• The secret of Taiwan’s Covid-19 success - Asia Times
    https://asiatimes.com/2021/04/the-secret-of-taiwans-covid-19-success

    The authors assumed that testing and isolation occurred simultaneously. This was the case in Taiwan, but not in other countries, for example England, where delays between testing, results and isolation diminish the effectiveness of case-based measures.Taiwan is an island nation with the ability to control the introduction of new cases through border control, and the authors acknowledge the findings of this study may not be fully applicable to other countries.This is why the authors focused on the effectiveness of case-based and population-based interventions on local transmission, rather than on border controls on the number of introductions of Covid-19.The authors conclude that intensive contact tracing is not possible when public health systems are overwhelmed. This never happened in Taiwan due to the success of its strategies, but it did, for example, take place in Ireland in January 2021, which experienced a damaging third wave.(...)We already knew there was much to be learned from Taiwan’s success in preventing Covid-19 from taking hold. Now, as vaccines roll out and new variants emerge, we have more information about the comparative and combined contributions of public health measures.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#taiwan#sante#politiquesante#systemesante#frontiere#controle#despistage#tracking

  • La corde du diable

    « La corde du diable » est le nom du barbelé, ce fil de fer inventé à la fin du XIXe siècle aux États-Unis qui emprisonne les hommes et les bêtes, de la prairie à la prison, de la base militaire à la frontière. C’est à travers ce prisme que Sophie Bruneau approche l’épineuse question de la #surveillance et du #contrôle. Un essai documentaire exigeant, à la force plastique stupéfiante qui présente une poignante réflexion sur la gestion politique de l’espace.

    « La corde du diable », c’est le nom donné par ses détracteurs au barbelé, ce fil de fer inventé à la fin du XIXe siècle aux États-Unis. Le film s’ancre dans les grands espaces américains et leurs kilomètres de clôture, comme si la trame narrative se dévidait en miroir de ces millions d’épissures acérées derrière lesquelles lorgnent les têtes de bétail. Point de départ : Omaha, dans le Nebraska, entre foire aux bestiaux, bottes rutilantes et Stetson poussiéreux. Claquements de fouet et musique bluegrass en fond sonore. De la prairie à la prison, de la base militaire à la frontière, la corde du diable emprisonne les hommes et les bêtes. C’est à travers le prisme de cet objet universel que Sophie Bruneau – coréalisatrice du remarquable documentaire Ils ne mouraient pas tous mais tous étaient frappés, sur la souffrance au travail – aborde l’épineuse question de la surveillance et du contrôle.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/057390-000-A/la-corde-du-diable

    #film #film_documentaire
    #barbelé #clôture #USA #Etats-Unis #fil_barbelé #élevage #prison #armée #objets #identification #frontières #Mexique #Tohono_O'odham #Baboquivari #migrations #mourir_dans_le_désert #morts #décès #morgue

  • #Biélorussie, une #dictature ordinaire

    Le temps semble figé en Biélorussie, pays oublié où règne sans partage #Alexandre_Loukachenko, ancien chef de kolkhoze à la tête de l’État depuis 1994. Là-bas, le #KGB s’appelle toujours KGB, les rues portent les noms de Marx et Engels, et la statue de Lénine domine la place centrale de Minsk, comme si l’homme imprimait toujours sa marque au destin du pays. Parades patriotiques et militaires rythment les saisons biélorusses, orchestrées par le président omnipotent, intarissable défenseur de la fibre nationale et dénonçant sans fin l’idée d’un complot occidental pour conserver son pouvoir. Disparitions, assassinats politiques et vagues de répression s’abattent sur ceux qui osent douter, résister, contredire la voix du maître. Car le pays est déchiré entre deux visions : l’une, attachée à Moscou et effrayée par la porosité de la crise ukrainienne frontalière, qui accepte la domination d’un pouvoir autoritaire, et l’autre résistante, qui s’emploie à aider les victimes de la répression et lutte pour la mémoire de ceux que le régime a fait disparaître. Y aura-t-il un « printemps biélorusse » ? La documentariste Manon Loizeau promène sa caméra dans un pays clivé, encombrant voisin de l’Europe qui sait tirer son parti des guerres d’influences entre Bruxelles et Moscou.

    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/53901_1
    #film #film_documentaire
    #Loukachenko #frontières #Europe #cimetière #laissez-passer #nationalisme #peur #répression #Alès_Bialiatski #liberté #ordre #contrôle #armée #populisme #résistance #prisonniers_politiques #Vesna #mémoire #totalitarisme #disparus_de_Biélorussie #Dmitry_Zavadsky #accords_de_Minsk #Mikalaï_Statkiévitch #parasites #parasitisme #décret_3 #Maksim_Filipovich #Gomel

    –—

    Citation d’une habitante d’un village coupé en 2 par la frontière entre la Biélorussie et la #Lithuanie (2004) :

    « On était une grande famille. Puis, l’#Union_soviétique s’est effondrée. Les Républiques ont voulu leur #indépendance. Elles ont pensé qu’elles deviendraient riches en ne vivant que pour elles-mêmes. Alors ils ont construit cette frontière. Et on s’est mis à se détester. La #haine, c’est qu’il y a de plus terrible »

  • Slovenia is planning to set up mixed patrols along the border with Croatia, where police officers from other EU member states would also patrol the border together with the Slovenian ones.

    –-> info reçue (avec lien ci-dessous) via la mailing-list Inicijativa Dobrodosli, mail du 07.04.2021

    Slovenija planira mješovite policijske patrole na granici s Hrvatskom

    Još nema službene hrvatske reakcije na slovensku najavu da će zbog pojačanih nelegalnih prijelaza migranata na granicu sa Hrvatskom postaviti mješovite patrole u kojima bi uz slovenske bili i policajci drugih država članica EU.

    Kako su naveli u slovenskoj Vladi, Slovenija se opet našla pred migracijskim pritiskom i nezakonitim prijelazima državne granice koji se ne smanjuje unatoč naporima slovenske policije i njenog djelovanja na granici s Hrvatskom, koja je i vanjska granica Schengena, i mješovite policijske patrole odgovor su na to.

    Mješovitim patrolama zapovijedali bi slovenski policajci, a ne navodi se koje bi druge države članice Europske unije slale svoje ljude u te patrole.

    Iz hrvatskog Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova do objavljivanja ovog teksta nisu odgovorili na upit Radija Slobodna Europa (RSE) o stanju na granici.
    U Hrvatskoj tvrde drugačije

    Međutim, zapovjednik policijske Antiterorističke jedinice “Lučko”, koja je također raspoređena na granici, Mate Bilobrk kazao je kako nema pojačanog pritiska migranata.

    “Mislim da je pritisak puno manji nego prošlih godina”, izjavio je Bilobrk 31. ožujka u razgovoru za Hrvatsku radio-televiziju (HTV).

    Nevladine udruge također nemaju informacije o nekom pojačanom pritisku migranata na hrvatsku granicu, ali podsjećaju da se ne mijenjaju uzroci prisilnih migracija, pa se ne može očekivati da se one same od sebe zaustave.

    “Jedina je promjena u većem broju obitelji koje su nakon požara pobjegle iz izbjegličkog kampa Moria u Grčkoj, koje se sada nalaze u Bosni i pokušavaju doći do Hrvatske i zatražiti azil, ali posljednjih tjedana nema nekog povećanja ukupnih brojeva”, kaže za RSE Sara Kekuš iz zagrebačke nevladine udruge Centar za mirovne studije (CMS).

    “Očito je ova odluka slovenske Vlade smišljena s ciljem da se zaustave migracije prema Sloveniji, tako da ta odluka ne čudi. Međutim, slovenska Vlada mora biti svjesna vlastite odgovornosti u međunarodnom kontekstu i toga da nikome ne može ograničiti pravo na traženje međunarodne zaštite, pa makar to bilo i na samoj granici. A znamo da – dok god ne uspostavimo neke sigurne i legalne putove - da će ljudi i dalje prelaziti granice nezakonitim putevima u potrazi za sigurnošću”, poručuje Sara Kekuš.

    Ona je podsjetila da se već godinama svjedoči lančanim protjerivanjima migranata iz Slovenije u Hrvatsku pa onda dalje u BiH, gdje to protjerivanje nužno ne staje.

    “Znamo i da su slovenske vlasti dugo vremena koristile readmisijske ugovore kao izgovor za zakonito protjerivanje ljudi u Hrvatsku, iako su im zapravo istovremeno onemogućavali pristup azilu i na taj način kršili njihova prava”, podsjeća Sara Kekuš.
    Reagiranje u pandemiji

    Sigurnosni analitičar Branimir Vidmarović sa Sveučilišta “Juraj Dobrila” u Puli kaže za RSE kako ovaj slovenski potez valja razumjeti kao legitimnu brigu za vlastitu sigurnost u kontekstu krize uzrokovane pandemijom.

    “Ako su slovenski obavještajci u suradnji sa drugim sigurnosnim službama dobili dojavu da se možda očekuje pojačani val migranata ili nova najava, onda je ovakva reakcija prevencijska i sasvim razumljiva, budući da nijedna zemlja sada, u osjetljivoj fazi procedure cijepljenja, ne bi htjela pritok ljudi iz područja za koje se apriori zna da su ranjivija, osjetljiva, u smislu pandemije nezaštićenija i da predstavljaju rizik”, procjenjuje Vidmarović.

    U slovenskoj Vladi kažu kako takvu suradnju policija omogućuje zaključak Vijeća EU iz 2008. o produbljivanju prekogranične suradnje, osobito na području borbe protiv terorizma i prekograničnog kriminala.

    Prema članku 17. te europske direktive mogu se formirati zajedničke ophodnje i poduzeti druge mjere djelovanja radi očuvanja javnog reda i sigurnosti, te zbog suzbijanja kaznenih djela, pojasnilo je slovensko Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova.

    Slovenija i Hrvatska nalaze se na tzv “balkanskoj”migrantskoj ruti od Grčke preko Srbije, Crne Gore i Bosne i Hercegovine do zapadnoeuropskih zemalja, nakon što je Mađarska na svoje granice prema Srbiji i Hrvatskoj postavila visoke žičane ograde.

    Nevladine udruge opetovano su upozoravale da slovenska i pogotovo hrvatska policija pribjegavaju ilegalnim “push-backovima” migranata, odnosno njihovom prisilnom vraćanju u državu za koju vjeruju da su iz nje došli – Hrvatsku, odnosno BiH.

    Nevladine udruge smještene u izbjegličkim kampovima u sjeverozapadnom dijelu BiH dostavile su medijima u više navrata i video zapise za koje tvrde da prikazuju migrante koje je zaustavila, istukla i vratila u BiH hrvatska policija, nakon što su pokušalno ilegalno ući u Hrvatsku.

    Hrvatska policija odbija ove optužbe.

    https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/slovenija-planira-mje%C5%A1ovite-policijske-patrole-na-granici-s-hrvatskom/31182152.html

    #patrouilles_mixtes #Slovénie #Croatie #frontière_sud-alpine #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers

  • The Struggle at Turkey’s Boğaziçi University. Attacks on higher education tighten the grip of the AKP’s hegemonic project

    Late at night on January 1, 2021, by presidential decree, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed new rectors to five universities in Turkey. One was Professor Melih Bulu, who became rector of the prestigious Boğaziçi University. This liberal and pluralist institution hosts dissident students and faculty, including many connected to Academics for Peace, an association that demands a peaceful resolution to Turkey’s war on the Kurds. Constituents of Boğaziçi immediately rejected this fait accompli as illegitimate, and began to protest. On January 4, police attacked hundreds of students: an image of Boğaziçi’s gates locked with handcuffs went viral.

    To this day, the campus remains under heavy police surveillance as the AKP and associated dominant social groups use both consent and coercion to impose their ways on social and political life. This process, called hegemony, plays out in the education sector today.

    Melih Bulu was unwelcome at Boğaziçi University for many reasons. A dean and a rector at two other universities, in 2015, he ran in the general elections as a candidate from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP.) In the first few days of his appointment at Boğaziçi, Bulu was credibly accused of plagiarizing his doctoral dissertation. Dismissing the charges as forgetfulness in using quotation marks, he tried to win students over by claiming that he supports LGBT rights – only to close down the LGBTI+ Studies student club as one of his first executive decisions.

    Since the day of Bulu’s appointment, students and faculty members at Boğaziçi have been protesting him, as well as the anti-democratic intervention in the university’s internal operations by President Erdoğan. The Boğaziçi resistance, however, is more than a struggle over the future of one university: it is a much larger struggle for academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and democracy in an increasingly authoritarian Turkey.

    Students and faculty have mobilized creative protests despite the likelihood of a further crackdown. On March 1, over 70 Boğaziçi faculty members applied to the Council of State, demanding the reversal of Bulu’s appointment as it violates the Constitution and the law. By the end of March, more than 800 protesters around Turkey had been taken into custody. Twenty-nine are now under extended house arrest, while six remain in pretrial detention. Faculty members continue to turn their backs on the rectorship every day, and students are boycotting the first six days of the new semester to honor six friends in detention.

    This is clearly an assault on academic and political freedom. But the Boğaziçi resistance also sheds light on why the Erdoğan government may be courting controversy with the nation’s public universities – and why this particular university has taken center stage in the struggle for democracy in Turkey.

    The AKP is a culturally conservative and economically center-right party that has been in power since 2002. The first few years of the Erdoğan government saw democratic advances: lifting of the ban on headscarves in public institutions and an end to military interference in politics. Over the course of two decades in power, however, the AKP has ruled through authoritarian and neoliberal governance.

    These events are neither new nor confined to the education sector. It is only one leg of the AKP’s ongoing political project to transform both state and society. This involves reconstituting higher education to mirror the AKP’s control of state institutions, governance structures, civil society, and the media. The AKP has seized control of the judiciary, parliament, the military, and the police. It has criminalized all opposition. It has imprisoned, purged, or silenced journalists, teachers, academics, lawyers, and others. It has bought off the media. It has removed democratically-elected mayors in the Kurdish southeast and appointed new ones.

    This has all taken place legally, through the constitutional amendments of 2010 and 2017, and the laws by decree that were issued during the two-year state of emergency between 2016 and 2018.

    But the infringement on institutional autonomy and academic freedom is older than the current regime. The Council of Higher Education (YÖK), established after the 1980 military coup, was established to curb the autonomy of universities by controlling university structures, their governance, staff, and intellectual output. Between 1992 and 2016, candidates for a rectorship were voted on first by university departments and faculty before being nominated for appointment by the YÖK. But after a law by decree was issued under emergency rule in 2016, the YÖK was put in charge of appointing rectors. Since 2018, President Erdoğan appoints them.

    The government, its media, and the President used their usual combination of divide-and-conquer techniques on the protesters in a bid to cordon them off from support by the population at large. Boğaziçi students and faculty members, as well as other students and supporters of the protests were characterized first as “elitist,” then as “LGBT deviants,” then “disrespectful of national sensibilities,” and then as “terrorists.”

    The inclusive politics that the Boğaziçi resistance showcased prompted Erdoğan to resort to even more populist tactics, to remind the nation that “lesbians and the like” (“lezbiyen mezbiyen”) should not be listened to, and that “the pillar of the family is the mother,” falling back on the age old conservative “our customs and values!” rhetoric. More broadly, these instances lay bare the differences between the kind of politics that the AKP and the student movement adhere to, suggesting the type of politics – inclusive, diverse, intersectional – that is well-positioned to burst through the cracks of the current system.

    The regime, unable to legitimize its appointed rector at Boğaziçi, seems poised to empty out the university and appoint loyalist deans and staff by using forms of clientelism that are common to AKP rule. Two new faculties were established on February 6. On March 1, Bulu appointed his vice-rector Professor Naci Inci, a physicist, as the director of the Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences. Re-staffing Boğaziçi will ease the process of governing the university, leaving the structure of the institution (if not its procedures) intact, and maintaining the appearance of legitimacy.

    Why is establishing ironclad control of universities necessary to the AKP? Because institutions of higher education mold individuals into citizens, workers, social and political beings. By exerting control over education, the AKP is not only demolishing public space but also ensuring the reproduction of “acceptable” citizens and publics who consent to these practices. At the same time, through establishing its control over education, the AKP is attempting to overturn the decline in support from the youth, as well as the educated and professional classes and re-establish what it calls the “national and religious” youth.

    Universities are also an economic and political project for the AKP: they are money-making, personnel-providing, vote-generating machines. Universities, many of poor quality, have popped up all over Turkey since the party came to power. Erecting a faculty building in a small town or city employs a lot of people. It also provides hope for social mobility, and attaches that hope to voting for the AKP.

    This process cannot be separated from the transformation of universities into institutions that provide a workforce, and where only profitable, depoliticized professions have value. This is the essence of what we mean by a neoliberal transformation of education. The decline and defunding of social sciences and humanities departments is discernible both in and outside of Turkey. Subjects that create space for studying economic, social, and political systems, promise to create politically engaged, critical individuals. It should, then, not come as a surprise that Melih Bulu, once appointed, declared that his mission and vision for Boğaziçi was, instead, to boost the university’s “sectoral cooperation, entrepreneurship, innovation ecosystem,” and put it in in the Times Higher Education (THE) and the QS first 100 rankings.

    Students of Boğaziçi have since made it clear, as one banner read, that they do not want a corporation but a university.

    Nevertheless, political encroachment into higher education continues. In its 19th year of rule, as it loses legitimacy and struggles to generate consent, the AKP increases coercion by repressing dissent everywhere. Higher education is no exception: trade unions, professional associations, political parties, publishing houses, and media outlets have been targeted too.

    These attacks on the university and academic freedom are yet another step by the AKP towards establishing authority over what little space remains for public debate and free expression. Indeed, the boundaries of the state, the government, and the public are already blurred in Turkey. When Bulu stated, in reaction to mounting pressure for his resignation, “touching me would mean touching the state” Erdoğan agreed: if the protesters “had the guts,” he said, they would ask him to resign.

    This conflation of Bulu’s authority with that of Erdoğan and the Turkish state reveals the stakes of the Boğaziçi resistance. Protesters denying the appointed “trustee” (“kayyum”) rector’s legitimacy at Boğaziçi also deny legitimacy to all kayyums in the Kurdish southeast. Refusing to accept Bulu’s appointment at Boğaziçi is also a refusal to accept the AKP’s anti-democratic politics. Reclaiming LGBTI+ identity also reclaims Muslim women’s rights. Freedom to establish or join a student club is a matter of freedom of assembly and expression.

    The students’ bold and incisive open letter to President Erdoğan eloquently expresses these entanglements and the intersectionality of their politics. Placing their struggle at Boğaziçi University within workers’ and minorities’ struggles, and within struggles against injustice, sexism and gender inequality, and the targeting of their fellow friends and professors, university students sum up what this resistance stands for. Their example should illuminate a way forward for an international left politics that commits to democracy and justice for all.

    For recent developments, follow bogazicidireniyor on Instagram and use the hashtags #bogazicidireniyor, #KabulEtmiyoruzVazgeçmiyoruz, #WeDoNotAcceptWeDoNotGiveUp, #WeWillNotLookDown and @unibogazici_en on Twitter.

    #Turquie #université #Bogazici #Boğaziçi #ESR #université_du_Bosphore #attaques #recteurs #Erdogan #Melih_Bulu #AKP #hégémonie #résistance #liberté_académique #contrôle #YÖK #autonomie #homophobie #Naci_Inci #répression #nationalisme #kayyum #légitimité #démocratie #justice

    ping @isskein

    • Open letter to President from Boğaziçi University students

      Amid ongoing protests against the appointed rector of Boğaziçi University, Erdoğan has issued a Presidential decree to open two new faculties at the university. The Boğaziçi Solidarity has addressed an open letter to the President.

      –—

      Amid the ongoing protests against the appointment of Prof. Melih Bulu as a new rector to Boğaziçi University by President and ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a new Presidential decree has been published in the Official Gazette, foreseeing the establishment of Law and Communication faculties at the university.

      While the appointed rector has welcomed the news on his social media account, the Boğaziçi Solidarity platform, on behalf of the Boğaziçi University students protesting the appointment of Melih Bulu, has addressed an open letter to the 12th President of Turkey on social media.

      Under the hashtags #YüreğimizYetiyor (We have the guts), referring to a statement by Erdoğan, and #FakülteyiSarayaKur (Establish the faculty at the palace), students have addressed the following letter:
      Reasons underlying the protests

      "Previously, we responded to Melih Bulu with the poem ’Satirical Attempts on a Provocateur.’ It is pleasing to see that you have acknowledged yourself to be the person responsible, and responded accordingly.

      "Up until today, you have demanded secret meetings with us via the Turkey Youth and Education Service Foundation (TÜRGEV).

      "Now, you are trying to start an argument against us through the media. We do not like go-betweens, we prefer speaking outright and explicitly to all. We hope that you will proceed accordingly.

      "First, let us remind you of our demands and of the reasons underlying our protests:

      "You appointed a trustee rector to our university with utter disregard for the students and faculty. Is what you did legal? Yes, as you like to mention every chance you get, but it is not legitimate. This appointment makes anyone who has even the tiniest sense of justice revolt with indignation.

      "To top it off, you open faculties and appoint deans with an overnight presidential order on a Friday night, in order to intimidate the whole institution with all its students, teachers and laborers.

      "Your attempts to pack our university with your own political militants is the symptom of the political crisis that you have fallen into.

      "Victims of your crisis grow in number with every passing day!
      Constitutional rights

      "We use our constitutional rights to make people from all segments of society aware of the injustices we are subjected to.

      "These are our demands:

      All our friends who have been arrested or detained in this period must be released immediately!
      All campaigns to defame and disenfranchise LGBTI+s and all other targeted groups must end!
      All government-appointed trustees, starting with Melih Bulu, who instigated all these arrests, detentions, scapegoating campaigns, and threats, must resign!
      In universities, democratic rectorate elections must be held with the participation of all constituents of the university!

      ’Don’t mistake us for those who obey you’

      "You uttered a sentence starting with ’If they have the guts...’ in your statement. Is it a constitutional right to call for the resignation of the president? YES! Since when is the use of a constitutional right a matter of courage?

      "Do not mistake us for those who obey you unconditionally. You are not a sultan, and we are not your subjects.

      "But since you mentioned courage, we shall also respond to that briefly.

      "We have no immunities! You, however, are the one who has been storming around, hiding behind your legal and political immunity for the last 19 years.

      "The Interior Minister is spreading lies to play on religious sensitivities. We say that we will not practice self-censorship.

      "You call LGBTI+s deviants, we state that LGBTI+ rights are human rights.

      "Members of your party kicked miners in Soma. We actively stood in solidarity with the mine workers, and we will continue to do so.

      "You unlawfully keep the Co-Chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) imprisoned, alongside journalists and union members.

      "We declare that we stand united with those who fearlessly speak the truth, and we are against all government-appointed trustees.

      "You make crowds boo Berkin Elvan’s mother in rallies. We declare that we stand with Berkin Elvan.

      "You target and attack Ayşe Buğra, without even mentioning her name, saying ’Osman Kavala ’s wife is among these provocateurs’.

      “In a vulgar manner, you restate the sexist fallacy that the only significant feature of a woman is her husband. We state that ’Ayşe Buğra is a dignified professor and an esteemed academic’. We say that ’We will take any charge against her as a charge against us’.
      ”(We know very well that you will file dozens of lawsuits against this letter on the grounds that it praises crime and criminals or insulting the president, but we also know that we will never give up on speaking the truth!)
      ’Why would we call on you to resign?’

      "Since you lack the power necessary to keep the trustee-rector you have appointed in the office, you resort to petty tricks like opening new faculties and appointing sham personnel, which does not appear to be an act of courage. That is why we disregard your words about courage.

      "We are aware that Bogaziçi University is not Turkey’s most significant institution, nor is the appointment of Melih Bulu Turkey’s most significant problem.

      "Regarding the demand for your resignation, we would not consider calling for your resignation based on this issue. YOU ASK WHY?

      "If you were ever going to resign,

      "You would have resigned when Brant Dink was slaughtered!

      "You would have resigned when 34 Kurds were killed in the Roboski massacre. You would have resigned when 301 miners were murdered in Soma! You would have resigned after the Çorlu train derailment!

      "You would have resigned in the face of the livelihood problems of thousands of citizens, who were left unemployed or could not find a job, and especially in face of the decree-law (KHK) purgees!

      "You would have assumed responsibility for the economic policies which condemned the people to poverty, instead of sacrificing your son-in-law.

      "The examples are plenty, but you have never resigned.

      "You preferred to present yourself as naively deceived, instead of, in your own words, ’having the guts’. So now why would we call on you to resign?

      "As long as Melih Bulu sits on that seat, we will continue our protest by strengthening our struggle, with all those who join the resistance. Whether or not you do what must be done is your own business. We stand with those who are robbed of their democratic rights and freedoms.

      “With hopes that you realize that you cannot silence the oppressed of these lands by shouting and threatening from arenas and podiums.”

      What happened?

      Prof. Melih Bulu has been appointed as the President of Boğaziçi University in a Presidential Decree issued on January 1. The appointment of Bulu has sparked harsh criticisms among both the students and academics of the university as well as in the academic community.

      Appointed to Boğaziçi, one of the most prestigious universities in Turkey, from outside its community, Bulu was a candidate for nomination to run in the Parliamentary elections in 2015 for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is chaired by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

      The students and several students’ clubs of the university have been campaigning on social media under the hashtag #kayyımrektöristemiyoruz (We don’t want a trustee university president).

      The call of the students was also supported by the faculty members of the university, who released a joint statement on January 3.

      “An academic outside Bogazici University community was appointed as rector (university president), which is a practice introduced for the first time after the 1980s military tutelage,” read their statement.

      Amid harsh criticisms of students and faculty members, Prof. Bulu has shared a message on his Twitter account, welcoming his appointment to the position, saying, “We are all in the same boat.”

      The students protested the appointment of Bulu in front of the South Campus of the university in İstanbul on January 4. However, the police intervened into the protest with pepper gas and plastic bullets.

      Next day, it was reported that there were detention warrants against 28 people for “violating the law on meetings and demonstrations” and “resisting the officer on duty.” Later in the day, 22 of them were detained.

      40 people in total were detained over the protests. All of the detained were released on January 7 and 8, 2021.

      The protests of students and faculty members at the South Campus of Boğaziçi University have been going on since January 4.

      On February 1, police stormed the South Campus and intervened into the students’ protests. Earlier in the day, the students gathered in front of the campus for the protest. Police hindered the protest while also preventing the students inside the South Campus from joining their friends outside.

      With the 51 students taken into custody inside the campus in the evening, the number of detained increased to 159. In a statement released by the İstanbul Governor’s Office in the early morning hours on February 2, it was announced that 98 students were released from detention.

      On February 2, Boğaziçi University students gathered in Kadıköy Rıhtım for another protest, which was attacked by the police with plastic bullets and tear gas. 134 people were taken into custody by the police. Two of the protesters were arrested by the court afterwards.
      About Melih Bulu

      Prof. Melih Bulu was appointed as the President of Haliç University on January 17, 2020. In office in this foundation university for less than a year, he has been appointed as the President of Boğaziçi University.

      He was a Dean and University President at the İstinye University from 2016 to 2019. Between the years of 2010 and 2016, he was the Head of the Business Management Department of İstanbul Şehir University’s Business Management and Management Science Faculty.

      He was the General Coordinator of International Competitiveness Research Institute (URAK), an NGO working on economic competitiveness of cities and countries, from the year 2017 to 2019. Since 2011, he has been the Executive Board member of the İstanbul Electric-Electronic Machinery and Informatics Exporters R&D Market.

      In 2002, he founded the Sarıyer District Organization of the ruling AKP in İstanbul. In 2015, he was a candidate for nomination to run in the Parliamentary elections from the AKP in the first election district in İstanbul.

      He studied Industrial Engineering at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara in 1992. He did his MBA and PhD at Boğaziçi University’s Department of Management.

      https://bianet.org/english/education/238843-open-letter-to-president-from-bogazici-university-students
      #lettre_ouverte

  • Macron roi

    Alors que le #Parlement est en ce jour transformé en une chambre d’enregistrement des désirs du Roi, il importe de revenir sur le bilan d’une année de gouvernement-covid. Est-ce la pandémie qui est hors de contrôle, ou bien notre président ? Les deux certainement.

    « Le président a acquis une vraie #expertise sur les sujets sanitaires. Ce n’est pas un sujet inaccessible pour une intelligence comme la sienne. » #Jean-Michel_Blanquer, Le Monde, le 30 mars 2021

    « Ce n’est pas Macron qui manque d’#humilité, c’est l’humilité qui n’est pas à la hauteur », #EmmanuelMacronFacts

    « Père Ubu – Allons, messieurs, prenons nos dispositions pour la bataille. Nous allons rester sur la colline et ne commettrons point la sottise de descendre en bas. Je me tiendrai au milieu comme une citadelle vivante et vous autres graviterez autour de moi » Alfred Jarry, Ubu roi, Acte IV, scène 3

    Je serai bref. On écrit bien trop sur Macron. Les trois épigraphes ci-dessus disent à peu près tout. Il faudrait juste ajouter que dans certaines versions de la mythologie grecque Hybris est l’un des enfants de la Nuit et d’Érèbe, une divinité des Enfers. L’#hybris désigne la #démesure, l’#excès_de_pouvoir et le vertige auquel il conduit. La Vème République est une détestable machine à produire de l’hybris. Des présidents hors de contrôle.

    En ce 31 mars 2021, Macron roi préside un #Conseil_de_défense_sanitaire où ne siège autour de lui qu’une petite grappe de ministres choisis par ses soins. Conseil opaque, soumis au secret et échappant à tout #contrôle_législatif . Le soir du même jour, il annonce ses décisions à ses sujets, au nom d’un « nous », dont on ne saura jamais s’il est de majesté ou s’il renvoie aux choix collectifs et débattus d’un #exécutif. Ce « je-nous » annonce donc le #reconfinement de toute la métropole, avec la fermeture des écoles. Je propose de déduire de ces décisions les trois #échecs de Macron, qui correspondent à trois #fautes, lesquelles sont directement en rapport avec la démesure qui caractérise le personnage, #démesure encouragée par la fonction et notre #constitution épuisée. Quand faire le #bilan d’une politique se résume, de facto, à la caractérologie de son Auteur, on se dit qu’il est grand temps de changer de République et d’en finir avec le #présidentialisme.

    Le premier échec de Macron roi, c’est le reconfinement de toute la métropole avec ses conséquences en termes de #santé_mentale, de #précarisation accrue pour les plus pauvres et les classes moyennes, et d’aggravation de la #crise_économique. L’engagement pris à de multiples reprises de ne pas reconfiner nationalement n’a jamais été accompagné de la politique qu’un tel choix exigeait. Macron a mis tout le pays dans une #impasse. Le reconfinement est la conséquence directe de ce choix. La décision de laisser filer l’#épidémie fin janvier, - dans un contexte de diffusion des variants, avec l’exemple anglais sous les yeux, et contre l’avis de toute la #communauté_scientifique -, a été, littéralement, criminelle. Macron était parfaitement informé de la flambée qui aurait lieu mi-mars. Nous y sommes.

    Le second échec de Macron roi, distrait et appuyé par son fou préféré dans son obstination à ne #rien_faire pour sécuriser sérieusement l’#Éducation_nationale, aura été la #fermeture contrainte des #écoles et le prolongement du semi-confinement des étudiant.es, qu’il convient de ne pas oublier : les dégâts sont pour elle et eux sans fin, que certain.es aident à réparer : https://blogs.mediapart.fr/parrainer-un-e-etudiant-e/blog/260221/parrainer-un-e-etudiant-e-pour-entrer-dans-le-monde-dapres-appel-ten. En plus des scandales des #masques, des #tests et des #vaccins, Macron et son gouvernement sont en effet directement comptables d’une #inaction incompréhensible. Monté sur son « cheval à phynances », Macron roi a certes arrosé les entreprises de centaines de milliards, mais n’en a dépensé aucun pour l’#Hôpital, l’École, l’#Université, la #Recherche et plus généralement la #sécurisation_sanitaire des #lieux_publics, parmi lesquels tous les lieux de #culture.

    Or, depuis bientôt un an, des chercheurs font la démonstration que des solutions existent (voir ici : https://blogs.mediapart.fr/pascal-maillard/blog/120121/rendre-l-universite-aux-etudiants-sans-attendre-les-decideurs ) et que la stratégie « #Zéro_Covid » est certainement la plus efficace et la plus propre à protéger des vies : voir par exemple les propositions concrètes de Rogue-ESR (https://rogueesr.fr/zero-covid). Pourquoi donc « une intelligence comme la sienne » ne parvient-elle pas à s’élever jusqu’à la compréhension que la #détection de la saturation en #CO2 d’un lieu fermé et l’utilisation de #filtres_Hepa sont des dispositifs techniques simples, efficaces et susceptibles de limiter la propagation du #virus ? Même des esprits infiniment plus bornés que le sien – Wauquiez par exemple (https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/auvergne-rhone-alpes/covid-l-efficacite-des-purificateurs-d-air-contre-le-sa), qui dégage 10 millions pour des #purificateurs_d’air dans les écoles et lycées - ont parfaitement saisi au bout de 6 mois ce que Macron-Roi mettra deux ans à reconnaitre.

    Le troisième échec de Macron roi, le plus terrible, est le nombre de #morts, de vies brisées, de souffrances psychiques et physiques que des années de soins peineront à soulager. Bientôt 100 000 morts. Des légions de "covid longs", des enfants, des adolescents et des étudiants habités par l’angoisse de contaminer leur parents … Question : combien de milliers de vies auraient pu être épargnées, non pas seulement par des décisions énergiques fin janvier 2021, mais par un véritable #plan_d’action visant à apporter une sécurité sanitaire digne de ce nom, à toute la population ? Pourquoi 3000 #lits de #réanimation supplémentaires seulement maintenant et pas à l’été 2020, avant la seconde vague ? Pourquoi Zéro mesure technique et financière pour les #universités quand des étudiants se suicident ? Pourquoi Zéro vaccin pour protéger les enseignants ? Pourquoi faire si peu de cas de « La valeur d’une vie » (https://blogs.mediapart.fr/pascal-maillard/blog/260121/la-valeur-d-une-vie) ?

    L’analyse des causes de ces #échecs montre que ce ne sont pas des #erreurs, mais des #fautes politiques. Tout d’abord une gestion présidentialiste et autocratique de la #crise_sanitaire, couplée avec un virage idéologique vers l’extrême droite. Ensuite le refus de toute #politique_d’anticipation, qui est à concevoir comme une conséquence du « #en-même-temps » : le #laisser_faire néolibéral du macronisme se conjugue avec un retrait massif de l’#Etat et un affaiblissement de la #Fonction_publique. Enfin la #gestion_sanitaire de Macron roi a pris lors de cette épidémie la forme d’un #pari : s’accoutumer au virus, #vivre_avec, le laisser filer permettra peut-être d’éviter un #confinement. Le pari au lieu de la #raison et de la #délibération, le jeu avec la science, le rêve de devenir un savant, l’adulation de Raoult, Macron roi devenu « l’expert », l’épidémiologiste en chambre. La limite de cette folie est éthique : un #pouvoir, quel qu’il soit, ne peut pas parier des vies comme dans une partie de poker.

    A ces trois fautes correspondent trois marqueurs de l’identité politique de Macron roi : l’#opportunisme, le #jeu et le #cynisme. Macron est certainement le président le plus dangereux que nous ayons eu depuis Pétain. Il est le président qui aura consenti à la mort de dizaines de milliers de citoyen.ne.s, qui aura fait le lit de l’#extrême_droite et aura remplacé la politique par un jeu de roulette russe. Président hors de contrôle, il est devenu à lui seul le haut comité médical qu’il a institué. Il est devenu à lui seul tout le Parlement. Il est devenu sa propre caricature. Le Roi et le fou du Roi. Seul en son Palais, "divertissant son incurable ennui en faisant des paris avec la vie de ses sujets"*.

    Pascal Maillard

    Père Ubu s’interrogeait ainsi : « Le mauvais droit ne vaut-il pas le bon ? ». Il parait que sous la plume de Jarry cette question rhétorique renvoyait au cynisme politique de Bismarck.

    * L’expression est de l’écrivain Yves Charnet, dans un livre à paraître.

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/pascal-maillard/blog/010421/macron-roi

    #macronisme #Macron #France #covid #coronavirus #Blanquer

  • ‘They can see us in the dark’: migrants grapple with hi-tech fortress EU

    A powerful battery of drones, thermal cameras and heartbeat detectors are being deployed to exclude asylum seekers

    Khaled has been playing “the game” for a year now. A former law student, he left Afghanistan in 2018, driven by precarious economic circumstances and fear for his security, as the Taliban were increasingly targeting Kabul.

    But when he reached Europe, he realised the chances at winning the game were stacked against him. Getting to Europe’s borders was easy compared with actually crossing into the EU, he says, and there were more than physical obstacles preventing him from getting to Germany, where his uncle and girlfriend live.

    On a cold December evening in the Serbian village of Horgoš, near the Hungarian border, where he had spent a month squatting in an abandoned farm building, he and six other Afghan asylum seekers were having dinner together – a raw onion and a loaf of bread they passed around – their faces lit up by the glow of a fire.

    The previous night, they had all had another go at “the game” – the name migrants give to crossing attempts. But almost immediately the Hungarian border police stopped them and pushed them back into Serbia. They believe the speed of the response can be explained by the use of thermal cameras and surveillance drones, which they had seen during previous attempts to cross.

    “They can see us in the dark – you just walk, and they find you,” said Khaled, adding that drones had been seen flying over their squat. “Sometimes they send them in this area to watch who is here.”

    Drones, thermal-vision cameras and devices that can detect a heartbeat are among the new technological tools being increasingly used by European police to stop migrants from crossing borders, or to push them back when they do.

    The often violent removal of migrants without giving them the opportunity to apply for asylum is illegal under EU law, which obliges authorities to process asylum requests whether or not migrants possess identification documents or entered the country legally.

    “Routes are getting harder and harder to navigate. Corridors [in the Balkans are] really intensively surveyed by these technologies,” says Simon Campbell, field coordinator for the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), a migrant rights group in the region.

    The militarisation of Europe’s borders has been increasing steadily since 2015, when the influx of migrants reached its peak. A populist turn in politics and fear whipped up around the issue have fuelled the use of new technologies. The EU has invested in fortifying borders, earmarking €34.9bn (£30bn) in funding for border and migration management for the 2021-27 budget, while sidelining the creation of safe passages and fair asylum processes.

    Osman, a Syrian refugee now living in Serbia, crossed several borders in the southern Balkans in 2014. “At the time, I didn’t see any type of technology,” he says, “but now there’s drones, thermal cameras and all sorts of other stuff.”

    When the Hungarian police caught him trying to cross the Serbian border before the pandemic hit last year, they boasted about the equipment they used – including what Osman recalls as “a huge drone with a big camera”. He says they told him: “We are watching you everywhere.”

    Upgrading of surveillance technology, as witnessed by Khaled and Osman, has coincided with increased funding for Frontex – the EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency. Between 2005 and 2016, Frontex’s budget grew from €6.3m to €238.7m, and it now stands at €420.6m. Technology at the EU’s Balkan borders have been largely funded with EU money, with Frontex providing operational support.

    Between 2014 and 2017, with EU funding, Croatia bought 13 thermal-imaging devices for €117,338 that can detect people more than a mile away and vehicles from two miles away.

    In 2019, the Croatian interior ministry acquired four eRIS-III long-range drones for €2.3m. They identify people up to six miles away in daylight and just under two miles in darkness, they fly at 80mph and climb to an altitude of 3,500 metres (11,400ft), while transmitting real-time data. Croatia has infrared cameras that can detect people at up to six miles away and equipment that picks upheartbeats.

    Romania now has heartbeat detection devices, alongside 117 thermo-vision cameras. Last spring, it added 24 vehicles with thermo-vision capabilities to its border security force at a cost of more than €13m.

    Hungary’s investment in migration-management technology is shielded from public scrutiny by a 2017 legal amendment but its lack of transparency and practice of pushing migrants back have been criticised by other EU nations and the European court of justice, leading to Frontex suspending operations in Hungary in January.

    It means migrants can no longer use the cover of darkness for their crossing attempts. Around the fire in Horgoš, Khaled and his fellow asylum-seekers decide to try crossing instead in the early morning, when they believe thermal cameras are less effective.

    A 2021 report by BVMN claims that enhanced border control technologies have led to increased violence as police in the Balkans weaponise new equipment against people on the move. Technology used in pushing back migrants has “contributed to the ease with which racist and repressive procedures are carried out”, the report says.

    BVMN highlighted the 2019 case of an 18-year-old Algerian who reported being beaten and strangled with his own shirt by police while attempting a night crossing from Bosnia to Croatia. “You cannot cross the border during the night because when the police catch you in the night, they beat you a lot. They break you,” says the teenager, who reported seeing surveillance drones.

    Ali, 19, an Iranian asylum-seeker who lives in a migrant camp in Belgrade, says that the Croatian and Romanian police have been violent and ignored his appeals for asylum during his crossing attempts. “When they catch us, they don’t respect us, they insult us, they beat us,” says Ali. “We said ‘we want asylum’, but they weren’t listening.”

    BVMN’s website archives hundreds of reports of violence. In February last year, eight Romanian border officers beat two Iraqi families with batons, administering electric shocks to two men, one of whom was holding his 11-month-old child. They stole their money and destroyed their phones, before taking them back to Serbia, blasting ice-cold air in the police van until they reached their destination.

    “There’s been some very, very severe beatings lately,” says Campbell. “Since the spring of 2018, there has been excessive use of firearms, beatings with batons, Tasers and knives.”

    Responding to questions via email, Frontex denies any link between its increased funding of new technologies and the violent pushbacks in the Balkans. It attributes the rise in reports to other factors, such as increased illegal migration and the proliferation of mobile phones making it easier to record incidents.

    Petra Molnar, associate director of Refugee Law Lab, believes the over-emphasis on technologies can alienate and dehumanise migrants.

    “There’s this alluring solution to really complex problems,” she says. “It’s a lot easier to sell a bunch of drones or a lot of automated technology, instead of dealing with the drivers that force people to migrate … or making the process more humane.”

    Despite the increasingly sophisticated technologies that have been preventing them from crossing Europe’s borders, Khaled and his friends from the squat managed to cross into Hungary in late December. He is living in a camp in Germany and has begun the process of applying for asylum.

    https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/26/eu-borders-migrants-hitech-surveillance-asylum-seekers

    #Balkans #complexe_militaro-industriel #route_des_Balkans #technologie #asile #migrations #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #caméras_thermiques #militarisation_des_frontières #drones #détecteurs_de_battements_de_coeur #Horgos #Horgoš #Serbie #the_game #game #surveillance_frontalière #Hongrie #Frontex #Croatie #Roumanie #nuit #violence #refoulements #push-backs #déshumanisation

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Frontex y España se enfrentan por las operaciones contra la inmigración irregular

    La pugna por el despliegue en África y el creciente poder del cuerpo europeo llevaron a la agencia de control de fronteras a amenazar con su retirada

    Las relaciones entre España y la Agencia Europea de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas (Frontex) son más tensas que nunca. La pugna por el despliegue de medios materiales y el control de los operativos ha llevado a Frontex a amagar con suspender su actividad en el Estrecho y las islas Canarias ―además del dispositivo que se despliega en cada operación #Paso_del_Estrecho― , según tres fuentes conocedoras del episodio. La decisión corrió el pasado miércoles por los despachos, llegó a comunicarse hasta a los agentes de la agencia desplegados en el archipiélago y amenazó con convertirse en una crisis política. El pasado viernes, Frontex salió al paso con un comunicado desde su sede en Varsovia para atajar rumores y anunciar que renovaba su presencia en España un año más.

    Las tensiones vienen de lejos y son el reflejo de la disputa entre los cuerpos y fuerzas de seguridad nacionales y una agencia europea de fronteras con un mandato extendido. En los planes operativos para este 2021, que se cierran a principios de año, Frontex reclamaba a España mayor control sobre la inteligencia y el acceso a los datos de carácter personal en las fronteras españolas, competencias en materia de investigaciones transfronterizas (como las mafias de narcotráfico internacional) o el despliegue sobre el terreno del nuevo cuerpo de agentes europeos, un personal armado de cuya profesionalidad recelan las policías españolas. La propuesta no gustó a los negociadores. Un mando de las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del Estado considera que aceptar las propuestas de Varsovia supone una “entrega de soberanía” y cree que el conflicto “estallará cuando haya una desgracia”.

    Influencia en África

    La negociación de estos puntos ha estado marcada por otra de las principales batallas para España: el papel de la agencia en las islas Canarias, un enclave desde el que Frontex quiere ganar influencia en África. Actualmente, la agencia trabaja con un equipo de 26 agentes, españoles y extranjeros, que apoyan a la Policía Nacional en la identificación y las entrevistas a los migrantes con el objetivo de desbaratar las redes que les facilitan el viaje. Pero este despliegue tiene una cobertura limitada y el espectacular repunte de llegadas al archipiélago, que ha recibido casi 25.000 personas en los últimos 13 meses, impulsó nuevas negociaciones entre Varsovia y Madrid para lanzar una operación conjunta con la Guardia Civil en Senegal.

    El objetivo inicial era reformular la operación Hera II, un operativo que Frontex y la Guardia Civil ya habían desplegado de 2006 a 2019 en varios países de origen para cerrar la vía migratoria que se abrió durante la llamada crisis de los cayucos. Pero las diferencias entre unos y otros mantienen la iniciativa bloqueada.

    Por un lado, Frontex ―que aprobó un nuevo reglamento en 2019 que le da más autonomía― alega la necesidad de firmar su propio acuerdo bilateral con Dakar para patrullar sus costas, señalan fuentes españolas conocedoras de la negociación. Por otro, la #Guardia_Civil demanda que no haya condiciones para que la agencia colabore con más medios en origen y lo haga siempre bajo su coordinación.

    La Guardia Civil, que ya tiene acuerdos y agentes desplegados en Mauritania, Gambia y Senegal hace más de una década, siempre concentró el mando de las operaciones, las investigaciones y las relaciones con las autoridades locales y no tiene intención de renunciar a ello. “Hemos trabajado en todos estos ámbitos independientemente del decreciente apoyo de Frontex a lo largo de los últimos años porque consideraba esta ruta cerrada”, afirma una fuente española. En definitiva, la agencia con más presupuesto de la UE quiere más poder del que los agentes españoles están dispuestos a darle.

    España trató de plantarse en la negociación de los planes operativos con Frontex: si no hay ayuda de la agencia europea para un despliegue conjunto en Senegal, no se aceptarían las peticiones de mandato extendido de Frontex en territorio nacional, según otra fuente al tanto de las discusiones. Pero finalmente, tras la presión por una posible cancelación de las operaciones, se han aceptado las exigencias de Varsovia. “Es una lucha entre la realidad del terreno y la de los altos cargos que firman los reglamentos en la oficina”, según esta fuente.

    Frontex, que tiene presupuestados 5.600 millones de euros para los próximos siete años ―frente a los 19,2 millones de 2006―, incorporará 10.000 agentes propios para la vigilancia de fronteras y costas. En este contexto de crecimiento, la agencia empieza a demandar más control e influencia sobre las operaciones y no quiere limitarse a ofrecer barcos y aviones. Los agentes españoles, por su parte, quieren el apoyo de la agencia en los países de origen, pero siempre bajo su mando. No quieren ceder espacio ni competencias en un ámbito en el que llevan años invirtiendo recursos propios y experiencia.

    Fuentes europeas reconocen que la incorporación de guardias de Frontex a las operaciones en España “ha complicado la negociación del programa de trabajo para el nuevo año”. El programa debía renovarse, como en cada ejercicio, para entrar en vigor el 1 de febrero, pero las fricciones retrasaron la negociación: España, según fuentes conocedoras de la negociación, pidió cambios relevantes en los planes operativos; la agencia hizo una contrapropuesta, y las autoridades españolas no la aceptaron. El acuerdo no llegó hasta 29 de enero, al filo de que el plan de trabajo no se aprobase y los dos operativos de Frontex en España se quedaran sin base legal para su continuidad. En Frontex aseguran que las operaciones nunca estuvieron en peligro y que la voluntad de la agencia siempre ha sido mantener su presencia en España.

    En una entrevista con EL PAÍS el pasado 4 de enero el propio vicepresidente de la Comisión Europea, Margaritis Schinas, se refirió a los desencuentros entre Madrid y Varsovia.

    –¿Por qué cree que España no ve con buenos ojos la presencia de Frontex?

    – Eso me pregunto yo, por qué Frontex no está en Canarias cuando hay un serio problema y sí está masivamente en el Egeo, con cientos de agentes

    España apoyó desde el inicio, en 2005, la creación y puesta en marcha de Frontex, pero con el tiempo se ha mostrado reticente a implicar a los agentes de la agencia en sus competencias. “España se caracteriza por ser un Estado miembro que ha invertido considerables recursos públicos en operaciones de rescates en el mar además de en el control de sus fronteras exteriores”, afirma el eurodiputado socialista Juan Fernando López Aguilar. “Eso explica que retenga bastante el protagonismo de su papel en fronteras, a diferencia de otros países que han recurrido más a la agencia, como Croacia, Grecia o incluso Italia”.

    La agencia está actualmente bajo una presión sin precedentes, cuando está a punto de convertirse en el primer cuerpo uniformado y armado en la historia de la UE. Las investigaciones cercan a su director, Fabrice Leggeri, sobre el que se han vertido duras críticas por su gestión, la degradación de las relaciones en el seno de la agencia y, sobre todo, por supuesta connivencia con la devolución en caliente de emigrantes en la frontera greco-turca.

    https://elpais.com/espana/2021-02-01/frontex-y-espana-se-enfrentan-por-las-operaciones-contra-la-inmigracion-irre

    Traduction:

    La lutte pour le déploiement en Afrique et la puissance croissante de l’organisme européen ont conduit l’agence de contrôle des frontières à menacer son retrait.
    Les relations entre l’Espagne et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) sont plus tendues que jamais. La lutte pour le déploiement des moyens matériels et la maîtrise des opérations a conduit Frontex à menacer de suspendre son activité dans le détroit et aux îles Canaries `` en plus du dispositif qui est déployé dans chaque opération au-dessus du détroit du détroit ’’, selon trois sources bien informées de l’épisode. La décision a traversé les bureaux mercredi dernier, elle a même été communiquée aux agents de l’agence déployés dans l’archipel et menaçait de devenir une crise politique. Vendredi dernier, Frontex a publié une déclaration de son siège à Varsovie pour arrêter les rumeurs et annoncer qu’elle renouvelait sa présence en Espagne pour une autre année.

    #Frontex #Espagne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #opération_Paso_del_Estrecho #Canaries #îles_Canaries #Mauritanie #Gambie #Sénégal

  • The fortified gates of the Balkans. How non-EU member states are incorporated into fortress Europe.

    Marko Gašperlin, a Slovenian police officer, began his first mandate as chair of the Management Board of Frontex in spring 2016. Less than two months earlier, then Slovenian Prime Minister Miro Cerar had gone to North Macedonia to convey the message from the EU that the migration route through the Balkans — the so-called Balkan route — was about to close.

    “North Macedonia was the first country ready to cooperate [with Frontex] to stop the stampede we had in 2015 across the Western Balkans,” Gašperlin told K2.0 during an interview conducted at the police headquarters in Ljubljana in September 2020.

    “Stampede” refers to over 1 million people who entered the European Union in 2015 and early 2016 in search of asylum, the majority traveling along the Balkan route. Most of them were from Syria, but also some other countries of the global South where human rights are a vague concept.

    According to Gašperlin, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s primary interest at the EU’s external borders is controlling the movement of people who he describes as “illegals.”

    Given numerous allegations by human rights organizations, Frontex could itself be part of illegal activity as part of the push-back chain removing people from EU territory before they have had the opportunity to assert their right to claim asylum.

    In March 2016, the EU made a deal with Turkey to stop the flow of people toward Europe, and Frontex became even more active in the Aegean Sea. Only four years later, at the end of 2020, Gašperlin established a Frontex working group to look into allegations of human rights violations by its officers. So far, no misconduct has been acknowledged. The final internal Frontex report is due at the end of February.

    After allegations were made public during the summer and fall of 2020, some members of the European Parliament called for Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri to step down, while the European Ombudsman also announced an inquiry into the effectiveness of the Agency’s complaints mechanism as well as its management.

    A European Parliament Frontex Scrutiny Working Group was also established to conduct its own inquiry, looking into “compliance and respect for fundamental rights” as well as internal management, and transparency and accountability. It formally began work this week (February 23) with its fact-finding investigation expected to last four months.

    2021 started with more allegations and revelations.

    In January 2021 the EU anti-fraud office, OLAF, confirmed it is leading an investigation over allegations of harassment and misconduct inside Frontex, and push-backs conducted at the EU’s borders.

    Similar accusations of human rights violations related to Frontex have been accumulating for years. In 2011, Human Rights Watch issued a report titled “The EU’s Dirty Hands” that documented the ill-treatment of migrant detainees in Greece.

    Various human rights organizations and media have also long reported about Frontex helping the Libyan Coast Guard to locate and pull back people trying to escape toward Europe. After being pulled back, people are held in notorious detention camps, which operate with the support of the EU.

    Nonetheless, EU leaders are not giving up on the idea of expanding the Frontex mission, making deals with governments of non-member states in the Balkans to participate in their efforts to stop migration.

    Currently, the Frontex plan is to deploy up to 10,000 border guards at the EU external borders by 2027.

    Policing Europe

    Frontex, with its headquarters in Poland, was established in 2004, but it remained relatively low key for the first decade of its existence. This changed in 2015 when, in order to better control Europe’s visa-free Schengen area, the European Commission (EC) extended the Agency’s mandate as it aimed to turn Frontex into a fully-fledged European Border and Coastguard Agency. Officially, they began operating in this role in October 2016, at the Bulgarian border with Turkey.

    In recent years, the territory they cover has been expanding, framed as cooperation with neighboring countries, with the main goal “to ensure implementation of the European integrated border management.”

    The budget allocated for their work has also grown massively, from about 6 million euros in 2005, to 460 million euros in 2020. According to existing plans, the Agency is set to grow still further and by 2027 up to 5.6 billion euros is expected to have been spent on Frontex.

    As one of the main migration routes into Europe the Balkans has become the key region for Frontex. Close cooperation with authorities in the region has been growing since 2016, particularly through the “Regional Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management in the Western Balkans and Turkey” project: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Third_countries/IPA_II_Phase_II.pdf.

    In order to increase its powers in the field, Frontex has promoted “status agreements” with the countries in the region, while the EC, through its Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) fund, has dedicated 3.4 million euros over the two-year 2019-21 period for strengthening borders.

    The first Balkan state to upgrade its cooperation agreement with Frontex to a status agreement was Albania in 2018; joint police operations at its southern border with Greece began in spring 2019. According to the agreement, Frontex is allowed to conduct full border police duties on the non-EU territory.

    Frontex’s status agreement with Albania was followed by a similar agreement with Montenegro that has been in force since July 2020.

    The signing of a status agreement with North Macedonia was blocked by Bulgaria in October 2020, while the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina requires further approvals and the one with Serbia is awaiting ratification by the parliament in Belgrade.

    “The current legal framework is the consequence of the situation in the years from 2014 to 2016,” Gašperlin said.

    He added that he regretted that the possibility to cooperate with non-EU states in returns of “illegals” had subsequently been dropped from the Frontex mandate after an intervention by EU parliamentarians. In 2019, a number of changes were made to how Frontex functions including removing the power to “launch return interventions in third countries” due to the fact that many of these countries have a poor record when it comes to rule of law and respect of human rights.

    “This means, if we are concrete, that the illegals who are in BiH — the EU can pay for their accommodation, Frontex can help only a little with the current tools it has, while when it comes to returns, Frontex cannot do anything,” Gašperlin said.

    Fortification of the borders

    The steady introduction of status agreements is intended to replace and upgrade existing police cooperation deals that are already in place with non-EU states.

    Over the years, EU member states have established various bilateral agreements with countries around the world, including some in the Balkan region. Further agreements have been negotiated by the EU itself, with Frontex listing 20 “working arrangements” with different non-member states on its website.

    Based on existing Frontex working arrangements, exchange of information and “consultancy” visits by Frontex officials — which also include work at border crossings — are already practiced widely across the Balkan-EU borders.

    The new status agreements allow Frontex officers to guard the borders and perform police tasks on the territory of the country with which the agreement is signed, while this country’s national courts do not have jurisdiction over the Frontex personnel.

    Comparing bilateral agreements to status agreements, Marko Gašperlin explained that, with Frontex taking over certain duties, individual EU states will be able to avoid the administrative and financial burdens of “bilateral solidarity.”

    Radoš Đurović, director of the NGO Asylum Protection Centre (APC) which works with migrants in Serbia, questions whether Frontex’s presence in the region will bring better control over violations and fears that if past acts of alleged violence are used it could make matters worse.

    “The EU’s aim is to increase border control and reduce the number of people who legally or illegally cross,” Đurović says in a phone interview for K2.0. “We know that violence does not stop the crossings. It only increases the violence people experience.”

    Similarly, Jasmin Redžepi from the Skopje-based NGO Legis, argues that the current EU focus on policing its borders only entraps people in the region.

    “This causes more problems, suffering and death,” he says. “People are forced to turn to criminals in search of help. The current police actions are empowering criminals and organized crime.”

    Redžepi believes the region is currently acting as some kind of human filter for the EU.

    “From the security standpoint this is solidarity with local authorities. But in the field, it prevents greater numbers of refugees from moving toward central Europe,” Redžepi says.

    “They get temporarily stuck. The EU calls it regulation but they only postpone their arrival in the EU and increase the violations of human rights, European law and international law. In the end people cross, just more simply die along the way.”

    EU accused of externalizing issues

    For the EU, it was a shifting pattern of migratory journeys that signified the moment to start increasing its border security around the region by strengthening its cooperation with individual states.

    The overland Balkan route toward Western Europe has always been used by people on the move. But it has become even more frequented in recent years as changing approaches to border policing and rescue restrictions in the Central Mediterranean have made crossings by sea even more deadly.

    For the regional countries, each at a different stage of a still distant promise of EU membership, partnering with Frontex comes with the obvious incentive of demonstrating their commitment to the bloc.

    “When regional authorities work to stop people crossing towards the EU, they hope to get extra benefits elsewhere,” says APC Serbia’s Radoš Đurovic.

    There are also other potential perks. Jasmin Redžepi from Legis explains that police from EU states often leave behind equipment for under-equipped local forces.

    But there has also been significant criticism of the EU’s approach in both the Balkans and elsewhere, with many accusing it of attempting to externalize its borders and avoid accountability by pushing difficult issues elsewhere.

    According to research by Violeta Moreno-Lax and Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, who have analyzed the consequences of the EU’s approach to border management, the bloc’s actions amount to a “dispersion of legal duties” that is not “ethically and legally tenable under international law.”

    One of the results, the researchers found, is that “repressive forces” in third countries gain standing as valid interlocutors for cooperation and democratic and human rights credentials become “secondary, if at all relevant.”

    APC’s Radoš Đurović agrees, suggesting that we are entering a situation where the power of the law and international norms that prevent illegal use of force are, in effect, limited.

    “Europe may not have enough power to influence the situations in places further away that push migration, but it can influence its border regions,” he says. “The changes we see forced onto the states are problematic — from push-backs to violence.”

    Playing by whose rules?

    One of the particular anomalies seen with the status agreements is that Albanian police are now being accompanied by Frontex forces to better control their southern border at the same time as many of Albania’s own citizens are themselves attempting to reach the EU in irregular ways.

    Asked about this apparent paradox, Marko Gašperlin said he did “not remember any Albanians among the illegals.”

    However, Frontex’s risk analysis for 2020, puts Albania in the top four countries for whose citizens return orders were issued in the preceding two years and second in terms of returns effectively carried out. Eurostat data for 2018 and 2019 also puts Albania in 11th place among countries from which first time asylum seekers come, before Somalia and Bangladesh and well ahead of Morocco and Algeria.

    While many of these Albanian citizens may have entered EU countries via regular means before being subject to return orders for reasons such as breaching visa conditions, people on the move from Albania are often encountered along the Balkan route, according to activists working in the field.

    Meanwhile, other migrants have complained of being subjected to illegal push-backs at Albania’s border with Greece, though there is a lack of monitoring in this area and these claims remain unverified.

    In Serbia, the KlikAktiv Center for Development of Social Policies has analyzed Belgrade’s pending status agreement for Frontex operations.

    It warns that increasing the presence of armed police, from a Frontex force that has allegedly been involved in violence and abuses of power, is a recipe for disaster, especially when they will have immunity from local criminal and civil jurisdiction.

    It also flags that changes in legislation will enable the integration of data systems and rapid deportations without proper safeguards in place.

    Police activities to secure borders greatly depend on — and supply data to — EU information technology systems. But EU law provides fewer protections for data processing of foreign nationals than for that of EU citizens, effectively creating segregation in terms of data protection.

    The EU Fundamental Rights Agency has warned that the establishment of a more invasive system for non-EU nationals could potentially lead to increased discrimination and skew data that could further “fuel existing misperceptions that there is a link between asylum-seekers, migration and crime.”

    A question of standards

    Frontex emphasizes that there are codified safeguards and existing internal appeal mechanisms.

    According to the status agreements, violations of fundamental rights such as data protection rules or the principle of non-refoulement — which prohibits the forcible return of individuals to countries where they face danger through push-backs or other means — are all reasons for either party to suspend or terminate their cooperation.

    In January, Frontex itself suspended its mission in Hungary after the EU member state failed to abide by an EU Court of Justice decision. In December 2020, the court found that Hungarian border enforcement was in violation of EU law by restricting access to its asylum system and for carrying out illegal push-backs into Serbia.

    Marko Gašperlin claimed that Frontex’s presence improved professional police standards wherever it operated.

    However, claims of raising standards have been questioned by human rights researchers and activists.

    Jasmin Redžepi recounts that the first complaint against a foreign police officer that his NGO Legis filed with North Macedonian authorities and international organizations was against a Slovenian police officer posted through bilateral agreement; the complaint related to allegations of unprofessional conduct toward migrants.

    “Presently, people cross illegally and the police push them back illegally,” Redžepi says. “They should be able to ask for asylum but cannot as police push people across borders.”

    Gašperlin told K2.0 that it is natural that there will be a variation of standards between police from different countries.

    In its recruitment efforts, Frontex has sought to enlist police officers or people with a customs or army background. According to Gašperlin, recruits have been disproportionately from Romania and Italy, while fewer have been police officers from northern member states “where standards and wages are better.”

    “It would be illusory to expect that all of the EU would rise up to the level of respect for human rights and to the high standards of Sweden,” he said. “There also has not been a case of the EU throwing a member out, although there have been examples of human rights violations, of different kinds.”

    ‘Monitoring from the air’

    One of the EU member states whose own police have been accused of serious human rights violations against refugees and migrants, including torture, is Croatia.

    Despite the allegations, in January 2020, Croatia’s Ministry of the Interior Police Academy was chosen to lead the first Frontex-financed training session for attendees from police forces across the Balkan route region.

    Frontex currently has a presence in Croatia, at the EU border area with Bosnia and Herzegovina, amongst other places.

    Asked about the numerous reports from international NGOs and collectives, as well as from the national Ombudsman Lora Vidović and the Council of Europe, of mass human rights violations at the Croatian borders, Gašperlin declined to engage.

    “Frontex helps Croatia with monitoring from the air,” he said. “That is all.”

    Gašperlin said that the role of his agency is only to notify Croatia when people are detected approaching the border from Bosnia. Asked if Frontex also monitors what happens to people once Croatian police find them, given continuously worsening allegations, he said: “From the air this might be difficult. I do not know if a plane from the air can monitor that.”

    Pressed further, he declined to comment.

    To claim ignorance is, however, becoming increasingly difficult. A recent statement on the state of the EU’s borders by UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs, notes: “The pushbacks [at Europe’s borders] are carried out in a violent and apparently systematic way.”

    Radoš Đurović from APC Serbia pointed out that Frontex must know about the alleged violations.

    “The question is: Do they want to investigate and prevent them?” he says. “All those present in the field know about the violence and who perpetrates it.”

    Warnings that strict and violent EU border policies are increasing the sophistication and brutality of smugglers, while technological “solutions” and militarization come with vested interests and more potential human rights violations, do not seem to worry the head of Frontex’s Management Board.

    “If passage from Turkey to Germany is too expensive, people will not decide to go,” said Gašperlin, describing the job done by Frontex:

    “We do the work we do. So people cannot simply come here, sit and say — here I am, now take me to Germany, as some might want. Or — here I am, I’m asking for asylum, now take me to Postojna or Ljubljana, where I will get fed, cared for, and then I’ll sit on the bus and ride to Munich where I’ll again ask for asylum. This would be a minimal price.”

    Human rights advocates in the region such as Jasmin Redžepi have no illusions that what they face on the ground reflects the needs and aims of the EU.

    “We are only a bridge,” Redžepi says. “The least the EU should do is take care that its policies do not turn the region into a cradle for criminals and organized crime. We need legal, regular passages and procedures for people to apply for asylum, not illegal, violent push-backs.

    “If we talk about security we cannot talk exclusively about the security of borders. We have to talk about the security of people as well.”

    https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/the-fortified-gates-of-the-balkans

    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontex #Macédoine_du_Nord #contrôles_frontaliers #militarisation_des_frontières #push-backs #refoulements #refoulements_en_chaîne #frontières_extérieures #Regional_Support_to_Protection-Sensitive_Migration_Management_in_the_Western_Balkans_and_Turkey #Instrument_for_Pre-Accession (#IPA) #budget #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #accords_bilatéraux

    –—

    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et plus particulièrement ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message782649

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • EU : One step closer to the establishment of the ’#permission-to-travel' scheme

    The Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement on rules governing how the forthcoming #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation System (#ETIAS) will ’talk’ to other migration and policing databases, with the purpose of conducting automated searches on would-be travellers to the EU.

    The ETIAS will mirror systems such as the #ESTA scheme in the USA, and will require that citizens of countries who do not need a #visa to travel to the EU instead apply for a “travel authorisation”.

    As with visas, travel companies will be required to check an individual’s travel authorisation before they board a plane, coach or train, effectively creating a new ’permission-to-travel’ scheme.

    The ETIAS also includes a controversial #profiling and ’watchlist’ system, an aspect not mentioned in the Council’s press release (full-text below).

    The rules on which the Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement - and which will thus almost certainly be the final text of the legislation - concern how and when the ETIAS can ’talk’ to other EU databases such as #Eurodac (asylum applications), the #Visa_Information_System, or the #Schengen_Information_System.

    Applicants will also be checked against #Europol and #Interpol databases.

    As the press release notes, the ETIAS will also serve as one of the key components of the “interoperability” scheme, which will interconnect numerous EU databases and lead to the creation of a new, biometric ’#Common_Identity_Repository' on up to 300 million non-EU nationals.

    You can find out more about the ETIAS, related changes to the Visa Information System, and the interoperability plans in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion: https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives

    –------

    The text below is a press release published by the Council of the EU on 18 March 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/18/european-travel-information-and-authorisation-system-etias-council-

    European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS): Council Presidency and European Parliament provisionally agree on rules for accessing relevant databases

    The Council presidency and European Parliament representatives today reached a provisional agreement on the rules connecting the ETIAS central system to the relevant EU databases. The agreed texts will next be submitted to the relevant bodies of the Council and the Parliament for political endorsement and, following this, for their formal adoption.

    The adoption of these rules will be the final legislative step required for the setting up of ETIAS, which is expected to be operational by 2022.

    The introduction of ETIAS aims to improve internal security, prevent illegal immigration, protect public health and reduce delays at the borders by identifying persons who may pose a risk in one of these areas before they arrive at the external borders. ETIAS is also a building bloc of the interoperability between JHA databases, an important political objective of the EU in this area, which is foreseen to be operational by the end of 2023.

    The provisionally agreed rules will allow the ETIAS central system to perform checks against the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Entry/Exit System (EES), Eurodac and the database on criminal records of third country nationals (ECRIS-TCN), as well as on Europol and Interpol data.

    They allow for the connection of the ETIAS central system to these databases and set out the data to be accessed for ETIAS purposes, as well as the conditions and access rights for the ETIAS central unit and the ETIAS national units. Access to the relevant data in these systems will allow authorities to assess the security or immigration risk of applicants and decide whether to issue or refuse a travel authorisation.
    Background

    ETIAS is the new EU travel information and authorisation system. It will apply to visa-exempt third country nationals, who will need to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application.

    The information submitted in each application will be automatically processed against EU and relevant Interpol databases to determine whether there are grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. If no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, the travel authorisation will be issued automatically and quickly. This is expected to be the case for most applications. If there is a hit or an element requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.

    A travel authorisation will be valid for three years or until the end of validity of the travel document registered during application, whichever comes first. For each application, the applicant will be required to pay a travel authorisation fee of 7 euros.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2021/march/eu-one-step-closer-to-the-establishment-of-the-permission-to-travel-sche

    #interopérabilité #base_de_données #database #données_personnelles #migrations #mobilité #autorisations #visas #compagnies_de_voyage #VIS #SIS #EU #UE #union_européenne #biométrie

    ping @etraces @isskein @karine4

    • L’UE précise son futur système de contrôle des voyageurs exemptés de visas

      Les modalités du futur système de #contrôle_préalable, auquel devront se soumettre d’ici fin 2022 les ressortissants de pays tiers pouvant se rendre dans l’Union #sans_visa, a fait l’objet d’un #accord annoncé vendredi par l’exécutif européen.

      Ce dispositif, baptisé ETIAS et inspiré du système utilisé par les Etats-Unis, concernera les ressortissants de plus de 60 pays qui sont exemptés de visas pour leurs courts séjours dans l’Union, comme les ressortissants des Etats-Unis, du Brésil, ou encore de l’Albanie et des Emirats arabes unis.

      Ce système dit « d’information et d’autorisation », qui vise à repérer avant leur entrée dans l’#espace_Schengen des personnes jugées à #risques, doit permettre un contrôle de sécurité avant leur départ via une demande d’autorisation sur internet.

      Dans le cadre de l’ETIAS, les demandes en ligne coûteront 7 euros et chaque autorisation sera valable trois ans pour des entrées multiples, a indiqué un porte-parole de la Commission.

      Selon les prévisions, « probablement plus de 95% » des demandes « donneront lieu à une #autorisation_automatique », a-t-il ajouté.

      Le Parlement européen avait adopté dès juillet 2018 une législation établissant le système ETIAS, mais dans les négociations pour finaliser ses modalités opérationnelles, les eurodéputés réclamaient des garde-fous, en le rendant interopérable avec les autres systèmes d’information de l’UE.

      Eurodéputés et représentants des Etats, de concert avec la Commission, ont approuvé jeudi des modifications qui permettront la consultation de différentes #bases_de_données, dont celles d’#Europol et d’#Interpol, pour identifier les « menaces sécuritaires potentielles, dangers de migration illégale ou risques épidémiologiques élevés ».

      Il contribuera ainsi à « la mise en oeuvre du nouveau Pacte (européen) sur la migration et l’asile », a estimé le porte-parole.

      « Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos #frontières_extérieures. (ETIAS) fournira des #informations_préalables sur les voyageurs avant qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières de l’UE afin d’identifier les risques en matière de #sécurité ou de #santé », a souligné Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, citée dans un communiqué.

      Hors restrictions dues à la pandémie, « au moins 30 millions de voyageurs se rendent chaque année dans l’UE sans visa, et on ne sait pas grand chose à leur sujet. L’ETIAS comblera cette lacune, car il exigera un "#background_check" », selon l’eurodéputé Jeroen Lenaers (PPE, droite pro-UE), rapporteur du texte.

      L’accord doit recevoir un ultime feu vert du Parlement et des Vingt-Sept pour permettre au système d’entrer en vigueur.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/fil-dactualites/190321/l-ue-precise-son-futur-systeme-de-controle-des-voyageurs-exemptes-de-visas
      #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes

  • À la frontière franco-espagnole, la police « #traque » les migrants

    Depuis environ un mois, les contrôles à la frontière franco-espagnole se sont intensifiés. Selon les associations, les migrants, « traqués par la police », prennent de plus en plus de #risques pour atteindre la France. Les humanitaires redoutent un drame, d’autant que certains exilés tentent désormais de rejoindre l’Hexagone en traversant la #rivière #Bidassoa à la nage.

    « #Refoulements illégaux », « traque », « #chasse_à_l'homme », « violation des droits »... Les mots utilisés par les associations locales pour décrire la situation à la frontière franco-espagnole sont forts. Depuis un mois, les humanitaires observent une présence de plus en plus importante des #forces_de_l'ordre. « Il y a toujours eu des contrôles mais à ce point-là, jamais ! On a même vu des #militaires déambuler dans les villages », raconte Lucie Bortaitu de l’association bayonnaise Diakité.

    Début novembre, lors d’une visite dans les Pyrénées, le président Emmanuel Macron avait annoncé le doublement des effectifs aux frontières françaises pour lutter contre la menace terroriste, les trafics et l’immigration illégale.

    À cela s’ajoute la fermeture, début janvier, de 15 points de passage sur les 650 kilomètres de frontière qui séparent l’Espagne de la France pour contenir la pandémie de Covid-19. Cette #surveillance renforcée 24h/24 mobilise 230 #policiers et #militaires.

    Mais pour les associations, le principal enjeu est de limiter l’arrivée de migrants dans l’Hexagone. « Les autorités françaises utilisent l’excuse de la crise sanitaire mais en fait le but premier est le #contrôle_migratoire », estime Ion Aranguren, de l’association espagnole Irungo Harrera Sarea, active du côté d’Irun. « C’est clairement pour lutter contre l’immigration illégale : seuls les Noirs sont constamment contrôlés par les policiers », renchérit Lucie Bortaitu.

    Des refoulements quotidiens

    Depuis plusieurs semaines, selon les humanitaires, les migrants sont « traqués » sur la route, dans les trains et dans la rue. À #Hendaye, les #gendarmes sont même entrés dans le jardin d’un particulier pour y extraire un exilé venu se cacher de la police, rapportent les bénévoles. Des migrants ont aussi été arrêtés au-delà des #20_kilomètres de la frontière, un rayon dans lequel les contrôles d’entrée sur le territoire sont autorisés. Plusieurs personnes ont ainsi été interpellées à #Bordeaux à leur descente du train et expulsées en Espagne.

    D’autres migrants racontent avoir été interpellés, puis envoyés dans les locaux de police avant d’être expulsés à la frontière au beau milieu de la nuit. « L’autre jour, on a appris que cinq femmes avaient été déposées à #Behobia [ville espagnole frontalière située à quelques kilomètres d’#Irun, ndlr] tard le soir. On les lâche là au milieu de nulle part, loin des associations et alors qu’un couvre-feu est aussi en vigueur en Espagne », souffle Lucie Bortaitu. D’autres encore ont été laissés par la police française à #Ibardin, en plein cœur des Pyrénées, du côté espagnol.

    Ce genre de témoignages de refoulement sont recueillis quotidiennement par les associations, françaises et espagnoles. Certains exilés ont déjà tenté six, sept voire huit fois le passage.

    Les mineurs non plus n’échappent pas à ces renvois, malgré la possession d’acte de naissance pour certains, synonyme d’une évaluation de leur minorité et d’une prise en charge par le département.

    Atteindre la France par la rivière

    Ces refoulements, de plus en plus fréquents, inquiètent les humanitaires et les avocats. « Ces #expulsions, qui sont devenues la norme, se font en dehors de tout cadre légal. Ce sont purement et simplement des renvois expéditifs illégaux », signale Me Francisco Sanchez Rodriguez, avocat en droits des étrangers au barreau de Bayonne. Les exilés n’ont en effet pas la possibilité de déposer l’asile, et aucun document de renvoi ne leur est délivré par un juge, comme le prévoit la loi. « On n’avait jamais vu cela à cette frontière », assure l’avocat.

    Malgré la pression policière et les violations de leurs droits, les migrants restent déterminés à continuer leur route. Résultat : ils prennent de plus en plus de risques pour échapper aux forces de l’ordre. Quelques-uns ont même tenté d’atteindre la France en traversant la frontière Bidassoa, qui sépare les deux pays. Un itinéraire jusque-là jamais emprunté par les exilés.

    Tom Dubois-Robin, un habitant d’Hendaye, voit depuis environ un mois des migrants essayer de « passer en France à la nage », en dépit des dangers. Samedi 13 mars, alors qu’il est assis au bord de l’eau avec des amis, il porte secours à un jeune homme venu de l’autre côté de la rivière. Quelques jours plus tard, Tom Dubois-Robin ramasse une doudoune dans l’eau. Dans les poches, il trouve des effets de la Croix-Rouge, dont le centre à Irun accueille des exilés. « Il a dû tenter la traversée et a jeté sa doudoune car elle était trop lourde », pense l’Hendayais.

    Les associations et les citoyens du #Pays_basque redoutent un drame, et se battent pour empêcher que leur rivière ne devienne un cimetière. Tom Dubois-Robin partage ce combat. Cet ancien policier, qui a lâché son uniforme en 2018 en raison justement de ces renvois à répétition, a écrit aux élus de sa région pour « qu’ils tapent du point sur la table et qu’on évite le pire ». Las qu’il est depuis plusieurs années de « ce ping-pong incessant » qui consiste à « renvoyer à la frontière des familles avec enfants ».

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/31024/a-la-frontiere-franco-espagnole-la-police-traque-les-migrants

    #traque_policière #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Pyrénées #France #Espagne #contrôles_frontaliers #militarisation_des_frontières #armée #police

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Cagnotte pour des frais d’avocat suite à la manifestation de Génération Identitaire. - Paris-luttes.info
    https://paris-luttes.info/cagnotte-pour-des-frais-d-avocat-14849?lang=fr

    Le 20 février 2021, alors que je sortais d’un parc en face de la mairie du 14e avec des ami.e.s en direction du métro, nous avons été #contrôlé.e.s par la police. Il est 17h.
    Comme je ne comprenais pas la raison du contrôle, j’ai demandé et on m’a répondu que nous étions sur un périmètre d’une #manifestation. Comprenez la manifestation de #Génération_Identitaire.

    Un des policiers vide mes poches, je lui fais alors la remarque que c’est un vol. Je demande à ce qu’on me rende le feutre qu’il a alors dans la main.
    Il me dit qu’il me le rendra à la fin du contrôle.
    Son collègue m’indique alors que je suis en état d’#ébriété sur la voie publique, et il m’attrape le poignet.
    Je lui demande de me lâcher et je lui dis que cela n’a pas de sens. Il me montre une canette de bière sur le sol.
    Il me demande de le suivre au commissariat pour faire un éthylotest.
    Ça ne sera qu’une excuse, car je n’ai pas bu, et je ne suis pas ivre.
    Une vingtaine de policiers de la BRAV-M débarquent en moto pour assister mon #arrestation.

    #arbitraire

  • Lutter contre la #financiarisation du #logement à #New_York
    https://metropolitiques.eu/Lutter-contre-la-financiarisation-du-logement-a-New-York.html

    À New York, le parc des logements à loyer contrôlé subit depuis une trentaine d’années une dérégulation qui a conduit à son rachat par des investisseurs financiers. Benjamin Teresa analyse ici la lutte des associations de #locataires contre ces propriétaires qui ont laissé le parc se dégrader tout en augmentant considérablement les #loyers. Dossier : Les villes à l’ère de la financiarisation En juin 2019, la législature de l’État de New York a stupéfié le secteur immobilier en entérinant le Housing Stability #Terrains

    / New York, financiarisation, logement, #mobilisation, #droit_au_logement, #politiques_du_logement, #États-Unis, #politiques_publiques, locataires, #savoirs_urbains, loyers, contrôle des (...)

    #contrôle_des_loyers
    https://metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/met-teresa2-fr.pdf

  • Des images communes
    https://lundi.am/Des-images-communes

    Nous sommes à quelques jours du retour par la navette parlementaire de la proposition de loi sur la Sécurité Globale, en première lecture devant le Sénat. Son fameux article 24 sur l’enregistrement et la diffusion d’images captant les forces de l’ordre a fait couler beaucoup d’encre.

    Ironie de l’Histoire, les dispositions les plus polémiques de cette loi pourraient être réécrites par l’opposition, un siècle et demi, jour pour jour après qu’Adolphe Thiers et son gouvernement aient envoyé de nuit, la troupe commandée par le général Lecomte s’emparer des canons de la Garde nationale sur la butte Montmartre.

    L’article propose une réflexion sur la place de la photographie dans l’identification des participant.es à la Commune mais aussi son usage dans la guerre psychologique livrée entre Communard.es et Versaillais.es ainsi que sa résonance aussi bien dans l’écriture des mythes fondateurs de la République que dans notre propre imaginaire commun.

    #insurrection #Commune_de_Paris #police #photographies #images #surveillance #contrôle

  • Contrôle des ventes d’armes : quel rôle pour les parlementaires ?
    http://obsarm.org/spip.php?article353

    À l’occasion de la sortie du communiqué du Sipri sur les exportations d’armement ce 15 mars, nous publions en partenariat avec la fondation Rosa Luxemburg une nouvelle étude comparative sur le contrôle parlementaire des exportations d’armes en Europe qui tente de répondre à cette question : instaurer davantage de transparence et de démocratie dans le domaine du #Contrôle_des_exportations d’armes a-t-il un impact sur les décisions de ventes d’armes ? À télécharger gratuitement ci-dessous. Selon le (...) #Transferts_d'armes

    / Contrôle des exportations, Transferts / exportations, #Maîtrise_des_armements

    #Transferts_/_exportations
    http://obsarm.org/IMG/pdf/contro_le_export_armes_rls-obsarm_03.21.pdf

  • asad abukhalil أسعد أبو خليل sur Twitter : “US controls all intelligence agencies in Lebanon; 90% of the ruling class are its clients; it controls all Lebanese military bases; it runs the Army command; 95% of media are under its control or control of Gulf despots; all NGOs are under its control; it runs the banks. Iran?” / Twitter
    https://twitter.com/asadabukhalil/status/1370791235263209475

    #états-unis #contrôle #Liban

  • Utviste 58 passasjerer fra én flyging til Torp – NRK Vestfold og Telemark – Lokale nyheter, TV og radio

    La Norvège ne rigole pas avec la fermeture des frontières et les règles très strictes pour l’entrée. en 2020 et 2021 so far, 7 600 personnes ont été interdites d’entrée sur le territoire norvégien, et renvoyées d’où elles venaient par le même avion avec lequel elles sont arrivées. Et quand c’était les avions du soir, les passagers étaient placés en hôtel de quarantaine sou surveillance pour être remise dans le premier avion retour le lendemain matin.
    https://www.nrk.no/vestfoldogtelemark/utviste-58-passasjerer-fra-en-flyging-til-torp-1.15414142

    Tall fra politiet viser en stor økning i antall bortvisninger i grensekontrollen. 600 er hittil i år sendt tilbake fra Gardermoen.

    I januar måtte 332 personer returnere til hjemlandet fra Torp, mens tallet for februar er 125.

    – Det at så mange ble bortvist i januar kommer nok delvis av endringer i regelverk og fordi mange som jobber i Norge var i hjemlandet på juleferie.

    Statistikk i forbindelse med koronaviruset – Politiet.no
    https://www.politiet.no/aktuelt-tall-og-fakta/tall-og-fakta/statistikk-i-forbindelse-med-koronaviruset

    I uke 9 ble 380 personer bortvist fra Norge. Det er 52 flere enn uken før. 60 av bortvisningene skyldtes manglende dokumentasjon på negativ Covid-19-test. For 294 personer var bortvisningsgrunnen at de ikke hadde rett til innreise som følge av innreiserestriksjoner. For de øvrige var det andre årsaker til bortvisningen.

    Så langt i år er 3094 personer bortvist fra Norge.

    #norvège #corona

  • Faudra-t-il remplir un « journal de bord » à Pôle emploi en 2022 ? - par mel

    Dans le cadre de la modalité dite « nouveau suivi » (théoriquement pour les demandeurs d’emploi les plus « autonomes ») on va déployer une nouvelle disposition : le bilan en ligne.
    Il s’agit d’un questionnaire en ligne que doivent remplir les personnes concernées sur comment elles organisent leur recherche d’emploi, le nombre de demandes faites en ligne, en candidature spontanée, en réponse à des offres , avec leur réseau etc...
    Et à chaque question on leur demande s’ils se sentent « en confiance » !!!
    Selon moi, c’est bien une préfiguration (une forme) d’auto controle comme le journal de bord.

    #pôle_emploi #journal_de_bord #candidat #emploi #contrôle_des_chômeurs #radiations #dématérialisation #société_de_contrôle

  • #Biden and the Border Security-Industrial Complex

    Successive administrations have poured money into the business of militarizing immigration control—and lobbyists have returned the favors. Will this president stop the juggernaut?

    There are many ways I wish I’d spent my last days of freedom before the coronavirus’s inexorable and deadly advance through the US began last year, but attending the 2020 Border Security Expo was not one of them. On March 9, 2020, President Trump told us the flu was more deadly than coronavirus and that nothing would be shut down. “Think about that!” he tweeted. On March 13, he declared the pandemic a national emergency. In the days between, I flew to San Antonio, Texas, to attend the Expo in an attempt to better understand the border security industry and its links to government. I soon found myself squeezing through dozens of suited men with buzz cuts clapping each other on the back and scarfing bagels at the catering table, with scant mention of the coming catastrophe.

    Instead, the focus was on how best to spend the ever-increasing budgets of the Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which had discretionary spending allocations that totaled $27 billion. Together, that was up 20 percent on the previous year’s budgets; and for decades now, under Democrats and Republicans alike, the border security industry has generally received more and more money each year. For the first time in years, the agencies’ latest combined budget records a modest reduction, of $1.5 billion (though the expenditure on ICE continues to grow unchecked).

    President Biden is working to undo some of the most violent anti-immigrant policies of his predecessor, including lifting the travel ban on thirteen nations, almost all in the Middle East or Africa, and working to end the Migrant Protection Protocols, which forced some 25,000 asylum seekers to stay in Mexico as they awaited their day in court. He has also created a task force to reunite families separated at the US–Mexico border and has already sent a comprehensive immigration reform bill to lawmakers. And he has halted construction of Donald Trump’s notorious border wall.

    Does this all signify that he is ready to consider taming the vast militarized machine that is the border security industry? Or will he, like Democratic presidents before him, quietly continue to expand it?

    (#paywall)

    https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2021/03/02/biden-and-the-border-security-industrial-complex

    #USA #complexe_militaro-industriel #Etats-Unis #migrations #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #business #réfugiés #migrations #militarisation_des_frontières #Joe_Biden #Customs_and_Border_Protection_agency (#CBP) #Immigration_and_Customs_Enforcement (#ICE)

    • Biden’s Border. The industry, the Democrats and the 2020 elections

      This briefing profiles the leading US border security contractors, their related financial campaign contributions during the 2020 elections, and how they have shaped a bipartisan approach in favor of border militarization for more than three decades. It suggests that a real change in border and immigration policies will require the Democrats to break with the industry that helps finance them.

      Key findings:

      – Early into his presidency, Joe Biden has already indicated through 10 executive orders that he wants to end the brutality associated with Trump’s border and immigration policies. However undoing all the harmful dimensions of the US border regime will require substantial structural change and an end to the close ties between the Democrats and the border industry.

      - The border security and immigration detention industry has boomed in the last decades thanks to constant increases in government spending by both parties—Democrats and Republicans. Between 2008 and 2020, CBP and ICE issued 105,997 contracts worth $55.1 billion to private corporations.The industry is now deeply embedded in US government bodies and decision-making, with close financial ties to strategic politicians.

      – 13 companies play a pivotal role in the US border industry: #CoreCivic, #Deloitte, #Elbit_Systems, #GEO_Group, #General_Atomics, #General_Dynamics, #G4S, #IBM, #Leidos, #Lockheed_Martin, #L3Harris, #Northrop_Grumman, and #Palantir. Some of the firms also provide other services and products to the US government, but border and detention contracts have been a consistently growing part of all of their portfolios.

      - These top border contractors through individual donations and their #Political_Action_Committees (PACs) gave more than $40 million during the 2020 electoral cycle to the two parties ($40,333,427). Democrats overall received more contributions from the big border contractors than the Republicans (55 percent versus 45 percent). This is a swing back to the Democrats, as over the last 10 years contributions from 11 of the 13 companies have favored Republicans. It suggests an intention by the border industry to hedge their political bets and ensure that border security policies are not rolled back to the detriment of future profits.

      – The 13 border security companies’ executives and top employees contributed three times more to Joe Biden ($5,364,994) than to Donald Trump ($1,730,435).

      - A few border security companies show preferences towards one political party. Detention-related companies, in particular CoreCivic, G4S and GEO Group, strongly favor Republicans along with military contractors Elbit Systems and General Atomics, while auditing and IT companies Deloitte, IBM and Palantir overwhelmingly favor the Democrats.

      – The 13 companies have contributed $10 million ($9,674,911) in the 2020 electoral cycle to members of strategic legislative committees that design and fund border security policies: the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the House Homeland Security Committee. The biggest contributors are Deloitte, General Dynamics, L3Harris, Leidos, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, and nearly all donate substantially to both parties, with a preference for Republican candidates. Democrat Senator Jack Reed ($426,413), Republican Congresswoman Kay Granger ($442,406) and Republican Senator Richard Shelby ($430,150) all received more than $400,000 in 2020.

      – Biden is opposed to the wall-building of Trump, but has along with many Democrats voiced public support for a more hidden ‘virtual wall’ and ‘smart borders’, deploying surveillance technologies that will be both more lucrative for the industry and more hidden in terms of the abuses they perpetrate.

      - Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Alejandro Mayorkas developed and implemented DACA under Obama’s administration, but also as a lawyer with the firm WilmerHale between 2018 and 2020 earned $3.3 million representing companies including border contractors Northrop Grumman and Leidos.

      - Over the last 40 years, Biden has a mixed voting record on border policy, showing some support for immigrant rights on several occasions but also approving legislation (the 1996 Illegal Immigration and Immigration Reform Act) that enabled the mass deportations under Obama, and the 2006 Secure Fence Act, which extended the wall long before Trump’s election.

      – The Democrat Party as a whole also has a mixed record. Under President Bill Clinton, the Democrats approved the 1994 Prevention through Deterrence national border strategy and implemented the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act that dramatically increased the pace of border militarization as well as deportations. Later Obama became the first president to deport nearly 3 million people during his eight-year term.

      – Nearly 8,000 bodies have been recovered in the U.S.–Mexico borderlands between 1998 and 2019 as a result of policies by both parties. The organization No More Deaths has estimated that three to ten times as many people may have died or disappeared since today’s border-enforcement strategy was implemented. The border industrial complex’s profits are based on border and immmigration policies that have deadly consequences.

      https://www.tni.org/en/bidensborder

      #rapport #TNI #murs #barrières_frontalières #démocrates #républicains #industrie_frontalière #smart_borders #murs_virtuels #technologie #morts #décès #mortalité

  • The big wall


    https://thebigwall.org/en

    An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent.

    There are satellites, drones, ships, cooperation projects, police posts, repatriation flights, training centers. They are the bricks of an invisible but tangible and often violent wall. Erected starting in 2015 onwards, thanks to over one billion euros of public money. With one goal: to eliminate those movements by sea, from North Africa to Italy, which in 2015 caused an outcry over a “refugee crisis”. Here we tell you about the (fragile) foundations and the (dramatic) impacts of this project. Which must be changed, urgently.

    –---

    Ready, Set, Go

    Imagine a board game, Risk style. The board is a huge geographical map, which descends south from Italy, including the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa and almost reaching the equator, in Cameroon, South Sudan, Rwanda. Places we know little about and read rarely about.

    Each player distributes activity cards and objects between countries and along borders. In Ethiopia there is a camera crew shooting TV series called ‘Miraj’ [mirage], which recounts the misadventures of naive youth who rely on shady characters to reach Europe. There is military equipment, distributed almost everywhere: off-road vehicles for the Tunisian border police, ambulances and tank trucks for the army in Niger, patrol boats for Libya, surveillance drones taking off from Sicily.

    There is technology: satellite systems on ships in the Mediterranean, software for recording fingerprints in Egypt, laptops for the Nigerian police. And still: coming and going of flights between Libya and Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia. Maritime coordination centers, police posts in the middle of the Sahara, job orientation offices in Tunisia or Ethiopia, clinics in Uganda, facilities for minors in Eritrea, and refugee camps in Sudan.

    Hold your breath for a moment longer, because we still haven’t mentioned the training courses. And there are many: to produce yogurt in Ivory Coast, open a farm in Senegal or a beauty salon in Nigeria, to learn about the rights of refugees, or how to use a radar station.

    Crazed pawns, overlapping cards and unclear rules. Except for one: from these African countries, more than 25 of them, not one person should make it to Italy. There is only one exception allowed: leaving with a visa. Embassy officials, however, have precise instructions: anyone who doesn’t have something to return to should not be accepted. Relationships, family, and friends don’t count, but only incomes, properties, businesses, and titles do.

    For a young professional, a worker, a student, an activist, anyone looking for safety, future and adventure beyond the borders of the continent, for people like me writing and perhaps like you reading, the only allies become the facilitators, those who Europe calls traffickers and who, from friends, can turn into worst enemies.

    We called it The Big Wall. It could be one of those strategy games that keeps going throughout the night, for fans of geopolitics, conflicts, finance. But this is real life, and it’s the result of years of investments, experiments, documents and meetings. At first disorderly, sporadic, then systematized and increased since 2015, when United Nations agencies, echoed by the international media, sounded an alarm: there is a migrant crisis happening and Europe must intervene. Immediately.

    Italy was at the forefront, and all those agreements, projects, and programs from previous years suddenly converged and multiplied, becoming bricks of a wall that, from an increasingly militarized Mediterranean, moved south, to the travelers’ countries of origin.

    The basic idea, which bounced around chancelleries and European institutions, was to use multiple tools: development cooperation, support for security forces, on-site protection of refugees, repatriation, information campaigns on the risks of irregular migration. This, in the language of Brussels, was a “comprehensive approach”.

    We talked to some of the protagonists of this story — those who built the wall, who tried to jump it, and who would like to demolish it — and we looked through thousands of pages of reports, minutes, resolutions, decrees, calls for tenders, contracts, newspaper articles, research, to understand how much money Italy has spent, where, and what impacts it has had. Months of work to discover not only that this wall has dramatic consequences, but that the European – and Italian – approach to international migration stems from erroneous premises, from an emergency stance that has disastrous results for everyone, including European citizens.
    Libya: the tip of the iceberg

    It was the start of the 2017/2018 academic year and Omer Shatz, professor of international law, offered his Sciences Po students the opportunity to work alongside him on the preparation of a dossier. For the students of the faculty, this was nothing new. In the classrooms of the austere building on the Rive Gauche of Paris, which European and African heads of state have passed though, not least Emmanuel Macron, it’s normal to work on real life materials: peace agreements in Colombia, trials against dictators and foreign fighters. Those who walk on those marble floors already know that they will be able to speak with confidence in circles that matter, in politics as well as diplomacy.

    Shatz, who as a criminal lawyer in Israel is familiar with abuses and rights violations, launched his students a new challenge: to bring Europe to the International Criminal Court for the first time. “Since it was created, the court has only condemned African citizens – dictators, militia leaders – but showing European responsibility was urgent,” he explains.

    One year after first proposing the plan, Shatz sent an envelope to the Court’s headquarters, in the Dutch town of The Hague. With his colleague Juan Branco and eight of his students he recounted, in 245 pages, cases of “widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population”, linked to “crimes against humanity consciously committed by European actors, in the central Mediterranean and in Libya, in line with Italian and European Union policies”.

    The civilian population to which they refer comprises migrants and refugees, swallowed by the waves or intercepted in the central Mediterranean and brought back to shore by Libyan assets, to be placed in a seemingly endless cycle of detention. Among them are the 13.000 dead recorded since 2015, in the stretch of sea between North Africa and Italy, out of 523.000 people who survived the crossing, but also the many African and Asian citizens, who are rarely counted, who were tortured in Libya and died in any of the dozens of detention centers for foreigners, often run by militias.

    “At first we thought that the EU and Italy were outsourcing dirty work to Libya to block people, which in jargon is called ‘aiding and abetting’ in the commission of a crime, then we realized that the Europeans were actually the conductors of these operations, while the Libyans performed”, says Shatz, who, at the end of 2020, was preparing a second document for the International Criminal Court to include more names, those of the “anonymous officials of the European and Italian bureaucracy who participated in this criminal enterprise”, which was centered around the “reinvention of the Libyan Coast Guard, conceived by Italian actors”.

    Identifying heads of department, office directors, and institution executives in democratic countries as alleged criminals might seem excessive. For Shatz, however, “this is the first time, after the Nuremberg trials, after Eichmann, that Europe has committed crimes of this magnitude, outside of an armed conflict”. The court, which routinely rejects at least 95 percent of the cases presented, did not do so with Shatz and his students’ case. “Encouraging news, but that does not mean that the start of proceedings is around the corner”, explains the lawyer.

    At the basis of the alleged crimes, he continues, are “regulations, memoranda of understanding, maritime cooperation, detention centers, patrols and drones” created and financed by the European Union and Italy. Here Shatz is speaking about the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Libya to “reduce the flow of illegal migrants”, as the text of the document states. An objective to be achieved through training and support for the two maritime patrol forces of the very fragile Libyan national unity government, by “adapting” the existing detention centers, and supporting local development initiatives.

    Signed in Rome on February 2, 2017 and in force until 2023, the text is grafted onto the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed by Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Gaddafi in 2008, but is tied to a specific budget: that of the so-called Africa Fund, established in 2016 as the “Fund for extraordinary interventions to relaunch dialogue and cooperation with African countries of priority importance for migration routes” and extended in 2020 — as the Migration Fund — to non-African countries too.

    310 million euros were allocated in total between the end of 2016 and November 2020, and 252 of those were disbursed, according to our reconstruction.

    A multiplication of tools and funds that, explains Mario Giro, “was born after the summit between the European Union and African leaders in Malta, in November 2015”. According to the former undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2013, and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs between 2016 and 2018, that summit in Malta “sanctioned the triumph of a European obsession, that of reducing migration from Africa at all costs: in exchange of this containment, there was a willingness to spend, invest”. For Giro, the one in Malta was an “attempt to come together, but not a real partnership”.

    Libya, where more than 90 percent of those attempting to cross the central Mediterranean departed from in those years, was the heart of a project in which Italian funds and interests support and integrate with programs by the European Union and other member states. It was an all-European dialogue, from which powerful Africans — political leaders but also policemen, militiamen, and the traffickers themselves — tried to obtain something: legitimacy, funds, equipment.

    Fragmented and torn apart by a decade-long conflict, Libya was however not alone. In October 2015, just before the handshakes and the usual photographs at the Malta meeting, the European Commission established an Emergency Trust Fund to “address the root causes of migration in Africa”.

    To do so, as Dutch researcher Thomas Spijkerboer will reconstruct years later, the EU executive declared a state of emergency in the 26 African countries that benefit from the Fund, thus justifying the choice to circumvent European competition rules in favor of direct award procedures. However “it’s implausible – Spijkerboeker will go on to argue – that there is a crisis in all 26 African countries where the Trust Fund operates through the duration of the Trust Fund”, now extended until the end of 2021.

    However, the imperative, as an advisor to the Budget Commission of the European Parliament explains, was to act immediately: “not within a few weeks, but days, hours“.

    Faced with a Libya still ineffective at stopping flows to the north, it was in fact necessary to intervene further south, traveling backwards along the routes that converge from dozens of African countries and go towards Tripolitania. And — like dominoes in reverse — raising borders and convincing, or forcing, potential travelers to stop in their countries of origin or in others along the way, before they arrived on the shores of the Mediterranean.

    For the first time since decolonization, human mobility in Africa became the keystone of Italian policies on the continent, so much so that analysts began speaking of migration diplomacy. Factors such as the number of migrants leaving from a given country and the number of border posts or repatriations all became part of the political game, on the same level as profits from oil extraction, promises of investment, arms sales, or trade agreements.

    Comprising projects, funds, and programs, this migration diplomacy comes at a cost. For the period between January 2015 and November 2020, we tracked down 317 funding lines managed by Italy with its own funds and partially co-financed by the European Union. A total of 1.337 billion euros, spent over five years and destined to eight different items of expenditure. Here Libya is in first place, but it is not alone.

    A long story, in short

    For simplicity’s sake, we can say that it all started in the hot summer of 2002, with an almost surrealist lightning war over a barren rock on the edge of the Mediterranean: the Isla de Persejil, the island of parsley. A little island in the Strait of Gibraltar, disputed for decades between Morocco and Spain, which had its ephemeral moment of glory when in July of that year the Moroccan monarchy sent six soldiers, some tents and a flag. Jose-Maria Aznar’s government quickly responded with a reconquista to the sound of fighter-bombers, frigates, and helicopters.

    Peace was signed only a few weeks later and the island went back to being a land of shepherds and military patrols. Which from then on, however, were joint ones.

    “There was talk of combating drug trafficking and illegal fishing, but the reality was different: these were the first anti-immigration operations co-managed by Spanish and Moroccan soldiers”, explains Sebastian Cobarrubias, professor of geography at the University of Zaragoza. The model, he says, was the one of Franco-Spanish counter-terrorism operations in the Basque Country, exported from the Pyrenees to the sea border.

    A process of externalization of Spanish and European migration policy was born following those events in 2002, and culminating years later with the crisis de los cayucos, the pirogue crisis: the arrival of tens of thousands of people – 31,000 in 2006 alone – in the Canary Islands, following extremely dangerous crossings from Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco.

    In close dialogue with the European Commission, which saw the Spanish border as the most porous one of the fragile Schengen area, the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero reacted quickly. “Within a few months, cooperation and repatriation agreements were signed with nine African countries,” says Cobarrubias, who fought for years, with little success, to obtain the texts of the agreements.

    The events of the late 2000s look terribly similar to what Italy will try to implement a decade later with its Mediterranean neighbors, Libya first of all. So much so that in 2016 it was the Spanish Minister of the Interior himself, Jorge Fernández Díaz, who recalled that “the Spanish one is a European management model, reproducible in other contexts”. A vision confirmed by the European Commission officials with whom we spoke.

    At the heart of the Spanish strategy, which over a few short years led to a drastic decrease of arrivals by sea, was the opening of new diplomatic offices in Africa, the launch of local development projects, and above all the support given to the security forces of partner countries.

    Cobarrubias recounts at least four characteristic elements of the Madrid approach: the construction of new patrol forces “such as the Mauritanian Coast Guard, which did not exist and was created by Spain thanks to European funds, with the support of the newly created Frontex agency”; direct and indirect support for detention centers, such as the infamous ‘Guantanamito’, or little Guantanamo, denounced by civil society organizations in Mauritania; the real-time collection of border data and information, carried out by the SIVE satellite system, a prototype of Eurosur, an incredibly expensive intelligence center on the EU’s external borders launched in 2013, based on drones, satellites, airplanes, and sensors; and finally, the strategy of working backwards along migration routes, to seal borders, from the sea to the Sahara desert, and investing locally with development and governance programs, which Spain did during the two phases of the so-called Plan Africa, between 2006 and 2012.

    Replace “Spain” with “Italy”, and “Mauritania” with “Libya”, and you’ll have an idea of what happened years later, in an attempt to seal another European border.

    The main legacy of the Spanish model, according to the Italian sociologist Lorenzo Gabrielli, however, is the negative conditionality, which is the fact of conditioning the disbursement of these loans – for security forces, ministries, trade agreements – at the level of the African partners’ cooperation in the management of migration, constantly threatening to reduce investments if there are not enough repatriations being carried out, or if controls and pushbacks fail. An idea that is reminiscent both of the enlargement process of the European Union, with all the access restrictions placed on candidate countries, and of the Schengen Treaty, the attempt to break down internal European borders, which, as a consequence, created the need to protect a new common border, the external one.
    La externalización europea del control migratorio: ¿La acción española como modelo? Read more

    At the end of 2015, when almost 150,000 people had reached the Italian coast and over 850,000 had crossed Turkey and the Balkans to enter the European Union, the story of the maritime migration to Spain had almost faded from memory.

    But something remained of it: a management model. Based, once again, on an idea of crisis.

    “We tried to apply it to post-Gaddafi Libya – explains Stefano Manservisi, who over the past decade has chaired two key departments for migration policies in the EU Commission, Home Affairs and Development Cooperation – but in 2013 we soon realized that things had blown up, that that there was no government to talk to: the whole strategy had to be reformulated”.

    Going backwards, through routes and processes

    The six-month presidency of the European Council, in 2014, was the perfect opportunity for Italy.

    In November of that year, Matteo Renzi’s government hosted a conference in Rome to launch the Khartoum Process, the brand new initiative for the migration route between the EU and the Horn of Africa, modeled on the Rabat Process, born in 2006, at the apex of the crisis de los cayucos, after pressure from Spain. It’s a regional cooperation platform between EU countries and nine African countries, based on the exchange of information and coordination between governments, to manage migration.
    Il processo di Khartoum: l’Italia e l’Europa contro le migrazioni Read more

    Warning: if you start to find terms such as ‘process’ and ‘coordination platform’ nebulous, don’t worry. The backbone of European policies is made of these structures: meetings, committees, negotiating tables with unattractive names, whose roles elude most of us. It’s a tendency towards the multiplication of dialogue and decision spaces, that the migration policies of recent years have, if possible, accentuated, in the name of flexibility, of being ready for any eventuality. Of continuous crisis.

    Let’s go back to that inter-ministerial meeting in Rome that gave life to the Khartoum Process and in which Libya, where the civil war had resumed violently a few months earlier, was not present.

    Italy thus began looking beyond Libya, to the so-called countries of origin and transit. Such as Ethiopia, a historic beneficiary of Italian development cooperation, and Sudan. Indeed, both nations host refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, two of the main countries of origin of those who cross the central Mediterranean between 2013 and 2015. Improving their living conditions was urgent, to prevent them from traveling again, from dreaming of Europe. In Niger, on the other hand, which is an access corridor to Libya for those traveling from countries such as Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, and Mali, Italy co-financed a study for a new law against migrant smuggling, then adopted in 2015, which became the cornerstone of a radical attempt to reduce movement across the Sahara desert, which you will read about later.

    A year later, with the Malta summit and the birth of the EU Trust Fund for Africa, Italy was therefore ready to act. With a 123 million euro contribution, allocated from 2017 through the Africa Fund and the Migration Fund, Italy became the second donor country, and one of the most active in trying to manage those over 4 billion euros allocated for five years. [If you are curious about the financing mechanisms of the Trust Fund, read here: https://thebigwall.org/en/trust-fund/].

    Through the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), born in 2014 as an operational branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy immediately made itself available to manage European Fund projects, and one idea seemed to be the driving one: using classic development programs, but implemented in record time, to offer on-site alternatives to young people eager to leave, while improving access to basic services.

    Local development, therefore, became the intervention to address the so-called root causes of migration. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newborn AICS, it seemed a winning approach. Unsurprisingly, the first project approved through the Trust Fund for Africa was managed by the Italian agency in Ethiopia.

    “Stemming irregular migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia” received 19.8 million euros in funding, a rare sum for local development interventions. The goal was to create job opportunities and open career guidance centers for young people in four Ethiopian regions. Or at least that’s how it seemed. In the first place, among the objectives listed in the project sheet, there is in fact another one: to reduce irregular migration.

    In the logical matrix of the project, which insiders know is the presentation – through data, indicators and figures – of the expected results, there is no indicator that appears next to the “reduction of irregular migration” objective. There is no way, it’s implicitly admitted, to verify that that goal has been achieved. That the young person trained to start a micro-enterprise in the Wollo area, for example, is one less migrant.

    Bizarre, not to mention wrong. But indicative of the problems of an approach of which, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains to us, “Italy had made itself the spokesperson in Europe”.

    “The mantra was that more development would stop migration, and at a certain point that worked for everyone: for AICS, which justified its funds in the face of political landscape that was scared by the issue of landings, and for many NGOs, which immediately understood that migrations were the parsley to be sprinkled on the funding requests that were presented”, explains the official, who, like so many in this story, prefers to remain anonymous.

    This idea of the root causes was reproduced, as in an echo chamber, “without programmatic documents, without guidelines, but on the wave of a vague idea of political consensus around the goal of containing migration”, he adds. This makes it almost impossible to talk about, so much so that a proposal for new guidelines on immigration and development, drawn up during 2020 by AICS, was set aside for months.

    Indeed, if someone were to say, as evidenced by scholars such as Michael Clemens, that development can also increase migration, and that migration itself is a source of development, the whole ‘root causes’ idea would collapse and the already tight cooperation budgets would risk being cut, in the name of the same absolute imperative as always: reducing arrivals to Italy and Europe.

    Maintaining a vague, costly and unverifiable approach is equally damaging.

    Bram Frouws, director of the Mixed Migration Center, a think-tank that studies international mobility, points out, for example, how the ‘root cause’ approach arises from a vision of migration as a problem to be eradicated rather than managed, and that paradoxically, the definition of these deep causes always remains superficial. In fact, there is never talk of how international fishing agreements damage local communities, nor of land grabbing by speculators, major construction work, or corruption and arms sales. There is only talk of generic economic vulnerability, of a country’s lack of stability. An almost abstract phenomenon, in which European actors are exempt from any responsibility.

    There is another problem: in the name of the fight against irregular migration, interventions have shifted from poorer and truly vulnerable countries and populations to regions with ‘high migratory rates’, a term repeated in dozens of project descriptions funded over the past few years, distorting one of the cardinal principles of development aid, codified in regulations and agreements: that of responding to the most urgent needs of a given population, and of not imposing external priorities, even more so if it is countries considered richer are the ones doing it.

    The Nigerien experiment

    While Ethiopia and Sudan absorb the most substantial share of funds destined to tackle the root causes of migration — respectively 47 and 32 million euros out of a total expenditure of 195 million euros — Niger, which for years has been contending for the podium of least developed country on the planet with Central African Republic according to the United Nations Human Development Index — benefits from just over 10 million euros.

    Here in fact it’s more urgent, for Italy and the EU, to intervene on border control rather than root causes, to stop the flow of people that cross the country until they arrive in Agadez, to then disappear in the Sahara and emerge, days later — if all goes well — in southern Libya. In 2016, the International Organization for Migration counted nearly 300,000 people passing through a single checkpoint along the road to Libya. The figure bounced between the offices of the European Commission, and from there to the Farnesina, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: faced with an uncontrollable Libya, intervening in Niger became a priority.

    Italy did it in great style, even before opening an embassy in the country, in February 2017: with a contribution to the state budget of Niger of 50 million euros, part of the Africa Fund, included as part of a maxi-program managed by the EU in the country and paid out in several installments.

    While the project documents list a number of conditions for the continuation of the funding, including increased monitoring along the routes to Libya and the adoption of regulations and strategies for border control, some local and European officials with whom we have spoken think that the assessments were made with one eye closed: the important thing was in fact to provide those funds to be spent in a country that for Italy, until then, had been synonymous only with tourism in the Sahara dunes and development in rural areas.

    Having become a priority in the New Partnership Framework on Migration, yet another EU operational program, launched in 2016, Niger seemed thus exempt from controls on the management of funds to which beneficiaries of European funds are normally subject to.

    “Our control mechanisms, the Court of Auditors, the Parliament and the anti-corruption Authority, do not work, and yet the European partners have injected millions of euros into state coffers, without imposing transparency mechanisms”, reports then Ali Idrissa Nani , president of the Réseau des Organizations pour la Transparence et l’Analyse du Budget (ROTAB), a network of associations that seeks to monitor state spending in Niger.

    “It leaves me embittered, but for some years we we’ve had the impression that civil liberties, human rights, and participation are no longer a European priority“, continues Nani, who —- at the end of 2020 — has just filed a complaint with the Court of Niamey, to ask the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the possible disappearance of at least 120 million euros in funds from the Ministry of Defense, a Pandora’s box uncovered by local and international journalists.

    For Nani, who like other Nigerien activists spent most of 2018 in prison for encouraging demonstrations against high living costs, this explosion of European and Italian cooperation didn’t do the country any good, and in fact favoured authoritarian tendencies, and limited even more the independence of the judiciary.

    For their part, the Nigerien rulers have more than others seized the opportunity offered by European donors to obtain legitimacy and support. Right after the Valletta summit, they were the first to present an action plan to reduce migration to Libya, which they abruptly implemented in mid-2016, applying the anti-trafficking law whose preliminary study was financed by Italy, with the aim of emptying the city of #Agadez of migrants from other countries.

    The transport of people to the Libyan border, an activity that until that point happened in the light of day and was sanctioned at least informally by the local authorities, thus became illegal from one day to the next. Hundreds of drivers, intermediaries, and facilitators were arrested, and an entire economy crashed

    But did the movement of people really decrease? Almost impossible to tell. The only data available are those of the International Organization for Migration, which continues to record the number of transits at certain police posts. But drivers and foreign travelers no longer pass through them, fearing they will be arrested or stopped. Routes and journeys, as always happens, are remodeled, only to reappear elsewhere. Over the border with Chad, or in Algeria, or in a risky zigzagging of small tracks, to avoid patrols.

    For Hamidou Manou Nabara, a Nigerien sociologist and researcher, the problems with this type of cooperation are manifold.

    On the one hand, it restricted the free movement guaranteed within the Economic Community of West African States, a sort of ‘Schengen area’ between 15 countries in the region, making half of Niger, from Agadez to the north, a no-go areas for foreign citizens, even though they still had the right to move throughout the national territory.

    Finally, those traveling north were made even more vulnerable. “The control of borders and migratory movements was justified on humanitarian grounds, to contrast human trafficking, but in reality very few victims of trafficking were ever identified: the center of this cooperation is repression”, explains Nabara.

    Increasing controls, through military and police operations, actually exposes travelers to greater violations of human rights, both by state agents and passeurs, making the Sahara crossings longer and riskier.

    The fight against human trafficking, a slogan repeated by European and African leaders and a central expenditure item of the Italian intervention between Africa and the Mediterranean — 142 million euros in five years —- actually risks having the opposite effect. Because a trafiicker’s bread and butter, in addition to people’s desire to travel, is closed borders and denied visas.

    A reinvented frontier

    Galvanized by the activism of the European Commission after the launch of the Trust Fund but under pressure internally, faced with a discourse on migration that seemed to invade every public space — from the front pages of newspapers to television talk-shows — and unable to agree on how to manage migration within the Schengen area, European rulers thus found an agreement outside the continent: to add more bricks to that wall that must reduce movements through the Mediterranean.

    Between 2015 and 2016, Italian, Dutch, German, French and European Union ministers, presidents and senior officials travel relentlessly between countries considered priorities for migration, and increasingly for security, and invite their colleagues to the European capitals. A coming and going of flights to Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tunisia, Senegal, Chad, Guinea, to make agreements, negotiate.

    “Niamey had become a crossroads for European diplomats”, remembers Ali Idrissa Nani, “but few understood the reasons”.

    However, unlike the border with Turkey, where the agreement signed with the EU at the beginning of 2016 in no time reduced the arrival of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi citizens in Greece, the continent’s other ‘hot’ border, promises of speed and effectiveness by the Trust Fund for Africa did not seem to materialize. Departures from Libya, in particular, remained constant. And in the meantime, in the upcoming election in a divided Italy, the issue of migration seemed to be tipping the balance, capable of shifting votes and alliances.

    It is at that point that the Italian Ministry of the Interior, newly led by Marco Minniti, put its foot on the accelerator. The Viminale, the Italian Ministry of the Interior, became the orchestrator of a new intervention plan, refined between Rome and Brussels, with German support, which went back to focusing everything on Libya and on that stretch of sea that separates it from Italy.

    “In those months the phones were hot, everyone was looking for Marco“, says an official of the Interior Ministry, who admits that “the Ministry of the Interior had snatched the Libyan dossier from Foreign Affairs, but only because up until then the Foreign Ministry hadn’t obtained anything” .

    Minniti’s first move was the signing of the new Memorandum with Libya, which gave way to a tripartite plan.

    At the top of the agenda was the creation of a maritime interception device for boats departing from the Libyan coast, through the reconstruction of the Coast Guard and the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS), the two patrol forces belonging to the Ministry of Defense and that of the Interior, and the establishment of a rescue coordination center, prerequisites for Libya to declare to the International Maritime Organization that it had a Search and Rescue Area, so that the Italian Coast Guard could ask Libyan colleagues to intervene if there were boats in trouble.

    Accompanying this work in Libya is a jungle of Italian and EU missions, surveillance systems and military operations — from the European Frontex, Eunavfor Med and Eubam Libya, to the Italian military mission “Safe Waters” — equipped with drones, planes, patrol boats, whose task is to monitor the Libyan Sea, which is increasingly emptied by the European humanitarian ships that started operating in 2014 (whose maneuvering spaces are in the meantime reduced to the bone due to various strategies) to support Libyan interception operations.

    The second point of the ‘Minniti agenda’ was to progressively empty Libya of migrants and refugees, so that an escape by sea would become increasingly difficult. Between 2017 and 2020, the Libyan assets, which are in large part composed of patrol boats donated by Italy, intercepted and returned to shore about 56,000 people according to data released by UN agencies. The Italian-European plan envisages two solutions: for economic migrants, the return to the country of origin; for refugees, the possibility of obtaining protection.

    There is one part of this plan that worked better, at least in terms of European wishes: repatriation, presented as ‘assisted voluntary return’. This vision was propelled by images, released in October 2017 by CNN as part of a report on the abuse of foreigners in Libya, of what appears to be a slave auction. The images reopened the unhealed wounds of the slave trade through Atlantic and Sahara, and helped the creation of a Joint Initiative between the International Organization for Migration, the European Union, and the African Union, aimed at returning and reintegrating people in the countries of origin.

    Part of the Italian funding for IOM was injected into this complex system of repatriation by air, from Tripoli to more than 20 countries, which has contributed to the repatriation of 87,000 people over three years. 33,000 from Libya, and 37,000 from Niger.

    A similar program for refugees, which envisages transit through other African countries (Niger and Rwanda gave their availability) and from there resettlement to Europe or North America, recorded much lower numbers: 3,300 evacuations between the end of 2017 and the end of 2020. For the 47,000 people registered as refugees in Libya, leaving the country without returning to their home country, to the starting point, is almost impossible.

    Finally, there is a third, lesser-known point of the Italian plan: even in Libya, Italy wants to intervene on the root causes of migration, or rather on the economies linked to the transit and smuggling of migrants. The scheme is simple: support basic services and local authorities in migrant transit areas, in exchange for this transit being controlled and reduced. The transit of people brings with it the circulation of currency, a more valuable asset than usual in a country at war, and this above all in the south of Libya, in the immense Saharan region of Fezzan, the gateway to the country, bordering Algeria, Niger, and Chad and almost inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.

    A game in which intelligence plays central role (as also revealed by the journalist Lorenzo D’Agostino on Foreign Policy), as indeed it did in another negotiation and exchange of money: those 5 million euros destined — according to various journalistic reconstructions — to a Sabratha militia, the Anas Al-Dabbashi Brigade, to stop departures from the coastal city.

    A year later, its leader, Ahmed Al-Dabbashi, will be sanctioned by the UN Security Council, as leader for criminal activities related to human trafficking.

    The one built in record time by the ministry led by Marco Minniti is therefore a complicated and expensive puzzle. To finance it, there are above all the Trust Fund for Africa of the EU, and the Italian Africa Fund, initially headed only by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unpacked among several ministries for the occasion, but also the Internal Security Fund of the EU, which funds military equipment for all Italian security forces, as well as funds and activities from the Ministry of Defense.

    A significant part of those 666 million euros dedicated to border control, but also of funds to support governance and fight traffickers, converges and enters this plan: a machine that was built too quickly, among whose wheels human rights and Libya’s peace process are sacrificed.

    “We were looking for an immediate result and we lost sight of the big picture, sacrificing peace on the altar of the fight against migration, when Libya was in pieces, in the hands of militias who were holding us hostage”. This is how former Deputy Minister Mario Giro describes the troubled handling of the Libyan dossier.

    For Marwa Mohamed, a Libyan activist, all these funds and interventions were “provided without any real clause of respect for human rights, and have fragmented the country even more, because they were intercepted by the militias, which are the same ones that manage both the smuggling of migrants that detention centers, such as that of Abd el-Rahman al-Milad, known as ‘al-Bija’ ”.

    Projects aimed at Libyan municipalities, included in the interventions on the root causes of migration — such as the whole detention system, invigorated by the introduction of people intercepted at sea (and ‘improved’ through millions of euros of Italian funds) — offer legitimacy, when they do not finance it directly, to the ramified and violent system of local powers that the German political scientist Wolfram Lacher defines as the ‘Tripoli militia cartel‘. [for more details on the many Italian funds in Libya, read here].
    Fondi italiani in Libia Read more

    “Bringing migrants back to shore, perpetuating a detention system, does not only mean subjecting people to new abuses, but also enriching the militias, fueling the conflict”, continues Mohamed, who is now based in London, where she is a spokesman of the Libyan Lawyers for Justice organization.

    The last few years of Italian cooperation, she argues, have been “a sequence of lost opportunities”. And to those who tell you — Italian and European officials especially — that reforming justice, putting an end to that absolute impunity that strengthens the militias, is too difficult, Mohamed replies without hesitation: “to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, the authorities contacted the militias close to the Tripoli government one by one and in the meantime built a non-existent structure from scratch, the Libyan Coast Guard: and you’re telling me that you can’t put the judicial system back on its feet and protect refugees? ”

    The only thing that mattered, however, in that summer of 2017, were the numbers. Which, for the first time since 2013, were falling again, and quickly. In the month of August there were 80 percent fewer landings than the year before. And so it would be for the following months and years.

    “Since then, we have continued to allocate, renewing programs and projects, without asking for any guarantee in exchange for the treatment of migrants”, explains Matteo De Bellis, researcher at Amnesty International, remembering that the Italian promise to modify the Memorandum of Understanding, introducing clauses of protection, has been on stop since the controversial renewal of the document, in February 2020.

    Repatriations, evacuations, promises

    We are 1500 kilometers of road, and sand, south of Tripoli. Here Salah* spends his days escaping a merciless sun. The last three years of the life of the thirty-year-old Sudanese have not offered much else and now, like many fellow sufferers, he does not hide his fatigue.

    We are in a camp 15 kilometers from Agadez, in Niger, in the middle of the Sahara desert, where Salah lives with a thousand people, mostly Sudanese from the Darfur region, the epicenter of one of the most dramatic and lethal conflicts of recent decades.

    Like almost all the inhabitants of this temporary Saharan settlement, managed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and — at the end of 2020 — undergoing rehabilitation also thanks to Italian funds, he passed through Libya and since 2017, after three years of interceptions at sea and detention, he’s been desperately searching for a way out, for a future.

    Salah fled Darfur in 2016, after receiving threats from pro-government armed militias, and reached Tripoli after a series of vicissitudes and violence. In late spring 2017, he sailed from nearby Zawiya with 115 other people. They were intercepted, brought back to shore and imprisoned in a detention center, formally headed by the government but in fact controlled by the Al-Nasr militia, linked to the trafficker Al-Bija.

    “They beat us everywhere, for days, raped some women in front of us, and asked everyone to call families to get money sent,” Salah recalls. Months later, after paying some money and escaping, he crossed the Sahara again, up to Agadez. UNHCR had just opened a facility and from there, as rumour had it, you could ask to be resettled to Europe.

    Faced with sealed maritime borders, and after experiencing torture and abuse, that faint hope set in motion almost two thousand people, who, hoping to reach Italy, found themselves on the edges of the Sahara, along what many, by virtue of investments and negotiations, had started to call the ‘new European frontier’.

    Three years later, a little over a thousand people remain of that initial group. Only a few dozen of them had access to resettlement, while many returned to Libya, and to all of its abuses.

    Something similar is also happening in Tunisia, where since 2017, the number of migrants and refugees entering the country has increased. They are fleeing by land and sometimes by sea from Libya, going to crowd UN structures. Then, faced with a lack of real prospects, they return to Libya.

    For Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Federation for Economic and Social Rights, “in Tunisia European partners have financed a non-reception: overcrowded centers in unworthy conditions, which have become recruitment areas for traffickers, because in fact there are two options offered there: go home or try to get back to the sea “.

    In short, even the interventions for the protection of migrants and refugees must be read in a broader context, of a contraction of mobility and human rights. “The refugee management itself has submitted to the goal of containment, which is the true original sin of the Italian and European strategy,” admits a UNHCR official.

    This dogma of containment, at any cost, affects everyone — people who travel, humanitarian actors, civil society, local governments — by distorting priorities, diverting funds, and undermining future relationships and prospects. The same ones that European officials call partnerships and which in the case of Africa, as reiterated in 2020 by President Ursula Von Der Leyen, should be “between equals”.

    Let’s take another example: the Egypt of President Abdel Fetah Al-Sisi. Since 2016, it has been increasingly isolated on the international level, also due to violent internal repression, which Italy knows something about. Among the thousands of people who have been disappeared or killed in recent years, is researcher Giulio Regeni, whose body was thrown on the side of a road north of Cairo in February 2016.

    Around the time of the murder, in which the complicity and cover-ups by the Egyptian security forces were immediately evident, the Italian Ministry of the Interior restarted its dialogue with the country. “It’s absurd, but Italy started to support Egypt in negotiations with the European Union,” explains lawyer Muhammed Al-Kashef, a member of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Right and now a refugee in Germany.

    By inserting itself on an already existing cooperation project that saw italy, for example, finance the use of fingerprint-recording software used by the Egyptian police, the Italian Ministry of the Interior was able to create a police academy in Cairo, inaugurated in 2018 with European funds, to train the border guards of over 20 African countries. Italy also backed Egyptian requests within the Khartoum Process and, on a different front, sells weapons and conducts joint naval exercises.

    “Rome could have played a role in Egypt, supporting the democratic process after the 2011 revolution, but it preferred to fall into the migration trap, fearing a wave of migration that would never happen,” says Al-Kashef.

    With one result: “they have helped transform Egypt into a country that kills dreams, and often dreamers too, and from which all young people today want to escape”. Much more so than in 2015 or that hopeful 2011.

    Cracks in the wall, and how to widen them

    If you have read this far, following personal stories and routes of people and funds, you will have understood one thing, above all: that the beating heart of this strategy, set up by Italy with the participation of the European Union and vice versa, is the reduction of migrations across the Mediterranean. The wall, in fact.

    Now try to add other European countries to this picture. Since 2015 many have fully adopted — or returned to — this process of ‘externalization’ of migration policies. Spain, where the Canary Islands route reopened in 2019, demonstrating the fragility of the model you read about above; France, with its strategic network in the former colonies, the so-called Françafrique. And then Germany, Belgium, Holland, United Kingdom, Austria.

    Complicated, isn’t it? This great wall’s bricks and builders keep multiplying. Even more strategies, meetings, committees, funds and documents. And often, the same lack of transparency, which makes reconstructing these loans – understanding which cement, sand, and lime mixture was used, i.e. who really benefited from the expense, what equipment was provided, how the results were monitored – a long process, when it’s not impossible.

    The Pact on Migration and Asylum of the European Union, presented in September 2020, seems to confirm this: cooperation with third countries and relaunching repatriations are at its core.

    Even the European Union budget for the seven-year period 2021-2027, approved in December 2020, continues to focus on this expenditure, for example by earmarking for migration projects 10 percent of the new Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, equipped with 70 billion euros, but also diverting a large part of the Immigration and Asylum Fund (8.7 billion) towards support for repatriation, and foreseeing 12.1 billion euros for border control.

    While now, with the new US presidency, some have called into question the future of the wall on the border with Mexico, perhaps the most famous of the anti-migrant barriers in the world, the wall built in the Mediterranean and further south, up to the equator, has seemingly never been so strong.

    But economists, sociologists, human rights defenders, analysts and travelers all demonstrate the problems with this model. “It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it,” says David Kipp, a researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs, a government-funded think-tank.

    For Kipp, however, we must begin to deflate this migration bubble, and go back to addressing migration as a human phenomenon, to be understood and managed. “I dream of the moment when this issue will be normalized, and will become something boring,” he admits timidly.

    To do this, cracks must be opened in the wall and in a model that seems solid but really isn’t, that has undesirable effects, violates human rights, and isolates Europe and Italy.

    Anna Knoll, researcher at the European Center for Development Policy Management, explains for example that European policies have tried to limit movements even within Africa, while the future of the continent is the freedom of movement of goods and people, and “for Europe, it is an excellent time to support this, also given the pressure from other international players, China first of all”.

    For Sabelo Mbokazi, who heads the Labor and Migration department of the Social Affairs Commission of the African Union (AU), there is one issue on which the two continental blocs have divergent positions: legal entry channels. “For the EU, they are something residual, we have a much broader vision,” he explains. And this will be one of the themes of the next EU-AU summit, which was postponed several times in 2020.

    It’s a completely flawed approach, and there are no quick fixes to change it
    David Kipp - researcher at the German Institute for International Affairs

    Indeed, the issue of legal access channels to the Italian and European territory is one of the most important, and so far almost imperceptible, cracks in this Big Wall. In the last five years, Italy has spent just 15 million euros on it, 1.1 percent of the total expenditure dedicated to external dimensions of migration.

    The European Union hasn’t done any better. “Legal migration, which was one of the pillars of the strategy born in Valletta in 2015, has remained a dead letter, but if we limit ourselves to closing the borders, we will not go far”, says Stefano Manservisi, who as a senior official of the EU Commission worked on all the migration dossiers during those years.

    Yet we all know that a trafficker’s worst enemy are passport stamps, visas, and airline tickets.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=HmR96ySikkY

    Helen Dempster, who’s an economist at the Center for Global Development, spends her days studying how to do this: how to open legal channels of entry, and how to get states to think about it. And there is an effective example: we must not end up like Japan.

    “For decades, Japan has had very restrictive migration policies, it hasn’t allowed anyone in”, explains Dempster, “but in recent years it has realized that, with its aging population, it soon won’t have enough people to do basic jobs, pay taxes, and finance pensions”. And so, in April 2019, the Asian country began accepting work visa applications, hoping to attract 500,000 foreign workers.

    In Europe, however, “the hysteria surrounding migration in 2015 and 2016 stopped all debate“. Slowly, things are starting to move again. On the other hand, several European states, Italy and Germany especially, have one thing in common with Japan: an increasingly aging population.

    “All European labor ministries know that they must act quickly, but there are two preconceptions: that it is difficult to develop adequate projects, and that public opinion is against it.” For Dempster, who helped design an access program to the Belgian IT sector for Moroccan workers, these are false problems. “If we want to look at it from the point of view of the security of the receiving countries, bringing a person with a passport allows us to have a lot more information about who they are, which we do not have if we force them to arrive by sea”, she explains.

    Let’s look at some figures to make it easier: in 2007, Italy made 340,000 entry visas available, half of them seasonal, for non-EU workers, as part of the Flows Decree, Italy’s main legal entry channel adopted annually by the government. Few people cried “invasion” back then. Ten years later, in 2017, those 119,000 people who reached Italy through the Mediterranean seemed a disproportionate number. In the same year, the quotas of the Flow decree were just 30,000.

    Perhaps these numbers aren’t comparable, and building legal entry programs is certainly long, expensive, and apparently impractical, if we think of the economic and social effects of the coronavirus pandemic in which we are immersed. For Dempster, however, “it is important to be ready, to launch pilot programs, to create infrastructures and relationships”. So that we don’t end up like Japan, “which has urgently launched an access program for workers, without really knowing how to manage them”.

    The Spanish case, as already mentioned, shows how a model born twenty years ago, and then adopted along all the borders between Europe and Africa, does not really work.

    As international mobility declined, aided by the pandemic, at least 41,000 people landed in Spain in 2020, almost all of them in the Canary Islands. Numbers that take us back to 2006 and remind us how, after all, this ‘outsourcing’ offers costly and ineffective solutions.

    It’s reminiscent of so-called planned obsolescence, the production model for which a technological object isn’t built to last, inducing the consumer to replace it after a few years. But continually renewing and re-financing these walls can be convenient for multinational security companies, shipyards, political speculators, authoritarian regimes, and international traffickers. Certainly not for citizens, who — from the Italian and European institutions — would expect better products. May they think of what the world will be like in 10, 30, 50 years, and avoid trampling human rights and canceling democratic processes in the name of a goal that — history seems to teach — is short-lived. The ideas are not lacking. [At this link you’ll find the recommendations developed by ActionAid: https://thebigwall.org/en/recommendations/].

    https://thebigwall.org/en
    #Italie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #frontières #business #Afrique #budget #Afrique_du_Nord #Libye #chiffres #Niger #Soudan #Ethiopie #Sénégal #root_causes #causes_profondes #contrôles_frontaliers #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #propagande #campagne #dissuasion

    –—

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et plus précisément :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765328

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_

  • #Intersectionnalité : une #introduction (par #Eric_Fassin)

    Aujourd’hui, dans l’espace médiatico-politique, on attaque beaucoup l’intersectionnalité. Une fiche de poste a même été dépubliée sur le site du Ministère pour purger toute référence intersectionnelle. Dans le Manuel Indocile de Sciences Sociales (Copernic / La Découverte, 2019), avec Mara Viveros, nous avons publié une introduction à ce champ d’études. Pour ne pas laisser raconter n’importe quoi.

    « Les féministes intersectionnelles, en rupture avec l’universalisme, revendiquent de ne pas se limiter à la lutte contre le sexisme. »

    Marianne, « L’offensive des obsédés de la race, du sexe, du genre, de l’identité », 12 au 18 avril 2019

    Une médiatisation ambiguë

    En France, l’intersectionnalité vient d’entrer dans les magazines. Dans Le Point, L’Obs ou Marianne, on rencontre non seulement l’idée, mais aussi le mot, et même des références savantes. Les lesbiennes noires auraient-elles pris le pouvoir, jusque dans les rédactions ? En réalité si les médias en parlent, c’est surtout pour dénoncer la montée en puissance, dans l’université et plus largement dans la société, d’un féminisme dit « intersectionnel », accusé d’importer le « communautarisme à l’américaine ». On assiste en effet au recyclage des articles du début des années 1990 contre le « politiquement correct » : « On ne peut plus rien dire ! » C’est le monde à l’envers, paraît-il : l’homme blanc hétérosexuel subirait désormais la « tyrannie des minorités ».

    Faut-il le préciser ? Ce fantasme victimaire est démenti par l’expérience quotidienne. Pour se « rassurer », il n’y a qu’à regarder qui détient le pouvoir dans les médias et l’université, mais aussi dans l’économie ou la politique : les dominants d’hier ne sont pas les dominés d’aujourd’hui, et l’ordre ancien a encore de beaux jours devant lui. On fera plutôt l’hypothèse que cette réaction parfois virulente est le symptôme d’une inquiétude après la prise de conscience féministe de #MeToo, et les révélations sur le harcèlement sexiste, homophobe et raciste de la « Ligue du Lol » dans le petit monde des médias, et alors que les minorités raciales commencent (enfin) à se faire entendre dans l’espace public.

    Il en va des attaques actuelles contre l’intersectionnalité comme des campagnes contre la (supposée) « théorie du genre » au début des années 2010. La médiatisation assure une forme de publicité à un lexique qui, dès lors, n’est plus confiné à l’univers de la recherche. La polémique a ainsi fait entrevoir les analyses intersectionnelles à un public plus large, qu’articles et émissions se bousculent désormais pour informer… ou le plus souvent mettre en garde. Il n’empêche : même les tribunes indignées qui livrent des noms ou les dossiers scandalisés qui dressent des listes contribuent, à rebours de leurs intentions, à établir des bibliographies et à populariser des programmes universitaires. En retour, le milieu des sciences sociales lui-même, en France après beaucoup d’autres pays, a fini par s’intéresser à l’intersectionnalité – et pas seulement pour s’en inquiéter : ce concept voyageur est une invitation à reconnaître, avec la pluralité des logiques de domination, la complexité du monde social.

    Circulations internationales

    On parle d’intersectionnalité un peu partout dans le monde – non seulement en Amérique du Nord et en Europe, mais aussi en Amérique latine, en Afrique du Sud ou en Inde. Il est vrai que le mot vient des États-Unis : c’est #Kimberlé_Crenshaw qui l’utilise d’abord dans deux articles publiés dans des revues de droit au tournant des années 1990. Toutefois, la chose, c’est-à-dire la prise en compte des dominations multiples, n’a pas attendu le mot. Et il est vrai aussi que cette juriste afro-américaine s’inscrit dans la lignée d’un « #féminisme_noir » états-unien, qui dans les années 1980 met l’accent sur les aveuglements croisés du mouvement des droits civiques (au #genre) et du mouvement des femmes (à la #race).

    Cependant, ces questions sont parallèlement soulevées, à la frontière entre l’anglais et l’espagnol, par des féministes « #chicanas » (comme #Cherríe_Moraga et #Gloria_Anzaldúa), dans une subculture que nourrit l’immigration mexicaine aux États-Unis ou même, dès les années 1960, au Brésil, au sein du Parti communiste ; des féministes brésiliennes (telles #Thereza_Santos, #Lélia_Gonzalez et #Sueli_Carneiro) développent aussi leurs analyses sur la triade « race-classe-genre ». Bref, la démarche intersectionnelle n’a pas attendu le mot intersectionnalité ; elle n’a pas une origine exclusivement états-unienne ; et nulle n’en a le monopole : ce n’est pas une « marque déposée ». Il faut donc toujours comprendre l’intersectionnalité en fonction des lieux et des moments où elle résonne.

    En #France, c’est au milieu des années 2000 qu’on commence à parler d’intersectionnalité ; et c’est d’abord au sein des #études_de_genre. Pourquoi ? Un premier contexte, c’est la visibilité nouvelle de la « #question_raciale » au sein même de la « #question_sociale », avec les émeutes ou révoltes urbaines de 2005 : l’analyse en termes de classe n’était manifestement plus suffisante ; on commence alors à le comprendre, pour les sciences sociales, se vouloir aveugle à la couleur dans une société qu’elle obsède revient à s’aveugler au #racisme. Un second contexte a joué un rôle plus immédiat encore : 2004, c’est la loi sur les signes religieux à l’école. La question du « #voile_islamique » divise les féministes : la frontière entre « eux » et « nous » passe désormais, en priorité, par « elles ». Autrement dit, la différence de culture (en l’occurrence religieuse) devient une question de genre. L’intersectionnalité permet de parler de ces logiques multiples. Importer le concept revient à le traduire dans un contexte différent : en France, ce n’est plus, comme aux États-Unis, l’invisibilité des #femmes_noires à l’intersection entre féminisme et droits civiques ; c’est plutôt l’hypervisibilité des #femmes_voilées, au croisement entre #antisexisme et #antiracisme.

    Circulations interdisciplinaires

    La traduction d’une langue à une autre, et d’un contexte états-unien au français, fait apparaître une deuxième différence. Kimberlé Crenshaw est juriste ; sa réflexion porte sur les outils du #droit qu’elle utilise pour lutter contre la #discrimination. Or aux États-Unis, le droit identifie des catégories « suspectes » : le sexe et la race. Dans les pratiques sociales, leur utilisation, implicite ou explicite, est soumise à un examen « strict » pour lutter contre la discrimination. Cependant, on passe inévitablement de la catégorie conceptuelle au groupe social. En effet, l’intersectionnalité s’emploie à montrer que, non seulement une femme peut être discriminée en tant que femme, et un Noir en tant que Noir, mais aussi une femme noire en tant que telle. C’est donc seulement pour autant qu’elle est supposée relever d’un groupe sexuel ou racial que le droit peut reconnaître une personne victime d’un traitement discriminatoire en raison de son sexe ou de sa race. Toutefois, dans son principe, cette démarche juridique n’a rien d’identitaire : comme toujours pour les discriminations, le point de départ, c’est le traitement subi. Il serait donc absurde de reprendre ici les clichés français sur le « communautarisme américain » : l’intersectionnalité vise au contraire à lutter contre l’#assignation discriminatoire à un groupe (femmes, Noirs, ou autre).

    En France, la logique est toute différente, dès lors que l’intersectionnalité est d’abord arrivée, via les études de genre, dans le champ des sciences sociales. La conséquence de cette translation disciplinaire, c’est qu’on n’a généralement pas affaire à des groupes. La sociologie s’intéresse davantage à des propriétés, qui peuvent fonctionner comme des variables. Bien sûr, on n’oublie pas la logique antidiscriminatoire pour autant : toutes choses égales par ailleurs (en l’occurrence dans une même classe sociale), on n’a pas le même salaire selon qu’on est blanc ou pas, ou la même retraite si l’on est homme ou femme. Il n’est donc pas ou plus possible de renvoyer toutes les explications à une détermination en dernière instance : toutes les #inégalités ne sont pas solubles dans la classe. C’est évident pour les femmes, qui appartiennent à toutes les classes ; mais on l’oublie parfois pour les personnes dites « non blanches », tant elles sont surreprésentées dans les classes populaires – mais n’est-ce pas justement, pour une part, l’effet de leur origine supposée ? Bien entendu, cela ne veut pas dire, à l’inverse, que la classe serait soluble dans une autre forme de #domination. En réalité, cela signifie simplement que les logiques peuvent se combiner.

    L’intérêt scientifique (et politique) pour l’intersectionnalité est donc le signe d’une exigence de #complexité : il ne suffit pas d’analyser la classe pour en avoir fini avec les logiques de domination. C’est bien pourquoi les féministes n’ont pas attendu le concept d’intersectionnalité, ni sa traduction française, pour critiquer les explications monocausales. En France, par exemple, face au #marxisme, le #féminisme_matérialiste rejette de longue date cette logique, plus politique que scientifique, de l’« ennemi principal » (de classe), qui amène à occulter les autres formes de domination. En 1978, #Danièle_Kergoat interrogeait ainsi la neutralisation qui, effaçant l’inégalité entre les sexes, pose implicitement un signe d’égalité entre « ouvrières » et « ouvriers » : « La #sociologie_du_travail parle toujours des “#ouvriers” ou de la “#classe_ouvrière” sans faire aucune référence au #sexe des acteurs sociaux. Tout se passe comme si la place dans la production était un élément unificateur tel que faire partie de la classe ouvrière renvoyait à une série de comportements et d’attitudes relativement univoques (et cela, il faut le noter, est tout aussi vrai pour les sociologues se réclamant du #marxisme que pour les autres. »

    Or, ce n’est évidemment pas le cas. Contre cette simplification, qui a pour effet d’invisibiliser les ouvrières, la sociologue féministe ne se contente pas d’ajouter une propriété sociale, le sexe, à la classe ; elle montre plus profondément ce qu’elle appelle leur #consubstantialité. On n’est pas d’un côté « ouvrier » et de l’autre « femme » ; être une #ouvrière, ce n’est pas la même chose qu’ouvrier – et c’est aussi différent d’être une bourgeoise. On pourrait dire de même : être une femme blanche ou noire, un garçon arabe ou pas, mais encore un gay de banlieue ou de centre-ville, ce n’est vraiment pas pareil !

    Classe et race

    Dans un essai sur le poids de l’#assignation_raciale dans l’expérience sociale, le philosophe #Cornel_West a raconté combien les taxis à New York refusaient de s’arrêter pour lui : il est noir. Son costume trois-pièces n’y fait rien (ni la couleur du chauffeur, d’ailleurs) : la classe n’efface pas la race – ou pour le dire plus précisément, le #privilège_de_classe ne suffit pas à abolir le stigmate de race. Au Brésil, comme l’a montré #Lélia_Gonzalez, pour une femme noire de classe moyenne, il ne suffit pas d’être « bien habillée » et « bien élevée » : les concierges continuent de leur imposer l’entrée de service, conformément aux consignes de patrons blancs, qui n’ont d’yeux que pour elles lors du carnaval… En France, un documentaire intitulé #Trop_noire_pour_être_française part d’une même prise de conscience : la réalisatrice #Isabelle_Boni-Claverie appartient à la grande bourgeoisie ; pourtant, exposée aux discriminations, elle aussi a fini par être rattrapée par sa couleur.

    C’est tout l’intérêt d’étudier les classes moyennes (ou supérieures) de couleur. Premièrement, on voit mieux la logique propre de #racialisation, sans la rabattre aussitôt sur la classe. C’est justement parce que l’expérience de la bourgeoisie ne renvoie pas aux clichés habituels qui dissolvent les minorités dans les classes populaires. Deuxièmement, on est ainsi amené à repenser la classe : trop souvent, on réduit en effet ce concept à la réalité empirique des classes populaires – alors qu’il s’agit d’une logique théorique de #classement qui opère à tous les niveaux de la société. Troisièmement, ce sont souvent ces couches éduquées qui jouent un rôle important dans la constitution d’identités politiques minoritaires : les porte-parole ne proviennent que rarement des classes populaires, ou du moins sont plus favorisés culturellement.

    L’articulation entre classe et race se joue par exemple autour du concept de #blanchité. Le terme est récent en français : c’est la traduction de l’anglais #whiteness, soit un champ d’études constitué non pas tant autour d’un groupe social empirique (les Blancs) que d’un questionnement théorique sur une #identification (la blanchité). Il ne s’agit donc pas de réifier les catégories majoritaires (non plus, évidemment, que minoritaires) ; au contraire, les études sur la blanchité montrent bien, pour reprendre un titre célèbre, « comment les Irlandais sont devenus blancs » : c’est le rappel que la « race » ne doit rien à la #biologie, mais tout aux #rapports_de_pouvoir qu’elle cristallise dans des contextes historiques. À nouveau se pose toutefois la question : la blanchité est-elle réservée aux Blancs pauvres, condamnés à s’identifier en tant que tels faute d’autres ressources ? On parle ainsi de « #salaire_de_la_blanchité » : le #privilège de ceux qui n’en ont pas… Ou bien ne convient-il pas de l’appréhender, non seulement comme une compensation, mais aussi et surtout comme un langage de pouvoir – y compris, bien sûr, chez les dominants ?

    En particulier, si le regard « orientaliste » exotise l’autre et l’érotise en même temps, la #sexualisation n’est pas réservée aux populations noires ou arabes (en France), ou afro-américaines et hispaniques (comme aux États-Unis), bref racisées. En miroir, la #blanchité_sexuelle est une manière, pour les classes moyennes ou supérieures blanches, de s’affirmer « normales », donc de fixer la #norme, en particulier dans les projets d’#identité_nationale. Certes, depuis le monde colonial au moins, les minorités raciales sont toujours (indifféremment ou alternativement) hypo- – ou hyper- –sexualisées : pas assez ou bien trop, mais jamais comme il faut. Mais qu’en est-il des majoritaires ? Ils se contentent d’incarner la norme – soit d’ériger leurs pratiques et leurs représentations en normes ou pratiques légitimes. C’est bien pourquoi la blanchité peut être mobilisée dans des discours politiques, par exemple des chefs d’État (de la Colombie d’Álvaro Uribe aux États-Unis de Donald Trump), le plus souvent pour rappeler à l’ordre les minorités indociles. La « question sociale » n’a donc pas cédé la place à la « question raciale » ; mais la première ne peut plus servir à masquer la seconde. Au contraire, une « question » aide à repenser l’autre.

    Les #contrôles_au_faciès

    Regardons maintenant les contrôles policiers « au faciès », c’est-à-dire fondés sur l’#apparence. Une enquête quantitative du défenseur des droits, institution républicaine qui est chargée de défendre les citoyens face aux abus de l’État, a récemment démontré qu’il touche inégalement, non seulement selon les quartiers (les classes populaires), mais aussi en fonction de l’âge (les jeunes) et de l’apparence (les Arabes et les Noirs), et enfin du sexe (les garçons plus que les filles). Le résultat, c’est bien ce qu’on peut appeler « intersectionnalité ». Cependant, on voit ici que le croisement des logiques discriminatoires ne se résume pas à un cumul des handicaps : le sexe masculin fonctionne ici comme un #stigmate plutôt qu’un privilège. L’intersectionnalité est bien synonyme de complexité.

    « Les jeunes de dix-huit-vingt-cinq ans déclarent ainsi sept fois plus de contrôles que l’ensemble de la population, et les hommes perçus comme noirs ou arabes apparaissent cinq fois plus concernés par des contrôles fréquents (c’est-à-dire plus de cinq fois dans les cinq dernières années). Si l’on combine ces deux critères, 80 % des personnes correspondant au profil de “jeune homme perçu comme noir ou arabe” déclarent avoir été contrôlées dans les cinq dernières années (contre 16 % pour le reste des enquêté.e.s). Par rapport à l’ensemble de la population, et toutes choses égales par ailleurs, ces profils ont ainsi une probabilité vingt fois plus élevée que les autres d’être contrôlés. »

    Répétons-le : il n’y a rien d’identitaire dans cette démarche. D’ailleurs, la formulation du défenseur des droits dissipe toute ambiguïté : « perçus comme noirs ou arabes ». Autrement dit, c’est l’origine réelle ou supposée qui est en jeu. On peut être victime d’antisémitisme sans être juif – en raison d’un trait physique, d’un patronyme, ou même d’opinions politiques. Pour peu qu’on porte un prénom lié à l’islam, ou même qu’on ait l’air « d’origine maghrébine », musulman ou pas, on risque de subir l’#islamophobie. L’#homophobie frappe surtout les homosexuels, et plus largement les minorités sexuelles ; toutefois, un garçon réputé efféminé pourra y être confronté, quelle que soit sa sexualité.

    Et c’est d’ailleurs selon la même logique qu’en France l’État a pu justifier les contrôles au faciès. Condamné en 2015 pour « faute lourde », il a fait appel ; sans remettre en cause les faits établis, l’État explique que la législation sur les étrangers suppose de contrôler « les personnes d’#apparence_étrangère », voire « la seule population dont il apparaît qu’elle peut être étrangère ». Traiter des individus en raison de leur apparence, supposée renvoyer à une origine, à une nationalité, voire à l’irrégularité du séjour, c’est alimenter la confusion en racialisant la nationalité. On le comprend ainsi : être, c’est être perçu ; l’#identité n’existe pas indépendamment du regard des autres.

    L’exemple des contrôles au faciès est important, non seulement pour celles et ceux qui les subissent, bien sûr, mais aussi pour la société tout entière : ils contribuent à la constitution d’identités fondées sur l’expérience commune de la discrimination. Les personnes racisées sont celles dont la #subjectivité se constitue dans ces incidents à répétition, qui finissent par tracer des frontières entre les #expériences minoritaires et majoritaires. Mais l’enjeu est aussi théorique : on voit ici que l’identité n’est pas première ; elle est la conséquence de #pratiques_sociales de #racialisation – y compris de pratiques d’État. Le racisme ne se réduit pas à l’#intention : le racisme en effet est défini par ses résultats – et d’abord sur les personnes concernées, assignées à la différence par la discrimination.

    Le mot race

    Les logiques de domination sont plurielles : il y a non seulement la classe, mais aussi le sexe et la race, ainsi que l’#âge ou le #handicap. Dans leur enchevêtrement, il est à chaque fois question, non pas seulement d’#inégalités, mais aussi de la #naturalisation de ces hiérarchies marquées dans les corps. Reste que c’est surtout l’articulation du sexe ou de la classe avec la race qui est au cœur des débats actuels sur l’intersectionnalité. Et l’on retrouve ici une singularité nationale : d’après l’ONU, les deux tiers des pays incluent dans leur recensement des questions sur la race, l’#ethnicité ou l’#origine_nationale. En France, il n’en est pas question – ce qui complique l’établissement de #statistiques « ethno-raciales » utilisées dans d’autre pays pour analyser les discriminations.

    Mais il y a plus : c’est seulement en France que, pour lutter contre le racisme, on se mobilise régulièrement en vue de supprimer le mot race de la Constitution ; il n’y apparaît pourtant, depuis son préambule de 1946 rédigé en réaction au nazisme, que pour énoncer un principe antiraciste : « sans distinction de race ». C’est aujourd’hui une bataille qui divise selon qu’on se réclame d’un antiracisme dit « universaliste » ou « politique » : alors que le premier rejette le mot race, jugé indissociable du racisme, le second s’en empare comme d’une arme contre la #racialisation de la société. Ce qui se joue là, c’est la définition du racisme, selon qu’on met l’accent sur sa version idéologique (qui suppose l’intention, et passe par le mot), ou au contraire structurelle (que l’on mesure à ses effets, et qui impose de nommer la chose).

    La bataille n’est pas cantonnée au champ politique ; elle s’étend au champ scientifique. Le racisme savant parlait naguère des races (au pluriel), soit une manière de mettre la science au service d’un #ordre_racial, comme dans le monde colonial. Dans la recherche antiraciste, il est aujourd’hui question de la race (au singulier) : non pas l’inventaire des populations, sur un critère biologique ou même culturel, mais l’analyse critique d’un mécanisme social qui assigne des individus à des groupes, et ces groupes à des positions hiérarchisées en raison de leur origine, de leur apparence, de leur religion, etc. Il n’est donc pas question de revenir aux élucubrations racistes sur les Aryens ou les Sémites ; en revanche, parler de la race, c’est se donner un vocabulaire pour voir ce qu’on ne veut pas voir : la #discrimination_raciste est aussi une #assignation_raciale. S’aveugler à la race ne revient-il pas à s’aveugler au racisme ?

    Il ne faut donc pas s’y tromper : pour les sciences sociales actuelles, la race n’est pas un fait empirique ; c’est un concept qui permet de nommer le traitement inégal réservé à des individus et des groupes ainsi constitués comme différents. La réalité de la race n’est donc ni biologique ni culturelle ; elle est sociale, en ce qu’elle est définie par les effets de ces traitements, soit la racialisation de la société tout entière traversée par la logique raciale. On revient ici aux analyses classiques d’une féministe matérialiste, #Colette_Guillaumin : « C’est très exactement la réalité de la “race”. Cela n’existe pas. Cela pourtant produit des morts. [...] Non, la race n’existe pas. Si, la race existe. Non, certes, elle n’est pas ce qu’on dit qu’elle est, mais elle est néanmoins la plus tangible, réelle, brutale, des réalités. »

    Morale de l’histoire

    A-t-on raison de s’inquiéter d’un recul de l’#universalisme en France ? Les logiques identitaires sont-elles en train de gagner du terrain ? Sans nul doute : c’est bien ce qu’entraîne la racialisation de notre société. Encore ne faut-il pas confondre les causes et les effets, ni d’ailleurs le poison et l’antidote. En premier lieu, c’est l’#extrême_droite qui revendique explicitement le label identitaire : des États-Unis de Donald Trump au Brésil de Jair Bolsonaro, on assiste à la revanche de la #masculinité_blanche contre les #minorités_raciales et sexuelles. Ne nous y trompons pas : celles-ci sont donc les victimes, et non pas les coupables, de ce retour de bâton (ou backlash) qui vise à les remettre à leur place (dominée).

    Deuxièmement, la #ségrégation_raciale que l’on peut aisément constater dans l’espace en prenant les transports en commun entre Paris et ses banlieues n’est pas le résultat d’un #communautarisme minoritaire. Pour le comprendre, il convient au contraire de prendre en compte un double phénomène : d’une part, la logique sociale que décrit l’expression #White_flight (les Blancs qui désertent les quartiers où sont reléguées les minorités raciales, anticipant sur la ségrégation que leurs choix individuels accélèrent…) ; d’autre part, les #politiques_publiques de la ville dont le terme #apartheid résume le résultat. Le #multiculturalisme_d’Etat, en Colombie, dessinerait une tout autre logique : les politiques publiques visent explicitement des identités culturelles au nom de la « #diversité », dont les mouvements sociaux peuvent s’emparer.

    Troisièmement, se battre pour l’#égalité, et donc contre les discriminations, ce n’est pas renoncer à l’universalisme ; bien au contraire, c’est rejeter le #communautarisme_majoritaire. L’intersectionnalité n’est donc pas responsable au premier chef d’une #fragmentation_identitaire – pas davantage qu’une sociologie qui analyse les inégalités socio-économiques n’est la cause première de la lutte des classes. Pour les #sciences_sociales, c’est simplement se donner les outils nécessaires pour comprendre un monde traversé d’#inégalités multiples.

    Quatrièmement, ce sont les #discours_publics qui opposent d’ordinaire la classe à la race (ou les ouvriers, présumés blancs, aux minorités raciales, comme si celles-ci n’appartenaient pas le plus souvent aux classes populaires), ou encore, comme l’avait bien montré #Christine_Delphy, l’#antisexisme à l’antiracisme (comme si les femmes de couleur n’étaient pas concernées par les deux). L’expérience de l’intersectionnalité, c’est au contraire, pour chaque personne, quels que soient son sexe, sa classe et sa couleur de peau, l’imbrication de propriétés qui finissent par définir, en effet, des #identités_complexes (plutôt que fragmentées) ; et c’est cela que les sciences sociales s’emploient aujourd’hui à appréhender.

    _____________

    Ce texte écrit avec #Mara_Viveros_Vigoya, et publié en 2019 dans le Manuel indocile de sciences sociales (Fondation Copernic / La Découverte), peut être téléchargé ici : https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2021/03/07/manuel-indocile-intersectionnalite.pdf

    À lire :

    Kimberlé Crenshaw, « Cartographies des marges : intersectionnalité, politique de l’identité et violences contre les femmes de couleur » Cahiers du Genre, n° 39, février 2005, p. 51-82

    Défenseur des droits, Enquête sur l’accès aux droits, Relations police – population : le cas des contrôles d’identité, vol. 1, janvier 2017

    Christine Delphy, « Antisexisme ou antiracisme ? Un faux dilemme », Nouvelles Questions Féministes, vol. 25, janvier 2006, p. 59-83

    Elsa Dorlin, La Matrice de la race. Généalogie sexuelle et coloniale de la nation française, La Découverte, Paris, 2006

    Elsa Dorlin, Sexe, race, classe. Pour une épistémologie de la domination, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2009

    Didier Fassin et Éric Fassin (dir.), De la question sociale à la question raciale ? Représenter la société française, La Découverte, Paris, 2009 [première édition : 2006]

    Éric Fassin (dir.), « Les langages de l’intersectionnalité », Raisons politiques, n° 58, mai 2015

    Éric Fassin, « Le mot race – 1. Cela existe. 2. Le mot et la chose », AOC, 10 au 11 avril 2019

    Nacira Guénif-Souilamas et Éric Macé, Les féministes et le garçon arabe, L’Aube, Paris, 2004

    Colette Guillaumin, « “Je sais bien mais quand même” ou les avatars de la notion de race », Le Genre humain, 1981, n° 1, p. 55-64

    Danièle Kergoat, « Ouvriers = ouvrières ? », Se battre, disent-elles…, La Dispute, Paris, 2012, p. 9-62

    Abdellali Hajjat et Silyane Larcher (dir.), « Intersectionnalité », Mouvements, 12 février 2019

    Mara Viveros Vigoya, Les Couleurs de la masculinité. Expériences intersectionnelles et pratiques de pouvoir en Amérique latine, La Découverte, Paris, 2018

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/eric-fassin/blog/050321/intersectionnalite-une-introduction#at_medium=custom7&at_campaign=10

    #définition #invisibilisation #antiracisme_universaliste #antiracisme_politique #racisme_structurel

    voir aussi ce fil de discussion sur l’intersectionnalité, avec pas mal de #ressources_pédagogiques :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/796554

  • 1) #Marco_Minniti si dimette da parlamentare. Sarà presidente della fondazione Leonardo (#Finmeccanica)

    2) Chissà a che punto è quel progetto per il controllo delle frontiere libiche il cui valore è passato da 300 a 900 milioni. Era il 2017...

    https://twitter.com/nelloscavo/status/1365621593171517442

    #Minniti #Fondazione_Leonardo #fondation

    #frontières #business #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #complexe_militaro-industriel

    –—
    Pour rappel, c’est Minniti qui avait déclaré que « la frontière Sud de la Libye est la frontière sud de l’Europe » :

    Il ministro dell’interno italiano, Minniti, dichiara al Corriere che:
    «Il confine sud della Libia è il confine sud dell’Europa»

    https://seenthis.net/messages/604039

    –---

    voir aussi ce long fil de discussion (2017) à partir de cet article :
    Migranti, vertice al Viminale dei ministri dell’Interno di Italia, Ciad, Libia e Niger


    https://seenthis.net/messages/600874

    –—

    Le site de la Fondation Leonardo :
    https://www.fondazioneleonardo-cdm.com

  • The Danger of Anti-Immigrant Extremism Posing as Environmentalism—and Who Funds It

    With President Joe Biden in the White House and Vice President Kamala Harris providing the deciding vote in the Senate, a range of long-sought Democratic policy goals are back in play, albeit just barely. That includes ambitious agendas on immigration and the environment.

    Could this be the administration that pushes through comprehensive immigration reform after decades of failed attempts? Will youth activists and the burgeoning movement for a Green New Deal provide a pathway to major climate legislation? If so, advocates and their funders alike face a tough road ahead, including an obstructionist congressional minority and opponents on both fronts that will look to appeal to the public’s darkest impulses to build opposition.

    At this inflection point, a report this month from the Center for American Progress, “The Extremist Campaign to Blame Immigrants for U.S. Environmental Problems,” offers a timely overview of the history of how opponents of immigration falsely portray it as a threat to the natural world—a strategy we’re likely to see more of in the months ahead. The report offers a valuable review of these efforts, ranging from the past anti-immigrant stances of some of the nation’s best-known environmental groups to the funders that have bankrolled the nation’s largest anti-immigration groups.

    Four years of an administration defined by its opposition to immigration, plus growing attention to climate change, breathed new life into the toxic and racist narrative of immigrants as a cause of environmental degradation. As the report lays out, this argument—often part of a right-wing, white supremacist ideology known as ecofascism, though CAP’s report does not use the term—found allies in the top echelons of government and media, including a former head of the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and conservative commentators like Ann Coulter and Fox News host Tucker Carlson.

    In contemporary politics, this strategy is mainly seen as a right-wing phenomenon or an artifact of the racist and Eurocentric early history of conservation. Yet the fact that anti-immigrant sentiment found a home within top environmental groups, including Earthfirst! and the Sierra Club, which had a major faction in support of these ideas as late as 2004, is a reminder that it has found fertile soil in a variety of political camps. That makes the narrative all the more dangerous, and one against which funders working in both immigration and the environment ought to take a firm and vocal stance.

    Who’s funding anti-immigration work in the name of the environment?

    Although not comprehensive, the report highlights three funders as key backers of anti-immigration groups: Colcom Foundation, Weeden Foundation and Foundation for the Carolinas. The first two are, in their branding and language, environmental funders—and make those grants in the name of preventing further damage to the natural world.

    Colcom, founded by Mellon Bank heir Cordelia Scaife May, is far and away the largest funder. With a roughly $500 million endowment, it has provided a large share of the support for a network of groups founded by John Tanton, a Sierra Club official in the 1980s, whom the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) calls “the racist architect of the modern anti-immigrant movement.”

    Recipients include NumbersUSA, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), and the Center for Immigration Studies, which we once called “Trump’s favorite immigration think tank.” The latter two are classified as hate groups by the SPLC, a designation the organizations reject.

    In keeping with the bending of reflexive political categories, it’s worth noting that May—who died in 2005—was also a substantial funder of Planned Parenthood due to her prioritization of “population control” as a means of achieving conservation. In 2019, the New York Times documented May’s dark journey to becoming a leading funder of the modern anti-immigrant movement, and the millions her foundation continued to move, long after her death, in support of ideas that gained a receptive audience in a nativist Trump administration. May’s wealth came from the Mellon-Scaife family fortune, which yielded several philanthropists, including another prominent conservative donor, Richard Mellon Scaife.

    Weeden, led by Don Weeden, has funded a similar who’s who of top anti-immigration groups, as well as lower-profile or regional groups like Californians for Population Stabilization, Progressives for Immigration Reform—which CAP calls the “most central organization in the anti-immigrant greenwashing universe”—and the Rewilding Institute.

    Both Weeden and Colcom, as well as the groups they fund, generally say they are neither anti-immigrant nor anti-immigration. Aside from restrictionist policy positions and racist comments by former leaders, it is revealing that the groups they fund are the favored information sources for some of the most virulently anti-immigrant politicians, both historically and among those who rose prominence during the Trump administration. For a deeper dive on Weeden and Colcom, see my colleague Philip Rojc’s excellent 2019 piece on these grantmakers.

    Finally, there is the Foundation for the Carolinas, which in many ways is a typical community foundation, with initiatives on topics from COVID-19 relief to local arts. But it also hosts a donor-advised fund that has supported several anti-immigration groups, including Center for Immigration Studies, FAIR and NumbersUSA. That fund channeled nearly $21 million to nine such groups between 2006 and 2018, according to the report.

    There’s a connection here to a larger problem of private foundations and DAFs, some of which are housed at community foundations, supporting 501(c)(3) nonprofits identified as hate groups, according to a recent analysis from the Chronicle of Philanthropy. Foundation for the Carolinas also made its list of top donors to these groups.

    An ideology funders must fight against

    As the debates over both immigration and climate policies move forward under this new administration, and the opposition marshals efforts to defeat them, this report offers a helpful guide to this enduring and noxious myth. It’s also an important reminder that if these ideas are not called actively combated, they can take root within well-intentioned efforts. Though it seems only a small number of foundations directly fund groups advancing these ideas, anti-immigrant sentiment is insidious.

    For example, while some commentators are suggesting that acceding to Trump-fueled demands for a border wall is how Congress could reach bipartisan action on immigration reform, the report notes how the existing sections of wall are ineffective against furtive crossings, disruptive to species migration, and in violation of Indigenous sacred sites. These facts—and more broadly, the connection to white supremacist and fascist movements—should put foundations on guard, whether they support grantees pushing for immigration reform, action on climate or both.

    With the United States and other nations facing greater and greater pressures from climate change—particularly as it forces migration from regions like Latin America and the Middle East—philanthropy would do well to be proactive now and draw a bright line in countering this ideology’s propagation.

    https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2021/2/24/anti-immigrant-environmentalism-is-resurgent-new-report-looks-at
    #extrême_droite #anti-migrants #USA #Etats-Unis #environnementalisme #environnement #migrations #nature #dégradation_environnementale #écofascisme #éco-fascisme #suprématisme_blanc #extrême_droite #Ann_Coulte #Tucker_Carlson #racisme #Earthfirst #Sierra_Club #deep_ecology #fondations #Colcom_Foundation #Weeden_Foundation #Foundation_for_the_Carolinas #Mellon_Bank #Cordelia_Scaife_May #mécénat #John_Tanton #NumbersUSA #Federation_for_American_Immigration_Reform (#FAIR) #Center_for_Immigration_Studies #Planned_Parenthood #démographie #contrôle_démographique #néo-malthusianisme #néomalthusianisme #protection_de_l'environnement #philanthropie #Richard_Mellon_Scaife #Weeden #Don_Weeden #Californians_for_Population_Stabilization #Progressives_for_Immigration_Reform #Rewilding_Institute

    • The Extremist Campaign to Blame Immigrants for U.S. Environmental Problems

      With growing frequency over the past four years, right-wing pundits, policymakers, and political operatives have fiercely and furiously blamed immigrants for the degradation and decline of nature in the United States. William Perry Pendley, who temporarily ran the U.S. Bureau of Land Management under former President Donald Trump, saw “immigration as one of the biggest threats to public lands,” according to an agency spokesperson.1 A handful of right-wing anti-immigration zealots, including Joe Guzzardi, have repeatedly misused data published by the Center for American Progress on nature loss to make xenophobic arguments for anti-immigration policies.2 This so-called “greening of hate”—a term explored by Guardian reporter Susie Cagle—is a common refrain in a wide range of conservative and white supremacist arguments, including those of Ann Coulter, Fox News host Tucker Carlson, neo-Nazi Richard Spencer, and the manifestos of more than one mass shooter.3

      The claim that immigration is to blame for America’s environmental problems is so absurd, racist, and out of the mainstream that it is easily debunked and tempting to ignore. The scientific community, and the little research that has been conducted in this area, resoundingly refutes the premise. Consider, for example, the environmental damage caused by weak and inadequate regulation of polluting industries; the destruction of wildlife habitat to accommodate wealthy exurbs and second homes; the design and propagation of policies that concentrate toxic poisons and environmental destruction near communities of color and low-income communities; the continued subsidization of fossil fuel extraction and trampling of Indigenous rights to accommodate drilling and mining projects; and the propagation of a throw-away culture by industrial powerhouses. All of these factors and others cause exponentially more severe environmental harm than a family that is fleeing violence, poverty, or suffering to seek a new life in the United States.

      The extremist effort to blame immigrants for the nation’s environmental problems deserves scrutiny—and not merely for the purpose of disproving its xenophobic and outlandish claims. The contours, origins, funding sources, and goals of this right-wing effort must be understood in order to effectively combat it and ensure that the extremists pushing it have no place in the conservation movement. The individuals and organizations that are most fervently propagating this argument come largely from well-funded hate groups that are abusing discredited ideologies that were prevalent in the 19th-century American conservation movement in an attempt to make their racist rhetoric more palatable to a public concerned about the health of their environment.

      While leaders of the contemporary, mainstream environmental movement in the United States have disavowed this strain of thought and are working to confront the legacies of colonialism and racism in environmental organizations and policies, a small set of right-wing political operatives are trying to magnify overtly xenophobic and false environmental arguments to achieve specific political objectives. In particular, these right-wing political operatives and their deep-pocketed funders are seeking to broaden the appeal of their anti-immigration zealotry by greenwashing their movement and supplying their right-wing base with alternative explanations for environmental decline that sidestep the culpability of the conservative anti-regulatory agenda. In their refusal to confront the true reasons for environmental decline, they are hurting the people—immigrants, Indigenous peoples, and people of color—who bear a disproportionate burden of environmental consequences and are increasingly the base of the climate justice and conservation movements.

      (...)

      https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2021/02/01/495228/extremist-campaign-blame-immigrants-u-s-environmental-problems

  • « En France, les sciences humaines et sociales ne sont pas au service du politique »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/02/23/en-france-les-sciences-humaines-et-sociales-ne-sont-pas-au-service-du-politi

    Les deux historiens Alain Blum et Juliette Cadiot rappellent, dans une tribune au « Monde », que nombre de leurs collègues en Pologne, Hongrie ou en Russie sont victimes de #contrôles_politiques et voient leurs recherches entravées par la #censure. Une mainmise du pouvoir sur la #recherche afin de contrôler le récit national.

    Tribune . Le 9 février, deux universitaires polonais de réputation internationale, travaillant de longue date sur la Shoah, ont été condamnés pour diffamation par un tribunal de Varsovie. Ils auraient, en décrivant l’action d’un maire de village à l’égard des juifs durant la guerre, porté atteinte à son honneur. Cela ne fait que concrétiser des décisions prises par les autorités polonaises incitant à condamner au civil toute personne attribuant les crimes de la Shoah aux Polonais et non aux Allemands, et donc interdisant, de fait, tout travail mettant en évidence la contribution de Polonais à l’extermination des juifs. Ce serait diffamer la nation polonaise.

    Il est vrai que les autorités polonaises ne sont pas les premières en Europe à s’attaquer ainsi au milieu universitaire en s’immisçant dans le débat scientifique. Les autorités hongroises le font régulièrement, sans parler de ce qu’on voit en Turquie.

    Interdire la « propagande anti-russe »

    La Russie, depuis plusieurs années, a mis en place des lois restrictives encadrant les recherches historiques. Une commission destinée à « contrer les tentatives de falsifier l’histoire au détriment des intérêts de la Russie » avait été créée en 2009. Elle a fait long feu, mais l’intervention politique contre le milieu universitaire ne s’est pas arrêtée là. Il est par exemple interdit de mettre en cause l’honneur de la Russie durant la seconde guerre mondiale. Cela fait peser une menace sur les chercheurs qui étudient les violences de l’armée rouge ou les stratégies du haut commandement militaire soviétique. Dans ce même pays, un addendum à la loi sur l’éducation est actuellement en discussion qui vise à interdire la diffusion « d’informations illégales » et de « propagande anti-russe » dans les écoles et les universités.

    « Les #libertés_académiques constituent une protection contre les tentatives d’instrumentalisation des #universités pour d’autres raisons que la science »

    Un nouveau pays se serait-il désormais joint à ce concert, la France ? Nous qui étudions l’histoire de l’est de l’Europe, voyons régulièrement nos collègues de certains de ces pays en proie au contrôle politique et à la censure de la recherche, notamment en sciences humaines et sociales. Nous sommes choqués par le parallélisme de procédés visant à remettre en cause les libertés académiques et ce qui fait le fondement des sciences sociales, une approche critique du monde dans lequel nous vivons. Les propos de la ministre de l’enseignement supérieur, et l’annonce d’une procédure d’enquête visant à la fois les opinions politiques des chercheurs et leurs catégories d’analyse, rappellent cette volonté de contrôler le récit national, que l’on croyait propre à des gouvernements autoritaires...

    Article réservé à nos abonnées

    • libertés académiques, suite et fin

      Le slogan de « l’islamo gauchisme » de Frédérique Vidal, parfois désigné sous le terme « d’anti-républicanisme », et les propos de Jean-Michel Blanquer auparavant, ne rappellent-ils pas celui de « l’antipatriotisme » russe ou de « l’antinationalisme » polonais, au nom desquels des recherches et des chercheurs de grande qualité sont fustigés et censurés ?

      Est-il nécessaire de rappeler, ici, en France, que les sciences humaines et sociales ne sont pas au service du politique et de sa conception de ce que devrait penser la nation ? Nous ne pouvons que saluer la réaction du monde académique, que ce soient les chercheurs, les universitaires ou les institutions, notamment la Conférence des présidents d’universités (CPU), l’Alliance thématique nationale des sciences humaines et sociales (Athéna), et nous l’espérons le CNRS, qui résistent à une demande alimentant des conflits politiques et s’opposent aux injonctions de la ministre. En Russie, en Pologne, en Hongrie, cette résistance est présente, bien plus courageuse tant les risques sont forts. Ces expériences nous rappellent combien l’autonomie des universités est fragile.

      Un lieu de savoir qui doit être respecté

      Le principe des libertés académiques est ancien et a été affirmé par l’Organisation des Nations unies dans une convention en 1948. Or, il est remis en cause dans des pays que nous qualifions d’autoritaires. Mais il est aussi attaqué quand, sous la pression d’activistes intellectuels qui se présentent comme « conservateurs » et qui se plaignent d’être mal représentés et mal traités dans le monde académique, les représentants de la puissance publique décident de s’immiscer dans les débats scientifiques. Dans le cas de la Pologne, la ligue contre la diffamation de la nation polonaise s’est portée partie civile contre les historiens susmentionnés, et ses arguments sont relayés au sommet de l’Etat.

      L’université est un lieu de savoir scientifique qui doit être respecté. Les libertés académiques constituent une protection contre l’intervention de l’Etat, mais aussi contre les tentatives d’instrumentalisation des universités pour d’autres raisons que la science. L’université doivent rester un lieu de débats ouverts et contradictoires, à l’écart d’une instrumentalisation politique, c’est un principe fondateur de nos démocraties.

      Alain Blum est historien, directeur de recherches à l’INED et au Centre d’études des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-européen (Cercec)/EHESS ; Juliette Cadiot est historienne, directrice d’études au Cercec/EHESS.

      #université #recherche #police_de_la_pensée