyday spatial and social needs.
      Precarious space

      The official brochure plans for the Bibby Stockholm show 222 single bedrooms over three stories, built around two small internal courtyards. It has now been retrofitted with bunk beds to host more than 500 single men – more than double the number it was designed to host.

      Journalists Lizzie Dearden and Martha McHardy have shown this means the asylum seekers housed there – for up to nine months – will have “less living space than an average parking bay”. This stands in contravention of international standards of a minimum 4.5m² of covered living space per person in cold climates, where more time is spent indoors.

      In an open letter, dated June 15 2023 and addressed to home secretary Suella Braverman, over 700 people and nearly 100 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) voiced concerns that this will only add to the trauma migrants have already experienced:

      Housing people on a sea barge – which we argue is equal to a floating prison – is morally indefensible, and threatens to retraumatise a group of already vulnerable people.

      Locals are concerned already overstretched services in Portland, including GP practices, will not be able to cope with further pressure. West Dorset MP Chris Lode has questioned whether the barge itself is safe “to cope with double the weight that it was designed to bear”. A caller to the LBC radio station, meanwhile, has voiced concerns over the vessel’s very narrow and low fire escape routes, saying: “What they [the government] are effectively doing here is creating a potential Grenfell on water, a floating coffin.”

      Such fears are not unfounded. There have been several cases of fires destroying migrant camps in Europe, from the Grand-Synthe camp near Dunkirk in France, in 2017, to the 2020 fire at the Moria camp in Greece. The difficulty of escaping a vessel at sea could turn it into a death trap.

      Performative hostility

      Research on migrant accommodation shows that being able to inhabit a place – even temporarily – and develop feelings of attachment and belonging, is crucial to a person’s wellbeing. Even amid ever tighter border controls, migrants in Europe, who can be described as “stuck on the move”, nonetheless still attempt to inhabit their temporary spaces and form such connections.

      However, designs can hamper such efforts when they concentrate asylum seekers in inhospitable, cut-off spaces. In 2015, Berlin officials began temporarily housing refugees in the former Tempelhof airport, a noisy, alienating industrial space, lacking in privacy and disconnected from the city. Many people ended up staying there for the better part of a year.

      French authorities, meanwhile, opened the Centre Humanitaire Paris-Nord in Paris in 2016, temporary migrant housing in a disused train depot. Nicknamed la Bulle (the bubble) for its bulbous inflatable covering, this facility was noisy and claustrophobic, lacking in basic comforts.

      Like the barge in Portland Port, these facilities, placed in industrial sites, sit uncomfortably between hospitality and hostility. The barge will be fenced off, since the port is a secured zone, and access will be heavily restricted and controlled. The Home Office insists that the barge is not a floating prison, yet it is an unmistakably hostile space.

      Infrastructure for water and electricity will physically link the barge to shore. However, Dorset council has no jurisdiction at sea.

      The commercial agreement on the barge was signed between the Home Office and Portland Port, not the council. Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission.

      This makes the barge an island of sorts, where other rules apply, much like those islands in the Aegean sea and in the Pacific, on which Greece and Australia have respectively housed migrants.

      I have shown how facilities are often designed in this way not to give displaced people any agency, but, on the contrary, to objectify them. They heighten the instability migrants face, keeping them detached from local communities and constantly on the move.

      The government has presented the barge as a cheaper solution than the £6.8 million it is currently spending, daily, on housing asylum seekers in hotels. A recent report by two NGOs, Reclaim the Seas and One Life to Live, concludes, however, that it will save less than £10 a person a day. It could even prove more expensive than the hotel model.

      Sarah Teather, director of the Jesuit Refugee Service UK charity, has described the illegal migration bill as “performative cruelty”. Images of the barge which have flooded the news certainly meet that description too.

      However threatening these images might be, though, they will not stop desperate people from attempting to come to the UK to seek safety. Rather than deterring asylum seekers, the Bibby Stockholm is potentially creating another hazard to them and to their hosting communities.

      https://theconversation.com/performative-cruelty-the-hostile-architecture-of-the-uk-governments

      –---

      Point intéressant, lié à l’aménagement du territoire :

      “Since the vessel is positioned below the mean low water mark, it did not require planning permission”

      C’est un peu comme les #zones_frontalières qui ont été créées un peu partout en Europe (et pas que) pour que les Etats se débarassent des règles en vigueur (notamment le principe du non-refoulement). Voir cette métaliste, à laquelle j’ajoute aussi cet exemple :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/795053

      voir aussi :

      The circumstances at Portland Port are very different because where the barge is to be positioned is below the mean low water mark. This means that the barge is outside of our planning control and there is no requirement for planning permission from the council.

      https://news.dorsetcouncil.gov.uk/2023/07/18/leaders-comments-on-the-home-office-barge

      #hostile_architecture #architecture_hostile #dignité #espace #Portland #hostilité #hostilité_performative #île #infrastructure #extraterritorialité #extra-territorialité #prix #coût

    • Sur l’#histoire (notamment liées au commerce d’ #esclaves) de la Bibby Stockholm :

      Bibby Line, shipowners

      Information
      From Guide to the Records of Merseyside Maritime Museum, volume 1: Bibby Line. In 1807 John Bibby and John Highfield, Liverpool shipbrokers, began taking shares in ships, mainly Parkgate Dublin packets. By 1821 (the end of the partnership) they had vessels sailing to the Mediterranean and South America. In 1850 they expanded their Mediterranean and Black Sea interests by buying two steamers and by 1865 their fleet had increased to twenty three. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 severely affected their business and Frederick Leyland, their general manager, failed to persuade the family partners to diversify onto the Atlantic. Eventually, he bought them out in 1873. In 1889 the Bibby family revived its shipowning interests with a successful passenger cargo service to Burma. From 1893 it also began to carry British troops to overseas postings which remained a Bibby staple until 1962. The Burma service ended in 1971 and the company moved to new areas of shipowning including bulkers, gas tankers and accommodation barges. It still has its head office in Liverpool where most management records are held. The museum holds models of the Staffordshire (1929) and Oxfordshire (1955). For further details see the attached catalogue or contact The Archives Centre for a copy of the catalogue.

      The earliest records within the collection, the ships’ logs at B/BIBBY/1/1/1 - 1/1/3 show company vessels travelling between Europe and South America carrying cargoes that would have been produced on plantations using the labour of enslaved peoples or used within plantation and slave based economies. For example the vessel Thomas (B/BIBBY/1/1/1) carries a cargo of iron hoops for barrels to Brazil in 1812. The Mary Bibby on a voyage in 1825-1826 loads a cargo of sugar in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to carry to Rotterdam. The log (B/BIBBY/1/1/3) records the use of ’negroes’ to work with the ship’s carpenter while the vessel is in port.

      In September 1980 the latest Bibby vessel to hold the name Derbyshire was lost with all hands in the South China Sea. This collection does not include records relating to that vessel or its sinking, apart from a copy ’Motor vessel ’Derbyshire’, 1976-80: in memoriam’ at reference B/BIBBY/3/2/1 (a copy is also available in The Archives Centre library collection at 340.DER). Information about the sinking and subsequent campaigning by the victims’ family can be found on the NML website and in the Life On Board gallery. The Archives Centre holds papers of Captain David Ramwell who assisted the Derbyshire Family Association at D/RAM and other smaller collections of related documents within the DX collection.

      https://www.liverpoolmuseums.org.uk/artifact/bibby-line-shipowners

      –—
      An Open Letter to #Bibby_Marine

      Links between your parent company #Bibby_Line_Group (#BLG) and the slave trade have repeatedly been made. If true, we appeal to you to consider what actions you might take in recompense.

      Bibby Marine’s modern slavery statement says that one of the company’s values is to “do the right thing”, and that you “strongly support the eradication of slavery, as well as the eradication of servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking”. These are admirable words.

      Meanwhile, your parent company’s website says that it is “family owned with a rich history”. Please will you clarify whether this rich history includes slaving voyages where ships were owned, and cargoes transported, by BLG’s founder John Bibby, six generations ago. The BLG website says that in 1807 (which is when slavery was abolished in Britain), “John Bibby began trading as a shipowner in Liverpool with his partner John Highfield”. John Bibby is listed as co-owner of three slaving ships, of which John Highfield co-owned two:

      In 1805, the Harmonie (co-owned by #John_Bibby and three others, including John Highfield) left Liverpool for a voyage which carried 250 captives purchased in West Central Africa and St Helena, delivering them to Cumingsberg in 1806 (see the SlaveVoyages database using Voyage ID 81732).
      In 1806, the Sally (co-owned by John Bibby and two others) left Liverpool for a voyage which transported 250 captives purchased in Bassa and delivered them to Barbados (see the SlaveVoyages database using Voyage ID 83481).
      In 1806, the Eagle (co-owned by John Bibby and four others, including John Highfield) left Liverpool for a voyage which transported 237 captives purchased in Cameroon and delivered them to Kingston in 1807 (see the SlaveVoyages database using Voyage ID 81106).

      The same and related claims were recently mentioned by Private Eye. They also appear in the story of Liverpool’s Calderstones Park [PDF] and on the website of National Museums Liverpool and in this blog post “Shenanigans in Shipping” (a detailed history of the BLG). They are also mentioned by Laurence Westgaph, a TV presenter specialising in Black British history and slavery and the author of Read The Signs: Street Names with a Connection to the Transatlantic Slave Trade and Abolition in Liverpool [PDF], published with the support of English Heritage, The City of Liverpool, Northwest Regional Development Agency, National Museums Liverpool and Liverpool Vision.

      While of course your public pledges on slavery underline that there is no possibility of there being any link between the activities of John Bibby and John Highfield in the early 1800s and your activities in 2023, we do believe that it is in the public interest to raise this connection, and to ask for a public expression of your categorical renunciation of the reported slave trade activities of Mr Bibby and Mr Highfield.

      https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/an-open-letter-to-bibby-marine

      –-

      Très peu d’info sur John Bibby sur wikipedia :

      John Bibby (19 February 1775 – 17 July 1840) was the founder of the British Bibby Line shipping company. He was born in Eccleston, near Ormskirk, Lancashire. He was murdered on 17 July 1840 on his way home from dinner at a friend’s house in Kirkdale.[1]


      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Bibby_(businessman)

    • ‘Floating Prisons’: The 200-year-old family #business behind the Bibby Stockholm

      #Bibby_Line_Group_Limited is a UK company offering financial, marine and construction services to clients in at least 16 countries around the world. It recently made headlines after the government announced one of the firm’s vessels, Bibby Stockholm, would be used to accommodate asylum seekers on the Dorset coast.

      In tandem with plans to house migrants at surplus military sites, the move was heralded by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Home Secretary Suella Braverman as a way of mitigating the £6m-a-day cost of hotel accommodation amid the massive ongoing backlog of asylum claims, as well as deterring refugees from making the dangerous channel crossing to the UK. Several protests have been organised against the project already, while over ninety migrants’ rights groups and hundreds of individual campaigners have signed an open letter to the Home Secretary calling for the plans to be scrapped, describing the barge as a “floating prison.”

      Corporate Watch has researched into the Bibby Line Group’s operations and financial interests. We found that:

      - The Bibby Stockholm vessel was previously used as a floating detention centre in the Netherlands, where undercover reporting revealed violence, sexual exploitation and poor sanitation.

      – Bibby Line Group is more than 90% owned by members of the Bibby family, primarily through trusts. Its pre-tax profits for 2021 stood at almost £31m, which they upped to £35.5m by claiming generous tax credits and deferring a fair amount to the following year.

      - Management aboard the vessel will be overseen by an Australian business travel services company, Corporate Travel Management, who have previously had aspersions cast over the financial health of their operations and the integrity of their business practices.

      - Another beneficiary of the initiative is Langham Industries, a maritime and engineering company whose owners, the Langham family, have longstanding ties to right wing parties.

      Key Issues

      According to the Home Office, the Bibby Stockholm barge will be operational for at least 18 months, housing approximately 500 single adult men while their claims are processed, with “24/7 security in place on board, to minimise the disruption to local communities.” These measures appear to have been to dissuade opposition from the local Conservative council, who pushed for background checks on detainees and were reportedly even weighing legal action out of concern for a perceived threat of physical attacks from those housed onboard, as well as potential attacks from the far right against migrants held there.

      Local campaigners have taken aim at the initiative, noting in the open letter:

      “For many people seeking asylum arriving in the UK, the sea represents a site of significant trauma as they have been forced to cross it on one or more occasions. Housing people on a sea barge – which we argue is equal to a floating prison – is morally indefensible, and threatens to re-traumatise a group of already vulnerable people.”

      Technically, migrants on the barge will be able to leave the site. However, in reality they will be under significant levels of surveillance and cordoned off behind fences in the high security port area.

      If they leave, there is an expectation they will return by 11pm, and departure will be controlled by the authorities. According to the Home Office:

      “In order to ensure that migrants come and go in an orderly manner with as little impact as possible, buses will be provided to take those accommodated on the vessel from the port to local drop off points”.

      These drop off points are to be determined by the government, while being sited off the coast of Dorset means they will be isolated from centres of support and solidarity.

      Meanwhile, the government’s new Illegal Migration Bill is designed to provide a legal justification for the automatic detention of refugees crossing the Channel. If it passes, there’s a chance this might set the stage for a change in regime on the Bibby Stockholm – from that of an “accommodation centre” to a full-blown migrant prison.

      An initial release from the Home Office suggested the local voluntary sector would be engaged “to organise activities that keep occupied those being accommodated, potentially involved in local volunteering activity,” though they seemed to have changed the wording after critics said this would mean detainees could be effectively exploited for unpaid labour. It’s also been reported the vessel required modifications in order to increase capacity to the needed level, raising further concerns over cramped living conditions and a lack of privacy.

      Bibby Line Group has prior form in border profiteering. From 1994 to 1998, the Bibby Stockholm was used to house the homeless, some of whom were asylum seekers, in Hamburg, Germany. In 2005, it was used to detain asylum seekers in the Netherlands, which proved a cause of controversy at the time. Undercover reporting revealed a number of cases abuse on board, such as beatings and sexual exploitation, as well suicide attempts, routine strip searches, scabies and the death of an Algerian man who failed to receive timely medical care for a deteriorating heart condition. As the undercover security guard wrote:

      “The longer I work on the Bibby Stockholm, the more I worry about safety on the boat. Between exclusion and containment I encounter so many defects and feel so much tension among the prisoners that it no longer seems to be a question of whether things will get completely out of hand here, but when.”

      He went on:

      “I couldn’t stand the way prisoners were treated […] The staff become like that, because the whole culture there is like that. Inhuman. They do not see the residents as people with a history, but as numbers.”

      Discussions were also held in August 2017 over the possibility of using the vessel as accommodation for some 400 students in Galway, Ireland, amid the country’s housing crisis. Though the idea was eventually dropped for lack of mooring space and planning permission requirements, local students had voiced safety concerns over the “bizarre” and “unconventional” solution to a lack of rental opportunities.
      Corporate Travel Management & Langham Industries

      Although leased from Bibby Line Group, management aboard the Bibby Stockholm itself will be handled by #Corporate_Travel_Management (#CTM), a global travel company specialising in business travel services. The Australian-headquartered company also recently received a £100m contract for the provision of accommodation, travel, venue and ancillary booking services for the housing of Ukrainian refugees at local hotels and aboard cruise ships M/S Victoria and M/S Ambition. The British Red Cross warned earlier in May against continuing to house refugees on ships with “isolated” and “windowless” cabins, and said the scheme had left many “living in limbo.”

      Founded by CEO #Jamie_Pherous, CTM was targeted in 2018 by #VGI_Partners, a group of short-sellers, who identified more than 20 red flags concerning the company’s business interests. Most strikingly, the short-sellers said they’d attended CTM’s offices in Glasgow, Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm and Switzerland. Finding no signs of business activity there, they said it was possible the firm had significantly overstated the scale of its operations. VGI Partners also claimed CTM’s cash flows didn’t seem to add up when set against the company’s reported growth, and that CTM hadn’t fully disclosed revisions they’d made to their annual revenue figures.

      Two years later, the short-sellers released a follow-up report, questioning how CTM had managed to report a drop in rewards granted for high sales numbers to travel agencies, when in fact their transaction turnover had grown during the same period. They also accused CTM of dressing up their debt balance to make their accounts look healthier.

      CTM denied VGI Partners’ allegations. In their response, they paraphrased a report by auditors EY, supposedly confirming there were no question marks over their business practices, though the report itself was never actually made public. They further claim VGI Partners, as short-sellers, had only released the reports in the hope of benefitting from uncertainty over CTM’s operations.

      Despite these troubles, CTM’s market standing improved drastically earlier this year, when it was announced the firm had secured contracts for the provision of travel services to the UK Home Office worth in excess of $3bn AUD (£1.6bn). These have been accompanied by further tenders with, among others, the National Audit Office, HS2, Cafcass, Serious Fraud Office, Office of National Statistics, HM Revenue & Customs, National Health Service, Ministry of Justice, Department of Education, Foreign Office, and the Equality and Human Rights Commission.

      The Home Office has not released any figures on the cost of either leasing or management services aboard Bibby Stockholm, though press reports have put the estimated price tag at more than £20,000 a day for charter and berthing alone. If accurate, this would put the overall expenditure for the 18-month period in which the vessel will operate as a detention centre at almost £11m, exclusive of actual detention centre management costs such as security, food and healthcare.

      Another beneficiary of the project are Portland Port’s owners, #Langham_Industries, a maritime and engineering company owned by the #Langham family. The family has long-running ties to right-wing parties. Langham Industries donated over £70,000 to the UK Independence Party from 2003 up until the 2016 Brexit referendum. In 2014, Langham Industries donated money to support the re-election campaign of former Clacton MP for UKIP Douglas Carswell, shortly after his defection from the Conservatives. #Catherine_Langham, a Tory parish councillor for Hilton in Dorset, has described herself as a Langham Industries director (although she is not listed on Companies House). In 2016 she was actively involved in local efforts to support the campaign to leave the European Union. The family holds a large estate in Dorset which it uses for its other line of business, winemaking.

      At present, there is no publicly available information on who will be providing security services aboard the Bibby Stockholm.

      Business Basics

      Bibby Line Group describes itself as “one of the UK’s oldest family owned businesses,” operating in “multiple countries, employing around 1,300 colleagues, and managing over £1 billion of funds.” Its head office is registered in Liverpool, with other headquarters in Scotland, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, Malaysia, France, Slovakia, Czechia, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Nigeria (see the appendix for more). The company’s primary sectors correspond to its three main UK subsidiaries:

      #Bibby_Financial_Services. A global provider of financial services. The firm provides loans to small- and medium-sized businesses engaged in business services, construction, manufacturing, transportation, export, recruitment and wholesale markets. This includes invoice financing, export and trade finance, and foreign exchanges. Overall, the subsidiary manages more than £6bn each year on behalf of some 9,000 clients across 300 different industry sectors, and in 2021 it brought in more than 50% of the group’s annual turnover.

      - #Bibby_Marine_Limited. Owner and operator of the Bibby WaveMaster fleet, a group of vessels specialising in the transport and accommodation of workers employed at remote locations, such as offshore oil and gas sites in the North Sea. Sometimes, as in the case of Chevron’s Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) project in Nigeria, the vessels are used as an alternative to hotels owing to a “a volatile project environment.” The fleet consists of 40 accommodation vessels similar in size to the Bibby Stockholm and a smaller number of service vessels, though the share of annual turnover pales compared to the group’s financial services operations, standing at just under 10% for 2021.

      - #Garic Ltd. Confined to construction, quarrying, airport, agriculture and transport sectors in the UK, the firm designs, manufactures and purchases plant equipment and machinery for sale or hire. Garic brought in around 14% of Bibby Line Group’s turnover in 2021.

      Prior to February 2021, Bibby Line Group also owned #Costcutter_Supermarkets_Group, before it was sold to #Bestway_Wholesale to maintain liquidity amid the Covid-19 pandemic. In their report for that year, the company’s directors also suggested grant funding from #MarRI-UK, an organisation facilitating innovation in maritime technologies and systems, had been important in preserving the firm’s position during the crisis.
      History

      The Bibby Line Group’s story begins in 1807, when Lancashire-born shipowner John Bibby began trading out of Liverpool with partner John Highfield. By the time of his death in 1840, murdered while returning home from dinner with a friend in Kirkdale, Bibby had struck out on his own and come to manage a fleet of more than 18 ships. The mysterious case of his death has never been solved, and the business was left to his sons John and James.

      Between 1891 and 1989, the company operated under the name #Bibby_Line_Limited. Its ships served as hospital and transport vessels during the First World War, as well as merchant cruisers, and the company’s entire fleet of 11 ships was requisitioned by the state in 1939.

      By 1970, the company had tripled its overseas earnings, branching into ‘factoring’, or invoice financing (converting unpaid invoices into cash for immediate use via short-term loans) in the early 1980s, before this aspect of the business was eventually spun off into Bibby Financial Services. The group acquired Garic Ltd in 2008, which currently operates four sites across the UK.

      People

      #Jonathan_Lewis has served as Bibby Line Group’s Managing and Executive Director since January 2021, prior to which he acted as the company’s Chief Financial and Strategy Officer since joining in 2019. Previously, Lewis worked as CFO for Imagination Technologies, a tech company specialising in semiconductors, and as head of supermarket Tesco’s mergers and acquisitions team. He was also a member of McKinsey’s European corporate finance practice, as well as an investment banker at Lazard. During his first year at the helm of Bibby’s operations, he was paid £748,000. Assuming his role at the head of the group’s operations, he replaced Paul Drescher, CBE, then a board member of the UK International Chamber of Commerce and a former president of the Confederation of British Industry.

      Bibby Line Group’s board also includes two immediate members of the Bibby family, Sir #Michael_James_Bibby, 3rd Bt. and his younger brother #Geoffrey_Bibby. Michael has acted as company chairman since 2020, before which he had occupied senior management roles in the company for 20 years. He also has external experience, including time at Unilever’s acquisitions, disposals and joint venture divisions, and now acts as president of the UK Chamber of Shipping, chairman of the Charities Trust, and chairman of the Institute of Family Business Research Foundation.

      Geoffrey has served as a non-executive director of the company since 2015, having previously worked as a managing director of Vast Visibility Ltd, a digital marketing and technology company. In 2021, the Bibby brothers received salaries of £125,000 and £56,000 respectively.

      The final member of the firm’s board is #David_Anderson, who has acted as non-executive director since 2012. A financier with 35 years experience in investment banking, he’s founder and CEO of EPL Advisory – which advises company boards on requirements and disclosure obligations of public markets – and chair of Creative Education Trust, a multi-academy trust comprising 17 schools. Anderson is also chairman at multinational ship broker Howe Robinson Partners, which recently auctioned off a superyacht seized from Dmitry Pumpyansky, after the sanctioned Russian businessman reneged on a €20.5m loan from JP Morgan. In 2021, Anderson’s salary stood at £55,000.

      Ownership

      Bibby Line Group’s annual report and accounts for 2021 state that more than 90% of the company is owned by members of the Bibby family, primarily through family trusts. These ownership structures, effectively entities allowing people to benefit from assets without being their registered legal owners, have long attracted staunch criticism from transparency advocates given the obscurity they afford means they often feature extensively in corruption, money laundering and tax abuse schemes.

      According to Companies House, the UK corporate registry, between 50% and 75% of Bibby Line Group’s shares and voting rights are owned by #Bibby_Family_Company_Limited, which also retains the right to appoint and remove members of the board. Directors of Bibby Family Company Limited include both the Bibby brothers, as well as a third sibling, #Peter_John_Bibby, who’s formally listed as the firm’s ‘ultimate beneficial owner’ (i.e. the person who ultimately profits from the company’s assets).

      Other people with comparable shares in Bibby Family Company Limited are #Mark_Rupert_Feeny, #Philip_Charles_Okell, and Lady #Christine_Maud_Bibby. Feeny’s occupation is listed as solicitor, with other interests in real estate management and a position on the board of the University of Liverpool Pension Fund Trustees Limited. Okell meanwhile appears as director of Okell Money Management Limited, a wealth management firm, while Lady Bibby, Michael and Geoffrey’s mother, appears as “retired playground supervisor.”

      Key Relationships

      Bibby Line Group runs an internal ‘Donate a Day’ volunteer program, enabling employees to take paid leave in order to “help causes they care about.” Specific charities colleagues have volunteered with, listed in the company’s Annual Review for 2021 to 2022, include:

      - The Hive Youth Zone. An award-winning charity for young people with disabilities, based in the Wirral.

      – The Whitechapel Centre. A leading homeless and housing charity in the Liverpool region, working with people sleeping rough, living in hostels, or struggling with their accommodation.

      - Let’s Play Project. Another charity specialising in after-school and holiday activities for young people with additional needs in the Banbury area.

      - Whitdale House. A care home for the elderly, based in Whitburn, West Lothian and run by the local council.

      – DEBRA. An Irish charity set up in 1988 for individuals living with a rare, painful skin condition called epidermolysis bullosa, as well as their families.

      – Reaching Out Homeless Outreach. A non-profit providing resources and support to the homeless in Ireland.

      Various senior executives and associated actors at Bibby Line Group and its subsidiaries also have current and former ties to the following organisations:

      - UK Chamber of Shipping

      - Charities Trust

      - Institute of Family Business Research Foundation

      - Indefatigable Old Boys Association

      - Howe Robinson Partners

      - hibu Ltd

      - EPL Advisory

      - Creative Education Trust

      - Capita Health and Wellbeing Limited

      - The Ambassador Theatre Group Limited

      – Pilkington Plc

      – UK International Chamber of Commerce

      – Confederation of British Industry

      – Arkley Finance Limited (Weatherby’s Banking Group)

      – FastMarkets Ltd, Multiple Sclerosis Society

      – Early Music as Education

      – Liverpool Pension Fund Trustees Limited

      – Okell Money Management Limited

      Finances

      For the period ending 2021, Bibby Line Group’s total turnover stood at just under £260m, with a pre-tax profit of almost £31m – fairly healthy for a company providing maritime services during a global pandemic. Their post-tax profits in fact stood at £35.5m, an increase they would appear to have secured by claiming generous tax credits (£4.6m) and deferring a fair amount (£8.4m) to the following year.

      Judging by their last available statement on the firm’s profitability, Bibby’s directors seem fairly confident the company has adequate financing and resources to continue operations for the foreseeable future. They stress their February 2021 sale of Costcutter was an important step in securing this, given it provided additional liquidity during the pandemic, as well as the funding secured for R&D on fuel consumption by Bibby Marine’s fleet.
      Scandal Sheet

      Bibby Line Group and its subsidiaries have featured in a number of UK legal proceedings over the years, sometimes as defendants. One notable case is Godfrey v Bibby Line, a lawsuit brought against the company in 2019 after one of their former employees died as the result of an asbestos-related disease.

      In their claim, the executors of Alan Peter Godfrey’s estate maintained that between 1965 and 1972, he was repeatedly exposed to large amounts of asbestos while working on board various Bibby vessels. Although the link between the material and fatal lung conditions was established as early as 1930, they claimed that Bibby Line, among other things:

      “Failed to warn the deceased of the risk of contracting asbestos related disease or of the precautions to be taken in relation thereto;

      “Failed to heed or act upon the expert evidence available to them as to the best means of protecting their workers from danger from asbestos dust; [and]

      “Failed to take all reasonably practicable measures, either by securing adequate ventilation or by the provision and use of suitable respirators or otherwise, to prevent inhalation of dust.”

      The lawsuit, which claimed “unlimited damage”’ against the group, also stated that Mr Godfrey’s “condition deteriorated rapidly with worsening pain and debility,” and that he was “completely dependent upon others for his needs by the last weeks of his life.” There is no publicly available information on how the matter was concluded.

      In 2017, Bibby Line Limited also featured in a leak of more than 13.4 million financial records known as the Paradise Papers, specifically as a client of Appleby, which provided “offshore corporate services” such as legal and accountancy work. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a global network of investigative media outlets, leaked Appleby documents revealed, among other things, “the ties between Russia and [Trump’s] billionaire commerce secretary, the secret dealings of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s chief fundraiser and the offshore interests of the Queen of England and more than 120 politicians around the world.”

      This would not appear to be the Bibby group’s only link to the shady world of offshore finance. Michael Bibby pops up as a treasurer for two shell companies registered in Panama, Minimar Transport S.A. and Vista Equities Inc.
      Looking Forward

      Much about the Bibby Stockholm saga remains to be seen. The exact cost of the initiative and who will be providing security services on board, are open questions. What’s clear however is that activists will continue to oppose the plans, with efforts to prevent the vessel sailing from Falmouth to its final docking in Portland scheduled to take place on 30th June.

      Appendix: Company Addresses

      HQ and general inquiries: 3rd Floor Walker House, Exchange Flags, Liverpool, United Kingdom, L2 3YL

      Tel: +44 (0) 151 708 8000

      Other offices, as of 2021:

      6, Shenton Way, #18-08A Oue Downtown 068809, Singapore

      1/1, The Exchange Building, 142 St. Vincent Street, Glasgow, G2 5LA, United Kingdom

      4th Floor Heather House, Heather Road, Sandyford, Dublin 18, Ireland

      Unit 2302, 23/F Jubilee Centre, 18 Fenwick Street, Wanchai, Hong Kong

      Unit 508, Fifth Floor, Metropolis Mall, MG Road, Gurugram, Haryana, 122002 India

      Suite 7E, Level 7, Menara Ansar, 65 Jalan Trus, 8000 Johor Bahru, Johor, Malaysia

      160 Avenue Jean Jaures, CS 90404, 69364 Lyon Cedex, France

      Prievozská 4D, Block E, 13th Floor, Bratislava 821 09, Slovak Republic

      Hlinky 118, Brno, 603 00, Czech Republic

      Laan Van Diepenvoorde 5, 5582 LA, Waalre, Netherlands

      Hansaallee 249, 40549 Düsseldorf, Germany

      Poland Eurocentrum, Al. Jerozolimskie 134, 02-305 Warsaw, Poland

      1/2 Atarbekova str, 350062, Krasnodar, Krasnodar

      1 St Peter’s Square, Manchester, M2 3AE, United Kingdom

      25 Adeyemo Alakija Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria

      10 Anson Road, #09-17 International Plaza, 079903 Singapore

      https://corporatewatch.org/floating-prisons-the-200-year-old-family-business-behind-the-bibby-s

      signalé ici aussi par @rezo:
      https://seenthis.net/messages/1010504

    • The Langham family seem quite happy to support right-wing political parties that are against immigration, while at the same time profiting handsomely from the misery of refugees who are forced to claim sanctuary here.


      https://twitter.com/PositiveActionH/status/1687817910364884992

      –---

      Family firm ’profiteering from misery’ by providing migrant barges donated £70k to #UKIP

      The Langham family, owners of Langham Industries, is now set to profit from an 18-month contract with the Home Office to let the Bibby Stockholm berth at Portland, Dorset

      A family firm that donated more than £70,000 to UKIP is “profiteering from misery” by hosting the Government’s controversial migrant barge. Langham Industries owns Portland Port, where the Bibby Stockholm is docked in a deal reported to be worth some £2.5million.

      The Langham family owns luxurious properties and has links to high-profile politicians, including Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Deputy Prime Minister Oliver Dowden. And we can reveal that their business made 19 donations to pro-Brexit party UKIP between 2003 and 2016.

      Late founder John Langham was described as an “avid supporter” of UKIP in an obituary in 2017. Now his children, John, Jill and Justin – all directors of the family firm – are set to profit from an 18-month contract with the Home Office to let the Bibby Stockholm berth at Portland, Dorset.

      While Portland Port refuses to reveal how much the Home Office is paying, its website cites berthing fees for a ship the size of the Bibby Stockholm at more than £4,000 a day. In 2011, Portland Port chairman John, 71, invested £3.7million in Grade II* listed country pile Steeple Manor at Wareham, Dorset. Dating to around 1600, it has a pond, tennis court and extensive gardens designed by the landscape architect Brenda Colvin.

      The arrangement to host the “prison-like” barge for housing migrants has led some locals to blast the Langhams, who have owned the port since 1997. Portland mayor Carralyn Parkes, 61, said: “I don’t know how John Langham will sleep at night in his luxurious home, with his tennis court and his fluffy bed, when asylum seekers are sleeping in tiny beds on the barge.

      “I went on the boat and measured the rooms with a tape measure. On average they are about 10ft by 12ft. The bunk bed mattresses are about 6ft long. If you’re taller than 6ft you’re stuffed. The Langham family need to have more humanity. They are only interested in making money. It’s shocking.”

      (#paywall)
      https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/family-firm-profiteering-misery-providing-30584405.amp

      #UK_Independence_Party

    • ‘This is a prison’: men tell of distressing conditions on Bibby Stockholm

      Asylum seekers share fears about Dorset barge becoming even more crowded, saying they already ‘despair and wish for death’

      Asylum seekers brought back to the Bibby Stockholm barge in Portland, Dorset, have said they are being treated in such a way that “we despair and wish for death”.

      The Guardian spoke to two men in their first interview since their return to the barge on 19 October after the vessel lay empty for more than two months. The presence of deadly legionella bacteria was confirmed on board on 7 August, the same day the first group of asylum seekers arrived. The barge was evacuated four days later.

      The new warning comes after it emerged that one asylum seeker attempted to kill himself and is in hospital after finding out he is due to be taken to the barge on Tuesday.

      A man currently on the barge told the Guardian: “Government decisions are turning healthy and normal refugees into mental patients whom they then hand over to society. Here, many people were healthy and coping with OK spirits, but as a result of the dysfunctional strategies of the government, they have suffered – and continue to suffer – from various forms of serious mental distress. We are treated in such a way that we despair and wish for death.”

      He said that although the asylum seekers were not detained on the barge and could leave to visit the nearby town, in practice, doing so was not easy.

      He added: “In the barge, we have exactly the feeling of being in prison. It is true that they say that this is not a prison and you can go outside at any time, but you can only go to specific stops at certain times by bus, and this does not give me a good feeling.

      “Even to use the fresh air, you have to go through the inspection every time and go to the small yard with high fences and go through the X-ray machine again. And this is not good for our health.

      “In short, this is a prison whose prisoners are not criminals, they are people who have fled their country just to save their lives and have taken shelter here to live.”

      The asylum seekers raised concerns about what conditions on the barge would be like if the Home Office did fill it with about 500 asylum seekers, as officials say is the plan. Those on board said it already felt quite full with about 70 people living there.

      The second asylum seeker said: “The space inside the barge is very small. It feels crowded in the dining hall and the small entertainment room. It is absolutely clear to me that there will be chaos here soon.

      “According to my estimate, as I look at the spaces around us, the capacity of this barge is maximum 120 people, including personnel and crew. The strategy of ​​transferring refugees from hotels to barges or ships or military installations is bound to fail.

      “The situation here on the barge is getting worse. Does the government have a plan for shipwrecked residents? Everyone here is going mad with anxiety. It is not just the barge that floats on the water, but the plans of the government that are radically adrift.”

      Maddie Harris of the NGO Humans For Rights Network, which supports asylum seekers in hotels, said: “Home Office policies directly contribute to the significant deterioration of the wellbeing and mental health of so many asylum seekers in their ‘care’, with a dehumanising environment, violent anti-migrant rhetoric and isolated accommodations away from community and lacking in support.”

      A Home Office spokesperson said: “The Bibby Stockholm is part of the government’s pledge to reduce the use of expensive hotels and bring forward alternative accommodation options which provide a more cost-effective, sustainable and manageable system for the UK taxpayer and local communities.

      “The health and welfare of asylum seekers remains the utmost priority. We work continually to ensure the needs and vulnerabilities of those residing in asylum accommodation are identified and considered, including those related to mental health and trauma.”

      Nadia Whittome and Lloyd Russell-Moyle, the Labour MPs for Nottingham East and Brighton Kemptown respectively, will travel to Portland on Monday to meet asylum seekers accommodated on the Bibby Stockholm barge and local community members.

      The visit follows the home secretary, Suella Braverman, not approving a visit from the MPs to assess living conditions as they requested through parliamentary channels.

      https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/oct/29/this-is-a-prison-men-tell-of-distressing-conditions-on-bibby-stockholm
      #prison #conditions_de_vie

  • Il muro della Bulgaria. Un altro ostacolo europeo ai diritti dei migranti

    La Commissione europea ha messo a disposizione 600 milioni di euro per sostenere gli Stati membri nelle attività di contrasto ai flussi delle persone. Sofia, tra i primi destinatari dei finanziamenti, punta a rafforzare la barriera di 130 chilometri con la Turchia. Mentre Ong e volontari internazionali denunciano gravi violazioni e abusi

    Il 3 aprile di quest’anno i cittadini bulgari sono stati chiamati alle urne. Ad avere la maggioranza (risicata) è stato il partito Gerb guidato da Bojko Borisov. Il gruppo conservatore non ha stravinto e si preannuncia dunque un difficile periodo di transizione alla ricerca di alleanze per poter formare un nuovo governo. Borisov è già stato per tre volte a capo dell’esecutivo e durante i suoi mandati si è distinto per una linea molto dura in tema di immigrazione.

    Una linea mantenuta anche dall’attuale presidente, Rumen Radev, eletto per la prima volta nel 2017 grazie al sostegno del Partito socialista. A febbraio di quest’anno Radev ha chiesto all’Unione europea fondi per finanziare il rafforzamento della barriera lunga 130 chilometri che divide il Paese dalla Turchia. La richiesta per il “muro” è pervenuta nonostante la presidente della Commissione europea, Ursula von der Leyen, già a ottobre avesse affermato, non senza ipocrisie, che l’Ue non avrebbe mai finanziato la costruzione di muri e di filo spinato per impedire l’attraversamento dei migranti.

    Pochi mesi dopo però, in apertura dell’ultimo Consiglio europeo, è stata diramata una lettera (diffusa da Statewatch: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/march/von-der-leyen-letter-key-border-between-bulgaria-and-turkiye-is-first-ta) nella quale è stato annunciato lo stanziamento di 600 milioni di euro per supportare “in modo sostanziale gli Stati membri nel controllo delle frontiere”, con particolare riferimento a quelle “esterne” della Turchia e quelle “interne” della Bulgaria, che riceveranno per prime tali fondi. Il budget sarà speso per finanziare sistemi di sorveglianza quali telecamere termiche, droni e radar grazie ai quali la polizia di frontiera potrà sorvegliare ogni movimento sospetto ai confini.

    Questa decisione, presa per rafforzare il controllo delle frontiere, interviene nonostante le criticità espresse da Ong e operatori locali nei confronti della gestione dell’immigrazione da parte delle autorità bulgare. A ottobre dello scorso anno un ragazzo siriano è stato raggiunto da colpi di arma da fuoco sparati dalla polizia di frontiera bulgara mentre tentava di attraversare il confine dalla Turchia. L’uomo è sopravvissuto nonostante i proiettili lo abbiano raggiunto al petto e alla mano, lasciandogli quest’ultima semi-paralizzata. E non era la prima volta che accadeva: sulla stessa frontiera nel 2015 un cittadino afghano è morto dopo gli spari esplosi da una guardia bulgara.

    Episodi del genere vengono confermati ripetutamente dalle testimonianze che i migranti rilasciano alle organizzazioni internazionali come Medici senza frontiere che in suo recente report ha raccolto le voci di chi è transitato in Bulgaria. C’è chi è stato picchiato ripetutamente con tubi di gomma da parte delle autorità, donne che hanno subito dalle stesse violenze sessuali, persone private di ogni bene e costrette a tornare in Turchia senza vestiti, sulla neve. Un uso della violenza spropositato, in barba a qualsiasi norma sui diritti umani, che viene denunciato anche da No name kitchen (Nnk), Ong spagnola e internazionale che opera sulle rotte balcaniche.

    Una delle testimonianze raccolte da Nnk recita: “La polizia bulgara ci ha attaccati con un cane che ha morso un mio amico alle gambe, alle mani e alla testa. Dopo ci hanno tolto tutti i vestiti, anche alle donne che erano con noi, e ci hanno spediti indietro in Turchia. I colpi che ci hanno inferto hanno rotto gambe e braccia ad alcune persone che poi non sono riuscite a proseguire il cammino per mesi e mesi”.

    Barbara Bécares, responsabile stampa della stessa Ong, spiega come tra 2018 e 2019 moltissimi migranti abbiano preferito passare per la Grecia a causa della nota violenza e dei trattamenti disumani perpetrati dalla polizia bulgara. Una polizia europea. Ma questa rotta è tornata in auge proprio dal 2020, quando anche in Grecia le autorità si sono macchiate di simili comportamenti rendendo il passaggio per il Paese altrettanto difficile e pericoloso. Le testimonianze che giungono sono da considerarsi come una piccola parte rispetto al totale di coloro che subiscono gli stessi trattamenti e che magari preferiscono non parlare per paura di ritorsioni. In Bulgaria la criminalizzazione delle organizzazioni non governative impedisce ai migranti di poter chiedere aiuto e denunciare gli abusi che subiscono. Chi riesce a varcare il confine dalla Turchia senza essere stanato, tenta di mantenere un profilo basso in attesa di oltrepassare la frontiera per la Serbia. Molti sanno che se vengono intercettati dalle autorità rischiano di essere respinti in Turchia o di finire all’interno di campi di detenzione. Un’inchiesta realizzata dal collettivo Lighthouse Reports denuncia l’esistenza di centri di detenzione illegali: vere e proprie gabbie nei pressi della stazione di polizia di Sredets (città a 40 chilometri dal confine turco) dove i migranti vengono rinchiusi anche per giorni. “La struttura assomiglia a una cuccia per cani in disuso, con sbarre su un lato -si legge nell’inchiesta-. I richiedenti asilo l’hanno descritta come una ‘gabbia’”.

    Gli abusi che vengono perpetrati quotidianamente a richiedenti asilo e migranti nel Paese sono ormai più che noti. A ciò si somma una sistematica negligenza nell’esame delle richieste d’asilo: molti richiedenti hanno denunciato di attendere una risposta alla propria domanda da anni.

    Tra questi c’è anche Khalid, un uomo eritreo che raggiunto telefonicamente ci ha raccontato la sua storia. È scappato dall’Eritrea nel lontano 2012. Arrivato in Turchia ha tentato di raggiungere la Grecia attraversando il confine dal fiume Evros ma per tre volte è stato respinto dalla polizia ellenica. Ha deciso dunque di cambiare frontiera e a marzo 2013 è riuscito ad arrivare in Bulgaria e da qui è cominciato quello che lui stesso definisce “un incubo”, non ancora finito. Dapprima è stato rinchiuso per tre mesi in un centro di detenzione a Lyubimets, una piccola cittadina non lontana dal confine turco. Le condizioni all’interno del centro sono descritte come degradanti: “Era un edificio di tre piani nelle quali venivano stipate migliaia di persone. Al piano inferiore c’erano le donne e le famiglie con bambini e a quello superiori gli uomini. Era sovraffollato e non veniva rispettata nessuna regola da parte delle autorità”.

    Poi è stato trasferito in un campo profughi vicino la capitale bulgara dove gli sono state prese le impronte digitali e dove ha richiesto la protezione internazionale. Non avendo ricevuto alcuna risposta, dopo sette mesi ha dunque deciso di scappare e di andare in Grecia, dove è stato rinchiuso all’interno di un altro centro. Qui ha trascorso altri sette mesi e dopo il suo rilascio ha iniziato un lungo viaggio che lo avrebbe poi portato fino in Svezia. Siamo nel 2016. Nel Paese scandinavo ha tentato di chiedere nuovamente asilo ma la sua domanda è stata respinta in base al Regolamento di Dublino ed è stato quindi trasferito in maniera coatta proprio in Bulgaria, dove è rimasto per altri tre anni. Dopo un anno e mezzo gli è stata notificata la prima risposta alla richiesta d’asilo: negativa. Ad aprile 2018 Khalid ha fatto appello alla Corte suprema bulgara. Ma tutto si è rivelato un buco nell’acqua. Senza alcun riscontro ed esasperato per l’attesa, ha deciso di ripercorrere l’intera rotta balcanica fino alla Slovenia, dove è giunto nel 2019 e dove ha ripresentato la domanda d’asilo. Dopo un anno gli è stato notificato l’ennesimo esito negativo e a quel punto, pur di non essere deportato nuovamente, ha deciso di andare in Francia, passando per l’Italia.

    Ed è proprio da un centro per richiedenti asilo di Parigi che ora racconta la sua storia. A metà aprile avrà il suo primo colloquio negli uffici per l’immigrazione ma è già stato avvisato che, tra le opzioni possibili, c’è anche quella di essere riportato in Slovenia e da lì in Bulgaria. Quando gli si chiede che cosa pensa di fare, dice che probabilmente non andrà all’appuntamento. “Preferisco rimettermi in viaggio per il Belgio o tenterò di attraversare il canale della Manica per raggiungere l’Inghilterra”. Nel 2012, quando fuggì dalla sua Asmara, aveva 33 anni.

    https://altreconomia.it/il-muro-della-bulgaria-un-altro-ostacolo-europeo-ai-diritti-dei-migrant
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Bulgarie #Turquie #drones #radar #caméras_thermiques #budget #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #violence #route_des_Balkans #Lyubimets

  • À qui profite l’exil ?

    Qui profite des moyens engagés en faveur de la fermeture des frontières ? Que se passe-t’il quand on retrouve des corps sur les plages ? Sait-on que les frontières de l’Europe se sont délocalisées au Sahara ? Qui sont les sans-papiers qui font fonctionner l’#économie ? Trafiquants, industriels de la défense, employeurs européens profitent de ce système sans se préoccuper des 40 000 morts et disparus.

    https://www.editions-delcourt.fr/bd/series/serie-qui-profite-l-exil/album-qui-profite-l-exil

    #BD #bande-dessinée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #business #complexe_militaro-industriel #livre #frontières #externalisation #décès #morts_aux_frontières #mourir_aux_frontières