• France : Belleville : EDF vide le cœur d’un réacteur malgré un problème de refroidissement

    https://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/France-Belleville-EDF-vide-le-coeur-d-un-reacteur-malgre-un-probl

    L’incident en dit long sur l’absence de compréhension du fonctionnement de l’installation et plus largement, l’absence de réflexion des équipes lors des opérations, même les plus critiques. À Belleville (Centre - val de Loire), le cœur du réacteur 2 a été entièrement vidé de son combustible alors qu’une partie du circuit de refroidissement était hors-service [1]. Les équipes ont pensé que l’autre partie du circuit suffirait. Sauf que cette partie là n’était plus alimentée en électricité puisque le diesel de secours censé prendre le relai en cas de coupure avait été mis hors-service. Si coupure électrique il y avait eu, la seule partie du circuit de refroidissement disponible n’aurait pas pu fonctionner.

    Quand tu vois la quantité et la diversité des « incidents »...(https://www.sortirdunucleaire.org/Nucleaire-des-accidents-partout)
    Ça relève du miracle qu’on ait pas eu une catastrophe majeure en France...

  • Revealed : The #OLAF report on Frontex

    An infamous internal report by the EU anti-fraud agency OLAF shows how Frontex tried to cover up human rights violations. We are publishing it for the first time.

    “The plane circled over our heads again and again, but no one helped us,” says Samuel Abraham. On 10 April 2021, he left the Libyan shore in a rubber boat with 62 other people. They were on the high seas for five days. “We didn’t think this trip would take so long. That’s why, and to save space, we didn’t bring much food and water.” Out of desperation, they drank sea water.

    Last year, Samuel Abraham reported to us his attempted crossing and we published it with Buzzfeed News Germany. We changed his name to protect him.

    He told us that, at one point, a cargo ship had appeared in sight and that three people had jumped into the water. They did not reach the ship, they drowned. On the last day at sea, the remaining people were picked up by a supposed fishing boat and taken back to Libya. Only 51 of them reached Libya alive, next to the dead bodies of the others who had died on the way back.

    The plane Samuel Abraham saw circling over his head was operated by Frontex, the EU border and coast guard agency who witnessed what constituted a human rights violation. This was not only researched and documented by journalists and NGOs, but also by EU bodies.

    In cooperation with Der Spiegel and Lighthouse Reports, we are publishing the report on Frontex by the EU’s anti-fraud agency OLAF. A report that has been talked about throughout the last year, that led to the resignation of former Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri, but until now has not been revealed to the public in full – it was never meant to be revealed.
    Human rights violations swept under the carpet

    In fact, up until today, only a very reduced group of EU officials have been able to read the document in full: this includes European Commission representatives, the former Frontex Management Board, a few selected Members of the European Parliament, and OLAF itself.

    The Frontex OLAF report shows that Samuel Abraham’s story is not exceptional; a serious human rights violation witnessed and later brushed under the carpet. It is neither exceptional nor a matter of chance.

    It was finalised in February 2022; 16 months, 20 witnesses and over 120 pages after the moment the EU anti-fraud watchdog first received a whistleblower alert by post warning about serious wrongdoing within the agency.

    Under EU and international law, Frontex has the legal obligation to guarantee respect for human rights during its operations. But what OLAF found is that instead of taking steps to prevent human rights violations from happening, Frontex took recurrent, deliberate measures to make sure the violations that were indeed taking place, would not be witnessed, documented, investigated or accounted for.

    More precisely, it shows how the Fundamental Rights Officer was sidelined; internal reports on human rights violations were manipulated; and how Frontex misled the European Commission and Parliament.
    “Not one of us”: the isolation of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer

    As the OLAF report shows, on 3 September 2020 Frontex’s main operational departments met to discuss the following: some officials had become convinced that the Greek-Turkish relationship was evolving into a “kind of ‘war’”, where Frontex’s operational information was subject to being “misused” and could therefore cause potential reputational damage to the agency.

    The cornerstone of all this suspicion was the Frontex Fundamental Rights Office. This department had been created to ensure violations of human rights during Frontex operations were prevented by design. If violations do take place, it is the Office’s duty to conduct an investigation and recommend appropriate action.

    This department and, in particular, its head, the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), had been encountering resistance internally. Labelled as “leftists” who were too close to NGOs, WhatsApp messages exchanged among Frontex officials qualified the FRO’s pro-rights stance as an “intellectual dictatorship” comparable to “Khmer Rouge terror”. Frontex staff was encouraged to consider their fundamental rights peers not as colleagues, but as “externals”; “not one of us”.

    As such, Frontex’s leadership considered the information the FRO had access to needed to be limited – even in cases relating to a violation of human rights. At the 3 September 2020 meeting, this rationale was clearly set out: “Fundamental Rights has a right of access to all information. But it does not mean that we give all information. (...) Fundamental Rights asks and we try to be friendly. That’s the trap.”

    The trap was an information shutdown which, in practice, would make it substantially harder and, in some cases, impossible, for the FRO to monitor and investigate the human rights violations that were, at this point, certainly taking place during Frontex operations. Efforts had started already in 2016, and were well underway by the time the 3 September 2020 meeting was held.

    The OLAF report describes how already in 2016, e-mails from the FRO in which she required details and clarifications in the context of a potential human rights violation that had been reported “remained long unanswered or did not receive a reply at all.” In January 2018, Frontex leadership took the decision to severely restrict the FRO’s access to the agency’s main border surveillance and information-management tool, the EUROSUR system. This required a redesign of the EUROSUR architecture so that the FRO, from now on, would only be able to view a limited amount of operational information, while all classified information would not only be inaccessible, but also invisible: it became “impossible for FRO to be aware of the existence of that specific document in the system”.

    The FRO’s EUROSUR cut-off would cost 15.000 euros of taxpayer money. The justification reflects how human rights monitoring was considered a danger to effective border control: “At stake is the possibility to use EUROSUR as a reliable security tool for MS [Member States] in full compliance with security standards”.

    Shortly after, a new idea emerges: Frontex Serious Incident Reports should be considered classified information.
    Control of the paper trail

    Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) are at the heart of Frontex’s internal reporting system. These reports are meant to be filed by Frontex agents deployed on mission when they witness or become part of a serious incident. This could be, for example, when Frontex staff has a car accident while deployed; wakes up to their property having been vandalised with anti-police messages; exposed to Covid-19; and, most importantly, when Frontex officers witness or become involved in a human rights violation.

    SIRs are the agency’s primary paper trail for wrongdoing. As such, the existence and distribution of these reports became uncomfortable for an agency that considers its human rights obligations an obstacle for its ultimate goal and mission: border control.

    The OLAF report lays out the measures taken to undermine and circumvent SIRs as a reporting mechanism, in order to downplay or ignore severe human rights violations that were taking place to the knowledge of Frontex. In 2020, an essential step was taken in this direction: “In case a SIR is generated based on operational data collected by FRONTEX (…) this SIR must be restricted,” reads an internal e-mail. This could be done by scaling up the classification of SIRs. Internally, some officials warned the efforts to classify these reports “would be illegal”.

    The process for handling SIRs was also manipulated. Frontex’s internal rules establish four categories of SIRs – incident reports relating to a possible violation of human rights should be allocated Category 4, which would immediately trigger an involvement of the FRO, investigation, and adequate follow-up.

    On the day Samuel Abraham was in distress at high sea, Frontex staff wrote an internal e-mail stressing the need to launch a Serious Incident Report and asked for guidance about the categorisation. OLAF notes, that all information about the incident “highlighted strong indications of violations of human rights”, which would fall under Category 4. But internally this was waved off to avoid involving the FRO.

    In other occasions, a decision was taken not to create a SIR in the first place; it appears that in Frontex’s eyes, a human rights violation that is not recorded is a violation that doesn’t exist.

    Letters to Greek authorities with regards to serious rights violations were re-drafted into a “politically softer” version, “less explicit on the gravity of the facts in question”. In April 2020, a SIR was launched after Frontex-deployed officers witnessed Greek authorities “towing an overcrowded fragile boat in the night towards the open sea is a situation that can seriously endanger the lives of the passengers”. Der Spiegel reported about this case end of October 2020. The FRO’s evaluation of the case found it a likely “case of an unprocessed return and violation of the principle of non-refoulement”. However, during its investigation, OLAF found no further follow-up: “no formal request for information or clarification was sent to the Hellenic Authorities in relation to this incident”. Human rights violation, once again, left unaddressed.
    Intimidation “bears fruit”: the silencing of officers

    But not only incidents were silenced, also those who report them. In summer of 2019, an internal e-mail warned: “we fear/have indications that potential violations are not always reported to Frontex [headquarters] because of possible repercussions of deployed officers in the Host MS [Member State]”. There had been at least one case where an officer deployed in a Frontex operation had filed a SIR and had later been relocated; the assumption was that “it could be linked to the fact of reporting”.

    Furthermore, Frontex-deployed officers were not making use of official reporting channels but were instead leaving mentions of what pointed to human rights violations in “unofficial reports”. When an officer was asked for the reason, (s)he argued that “it happened in the past that because of the initiation of a SIR the debriefing expert had serious conflict with the Greek Authorities and could that made [REDACTED] stay unbearable“. In order to avoid a similar situation, the officer had chosen to report incidents “via alternative channels”.

    Intimidation and threats to Frontex officers, notably by Greek authorities, in order to avoid formal reporting of violations of human rights, were well known to Frontex management. The topic had been “thoroughly discussed” internally, recognising that “threats of EL [Greek] authorities to sanction ‘critical’ deployed staff bears fruit”.

    However, no action was ever taken to address this problem or to prevent it from happening again. Out of “the need to keep a good relationship with the Greek authorities”, Frontex did “not ask for any specific action to be taken or checks to be done”. The matter was set aside.
    “So not to witness…”

    On 5 August 2020, the Frontex plane FSA METIS was surveilling the Aegean Sea when it witnessed a boat with approximately 30 people on board, in Greek territorial waters, being towed by Greek authorities towards Turkish territorial waters. The sighting amounted to a human rights violation. A Serious Incident Report was launched.

    Within a month, the Frontex plane was no longer operating in the Aegean but had instead been relocated to the Central Mediterranean “to support activities in the region”.

    Three months later, during a raid to the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, OLAF finds a report mentioning the FSA METIS relocation. A handwritten note of a high representative on the last page of the document reads: “We have withdrawn our FSA some time ago, so not to witness...”.

    In an interview with OLAF, (s)he would elaborate on his handwritten remark: “the withdrawing of aerial surveillance served the purpose for FRONTEX to avoid witnessing incidents and alleged pushbacks by Greece, so avoiding to have to deal internally at the Agency with sensitive cases. Personally, the solution was good for me as I was in the middle of two different and opposite demands: [REDACTED] wanted to cover possible irregularities by Greece and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] wanted to deal with those cases in full compliance with the SOP [Standard Operating Procedure]”.

    Frontex’s choice was in fact much more effective than a cover-up of “irregularities”. It was a carte blanche for impunity.
    Disloyalty to the Union

    Internal control mechanisms disabled, there were few avenues left to hold Frontex accountable – mainly, EU institutions. When in 2020, media and civil society reports on Frontex became more and more frequent, the European Commission started seeking answers from the EU’s border agency. The Commission wanted to know whether progress had been made on several of the human rights protection mechanisms – as it is Frontex’s legal obligation.

    OLAF found Frontex misled the Commission when responding to its questions, offering “a partial view of the dynamics of the events“ and showed “lack of cooperation and the reluctance” to implement the Commission’s recommendations. Cooperating and following the EU Commission’s guidance was indeed not in Frontex’s plans, since for some years now, Frontex leadership had been harvesting an increasingly derogatory view of the EU legislative body which it saw less as a respectable authority and more like an enemy.

    Private messages exchanged among Frontex high-level reveal a view of the European Commission as “the legislator who makes Frontex a legal smuggler/taxi”.

    Demeaning messages, which harden in tone from 2019 onwards following the appointment of Ylva Johansson as Commissioner for Home Affairs, criticised the EU institution for “amateurism on operational subjects, obsession on FR [Fundamental Rights] subjects, and bureaucratic cretinism”.

    By 2020, the Commission had become an adversary: “Today the biggest risk for the European corps and Frontex comes from the Commission” – a striking conclusion since the proposal for a Frontex standing corps of 10,000 border guards initially originated, in 2018, from the European Commission itself.

    But it wasn’t only the European Commission’s questions getting shunned – also the European Parliament’s. In multiple occasions, the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Homme Affairs (LIBE) summoned Frontex and requested explanations and clarifications with regards to the recurrent reports of human rights violations. During its investigation, OLAF identified at least eleven stances where Frontex lied or misled the European Parliament in its responses.

    These lies, misleading statements and antagonistic views with respect to the European Commission and Parliament were found by OLAF as a “lack of loyalty towards the Union”.
    Eight months later: the aftermath of the OLAF report

    For almost eight months, some EU representatives have known about the explosive facts and findings of the report: the recurrent human rights violations taking place under Frontex’s eyes; Frontex’s studied efforts to brush off and conceal these violations; an unlawful system of impunity built by an agency of the EU, financed with EU taxpayer money.

    And yet the fact is, very little has changed in the aftermath of the OLAF investigation. Only the resignation of one person, former Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri, is the most visible consequence of the report’s findings to date, besides the fact that the European Parliament continues to refuse to approve the agency’s budget. A climate of silence and inaction seems to have been established, incomprehensibly to anyone familiar with the content of the OLAF report.

    In this context, on 21 September, Frontex issued a statement announcing “recent changes within the agency”, presenting in six vague bullet points. But the reality seems to be different: Crucially, a noticeable absence from Frontex’s “recent changes” press release is the suspension of operations in the Aegean. This is a provision set by Article 46 of the Frontex Regulation, which states that the Frontex Executive Director should “suspend or terminate any activity by the Agency, in whole or in part, if he or she considers that there are violations of fundamental rights or international protection obligations related to the activity concerned that are of a serious nature or are likely to persist.”

    These violations have been well-established by the OLAF report, which includes among its findings that, while being aware of the human rights violations taking place in Greece, Frontex “did not ensure appropriate follow-up, including taking any actions in relation to the scope of the Article 46 of the FRONTEX Regulation”. And yet Frontex continues to contradict OLAF’s findings, reiterating in the media that “Frontex’s actions in the Aegean Sea region had been carried out in compliance with the applicable legal framework, including in accordance with the responsibilities stemming from fundamental rights.”

    At the same time, some signs already point at some of Frontex’s “recent changes” which could be failing to materialise. Frontex argues that in 2021 it conducted a revision of its Serious Incident Reporting Mechanism “to improve the reporting on events at the external borders, including fundamental rights violations”. However, civil society has alerted to the fact that it has been over 1,000 days since Frontex last filed a SIR in the Greek island of Samos. It was precisely in Samos, as documented in the OLAF report, where Greek authorities’ intimidation tactics to discourage incident reporting had been bearing fruit.

    We have asked Frontex for a statement concerning the OLAF report and its investigations, but they have not replied to it yet.
    Commission remains inactive

    Meanwhile, the European Commission’s reluctance to take a stance, let alone any action, in response to the OLAF report has been remarkable. When questioned about Der Spiegel’s previous reporting on OLAF’s findings, the Commission merely made vague references to the one change in Frontex leadership, a “new Action Plan” for a Fundamental Rights Strategy, and the hiring of Fundamental Rights Monitors – which has been a legal obligation of Frontex since 2019. “A lot of work is being done,” stated the Commission spokesperson, who did not deliver specifics and made no mention of Article 46.

    In all, the OLAF report reveals the making of a system of impunity by Frontex: continuous efforts to downplay, conceal and enable serious violations of human rights and international law taking place on an ongoing basis at the EU’s borders. Despite OLAF’s investigation, Frontex’s system of impunity remains largely untouched.

    https://fragdenstaat.de/en/blog/2022/10/13/frontex-olaf-report-leaked

    #rapport #OLAF #Frontex #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #Libye #droits_humains #Grèce #Turquie #Serious_Incident_Reports (#SIRs) #omerta #silence #intimidation #EU #Union_européenne #UE

    • Migration : un rapport pointe la gestion accablante de Frontex dans les eaux grecques

      L’agence européenne Frontex aurait-elle fermé les yeux face à des refoulements de migrants dans les eaux grecques ? C’est ce qui ressort d’un rapport confidentiel de l’OLAF, l’Office européen de lutte antifraude, rendu public par la plateforme FragDenStaat, basée en Allemagne, en collaboration avec Der Spiegel et Lighthouse Reports (Pays-Bas).

      Selon l’OLAF, des cadres de l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’UE ont commis « des fautes graves », en ne signalant pas des refoulement de migrants de la part des garde-frontières grecs.

      Ce rapport indique que dans un cas, l’avion de l’agence de l’UE s’est volontairement éloigné d’une zone en mer Egée, pour ne pas être témoin d’un incident en cours. Le rapport pointe par ailleurs une multitude de manquements, face à l’arrivée de bateaux de fortune, souvent en provenance de Turquie.

      Ces conclusions confirment les accusations de plusieurs ONG, qui pointaient depuis plusieurs années les manquements de l’Union européenne dans la gestion de la crise migratoire, due notamment à la guerre en Syrie. En avril dernier, mis sous pression, le patron Frontex Fabrice Leggeri a démissionné.

      https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/14/migration-un-rapport-pointe-la-gestion-accablante-de-frontex-dans-les-e

    • "Des pratiques du passé" : Frontex réagit au rapport accablant ses dirigeants

      L’agence de garde-frontières Frontex a réagi aujourd’hui à la publication par des ONG et médias de l’intégralité du rapport de l’OLAF, l’organe anti-fraude de l’Union européenne. Ce rapport accusant les dirigeants de Frontex d’avoir dissimulé des refoulements, en violation du droit international, avait fait grand bruit il y a plusieurs mois, jusqu’à pousser à la démission l’ex-patron Fabrice Leggeri.

      Ce vendredi, l’agence des garde-frontières et des garde-côtes de l’Union européenne, Frontex, a réagi à la publication de l’intégralité du rapport de l’OLAF (office européen de lutte anti-fraude) par plusieurs ONG et médias. "L’Agence prend au sérieux les conclusions des enquêtes, audits et examens, et les utilise comme des opportunités pour changer et s’améliorer", a déclaré Frontex dans un communiqué de presse paru aujourd’hui.

      Ce rapport de l’OLAF se concentrait sur les activités de Frontex en Grèce du printemps à l’automne 2020. Il révélait que Frontex n’avait pas traité correctement des preuves de refoulements d’exilés aux frontières maritimes et terrestre, allant jusqu’à les dissimuler. Or, ces "puschback" sont contraire au droit international et européen, puisqu’ils empêchent tout examen d’une demande de protection.

      L’agence ne nie plus sa responsabilité dans les accusations détaillées par l’enquête de l’OLAF. Elle reconnaît volontiers de "graves fautes de conduites" commises par les dirigeants de Frontex d’alors. Le numéro un, Fabrice Leggeri, directeur général depuis 2015, avait démissionné fin avril face aux accusations relayées dans la presse.
      Changements dans les procédures de signalement

      Plusieurs enquêtes journalistiques menées par le consortium Lighthouse Reports et publiées notamment dans Le Monde, avaient ainsi démontré qu’entre mars 2020 et septembre 2021, Frontex avait enregistré des renvois illégaux dans les eaux grecques comme de simples "opérations de prévention au départ, menées dans les eaux turques".

      Or, toutes les investigations menées par des médias menaient à la conclusion "que les responsables de Frontex [étaient] conscients des pratiques illégales des gardes-frontières grecs et [étaient] en partie impliqués dans les refoulements eux-mêmes", écrivait le journal allemand Der Spiegel en octobre 2021.

      Aujourd’hui, Frontex qualifie ces actes répréhénsibles de "pratiques du passé" dans son communiqué. L’agence affirme ainsi avoir pris, depuis, des "mesures correctives". Par exemple, Frontex déclare avoir renforcé les procédures de signalement des incidents graves, y compris en ce qui concerne les refoulements.
      D’autres conclusions d’enquêtes à venir

      Enfin, Frontex assure avoir établi à la fin de l’été 2022 "un plan d’action pour réparer les torts du passé et du présent et pour engager un dialogue structuré" avec les autorités grecques.

      InfoMigrants reçoit depuis plusieurs années des témoignages d’exilés victimes de "pushbacks" par les garde-côtes et garde-frontières grecs. À l’été 2021, une Congolaise avait expliqué comment les garde-côtes avaient refoulé son embarcation en mer, mettant les passagers en danger. "Ils nous ont menacé avec leur armes (…) Ils ont tourné autour de nous, ce qui a fait de grandes vagues et du courant", avait-elle rapporté. Au mois de mai 2021, Samuel, un autre migrant d’Afrique subsaharienne, avait raconté comment son embarcation avait été refoulée vers les côtes turques.

      Au-delà de ces refoulements, d’autres enquêtes visent actuellement Frontex, notamment au sujet de dissimulations de maltraitances commises sur des exilés en Hongrie et en Bulgarie. Frontex nie, jusqu’ici, avoir couvert ces violences. Elle avait expliqué officiellement n’avoir “pas autorité sur le comportement des polices aux frontières locales".

      En attendant la progression de ces enquêtes, l’agence européenne prévoit de disposer d’un effectif propre de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes, à l’horizon 2027. Dans cette perspective, elle programme déjà des commandes d’armes "létales et non-létales".

      http://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/44017/des-pratiques-du-passe--frontex-reagit-au-rapport-accablant-ses-dirige

    • Certificate le pratiche illegali di Frontex. Ma l’Agenzia resta a operare sulle frontiere

      L’Ufficio europeo per la lotta antifrode ha ricostruito le gravi violazioni dei diritti umani commesse in questi anni dall’Agenzia europea chiamata a sorvegliare i confini dell’Ue. Dalla copertura di centinaia di respingimenti al contrasto a chi voleva denunciare. Il cambio al vertice non è sufficiente, segnala il Parlamento europeo

      Frontex ha coperto centinaia di respingimenti illegali ai confini esterni dell’Unione europea e al suo interno ha ostacolato chi voleva denunciare queste pratiche. Il rapporto dell’Ufficio europeo per la lotta antifrode (Olaf) sull’Agenzia, che aveva portato nell’aprile 2022 alle dimissioni dell’ex direttore esecutivo Fabrice Leggeri, è stato reso pubblico a metà ottobre 2022 dal settimanale tedesco Der Spiegel, testata che con le sue inchieste aveva dato avvio proprio all’indagine dell’Olaf sull’operato di Frontex. E martedì 18 ottobre il Parlamento europeo ha approvato una risoluzione (con 345 voti favorevoli, 284 contrari e otto astenuti) contro la cosiddetta “procedura di discarico” del bilancio dell’Agenzia, ovvero una valutazione ex post che ha l’obiettivo di monitorarne l’attività degli anni precedenti (in questo caso del 2020). “Un segnale importante ma dalle conseguenze solo politiche: l’Agenzia purtroppo continuerà a fare quello che ha sempre fatto e di certo questo voto non bloccherà le sue attività -spiega Laura Salzano, dottoranda in Diritto europeo dell’immigrazione presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Questo significa che Frontex continua a poter utilizzare il suo ampio budget nonostante la votazione degli eurodeputati”. Un bilancio che per il 2022 ammonta a 754 milioni di euro: un aumento di più del 100% rispetto al 2006, il primo anno di piena operatività dell’Agenzia e che continuerà a crescere fino a toccare i 5,6 miliardi di euro entro il 2027 come ricostruito anche nel nostro libro “Respinti“.

      Scorrendo il report di 123 pagine dell’Olaf emergono chiaramente le lacune nei meccanismi di denuncia di situazioni di violazione dei diritti umani delle persone coinvolte (direttamente o indirettamente) nell’attività dell’Agenzia e come queste non siano emerse in precedenza per motivi politici. In altri termini le istituzioni europee hanno fatto finta di nulla perché l’obiettivo perseguito da Frontex, “chiudere” le frontiere, doveva essere raggiunto a qualsiasi costo. “L’Agenzia ha avuto un’espansione molto ampia con l’approvazione di due regolamenti (2016 e 2019) nel giro di tre anni e non accompagnati da un parallelo monitoraggio -sottolinea Salzano-. Le sue competenze, le sue capacità di incidere sui diritti umani dei rifugiati sono esponenzialmente aumentate ma senza adeguati meccanismi di ‘responsabilità’ interna”. Su questo punto secondo la ricercatrice è un “controsenso” che Frontex non sia mai responsabile di quanto succede durante le operazioni a cui partecipa: “Il direttore esecutivo ha grandi poteri, può prendere tantissime decisioni ma la responsabilità di quanto avviene lungo i confini ricade sugli Stati membri. Non può funzionare”.

      E che non funzioni lo si capisce analizzando alcuni stralci del rapporto. Parte dell’inchiesta di Olaf si concentra sui cosiddetti “Serious incident report”, ovvero le segnalazioni di “gravi incidenti” che, secondo il regolamento dell’Agenzia, sono “avvenimenti naturali o causati dall’azione umana che possono influire negativamente o essere rilevanti per una particolare attività di Frontex” che possono mettere a repentaglio la sua reputazione e includere situazioni di potenziali “violazione dei diritti fondamentali e di quanto stabilito dal diritto Ue e internazionale con particolare riferimento alla possibilità di richiedere asilo”. Una volta ricevuta una segnalazione di tali incidenti, l’ufficio del Frontex situation center individua un “coordinatore” che ha il compito di procedere con indagini interne per chiarire la situazione. Ci sono quattro categorie di segnalazioni classificate in base alla pericolosità: la quarta, la più grave, che riguarda proprio la possibile violazione dei diritti fondamentali delle persone coinvolte, prevede un particolare meccanismo per cui le indagini sono di responsabilità del “Fundamental rights officer”, l’ufficio che si occupa di monitorare il rispetto dei diritti umani.

      Tra il 10 e il 12 aprile 2020 l’aereo di Frontex che sorveglia il Mediterraneo centrale individua quattro imbarcazioni con a bordo circa 250 persone che si muovono dalla “zona Sar” libica a quella maltese. Le autorità de La Valletta non collaborano con l’Agenzia nell’implementare un’operazione di salvataggio. Alle 12.34 di mercoledì 13 aprile al Frontex situation center arriva una segnalazione in cui si sottolinea che le imbarcazioni sono “sovraffollate” e le persone sono “senza giubbotti di salvataggio”. Un’ora dopo, un ulteriore messaggio inviato al centro di comando sottolinea la mancanza di cooperazione delle autorità maltesi e segnala che due delle barche sono arrivate in Italia e avevano bottiglie d’acqua a bordo. “Probabilmente la Guardia costiera maltese le ha trainate fino alle coste italiane. Mi chiedo -scrive l’ufficiale di Frontex- se a livello politico si possa fare pressione su Malta dato che questa diventa una situazione umanamente irresponsabile”. Ventiquattr’ore dopo, l’ufficiale pretende che sia lanciato un “Serious incident report” e che sia classificato nella “Categoria quattro” dato che l’attività osservata è in chiara violazione di diritti fondamentali dei naufraghi. Ma dagli uffici dell’Agenzia non sono d’accordo: viene assegnata la “Categoria 2” -ovvero un incidente dall’alto interesse pubblico e politico- perché quanto osservato è avvenuto al di fuori delle operazioni di Frontex ed è necessario “tenere un profilo neutrale nelle discussioni tra Italia e Malta”. Solo successivamente si scopre che il 15 aprile 2020 una delle barche è arrivata a Tripoli dopo aver ricevuto l’assistenza di una nave commerciale nella zona Sar maltese: 51 persone superstiti, cinque morti. Il 4 maggio 2020 sempre il Frontex situation center chiede di riclassificare l’incidente nella “Categoria quattro”. Ma da Varsavia, sede dell’Agenzia, l’obiettivo è uno: fare in modo che la competenza non passi all’ufficio che si occupa dei diritti umani. La giustificazione? “Non vedo l’interesse di cambiare la classificazione, né il valore aggiunto di avere un Fundamental rights officer in sovrapposizione con le inchieste giudiziarie a Malta”. L’Olaf osserva, tra l’altro, come sia lo stesso regolamento che, in caso di incidenti gravi, non distingue tra “operazioni congiunte di Frontex con gli Stati membri o semplici attività messe in atto dalla stessa Agenzia”. Come in questo caso.

      Il copione si ripete, pochi giorni dopo, nel Mar Egeo. Nella notte tra il 18 e il 19 aprile dello stesso anno la sorveglianza area di Frontex permette di osservare le attività della Guardia costiera greca: dopo aver intercettato, già nelle acque territoriali di competenza, una barca con a bordo alcuni naufraghi questi vengono caricati su un vascello delle autorità elleniche. Poco dopo, vengono nuovamente trasferiti sulla loro imbarcazione e trainati verso le acque territoriali turche dove vengono lasciati in balia delle onde, senza motore, alle sei del mattino. Come nel caso descritto precedentemente viene richiesta la “Categoria quattro” anche perché in questo episodio un video ricostruisce quanto avvenuto: l’ufficiale scrive via WhatsApp che si tratta di “un nuovo caso, molto più problematico” a dimostrazione del “sistematico” utilizzo di questi metodi di respingimento. Ma da Varsavia arriva lo steso messaggio: “Frontex non ha assetti coinvolti, la segnalazione ricade nella ‘Categoria due’”. Nei giorni successivi si susseguono le richieste per riclassificare la segnalazione. Tutto resta uguale e addirittura il report viene classificato come “riservato” e raggiunge un numero ristretto di destinatari. Il Fundamental rights officer non riceverà mai il report finale di questo evento.

      Quando sul confine greco-turco si susseguono i casi descritti (dall’aprile 2020 a oggi secondo la ricerca del Forensic Architecture, l’Agenzia è stata coinvolta in 122 casi drift-back ed era a conoscenza di 417 che sono stati registrati negli archivi operativi e mascherati come “prevenzioni nell’ingresso”) la soluzione di Frontex va alla radice. Viene messo in discussione il termine respingimenti “che giuridicamente non esiste e non è possibile dire con certezza che siano tali anche considerando che la Turchia e le Ong hanno interessi comuni” ma soprattutto vengono “rimossi gli occhi scomodi”. Così il 5 agosto 2020 (“Senza alcun senso da un punto di vista di operazione Sar”, ha spiegato all’Olaf un agente) a seguito dell’ennesima procedura di traino della Guardia costiera greca verso la Turchia l’aereo dell’Agenzia viene “spostato a sorvegliare il confine terrestre greco facendolo muovere avanti e indietro per nove volte tra due punti in cui nessuna attività era stata osservata”. Il 7 settembre, un mese dopo, il velivolo viene ricollocato nel Mediterraneo centrale. Meglio non vedere quello che succede in Grecia.

      Dal rapporto emergono anche marcate fratture interne. Un membro del personale afferma che l’ufficio per i diritti fondamentali “non sono veri colleghi” mentre un altro agente osserva che “è il primo [nemico, ndr] di Frontex perché riferisce tutto alle Ong e fa regnare all’interno dell’Agenzia un regime di terrore simile a quello dei Khmer rossi”. E non stupisce che l’Ufficio non abbia mai avuto accesso a Eurosur, il Sistema europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere che è il “cuore” delle prove dei respingimenti. A tutto questo si aggiunge la pessima gestione interna: si registra un suicidio di un membro legato a “presunte pratiche di molestie sessuali” e nel 2020 su 17 casi segnalati di molestie, 15 sono stati chiusi senza seguito.

      Questa è Frontex. Nonostante dal board dell’Agenzia si siano affrettati a dichiarare che “queste pratiche appartengono al passato” così come la Commissaria agli affari interni Ylva Johansson che si è definita “scioccata” ma “sicura che il consiglio di amministrazione si è assunto pienamente le proprie responsabilità”. “L’Agenzia ha problemi strutturali -osserva Salzano-. Finché non si risolvono è difficile che il suo mandato possa rispettare il diritto internazionale e quello dell’Unione europea. E l’unico passo possibile in questa direzione è una sentenza della Corte di giustizia che ristabilisca i confini del suo operato. Olaf segna un punto di svolta perché l’illegalità è finalmente certificata da un corpo dell’Ue ma resta un ente amministrativo, non una Corte”.

      L’Agenzia infatti è ancora lì (e nessun provvedimento disciplinare è stato preso contro l’ex direttore Leggeri e il suo ex capo di gabinetto, come nota con “rammarico” il Parlamento europeo), sulle frontiere tra Grecia e Turchia (e non solo) dove i respingimenti, così come le condanne della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nei confronti del governo di Atene, sono proseguiti sistematicamente. E la scusa del “se c’è Frontex si rispettano maggiormente i diritti umani” oggi vacilla ancora di più. Fa poi riflettere che il rapporto Olaf, chiuso nel febbraio 2022, sia rimasto per mesi inaccessibile anche agli stessi parlamentari europei e che solo la sua pubblicazione da parte di alcuni quotidiani e Ong abbia portato l’assemblea di Strasburgo a votare nuovamente il discarico sul bilancio di Frontex e a parlare apertamente di quanto successo.

      https://altreconomia.it/certificate-le-pratiche-illegali-di-frontex-ma-lagenzia-resta-a-operare

  • [Rapport] Le storytelling armé à la française | Emma Soubrier
    https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/defense-industries,-foreign-policy-and-armed-conflict:-french-study

    Dans le discours de la France sur ses exportations d’armes, les processus sont décrits comme « stricts, transparents et responsables » et les ventes d’armes comme un soutien intrinsèquement essentiel à l’autonomie stratégique et aux intérêts de politique étrangère du pays. L’analyse des exportations vers cinq zones de conflit suggère que cette perception de soi est au mieux incomplète, au pire, erronée. Source : World Peace Foundation

  • Stress, peur, pression : le difficile quotidien des salariés du réacteur nucléaire Iter
    https://reporterre.net/Stress-peur-pression-le-difficile-quotidien-des-salaries-du-reacteur-nuc

    « L’Organisation #Iter a instauré une gestion par la peur », a déclaré ce lundi 28 février Michel Claessens, directeur de la communication de 2011 à 2015 et « ITER policy officer » à la Commission européenne de 2016 à 2021. « Mes collègues subissent un stress insupportable, une peur omniprésente, la peur de parler. Il y a dans ce projet de pointe une omerta scientifique. Elle conduit à des dérives inacceptables concernant le personnel et la radioprotection. » Il était entendu lors d’une réunion exceptionnelle consacrée au projet Iter par la Commission de contrôle budgétaire du Parlement européen. Bernard Bigot, directeur de l’Organisation d’Iter, a annulé sa participation à la réunion au Parlement européen, expliquant dans un message qu’« il ne souhaitait pas s’exprimer en présence de Michel Claessens ». Cette rencontre a été organisée suite au rapport accablant de cet ancien directrice de la communication, spécialiste de la fusion, et au suicide en mai 2021 d’un ingénieur italien de 38 ans au sein de l’agence Fusion 4 Energy de Barcelone, qui coordonne le projet Iter au niveau européen.

    #nucléaire

  • AllôBercy
    https://allobercy.multinationales.org

    À l’occasion de la pandémie, les pouvoirs publics ont débloqué plus de 240 milliards d’euros d’aides pour les entreprises sans véritables conditions sociales, fiscales ou écologiques. Un soutien massif que nous risquons de payer au prix fort – et pas seulement du point de vue financier.

  • Épisode 3
    Surveillance made in France - Les mémos de la terreur
    Mardi 23 Novembre 2021
    https://egypt-papers.disclose.ngo/fr/chapter/surveillance-dassault

    (...) 65 000 opposants en prison

    Opposants politiques, journalistes, responsables d’ONG, homosexuels, grévistes… Depuis cinq ans, tous ceux qui ne pensent pas ou ne vivent pas selon les préceptes du régime militaire risquent la prison – près de 65 000 opposants croupiraient dans les geôles du régime, tandis que 3 000 autres auraient « disparu » après leur interpellation, selon le département d’Etat américain. Une répression sans précédent de la société civile égyptienne facilitée par un système de cybersurveillance massif installé par trois entreprises françaises, avec l’accord tacite des autorités.

    La première, baptisée Nexa Technologies, est dirigée par les fondateurs d’Amesys, une société accusée d’avoir fourni du matériel de surveillance à la dictature de Mouammar Kadhafi, en Libye. La deuxième, Ercom-Suneris – filiale de Thalès depuis 2019 – est connue pour sécuriser l’un des téléphones portables d’Emmanuel Macron. La troisième n’est autre que Dassault Systèmes, la filiale technologique du poids lourd de l’armement tricolore et constructeur de l’avion Rafale. Sollicités, Ercom-Suneris et Dassault Systèmes n’ont pas répondu à nos questions. (...)

    Episode 1 : Opération Sirli - Les mémos de la terreur
    https://seenthis.net/messages/937340

    Episode 2 Les mercenaires du ciel - Les mémos de la terreur
    https://seenthis.net/messages/937425
    #FranceEgypte

  • Les GAFAM échappent au RGPD, la CNIL complice
    https://www.laquadrature.net/2021/05/25/les-gafam-echappent-au-rgpd-avec-la-complicite-de-la-cnil

    Le 25 mai 2018, le RGPD entrait en application. Nous célébrions l’espoir qu’il renverse le modèle économique des GAFAM, qui font de nos #Données_personnelles une vulgaire monnaie d’échange. Porté·es par notre enthousiasme, nous déposions…

    • Conclusion

      Sur nos cinq plaintes, deux n’ont jamais été examinées (Google, Amazon), deux autres semblent faire l’objet de manœuvres dilatoires absurdes (Apple, Facebook) et la cinquième n’a pas davantage abouti sur quoi que ce soit de tangible en trois années (Linkedin).

      On l’a souligné plusieurs fois : si les GAFAM échappent aussi facilement au RGPD, ce n’est pas en raison de la complexité de nos affaires ou d’un manque de moyens matériels. Le budget annuel de la CNIL est de 18 millions d’euros et elle emploie 215 personnes. Au fil des ans et sur d’autres sujets, nous avons souvent échangé avec les personnes employées par la CNIL : leur maîtrise du droit des données personnelles est sincère. Elles partagent certainement nos frustrations dans une bonne mesure et n’auraient aucune difficulté à redresser la situation si on le leur demandait. Le RGPD leur donne toutes les cartes et, s’il en était besoin, nous leur avons explicitement pointé quelles cartes jouer.

      Si les causes de cet échec ne sont pas matérielles, elle ne peuvent être que politiques. La défaillance du RGPD vis à vis des GAFAM est si totale et flagrante qu’il est difficile d’imaginer qu’elle ne soit pas volontaire ou, tout le moins, sciemment permise. Les motivations d’une telle complicité sont hélas déjà bien identifiées : les GAFAM sont les fidèles partenaires des états pour maintenir l’ordre sur Internet. Plus que jamais, l’État français, dans sa dérive autoritaire, a tout intérêt à les maintenir au-dessus des lois pour leur laisser gérer la censure et la surveillance de masse.

      #RGPD #CNIL #complice #contrôle_citoyen #jouer_la_montre

  • Usbek & Rica - « Robots tueurs » : le « Oui » sous conditions du Comité d’éthique de la défense
    https://usbeketrica.com/fr/article/oui-robots-tueurs-oui-france

    "Systèmes d’armes létaux pleinement autonomes (SLA)" vs
    "Systèmes d’armes létaux intégrant de l’autonomie (SLAi)" : ou comment se dédouaner à bon compte du débat éthique sur les robots tueurs...

    Voir aussi :
    – le "Rapport d’information déposé par la commission de la défense nationale et des armées sur les systèmes d’armes létaux autonomes" : https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/275499-les-systemes-darmes-letaux-autonomes#panel-2
    ...et en particulier le chapitre III où l’on voit bien que, comme pour la reconnaissance faciale, le prétexte de ne pas handicaper la start-up nation justifie tous les renoncements éthiques :

    III. Le débat sur les SALA ne doit pas parasiter les efforts entrepris dans le domaine de l’autonomie des systèmes d’armes, au risque d’un déclassement technologique, industriel et stratégique

    – le site de la campagne "Stopper les robots tueurs" https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/?lang=fr qui affirme clairement au contraire que la solution est :

    Interdire le développement, la production et l’utilisation de l’armement entièrement autonome.

    #robot_tueur #stop_killer_robots #SLA #éthique #Comité_d’éthique_de_la_défense #assemblée_nationale #contrôle_citoyen