• New Frontex Regulation : corrected version of the text

    The European Parliament is due to approve a corrected version of the new Frontex Regulation, which was originally agreed between the Council and Parliament in April but has been undergoing revision by legal and linguistic specialists.

    See: REGULATION (EU) 2019/... OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of ... on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-frontex-regulation-ep-approved-corrected-version-2-10-19.pdf)

    And: the version initially agreed between the Parliament and Council in April (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/apr/eu-frontex-final-tAnnex%20to%20LIBE%20letter-EBCG-text.pdf)

    The Regulation was proposed in September 2018 and agreement was reached between the Parliament and Council in April 2019. The speed of the legislative process may explain why the text has to be corrected and approved in accordance with Rule 241 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-9-2019-07-02-RULE-241_EN.html).

    The headline change introduced by the new Regulation is a “standing corps” of 10,000 border guards. The official intention is to introduce the standing corps by 2027, but incoming Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has committed to doing so by 2024 - although an article in DW commented (https://www.dw.com/en/can-the-eus-ursula-von-der-leyen-fulfill-her-promises/a-49625188) that this “looks extremely unlikely, as the member states have repeatedly rejected the move.”

    The new Regulation will also give the agency expanded surveillance powers, an extended mandate in the field of deportations and new possibilities for cooperation with non-EU states. Under its current mandate, Frontex has already begun to operate outside the EU, with an operation launched in Albania in May.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-new-frontex-reg.htm
    #frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-frontières_européens #gardes-frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Albanie #surveillance #renvois #expulsions

    –---

    Sur la coopération avec l’Albanie, voir :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/782260

  • Dictators as 
Gatekeepers for Europe : 
Outsourcing EU border 
controls to Africa

    The USA is divided around the wall President Trump wants to build along the Mexican border. Europe has long answered this question at its own southern border: put up that wall but don’t make it look like one.

    Today the EU is trying to close as many deals as it can with African states, making it harder and harder for refugees to find protection and more dangerous for labour migrants to reach places where they can earn an income. But this is not the only effect: the more Europe tries to control migration from Africa, the harder it becomes for many Africans to move freely through their own continent, even within their own countries.

    Increasingly, the billions Europe pays for migration control are described as official development assistance (ODA), more widely known as development aid, supposedly for poverty relief and humanitarian assistance. The EU is spending billions buying African leaders as gatekeepers, including dictators and suspected war criminals. And the real beneficiaries are the military and technology corporations involved in the implementation.

    https://darajapress.com/publication/dictators-as-%e2%80%a8gatekeepers-for-europe-%e2%80%a8outsourcing-eu-bo
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #dictature #dictatures #Afrique #contrôles_frontaliers #fermeture_des_frontières #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #développement #livre

    Ajouté à la métaliste autour de l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765340

    Et celle-ci sur le lien migrations et développement :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

    ping @karine4 @isskein @pascaline

    • Op-ed: The Birth Defect of EU Migration Diplomacy

      Prevention of migration to Europe, especially from Africa, was a priority of the previous Commission and, as it looks, likely to remain as such for the new Commission.

      This makes it increasingly difficult for refugees to find protection. And it is becoming increasingly dangerous for migrant workers to reach places where they can seek income. But that is not the only consequence. The more Europe tries to control migration, the more difficult it becomes for many Africans to move freely within their own continent, even within their own country.

      The EU investment is substantial. From the beginning of the millennium until 2015, the figure was around two billion euros. By 2020, at least another 15 billion euros will have been added. The EU will pay for the costs incurred by controlling migration itself: supplying detained refugees, jeeps or ships for the border police, deportations, reception camps. But it gives even more, in a sense as a premium: an extra portion of development aid for the coalition of the willing in matters of border protection.

      Some African states, such as Tunisia, therefore make it a punishable offence to leave for Europe without papers. Some save themselves such a law and imprison migrants just like that – for example Libya. Some set up border posts where there haven’t been any so far – Sudan, for example. Some introduce biometric passports that many of their citizens cannot afford – such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which charges 185 dollars for one of the new so-called e-passports produced by a Belgian-Arab consortium. Some take back deportees from Europe, even if they are not their own citizens – for example Morocco. Some states block migration routes with soldiers – Egypt, for example. Some allow Frontex and European Police-Officers to come and help with this – Niger, for example. And some close the borders: not only for transit migrants, but also for their own citizens if they want to enter Europe irregularly – Algeria, for example.

      More and more often, the money paid in return for controlling migration is booked as Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is a misappropriation of funds that are there to alleviate poverty and hardship. It also contradicts the sense of development aid because labour migration is a blessing for poor countries. It brings money into the coffers of small traders and farmers. This mixture of development aid and migration control will increase. “Combating the root causes” is the new paradigm of development policy.

      Günter Nooke, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Africa Commissioner, had an idea on what Africa’s future could look like. In October 2018 he proposed that African states should give up parts of their territory against payment so that the EU could settle refugees there: “Perhaps one or the other African head of government is prepared to give up a piece of territorial sovereignty in exchange for a lease and allow free development there for 50 years. Migrants could be settled there in special economic zones, supported by the World Bank or the EU or individual states.” Such statements are hardly beneficial neither in the formal relationship between Europe and Africa nor in broader segments of the public on the African continent.

      But the cordon sanitaire that the EU is trying to weave against undesirable migration is full of holes. The blueprint agreement with Turkey is crumbling. The number of arrivals in the Aegean islands is currently higher than at any other time since the EU-Turkey deal came into force. Boats from Libya keep leaving, arrivals in Morocco increases.

      The massive political pressure that had been built up for the African states to recognise for example the EU „Laissez Passers“ – passport replacement papers that the deportation country can simply issue itself – or otherwise contribute to increasing the deportations of those obliged to leave has had only a limited effect. And last February, the African Union made it clear that it will not accept transit EU asylum camps on African soil.

      Neither the transit regions nor the regions of origin will let themselves be used in the long term as reception camps or assistant EU border guards. The consequence of this is that the EU cannot solve its migration problem outside its own territory on the long run. The old Commission had consistently refused to accept this insight. The new Commission would now have the opportunity not to repeat this mistake.

      https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-the-birth-defect-of-eu-migration-diplomacy

  • Une journée avec les hommes et les femmes de Frontex

    Chaque jour ils surveillent, contrôlent, lisent avec attention vos documents. Les employés de Frontex sont au taquet. L’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes a pour mission principale d’aider les Etats membres de l’Union européenne et de l’espace Schengen à sécuriser leurs frontières extérieures. Elle dispose d’une réserve de réaction rapide de 1500 agents et sera dotée, progressivement jusqu’à 2027, d’un corps permanent de 10.000 agents.

    Les hommes et les femmes qui la composent traquent la moindre anomalie, le moindre document frauduleux. Au moindre doute, tout votre véhicule est fouillé.

    Frontex dirige des opérations maritimes, aériennes et terrestres (en Méditerranée et dans les pays de l’Est notamment). Elles sont menées par des garde-frontières mis à la disposition de l’agence par les Etats membres. Ils sont reconnaissables à leur brassard ou leur dossard bleu clair et sont toujours accompagnés par des agents de l’Etat membre dans lequel a lieu l’opération.

    A l’été 2018 par exemple, dans le cadre de l’opération opération Minerva, Frontex a aidé les autorités espagnoles à contrôler les passagers arrivant du Maroc par ferry. L’agence avait également déployé des experts en documents contrefaits et des agents formés pour repérer les véhicules volés.

    https://ds1.static.rtbf.be/article/image/770xAuto/5/b/b/b8d4c4953a1d60bd9cf28d042fa96f59-1568391909.pngCertains week-ends jusqu’à 100.000 voyageurs et 20.000 véhicules différents sont contrôlés au poste frontière de Medika. D’un côté c’est l’Europe. De l’autre, l’Ukraine. Un point de passage idéal pour a trafiquants en tout genre, drogue, contrebande, contrefaçon. Pour les affronter, une coopération internationale est tout simplement indispensable.

    En matière de lutte contre l’immigration illégale, Frontex coordonne aussi des opérations de renvoi de migrants irréguliers vers leurs pays d’origine (chaque Etat membre restant libre de déterminer quelle personne doit être renvoyée). Elle peut aider les États membres à financer les opérations de retour et à coopérer avec les pays tiers chargés des procédures de réadmission.

    L’Agence européenne assure également une veille permanente de la situation aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et de l’espace Schengen : elle analyse les tendances et collecte des données sur les personnes liées aux filières d’immigration clandestine ou aux activités criminelles transfrontalières (trafics, terrorisme, pêches illégales…). Elle transmet ces informations aux Etats membres et à l’office européen de police Europol.

    Une vocation familiale

    Piotr Wiciejowski a toujours voulu être soldat, il faut dire que c’est une tradition dans la famille. Sauf qu’il a choisi la protection des frontières comme terrain de chasse. Aujourd’hui il coordonne l’agence européenne Frontex à Medyka.

    Dans le même bureau travaillent un Polonais, un Autrichien, un Portugais, un Letton et un Moldave. Tous ont des expériences différentes mais un même objectif : agir rapidement et compter les uns sur les autres.

    « On contrôle les polices d’assurance, les documents de voiture, les passeports, les papiers de voyage, les visas et même les cartes de pêche. » Explique Piotr Wiciejowski.

    La détection des faux documents est une priorité dans la profession et un succès face aux criminels.

    « Notre groupe s’entraîne constamment. Nous avons des spécialistes de la contrefaçon de documents, de la détection des documents de voitures volées, nous partageons les expériences de nos collègues des services de police et des services des frontières d’autres pays de l’Union européenne. » ajoute le garde-frontière.

    En 2018, 1500 faux documents d’identité ont été saisis à la frontière orientale de l’Union européenne. La contrebande est un aussi un défi aux postes frontières. Drogues, alcool sans accise, cigarettes permettent aux organisations criminelles de gagner beaucoup d’argent.

    Un agent témoigne anonymement. « Il s’agit d’un secteur très lucratif pour les groupes criminels, c’est de l’argent facile à gagner, il n’est pas étonnant que des personnes peu scrupuleuses tentent leur chance. Mais nous sommes là pour l’éviter. »

    Les passeurs rivalisent d’imagination pour cacher leur marchandise. Mais les hommes de Frontex ne sont pas dupes et les chiens détecteurs de drogue par exemple, sont très utiles pour dénicher les cargaisons frauduleuses.

    « L’innovation et la créativité de ces groupes criminels n’ont pas de limite » explique le garde.

    Piotr Wiciejowski sait que toutes les voitures doivent être soigneusement contrôlées à la frontière de Medyka. C’est le dernier point de passage pour qu’un véhicule volé ne disparaît complètement des radars. La lutte contre les voleurs de voitures est possible grâce à la coopération internationale. En 2018, près de 1000 voitures volées ont été interceptées aux frontières de l’Union européenne. « Nous venons de saisir une voiture Jaguar en version limitée, d’une valeur marchande supérieure à 400.000 PLN. (Soit 92.313 euros) Lors des contrôles frontaliers en Pologne, il s’est avéré que les numéros d’identification et les papiers de la voiture étaient contrefaits », explique une responsable du bureau polonais.

    Lorsqu’un agent doit vérifier un document ou obtenir des informations rapidement, les employés de Frontex peuvent immédiatement contacter leurs collègues européens. Le temps et la rapidité de réaction sont au détriment des criminels." Si quelqu’un franchit la frontière de notre côté, il peut ensuite arriver facilement à Lisbonne, au Portugal. Nous sommes donc tenus de travailler d’une façon précise et la plus professionnelle possible. Nous sentons la pression sur nous, mais nous la gérons très bien. "

    Lorsqu’ils rentrent dans leur pays, les employés de Frontex ont acquis de nouvelles expériences tout en contribuant à protéger la frontière orientale de l’Union européenne. Une coopération qui joue aussi sur la dissuasion. Les hommes de Frontex veulent aussi donner l’impression aux trafiquants qu’ils ne peuvent leur échapper.

    https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_ces-heros-du-quotidien-les-hommes-et-les-femmes-de-frontex?id=10313604
    #Frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #témoignage #gardes-frontière #travail #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    • Frontex, rempart de l’Europe forteresse !

      À la lecture de l’article paru sur le site de la RTBF du 21 septembre dernier[1], initialement titré “Ces héros du quotidien : les hommes et les femmes de Frontex” et rebaptisé quelques heures plus tard “Une journée avec les hommes et les femmes de Frontex”, nous aurions pu croire qu’il s’agissait d’une campagne de recrutement pour cet organisme européen. “Travailler pour Frontex, c’est agir pour la collectivité” ; “travailler pour Frontex, c’est se réaliser” ; “travailler pour Frontex, c’est faire partie de la grande Europe” semble affirmer ce papier. Mais sous des faux-semblants d’objectivité, cet article nous apparaît clairement partial étant donné l’omission de nombreuses informations.

      Melting-pot nauséabond

      Non, Frontex n’a pas un rôle émancipateur mais est un outil de répression et de blocage des arrivant.e.s et migrant.e.s avant qu’ils.elles ne touchent le sol de l’Union européenne ou de l’Espace Schengen.

      Or, les raisons d’être de Frontex – en réalité, celles que l’autrice a choisi de présenter – s’égrènent tout au long de l’article sous un jour positif. Nous y apprenons que les employé.e.s se dévouent pour nous protéger de la drogue, de la criminalité, des trafics en tout genre… mais aussi de l’immigration “illégale”. Il s’agirait donc de nuisances multiples agrégeables en un tout homogène. Autrement dit, les Européen.ne.s, honnêtes citoyen.ne.s, seraient menacé.e.s et l’objet du malheur viendrait, forcément, de l’extérieur. Cette idée prend appui sur une sémantique très orientée : “sécurité”, “protection”, “affrontement”, “terrain de chasse” (l’Europe serait-elle un terrain de chasse ?!)...

      Paresse intellectuelle et alimentation des peurs constituent donc le ton de cet article. À l’heure où l’extrême droite, véritable menace, gangrène toute l’Europe, nous ne pouvons nous y résoudre. Dès lors, nous formulons une série d’interrogations.

      Quels sont les effets possibles de ce type d’article ? A titre d’illustration, de la perception de menaces à l’armement des agents[2], il n’y a qu’un pas… que la Commission européenne a déjà franchi… et que l’article de la RTBF ne mentionne pas.

      Faut-il, une fois de plus, assimiler l’immigration à une menace ? Faut-il associer l’immigration au trafic de drogue ? À la criminalité ? Faut-il rappeler que les migrant.e.s sont en danger et que les politiques migratoires européennes tuent ? L’Europe, érigée en terre isolée, a déjà laissé périr 30 000 personnes depuis l’année 2000, rien qu’en Méditerranée (selon The Migrants files). Pourtant elles tentaient seulement de fuir des guerres, des traitements iniques et des conditions de vie indignes. Leurs espoirs se heurtent aux murs d’une Europe érigée en forteresse. Cela, l’article ne le mentionne pas non plus. Ne nous y trompons pas : ce ne sont pas “seulement” des personnes qui nous sont étrangères qui décèdent. Nous affirmons que chaque corps qui se noie, chaque vie arrachée s’accompagne de l’amenuisement de notre conscience et de nos valeurs. Voilà bien une menace réelle.

      Angles-morts de l’article

      Le fait que Frontex soit très fort critiqué par des associations ne figure pas non plus dans l’article. Les actions de ces “héros” (comme le titrait au départ la journaliste rédactrice) sont dénoncées par de nombreuses associations (Agir pour la Paix, CNCD, Migreurop, à titre d’illustrations). Beaucoup de critiques venant du monde journalistique ont été faites concernant le manque de transparence de l’agence de contrôle des frontières. Le Guardian, notamment, avait déclaré que Frontex se rendait coupable de violations des droits fondamentaux. Par ailleurs, le journaliste allemand Arne Semsrott et l’espagnole Luisa Izuzquiza, une militante du droit à l’information avaient déposé plainte contre Frontex pour manque de transparence. Nous aurions aimé a minima une solidarité journalistique de la part de la RTBF[3]

      L’article omet également de mentionner ce que Frontex nous coûte. Cette agence, garante de l’Europe forteresse, a investi, depuis l’an 2000… 15 milliards d’euros pour barricader ses frontières qui n’ont pour effet que de garder les personnes migrantes prisonnières à l’intérieur de nos murs physiques et numériques (fichages et contrôles) en complément d’une politique de l’externalisation (Turquie, Maghreb, Libye, collaborant ainsi avec des régimes autoritaires sinon des dictatures) qui représentent un marché lucratif, impossible à mener sans des politiques sécuritaires (et corollaires, racistes).

      Frontex et ses dérives

      Ce sont bien les mesures de nos gouvernements démocratiques qui ont préféré investir des milliards d’euros dans des moyens issus de la haute technologie sécuritaire prônée par Frontex, distillant le principe de la libre circulation des capitaux, au détriment de la sécurité des personnes qui sont forcées de fuir la misère, les changements climatiques ou les dictatures.

      Ainsi, durant la récente période des “vacances”, des centaines de personnes sont mortes en mer, contraintes de fuir dans des embarcations de fortune, faute d’obtenir des moyens légaux de quitter des terres hostiles. Les avions et bateaux de Frontex ont empêché les missions de sauvetage des ONG en criminalisant leurs actions, en les poursuivant pour délit de solidarité ou en les accusant de trafic d’êtres humains. Notons que cette épée de Damoclès poursuit également les hébergeur.se.s aujourd’hui.

      Questionner la déontologie journalistique

      Cet article s’avère donc problématique, et ce, à bien des égards. En plus des questions soulevées précédemment, nous questionnons l’aspect déontologique. La mission du journalisme est d’informer et non de faire du publi-reportage. Faut-il le rappeler ?

      Certes, protéger un territoire des trafics en tout genre, comme la criminalité, est indispensable. Néanmoins, Frontex, comme nous l’avons démontré, c’est avant tout le rempart de l’Europe forteresse.

      Ce reportage unilatéral, partiel et partial est-il digne de l’ambition de la RTBF qui est d’offrir à ses auditeur.trice.s une information de qualité et de référence ? On attend mieux du service public.

      Aucun des médias principaux de la presse écrite de Belgique francophone n’a accepté positivement notre carte blanche selon nos conditions, à savoir qu’elle soit l’objet d’un article à part entière.

      Conclusion

      Le contrôle des murs aux frontières de l’Europe est le problème et non la solution. La hiérarchisation entre les personnes, la catégorisation entre celles et ceux qui ont le droit d’avoir des droits ou non sur le sol européen doit cesser. Les personnes qui risquent leur vie aux frontières doivent être sauvées et accueillies dignement. La solidarité est la seule solution pour faire face aux défis climatiques, démocratiques et économiques à venir.

      https://blogs.mediapart.fr/collectif-citoyen-belge/blog/270919/frontex-rempart-de-l-europe-forteresse
      #journalisme #presse #fact-checking
      ping @karine4

  • #Soudan : les #milices #Janjawid garde-frontières ou #passeurs ?

    Dans un communiqué, les #Forces_de_soutien_rapide (#RSF), groupe paramilitaire servant de “garde-frontières” au Soudan, ont annoncé avoir arrêté 138 migrants africains, jeudi 19 septembre. Pour le spécialiste Jérôme Tubiana, cette annonce fait partie d’une stratégie : le Soudan cherche à attirer l’attention de l’Union européenne qui a arrêté de lui verser des fonds.

    Les Forces de soutien rapide (RSF), une organisation paramilitaire soudanaise, ont annoncé avoir arrêté, jeudi 19 septembre, 138 Africains qui souhaitaient pénétrer “illégalement” en Libye. Parmi eux, se trouvaient des dizaines de Soudanais mais aussi des Tchadiens et des Éthiopiens.

    "Le 19 septembre, une patrouille des RSF a arrêté 138 personnes de différentes nationalités qui essayaient de traverser illégalement la frontière avec la Libye", précise le communiqué.

    Une partie de ces migrants ont été incarcérés dans la zone désertique de #Gouz_Abudloaa, situé environ à 100 km au nord de Khartoum, comme ont pu le constater des journalistes escortés sur place par des RSF, mercredi 25 septembre. Dans le communiqué, les RSF assurent également avoir saisi six véhicules appartenant à des passeurs libyens chargés du transit des migrants.

    Le même jour, le Soudan a décidé de fermer ses #frontières avec la Libye et la Centrafrique pour des raisons de sécurité. Dans les faits, le pays souhaite mettre fin aux départs de rebelles soudanais vers la Libye, qui sont parfois rejoints par des migrants.

    Créées en 2013 par l’ex-président soudanais, Omar el-Béchir, les RSF assurent le maintien de l’ordre dans le pays. Trois ans après leur création, elles ont été dotées d’une mission supplémentaire : empêcher les migrants et les rebelles de franchir les frontières nationales. C’est ce que montrent notamment des chercheurs dans un rapport publié par un think tank néerlandais, Clingendael, publié en septembre 2018.

    Les Forces de soutien rapide, véritables gardes-frontières du Soudan

    Si le document pointe une politique soudanaise de surveillance des frontières "en grande partie assignée aux ‘forces de soutien rapide’ (RSF)", derrière cette appellation officielle, se cache une réalité plus sombre. Connue localement sous le nom de Janjawid, cette milice fait notamment l’objet d’une enquête du Conseil militaire de transition, qui dirige le Soudan depuis la destitution, le 11 avril, du président Omar el-Béchir.

    D’après les conclusions de l’enquête, rendues publiques samedi 27 juillet, les RSF auraient frappé et tiré sur des manifestants lors d’un sit-in, le 3 juin, à Khartoum, alors qu’ils étaient venus protester contre la politique d’Omar el-Béchir. Si d’après un groupe de médecins, 127 manifestants ont été tués, le commission d’enquête compte, de son côté, 87 morts. Cette répression violente avait provoqué, dans la foulée, un levé de boucliers à l’échelle internationale.

    Un groupe armé qui a bénéficié de fonds européens

    Certains RSF sont aussi accusés d’avoir commis des exactions dans la région du Darfour, à l’ouest du Soudan. Le rapport précise pourtant que, grâce aux fonds versés par l’Union européenne, ils “sont mieux équipés, mieux financés et déployés non seulement au Darfour, mais partout au Soudan". D’après ce document, "160 millions d’euros ont été alloués au Soudan" entre 2016 et 2017. Et, une partie de cet argent a été versé par Khartoum aux RSF. Leur chef, Hemeti, est d’ailleurs officiellement le numéro 2 du Conseil militaire de transition.

    Fin juillet, l’Union européenne a toutefois annoncé le gel de ses financements au Soudan. "L’Union européenne a pris peur. Elle a considéré que cette coopération avec le Soudan était mauvaise pour son image car, depuis plusieurs années, elle finançait un régime très violent envers les migrants et les civils", explique Jérôme Tubiana, chercheur spécialiste du Soudan et co-auteur du rapport néerlandais.

    Non seulement les passeurs demandent de l’argent aux migrants mais ce ne sont pas les seuls à leur en réclamer. "La milice Janjawid taxe les migrants, elle joue à un double-jeu", dénonce sur RFI, Clotilde Warin, journaliste chercheuse et co-auteure du rapport. "Les miliciens […] qui connaissent très bien la zone frontalière entre le Soudan, le Tchad et le Niger […] deviennent eux-mêmes des passeurs, ils utilisent les voitures de l’armée soudanaise, le fuel de l’armée soudanaise. C’est un trafic très organisé."

    "Les RSF profitent de leur contrôle de la route migratoire pour vendre les migrants à des trafiquants libyens", ajoute, de son côté, Jérôme Tubiana, qui estime que ces miliciens s’enrichissent plus sur le dos des migrants qu’ils ne les arrêtent.

    Annoncer l’arrestation d’un convoi est donc un moyen, pour les RSF, de faire du chantage à l’Europe. "Ils essayent de lui dire que si elle veut moins de migrants sur son territoire, elle doit apporter son soutien aux RSF car, ils sont les seuls à connaître cette région dangereuse", précise Jérôme Tubiana, ajoutant qu’Hemeti, fragilisé, est en recherche de soutiens politiques.

    Un membre des RSF, interrogé dans le cadre de l’enquête néerlandaise, reconnaît lui-même le rôle actif de la milice dans le trafic des migrants. "De temps en temps, nous interceptons des migrants et nous les transférons à Khartoum, afin de montrer aux autorités que nous faisons le travail. Nous ne sommes pas censés prendre l’argent des migrants, [nous ne sommes pas censés] les laisser s’échapper ou les emmener en Libye… Mais la réalité est assez différente…", lit-on dans le rapport.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/19795/soudan-les-milices-janjawid-garde-frontieres-ou-passeurs?ref=tw_i
    #gardes-frontière #para-militaires #paramilitaires #fermeture_des_frontières #maintien_de_l'ordre #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance_des_frontières #fonds_européen #Hemeti #armée #trafic_d'êtres_humains #armée_soudanaise #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières

    ping @karine4 @isskein @pascaline

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message804171

    • Une nouvelle de juillet 2019...

      EU suspends migration control projects in Sudan amid repression fears

      The EU has suspended projects targeting illegal migration in Sudan. The move comes amid fears they might have aided security forces responsible for violently repressing peaceful protests in the country, DW has learned.

      An EU spokesperson has confirmed to DW that a German-led project that organizes the provision of training and equipment to Sudanese border guards and police was “halted” in mid-March, while an EU-funded intelligence center in the capital, Khartoum, has been “on hold” since June. The EU made no public announcements at the time.

      The initiatives were paid for from a €4.5 billion ($5 billion) EU fund for measures in Africa to control migration and address its root causes, to which Germany has contributed over €160 million. Sudan is commonly part of migration routes for people aiming to reach Europe from across Africa.

      Critics had raised concerns that working with the Sudanese government on border management could embolden repressive state forces, not least the notorious Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, which is accused by Amnesty International of war crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region. An EU summary of the project noted that there was a risk that resources could be “diverted for repressive aims.”

      Support for police

      A wave of protest swept the country in December, with demonstrators calling for the ouster of autocratic President Omar al-Bashir. Once Bashir was deposed in April, a transitional military council, which includes the commander of the RSF as deputy leader, sought to restore order. Among various incidents of repression, the militia was blamed for a massacre on June 3 in which 128 protesters were reportedly killed.

      While the EU maintains it has provided neither funding nor equipment to the RSF, there is no dispute that Sudanese police, who also stand accused of brutally repressing the protests, received training under the programs.

      Dr. Lutz Oette, a human rights expert at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), told DW: “The suspension is the logical outcome of the change in circumstances but it exposes the flawed assumptions of the process as far as working with Sudan is concerned.”

      Oette said continuing to work with the Sudanese government would have been incompatible with the European Union’s positions on human rights, and counterproductive to the goal of tackling the root causes of migration.

      Coordination center

      The intelligence center, known as the Regional Operational Center in Khartoum (ROCK), was to allow the security forces of nine countries in the Horn of Africa to share intelligence about human trafficking and people smuggling networks.

      A spokesperson for the European Commission told DW the coordination center had been suspended since June “until the political/security situation is cleared,” with some of its staff temporarily relocated to Nairobi, Kenya. Training and some other activities under the Better Migration Management (BMM) program were suspended in mid-March “because they require the involvement of government counterparts to be carried out.” The EU declined to say whether the risk of support being provided to repressive forces had contributed to the decision.

      The spokesperson said other EU activities that provide help to vulnerable people in the country were continuing.

      An official EU document dated December 2015 noted the risk that the provision of equipment and training to security services and border guards could be “diverted for repressive aims” or subject to “criticism by NGOs and civil society for engaging with repressive governments on migration (particularly in Eritrea and Sudan).”

      ’Regular monitoring’

      The BMM program is being carried out by a coalition of EU states — France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom — and aid agencies led by the German development agency GIZ. It includes projects in 11 African countries under the auspices of the “Khartoum process,” an international cooperation initiative targeting illegal migration.

      The ROCK intelligence center, which an EU document shows was planned to be situated within a Sudanese police training facility, was being run by the French state-owned security company Civipol.

      The EU spokesperson said, “Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.”

      “All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.

      A spokesperson for GIZ said: “The participant lists of BMM’s training courses are closely coordinated with the [Sudanese government] National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking (NCCHT) to prevent RSF militiamen taking part in training activities.”

      The GIZ spokesperson gave a different explanation for the suspension to that of the EU, saying the program had been stopped “in order not to jeopardize the safety of [GIZ] employees in the country.” The spokesperson added: “Activities in the field of policy harmonization and capacity building have slowly restarted.”

      https://www.dw.com/en/eu-suspends-migration-control-projects-in-sudan-amid-repression-fears/a-49701408

      #police #Regional_Operational_Center_in_Khartoum (#ROCK) #Better_Migration_Management (#BMM) #processus_de_Khartoum

      Et ce subtil lien entre migrations et #développement :

      Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.

      “All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.

      #GIZ

      Ajouté à la métaliste #migrations et développement :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

  • A #Split, l’Europe tente de former les #gardes-côtes_libyens

    La mission militaire européenne #Sophia a accepté, pour la première fois et dans des conditions strictes, d’ouvrir à un journaliste l’une des formations qu’elle dispense depuis 2016.

    « Vous ne pourrez pas rester au-delà d’une matinée » ; « Tout sujet politique doit être évité » ; « Vous ne pourrez pas interviewer les élèves »… Après plusieurs demandes, la mission militaire européenne Sophia a accepté, pour la première fois et dans des conditions strictes, d’ouvrir à un journaliste l’une des formations qu’elle dispense depuis 2016 à des gardes-côtes et d’autres membres de la #marine_libyenne.

    En ce mois de septembre, sur la base navale de Split (#Croatie), onze militaires libyens participent à un cours avancé de #plongée_sous-marine, dispensé par d’anciens membres des forces spéciales croates. Dans une salle de classe, on les retrouve en tenue, chemises bleues, pantalons marine, mocassins noirs et casquettes neuves sur lesquelles a été brodé au fil jaune, en anglais, « #Libyan_Navy ». Ils s’appellent Saïd, Aymen, Tabal… La plupart sont sous-officiers et ont entre 20 et 35 ans. Au tableau, un instructeur, traduit en arabe par un interprète, déroule le programme de la journée.

    Volet controversé de l’aide apportée par l’Union européenne (UE) à la Libye pour lutter contre l’immigration clandestine, le soutien aux gardes-côtes a accompagné le désengagement des secours venus des Etats membres en Méditerranée centrale et le transfert à la Libye de la coordination des sauvetages au large de ses côtes, autrefois assumée par l’Italie. L’opération Sophia avait été lancée en 2015 après une série de naufrages afin de « démanteler les modèles économiques des passeurs ». A la demande de Rome, elle a, par la suite, été privée de ses navires pour se concentrer sur la surveillance aérienne.


    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/09/24/a-split-l-europe-tente-de-former-les-gardes-cotes-libyens_6012777_3210.html
    #formation #Frontex #asile #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #opération_Sophia #operation_Sophia

    ping @karine4

  • Le fichage. Note d’analyse ANAFE
    Un outil sans limites au service du contrôle des frontières ?

    La traversée des frontières par des personnes étrangères est un « outil » politique et médiatique, utilisé pour faire accepter à la population toutes les mesures toujours plus attentatoires aux libertés individuelles, au nom par exemple de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le prétexte sécuritaire est érigé en étendard et il est systématiquement brandi dans les discours politiques, assimilant ainsi migration et criminalité, non seulement pour des effets d’annonce mais de plus en plus dans les législations.
    Les personnes étrangères font depuis longtemps l’objet de mesures de contrôle et de surveillance. Pourtant, un changement de perspective s’est opéré pour s’adapter aux grands changements des politiques européennes vers une criminalisation croissante de ces personnes, en lien avec le développement constant des nouvelles technologies. L’utilisation exponentielle des fichiers est destinée à identifier, catégoriser, contrôler, éloigner et exclure. Et si le fichage est utilisé pour bloquer les personnes sur leurs parcours migratoires, il est aussi de plus en plus utilisé pour entraver les déplacements à l’intérieur de l’Union et l’action de militants européens qui entendent apporter leur soutien aux personnes exilées.
    Quelles sont les limites à ce développement ? Les possibilités techniques et numériques semblent illimitées et favorisent alors un véritable « business » du fichage.

    Concrètement, il existe pléthore de fichiers. Leur complexité tient au fait qu’ils sont nombreux, mais également à leur superposition. De ce maillage opaque naît une certaine insécurité juridique pour les personnes visées.
    Parallèlement à la multiplication des fichiers de tout type et de toute nature, ce sont désormais des questions liées à leur interconnexion[1], à leurs failles qui sont soulevées et aux abus dans leur utilisation, notamment aux risques d’atteintes aux droits fondamentaux et aux libertés publiques.

    Le 5 février 2019, un accord provisoire a été signé entre la présidence du Conseil européen et le Parlement européen sur l’interopérabilité[2] des systèmes d’information au niveau du continent pour renforcer les contrôles aux frontières de l’Union.

    http://www.anafe.org/IMG/pdf/note_-_le_fichage_un_outil_sans_limites_au_service_du_controle_des_frontieres

    #frontières #contrôle #surveillance #migration #réfugiés #fichage #interconnexion #interopérabilité

  • US Testing Autonomous Border-Patrol Drones

    #Planck_Aerosystems gets funding to try its small rotorcraft in operational environments over the next three to six months.

    The Customs and Border Protection agency is getting ready to test autonomous drones that can provide situational awareness for agents working between ports of entry.

    The agency has been working with colleagues at Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate Silicon Valley Innovation Program to build and test prototypes of Planck Aerosystems’ autonomous #small_unmanned_aircraft_systems, or #sUAS. The agencies announced a fourth round of funding Thursday, granting Planck $200,000 to test its #prototype in operational environments over the next three to six months.

    “Planck’s system capability enables a sUAS to launch from and land on the bed of a moving vehicle, in addition to providing fully autonomous navigation coupled with a securing mechanism, advanced computer vision capabilities and customized communications interfaces,” according to the announcement from S&T. “Through a combination of integrated technologies, including full-motion video, automatic target detection and geolocation, Planck seeks to provide CBP agents with a portable, ruggedized detection system that provides real-time situational awareness in the field.”

    The Silicon Valley Innovation Program uses the department’s other transaction authority to foster development of technologies that can be applied directly to agency missions. As part of the incremental funding structure, the program offers individual projects up to $800,000 across four phases, beginning with $50,000 to $200,000 awarded to develop a proof-of-concept demo.

    If the demo is successful, S&T can opt to continue the project with an award of between $50,000 and $200,000 for phase two, which consists of building a pilot-ready prototype within three to six months. Phases three and four—with the same funding and time ranges—provide for testing the prototype through a pilot and in various operational scenarios, respectively.

    Planck Aerosystems’ project was awarded full funding for the fourth phase to begin testing its systems in live environments.

    “S&T is looking for technologies to enhance the efficacy of CBP patrols while simultaneously increasing the safety of patrolling agents,” said Melissa Oh, managing director of the Silicon Valley Innovation Program. “We look forward to the ways Planck will further refine its technology in support of this homeland security mission.”

    https://cdn.defenseone.com/b/defenseone/interstitial.html?v=9.4.0&rf=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defenseone.com%2Ftech

    #drones #drones_autonomes #militarisation_des_frontières #USA #Etats-Unis #Mexique #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #surveillance #contrôles_frontaliers

  • EU supports Bosnia and Herzegovina in managing migration with additional €10 million

    On 19 August 2019, the European Commission adopted a decision to allocate €10 million of additional funds to support Bosnia and Herzegovina addressing the increased presence of migrants and refugees. This additional allocation brings the total EU funding for migration to Bosnia and Herzegovina to €34 million since the beginning of 2018.

    The EU funds will be mainly used to set up additional temporary reception centres and provide basic services and protection, including food and accommodation, access to water sanitation and hygiene.

    The EU will also continue improving the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities for identification, registration and referral of third-country nationals crossing the border and for border control and surveillance, thereby also contributing to the fight against and prevention of migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and other types of cross-border crimes. It will also help the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin.

    Background

    Nearly 36,000 refugees and migrants entered Bosnia and Herzegovina since January 2018, according to official estimates. Approximately 7,400 refugees and migrants in need of assistance are currently present in the country, mostly in the Una-Sana Canton. Approximately 4,100 are accommodated in EU-funded temporary reception centres.

    Since 2007, the European Union has been providing assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina worth € 58.6 million in the area of migration and border management through the Instrument for pre-accession assistance. The country is also benefiting from the IPA regional programme ‘Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management’ worth up to €14.5 million.

    EU overall assistance already being implemented to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2018 to cope with the increased migratory presence amounts to €24 million (€20.2 million from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and €3.8 million of humanitarian aid). This supplementary allocation brings the total to €34 million. This is in addition to €24.6 million assistance the European Union has provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of asylum, migration and border management since 2007.

    http://europa.ba/?p=65185
    #EU #UE #Bosnie-Herzégovine #migrations #réfugiés #asile #aide_financière

    Aide à l’#accueil (dont #hébergement), mais évidemment aussi :

    The EU will also continue improving the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities for identification, registration and referral of third-country nationals crossing the border and for border control and surveillance, thereby also contributing to the fight against and prevention of migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and other types of cross-border crimes.

    #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #surveillance...
    Et aussi #identification #enregistrement...
    Encore une fois, donc, voici un bel exemple où sous couvert d’#aide_humanitaire, ce qu’on fait en réalité c’est... externaliser les contrôles frontaliers à un pays tiers... dans ce cas la Bosnie...
    Et #externalisation des procédures d’asile...

    J’ajoute à cette métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765335

    ping @isskein

  • On the Irish border lanes of Fermanagh, the bad old days are returning | UK news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/aug/24/fermanagh-irish-border-lanes-bad-old-days-returning-no-deal-brexit-bomb

    Boris Johnson vowed to preserve peace in Northern Ireland during diplomatic forays to Germany and France last week, saying “under no circumstances” would the UK put checks and controls on the border.

    The prime minister’s reassurance did not reach the narrow lanes and hedgerows of County Fermanagh. Here it felt like the bad old days had already returned.

    A helicopter and surveillance aircraft criss-crossed grey skies over the village of Newtownbutler, while in the fields below police and soldiers fanned out in the grim, familiar choreography of securing a bomb scene.

    #irlande_du_nord

  • #Frontex : repousser à tout prix

    Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-frontières, suscite la controverse. A plusieurs reprises, elle s’est retrouvée sous le feu des critiques en raison de violations des #droits_humains aux #frontières_extérieures de l’UE. Ces méfaits, commis par des gardes-frontières à l’encontre de personnes en quête de protection, étaient connus de l’agence, comme l’attestent des documents internes.

    Dissuader, repousser, s’isoler – telle pourrait être la devise de l’Europe quand il s’agit de garder ses frontières, quitte à bafouer les droits humains. Aux frontières extérieures de l’UE, chaque jour draine son lot de violence, de misère et de mort. Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côte, jouent à cet égard un rôle central.

    Récemment, des médias ont fait état d’un recours excessif à la force et de maltraitances à l’encontre des personnes cherchant protection aux frontières extérieures de l’UE. Ces informations ne surprennent pas : cela fait des années que des rapports signalent des refoulements à la frontière et d’autres violations des droits humains. L’OSAR condamne fermement ces violations massives des #droits_fondamentaux, qui privent les personnes en quête de protection d’une procédure d’asile. Or, demander l’asile est un droit humain et celui-ci s’applique à toute personne, peu importe comment elle est entrée dans le pays.
    Implication de la Suisse

    De par sa participation à Frontex, la Suisse est co-responsable des événements déplorables aux frontières extérieures de l’UE. Elle devrait mettre à profit sa coopération avec Frontex afin de promouvoir le respect des droits humains et d’établir des priorités en la matière. La Suisse doit œuvrer en faveur d’une surveillance des frontières conforme aux droits humains et de l’instauration de possibilités de recours en cas de violation. Il s’agit en effet de mettre en place un mécanisme de recours indépendant sur le plan institutionnel, qui soit facilement accessible aux victimes et qui soit en mesure de prendre des décisions juridiquement contraignantes. Dans les cas de décès survenus dans le cadre d’opérations de Frontex, des enquêtes doivent impérativement être ouvertes.

    En tant que membre de Schengen/Dublin, la Suisse est étroitement liée à la politique migratoire de l’UE. Depuis, 2009, elle est par ailleurs directement impliquée financièrement et opérationnellement dans Frontex. Le Corps suisse des gardes-frontières participe à des programmes de formation, à l’élaboration d’analyses de risques et à des opérations aux frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen. Chaque année, une quarantaine de membres du Corps suisse des gardes-frontières sont déployés aux frontières extérieures de l’Europe. Des fonctionnaires suisses travaillent pour Frontex en Grèce, en Italie, en Bulgarie, en Croatie et en Espagne. L’année dernière, les gardes-frontières suisses, les policiers cantonaux et les employés du Secrétariat d’État aux migrations ont ainsi totalisé près de 1 500 journées d’intervention. Par ailleurs, la Suisse a apporté en 2018 un soutien financier à Frontex pour un montant total d’environ 14 millions de francs, soit environ six fois plus qu’il y a dix ans.
    Frontex : un développement incontrôlé

    Frontex a été créée en 2004 pour assurer et faciliter la coordination des opérations et soutenir les contrôles aux frontières. L’agence surveille et contrôle les frontières extérieures de l’UE en déployant des unités de police européennes. Ces dernières années, Frontex n’a cessé d’étendre ses activités aux frontières, devenant l’instrument central de la politique de repoussoir européenne. En mai 2019, elle a lancé sa première opération en dehors de l’UE, en Albanie. Frontex a connu une croissance massive et continue de croître. Au moment de sa création, son budget s’élevait à six millions d’euros. D’ici 2021, il devrait augmenter de 1,6 milliard d’euros. Le nombre de collaborateurs de Frontex travaillant pour la protection des frontières devrait à l’avenir passer de 1 500 à 10 000. Parallèlement, Frontex gagne en indépendance vis-à-vis des États membres de l’UE. Ainsi, ses fonctionnaires seront désormais autorisés à effectuer des contrôles aux frontières et à collecter des données personnelles de manière indépendante. L’OSAR estime que cette évolution est préoccupante. Frontex évolue en effet dans un domaine délicat en matière de droits humains. Or, elle n’est soumise à aucun contrôle indépendant quant au respect des droits humains et n’offre aucun recours en cas de violation.

    https://www.osar.ch/news/archives/2019/frontex-repousser-a-tout-prix.html
    #Suisse #externalisation #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers

    La #contribution suisse à Frontex :

    En tant que membre de Schengen/Dublin, la Suisse est étroitement liée à la politique migratoire de l’UE. Depuis, 2009, elle est par ailleurs directement impliquée financièrement et opérationnellement dans Frontex. Le Corps suisse des gardes-frontières participe à des programmes de formation, à l’élaboration d’analyses de risques et à des opérations aux frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen. Chaque année, une quarantaine de membres du Corps suisse des gardes-frontières sont déployés aux frontières extérieures de l’Europe. Des fonctionnaires suisses travaillent pour Frontex en Grèce, en Italie, en Bulgarie, en Croatie et en Espagne. L’année dernière, les gardes-frontières suisses, les policiers cantonaux et les employés du Secrétariat d’État aux migrations ont ainsi totalisé près de 1 500 journées d’intervention. Par ailleurs, la Suisse a apporté en 2018 un soutien financier à Frontex pour un montant total d’environ 14 millions de francs, soit environ six fois plus qu’il y a dix ans.

    #budget

    ping @albertocampiphoto @daphne @i_s_ @isskein

  • #CIVIPOL au #Soudan

    L’Union européenne a suspendu ses programmes liés au #contrôle_migratoire au Soudan, en raison de la situation politique. CIVIPOL était en charge des programmes coordonnés par la #France. Présentation.

    CIVIPOL est défini comme "l’opérateur de #coopération_technique_internationale du ministère de l’Intérieur". C’est une #société_anonyme dont 40% du capital son détenus par l’État et 60% par des acteurs privés comme #Airbus, #Safran, #Thalès et d’autres, ainsi que #Défense_Conseil_International, qui est la société privée équivalente de CIVIPOL pour le ministère de la défense.

    CIVIPOL a une action d’#expertise, de #conseil, de #formation. Elle est "financée quasi exclusivement par les bailleurs internationaux". Elle a aussi comme savoir-faire le "soutien à la filière des #industries_de_sécurité" : "Civipol soutient les acteurs de la filière des industries de sécurité. À travers le réseau international des salons #Milipol, Civipol permet aux États partenaires d’identifier, avec les industriels, les #solutions_technologiques les plus adaptées à leurs impératifs de protection. En proposant des offres intégrées issues de la filière européenne des industries de sécurité, Civipol contribue à la mise en place de #systèmes_opérationnels_interopérables au sein des États partenaires et, le cas échéant, avec les systèmes homologues européens."

    #CIVIPOL_Conseil, la société anonyme, est en effet associée dans #CIVIPOL_Groupe au Groupement d’Intérêt Économique Milipol, qui organise des #salons "de la sûreté et de la sécurité intérieure des États" à Paris, au Qatar et dans la zone Asie - Pacifique (on peut découvrir ici le message adressé par le ministre français de l’intérieur à l’ouverture du dernier salon).

    CIVIPOL a aussi racheté en 2016 la société #Transtec, qui a des activités de soutien, accompagnement, conseil, expertise, dans le domaine de la #gouvernance. Elle a par exemple mené deux programmes au Soudan, l’un « #Soutien_à_l'Analyse_Economique_et_à_la Planification_Sectorielle_à_l’Appui_de_la_République_du_Soudan » « afin de permettre à la délégation de l’UE au Soudan de mieux comprendre la situation économique du pays et de contribuer à une approche plus cohérente de la programmation de l’UE dans chaque secteur d’intervention » ; l’autre « #Programme_de_renforcement_des_capacités_des_organisations_de_la_société_civile_soudanaise », dont « l’objectif consistait à renforcer les capacités des bénéficiaires des #OSC locales dans le cadre du programme de l’#Instrument_Européen_pour_la_Démocratie_et_les_Droits_de_l'Homme (#IEDDH) afin d’améliorer leur gestion administrative et financière des projets financés par l’UE » (il ne s’agit donc pas de développer la démocratie, mais de permettre aux OSC – Organisations de la Société Civile – soudanaises de s’inscrire dans les programmes de financement de l’Union européenne.

    CIVIPOL intervient dans quatre programmes au Soudan, financés par l’Union européenne. L’un concernant le #terrorisme, « Lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent et le financement du terrorisme dans la grande Corne de l’Afrique (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-dargent-et-le-financement-du-terrorisme) », l’autre concernant l’application de la loi, « #Regional_law_enforcement_in_the_Greater_Horn_of_Africa_and_Yemen (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-law-enforcement-in-the-greater-horn-of-africa-and-yemen-rl) ». Notons que ces deux programmes concernent aussi le #Yémen, pays en proie à une guerre civile, et une intervention militaire extérieure par une coalition menée par l’Arabie saoudite, pays allié de la France et en partie armée par elle, coalition à laquelle participe plusieurs milliers de membres des #Forces_d’Action_Rapide soudanaises, ancienne milice de Janjawid, aussi reconvertie en garde-frontière dans le cadre de la politique de contrôle migratoire mise en place par le Soudan à la demande de l’Union européenne, Forces d’Action Rapide dont le chef est l’homme fort actuel de la junte militaire qui a succédé au dictateur Omar El-Béchir. CIVIPOL agit dans cette complexité.

    Les deux autres programmes concerne la politique de #contrôle_migratoire. L’un, sous l’intitulé de « #Meilleure_Gestion_des_Migrations (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/better-migration-management-bmm.pdf) », implique différents intervenants pour le compte de plusieurs États membres de l’Union européenne et des agences de l’ONU, sous coordination allemande, l’#Allemagne cofinançant ce programme. « Dans cette contribution, CIVIPOL fournit des formations pour les unités spécialisés en charge de la lutte contre le trafic d’êtres humains, forme les agents de police dans les #zones_frontalières et aide les autorités chargées de la formation de la #police ». Compte-tenu du rôle des Forces d’Action Rapide, il semble difficile que CIVIPOL ne les ait pas croisées. Ce programme a été suspendu en mars 2019, l’Union européenne ayant donné une explication quelque peu sybilline : « because they require the involvement of government counterparts to be carried out » (« parce que leur mise en œuvre exige l’implication d’interlocuteurs gouvernementaux d’un niveau équivalent »).

    L’autre, mis en œuvre par CIVIPOL, est le #ROCK (#Centre_opérationnel_régional_d'appui_au_processus_de_Khartoum et à l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique de l’Union africaine (https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2019/07/26/regional-operational-center-in-khartoum-in-support-of-the-khartoum-) – en anglais #Regional_Operational_Centre_in_Khartoum etc.) La stratégie du projet ROCK est de faciliter l’#échange_d'informations entre les services de police compétents. Ainsi, le projet consiste à mettre en place une plate-forme à Khartoum, le centre régional "ROCK", afin de rassembler les #officiers_de_liaison des pays bénéficiaires en un seul endroit pour échanger efficacement des #informations_policières. » Il a été suspendu en juin « until the political/security situation is cleared » (« jusqu’à ce que la situation politique/sécurtiaire soit clarifiée ») selon l’Union européenne.

    D’après la présentation qu’on peut télécharger sur le site de CIVIPOL, le premier « programme intervient en réponse aux besoins identifiés par les pays africains du #processus_Khartoum », tandis que le second a été « lancé dans le cadre du processus de Khartoum à la demande des pays de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique ». Il ne faut donc surtout pas penser qu’il puisse s’agir d’une forme d’externalisation des politiques migratoires européennes.

    Ces deux programmes concernent neuf pays africains. L’un d’eux est l’#Érythrée. Il n’est pas interdit de penser que les liens tissés ont pu faciliter la coopération entre autorités françaises et érythréennes qui a permis l’expulsion d’un demandeur d’asile érythréen de France en Érythrée le 6 juin dernier.

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/philippe-wannesson/blog/260719/civipol-au-soudan
    #complexe_militaro-industriel #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #asile #réfugiés #suspension #Erythrée

  • Militarisation des frontières en #Mer_Egée

    En Mer Egée c’est exactement la même stratégie qui se met en place, et notamment à #Samos, où une #zeppelin (#zeppelin_de_surveillance) de #Frontex surveillera le détroit entre l’île et la côte turque, afin de signaler tout départ de bateaux. L’objectif est d’arrêter « à temps » les embarcations des réfugiés en les signalant aux garde-corps turques. Comme l’a dit le vice-ministre de l’immigration Koumoutsakos « on saura l’heure de départ de l’embarcation, on va en informer les turques, on s’approcher du bateau... »
    S’approcher pourquoi faire, sinon, pour le repousser vers la côte turque ?
    Le fonctionnement de la montgolfière sera confié aux garde-cotes et à la police grecque, l’opération restant sous le contrôle de Frontex.

    –-> reçu via la mailing-list de Migreurop, le 30.07.2017

    #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Turquie #Grèce #migrations #réfugiés #asile #police #gardes-côtes #surveillance

    –-----------

    Commentaire de Martin Clavey sur twitter :

    Cynisme absolu : Frontex utilise des drones pour surveiller les migrants en méditerranée ce qui permet à l’Union européenne de ne pas utiliser de bateau de surveillance et donc ne pas être soumis au #droit_maritime et à avoir à les sauver

    https://twitter.com/mart1oeil/status/1158396604648493058

    • Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία το αερόσταστο της FRONTEX

      Σε δοκιμαστική λειτουργία τίθεται από σήμερα για 28 ημέρες το αερόστατο της FRONTEX στη Σάμο, μήκους 35 μέτρων, προσδεμένο στο έδαφος, εξοπλισμένο με ραντάρ, θερμική κάμερα και σύστημα αυτόματης αναγνώρισης, το οποίο θα επιτηρεί αδιάλειπτα και σε πραγματικό χρόνο το θαλάσσιο πεδίο.

      Σύμφωνα με ανακοίνωση του Λιμενικού, στόχος είναι η αστυνόμευση του θαλάσσιου πεδίου και η καταπολέμηση του διασυνοριακού εγκλήματος. Δημιουργείται ωστόσο το ερώτημα αν οι πληροφορίες που θα συλλέγει το αερόστατο θα χρησιμοποιούνται για την αναχαίτιση ή την αποτροπή των πλεούμενων των προσφύγων που ξεκινούν από τα τουρκικά παράλια για να ζητήσουν διεθνή προστασία στην Ευρώπη.

      « Πρώτα απ’ όλα ξέρεις τι ώρα φεύγει από τους διακινητές το σκάφος, ενημερώνεις την τουρκική πλευρά, πηγαίνεις εσύ κοντά, δηλαδή είναι ένα σύνολο ενεργειών » σημείωνε την περασμένη εβδομάδα σε συνέντευξή του στον ΑΝΤ1 ο αναπληρωτής υπουργός Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής Γιώργος Κουμουτσάκος, μιλώντας για τα αποτελέσματα που αναμένεται να έχει το αερόστατο στην ενίσχυση της επιτήρησης των συνόρων.

      Το Λιμενικό είναι η πρώτη ακτοφυλακή κράτους-μέλους της Ε.Ε. που χρησιμοποιεί αερόστατο για την επιτήρηση της θάλασσας, δέκα μήνες μετά την πρώτη παρόμοια πανευρωπαϊκή χρήση μη επανδρωμένου αεροσκάφους μεσαίου ύψους μακράς εμβέλειας.

      « Αυτό καταδεικνύει την ισχυρή και ξεκάθαρη βούληση του Λ.Σ.-ΕΛ.ΑΚΤ. να καταβάλει κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια, χρησιμοποιώντας τη διαθέσιμη τεχνολογία αιχμής, για την αποτελεσματική φύλαξη των εξωτερικών θαλάσσιων συνόρων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης, την πάταξη κάθε μορφής εγκληματικότητας καθώς και την προστασία της ανθρώπινης ζωής στη θάλασσα », σημειώνει το Λιμενικό.

      Η λειτουργία του αερόστατου εντάσσεται στην επιχείρηση « Ποσειδών » που συντονίζουν το Λιμενικό και η ΕΛ.ΑΣ. υπό την επιτήρηση της FRONTEX.

      Παράλληλα, στο νησί θα τεθεί σε λειτουργία φορτηγό εξοπλισμένο με παρόμοια συστήματα, προκειμένου να μπορούν να συγκριθούν τα αποτελέσματα και η λειτουργία του επίγειου και του εναέριου συστήματος.

      https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/205553_se-dokimastiki-leitoyrgia-aerostasto-tis-frontex

    • Zeppelin over the island of Samos to monitor migrants trafficking

      Greek authorities and the Frontex will release a huge surveillance Zeppelin above the island of Samos to monitor migrants who illegally try to reach Greece and Europe. The installation of the ominous balloon will be certainly a grotesque attraction for the tourists who visit the island in the East Aegean Sea.

      Deputy Minister of Migration Policy Giorgos Koumoutsakos told private ANT1 TV that the Zeppelin will go in operation next week.

      “In Samos, at some point, I think it’s a matter of days or a week, a Zeppelin balloon will be installed in cooperation with FRONTEX, which will take a picture of a huge area. What does that mean? First of all, you know what time the ship moves away from the traffickers, inform the Turkish side, you go near, that is a set of actions,” Koumoutsakos said.

      The Zeppelin will be monitored by the GNR radar unit of the Frontext located at the port of Karlovasi, samiakienimerosi notes adding “It will give a picture of movements between the Turkish coast to Samos for the more effective guarding of our maritime borders.”

      The Deputy Minister did not elaborate on what exactly can the Greek Port Authority do when it comes “near” to the refugee and migrants boats.

      According to daily efimerida ton syntakton, the Norwegian NGO, Aegean Boat Report, revealed a video shot on July 17. The video shows how a Greek Coast Guard vessel approaches a boat with 34 people on board and leaves them at the open sea to be “collected” by Turkish authorities, while the passengers, among them 14 children, desperately are shouting “Not to Turkey!”

      It is not clear, whether the Greek Coast Guard vessel is in international waters as such vessels do not enter Turkish territorial waters. According to international law, the passengers ought to be rescued. The Greek Coast Guard has so far not taken position on the issue, saying it will need to evaluate the video first, efsyn notes.

      “There is no push backs. Everything will be done in accordance with the international law. Greece will do nothing beyond the international law,” Koumoutsakos stressed.

      PS I suppose, tourists will be cheered to have their vacation activities monitored by a plastic Big Brother. Not?

      https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2019/07/26/zeppelin-samos-migrants-refugees

    • Once migrants on Mediterranean were saved by naval patrols. Now they have to watch as #drones fly over
      https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/8a92adecf247b04c801a67a612766ee753738437/0_109_4332_2599/master/4332.jpg?width=605&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=c0051d5e4fff6aff063c70

      Amid the panicked shouting from the water and the smell of petrol from the sinking dinghy, the noise of an approaching engine briefly raises hope. Dozens of people fighting for their lives in the Mediterranean use their remaining energy to wave frantically for help. Nearly 2,000 miles away in the Polish capital, Warsaw, a drone operator watches their final moments via a live transmission. There is no ship to answer the SOS, just an unmanned aerial vehicle operated by the European border and coast guard agency, Frontex.

      This is not a scene from some nightmarish future on Europe’s maritime borders but a present-day probability. Frontex, which is based in Warsaw, is part of a £95m investment by the EU in unmanned aerial vehicles, the Observer has learned.

      This spending has come as the EU pulls back its naval missions in the Mediterranean and harasses almost all search-and-rescue charity boats out of the water. Frontex’s surveillance drones are flying over waters off Libya where not a single rescue has been carried out by the main EU naval mission since last August, in what is the deadliest stretch of water in the world.

      The replacement of naval vessels, which can conduct rescues, with drones, which cannot, is being condemned as a cynical abrogation of any European role in saving lives.

      “There is no obligation for drones to be equipped with life-saving appliances and to conduct rescue operations,” said a German Green party MEP, Erik Marquardt. “You need ships for that, and ships are exactly what there is a lack of at the moment.” This year the death rate for people attempting the Mediterranean crossing has risen from a historical average of 2% to as high as 14% last month. In total, 567 of the estimated 8,362 people who have attempted it so far this year have died.

      Gabriele Iacovino, director of one of Italy’s leading thinktanks, the Centre for International Studies, said the move into drones was “a way to spend money without having the responsibility to save lives”. Aerial surveillance without ships in the water amounted to a “naval mission without a naval force”, and was about avoiding embarrassing political rows in Europe over what to do with rescued migrants.

      Since March the EU’s main naval mission in the area, Operation Sophia, has withdrawn its ships from waters where the majority of migrant boats have sunk. While Sophia was not primarily a search-and-rescue mission, it was obliged under international and EU law to assist vessels in distress. The switch to drones is part of an apparent effort to monitor the Mediterranean without being pulled into rescue missions that deliver migrants to European shores.

      Marta Foresti, director of the Human Mobility Initiative at the Overseas Development Institute, an influential UK thinktank, said Europe had replaced migration policy with panic, with potentially lethal consequences. “We panicked in 2015 and that panic has turned into security budgets,” she said. “Frontex’s budget has doubled with very little oversight or design. It’s a knee-jerk reaction.”

      The strategy has seen Frontex, based in Warsaw, and its sister agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, based in Lisbon, invest in pilotless aerial vehicles. The Observer has found three contracts – two under EMSA and one under Frontex – totalling £95m for drones that can supply intelligence to Frontex.

      The models include the Hermes, made by Elbit Systems, Israel’s biggest privately owned arms manufacturer, and the Heron, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, a state-owned company. Both models were developed for use in combat missions in the occupied Palestinian territory of Gaza. Frontex said its drone suppliers met all “EU procurement rules and guidelines”.

      There is mounting concern both over how Frontex is spending EU taxpayers’ money and how it can be held accountable. The migration panic roiling Europe’s politics has been a boon for a once unfashionable EU outpost that coordinated national coastal and border guards. Ten years ago Frontex’s budget was £79m. In the latest budget cycle it has been awarded £10.4bn.

      Demand from member states for its services have largely been driven by its role in coordinating and carrying out deportations. The expansion of the deportation machine has caused concern among institutions tasked with monitoring the forced returns missions: a group of national ombudsmen, independent watchdogs appointed in all EU member states to safeguard human rights, has announced plans to begin its own independent monitoring group. The move follows frustration with the way their reports on past missions have been handled by Frontex.

      Andreas Pottakis, Greece’s ombudsman, is among those calling for an end to the agency policing itself: “Internal monitoring of Frontex by Frontex cannot substitute for the need for external monitoring by independent bodies. This is the only way the demand for transparency can be met and that the EU administration can effectively be held into account.”
      Acting to extradite helpless civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability

      The Frontex Consultative Forum, a body offering strategic advice to Frontex’s management board on how the agency can improve respect for fundamental rights, has also severely criticised it for a sloppy approach to accountability. An online archive of all Frontex operations, which was used by independent researchers, was recently removed.

      The switch to drones in the Mediterranean has also led to Frontex being accused of feeding intelligence on the position of migrant boats to Libya’s coast guards so they can intercept and return them to Libya. Although it receives EU funds, the Libyan coast guard remains a loosely defined outfit that often overlaps with smuggling gangs and detention centre owners.

      “The Libyan coast guard never patrols the sea,” said Tamino Böhm of the German rescue charity Sea-Watch. “They never leave port unless there is a boat to head to for a pullback. This means the information they have comes from the surveillance flights of Italy, Frontex and the EU.”

      A Frontex spokesperson said that incidents related to boats in distress were passed to the “responsible rescue coordination centre and to the neighbouring ones for situational awareness and potential coordination”. Thus the maritime rescue coordination centre in Rome has begun to share information with its Libyan counterpart in Tripoli, under the instructions of Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini.

      The EU is already accused of crimes against humanity in a submission before the International Criminal Court for “orchestrating a policy of forced transfer to concentration camp-like detention facilities [in Libya] where atrocious crimes are committed”.

      The case, brought by lawyers based in Paris, seeks to demonstrate that many of the people intercepted have faced human rights abuses ranging from slavery to torture and murder after being returned to Libya.

      Omer Shatz, an Israeli who teaches at Sciences Po university in Paris, and one of the two lawyers who brought the ICC case, said Frontex drone operators could be criminally liable for aiding pullbacks. “A drone operator that is aware of a migrant boat in distress is obliged to secure fundamental rights to life, body integrity, liberty and dignity. This means she has to take actions intended to search, rescue and disembark those rescued at safe port. Acting to extradite helpless vulnerable civilians to the hands of Libyan militias may amount to criminal liability.”

      Under international law, migrants rescued at sea by European vessels cannot be returned to Libya, where conflict and human rights abuses mean the UN has stated there is no safe port. Under the UN convention on the law of the sea (Unclos) all ships are obliged to report an encounter with a vessel in distress and offer assistance. This is partly why EU naval missions that were not mandated to conduct rescue missions found themselves pitched into them regardless.

      Drones, however, operate in a legal grey zone not covered by Unclos. The situation for private contractors to EU agencies, as in some of the current drone operations, is even less clear.

      Frontex told the Observer that all drone operators, staff or private contractors are subject to EU laws that mandate the protection of human life. The agency said it was unable to share a copy of the mission instructions given to drone operators that would tell them what to do in the event of encountering a boat in distress, asking the Observer to submit a freedom of information request. The agency said drones had encountered boats in distress on only four occasions – all in June this year – in the central Mediterranean, and that none had led to a “serious incident report” – Frontex jargon for a red flag. When EU naval vessels were deployed in similar areas in previous years, multiple serious incidents were reported every month, according to documents seen by the Observer.

      https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ships-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths

      #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Libye

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Et aussi... l’utilisation de moins en moins de #bateaux et de plus en plus de #avions a le même effet...

      Sophia : The EU naval mission without any ships

      Launched in 2015 to combat human smuggling in the Mediterranean, the operation has been all but dismantled, symbolizing European division on immigration policy.


      The Italian air base of Sigonella extends its wire fencing across the green and yellow fields of Sicily, 25 kilometers inland from the island’s coastline. Only the enormous cone of Mount Etna, visible in the distance, stands out over this flat land. Posters depicting a sniper taking aim indicate that this is a restricted-access military zone with armed surveillance.

      Inside, there is an enormous city with deserted avenues, runways and hangars. This is the departure point for aircraft patrolling the Central Mediterranean as part of EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia, Europe’s military response to the human smuggling rings, launched in 2015. But since March of this year, the planes have been a reflection of a mutilated mission: Sophia is now a naval operation without any ships.

      The Spanish detachment in #Sigonella has just rotated some of its personnel. A group of newly arrived soldiers are being trained in a small room inside one of the makeshift containers where the group of 39 military members work. The aircraft that they use is standing just a few meters away, on a sun-drenched esplanade that smells of fuel. The plane has been designed for round-the-clock maritime surveillance, and it has a spherical infrared camera fitted on its nose that allows it to locate and identify seagoing vessels, as well as to detect illegal trafficking of people, arms and oil.

      If the EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy [...] Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing to the far right

      Juan Fernando López Aguilar, EU Civil Liberties Committee

      This aircraft was also made to assist in sea rescues. But this activity is no longer taking place, now that there are no ships in the mission. Six aircraft are all that remain of Operation Sophia, which has been all but dismantled. Nobody would venture to say whether its mandate will be extended beyond the current deadline of September 30.

      The planes at Sigonella continue to patrol the Central Mediterranean and collect information to meet the ambitious if vague goal that triggered the mission back at the height of the refugee crisis: “To disrupt the business of human and weapons smuggling.” The operation’s most controversial task is still being carried out as well: training Libya’s Coast Guard so they will do the job of intercepting vessels filled with people fleeing Libyan war and chaos, and return them to the point of departure. Even official sources of Europe’s diplomatic service admitted, in a written reply, that the temporary suspension of naval assets “is not optimal,” and that the mission’s ability to fulfill its mandate “is more limited.”

      In these four years, the mission has had some tangible achievements: the arrest of 151 individuals suspected of human trafficking and smuggling, and the destruction of 551 boats used by criminal networks. Operation Sophia has also inspected three ships and seized banned goods; it has made radio contact with 2,462 vessels to check their identity, and made 161 friendly approaches. For European diplomats, the mission has been mainly useful in “significantly reducing smugglers’ ability to operate in high seas” and has generally contributed to “improving maritime safety and stability in the Central Mediterranean.”

      Sophia’s main mission was never to rescue people at sea, yet in these last years it has saved 45,000 lives, following the maritime obligation to aid people in distress. The reason why it has been stripped of its ships – a move that has been strongly criticized by non-profit groups – can be found 800 kilometers north of Sicily, in Rome, and also in the offices of European politicians. Last summer, Italy’s far-right Interior Minister Matteo Salvini began to apply a closed-port policy for ships carrying rescued migrants unless a previous relocation agreement existed with other countries. Salvini first targeted the non-profit groups performing sea rescues, and then he warned his European colleagues that Italy, which is leading the EU mission, would refuse to take in all the rescued migrants without first seeing a change in EU policy. A year later, no European deal has emerged, and every time a rescue is made, the issue of who takes in the migrants is negotiated on an ad hoc basis.

      Operation Sophia has saved 45,000 lives

      Although arrivals through this route have plummeted, Salvini insists that “Italy is not willing to accept all the migrants who arrive in Europe.” Political division among member states has had an effect on the European military mission. “Sophia has not been conducting rescues since August 2018,” says Matteo Villa, a migration expert at Italy’s Institute for International Policy Studies (ISPI). “Nobody in the EU wanted to see a mission ship with migrants on board being refused port entry, so the ‘solution’ was to suspend Sophia’s naval tasks.”

      The decision to maintain the operation without any ships was made at the last minute in March, in a move that prevented the dismantling of the mission just ahead of the European elections. “Operation Sophia has helped save lives, although that was not its main objective. It was a mistake for [the EU] to leave it with nothing but airplanes, without the ships that were able to save lives,” says Matteo de Bellis, a migration and refugee expert at Amnesty International. “What they are doing now, training the Libyans, only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face arbitrary detention in centers where there is torture, exploitation and rape.”

      Ever since the great maritime rescue operation developed by Italy in 2013, the Mare Nostrum, which saved 150,000 people, its European successors have been less ambitious in scope and their goals more focused on security and border patrolling. This is the case with Sophia, which by training the Libyan Coast Guard is contributing to the increasingly clear strategy of outsourcing EU migratory control, even to a country mired in chaos and war. “If Europe reduces search-and-rescue operations and encourages Libya to conduct them in its place, then it is being an accomplice to the violations taking place in Libya,” says Catherine Wollard, secretary general of the non-profit network integrated in the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).

      Training the Libyans only serves to empower the forces that intercept refugees and migrants and return them to Libya, where they face torture, exploitation and rape

      Matteo de Bellis, Amnesty International

      The vision offered by official European sources regarding the training of the Libyan Coast Guard, and about Operation Sophia in general, is very different when it comes to reducing mortality on the Mediterranean’s most deadly migration route. “Operation Sophia was launched to fight criminal human smuggling networks that put lives at risk in the Central Mediterranean,” they say in a written response. European officials are aware of what is going on in Libya, but their response to the accusations of abuse perpetrated by the Libyan Coast Guard and the situation of migrants confined in detention centers in terrible conditions, is the following: “Everything that happens in Libyan territorial waters is Libya’s responsibility, not Europe’s, yet we are not looking the other way. […] Through Operation Sophia we have saved lives, fought traffickers and trained the Libyan Coast Guard […]. We are performing this last task because substantial loss of life at sea is taking place within Libyan territorial waters. That is why it is very important for Libya’s Coast Guard and Navy to know how to assist distressed migrants in line with international law and humanitarian standards. Also, because the contribution of Libya’s Coast Guard in the fight against traffickers operating in their waters is indispensable.”

      Criticism of Operation Sophia is also coming from the European Parliament, which funded the trip that made this feature story possible. Juan Fernando López Aguilar, president of the parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, attacks the decision to strip Sophia of its naval resources. The Socialist Party (PSOE) politician says that this decision was made “in the absolute absence of a global approach to the migration phenomenon that would include cooperative coordination of all the resources at member states’ disposal, such as development aid in Africa, cooperation with origin and transit countries, hirings in countries of origin and the creation of legal ways to access the EU. Now that would dismantle [the mafias’] business model,” he says.

      López Aguilar says that the EU is aware of Italy’s weariness of the situation, considering that “for years it dealt with a migratory pressure that exceeded its response capacity.” Between 2014 and 2017, around 624,000 people landed on Italy’s coasts. “If they EU had systematically shown more solidarity with Italy, if relocation programs for people in hotspots had been observed, very likely Italian voters would not have made a dramatic swing giving victory to the far right, nor would we have reached a point where a xenophobic closed-port narrative is claimed to represent the salvation of Italian interests.”

      Miguel Urbán, a European Member of Parliament for the Spanish leftist party Unidas Podemos, is highly critical of the way the EU has been managing immigration. He talks about a “militarization of the Mediterranean” and describes European policy as bowing to “the far right’s strategy.” He blames Italy’s attitude for turning Sophia into “an operation in the Mediterranean without a naval fleet. What the Italian government gets out of this is to rid itself of its humanitarian responsibility to disembark migrants on its coasts.”

      For now, no progress has been made on the underlying political problem of disembarkation and, by extension, on the long-delayed reform of the Dublin Regulation to balance out frontline states’ responsibility in taking in refugees with solidarity from other countries. Sophia will continue to hobble along until September after being all but given up for dead in March. After that, everything is still up in the air.

      https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/08/29/inenglish/1567088519_215547.html
      #Sophie #Opération_Sophia #Sicile

    • L’uso dei droni per guardare i migranti che affogano mette a nudo tutta la disumanità delle pratiche di controllo sui confini

      In troppi crediamo al mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la realtà macchiata di sangue.

      “Se avessi ignorato quelle grida di aiuto, non avrei mai più trovato il coraggio di affrontare il mare”.

      Con queste parole il pescatore siciliano Carlo Giarratano ha commentato la sua decisione di sfidare il “decreto sicurezza” del Governo italiano, che prevede sanzioni o l’arresto nei confronti di chiunque trasporti in Italia migranti soccorsi in mare.

      La sua storia è un esempio della preoccupante tensione che si è creata ai confini della “Fortezza Europa” in materia di leggi e regolamenti. Secondo il diritto internazionale, il capitano di un’imbarcazione in mare è tenuto a fornire assistenza alle persone in difficoltà, “a prescindere dalla nazionalità o dalla cittadinanza delle persone stesse”. Al contempo, molti paesi europei, e la stessa UE, stanno cercando di limitare questo principio e queste attività, malgrado il tragico bilancio di morti nel Mediterraneo, in continua crescita.

      L’Agenzia di Confine e Guardia Costiera Europea, Frontex, sembra aver escogitato una soluzione ingegnosa: i droni. L’obbligo legale di aiutare un’imbarcazione in difficoltà non si applica a un veicolo aereo senza pilota (UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle). Si può aggirare la questione, politicamente calda, su chi sia responsabile di accogliere i migranti soccorsi, se questi semplicemente non vengono proprio soccorsi. Questo principio fa parte di una consolidata tendenza a mettere in atto politiche finalizzate a impedire che i migranti attraversino il Mediterraneo. Visto l’obbligo di soccorrere le persone che ci chiedono aiuto, la soluzione sembra essere questa: fare in modo di non sentire le loro richieste.

      Jean-Claude Juncker sostiene che le politiche europee di presidio ai confini sono concepite per “stroncare il business dei trafficanti”, perché nella moralità egocentrica che ispira la politica di frontiera europea, se non ci fossero trafficanti non ci sarebbero migranti.

      Ma non ci sono trafficanti che si fabbricano migranti in officina. Se le rotte ufficiali sono bloccate, le persone vanno a cercare quelle non ufficiali. Rendere la migrazione più difficile, ha fatto aumentare la richiesta di trafficanti e scafisti, certamente non l’ha fermata. Invece che stroncare il loro business, queste politiche lo hanno creato.

      Secondo la logica della foglia di fico, l’UE sostiene di non limitarsi a lasciare affogare i migranti, ma di fornire supporto alla guardia costiera libica perché intercetti le imbarcazioni che tentano la traversata e riporti le persone nei campi di detenzione in Libia.

      Ma il rapporto del Global Detention Project, a proposito delle condizioni in questi campi, riferisce: “I detenuti sono spesso sottoposti a gravi abusi e violenze, compresi stupri e torture, estorsioni, lavori forzati, schiavitù, condizioni di vita insopportabili, esecuzioni sommarie.” Human Rights Watch, in un rapporto intitolato Senza via di fuga dall’Inferno, descrive situazioni di sovraffollamento e malnutrizione e riporta testimonianze di bambini picchiati dalle guardie.

      L’Irish Times ha riportato accuse secondo cui le milizie associate con il GNA (Governo Libico di Alleanza Nazionale, riconosciuto dall’ONU), starebbero immagazzinando munizioni in questi campi e userebbero i rifugiati come “scudi umani”. Sembra quasi inevitabile, quindi, la notizia che il 3 luglio almeno 53 rifugiati sono stati uccisi durante un attacco dei ribelli appartenenti all’Esercito Nazionale Libico, nel campo di detenzione di Tajura, vicino a Tripoli.

      Secondo una testimonianza riportata dall’Associated Press, a Tajura i migranti erano costretti a pulire le armi delle milizie fedeli al GNA, armi che erano immagazzinate nel campo. Secondo i racconti di testimoni oculari dell’attacco, riportati dalle forze ONU, le guardie del campo avrebbero aperto il fuoco su chi tentava di scappare.

      Nel mondo occidentale, quando parliamo di immigrazione, tendiamo a focalizzarci sul cosiddetto “impatto sulle comunità” causato dai flussi di nuovi arrivati che si muovono da un posto all’altro.

      Nelle nostre discussioni, ci chiediamo se i migranti portino un guadagno per l’economia oppure intacchino risorse già scarse. Raramente ci fermiamo a guardare nella sua cruda e tecnica realtà la concreta applicazione del controllo alle frontiere, quando si traduce davvero in fucili e filo spinato.

      Ci ripetiamo che i costi vanno tutti in un’unica direzione: secondo la nostra narrazione preferita, i controlli di confine sono tutti gratis, è lasciare entrare i migranti la cosa che costa. Ma i costi da pagare ci sono sempre: non solo il tributo di morti che continua a crescere o i budget multimilionari e sempre in aumento delle nostre agenzie di frontiera, ma anche i costi morali e sociali che finiamo con l’estorcere a noi stessi.

      L’ossessione per la sicurezza dei confini deve fare i conti con alcune delle più antiche e radicate convinzioni etiche proprie delle società occidentali. Prendersi cura del più debole, fare agli altri quello che vogliamo sia fatto a noi, aiutare chi possiamo. Molti uomini e donne che lavorano in mare, quando soccorrono dei naufraghi non sono spinti solo da una legge che li obbliga a prestare aiuto, ma anche da un imperativo morale più essenziale. “Lo facciamo perché siamo gente di mare”, ha detto Giarratano al Guardian, “in mare, se ci sono persone in pericolo, le salviamo”.

      Ma i nostri governi hanno deciso che questo non vale per gli europei. Come se fosse una perversa sfida lanciata a istinti morali vecchi di migliaia di anni, nell’Europa moderna un marinaio che salva un migrante mentre sta per affogare, deve essere punito.

      Infrangere queste reti di reciproche responsabilità fra gli esseri umani, ha dei costi: divisioni e tensioni sociali. Ed è un amaro paradosso, perché proprio argomenti di questo genere sono in testa alle nostre preoccupazioni percepite quando si parla di migrazioni. E mentre l’UE fa di tutto per respingere un fronte del confine verso i deserti del Nord Africa, cercando di tenere i corpi dei rifugiati abbastanza lontani da non farceli vedere da vicino, intanto l’altro fronte continua a spingere verso di noi. L’Europa diventa un “ambiente ostile” e quindi noi diventiamo un popolo ostile.

      Ci auto-ingaggiamo come guardie di confine al nostro interno. Padroni di casa, infermiere, insegnanti, manager – ogni relazione sociale deve essere controllata. Il nostro regime di “frontiera quotidiana” crea “comunità sospette” all’interno della nostra società: sono persone sospette per il solo fatto di esistere e, nei loro confronti, si possono chiamare le forze dell’ordine in ogni momento, “giusto per dare un’occhiata”.

      Il confine non è solo un sistema per tenere gli estranei fuori dalla nostra società, ma per marchiare per sempre le persone come estranee, anche all’interno e per legittimare ufficialmente il pregiudizio, per garantire che “l’integrazione” – il Sacro Graal della narrazione progressista sull’immigrazione – resti illusoria e irrealizzabile, uno scherzo crudele giocato sulla pelle di persone destinate a rimanere etichettate come straniere e sospette. La nostra società nel suo insieme si mette al servizio di questo insaziabile confine, fino a definire la sua vera e propria identità nella capacità di respingere le persone.

      Malgrado arrivino continuamente immagini e notizie di tragedie e di morti, i media evitano di collegarle con le campagne di opinione che amplificano le cosiddette “legittime preoccupazioni” della gente e le trasformano in un inattaccabile “comune buon senso”.

      I compromessi che reggono le politiche di controllo dei confini non vengono messi in luce. Questo ci permette di guardare da un’altra parte, non perché siamo crudeli ma perché non possiamo sopportare di vedere quello che stiamo facendo. Ci sono persone e gruppi che, come denuncia Adam Serwer in un articolo su The Atlantic, sono proprio “Focalizzati sulla Crudeltà”. E anche se noi non siamo così, viviamo comunque nel loro stesso mondo, un mondo in cui degli esseri umani annegano e noi li guardiamo dall’alto dei nostri droni senza pilota, mentre lo stato punisce chi cerca di salvarli.

      In troppi crediamo nel mito di una frontiera dal volto umano, solo perché ci spaventa guardare in faccia la tragica e insanguinata realtà del concreto controllo quotidiano sui confini. E comunque, se fosse possibile, non avremmo ormai risolto questa contraddizione? Il fatto che non lo abbiamo fatto dovrebbe portarci a pensare che non ne siamo capaci e che ci si prospetta una cruda e desolante scelta morale per il futuro.

      D’ora in poi, il numero dei migranti non può che aumentare. I cambiamenti climatici saranno determinanti. La scelta di non respingerli non sarà certamente gratis: non c’è modo di condividere le nostre risorse con altri senza sostenere dei costi. Ma se non lo facciamo, scegliamo consapevolmente i naufragi, gli annegamenti, i campi di detenzione, scegliamo di destinare queste persone ad una vita da schiavi in zone di guerra. Scegliamo l’ambiente ostile. Scegliamo di “difendere il nostro stile di vita” semplicemente accettando di vivere a fianco di una popolazione sempre in aumento fatta di rifugiati senza patria, ammassati in baracche di lamiera e depositi soffocanti, sfiniti fino alla disperazione.

      Ma c’è un costo che, alla fine, giudicheremo troppo alto da pagare? Per il momento, sembra di no: ma, … cosa siamo diventati?

      https://dossierlibia.lasciatecientrare.it/luso-dei-droni-per-guardare-i-migranti-che-affogano-m

    • Grèce : le gouvernement durcit nettement sa position et implique l’armée à la gestion de flux migratoire en Mer Egée

      Après deux conférences intergouvernementales ce we., le gouvernement Mitsotakis a décidé la participation active de l’Armée et des Forces Navales dans des opérations de dissuasion en Mer Egée. En même temps il a décidé de poursuivre les opérations de ’désengorgement’ des îlses, de renfoncer les forces de garde-côte en effectifs et en navires, et de pousser plus loin la coopération avec Frontex et les forces de l’Otan qui opèrent déjà dans la région.

      Le durcissement net de la politique gouvernementale se traduit aussi par le retour en force d’un discours ouvertement xénophobe. Le vice-président du gouvernement grec, Adonis Géorgiadis, connu pour ses positions à l’’extrême-droite de l’échiquier politique, a déclaré que parmi les nouveaux arrivants, il y aurait très peu de réfugiés, la plupart seraient des ‘clandestins’ et il n’a pas manqué de qualifier les flux d’ ‘invasion’.

      source – en grec - Efimerida tôn Syntaktôn : https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/kybernisi/211786_kybernisi-sklirainei-ti-stasi-tis-sto-prosfygiko

      Il va de soi que cette militarisation de la gestion migratoire laisse craindre le pire dans la mesure où le but évident de l’implication de l’armée ne saurait être que la systématisation des opérations de push-back en pleine mer, ce qui est non seulement illégal mais ouvertement criminel.

      Reçu de Vicky Skoumbi via la mailing-list Migreurop, 23.09.2019

  • EU-Egypt migration cooperation : where are human rights ?

    The new EuroMed Rights study “EU-Egypt migration cooperation: at the expense of human rights,” published today, maps EU and Member State cooperation with Egypt in migration and border management. The study highlights the impact of this cooperation on the rights of refugees and migrants in Egypt and offers concrete recommendations for action. This publication follows the second meeting of the Migration Dialogue between the European Union and Egypt, which took place in Cairo on 11 July.

    While Egypt does not constitute a major country of departure for migrant movement towards Europe, the report finds that attention towards EU-Egypt cooperation on migration is predominately driven by Egypt’s attempts to strengthen its image as a regional leader, gain European support for its counter-terrorism policy and obtain funds for its domestic projects. If EU-led cooperation programmes in Egypt have stalled, certain Member States have stepped up bilateral cooperation on migration, going so far as to increase deportations of Egyptians back to Egypt where they could face severe human rights violations.

    “EU support to Egypt on migration has served to reinforce Egypt’s policing capacities and harsh border management policies, legitimising and strengthening the violence of the authoritarian Egyptian regime,” said Wadih Al-Asmar, President of EuroMed Rights. “We urge the EU to consult independent NGOs, inside and outside Egypt, on migration cooperation, assess the human rights impact of EU-Egypt agreements and funding, report to the European Parliament on cooperation between Frontex and the Egyptian authorities, and reject any proposals for a readmission agreement with Egypt.”

    https://euromedrights.org/publication/eu-egypt-migration-cooperation-where-are-human-rights

    #droits_humains #Egypte #UE #EU #Europe #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Italie #Allemagne #externalisation #coopération

    –--------
    Reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop avec ce commentaire :

    Le dernier rapport d’EuroMed Droits (disponible en anglais, recommandations disponibles en arabe aussi) porte sur la coopération entre l’UE et l’Egypte relativement à la question dite de la « gestion des flux migratoires ». Peu documentée, cette coopération s’est pourtant intensifiée depuis la fin 2016 au niveau de la Commission européenne, mais aussi à l’appui notamment d’une coopération bilatérale fournie entre l’Egypte et l’Italie, d’une part, et l’Allemagne d’autre part. Le faible contrôle démocratique et le manque de transparence sur la réalité de cette coopération ajoute aux inquiétudes fortes d’une coopération qui ne fait ni guère cas de l’impact de cette coopération sur les droits humains (des personnes en migration et des Egyptien.nes).

    Le rapport met aussi en lumière des éléments d’analyse qui contredisent la thèse d’une « externalisation des politiques européennes » au sens classique du terme : les auteurs avancent que l’UE ne bénéficie que très peu d’une coopération qui, à l’inverse, profite véritablement à l’Egypte qui voit dans la coopération migratoire un canal de financement & de légitimité diplomatique fort utile, dans un contexte plus général de politique anti-terroriste qui s’accommode assez bien d’un amalgame politiquement utile entre migration irrégulière, criminalité transfrontalière et terrorisme.

    Au vu des enjeux en matière de droits humains particulièrement prégnant en Egypte, des recommandations sont émises aux institutions européennes, ainsi qu’aux autorités italiennes et égyptiennes pour tirer la sonnette d’alarme sur une coopération dangereuse qui se poursuit loin des regards.

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation, et plus précisément sur l’externalisation en Egypte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message767801

  • Découvrir la #France derrière des barbelés

    Chaque année, à leur descente de l’avion, du train ou du bateau qui les a menés en France, des milliers d’étrangers sont victimes de l’arbitraire de la frontière et ne sont pas autorisés à pénétrer sur le territoire. Quand ils ne sont pas renvoyés illico, on les enferme en « #zone_d’attente ».

    Tout commence lors des contrôles des passagers. Certaines personnes sont admises sur le territoire Schengen sur simple présentation de leurs documents de voyage. D’autres, en raison de leur provenance, de leur nationalité ou de leur comportement, subissent un contrôle plus poussé.

    Claudia, Lola et Sarah [1], trois amies de nationalité dominicaine, résident à Naples depuis huit ans. Elles décident de venir en France, sans avoir réservé leur billet retour, une condition nécessaire à leur entrée sur le territoire – ce qu’elles ignorent. Lorsque Claudia passe les #contrôles_frontaliers, aucune question ne lui est posée : elle est admise sur le territoire français. Ses deux amies n’ont pas la même chance et subissent un contrôle plus approfondi. Elles ont beau présenter immédiatement leurs cartes de résidence italienne, comme pour rassurer la police française : elles ne veulent pas rester, elles ont leur vie en Italie... rien n’y fait. L’entrée leur est refusée et elles sont enfermées jusqu’à leur refoulement.

    Bienvenue en « zone d’attente ». Des lieux de #privation_de_liberté [2] qui se trouvent dans les #aéroports, les #ports et les #gares desservant l’international. En France, il en existe cent une, toutes différentes. Il peut s’agir d’une salle dans l’aéroport de Toulouse, de cellules dans le sous-sol de l’aéroport de Marseille ou encore d’une chambre d’hôtel en face de l’aéroport de Nantes.

    À #Roissy, la #Zapi_3 (Zone d’attente pour personnes en instance) s’étend sur deux niveaux et peut recevoir jusqu’à 120 personnes. Placé au bord des pistes, le bâtiment est entouré de grillages surplombés de barbelés. L’intérieur n’est pas moins oppressant : présence policière constante, caméras de surveillance, fenêtres condamnées, lumière de néons blafarde et bruit incessant des haut-parleurs appelant des personnes pour un éventuel renvoi. Surnommée « l’hôtel » par la police aux frontières, la Zapi 3 est la vitrine des zones d’attente françaises.
    *

    Lorsqu’elles ne sont pas immédiatement renvoyées vers leur pays de provenance, les personnes non-admises sur le territoire sont donc enfermées en zone d’attente, pour une durée initiale de quatre jours et une durée maximum de vingt jours, le temps pour les autorités d’organiser leur renvoi. Durant leur maintien, elles sont dépendantes de la #police_aux_frontières (#PAF) pour l’exercice de leurs droits : enregistrement d’une demande d’asile, repas, accès aux soins.

    Dina et Ehsan, un couple afghan, sont arrivés de Grèce à l’aéroport de Beauvais. Placés en zone d’attente, ils ont vécu un calvaire durant cinq jours avant d’être libérés au titre de l’asile. Dina, alors enceinte de cinq mois, souffrait de maux de ventre et de saignements abondants ; Ehsan, lui, avait une plaie au bras nécrosée et inquiétante, due à une blessure par balle. Seule une lotion vitaminée leur a été délivrée lors de leur bref passage à l’hôpital.

    Les conditions d’enfermement étaient également inhumaines : un espace extrêmement sale, des poubelles débordantes, une chaleur suffocante, l’impossibilité de se laver, pas d’accès à un espace extérieur et une nourriture en quantité et qualité insuffisantes.

    À leur arrivée, la police a refusé d’enregistrer leurs demandes d’asile, et tenté de les renvoyer à deux reprises vers la Grèce. Pendant quatre jours, le couple n’a reçu aucune explication sur ses droits, la PAF n’ayant pas fait appel à un interprète. Les agents ont refusé de leur remettre les documents administratifs relatifs au refus d’entrée et au maintien en zone d’attente.

    La procédure de demande d’asile à la frontière est un #filtre qui sert avant tout au contrôle des flux migratoires, au détriment de la protection des personnes. Elle ne tend pas à reconnaître le statut de réfugié, mais seulement à donner l’autorisation d’entrer sur le territoire français afin d’y déposer une demande d’asile. Cette première décision revient au ministère de l’Intérieur. Pour cela, le demandeur est entendu par l’Ofpra (Office français de protection des réfugiés et des apatrides) qui examinera de façon superficielle le « caractère manifestement infondé » de sa demande [3].

    Lydia est nicaraguayenne. Elle a demandé l’asile à la frontière depuis la zone d’attente de Roissy. Sur la base d’un entretien de 25 minutes avec interprète, l’Ofpra et le ministère de l’Intérieur ont considéré que sa demande était manifestement infondée, décision confirmée par le tribunal administratif qui a rejeté son recours contre la décision ministérielle. Lydia a alors subi plusieurs tentatives d’embarquement. Après vingt jours d’enfermement, elle est placée en garde à vue pour avoir refusé d’embarquer, puis directement au Centre de rétention administrative (#CRA) sur la base d’une obligation de quitter le territoire français émise à l’issue de la garde à vue. L’Ofpra lui accordera finalement le statut de réfugiée depuis le CRA.

    La situation de Lydia n’est malheureusement pas isolée. Si certaines personnes finissent par être libérées de la zone d’attente, les autres sont majoritairement refoulées ou placées en garde à vue pour leur refus d’embarquer, ce qui constitue souvent le point d’entrée d’une spirale d’enfermements successifs. Les possibilités sont nombreuses : prison, local ou centre de rétention administrative. Si le juge prononce une interdiction du territoire français, la personne est placée en rétention juste après l’audience. Si, en plus, le juge condamne la personne (le refus d’embarquer est un délit passible de trois ans de prison ferme), elle sera placée en rétention à sa sortie de prison. La police tentera de nouveau de l’éloigner et si elle persiste à refuser d’embarquer, elle pourra une nouvelle fois être placée en garde à vue et condamnée.
    *

    Pour se protéger d’un prétendu « risque migratoire » ou d’un « afflux massif », l’enfermement est un instrument central et banalisé de gestion des populations migrantes en Europe et au-delà. Les logiques frontalières sont généralement les mêmes : rejet, #invisibilisation, opacité des pratiques, fichage, violations des droits fondamentaux. L’enfermement se double d’une dimension de « #tri à l’entrée », qui renverrait à l’idée de prévention associée à l’image de « criminels » placés derrière des barreaux. Cet enfermement crée surtout des traumatismes profonds.

    http://cqfd-journal.org/Decouvrir-la-France-derriere-des

    #zones_d'attente #refoulement #push-back #refoulements #refoulements #aéroport #enfermement #détention_administrative #rétention

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?

    Depuis 2015, l’Union européenne a renforcé sa coopération avec l’Afrique pour lutter contre les migrations « irrégulières » et bloquer les migrants avant qu’ils ne traversent la Méditerranée. Mais l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres dans cette « sous-traitance » de sa politique migratoire ?

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/dimanche-et-apres/dimanche-et-apres-emission-du-dimanche-23-juin-2019
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Afrique #Europe #EU #UE #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers

    Ajouté à la métaliste
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Le numéro 1, un très beau numéro de la revue
    #Nunatak , Revue d’histoires, cultures et #luttes des #montagnes...

    Sommaire :

    Une sensation d’étouffement/Aux frontières de l’Iran et de l’Irak/Pâturages et Uniformes/La Banda Baudissard/
    À ceux qui ne sont responsables de rien/Des plantes dans l’illégalité/Conga no va !/Mundatur culpa labore

    La revue est disponible en pdf en ligne (https://revuenunatak.noblogs.org/numeros), voici l’adresse URL pour télécharger le numéro 1 :
    https://revuenunatak.noblogs.org/files/2017/03/Nunatak1HiverPrintemps2017.pdf

    Je mettrai ci-dessous des mots-clés et citations des articles...

  • Chinese Surveillance Complex Advancing in Latin America

    In February, 2019, in a story that went almost unnoticed in Washington, the small South American nation of #Uruguay began installing the first of 2,100 surveillance cameras, donated by the People’s Republic of China to improve control of its borders with neighboring Argentina and Brazil.

    The move highlights the significant deepening of the Uruguay-PRC relationship over the last decade, including their establishment of a “Strategic Partnership” in October 2016, and the signing of a memorandum of understanding in August 2018 for Uruguay to join China’s Belt and Road initiative (despite being about as far from the PRC as is geographically possible).

    Beyond Uruguay, the development also highlights a little-discussed but important dimension of China’s advance: its expanding global sales of surveillance and control technologies. Although the press and U.S. political leadership have given significant attention to the risks of employing Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei the equally serious but newer issue of expanding sales of Chinese surveillance systems has been less discussed.

    The installation of Chinese surveillance systems, acquired through PRC government donations or commercial contracts, is a growing phenomenon in Latin America and elsewhere.

    Such systems began to appear in the region more than a decade ago, including in 2007, when then mayor of Mexico City (now Mexican Foreign Minister) Miguel Ebrard returned from a trip to the PRC with a deal to install thousands of Chinese cameras to combat crime in the Mexican capital. More recent examples include ECU-911 in Ecuador, a China-built national system of surveillance and communication initially agreed to by the administration of anti-U.S. populist president Rafael Correa. The system, which has expanded to currently include 4,300 cameras and a command center manned by thousands of Ecuadorans, has been built almost completely from Chinese equipment, designed for a range of otherwise noble purposes from emergency response and combatting crime, to monitoring volcanoes. Bolivia boasts a similar Chinese built system, albeit more limited in scope, BOL-110, in addition to hundreds of surveillance cameras donated by the PRC to at least four of Bolivia’s principal cities.

    In Panama, which abandoned Taiwan to establish relations with the PRC in 2017, the government of Juan Carlos Varela has agreed to allow Huawei to install a system of cameras in the crime-ridden city of Colon and the associated free trade zone. Not by coincidence, in July 2019, Hikivision, China’s largest producer of surveillance cameras, announced plans to set up a major distribution center in Colon to support sales of its products throughout the Americas.

    In northern Argentina, near where the Chinese are developing a lithium mining operation and constructing the hemisphere’s largest array of photovoltaic cells for electricity generation, the Chinese company ZTE is installing another “911” style emergency response system with 1,200 cameras.

    In Venezuela, although not a surveillance system per se, the Chinese company ZTE has helped the regime of Nicholas Maduro implement a “fatherland identity card” linking different kinds of data on individuals through an identity card which allows the state to confer privileges (such as rationing food) as a tool for social control.

    As with sectors such as computers and telecommunications, the PRC arguably wishes to support the global export of such systems by its companies to advance technologies it recognizes as strategic for the Chinese nation, per its own official policy documents such as Made In China 2025.

    The risks arising from spreading use of Chinese surveillance equipment and architectures are multiple and significant, involving: (1) the sensitivity of the data collected on specific persons and activities, particularly when processed through technologies such as facial recognition, integrated with other data, and analyzed through artificial intelligence (AI) and other sophisticated algorithms, (2) the potential ability to surreptitiously obtain access to that data, not only through the collection devices, but at any number of points as it is communicated, stored, and analyzed, and (3) the long-term potential for such systems to contribute to the sustainment of authoritarian regimes (such as those in Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and formerly Ecuador) whose corrupt elites provide strategic access and commercial benefits to the Chinese state.

    The risk posed by such Chinese architectures is underestimated by simply focusing on the cameras and sensors themselves.

    Facial and other recognition technologies, and the ability to integrate data from different sensors and other sources such as smartphones enables those with access to the technology to follow the movement of individual human beings and events, with frightening implications. It includes the ability to potentially track key political and business elites, dissidents, or other persons of interest, flagging possible meetings between two or more, and the associated implications involving political or business meetings and the events that they may produce. Flows of goods or other activities around government buildings, factories, or other sites of interest may provide other types of information for political or commercial advantage, from winning bids to blackmailing compromised persons.

    While some may take assurance that the cameras and other components are safely guarded by benevolent governments or companies, the dispersed nature of the architectures, passing information, instructions, and analysis across great distances, means that the greatest risk is not physical access to the cameras, but the diversion of information throughout the process, particularly by those who built the components, databases and communication systems, and by those who wrote the algorithms (increasingly Chinese across the board).

    With respect to the political impact of such systems, while democratic governments may install them for noble purposes such as crimefighting and emergency response, and with limitations that respect individual privacy, authoritarian regimes who contract the Chinese for such technologies are not so limited, and have every incentive to use the technology to combat dissent and sustain themselves in power.

    The PRC, which continues to perfect it against its own population in places like Xinjiang (against the Uighur Muslims there), not only benefits commercially from selling the technology, but also benefits when allied dictatorships provide a testing ground for product development, and by using it to combat the opposition, keeping friends like Maduro in power, continuing to deliver the goods and access to Beijing.

    As with the debate over Huawei, whether or not Chinese companies are currently exploiting the surveillance and control systems they are deploying across Latin America to benefit the Chinese state, Chinese law (under which they operate) requires them to do so, if the PRC government so demands.

    The PRC record of systematic espionage, forced technology transfer, and other bad behavior should leave no one in Latin America comfortable that the PRC will not, at some point in the future, exploit such an enormous opportunity.

    https://www.newsmax.com/evanellis/china-surveillance-latin-america-cameras/2019/04/12/id/911484

    #Amérique_latine #Chine #surveillance #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Argentine #Brésil
    ping @reka

    • Il processo di esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee. Tra interessi economici e violazioni dei diritti fondamentali

      Dalla normalizzazione e banalizzazione della violazione sistematica delle Convenzioni Internazionali fino al rischio democratico per una sempre più diffusa opacità dell’uso dei fondi italiani ed europei. L’ultimo rapporto Arci sull’esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee fa luce su un processo che sembra sempre più rispondere agli interessi dell’industria della sicurezza, per la quale la frontiera altro non è che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire e fare profitto. Ce ne parla Sara Prestianni, coordinatrice del progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch

      Diventata già nel 2015 pilastro dell’agenda europea e italiana sull’immigrazione, l’esternalizzazione – ovvero la collaborazione con i paesi di origine e transito con l’obbiettivo di espellere facilmente i migranti dal territorio europeo o di bloccarli prima di raggiungere le nostre coste – si articola oggi, nel continente africano, nella logica strumentale di un legame tra migrazione, sviluppo e sicurezza. La sua combinazione con pratica costante di criminalizzazione della solidarietà porta ad un aumento, inaccettabile, dei morti per mare e per terra. L’azione del Governo Italiano s’iscrive perfettamente nella logica europea, sia nei proclami politici che nella creazione e gestione di fondi sull’esternalizzazione. Gli obiettivi sono chiari: bloccare gli arrivi via mare collaborando con i vicini Niger, Libia e Tunisia, oltre che facilitare le espulsioni strizzando l’occhio a Tunisi e a Il Cairo senza preoccuparsi del carico umano di vite che questa politica porta con sé.

      Arci, impegnata sul territorio italiano nell’accoglienza e in campagne di denuncia e sensibilizzazione, porta negli ultimi anni un’attenzione particolare alle conseguenze della dimensione esterna dell’asilo e la migrazione attraverso il progetto #externalisationpolicieswatch.

      Nel suo terzo rapporto, appena pubblicato, si concentra sulla moltiplicazione degli strumenti finanziari adottati a questo fine con un interesse particolare sull’impatto in Libia, Niger ed Egitto. Il capitolo italiano ed europeo dei fondi sulla sicurezza aumenta vorticosamente ed interessa sempre più la gestione delle frontiere all’interno e all’esterno dello spazio europeo: sistemi biometrici, moltiplicazione di missioni civili e militari impegnate nel controllo delle frontiere dalla Libia al Niger, rafforzamento del ruolo dell’Agenzia Frontex nelle operazioni di rimpatrio, meccanismi di interoperabilità dei sistemi di identificazione, elaborazioni di strumenti di sorveglianza sempre più elaborati. La gestione delle frontiere diventa un business, spingendo sempre più la politica europea e nazionale sulla migrazione verso una logica repressiva del fenomeno migratorio.

      Esternalizzare il controllo delle frontiere in Libia significa concretamente rafforzare il ruolo della Guardia Costiera Libica perché intervenga per rinviare i migranti intercettati in mare nell’inferno da cui, disperatamente, scappano. Per fare questo l’Italia ha ricevuto due tranche di contributi provenienti dal Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa – la prima, di 46 milioni di euro, nel luglio 2017, la seconda di 45 milioni di euro nel 2018 – a cui si aggiunge il contributo annuale di 50 milioni di euro che finanziano annualmente la presenza dei nostri militari sul territorio. In Egitto la logica è simile, attraverso il supporto di competenza del Ministero dell’Interno per l’istituzione di un centro internazionale di formazione (progetto I.T.E.P.A) che prevede la “formazione della Polizia di frontiera di 22 Paesi africani per contrastare l’immigrazione clandestina e il traffico di esseri umani” in un Egitto che sta, ogni giorno di più, rafforzando il suo regime autoritario. Con il Cairo l’interesse è molteplice e riguarda anche il fronte espulsione. In flagrante violazione dell’articolo 16 della Convenzione internazionale per la protezione di tutte le persone dalla sparizione forzata che prevede, ratificandolo come ha fatto l’Italia, di non “espellere, respingere, consegnare o estradare una persona verso uno Stato qualora esistano fondate ragioni per credere che, in tale Stato, correrebbe il pericolo di essere vittima di una sparizione forzata”. Impegno che è stato violato dall’Italia per le 294 espulsioni di cittadini egiziani nel 2018, rimandati in un paese dove le sparizioni forzate sono all’ordine del giorno.

      A farne le spese sono i migranti – obbligati a rotte sempre più pericolose e lunghe – a beneficio di imprese nazionali, che del mercato della sicurezza hanno fatto un vero e proprio business, e di politici che sull’immaginario dell’invasione basano i loro successi elettorali. L’esempio di come la politica risponda sempre di più alle esigenze delle lobby dell’industria della sicurezza risulta evidente nei corridoi e nei saloni espositivi dei congressi che da Madrid a Bruxelles, da Roma a Casablanca, sono dedicati alla sicurezza e alle frontiere come nuovo settore d’investimenti. Dal “Security Research Event” al “World Border Security Congress”, rappresentanti della Commissione Europea e delle principali industrie del settore della sicurezza si incontrano e si confrontano con l’obiettivo prioritario di “ingrandire il mercato europeo della sicurezza”, come gli stessi partecipanti al SRE di Bruxelles hanno annunciato dal palco.

      Gravissime sono le conseguenze di questa deriva delle politiche italiane ed europee: dalla normalizzazione e banalizzazione della violazione sistematica delle Convenzioni Internazionali fino ad un rischio democratico per una sempre più diffusa opacità dell’uso dei fondi. La politica sembra più interessata a rispondere agli interessi dell’industria della sicurezza, per la quale la frontiera altro non è che l’ennesimo mercato su cui investire e fare profitto -cosi come lo è da tempo la guerra- dimenticandosi del costo in termine di vite umane che ne consegue.

      https://openmigration.org/idee/il-processo-di-esternalizzazione-delle-frontiere-europee-tra-interess
      #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_74gU8Fo12E

    • European Border and Coast Guard: Launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Today, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, in cooperation with the Albanian authorities, is launching the first ever joint operation on the territory of a neighbouring non-EU country. As of 22 May, teams from the Agency will be deployed together with Albanian border guards at the Greek-Albanian border to strengthen border management and enhance security at the EU’s external borders, in full agreement with all concerned countries. This operation marks a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and its Western Balkan partners, and is yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The launch event is taking place in Tirana, Albania, in the presence of Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister and Sandër Lleshaj, Albanian Interior Minister.

      Dimitris Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, said: "With the first ever deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams outside of the EU, we are opening an entirely new chapter in our cooperation on migration and border management with Albania and with the whole Western Balkan region. This is a real game changer and a truly historical step, bringing this region closer to the EU by working together in a coordinated and mutually supportive way on shared challenges such as better managing migration and protecting our common borders.”

      Fabrice Leggeri, Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, said: “Today we mark a milestone for our agency and the wider cooperation between the European Union and Albania. We are launching the first fully fledged joint operation outside the European Union to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.”

      While Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders, the European Border and Coast Guard is able to lend both technical and operational support and assistance. The European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to support the Albanian border guards in performing border checks at crossing points, for example, and preventing unauthorised entries. All operations and deployments at the Albanian border with Greece will be conducted in full agreement with both the Albanian and Greek authorities.

      At the start of the operation, the Agency will be deploying 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and 1 thermo-vision van from 12 EU Member States (Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) to support Albania in border control and tackling cross-border crime.

      Strengthened cooperation between priority third countries and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will contribute to the better management of irregular migration, further enhance security at the EU’s external borders and strengthen the Agency’s ability to act in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, while bringing that neighbourhood closer to the EU.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2591_en.htm
      #externalisation

    • Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Albania at the official launch of first ever joint operation outside the EU

      Ladies and Gentlemen,

      We are here today to celebrate an important achievement and a milestone, both for Albania and for the EU.

      Only six months ago, here in Tirana, the EU signed the status agreement with Albania on cooperation on border management between Albania and the European Border and Coast Guard. This agreement, that entered into force three weeks ago, was the first agreement ever of its kind with a neighbouring country.

      Today, we will send off the joint European Border and Coast Guard Teams to be deployed as of tomorrow for the first time in a non-EU Member State. This does not only mark a new phase for border cooperation between the EU and Western Balkan partners, it is also yet another step towards the full operationalisation of the Agency.

      The only way to effectively address migration and security challenges we are facing today and those we may be confronted with in the years to come is by working closer together, as neighbours and as partners. What happens in Albania and the Western Balkans affects the European Union, and the other way around.

      Joint approach to border management is a key part of our overall approach to managing migration. It allows us to show to our citizens that their security is at the top of our concerns. But effective partnership in ensuring orderly migration also enables us, as Europe, to remain a place where those in need of protection can find shelter.

      Albania is the first country in the Western Balkans with whom the EU is moving forward with this new important chapter in our joint co-operation on border management.

      This can be a source of pride for both Albania and the EU and an important step that brings us closer together.

      While the overall situation along the Western Balkans route remains stable with continuously low levels of arrivals - it is in fact like night and day when compared to three years ago - we need to remain vigilant.

      The Status Agreement will help us in this effort. It expands the scale of practical, operational cooperation between the EU and Albania and hopefully soon with the rest of the Western Balkan region.

      These are important elements of our co-operation, also in view of the continued implementation of the requirements under the visa liberalisation agreement. Visa-free travel is a great achievement, which brings benefits to all sides and should be safeguarded.

      Together with Albanian border guards, European Border and Coast Guard teams will be able to perform border checks at crossing points and perform border surveillance to prevent unauthorized border crossings and counter cross-border criminality.

      But, let me be clear, Albania remains ultimately responsible for the protection of its borders. European Border and Coast Guard Teams may only perform tasks and exercise powers in the Albanian territory under instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the Republic of Albania.

      Dear Friends,

      When it comes to protecting our borders, ensuring our security and managing migration, the challenges we face are common, and so must be our response.

      The European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement and its implementation will allow us to better work together in all these areas. I hope that these agreements can be finalised also with other Western Balkans partners as soon as possible.

      I wish to thank Prime Minister Edi Rama, the Albanian authorities, and the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Fabrice Leggeri and his team for their close cooperation in bringing this milestone achievement to life. I also want to thank all Member States who have contributed with staff and the personnel who will be part of this first deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams in a neighbouring country.

      With just a few days to go before the European Elections, the need for a more united and stronger European family is more important than ever. We firmly believe that a key priority is to have strong relations with close neighbours, based on a clear balance of rights and obligations – but above all, on genuine partnership. This includes you, fellow Albanians.

      Albania is part of the European family.Our challenges are common. They know no borders. The progress we are witnessing today is another concrete action and proof of our commitment to bring us closer together. To make us stronger.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-2668_en.htm

    • Externalisation: Frontex launches first formal operation outside of the EU and deploys to Albania

      The EU has taken a significant, if geographically small, step in the externalisation of its borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, has launched its first Joint Operation on the territory of a non-EU-Member State, as it begins cooperation with Albania on the border with Greece.

      After the launch of the operation in Tirana on 21 May a deployment of 50 officers, 16 patrol cars and a thermo-vision van started yesterday, 22 May (European Commission, link). Twelve Member States (Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Poland and Slovenia) have contributed to the operation.

      New agreements

      The move follows the entry into force on 1 May this year of a Status Agreement between the EU and Albania on actions carried out by Frontex in that country (pdf). Those actions are made possible by the conclusion of operational plans, which must be agreed between Frontex and the Albanian authorities.

      The Status Agreement with Albania was the first among several similar agreements to be signed between the Agency and Balkan States, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia.

      The nascent operation in Albania will give Frontex team members certain powers, privileges and immunities on Albanian territory, including the use of force in circumstances authorised by Albanian border police and outlined in the operational plan.

      Frontex does not publish operational plans whilst operations (which can be renewed indefinitely) are ongoing, and documents published after the conclusion of operations (usually in response to requests for access to documents) are often heavily-redacted (Ask the EU, link).

      Relevant articles

      Article 4 of the Status Agreement outlines the tasks and powers of members of Frontex teams operating in Albanian territory. This includes the use of force, if it is authorised by both the Frontex team member’s home Member State and the State of Albania, and takes place in the presence of Albanian border guards. However, Albania can authorise team members to use force in their absence.

      Article 6 of the Status Agreement grants Frontex team members immunity from Albanian criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction “in respect of the acts performed in the exercise of their official functions in the course of the actions carried out in accordance with the operational plan”.

      Although a representative of Albania would be informed in the event of an allegation of criminal activity, it would be up to Frontex’s executive director to certify to the court whether the actions in question were performed as part of an official Agency function and in accordance with the Operational Plan. This certification will be binding on the jurisdiction of Albania. Proceedings may only continue against an individual team member if the executive director confirms that their actions were outside the scope of the exercise of official functions.

      Given the closed nature of the operational plans, this grants the executive director wide discretion and ensures little oversight of the accountability of Agency team members. Notably, Article 6 also states that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses. This immunity does not, however, extend to the jurisdiction of team members’ home Member States, and they may also waive the immunity of the individual under Albanian jurisdiction.

      Right to redress

      These measures of immunity alongside the lack of transparency surrounding documents outlining team members’ official functions and activities (the operational plan) raise concerns regarding access to redress for victims of human rights violations that may occur during operations.

      Human rights organisations have denounced the use of force by Frontex team members, only to have those incidents classified by the Agency as par for the course in their operations. Cases include incidents of firearm use that resulted in serious injury (The Intercept, link), but that was considered to have taken place according to the standard rules of engagement. This opacity has implications for individuals’ right to good administration and to the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms.

      If any damage results from actions that were carried out according to the operational plan, Albania will be held liable. This is the most binding liability outlined by the Status Agreement. Albania may only “request” that compensation be paid by the Member State of the team member responsible, or by the Agency, if acts were committed through gross negligence, wilful misconduct or outside the scope of the official functions of the Agency team or staff member.

      Across the board

      The provisions regarding tasks, powers and immunity in the Status Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia are all broadly similar, with the exception of Article 6 of the agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. This states:

      “Members of the team who are witnesses may be obliged by the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina… to provide evidence in accordance with the procedural law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

      The Status Agreement with Serbia, an early draft of which did not grant immunity to team members, is now consistent with the Agreement with Albania and includes provisions stating that members of teams shall not be obliged to give evidence as witnesses.

      It includes a further provision that:

      “...members of the team may use weapons only when it is absolutely necessary in self-defence to repel an immediate life-threatening attack against themselves or another person, in accordance with the national legislation of the Republic of Serbia”.

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/may/fx-albania-launch.htm

    • La police des frontières extérieures de l’UE s’introduit en Albanie

      Frontex, l’agence chargée des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, a lancé mardi en Albanie sa première opération hors du territoire d’un de ses États membres.

      Cette annonce de la Commission européenne intervient quelques jours avant les élections européennes et au moment où la politique migratoire de l’UE est critiquée par les candidats souverainistes, comme le ministre italien de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini ou le chef de file de la liste française d’extrême droite, Jordan Bardella, qui a récemment qualifié Frontex d’« hôtesse d’accueil pour migrants ».

      Cette opération conjointe en Albanie est « une véritable étape historique rapprochant » les Balkans de l’UE, et témoigne d’une « meilleure gestion de la migration et de la protection de nos frontières communes », a commenté à Tirana le commissaire chargé des migrations, Dimitris Avramopoulos.

      L’Albanie espère convaincre les États membres d’ouvrir des négociations d’adhésion ce printemps, ce qui lui avait été refusé l’an passé. Son premier ministre Edi Rama a salué « un pas très important dans les relations entre l’Albanie et l’Union européenne » et a estimé qu’il « renforçait également la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité ».

      À partir de 22 mai, Frontex déploiera des équipes conjointes à la frontière grecque avec des agents albanais.

      La Commission européenne a passé des accords semblables avec la Macédoine du Nord, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui devraient également entrer en vigueur.

      Tous ces pays sont sur une des « routes des Balkans », qui sont toujours empruntées clandestinement par des milliers de personnes en route vers l’Union européenne, même si le flux n’est en rien comparable avec les centaines de milliers de migrants qui ont transité par la région en quelques mois jusqu’à la fermeture des frontières par les pays de l’UE début 2016.

      Ce type d’accord « contribuera à l’amélioration de la gestion de la migration clandestine, renforcera la sécurité aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et consolidera la capacité de l’agence à agir dans le voisinage immédiat de l’UE, tout en rapprochant de l’UE les pays voisins concernés », selon un communiqué de la Commission.

      Pour éviter de revivre le chaos de 2015, l’Union a acté un renforcement considérable de Frontex. Elle disposera notamment d’ici 2027 d’un contingent de 10 000 garde-frontières et garde-côtes pour aider des pays débordés.


      https://www.lapresse.ca/international/europe/201905/21/01-5226931-la-police-des-frontieres-exterieures-de-lue-sintroduit-en-albani

    • European Border and Coast Guard Agency began to patrol alongside the Albanian-Greek border in late May (https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118). Similar agreements have recently been concluded with Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina but Albania is the first country to start implementing programs aimed at blocking refugees entering the EU. Bilten states that Frontex employees can carry arms and fight “against any kind of crime, from” illegal migration “to theft of a car or drug trafficking”. Frontex’s mission is not time-bound, i.e. it depends on the EU’s need. The Albanian authorities see it as a step forward to their membership in the Union.

      Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 10.06.2019

      L’article original:
      Što Frontex radi u Albaniji?

      Nakon što je Europska unija službeno zatvorila “balkansku migrantsku rutu”, očajni ljudi počeli su tražiti nove puteve. Jedan od njih prolazi kroz Albaniju, a tamošnja se vlada odrekla kontrole nad vlastitom granicom u nadi da će time udobrovoljiti unijske dužnosnike.

      Agencija za europsku graničnu i obalnu stražu, Frontex, počela je krajem prošlog mjeseca patrolirati uz albansko-grčku granicu. Već prvog dana, raspoređeno je pedesetak policajaca iz različitih zemalja članica EU koji bi se u suradnji s albanskim graničarima trebali boriti protiv “ilegalne migracije”. Iako je slične dogovore Unija nedavno sklopila sa zemljama poput Srbije, Sjeverne Makedonije, Crne Gore te Bosne i Hercegovine – a sve s ciljem blokiranja mogućnosti izbjeglica da uđu na područje EU – Albanija je prva zemlja u kojoj je počela provedba tog programa. Zaposlenici Frontexa ne samo da smiju nositi oružje, već imaju i dozvolu da se bore protiv bilo koje vrste kriminala, od “ilegalnih migracija” do krađe automobila ili trgovine drogom. Također, njihova misija nije vremenski ograničena, što znači da će Frontexovi zaposlenici patrolirati s albanske strane granice dok god to Unija smatra potrebnim.

      Unatoč nekim marginalnim glasovima koji su se žalili zbog kršenja nacionalne suverenosti prepuštanjem kontrole nad granicom stranim trupama, javnost je reagirala bilo potpunom nezainteresiranošću ili čak blagom potporom sporazumu koji bi tobože trebao pomoći Albaniji da uđe u Europsku uniju. S puno entuzijazma, lokalni su se mediji hvalili kako su u prva četiri dana Frontexovi zaposlenici već ulovili 92 “ilegalna migranta”. No to nije prvo, a ni najozbiljnije predavanje kontrole nad granicom koje je poduzela albanska vlada. Još od kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih jadranskim i jonskim teritorijalnim vodama Republike Albanije patrolira talijanska Guardia di Finanza. Tih se godina albanska obala često koristila kao most prema Italiji preko kojeg je prelazila većina migranata azijskog porijekla, ne samo zbog blizine južne Italije, već i zbog slabosti državnih aparata tijekom goleme krize 1997. i 1998. godine.

      Helikopteri Guardije di Finanza također kontroliraju albansko nebo u potrazi za poljima kanabisa i to sve u suradnji s lokalnom državnom birokracijom koja je sama dijelom suradnica dilera, a dijelom nesposobna da im se suprotstavi. No posljednjih godina, zbog toga što su druge rute zatvorene, sve veći broj ljudi počeo se kretati iz Grčke preko Albanije, Crne Gore i BiH prema zemljama EU. Prema Međunarodnoj organizaciji za migracije, granicu je prešlo oko 18 tisuća ljudi, uglavnom iz Sirije, Pakistana i Iraka. To predstavlja povećanje od sedam puta u odnosu na godinu ranije. Tek manji dio tih ljudi je ulovljen zbog nedostatka kapaciteta granične kontrole ili pak potpune indiferencije prema ljudima kojima siromašna zemlja poput Albanije nikada neće biti destinacija.
      Tranzitna zemlja

      Oni koje ulove smješteni su u prihvatnom centru blizu Tirane, ali odatle im je relativno jednostavno pobjeći i nastaviti put dalje. Dio njih službeno je zatražio azil u Albaniji, ali to ne znači da će se dulje zadržati u zemlji. Ipak, očekuje se da će ubuduće albanske institucije biti znatno agresivnije u politici repatrijacije migranata. U tome će se susretati s brojnim pravnim i administrativnim problemima: kako objašnjavaju lokalni stručnjaci za migracije, Albanija sa zemljama iz kojih dolazi većina migranata – poput Sirije, Pakistana, Iraka i Afganistana – uopće nema diplomatske odnose niti pravne predstavnike u tim zemljama. Zbog toga je koordiniranje procesa repatrijacije gotovo nemoguće. Također, iako sporazum o repatrijaciji postoji s Grčkoj, njime je predviđeno da se u tu zemlju vraćaju samo oni za koje se može dokazati da su iz nje došli, a većina migranata koji dođu iz Grčke nastoji sakriti svaki trag svog boravka u toj zemlji.

      U takvoj situaciji, čini se izvjesnim da će Albanija biti zemlja u kojoj će sve veći broj ljudi zapeti na neodređeno vrijeme. Prije nekih godinu i pol dana, izbila je javna panika s dosta rasističkih tonova. Nakon jednog nespretnog intervjua vladinog dužnosnika njemačkom mediju proširile su se glasine da će se u Albaniju naseliti šesto tisuća Sirijaca. Brojka je već na prvi pogled astronomska s obzirom na to da je stanovništvo zemlje oko tri milijuna ljudi, ali teorije zavjere se obično šire kao požar. Neki od drugorazrednih političara čak su pozvali na oružanu borbu ako dođu Sirijci. No ta je panika zapravo brzo prošla, ali tek nakon što je vlada obećala da neće primiti više izbjeglica od onog broja koji bude određen raspodjelom prema dogovoru u Uniji. Otad zapravo nema nekog osobitog antimigrantskog raspoloženja u javnosti, unatoč tome što tisuće ljudi prolazi kroz zemlju.
      Europski san

      Odnos je uglavnom onaj indiferencije. Tome pridonosi nekoliko stvari: činjenica da je gotovo trećina stanovništva Albanije također odselila u zemlje Unije,1 zatim to što ne postoje neke vjerske i ultranacionalističke stranke, ali najviše to što nitko od migranata nema nikakvu namjeru ostati u zemlji. No zašto je albanska vlada tako nestrpljiva da preda kontrolu granice i suverenitet, odnosno zašto je premijer Edi Rama izgledao tako entuzijastično prilikom ceremonije s Dimitrisom Avramopulosom, europskim povjerenikom za migracije, unutrašnje poslove i državljanstvo? Vlada se nada da će to ubrzati njezin put prema članstvu u Europskoj uniji. Posljednjih pet godina provela je čekajući otvaranje pristupnih pregovora, a predavanje kontrole nad granicom vidi kao još jednu ilustraciju svoje pripadnosti Uniji.

      S druge strane, stalna politička kriza koju su izazvali studentski protesti u prosincu 2018., te kasnije bojkot parlamenta i lokalnih izbora od strane opozicijskih stranaka, stavlja neprestani pritisak na vladu. Očajnički treba pozitivan znak iz EU jer vodi političku i ideološku borbu protiv opozicije oko toga tko je autentičniji kulturni i politički predstavnik europejstva. Vlada naziva opoziciju i njezine nasilne prosvjede antieuropskima, dok opozicija optužuje vladu da svojom korupcijom i povezanošću s organiziranim kriminalom radi protiv europskih želja stanovništva. Prije nekoliko dana, Komisija je predložila početak pristupnih pregovora s Albanijom, no Europsko vijeće je to koje ima zadnju riječ. Očekuje se kako će sve ovisiti o toj odluci. Ideja Europe jedno je od čvorišta vladajuće ideologije koja se desetljećima gradi kao antipod komunizmu i Orijentu te historijska destinacija kojoj Albanci stoljećima teže.

      Neoliberalna rekonstrukcija ekonomije i društva gotovo je uvijek legitimirana tvrdnjama kako su to nužni – iako bolni – koraci prema integraciji u Europsku uniju. Uspješnost ove ideologije ilustrira činjenica da otprilike 90% ispitanih u različitim studijama podržava Albansku integraciju u EU. U toj situaciji ne čudi ni odnos prema Frontexu.

      https://www.bilten.org/?p=28118

  • The creation of preconditions for Croatia’s entry into #Schengen is visible in the both on the field and diplomacy - while the Croatian border police continues to prevent the entry of refugees into the country and does not restrain from using violent methods, Minister #Božinović received praises from Bavarian Minister of Interior, Sports and Integration, #Joachim_Herrman, on the work of Croatian #police and protection of Croatian Borders (http://hr.n1info.com/Vijesti/a401099/Bavarski-ministar-unutarnjih-poslova-pohvalio-hrvatsku-granicnu-policiju.). The border area of the European Union seems to have become a mirror in which politics sees only itself and those who “pat it on the back”, while they refuse to face with the reality.

    #route_des_balkans #Allemagne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Croatie #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #militarisation_des_frontières #buffer_zone #Balkans

    Une manière de contrôler la #frontière_sud-alpine

    Reçu via la mailing-list Inicijativa dobrodosli, le 15.05.2019

    ping @isskein

  • Swarms of Drones, Piloted by Artificial Intelligence, May Soon Patrol Europe’s Borders
    https://theintercept.com/2019/05/11/drones-artificial-intelligence-europe-roborder

    Imagine you’re hiking through the woods near a border. Suddenly, you hear a mechanical buzzing, like a gigantic bee. Two quadcopters have spotted you and swoop in for a closer look. Antennae on both drones and on a nearby autonomous ground vehicle pick up the radio frequencies coming from the cell phone in your pocket. They send the signals to a central server, which triangulates your exact location and feeds it back to the drones. The robots close in. Cameras and other sensors on the (...)

    #algorithme #robotique #militarisation #aérien #migration #surveillance #frontières #Roborder (...)

    ##drone

  • L’#OIM, une organisation au service des #frontières… fermées.

    Le 4 avril 2019, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) faisait connaître sa préoccupation au sujet des migrant·e·s détenu·e·s en Libye. Ce communiqué faisait office de « clarification », rendue nécessaire par la prise de position d’António Guterres, secrétaire général de l’ONU. En visite en Libye, celui-ci s’était en effet déclaré « choqué » du sort des personnes migrantes et avait lancé « un appel à la communauté internationale pour le respect du droit international des réfugiés et la nécessité de traiter le problème de la migration d’une manière compatible […] avec les droits de l’Homme ».

    Dans sa mise au point, l’OIM prend pourtant soin de n’incriminer aucun État, pas même cette « communauté internationale » qui avait clairement été pointée par António Guterres. Pour l’OIM, la détention des personnes que ses agents accueillent dans des « points de désembarquement » est certes « arbitraire », mais elle se borne à plaider pour des « solutions alternatives » à l’internement pratiqué par le gouvernement libyen. Le soutien donné à ce dernier par des États européens avides de trouver des partenaires prêts à mettre en oeuvre leurs politiques d’externalisation n’est pas même évoqué. L’OIM est en effet un maillon important des dispositifs de #dissuasion et d’entrave de l’émigration prônés par ses principaux financeurs. Y oeuvrer sans états d’âme lui a permis d’occuper une place de plus en plus grande dans un système onusien où d’autres agences et instances sont un peu plus regardantes en matière de droits humains.

    Le 5 avril, le secrétaire général de l’OIM se déclarait particulièrement préoccupé par « la sécurité des migrants en détention en cas d’escalade des actions militaires ». La reprise des affrontements militaires dans la région de Tripoli rendait la fiction d’une Libye « pays sûr » de moins en moins tenable. Hors de question cependant de renoncer à « défendre » les frontières des pays du nord de la Méditerranée : c’est au #Niger et au #Nigeria qu’ont été déplacées ou reconduites quelques centaines de personnes placées sous la « protection » de l’OIM.

    http://www.migreurop.org/article2918.html
    #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #fermeture_des_frontières #IOM #renvois #retours_volontaires #externalisation #ONU
    ping @karine4 @reka @_kg_

  • Immigration Checks Used In Schools To De-Prioritise Children Of Undocumented Migrants

    Children in a line, outside the classroom door with their passport in hand, waiting one by one to be checked and let in. Teachers checking pupils’ passports, one by one, wondering when the right to free education started being determined by nationality and place of birth.

    This is not the start to a dystopian novel. This was the original vision of the Home Secretary in 2015, as revealed in leaked cabinet letters, for teachers to conduct immigration checks in the classroom.

    As part of the #hostile_environment master plan, immigration checks in schools were to be deployed to de-prioritise the children of undocumented migrants for school places.

    As this first plan didn’t gain sufficient consensus, the government folded and opted for a simpler and less ‘in the open’ option: collecting pupils’ nationality and country of birth data via the school census.

    https://rightsinfo.org/immigration-checks-in-schools-deployed-to-de-prioritise-children-of-undo
    #écoles #frontières_mobiles #migrations #enfants #enfance #sans-papiers #contrôles_frontaliers #UK #Angleterre #it_has_begun #nationalité

  • Runaway Saudi sisters call on #Google and #Apple to pull ’inhuman’ woman-monitoring app

    Two runaway Saudi sisters on Wednesday urged Apple and Google to pull an “inhuman” app allowing men to monitor and control female relatives’ travel as it helped trap girls in abusive families.

    Maha and Wafa al-Subaie, who are seeking asylum in Georgia after fleeing their family, said Absher – a government e-services app – was bad for women as it supported Saudi Arabia’s strict male guardian system.

    “It gives men control over women,” said Wafa, 25. “They have to remove it,” she added, referring to Google and Apple.

    #Absher, which is available in the Saudi version of Google and Apple online stores, allows men to update or withdraw permissions for female relatives to travel abroad and to get SMS updates if their passports are used, according to researchers.

    Neither company was immediately available to comment. Apple’s chief executive Tim Cook said in February that he had not heard of Absher but pledged to “take a look at it”.

    A free tool created by the interior ministry, Absher allows Saudis to access a wide range of government services, such as renewing passports, making appointments and viewing traffic violations.

    Saudi women must have permission from a male relative to work, marry and travel under the ultra-conservative Islamic kingdom’s guardianship system, which has faced scrutiny following recent cases of Saudi women seeking refuge overseas.

    The al-Subaie sisters, who stole their father’s phone to get themselves passports and authorisation to fly to Istanbul, said they knew of dozens of other young women who were looking to escape abusive families.

    Tech giants could help bring about change in Saudi Arabia if they pulled Absher or insisted that it allows women to organise travel independently – which would significantly hamper the guardianship system - they said.

    “If [they] remove this application, maybe the government will do something,” Wafa said.

    The sisters’ plea added to growing calls from rights groups, diplomats and US and European politicians for the app to be removed from online stores.

    United Nations human rights chief Michelle Bachelet said on Wednesday that she had asked tech companies in Silicon Valley “tough questions” this month about the “threats” posed by apps like Absher.

    “Technology can, and should, be all about progress. But the hugely invasive powers that are being unleashed may do incalculable damage if there are not sufficient checks in place to respect human rights,” she said in a statement.

    A Saudi teen received global attention and ultimately an offer of asylum in Canada when she refused to leave a Thai airport hotel in January to escape her family. Two other Saudi sisters who hid in Hong Kong for six months were granted visas in March to travel to a third country.

    “Increasing cases of women fleeing the country are indicative of the situation of women in Saudi Arabia,” said Lynn Maalouf, Middle East research director for rights group Amnesty International.

    “Despite some limited reforms, [they] are inadequately protected against domestic violence and abuse and, more generally, are discriminated against.”

    Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has introduced reforms, such as lifting the driving ban for women, and indicated last year that he favoured ending the guardianship system. But he has stopped short of backing its annulment.

    Western criticism of the kingdom has sharpened with the trial of 11 women activists who said last month that they had been tortured while in detention on charges related to human rights work and contacts with foreign journalists and diplomats.

    The public prosecutor has denied the torture allegations and said the women had been arrested on suspicion of harming Saudi interests and offering support to hostile elements abroad.

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/25/runaway-saudi-sisters-call-for-inhuman-woman-monitoring-app-absher-to-b
    #contrôle #hommes #surveillance #femmes
    #liberté #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Arabie_Saoudite #femmes #technologie #domination_masculine #fuite #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #passeport

    ping @reka