• Decolonisation and humanitarian response

    As part of our annual Careers in Humanitarianism Day, we were joined by:

    #Juliano_Fiori (Save the Children, and PhD Candidate at HCRI)
    – Professor #Patricia_Daley (Oxford University)
    – Professor #Elena_Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (UCL)

    in discussion (and sometimes disagreement!) on the notions of humanitarianism and decolonisation.


    #décolonialité #décolonialisme #humanitaire #conférence

    ping @cede @isskein @karine4

    • Migration, Humanitarianism, and the Politics of Knowledge —> An Interview with #Juliano_Fiori.

      Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh: In this issue of Migration and Society we are interested in the overarching theme of “Recentering the South in Studies of Migration.” Indeed, it is increasingly acknowledged that studies of and policy responses to migration and displacement often have a strong Northern bias. For instance, in spite of the importance of different forms of migration within, across, and between countries of the “global South” (i.e., “South-South migration”), there is a significant tendency to focus on migration from “the South” to countries of “the North” (i.e., South-North migration), prioritizing the perspectives and interests of stakeholders associated with the North. Against this backdrop, what is your position with regard to claims of Eurocentrism in studies of and responses to migration?

      Juliano Fiori: To the extent that they emerge from immanent critiques of colonialism and liberal capitalism, I am sympathetic toward them.1 Decentering (or provincializing) Europe is necessarily an epistemological project of deconstruction. But to contribute to a counterhegemonic politics, this project must move beyond the diagnosis of epistemicide to challenge the particular substance of European thought that has produced systems of oppression.

      The idea of “decolonizing the curriculum” is, of course, à la mode (Sabaratnam 2017; Vanyoro 2019). It is difficult to dispute the pedagogical necessity to question epistemic hierarchies and create portals into multiple worlds of knowledge. These endeavors are arguably compatible with the exigencies of Enlightenment reason itself. But, though I recognize Eurocentrism as an expression of white identity politics, I am wary of the notion that individual self-identification with a particular body of knowledge is a worthy or sufficient end for epistemic decolonization—a notion I associate with a prevalent strain of woke post-politics, which, revering the cultural symbols of late capitalism but seeking to resignify them, surely produces a solipsistic malaise. Decolonization of the curriculum must at least aim at the reconstruction of truths.

      Eurocentrism in the study of human migration is perhaps particularly problematic—and brazen—on account of the transnational and transcultural histories that migrants produce. Migrants defy the neat categorization of territories and peoples according to civilizational hierarchies. They redefine the social meaning of physical frontiers, and they blur the cultural frontier between Self and Other. They contribute to an intellectual miscegenation that undermines essentialist explanations of cultural and philosophical heritage. Migration itself is decentering (Achiume 2019).

      And it is largely because of this that it is perceived as a threat. Let’s consider Europe’s contemporary backlash against immigration. The economic argument about the strain immigration places on the welfare state—often framed in neo-Malthusian terms—can be readily rebutted with evidence of immigrants’ net economic contribution. But concerns about the dethroning of “European values” are rarely met head-on; progressive political elites have rather responded by doubling down on calls for multiculturalism from below, while promoting universalism from above, intensifying the contradictions of Eurocentricity.

      It is unsurprising that, in the Anglophone world, migration studies developed the trappings of an academic discipline—dedicated university programs, journals, scholarly societies—in the late 1970s, amid Western anxieties about governing increased emigration from postcolonial states. It quickly attracted critical anthropologists and postcolonial theorists. But the study of the itinerant Other has tended to reinforce Eurocentric assumptions. Migration studies has risen from European foundations. Its social scientific references, its lexicon, its institutional frameworks and policy priorities, its social psychological conceptions of identity—all position Europe at the zero point. It has assembled an intellectual apparatus that privileges the Western gaze upon the hordes invading from the barrens. That this gaze might be cast empathetically does nothing to challenge epistemic reproduction: Eurocentrism directs attention toward the non-Western Other, whose passage toward Europe confirms the centrality of Europe and evokes a response in the name of Eurocentrism. To the extent that Western scholars focus on South-South migration, the policy relevance of their research is typically defined by its implications for flows from South to North.

      The Eurocentrism of responses to forced migration by multinational charities, UN agencies, and the World Bank is not only a product of the ideological and cultural origins of these organizations. It also reflects the political interests of their principal donors: Western governments. Aid to refugees in countries neighboring Syria has been amply funded, particularly as the European Union has prioritized the containment of Syrians who might otherwise travel to Europe. Meanwhile, countries like India, South Africa, and Ivory Coast, which host significant numbers of regional migrants and refugees, receive proportionally little attention and support.

      It is an irony of European containment policies that, while adopted as a measure against supposed threats to Europeanness, they undermine the moral superiority that Eurocentrism presupposes. The notion of a humanitarian Europe is unsustainable when European efforts to deter immigration are considered alongside the conditions accepted for other regions of the world. A continent of more than half a billion people, Europe hosts just under 2.3 million refugees; Lebanon, with a population of six million, hosts more than 1.5 million refugees from Syria alone. It should be noted that, in recent years, European citizens’ movements have mobilized resources to prevent the death of people crossing the Mediterranean. Initiatives like Alarm Phone, Open Arms, Sea Watch, and SOS MEDITERRANEE seem to represent a politicized humanitarianism for the network age. But in their overt opposition to an emboldened ethnonationalist politics, they seek to rescue not only migrants and refugees, but also an idea of Europe.

      EFQ: How, if at all, do you engage with constructs such as “the global North,” “the global South,” and “the West” in your own work?

      JF: I inevitably use some of these terms more than others, but they are all problematic in a way, so I just choose the one that I think best conveys my intended meaning in each given context. West, North, and core are not interchangeable; they are associated with distinct, if overlapping, ontologies and temporalities. As are Third World, South, and developing world.

      I try to stick to three principles when using these terms. The first is to avoid the sort of negative framing to which your work on South-South encounters has helpfully drawn attention (i.e., Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, 2018; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018). When we come across one of these terms being deployed negatively, it invariably describes that which is not of the West or of the North. As such, it centers Europe and North America, and it opens up an analytical terrain on which those residing beyond the imagined cultural bounds of these regions tend to be exoticized. When I need to frame something negatively, I try to do so directly, using the appropriate prefix.

      Second, I try to avoid setting up dichotomies and continuities. Placing East and West or North and South in opposition implies entirely dissimilar bodies, separated by a definite, undeviating frontier. But these terms are mutually constitutive, and it is rarely clear where, or even if, a frontier can be drawn. Such dichotomies also imply a conceptual equilibrium: that what lies on one side of the opposition is ontologically equivalent to what lies on the other. But the concept of the West is not equivalent to what the East represents today; indeed, it is questionable whether a concept of the East is now of much analytical value. South, West, North, and East might be constructed dialectically, but their imagined opposites are not necessarily their antitheses. Each arguably has more than one counterpoint.

      Similarly, I generally don’t use terms that associate countries or regions with stages of development—most obviously, least developed, developing, and developed. They point toward a progressivist and teleological theory of history to which I don’t subscribe. (The world-systems concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery offer a corrective to national developmental mythologies, but they are nonetheless inscribed in a systemic teleology.) The idea of an inexorable march toward capitalist modernity—either as the summit of civilization or as the point of maximum contradiction—fails to account for the angles, forks, and dead ends that historical subjects encounter. It also tends to be founded on a Eurocentric and theological economism that narrows human experience and, I would argue, mistakenly subordinates the political.

      Third, I try to use these terms conceptually, without presenting them as fixed unities. They must be sufficiently tight as concepts to transmit meaning. But they inevitably obscure the heterogeneity they encompass, which is always in flux. Moreover, as concepts, they are continuously resignified by discursive struggles and the reordering of the interstate system. Attempts to define them too tightly, according to particular geographies or a particular politics, can give the impression that they are ahistorical. Take Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s definition of the South, for example. For Santos, the South is not a geographical concept: he contends that it also exists in the geographical North (2014, 2016). Rather, it is a metaphor for the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism. It is anticapitalist, anticolonialist, antipatriarchal, and anti-imperialist. According to this definition, the South becomes representative of a particular left-wing politics (and it is negative). It thus loses its utility as a category of macrosociological analysis.

      Ultimately, all these terms are problematic because they are sweeping. But it is also for this reason that they can be useful for certain kinds of systemic analysis.

      EFQ: You have written on the history of “Western humanitarianism” (i.e., Fiori 2013; Baughan and Fiori 2015). Why do you focus on the “Western” character of humanitarianism?

      JF: I refer to “Western humanitarianism” as a rejoinder to the fashionable notion that there is a universal humanitarian ethic. Within both the Anglophone academy and the aid sector, it has become a commonplace that humanitarianism needs to be decolonized, and that the way to do this is to recognize and nurture “local” humanitarianisms around the world. In the last decade and a half, enthusiasm for global history has contributed to broader and more sophisticated understandings of how humanitarian institutions and discourses have been constructed. But it has also arguably contributed to the “humanitarianization” of different altruistic impulses, expressions of solidarity, and charitable endeavors across cultures.

      The term “humanitarian” was popularized in English and French in the first half of the nineteenth century, and it soon became associated with humanistic religion. It thus connoted the existence of an ideal humanity within every individual and, as Didier Fassin (2012) has argued, it has come to represent the secularization of the Christian impulse to life. It was used to describe a wide range of campaigns, from abolition and temperance to labor reform. But all promoted a rationalist conception of humanity derived from European philosophy. That is, an abstract humanity, founded upon a universal logos and characterized by the mind-body duality. What is referred to today as the “humanitarian system”—of financial flows and liberal institutions—has been shaped predominantly by Western power and political interests. But the justification for its existence also depends upon the European division between the reasoned human and the unreasoned savage. The avowed purpose of modern humanitarianism is to save, convert, and civilize the latter. To cast modern humanitarian reason as a universal is to deny the specificity of ethical dispositions born of other conceptions of humanity. Indeed, the French philosopher François Jullien (2014) has argued that the concept of “the universal” itself is of the West.

      Of course, there are practices that are comparable to those of Western humanitarian agencies across different cultures. However, claiming these for humanitarianism sets them on European foundations, regardless of their author’s inspiration; and it takes for granted that they reproduce the minimalist politics of survival with which the Western humanitarian project has come to be associated.

      So why not refer to “European humanitarianism”? First, because it must be recognized that, as a set of evolving ethical practices, humanitarianism does not have a linear intellectual genealogy. European philosophy itself has of course been influenced by other traditions of thought (see Amin 1989; Bevilacqua 2018; Hobson 2004; Patel 2018): pre-Socratic Greek thinkers borrowed from the Babylonians, the Persians, and the Egyptians; Enlightenment philosophes had exchanges with Arab intellectuals. Second, reference to the West usefully points to the application of humanitarian ideas through systems of power.

      Since classical antiquity, wars and ruptures have produced various narratives of the West. In the mid-twentieth century, essentialist histories of Western civilization emphasized culture. For Cold War political scientists, West and East often represented distinct ideological projects. I refer to the West as something approaching a sociopolitical entity—a power bloc—that starts to take form in the early nineteenth century as Western European intellectuals and military planners conceive of Russia as a strategic threat in the East. This bloc is consolidated in the aftermath of World War I, under the leadership of the United States, which, as net creditor to Europe, shapes a new liberal international order. The West, then, becomes a loose grouping of those governments and institutional interests (primarily in Europe and North America) that, despite divergences, have been at the forefront of efforts to maintain and renew this order. During the twentieth century, humanitarians were sometimes at odds with the ordering imperatives of raison d’état, but contemporary humanitarianism is a product of this West—and a pillar of liberal order.2

      EFQ: With this very rich historically and theoretically grounded discussion in mind, it is notable that policy makers and practitioners are implementing diverse ways of “engaging” with “the global South” through discourses and practices of “partnership” and supporting more “horizontal,” rather than “vertical,” modes of cooperation. In turn, one critique of such institutionalized policy engagement is that it risks instrumentalizing and co-opting modes of so-called South-South cooperation and “hence depoliticising potential sources of resistance to the North’s neoliberal hegemony” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018: 2). Indeed, as you suggested earlier, it has been argued that policy makers are strategically embracing “South-South migration,” “South-South cooperation,” and the “localisation of aid agenda” as efficient ways both “to enhance development outcomes” and to “keep ‘Southerners’ in the South,” as “part and parcel of Northern states’ inhumane, racist and racialised systems of border and immigration control” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018: 19). What, if any, are the dangers of enhancing “policy engagement” with “the South”? To what extent do you think that such instrumentalization and co-option can be avoided?

      JF: The term “instrumentalization” gives the impression that there are circumstances under which policy engagement can be objectively just and disinterested. Even when framed as humanitarian, the engagement of Western actors in the South is inspired by a particular politics. Policy engagement involves an encounter of interests and a renegotiation of power relations; for each agent, all others are instruments in its political strategy. Co-option is just a symptom of negotiation between unequal agents with conflicting interests—which don’t need to be stated, conscious, or rationally pursued. It is the means through which the powerful disarm and transform agendas they cannot suppress.

      The “localization agenda” is a good example. Measures to enable effective local responses to disaster are now discussed as a priority at international humanitarian congresses. These discussions can be traced at least as far back as Robert Chambers’s work (1983) on participatory rural development, in the 1980s. And they gathered momentum in the mid-2000s, as a number of initiatives promoted greater local participation in humanitarian operations. But, of course, there are different ideas about what localization should entail.

      As localization has climbed the humanitarian policy agenda, the overseas development divisions of Western governments have come to see it as an opportunity to increase “value for money” and, ultimately, reduce aid expenditure. They promote cash transfer programming as the most “empowering” aid technology. Localization then becomes complementary to the integration of emergency response into development agendas, and to the expansion of markets.

      Western humanitarian agencies that call for localization—and there are those, notably some branches of Médecins Sans Frontières, that do not—have generally fallen in line with this developmental interpretation, on account of their own ideological preferences as much as coercion by donor governments. But they have also presented localization as a moral imperative: a means of “shifting power” to the South to decolonize humanitarianism. While localization might be morally intuitive, Western humanitarians betray their hubris in supposing that their own concessions can reorder the aid industry and the geostrategic matrix from which it takes form. Their proposed solutions, then, including donor budgetary reallocations, are inevitably technocratic. Without structural changes to the political economy of aid, localization becomes a pretext for Western governments and humanitarian agencies to outsource risk. Moreover, it sustains a humanitarian imaginary that associates Westerners with “the international”—the space of politics, from which authority is born—and those in disaster-affected countries with “the local”—the space of the romanticized Other, vulnerable but unsullied by the machinations of power. (It is worth stating that the term “localization” itself implies the transformation of something “global” into something local, even though “locals”—some more than others—are constitutive of the global.)

      There are Southern charities and civil society networks—like NEAR,3 for example—that develop similar narratives on localization, albeit in more indignant tones. They vindicate a larger piece of the pie. But, associating themselves with a neomanagerial humanitarianism, they too embrace a politics incapable of producing a systemic critique of the coloniality of aid.

      Yet demands for local ownership of disaster responses should also be situated within histories of the subaltern. Some Western humanitarian agencies that today advocate for localization, including Save the Children, once faced opposition from anticolonial movements to their late imperial aid projects. More recently, so-called aid recipient perception surveys have repeatedly demonstrated the discontent of disaster-affected communities regarding impositions of foreign aid, but they have also demonstrated anguish over histories of injustice in which the Western humanitarian is little more than an occasional peregrine. It is the structural critique implicit in such responses that the localization agenda sterilizes. In the place of real discussion about power and inequalities, then, we get a set of policy prescriptions aimed at the production of self-sufficient neoliberal subjects, empowered to save themselves through access to markets.

      While some such co-option is always likely in policy engagement, it can be reduced through the formation of counterhegemonic coalitions. Indeed, one dimension of what is now called South-South cooperation involves a relatively old practice among Southern governments of forming blocs to improve their negotiating position in multilateral forums. And, in the twenty-first century, they have achieved moderate successes on trade, global finance, and the environment. But it is important to recognize that co-option occurs in South-South encounters too. And, of course, that political affinities and solidarity can and do exist across frontiers.

      EFQ: You edited the first issue of the Journal of Humanitarian Affairs, which focused on “humanitarianism and the end of liberal order” (see Fiori 2019), and you are also one of the editors of a forthcoming book on this theme, Amidst the Debris: Humanitarianism and the End of Liberal Order. New populisms of the right now challenge the liberal norms and institutions that have shaped the existing refugee regime and have promoted freer movement of people across borders. Can decolonial and anticolonial thinking provide a basis for responses to displacement and migration that do more than resist?

      JF: Any cosmopolitan response to migration is an act of resistance to the political organization of the interstate system.4 As blood-and-soil politicians now threaten to erect walls around the nation-state, the political meaning and relevance of cosmopolitan resistance changes. But if this resistance limits itself to protecting the order that appears to be under threat, it is likely to be ineffective. Moreover, an opportunity to articulate internationalisms in pursuit of a more just order will be lost.

      In recent years, liberal commentators have given a great deal of attention to Trump, Salvini, Duterte, Orbán, Bolsonaro, and other leading figures of the so-called populist Right. And these figures surely merit attention on account of their contributions to a significant conjunctural phenomenon. But the fetishization of their idiosyncrasies and the frenzied investigation of their criminality serves a revanchist project premised on the notion that, once they are removed from office (through the ballot box or otherwise), the old order of things will be restored. To be sure, the wave that brought them to power will eventually subside; but the structures (normative, institutional, epistemological) that have stood in its way are unlikely to be left intact. Whether the intention is to rebuild these structures or to build new ones, it is necessary to consider the winds that produced the wave. In other words, if a cosmopolitan disposition is to play a role in defining the new during the current interregnum, resistance must be inscribed into strategies that take account of the organic processes that have produced Trumpism and Salvinism.

      French geographer Christophe Guilluy offers an analysis of one aspect of organic change that I find compelling, despite my discomfort with the nativism that occasionally flavors his work. Guilluy describes a hollowing out of the Western middle class (2016, 2018). This middle class was a product of the postwar welfarist pact. But, since the crisis of capitalist democracy in the 1970s, the internationalization of capital and the financialization of economies have had a polarizing effect on society. According to Guilluy, there are now two social groupings: the upper classes, who have profited from neoliberal globalization or have at least been able to protect themselves from its fallout; and the lower classes, who have been forced into precarious labor and priced out of the city. It is these lower classes who have had to manage the multicultural integration promoted by progressive neoliberals of the center-left and center-right. Meanwhile, the upper classes have come to live in almost homogenous citadels, from which they cast moral aspersions on the reactionary lower classes who rage against the “open society.” An assertion of cultural sovereignty, this rage has been appropriated by conservatives-turned-revolutionaries, who, I would argue, represent one side of a new political dichotomy. On the other side are the progressives-turned-conservatives, who cling to the institutions that once seemed to promise the end of politics.

      This social polarization would appear to be of significant consequence for humanitarian and human rights endeavors, since their social base has traditionally been the Western middle class. Epitomizing the open society, humanitarian campaigns to protect migrants deepen resentment among an aging precariat, which had imagined that social mobility implied an upward slope, only to fall into the lower classes. Meanwhile, the bourgeois bohemians who join the upper classes accommodate themselves to their postmodern condition, hunkering down in their privileged enclaves, where moral responses to distant injustices are limited to an ironic and banalizing clicktivism. The social institutions that once mobilized multiclass coalitions in the name of progressive causes have long since been dismantled. And, despite the revival of democratic socialism, the institutional Left still appears intellectually exhausted after decades in which it resigned itself to the efficient management of neoliberal strategies.

      And yet, challenges to liberal order articulated through a Far Right politics create a moment of repoliticization; and they expose the contradictions of globalization in an interstate system, without undermining the reality of, or the demand for, connectivity. As such, they seem to open space for the formulation of radical internationalisms with a basis in the reconstruction of migrant rights. In this space, citizens’ movements responding to migration have forged a politics of transnational solidarity through anarchistic practices of mutual aid and horizontalism more than through the philosophizing of associated organic intellectuals. Fueled by disaffection with politics, as much as feelings of injustice, they have attracted young people facing a precarious future, and migrants themselves; indeed, there are movements led by migrants in Turkey, in Germany, in Greece, and elsewhere. They construct social commons with a basis in difference, forming “chains of equivalence.” Decolonial and anticolonial thinking is thus more likely to influence their responses to migration and displacement than those of Western governments and conventional humanitarian agencies. Indeed, beyond the political inspiration that horizontalism often draws from anticolonial struggles, decolonial and postcolonial theories offer a method of deconstructing hierarchy from the inside that can transform resistance into the basis for a pluralist politics built from the bottom up. But for this sort of internationalism to reshape democratic politics, the movements promoting it would need to build bridges into political institutions and incorporate it into political strategies that redress social polarization. To the extent that this might be possible, it will surely dilute their more radical propositions.

      I rather suspect that the most likely scenario, in the short term at least, involves a political reordering through the reassertion of neoliberal strategies. We could see the development of the sort of political economy imagined by the early neoliberal thinker Gottfried Haberler (1985): that is, one in which goods, wages, and capital move freely, but labor doesn’t. This will depend on the consolidation of authoritarian states that nonetheless claim a democratic mandate to impose permanent states of emergency.



    • Conceptualising the global South and South–South encounters

      Long before the institutional interest in ‘engaging with’, and ostensibly mobilising and co-opting actors from across the global South, rich, critical literatures have been published in diverse languages around the world, demonstrating the urgency of developing and applying theoretical and methodological frameworks that can be posited as Southern, anti-colonial, postcolonial and/or decolonial in nature.[1] These and other approaches have traced and advocated for diverse ways of knowing and being in a pluriversal world characterised (and constituted) by complex relationalities and unequal power relations, and equally diverse ways of resisting these inequalities – including through historical and contemporary forms of transnational solidarities.

      Of course, the very term ‘South’ which is included not once but twice in the title of the Handbook of South-South Relations, is itself a debated and diversely mobilised term, as exemplified in the different usages and definitions proposed (and critiqued) across the Handbook’s constituent chapters.

      For instance, a number of official, institutional taxonomies exist, including those which classify (and in turn interpellate) different political entities as ‘being’ from and of ‘the South’ or ‘the North’. Such classifications have variously been developed on the basis of particular readings of a state’s geographical location, of its relative position as a (formerly) colonised territory or colonising power, and/or of a state’s current economic capacity on national and global scales.[2]

      In turn, Medie and Kang (2018) define ‘countries of the global South’ as ‘countries that have been marginalised in the international political and economic system’. Indeed, Connell (2007) builds upon a long tradition of critical thinking to conceptualise the South and the North, respectively, through the lens of the periphery and the metropole, as categories that transcend fixed physical geographies. And of course, as stressed by Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Kenneth Tafira in their contribution to the Handbook, such geographies have never been either static or defined purely through reference to physical territories and demarcations:

      ‘imperial reason and scientific racism were actively deployed in the invention of the geographical imaginaries of the global South and the global North.’

      Through conceptualising the South and North through the lenses of the periphery and metropole, Connell argues that there are multiple souths in the world, including ‘souths’ (and southern voices) within powerful metropoles, as well as multiple souths within multiple peripheries. As Sujata Patel notes in her chapter in the Handbook, it is through this conceptualisation that Connell subsequently posits that

      ‘the category of the south allows us to evaluate the processes that permeate the non-recognition of its theories and practices in the constitution of knowledge systems and disciplines’.

      It enables, and requires us, to examine how, why and with what effect certain forms of knowledge and being in the world come to be interpellated and protected as ‘universal’ while others are excluded, derided and suppressed ‘as’ knowledge or recognisable modes of being.[3] Indeed, in her chapter, Patel follows both Connell (2007) and de Sousa Santos (2014) in conceptualising ‘the South’ as ‘a metaphor’ that ‘represents the embeddedness of knowledge in relations of power’.

      In turn, in their contribution to the Handbook, Dominic Davies and Elleke Boehmer centralise the constitutive relationality of the South by drawing on Grovogu (2011), who defines ‘the term “Global South” not as an exact geographical designation, but as “an idea and a set of practices, attitudes, and relations” that are mobilised precisely as “a disavowal of institutional and cultural practices associated with colonialism and imperialism”’ (cited in Davies and Boehmer). Viewing the South, or souths, as being constituted by and mobilising purposeful resistance to diverse exploitative systems, demonstrates the necessity of a contrapuntal reading of, and through, the South.

      As such, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Tafira powerfully argue in their chapter,

      ‘the global South was not only invented from outside by European imperial forces but it also invented itself through resistance and solidarity-building.’

      In this mode of analysis, the South has been constituted through a long history of unequal encounters with, and diverse forms of resistance to, different structures and entities across what can be variously designated the North, West or specific imperial and colonial powers. An analysis of the South therefore necessitates a simultaneous interrogation of the contours and nature of ‘the North’ or ‘West’, with Mignolo arguing (2000) that ‘what constitutes the West more than geography is a linguistic family, a belief system and an epistemology’.

      Indeed, the acknowledgement of the importance of relationality and such mutually constitutive dynamics provides a useful bridge between these rich theoretical and conceptual engagements of, with and from ‘the South’ on the one hand, and empirically founded studies of the institutional interest in ‘South–South cooperation’ as a mode of technical and political exchange for ‘international development’ on the other. In effect, as noted by Urvashi Aneja in her chapter, diverse policies, modes of political interaction and ‘responses’ led by political entities across the South and the North alike ‘can thus be said to exist and evolve in a mutually constitutive relationship’, rather than in isolation from one another.

      An important point to make at this stage is that it is not our aim to propose a definitive definition of the South or to propose how the South should be analysed or mobilised for diverse purposes – indeed, we would argue that such an exercise would be antithetical to the very foundations of the debates we and our contributors build upon in our respective modes of research and action.

      Nonetheless, a common starting point for most, if not all, of the contributions in the Handbook is a rejection of conceptualisations of the South as that which is ‘non-Western’ or ‘non-Northern’. As noted by Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (here and in the Handbook), it is essential to continue actively resisting negative framings of the South as that which is not of or from ‘the West’ or ‘the North’ – indeed, this is partly why the (still problematic) South/North binary is often preferred over typologies such as Western and non-Western, First and Third World, or developed and un(der)developed countries, all of which ‘suggest both a hierarchy and a value judgment’ (Mawdsley, 2012).

      In effect, as Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues in the Handbook (drawing on Brigg), such modes of negative framing risk ‘maintaining rather than disrupting the notion that power originates from and operates through a unidirectional and intentional historical entity’. She – like other contributors to the Handbook addressing the relationships between theoretical, conceptual and empirical dynamics and modes of analysis, response and action – advocates for us to ‘resist the tendency to reconstitute the power of “the North” in determining the contours of the analysis’, while simultaneously acknowledging the extent to which ‘many Southern-led responses are purposefully positioned as alternatives and challenges to hegemonic, Northern-led systems’.

      This is, in many ways, a ‘double bind’ that persists in many of our studies of the world, including those of and from the South: our aim not to re-inscribe the epistemic power of the North, while simultaneously acknowledging that diverse forms of knowledge and action are precisely developed as counterpoints to the North.

      As noted above, in tracing this brief reflection on conceptualisations of the South it is not our intention to offer a comprehensive definition of ‘the South’ or to posit a definitive account of Southern approaches and theories. Rather, the Handbook aims to trace the debates that have emerged about, around, through and from the South, in all its heterogeneity (and not infrequent internal contradictions), in such a way that acknowledges the ways that the South has been constructed in relation to, with, through but also against other spaces, places, times, peoples, modes of knowledge and action.

      Such processes are, precisely, modes of construction that resist dependence upon hegemonic frames of reference; indeed, the Handbook in many ways exemplifies the collective power that emerges when people come together to cooperate and trace diverse ‘roots and routes’ (following Gilroy) to knowing, being and responding to the world – all with a view to better understanding and finding more nuanced ways of responding to diverse encounters within and across the South and the North.

      At the same time as we recognise internal heterogeneity within and across the South/souths, and advocate for more nuanced ways of understanding the South and the North that challenge hegemonic epistemologies and methodologies, Ama Biney’s chapter in the Handbook reminds us of another important dynamic that underpins the work of most, perhaps all, of the contributors to the Handbook. While Biney is writing specifically about pan-Africanism, we would argue that the approach she delineates is essential to the critical theoretical perspectives and analyses presented throughout the Handbook:

      ’Pan-Africanism does not aim at the external domination of other people, and, although it is a movement operating around the notion of being a race conscious movement, it is not a racialist one … In short, pan-Africanism is not anti-white but is profoundly against all forms of oppression and the domination of African people.’

      While it is not our aim to unequivocally idealise or romanticise decolonial, postcolonial, anti-colonial, or Southern theories, or diverse historical or contemporary modes of South South Cooperation and transnational solidarity – such processes are complex, contradictory, and at times are replete of their own forms of discrimination and violence – we would nonetheless posit that this commitment to challenging and resisting all forms of oppression and domination, of all peoples, is at the core of our collective endeavours.

      With such diverse approaches to conceptualising ‘the South’ (and its counterpoint, ‘the North’ or ‘the West’), precisely how we can explore ‘South–South relations’ thus becomes, first, a matter of how and with what effect we ‘know’, ‘speak of/for/about’, and (re)act in relation to different spaces, peoples and objects around the world; subsequently, it is a process of tracing material and immaterial connections across time and space, such as through the development of political solidarity and modes of resistance, and the movement of aid, trade, people and ideas. It is with these overlapping sets of debates and imperatives in mind, that the Handbook aims to explore a broad range of questions regarding the nature and implications of conducting research in and about the global South, and of applying a ‘Southern lens’ to such a wide range of encounters, processes and dynamics around the world.[4]


      From a foundational acknowledgement of the dangers of essentialist binaries such as South–North and East–West and their concomitant hierarchies and modes of exploitation, the Handbook aims to explore and set out pathways to continue redressing the longstanding exclusion of polycentric forms of knowledge, politics and practice. It is our hope that the Handbook unsettles thinking about the South and about South–South relations, and prompts new and original research agendas that serve to transform and further complicate the geographic framing of the peoples of the world for emancipatory futures in the 21st century.

      This extract from Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley’s Introduction to The Handbook of South-South Relations has been slightly edited for the purposes of this blog post. For other pieces published as part of the Southern Responses blog series on Thinking through the Global South, click here.

      References cited

      Anzaldúa, G., 1987. Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute.

      Brigg, M., 2002. ‘Post-development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor.’ Third World Quarterly 23(3), 421–436.

      Chakrabarty, D., 2007. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

      Connell, R., 2007. Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Science. London: Polity.

      Dabashi, H., 2015. Can Non-Europeans Think? London: Zed Books.

      de Sousa Santos, B., 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

      Dussel, E., 1977. Filosofía de Liberación. Mexico City: Edicol.

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., 2015. South-South Educational Migration, Humanitarianism and Development: Views from the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East. Oxford: Routledge.

      Gilroy, P., 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso.

      Grosfoguel, R., 2011. Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality. Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1(1). Available from: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq [Accessed 7 September 2018].

      Grovogu, S., 2011. A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations. The Global South 5(1), Special Issue: The Global South and World Dis/Order, 175–190.

      Kwoba, B, Nylander, O., Chantiluke, R., and Nangamso Nkopo, A. (eds), 2018. Rhodes Must Fall: The Struggle to Decolonise the Racist Heart of Empire. London: Zed Books.

      Mawdsley, E., 2012. From Recipients to Donors: The Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape. London: Zed Books.

      Medie, P. and Kang, A.J., 2018. Power, Knowledge and the Politics of Gender in the Global South. European Journal of Politics and Gender 1(1–2), 37–54.

      Mignolo, W.D., 2000. Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

      Mignolo, W.D., 2015. ‘Foreword: Yes, We Can.’ In: H. Dabashi, Can Non-Europeans Think? London and New York: Zed Books, pp. viii–xlii.

      Minh-ha, Trinh T., 1989. Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

      Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J., 2013. Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

      Quijano, A., 1991. Colonialidad y Modernidad/Racionalidad. Perú Indígena 29, 11–21.

      Said, E., 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. New York: Vintage Books.

      Spivak, G.C., 1988. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge.

      Sundberg, J., 2007. Reconfiguring North–South Solidarity: Critical Reflections on Experiences of Transnational Resistance. Antipode 39(1), 144–166.

      Tuhiwai Smith, L., 1999. Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed Books.

      wa Thiong’o, N., 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: Heinemann Educational.

      Wynter, S., 2003. Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation – An Argument. The New Centennial Review 3(3), 257–337.

      * Notes

      [1] For instance, see Anzaldúa 1987; Chakrabarty 2007; Connell 2007; de Sousa Santos 2014; Dussell 1977; Grosfoguel 2011; Kwoba et al. 2018; Mignolo 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Quijano 1991, 2007; Said 1978; Spivak 1988; Sundberg 2007; Trinh T. Minh-ha 1989; Tuhiwai Smith 1999; wa Thiong’o 1986; Wynter 2003.

      [2] Over 130 states have defined themselves as belonging to the Group of 77 – a quintessential South–South platform – in spite of the diversity of their ideological and geopolitical positions in the contemporary world order, their vastly divergent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita income, and their rankings in the Human Development Index – for a longer discussion of the challenges and limitations of diverse modes of definition and typologies, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015.

      [3] Also see Mignolo 2000; Dabashi 2015.

      [4] Indeed, Connell notes that ‘#Southern_theory’ is a term I use for social thought from the societies of the global South. It’s not necessarily about the global South, though it often is. Intellectuals from colonial and postcolonial societies have also produced important analyses of global-North societies, and of worldwide structures (e.g. Raúl Prebisch and Samir Amin).


    • Exploring refugees’ conceptualisations of Southern-led humanitarianism

      By Prof Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Principal Investigator, Southern Responses to Displacement Project

      With displacement primarily being a Southern phenomena – circa 85-90% of all refugees remain within the ‘global South – it is also the case that responses to displacement have long been developed and implemented by states from the South (a construct we are critically examining throughout the Southern Responses to Displacement project – see here). Some of these state-led responses to displacement have been developed and implemented within the framework of what is known as ‘South-South Cooperation’. This framework provides a platform from which states from the global South work together to complement one another’s abilities and resources and break down barriers and structural inequalities created by colonial powers. It can also be presented as providing an alternative mode of response to that implemented by powerful Northern states and Northern-led organisations (see here).

      An example of this type of South-South Cooperation, often driven by principles of ‘internationalism,’ can be found in the international scholarship programmes and schools established by a number of Southern states to provide primary, secondary and university-level education for refugees from across the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, since the 1960s, Cuba has provided free education through a scholarship system for Palestinian refugees based in camps and cities across the Middle East following the Nakba (the catastrophe) and for Sahrawi refugees who have lived in desert-based refugee camps in Algeria since the mid-1970s.

      In line with the Southern Responses to Displacement project, which aims to purposefully centralise refugees’ own experiences of and perspectives on Southern-led initiatives to support refugees from Syria, throughout my previous work I have examined how Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees have conceptualised, negotiated or, indeed, resisted, diverse programmes that have been developed and implemented ‘on their behalf.’ While long-standing academic and policy debates have addressed the relationship between humanitarianism, politics and ideology, few studies to date have examined the ways in which refugee beneficiaries – as opposed to academics, policymakers and practitioners – conceptualise the programmes which are designed and implemented ‘for refugees’. The following discussion addresses this gap precisely by centralising Palestinian and Sahrawi graduates’ reflections on the Cuban scholarship programme and the extent to which they conceptualise political and ideological connections as being compatible with humanitarian motivations and outcomes.

      This blog, and my previous work (here and here) examines how Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees have understood the motivations, nature and impacts of Cuba’s scholarship system through reference to identity, ideology, politics and humanitarianism. Based on my interviews with Palestinians and Sahrawis while they were still studying in Cuba, and with Palestinian and Sahrawi graduates whom I interviewed after they had returned to their home-camps in Lebanon and Algeria respectively, this short piece examines the complex dynamics which underpin access to, as well as the multifaceted experiences and outcomes of, the scholarship programme on both individual and collective levels.
      Balancing ‘the humanitarian’

      Although both Palestinian and Sahrawi interviewees in Cuba and Sahrawi graduates in their Algeria-based home-camps repeatedly asserted the humanitarian nature of the Cuban scholarship programme, precisely what this denomination of ‘humanitarianism’ might mean, and how compatible it could be given the ideological and political links highlighted by Palestinian graduates whom I interviewed in a range of refugee camps in Lebanon, requires further discussion.

      The contemporary international humanitarianism regime is habitually equated with the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Ferris 2011: 11), and a strict separation is firmly upheld by Western humanitarian institutions between morality and politics (as explored in more detail by Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). However, many critics reject the assertion that humanitarianism can ever be separated from politics, since ‘“humanitarianism” is the ideology of hegemonic states in the era of globalisation’ (Chimni 2000:3). Recognising the extent to which the Northern-led and Northern-dominated humanitarian regime is deeply implicated in, and reproduces, ‘the ideology of hegemonic [Northern] states’ is particularly significant since many (Northern) academics, policymakers and practitioners reject the right of Southern-led initiatives to be denominated ‘humanitarian’ in nature on the basis that such projects and programmes are motivated by ideological and/or faith-based principles, rather than ‘universal’ humanitarian principles.

      Palestinians who at the time of our interviews were still studying in Cuba, in addition to those who had more recently graduated from Cuban universities, medical and dentistry schools and had ‘returned’ to their home-camps in Lebanon, repeatedly referred to ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘human values’ when describing the Cuban scholarship programme. Yet, while they maintained that Cuba’s programme for Palestinian refugees is ‘humanitarian’ in nature, Palestinian graduates offered different perspectives regarding the balance between these different dimensions, implicitly and at times explicitly noting the ways in which these overlap or are in tension.

      Importantly, these recurrent concepts are to be contrasted with the prevalent terminology and frames of reference arising in Sahrawi refugees’ accounts of the Cuban educational programme. Having also had access to the Cuban educational migration programme, Sahrawi graduates’ accounts can perhaps be traced to the continued significance of Spanish – the language learned and lived (following Bhabha 2006:x) in Cuba – amongst graduates following their return to the Sahrawi refugee camps, where Spanish is the official language used in the major camp-based Sahrawi medical institutions.

      As such, in interviews and in informal conversations in the Sahrawi camps, Cuban-educated Sahrawis (commonly known as Cubarauis) consistently used the Spanish-language term solidaridad (solidarity) to define both the nature of the connection between the Sahrawi people and Cuba, and the nature of the scholarship programme; they also regularly cited Cuban revolutionary figures such as José Martí and Fidel Castro. In contrast, no such quotes were offered by the Palestinian graduates I interviewed in Lebanon, even if the significance of Fidel Castro and Ché Guevara was noted by many during our interviews in Cuba.

      Explaining his understanding of the basis of the scholarship programme for Palestinians, Abdullah elaborated that this was:

      ‘mainly prompted because Cuban politics is based upon human values and mutual respect, and in particular upon socialism, which used to be very prominent in the Arab world during that time.’

      In turn, referring to the common visions uniting both parties and facilitating Cuba’s scholarship programme for Palestinian refugees, Hamdi posited that:

      ‘Certain ideological and political commonalities contributed to this collaboration between the Cuban government and the PLO. However, the humanitarian factor was present in these negotiations.’ (Emphasis added)

      These accounts reflect the extent to which ideology and humanitarianism are both recognised as playing a key role in the scholarship programme, and yet Hamdi’s usage of the term ‘however’, and his reference to ‘the humanitarian factor’, demonstrate an awareness that a tension may be perceived to exist between ideology/politics and humanitarian motivations.

      Indeed, rather than describing the programme as a humanitarian programme per se, eight of my interviewees offered remarkably similar humanitarian ‘qualifiers’: the Cuban education programme is described as having ‘a humanitarian component’ (Marwan), ‘a humanitarian dimension’ (Younis), a ‘humanitarian aspect’ (Saadi), and ‘humanitarian ingredients’ (Abdel-Wahid); while other interviewees argued that it is ‘a mainly humanitarian system’ (Nimr) which ‘carr[ies] humanitarian elements’ (Hamdi) and ‘shares its humanitarian message in spite of the embargo [against Cuba]’ (Ibrahim).

      As exemplified by these qualifiers, Palestinians who participated in this programme themselves recognise that humanitarianism was not the sole determining justification for the initiative, but rather that it formed part of the broader Cuban revolution and a particular mode of expressing support for other liberation movements, including the Palestinian cause.

      In terms of weighting these different motivating and experiential elements, Mohammed argued that the ‘humanitarian aspect outweighs the ideological one’, emphasising the ‘programme’s strong humanitarian aspect’. In turn, Ahmed and Nimr declared that the Cuban scholarships were offered ‘without conditions or conditionalities’ and without ‘blackmailing Palestinians to educate them’.

      These references are particularly relevant when viewed alongside critiques of neoliberal development programmes and strategies which have often been characterised by ‘tied aid’ or diverse economic, socio-political and gendered conditionalities which require beneficiaries to comply with Northern-dominated priorities vis-à-vis ‘good governance’ – all of which are, in effect, politically and/or ideologically driven.

      Concurrently, Khalil argued that the programme is ‘humanitarian if used correctly’, thereby drawing attention to the extent to which the nature of the programme transcends either Cuba’s or the PLO’s underlying motivating factors per se, and is, rather, characterised both by the way in which the programme has been implemented since the 1970s, and its longer-term impacts.

      With reference to the former, claims regarding the absence of conditionalities on Cuba’s behalf must be viewed alongside the extent to which Palestinians could only access the scholarships if they were affiliated with specific Palestinian factions (as I explore in the book): can the programme be ‘truly’ humanitarian if individual participation has historically been contingent upon an official declaration of ideological commonality with a leftist faction and/or the Cuban internationalist project?

      With universality, neutrality and impartiality being three of the core ‘international’ humanitarian principles, a tension is apparent from the perspective of ‘the Northern relief elite’ who arguably monopolise the epithet humanitarian (Haysom, cited in Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013: 6). Indeed, although José Martí’s humanitarian principle to ‘compartir lo que tienes, no dar lo que te sobra’ (‘to share what you have, not what is left over’) has historically guided many of the Cuban state’s revolutionary programmes on national(ist) and international(ist) levels, precisely who Cuba should share with (on a collective) has often been geopolitically framed. Whilst designed to overcome the historical legacy of diverse exclusionary processes in Cuba, the programme could itself be conceptualised as being guided by an ideological commitment to inclusion with exclusionary underpinnings.

      The imposition of a hegemonic discourse leaves people out, primarily on ideological grounds. Ideological repression means that everybody who questions the regime in a fundamental way is basically left out in the dark. There is a creation of boundaries between Self and Other that leaves very little room for fundamental critique. However, the existence of a hegemonic discourse, and demands for students to publicly assert their affiliation to an official ideological stance, whether this refers to Cuban or Palestinian discourses, should not necessarily be equated with the exclusion of individuals and groups who do not share particular opinions and beliefs.

      In the case explored in this blog and in the book it is based on, a distinction can therefore perhaps be usefully made between the collective basis of scholarships primarily being offered to groups and nations with political and ideological bonds to Cuba’s revolutionary project, and the extent to which individual Palestinian students have arguably negotiated the Cuban system and the factional system alike to maximise their personal, professional and political development. To achieve the latter, individuals have developed official performances of ideological loyalty to access and complete their university studies in Cuba, whilst ultimately maintaining or developing political and ideological opinions, and critiques, of their own.

      With reference to the broader outcomes of the programme, is it sufficient to announce, as seven Palestinian graduates did, that the project was ‘humanitarian’ in nature precisely because the beneficiaries of the scheme were refugees, and the overarching aim was to achieve professional self-sufficiency in refugee camps?

      In effect, and as explored in my other research (here) Cuba’s programme might appear to fall under the remit of a developmental approach, rather than being ‘purely’ humanitarian in nature, precisely due to the official aim of maximising self-sufficiency as opposed to addressing immediate basic needs in an emergency phase (with the latter more readily falling under the remit of ‘humanitarian’ assistance).

      Nonetheless, Cuba’s aim to enhance refugees’ self-sufficiency corresponds to the UNHCR’s well-established Development Assistance to Refugees approach, and programmes supporting medium- and long-term capacity building are particularly common in protracted refugee situations. At the same time, it could be argued that the distinction between humanitarianism and development is immaterial given that the rhetoric of solidarity underpins all of Cuba’s internationalist projects, whether in contexts of war or peace, and, furthermore, since Cuba has offered scholarships not only to refugees but also to citizens from across the Global South.

      Related to the programme’s reach to citizens and refugees alike, and simultaneously to the nature of the connection between humanitarianism and politics, Younis drew attention to another pivotal dimension: ‘although the educational system had a humanitarian dimension, I don’t think it is possible to separate the human being from politics’. Cuba’s political (in essence, socialist) commitment to the ‘human being’ was reasserted throughout the interviews, with Saadi, for instance, referring to Cuba’s prioritisation of the ‘relationship between a human being and a fellow human being’, and Khalil explaining that Cuba had adopted ‘the cause of the human being, and that’s why it supported Palestinians in their struggle’.

      While critiques of Northern-led human rights discourses have been widespread, and such critiques have often paralleled or influenced critical analyses of humanitarianism (as I explore elsewhere), in their responses Palestinian graduates invoked an alternative approach to supporting the rights of human beings.

      By conceptualising Cuba’s commitment to human beings as being inherently connected to politics, graduates, by extension, also highlighted that politics cannot be separated from approaches geared towards supporting humanity, whether external analysts consider that such approaches should be labelled ‘development’ or ‘humanitarianism’. Whilst absent from the terminology used by Palestinian graduates, it can be argued that the notion of solidarity centralised in Cubaraui (and Cuban) accounts captures precisely these dimensions of Cuba’s internationalist approach.
      Moving Forward

      These dynamics – including conceptualisations of the relationship between politics, ideology, and humanitarianism; of short-, medium- and long-term responses to displacement; and how refugees themselves negotiate and conceptualise responses developed by external actors ‘on their behalf’ – will continue to be explored throughout the Southern Responses to Development from Syria project. This ongoing research project aims, amongst other things, to examine how people displaced from Syria – Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Kurds … -, experience and perceive the different forms of support that ‘Southern’ states, civil society groups, and refugees themselves have developed in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. This will include reflections on how refugees conceptualise (and resist) both the construct of ‘the South’ itself and diverse responses developed by states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, but also by different groups of refugees themselves. The latter include Palestinian refugees whose home-camps in Lebanon have been hosting refugees from Syria, but also whose educational experiences in Cuba mean that they are amongst the medical practitioners who are treating refugees from Syria, demonstrating the complex legacies of the Cuban scholarship programme for refugees from the Middle East.


      For more information on Southern-led responses to displacement, including vis-à-vis South-South Cooperation, read our introductory mini blog series here, and the following pieces:

      Carpi, E. (2018) ‘Empires of Inclusion‘

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2019) ‘Looking Forward. Disasters at 40′

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Histories and spaces of Southern-led responses to displacement

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Internationalism and solidarity

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2018) Refugee-refugee humanitarianism

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2014) The Ideal Refugees: Islam, Gender, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival

      Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. and Daley, P. (2018) Conceptualising the global South and South–South encounters

      Featured Image: A mural outside a school in Baddawi camp, N. Lebanon. Baddawi has been home to Palestinian refugees from the 1950s, and to refugees from Syria since 2011 (c) E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2017


      #réfugiés #post-colonialisme #ressources_pédagogiques

  • International Mobility Restrictions and the Spread of Pandemics: New Data and Research

    Global Mobility and the Threat of Pandemics: Evidence from Three Centuries, Michael A. Clemens and Thomas Ginn, Center for Global Development

    Countries restrict the overall extent of international travel and migration to balance the expected costs and benefits of mobility. Given the ever-present threat of new, future pandemics, how should permanent restrictions on mobility respond? We find that in all cases, even a draconian 50 percent reduction in pre-pandemic international mobility is associated with 1–2 weeks later arrival and no detectable reduction in final mortality. The case for permanent limits on international mobility to reduce the harm of future pandemics is weak.

    The Airport Factor: Assessing the impact of aviation mobility on the spread of Covid-19, by Ettore Recchi and Alessandro Ferrara

    An ongoing research project at MPC (The Airport Factor) is assessing the impact of air travels on Covid-19 mortality in 430 sub-national regions of 39 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Oceania. Our early analyses find that the volume of pre-pandemic inbound air travelers (including from China) has no significant effect either on the number of Covid-19 casualties, or on the timing of the outbreaks in the first semester of 2020.

    Ellen M. Immergut, Head of Department, Chair in Political Sciences, SPS, EUI
    Daniel Fernandes, Researcher, SPS

    Chair: Lenka Dražanová, MPC, RSCAS, EUI


    #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières #pandémie #mobilité #mobilité_internationale #conférence #fermeture_des_frontières #restrictions #migrations

  • Sur les rapports entre #Philosophie et #Politique

    Séminaire XXII du 1er juin 1983, dans « Ce qui fait la #Grèce. La Cité et les Lois. Séminaire 1983-1984. La Création humaine 3. », Seuil, 2008, pp. 197-212. Source : http://palimpsestes.fr/textes_philo... Tout au long de cette année, nous avons essayé de trouver les racines – non pas les causes, ni les conditions nécessaires et suffi­santes – de la démocratie et de la philosophie dans cette première saisie imaginaire du monde grec qu’est sa mythologie. Puis nous avons parlé de la constitution de la cité (...) #Apports_théoriques_:_Imaginaire,_culture,_création

    / #Grèce, #Antiquité, #Conférence, #Assemblée, #Démocratie_directe#Castoriadis (...)


  • Ouvrir sa porte à l’inconnu. Récit d’une #solidarité_ordinaire

    En 2017, la journaliste #Julia_Montfort et son mari accueillent chez eux Abdelhaq, un jeune migrant Tchadien. De cette rencontre est née un constat : il existe une France accueillante et solidaire, et une envie : celle de la filmer. Julia Montfort est journaliste indépendante. Spécialisée dans les droits humains, elle collabore notamment avec Public Sénat pour la série « Les Dessous de la mondialisation ». Elle a reçu le Prix du jury du festival du film d’environnement (Québec) pour « Poussière d’or au Burkina Faso », une immersion dans les tréfonds de l’orpaillage. Elle réalise actuellement une web-série documentaire, « Carnets de solidarité », sur l’accueil citoyen de migrants et réfugiés en France. Cette série accompagne le lancement de sa chaîne YouTube destinée à diffuser un travail indépendant et financé par les spectateurs. This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community.


    #hospitalité #hospitalité_privée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #témoignage #accueil_privé #France #TEDx #vidéo #Paris #conférence #espace #solidarité #entraide #capacité_d'entraide

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • New policy brief : Not all returns can result in sustainable reintegration



    Commentaire de Jill Alpes via la mailing-list Migreurop :

    Returns can both exacerbate existing, as well as create new vulnerabilities. #IzabellaMajcher and #Jill_Alpes published a policy brief with UNU-CRIS, entitled “Who can be sustainably reintegrated after return? Using post-return monitoring for rights-based return policies.” (https://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/PB20.3%20-%20Jill%20Alpes%20and%20Izabella%20Majcher.pdf) In the brief, they argue that rights-based return policies need more robust vulnerability assessments and more extensive monitoring of people’s access to rights and well-being after return.

    - For a video presentation of the police brief, please feel free to check out this recorded webinar organised by Statewatch (starting at 54 minutes: https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/deportation-union-revamped-return-policies-and-reckless-forced-removals).
    – Thanks to a collaboration with PICUM and a series of artists, we also have an illustrated booklet of selected testimonies. “Removed Stories: Stories of hardship and resilience in facing deportation and its aftermath” (https://picum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Removed-stories.pdf) highlights the impact of EU return policies on people’s lives and dreams.
    - For a short summary in French of some of the key lessons we can learn from post-return interviews for rights-based return policies, please feel free to explore either the Summary of Workshop - “Au dela du retours” (https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.be/system/tdf/fr_au-dela_du_retour.pdf?file=1&type=document) -organized by a collective of Belgian NGOs (p. 29 - 31) - or this intervention (https://vimeo.com/389291559

    ) at an event organized by the Cimade (starting 14 minutes).

    Few selected tweets by the United Nations University - CRIS:
    UNU - CRIS Tweets:

    - “Returns can create new vulnerabilities for certain profiles of migrants in particular. For example, people might not be vulnerable in Europe but will become so upon deportation to their country of nationality if they do not have families or social networks there, have not spent a significant number of years in their country of nationality (and might thus lack the necessary language skills for basic survival), or had been internally displaced beforehand. Deporting countries should take these specific returnee profiles into consideration when both issuing removal orders and deciding whether and how these removal orders are to be implemented.”
    - “The weakness or strength of people’s social networks in countries of nationality should be part of vulnerability assessments prior to return. Deporting countries should also consider not just existing social policies in countries of nationality, but also real impediments to services and entitlements that returnees will likely face upon return. Such barriers are typically stronger for those who are returned after long periods abroad and for those who have other pre-existing vulnerabilities.”
    - “States need to implement rights-based post-return monitoring. People who suffer from exacerbated or new vulnerabilities are less likely to be able to build up new life projects necessary for their “sustainable reintegration” in countries of nationality. Financial investments into reintegration assistance would thus not be able to achieve declared policy objectives.”


    #réintégration #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #après-expulsion

    ping @_kg_ @rhoumour @karine4

  • #Alcool et #drogue dans les relations affectives ou sexuelles : #transactions, #consentements, zones grises ?”

    Cette #conférence est l’occasion d’aborder le rôle de la consommation de #psychotropes dans la #sexualité, et de questionner la façon dont les #espaces_urbains (des #espaces_domestiques – de l’#intimité du couple à la #fête_privée ; aux espaces de #sociabilité_nocturne) sont impliqués et transformés par ces pratiques.


    #espace_public #espace_privé

  • Séance 2 du séminaire glanages du 06 novembre 2020

    Récupérer des invendus alimentaires, cueillir des pissenlits, grappiller des figues ou ramasser de la ferraille. Autant de pratiques de quête et/ou subsistance qui reposent sur la collecte de ressources biologiques ou matérielles encore non appropriées, et de manières de les nommer. Comment relire ces pratiques ancestrales dans le cadre du tournant écologique des sciences humaines et sociales ? En quoi ces pratiques de glanage interrogent-elle les manières de concevoir nos relations avec les vivants et ce(ux) qu’on ingère comme nos rapports aux territoires et à la propriété ? Si le droit de glanage est un droit d’usage profondément ancré dans les espaces ruraux depuis plusieurs siècles, la réflexion contemporaine autour des communs, notamment en contextes urbains, propose de nouvelles pistes scientifiques et politiques pour comprendre ce qui se joue dans ces formes alternatives et non-extractivistes de réappropriation des ressources.

    Ce séminaire réunira des géographes, anthropologues, historiens, philosophes, sociologues, et tou·te·s celles et ceux qui sont intéressé·e·s par une réflexion sur les pratiques de glanages. Il vise à explorer comment elles prennent place dans les marges spatiales et socio-économiques du capitalisme et de la propriété, ainsi qu’à analyser les conditions d’adaptation, de négociation et de résistance qu’elles permettent. Au final, il s’agit d’interroger comment les enjeux socio-écologiques contemporains renouvellent les manières de penser ce mode particulier de quête et de subsistance.

    – Programme séance 2
    vendredi 6 novembre 2020, de 14h à 17h30
    Cueillir en ville, cueillir aux champs : territoires et pratiques de la cueillette contemporaine

    « Des champs à la ville : cueillir dans des mondes en transition, l’exemple de la Guyane française »
    par Marc-Alexandre Tareau (anthropologue, LEEISA) et Lucie DEJOUANET (géographe, AIHP-GEODE, Université des Antilles)

    « Cueillir dans les marges urbaines : le cas du Grand Paris »
    par Flaminia Paddeu (Pléiade, USPN) et Fabien Roussel (Discontinuités, Université d’Artois)

    « Économies de disettes et glanages dans des mondes perdus. Observations d’un géographe, de l’Océanie à la Dordogne »
    par Mathias Faurie, (géographe et cidrier)


    #glanage #conférence #séminaire #vidéo


  • #Conférence_de_presse conjointe sur la réponse européenne à la #menace_terroriste

    Une conférence de presse a eu lieu hier à Paris, avec #Sebastian_Kurz (chancelier autrichien), #Angela_Merkel, #Mark_Rutte (Pays Bas) ainsi qu’avec le président du Conseil européen, #Charles_Michel, et la présidente de la Commission européenne, #Ursula_Von_der_Leyen.

    La conférence de presse complète est visible ici : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zL6_Ewwy8dE&feature=youtu.be

    Message reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, 11.11.2020 (que j’anonymise et modifie légèrement) :

    Lors de cette conférence ont été tenu des propos potentiellement inquiétants par Emmanuel #Macron. Dans sa prise de parole officielle, il a déclaré : « Il ne faut en rien confondre la lutte contre l’#immigration_clandestine et le terrorisme, mais il nous faut regarder lucidement les #liens qui existent entre ces deux phénomènes. » (à 4mn52sec.)
    Parfaite illustration de l’utilisation rhétorique de la litote !
    En résumé tout ce qui est dit avant le « mais » ne compte pas…

    Plus tard dans la conférence de presse, une journaliste lui pose la question du respect du #droit_d’asile, et il répond ceci : « Tout particulièrement, et c’est un sujet dont nous devons nous emparer collectivement, nous constatons dans tous nos pays à un dévoiement de ce qui est le droit d’asile. Le droit d’asile est fait pour les #combattants_de_la_paix, pour ceux qui prennent un #risque dans leur choix politique dans leur pays. Et nous voyons de plus en plus aujourd’hui de personnes qui viennent demander le droit d’asile en Europe et qui viennent de pays qui ne sont pas en #guerre, auxquels nous donnons des centaines de milliers de #visas chaque année. Donc il y a un dévoiement, qui est utilisé chaque année par des trafiquants, par des réseaux qui sont bien identifiés. » (à 35mn20sec.)

    Ces mots sont inquiétants…
    D’abord parce que Macron, quand il parle du droit d’asile sous cette forme, ne parle pas du droit d’asile au sens de la #convention_de_Genève, mais bien uniquement de l’asile sous sa forme constitutionnelle française.
    #Asile_constitutionnel : "toute personne persécutée en raison de son action en faveur de la #liberté" (alinéa 4 du préambule de la Constitution de 1946)
    L’OFPRA le détaille comme ceci :
    "existence d’une #persécution_effective (et donc pas seulement d’une #crainte_de_persécution)
    les auteurs des persécutions peuvent être déterminés ou non, organisés ou non
    le demandeur a fait preuve d’un engagement actif en faveur de l’instauration d’un régime démocratique ou des valeurs qui s’y attachent (liberté d’expression, liberté d’association, liberté syndicale...)
    l’engagement du demandeur doit être dicté par des considérations d’#intérêt_général (et non d’ordre personnel)"

    Cette forme est bien plus restrictive que l’asile au sens de la Convention :
    Article 1, A, 2 :
    « toute personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un certain groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques, se trouve hors du pays dont elle a la nationalité et qui ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays. ».

    Quand Emmanuel Macron déclare que c’est un sujet dont les pays européens doivent s’emparer collectivement, est-ce qu’il ne faut pas craindre que des discussions au sein des Etats-membres s’engagent sur une #restriction des #critères d’attribution de l’asile ? Voire une #remise_en_cause de l’asile conventionnel ?
    Ce vendredi doit se tenir une réunion du Conseil Européen, avec tous les ministres de l’intérieur européens. Il faut rappeler que Gérald Darmanin aurait évoqué une remise en cause du droit d’asile, le 18 octobre. Sujet qui n’aurait « pas été à l’ordre du jour » du conseil de défense, contrairement à son souhait.

    Ce #glissement _émantique de la France, qui je l’espère ne va pas déteindre sur les autres Etats-membres.

    #extrémisme_violent #terrorisme #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    ping @isskein @karine4


    Le 2 octobre, une conférence intitulée “Maintien de l’ordre : du terrain au politique” était organisée à l’initiative de X-Alternative, une association de polytechniciens formée à la suite des gilets jaunes. Elle a pu avoir lieu grâce à un partenariat avec le Dissident Bar, lieu d’expression des dissidents de tous pays, et avec Le Média TV, qui l’a filmée. Et la restitue ici. Deux intervenants étaient à l’honneur : Laurent Bigot, ancien sous-préfet et Bertrand Cavallier, général de gendarmerie ayant quitté le service actif, ancien commandant du Centre national d’entraînement des forces de gendarmerie de Saint-Astier.

    La conférence s’est ouverte sur une citation : « Je pardonne à celui qui a tiré, que celui-ci l’ait fait accidentellement ou intentionnellement, mais je ne peux pas pardonner à ceux qui ont donné les ordres ». Une phrase prononcée par un mutilé dans le film « Un pays qui se tient sage », de David Dufresne. Elle montre un homme qui a toutes les raisons d’en vouloir aux policiers, et qui au final n’en veut qu’à la hiérarchie.

    Comment se mettent en place les ordres, justement ? En polarisant le débat, sous l’influence du pouvoir, sur la question des bavures, on prend le risque de commettre une erreur : exempter les politiques pour ne charger que les fonctionnaires sur le terrain.

    Ce serait une double faute. On laisserait filer les coupables, et ces coupables ont des noms : Castaner, Nunez, Lallement, et au-delà Valls ou Sarkozy. Par ailleurs on continuerait d’enfermer la police dans un syndrome obsidional.

    Ceci n’aurait pour effet que de contribuer à la cantonner à un rôle de force au service d’institutions délégitimées. On céderait ainsi à la thèse des « deux camps » du préfet Lallement. En posant la question de la hiérarchie politique et des relations de commandement, on questionne au contraire un système.

    Ceci n’exonère pas les policiers de toute responsabilité individuelle mais désigne un responsable “structurel” : celui qui laisse pourrir les commissariats tout en envoyant castagner du manifestant. Manifestant qui, d’ailleurs, manifestent à cause de la politique de ce même responsable.

    Nos invités étaient donc appelés à nous expliquer ces rapports de force entre commandement, syndicats, ministères, préfecture, qu’on ne voit pas souvent et qui se gardent bien de se montrer au grand jour.

    Cela s’articule aussi avec la nature de X-Alternative, une association de diplômés souvent au cœur d’une autre machine ultra violente : l’économie. De même que le manifestant ne voit pas Castaner mais seulement le CRS en face de lui (et inversement), l’ouvrier viré ne voit que le patron de site, et pas le milliardaire qui, en bout de chaîne actionnariale, fait pression sur toute la chaîne managériale pour augmenter les dividendes.

    Explorer ces chaînes de pouvoir, c’est rendre au peuple les moyens de compréhension des choses qui l’oppressent.

    #ViolencesPolicières #Police #Conférence

  • Vidéo - Replay webinaire « Surveillance et numérique » | Drupal | inno³ | Open Innovation, Open Source et Open Data |

    Replongez dans le webinaire « Surveillance et numérique : quelle implication pour et par la recherche ? » du 26 Mai 2020 avec Christophe Masutti

    Historien des sciences et des techniques, Christophe nous a présenté son dernier ouvrage Affaires privées : aux sources du capitalisme de surveillance et la place prise par l’informatique et les données dans nos sociétés actuelles en tant que leviers d’une surveillance intimement reliée aux mécanismes capitalistiques.

    #Christophe_Masutti #Vidéo #Affaires_privées #Capitalisme_surveillance #C&F_éditions #Conférence

  • [OpenESR] - Webinaire « Surveillance et Numérique » avec Christophe Masutti - CodiMD

    Intervention de Christophe MASUTTI

    Le webinaire dans son ensemble est disponible sur l’instance Libre Video
    C. Masutti propose de commencer par une contextualisation historique de la vie privée et de la surveillance, afin de prendre du recul sur ce que nous vivons et de retracer la longue histoire de la vie privée, de la privacy et des différents acteurs qui ont participé à leurs conceptualisations.

    Retour historique sur des notions intriquées : vie privée, privacy, surveillance

    À l’origine du travail de C. Masutti sur la vie privée et la surveillance, il y a la lecture de nombreuses réflexions qui, dès la fin des années 1960, font surgir une crainte de la société Orwellienne face aux grandes banques de données. Il procède à trois citations remarquables :

    Cette littérature grise (rapport, discours, etc.) est essentielle pour se saisir des enjeux inhérents à la vie privée et la surveillance, ainsi C. Masutti a noté un écart important entre les grands discours des livres et publications scientifiques et la « science en acte », la manière dont elle se confronte au réel et aux puissances décisionnaires.

    À partir de cette littérature, qui cite fréquemment et amplement Orwell (auteur du roman dystopique 1984), la question a été de savoir ce qui avait changé depuis la fin des années 1960 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. La réponse, qui constitue l’objet de l’ouvrage de C. Masutti, est l’émergence d’un capitalisme de surveillance.
    Pour comprendre comment s’est opérée la mutation vers un capitalisme de surveillance, une voie possible consiste à revenir sur la façon dont le concept de vie privée, et celui plus large de privacy se sont structurés au cours du temps, en commençant par leur théorisation dans les travaux d’Alan Westin.

    Professeur de droit à l’université de Columbia, Alan Westin travaille sur la vie privée et la confidentialité dans les pratiques de consommation. Il définit la vie privée comme une exigence à décider soi même quand et comment les informations qui nous concernent peuvent être communiquées à d’autres.
    Avec d’autres juristes, A. Westin a initié aux États-Unis (et très vite de manière internationale) un mouvement de pensées sur la vie privée. Si la vie privée est un concept défini à la fin du XIXe siècle (par S. Warren et L . Brandeis) avec l’expression célèbre The right to be let alone, il faut comprendre qu’avec l’arrivée du substrat technologique des ordinateurs, des bases de données et des pratiques de communication, cette définition ne pouvait plus suffire. Et tout le champ de recherche à ce sujet est encore loin d’être épuisé : la vie privée est un concept mouvant, éternellement en adaptation aux contextes sociaux et technologiques.

    Un ami d’A. Westin, Daniel J. Solove, publiera en 2002 une tentative de généralisation de la Privacy qu’il définit en 6 points : 1) The right to be let alone, 2) l’accès limité à sa personne, 3) le secret, 4) le contrôle des renseignements personnels et 5) la vie privée.

    Dans les années 2000, privacy comme vie privée vont devenir des sujets phares du monde universitaire en questionnant leur évolution avec le développement de l’informatique. Ainsi deux lois clefs, datant des années 1970 sont particulièrement importantes à rappeler. Il s’agit du Fair Credit Reporting Act de 1970, qui réglemente la collecte, l’utilisation et la redistribution des données des consommateurs ; ainsi que du Privacy Act de 1974, qui donne un cadre à la collecte, la conservation, et l’utilisation d’informations personnelles identifiables par le gouvernement fédéral.

    Ces lois, qui entrent en vigueur aux Etats-Unis, sont une réponse aux pratiques de fichage informatisé mises en place par des banques pour en produire des listes secrètes et des analyses illicites qu’elles revendaient par la suite, sur un modèle d’affaire particulièrement lucratif. Aussi, grâce à ce cadre juridique, les institutions publiques ont dû obéir à un code de conduite ficelé.

    1974 est également une année charnière en France avec l’affaire du Système Automatisé pour les Fichiers Administratifs et le Répertoire des Individus (SAFARI). Ce projet d’interconnexion des fichiers nominatifs de l’administration française géré par le Ministère de l’intérieur rassemblait toutes les informations issues d’autres bases de données nationales pour pouvoir établir un grand fichage informatisé de tous les Français. Cette affaire a permis en France la création de la CNIL (Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés) en 1978 bien que la question du consentement ait fait l’objet de quelques études depuis le début des années 1970 (en parallèle des recherches à l’œuvre aux Etats-Unis et au Royaume-Uni).

    Ce mouvement de réponse législative aux violations de la vie privée par les entreprises se développera également au Royaume-Uni, avec d’une part le rapport Younger sur le Right of Privacy Bill, et d’autre part les dispositions liées au scandale des procédures de recensement dont les questions invasives étaient posées afin que l’administration publique puisse créer des banques de données destinées à la revente.

    Le rôle de l’information dans nos sociétés

    Cette approche critique du capitalisme passe notamment par une critique de l’information comme valeur capitalistique et du développement en conséquence des technologies de l’information. C’est ainsi le rapport entre information et société qui est en jeu et qui n’a cessé d’être questionné depuis les années 1960 dès le début de l’informatisation.

    Cette vision, corroborée par les révélations de Snowden, pousse à envisager la question de la vie privée au regard du niveau technique et technologique d’une société. On ne peut pas faire l’histoire de la surveillance en faisant l’impasse sur les conditions technologiques dans lesquelles elle se développe.
    En effet, l’émergence d’une économie de la surveillance n’est pas seulement due à une mutation de l’économie (dans laquelle l’information devient un capital), mais est aussi fonction des évolutions technologiques qui l’ont rendue possible. Une société de l’information constitue en cela un terrain fertile pour le développement de la surveillance avec notamment le rôle majeur de l’information pour orienter les comportements de consommation.

    Issues des mouvements des années 1970 et représentées par les travaux de David Lyon, les surveillance studies constituent un champ dédié à l’étude du développement du phénomène de la surveillance massive, et tendent actuellement à montrer que le solutionnisme technologique s’est élevé au rang d’idéologie (Silicon Valley, startup nation), depuis notamment CyberSyn au Chili, entrainant avec lui de nouveaux moyens de surveillance auxquels consentent plus ou moins facilement les citoyens.
    L’exemple récent des débats autour de l’application StopCovid, et de l’utilisation des données captées par une application similaire aux USA aux fins de savoir qui participe à des manifestations, en sont des illustrations particulièrement frappantes.

    Solutions face au capitalisme de surveillance

    Privilégier le collectif et le local.
    Ne pas faire de concessions par rapport au chiffrement des données.
    L’utilisation des logiciels libres.
    Dispatcher les lieux de pouvoirs en autant d’instances locales que possible (instances en pair-à pair).

    #Christophe_Masutti #Affairs_privées #Capitalisme_surveillance #Conference

  • "Inventer l’#Université et la #recherche de demain"

    Les #vidéos des journées de prospective « Inventer l’#Université et la #recherche de demain » sont désormais presque toutes en ligne :

    • Introduction (J. Siméant-Germanos et B. Andreotti) : repartir des besoins de la société plutôt que de ceux de la recherche et de l’Université. https://youtu.be/qVwUzbKoi3Y

    • Finalités de l’#enseignement_universitaire (V. Durand) : https://youtu.be/RqTXfm888Ok

    • Workday for Future (V. Guillet) : https://youtu.be/IPItYRdfog8

    #Sciences_citoyennes (A. Lapprand) : https://youtu.be/_fKjTFMwSSc

    • De la #division_du_travail scientifique : le couple P.I. / précarité (R. Brette) : https://youtu.be/tu3yo64Q9UQ

    #Université et #démocratie (W. Brown) : https://youtu.be/3lnzDEkZj7g


    • Les conditions de l’#autonomie_étudiante (H. Harari-Kermadec) : https://youtu.be/N3-ht5lLmzc

    • La condition de #précaire (P.Stamenkovic) : https://youtu.be/NCwy4vqaddI

    • Restaurer la #collégialité dans les instances (J.Gossa) : https://youtu.be/psYZoBQI3_g

    • Une proposition de #budget répondant au besoins de la société (P-Y Modicom) : https://youtu.be/QbHtnZcroyg

    #ESR #facs #conférence

  • Deligny/ Camérer

    Un groupe de recherche travaillant sur l’ouvrage Camérer (à paraître aux éditions L’Arachnéen) viendra nous parler de la caméra Paluche, de la place de l’image dans l’œuvre de Deligny et bien plus encore. Venez échanger avec eux ! Projections, lectures et discussions avec Marlon Miguel et Marina Vidal-Naquet.

    dimanche 27 septembre 2020 à 21h


  • Les cartes du « Monde Afrique » : qui a dessiné les frontières de l’Afrique ?

    C’est lors de la #conférence_de_Berlin, du 15 novembre 1884 au 26 février 1885, que les puissances européennes se sont partagé le continent.

    Plus de trente-deux conflits territoriaux ont éclaté en Afrique entre 1974 et 2002, ce qui en fait le continent le plus affecté par ce type de conflits. Ces nombreuses tensions transfrontalières depuis les indépendances s’expliquent par l’artificialité des frontières africaines, largement héritées des partages coloniaux datant du XIXe siècle.

    Tracées à l’issue de la Conférence de Berlin – du 15 novembre 1884 à Berlin au 26 février 1885 –, ces démarcations correspondaient davantage aux ambitions hégémoniques des puissances européennes qu’aux identités et solidarités des populations locales. Aujourd’hui, 87 % de la longueur des frontières du continent, soit 70 000 km sur un total d’environ 80 000 km, selon les calculs du géographe Michel Foucher, sont le résultat de cette histoire coloniale.

    #frontières_africaines #Afrique #frontières #frontières_artificielles #vidéo #cartes #cartographie #visualisation


    Ajouté à la #métaliste sur la supposée #artificialité des #frontières_africaines :

    • Encore des clichés sur les frontières africaines #Thread
      Revers de main avec index pointant vers le bas

      Commentaire (critique) sur twitter de #Camille_Lefebvre :

      1/ En cherchant à dénoncer l’arbitraire colonial, ce discours réduit les configurations territoriales africaines à de simples csq de la domination et fait des pop. africaines des spectateurs passifs de leur propre histoire

      2/ On sait depuis les années 1970 qu’aucune frontière n’a été tracée à la conférence de Berlin comme l’ont montré les travaux sur les archives de la conférence d’Henri Brunschwig et de beaucoup d’autres à sa suite.
      3/ L’idée que les E. se seraient partagés l’Afrique est une idée coloniale ! La construction du thème du partage de l’Afrique par l’Europe apparait à la fin des années 1880 dans la propagande coloniale et sert à construire l’idée d’un continent africain comme espace à conquérir
      4/ On ne peut plus faire aujourd’hui une histoire des frontières en Afrique qui ne serait qu’une histoire de la diplomatie européenne ou de l’action coloniale sur le continent. Pour comprendre ces frontières, il faut s’intéresser à l’histoire africaine qui entoure leur tracé.
      5/ Lorsque les colonisateurs fr. ou brit. occupent le continent au19e s., contrairement à ce qu’ils disent ils n’arrivent pas dans des espaces vides. Sur le terrain, ils rencontrent des autorités, des États, utilisent des routes et des frontières qui existent en dehors d’eux.
      6/ Pour comprendre comment des frontières ont été tracées il faut reconstituer la complexité de cette géopolitique africaine, il faut s’intéresser au monde dans lequel la colonisation arrive. Les colonisateurs n’ont jamais été tout puissant, ils ont été combattus, ont dû négocier
      7/ Sur la question de ce que cette vidéo appelle les « ethnies divisées », une immense bibliographie a montré la complexité de cette question à la suite des travaux d’Anthony asiwaju, puis de @GeorgeNugybaby et Bill Miles
      Ce type de discours perpétue l’idée d’une exceptionnalité du continent africain, pour lequel les frontières politiques ne seraient pas vraiment adaptées, où il y aurait plus de conflits qu’ailleurs. Le continent africain et son histoire méritent mieux que cela.


      ping @reka @isskein @cede @karine4

  • SotM 2020 – a few thoughts on the experiment | Imagico.de

    The #pads for collecting questions and comments on talks worked great. This is definitely a concept that could play a central role in future #distributed #conferences.

    None the less what also became clear to me during the conference is that the willingness of people to engage in communication was very clearly in the order written conversation > audio communication > video. I think this is an observation to consider for any audio or video conversation in the OSM context. Video meetings might be very convenient for heavily engaged extroverted community members with a pre-existing prominence but for many people this can be a source of discomfort. And cultural and language barriers can be strongly emphasized by use of real time #audio and especially #video communication.

    A few further ideas on what possibilities a virtual conference format could offer beyond what has been tried this year:

    In a distributed conference the hurdle to submit a talk proposal would be much lower because it does not require a commitment to make an expensive travel to the conference location. I can already imagine people fearing the program committee might be drowned in submissions. The solution to that is to not think of this in terms of a physical conference. You don’t actually need to make a pre-selection of talks based on abstracts submitted, you can let people simply submit their pre-recorded talks. That would require more effort on the side of a presenter than submitting a bloomy abstract which would filter out any non-serious submissions. And assessing a talk based on scrolling through the video for a few minutes is much fairer than doing so based on just an abstract. So having the program committee select talks rather than abstracts is likely the better and fairer option for a virtual conference. Alternatively you could skip the selection of talks altogether and simply make all submissions accessible to the conference visitors. After all a virtual conference is not subject to the physical limitation of available rooms. That you might not necessarily be able to offer a moderated live Q&A for all talks is clear – but there are options to solve that with some creativity.

    The other idea is that a virtual distributed conference might be set up not only removing the constraint to a specific place but also spread out the conference in the time domain. Time zone differences are a serious issue with an international real time online conference – this could be observed at SotM 2020 quite well. So why not forego squeezing the conference into two days but instead spreading it across something like one or two weeks. A few days before the beginning of the actual real time part of the conference you make available the pre-recorded videos for everyone to watch at a time of their choosing. And they have the option to comment and ask questions asynchronously then. The speakers of the talks then have also some time to consider the questions and comments carefully before there is a moderated real time video session where the written feedback is discussed and further real time discussion is possible. The whole thing could be wrapped up by an integrated mechanism to allow speakers to provide some followup to the discussion in the days afterwards.

    With Allan’s keynote we had already a demonstration during this conference giving a bit of a glimpse on how this might work. There was no Q&A immediately after the talk but there was a longer Q&A later in the evening in form of a self organized session. Conference visitors in addition to asking questions during the talk streaming could afterwards for several hours re-watch the talk using the re-live feature and ask further questions and make comments. It was a bit unfortunate that Allan did not have more time to more carefully read the questions and prepare more elaborate answers which could have been the basis for a more interesting live discussion or later followup comments. But overall i think it was already visible how a more slowly paced dialog between presenters and visitors of the conference could facilitate a more productive and meaningful discourse.

    Explication du fonctionnement sur le site du SOTM 2020 :

    How is my talk presented?

    There will be an introduction session shortly before the conference for all speakers and session hosts. We will use the following workflow during your talk: 10 minutes before the talk the speaker and the session host test their equipment and connectivity with the video team. The talk takes place in a Jitsi session which will be streamed publicly. In the first 2-3 minutes the session hosts gives a short introduction about the speaker and the talk. Then the pre-recorded video is broadcast. During the broadcasting of the video the audience has the opportunity to ask questions on the Q&A pad of the talk. After the video the session host and the speaker go through the questions of the talk. We have allocated about 20 minutes for that.

    How can I participate it the Question & Answer session of my talk?

    You have to join the Jitsi session of your talk and talk with the session host about the questions from the audience. You can watch all incoming questions in the Q&A pad (hackpad) linked in the detail page of your talk. It is the task of the session host to make a kind of pre-selection of the questions, sorting them and leaving out those that are inappropriate.


    Les vidéos de l’événement ont été prises en charge par les gens du CCC (Chaos Computer Club) https://c3voc.de

    Quelques liens au sujet des confs vidéos :

    https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/State_of_the_Map_2020/Tutorial_Pre-Recorded_Talk : Tutorial Pre-Recorded Talk
    https://c3voc.de/wiki/start : Working group in the Chaos Computer Club on event recording and streaming
    https://gitlab.com/billowconf/billowconf : BillowConf is an online platform for virtual conferences. It supports different rooms that people can join and interact with. Presenters give talks and can enagage with the audience in real time through text (IRC) and video.

  • #Webinars. #COVID-19 Capitalism #Webinar Series

    Since 1 April, #TNI with allies has brought together experts and activists weekly to discuss how this pandemic health crisis exposes the injustices of the global economic order and how it must be a turning point towards creating the systems, structures and policies that can always protect those who are marginalised and allow everyone to live with dignity. Every Wednesday at 4pm CET.

    TNI works closely with allied organisations and partners around the world in organising these webinars. AIDC and Focus on the Global South are co-sponsors for the full series.


    Les conférences déjà en ligne sont ci-dessous en commentaire.


    Les prochains webinars:

    On 10 June, TNI will hold a webinar on Taking on the Tech Titans: Reclaiming our Data Commons.

    Upcoming webinars - Wednesdays at 4pm CET

    17 June: Borders and migration
    #frontières #migrations

    24 June: Broken Trade System

    #capitalisme #vidéo #conférence #coronavirus

    ping @isskein @reka

    • Building an internationalist response to Coronavirus


      Sonia Shah, award-winning investigative science journalist and author of Pandemic: Tracking contagions from Cholera to Ebola and Beyond (2017).
      Luis Ortiz Hernandez, public health professor in UAM-Xochimilco, Mexico. Expert on social and economic health inequities.
      Benny Kuruvilla, Head of India Office, Focus on the Global South, working closely with Forum For Trade Justice.
      Mazibuko Jara, Deputy Director, Tshisimani Centre for Activist Education, helping to coordinate a national platform of civic organisations in South Africa to confront COVID-19.
      Umyra Ahmad, Advancing Universal Rights and Justice Associate, Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), Malaysia


    • The coming global recession: building an internationalist response

      Recording of a TNI-hosted webinar on Wednesday, 8 April with Professor Jayati Ghosh, Quinn Slobodian, Walden Bello and Lebohang Pheko on the likely global impacts of the economic fallout from the Coronavirus and how we might be better prepared than the 2008 economic crisis to put forward progressive solutions.

      The webinar explored what we can expect in terms of a global recession that many predict could have bigger social impacts than the virus itself. How should we prepare? What can social movements learn from our failures to advance alternative progressive policies in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis?



      Professor Jayati Ghosh, award-winning economist Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Author of India and the International Economy (2015) and co-editor of Handbook of Alternative Theories of Economic Development, 2018.
      Quinn Slobodian, associate professor of history, Wellesley College. Author of Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (2018)
      Walden Bello, author of Paper Dragons: China and the Next Crash (2019) and Capitalism’s Last Stand?: Deglobalization in the Age of Austerity (2013)

      Lebohang Liepollo Pheko, Senior Research Fellow of Trade Collective, a thinktank in South Africa that works on international trade, globalisation, regional integration and feminist economics

      #récession #crise_économique

    • A Recipe for Disaster: Globalised food systems, structural inequality and COVID-19

      A dialogue between Rob Wallace, author of Big Farms Make Big Flu and agrarian justice activists from Myanmar, Palestine, Indonesia and Europe.

      The webinar explored how globalised industrial food systems set the scene for the emergence of COVID-19, the structural connections between the capitalist industrial agriculture, pathogens and the precarious conditions of workers in food systems and society at large. It also touched on the kind of just and resilient food systems we need to transform food and agriculture today?



      Rob Wallace author of Big Farms Make Big Flu and co-author of Neoliberal Ebola: Modeling Disease Emergence from Finance to Forest and Farm.
      Moayyad Bsharat of Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), member organization of La Via Campesina in Palestine.
      Arie Kurniawaty of Indonesian feminist organization Solidaritas Perempuan (SP) which works with women in grassroots communities across the urban-rural spectrum.
      Sai Sam Kham of Metta Foundation in Myanmar.
      Paula Gioia, peasant farmer in Germany and member of the Coordination Committee of the European Coordination Via Campesina.

      #inégalités #agriculture #alimentation


      Big Farms Make Big Flu

      In this collection of dispatches, by turns harrowing and thought-provoking, #Rob_Wallace tracks the ways #influenza and other pathogens emerge from an agriculture controlled by multinational corporations. With a precise and radical wit, Wallace juxtaposes ghastly phenomena such as attempts at producing featherless chickens with microbial time travel and neoliberal Ebola. While many books cover facets of food or outbreaks, Wallace’s collection is the first to explore infectious disease, agriculture, economics, and the nature of science together.


    • Taking Health back from Corporations: pandemics, big pharma and privatized health

      This webinar brought together experts in healthcare and activists at the forefront of struggles for equitable universal public healthcare from across the globe. It examined the obstacles to access to medicines, the role of Big Pharma, the struggles against health privatisation, and the required changes in global governance of health to prevent future pandemics and bring about public healthcare for all.



      Susan George, Author and President of the Transnational Institute
      Baba Aye, Health Officer, Public Services International
      Mark Heywood, Treatment Action Campaign, Section27 and editor at the Daily Maverick
      Kajal Bhardwaj, Independent lawyer and expert on health, trade and human rights
      David Legge, Peoples Health Movement Moderator: Monica Vargas, Corporate Power Project, Transnational Institute

      #santé #big-pharma #industrie_pharmaceutique #privatisation #système_de_santé

    • States of Control – the dark side of pandemic politics

      In response to an unprecedented global health emergency, many states are rolling out measures from deploying armies and drones to control public space, to expanding digital control through facial recognition technology and tracker apps.

      This webinar explored the political dimension of state responses, particularly the securitisation of COVID-19 through the expansion of powers for military, police, and security forces. It examined the impact of such repression on certain groups who are unable to socially distance, as well as how digital surveillance is being rolled out with little, if any democratic oversight.



      Fionnuala Ni Aolain, UN Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, University of Minnesota
      Arun Kundnani, New York University, author of The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, extremism, and the domestic War on Terror and The End of Tolerance: racism in 21st century Britain
      Anuradha Chenoy, School of International Studies in Jawaharlal Nehru University (retired), and author of Militarisation and Women in South Asia
      María Paz Canales, Derechos Digitales (Digital Rights campaign), Chile

      #contrôle #surveillance #drones #reconnaissance_faciale #démocratie

      ping @etraces

    • A Global Green New Deal

      This sixth webinar in our COVID Capitalism series asked what a truly global #Green_New_Deal would look like. It featured Richard Kozul-Wright (UNCTAD), and leading activists from across the globe leading the struggle for a just transition in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic.



      Richard Kozul-Wright, Director of the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, author of Transforming Economies: Making Industrial Policy Work for Growth, Jobs and Development
      Karin Nansen, chair of Friends of the Earth International, founding member of REDES – Friends of the Earth Uruguay
      Sandra van Niekerk, Researcher for the One Million Climate Jobs campaign, South Africa


    • Proposals for a democratic just economy

      Outgoing UN rapporteur, #Philip_Alston in conversation with trade unionists and activists in Italy, Nigeria and India share analysis on the impacts of privatisation in a time of COVID-19 and the strategies for resistance and also constructing participatory public alternatives.



      Philip Alston, outgoing UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights
      Rosa Pavanelli, General Secretary of the global union federation Public Services International (PSI)
      Aderonke Ige, Our Water, Our Rights Campaign in Lagos / Environmental Rights Action /Friends of The Earth Nigeria
      Sulakshana Nandi, Co-chair, People’s Health Movement Global (PHM Global)

      #privatisation #participation #participation_publique #résistance

    • Feminist Realities – Transforming democracy in times of crisis

      An inspiring global panel of feminist thinkers and activists reflect and discuss how we can collectively reorganise, shift power and pivot towards building transformative feminist realities that can get us out of the worsening health, climate and capitalist crises.



      Tithi Bhattacharya, Associate Professor of History and the Director of Global Studies at Purdue University and co-author of the manifesto Feminism for the 99%.
      Laura Roth, Lecturer of legal and political philosophy at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, member of Minim Municipalist Observatory and co-author of the practice-oriented report Feminise Politics Now!
      Awino Okech, Lecturer at the Centre for Gender Studies at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London who brings over twelve years of social justice transformation work in Eastern Africa, the Great Lakes region, and South Africa to her teaching, research and movement support work.
      Khara Jabola-Carolus, Executive Director of the Hawaii State Commission on the Status of Women, co-founder of AF3IRM Hawaii (the Association of Feminists Fighting Fascism, Imperialism, Re-feudalization, and Marginalization) and author of Hawaii’s Feminist Economic Recovery Plan for COVID-19.
      Felogene Anumo, Building Feminist Economies, AWID presenting the #feministbailout campaign


    • COVID-19 and the global fight against mass incarceration

      November 3rd, 2015, Bernard Harcourt (Columbia Law School) and Naomi Murakawa (Princeton) present rival narratives about mass incarceration in America. In The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order , Harcourt shows the interdependence of contract enforcements in global markets and punitive authority. InThe First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America, by contrast, Murakawa traces prison growth to liberal campaigns and progressive legislation. Together, Murakawa and Harcourt offer fresh ideas about into the political, economic and ethical dimensions of mass incarceration.


      Olivia Rope, Director of Policy and International Advocacy, Penal Reform International
      Isabel Pereira, Principal investigator at the Center for the Study of Law, Justice & Society (Dejusticia), Colombia
      Sabrina Mahtani, Advocaid Sierra Leone
      Maidina Rahmawati, Institute of Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), Indonesia
      Andrea James, Founder and Exec Director, and Justine Moore, Director of Training, National Council For Incarcerated and Formerly Incarcerated Women and Girls, USA

      #prisons #emprisonnement_de_masse #USA #Etats-Unis

  • #Kimberlé_Crenshaw

    Now more than ever, it’s important to look boldly at the reality of race and gender bias — and understand how the two can combine to create even more harm. Kimberlé Crenshaw uses the term “intersectionality” to describe this phenomenon; as she says, if you’re standing in the path of multiple forms of exclusion, you’re likely to get hit by both. In this moving talk, she calls on us to bear witness to this reality and speak up for victims of prejudice.

    #intersectionnalité #genre #race #exclusion #préjugés #conférence #TEDx

  • #Décolonisation_épistémique

    Enregistré le 5 avril 2018, à l’Université de Montréal, dans le cadre du cycle de conférences 2018 de la Chaire de recherche du Canada Polethics.

    Une conversation entre #Souleymane_Bachir_Diagne (Columbia University) « Quand traduire est un acte de décolonisation » et Nadia #Yala_Kisukidi (Université Paris 8) « Du #retour en Afrique » sur le thème de la décolonisation épistémique.


    #conférence #violence_épistémique #colonisation #colonialisme #décolonialité #retour_en_Afrique

    ping @cede @karine4

  • The Left Reflects on the Global Pandemic: Gayatri C. #Spivak

    As humanity faces the catastrophic COVID-19 pandemic, unprecedented in recent times, the Left internationally must address this crisis with both short and long term action, analysis and planning. We are active day by day, driven by the needs of our communities - this is already reshaping the way we do politics. We are building solidarity networks and launching campaigns to protect and work alongside the people that are hardest hit by the crisis. At the same time, we must think strategically and present alternatives for the future. There can be no going back to the vicious circle of austerity and poverty: we cannot allow the global reimposition of a failed system on the people. The radical left will pose alternatives to reinvent socialist politics for the 21st century: to build a new society that empowers and liberates us all.


    #conférence #vidéo #Gayatri_Spivak #pandémie #épidémie #coronavirus #covid-19 #crise #gauche #solidarité #pauvreté #austérité #alternative #alternatives #le_monde_d'après

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • COVID-19 at the borders of Europe

    Webinar with :

    #Karen_Mets - Senior Advocacy Adviser - Asylum and Migration, Save the Children
    #Sara_Prestianni – Program Officer Asylum and Migration, Euromed Rights
    #Vicky_Skoumbi – Editor αληthεια Magazine and Director of the Greece Programme, Collège de Philosophie de Paris
    #Alexandra_Embiricos- Policy and Legal Associate, UNHCR EU Representation


    #webinaire #séminaire #conférence #frontières #Europe #asile #migrations #réfugiés #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_européennes #Italie #Grèce #hotspots #Malte #ports #fermeture_des_ports #fermeture_des_frontières #Méditerranée #quarantaine

    ping @karine4 @isskein @luciebacon @thomas_lacroix @mobileborders @_kg_