• Russian Hypersonic Strikes on Ukraine’s New Patriot Missiles Likely Caused Mercenary Casualties - This is Why
    https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russian-hypersonic-patriot-mercenary-casualties


    Patriot Battery and MiG-31K with Kinzhal Missile

    On May 16 as part of a broad spectrum of attacks on targets in the Ukrainian capital Kiev Russian Air Force MiG-31K strike fighters launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles to target Ukraine’s Patriot air defence systems. Recently delivered from Germany and the United States, Patriots are considered by far the most costly and high end weapons systems in Ukrainian service, and are very widely deployed both by seven NATO members and by key overseas strategic partners such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Israel. The strikes on the Patriots followed warnings form Russian officials, as well as from several analysts in the West, that any systems delivered to Ukraine would very quickly be targeted and destroyed after becoming operational. The reputational loss the Patriot was expected to suffer was thus reportedly a major factor leading Washington to hesitate to approve transfers of the assets. While a radar system and five missile batteries from the Patriot system were reported to have been destroyed in the MiG-31K strike, reportedly after firing 32 surface to air missiles as part of unsuccessful attempts to intercept the Kinzhal missiles, little remains known regarding casualties among the system’s crew or the nature of the personnel which were manning it when it was struck.
    […]
    With Ukrainian personnel thus unlikely to have been manning the Patriot systems deployed in April and attacked in May, less than five months after the decision was taken to supply the systems, it is likely that contractors from NATO member states with experience operating the Patriots were the ones targeted. The scale of the destruction caused by the strikes means casualties among these personnel are likely, although they are unlikely to be disclosed at least until many years after the war’s conclusion.

    entre les deux passages cités des considérations plus générales sur le rôle des #contractors
    #kinjal

    • Why Russia’s Kinzhal Strike on Patriot Missiles is Very Reassuring For North Korea - Security Expert A. B. Abrams
      https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/kinzhal-patriot-reassuring-nkorea-ababrams

      The Russian Air Force’s successful operation to destroy a Patriot missile system guarding the Ukrainian capital Kiev on May 16, using MiG-31K strike fighters armed with Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, represents the first serious modern suppression effort against Western long range air defences. The engagement for the first time put to the test decades old arguments regarding the vulnerability of these assets against modern ballistic missile types, with systems such as the Kinzhal, the surface to surface Iskander-M system on which it is based, and even the Soviet OTR-23 Oka which the Iskander was developed from, all long seen to be effectively impossible to intercept for new Western air defence assets. The missiles are particularly survivable in flight due to a number of features including their semi ballistic depressed trajectories, which have apogees of 50 km, the ability to conduct extensive in flight manoeuvres, and their hypersonic terminal speeds of close to Mach 9 - all far outside the parameters of a system like the Patriot to intercept. The Kinzhals’ ability to destroy the Patriot, and to evade 32 rounds of surface to air missiles intended to intercept them, thus indicates that the expectations for the near invulnerability of these kinds of missiles have likely been realised. This has serious implications for Russia’s much larger arsenal of Iskander-M systems that forms the backbone of its tactical strike capabilities.
      […]
      Regarding the significance of the ability to reliably penetrate Western built air defences, Abrams [expert on East Asian security] observes: “The ability to get past American and allied missile defences is if anything far more important for North Korean security than it is for Russia’s, due not only to the fact that such defence systems are much more concentrated in the Pacific than they are in Europe or the Arctic, but also because the country relies much more on ballistic missile capabilities for its defence than Russia does.” Having previously detailed how investment in systems like the KN-23 provided a key means of countering growing deployments of F-35 fighters to Korea - namely by providing the capability to strike their airfields - he reiterated this point as an example of how modern surface to surface systems were used to compensate for the country’s lack of a modern Air Force. Regarding the potential role of missiles like the KN-23 to facilitate more effective strikes by other classes of missile like the less survivable Scud types, Abrams observed: “With the Kinzhals serving as effective force multipliers by destroying the Patriot early on, and thus facilitating a higher success rate for strikes using larger arsenals of less advanced or subsonic missiles, North Korea can potentially similarly use the KN-23 neutralise enemy air defences and thus leave targeted territories much more vulnerable to its wider arsenals.” The success of the Kinzhal system, and multiple prior successes using the Iskander-M, are thus highly promising signs for North Korea that its investments could have vital asymmetric value to deter and if possible counter a U.S.-led assault, which has been the leading objective of its armed forces for decades.

  • Per sorvegliare i migranti l’Ue fa affari con i #contractor

    - È un’area grigia nel cuore del Mediterraneo, una zona d’ombra dove la parola “sovranità” è soprattutto #business. Produttori di armi e munizioni, mediatori specializzati in sicurezza e fornitura di #contractors, navi cariche di fucili automatici che funzionano come vere e proprie Santa barbara fluttuanti.
    – In questa terra di mezzo dove si incontrano trafficanti e governi, i migranti sono prima di tutto un lucroso affare.
    - Nel progetto #Rapsody di #Esa, che dovrebbe controllare il Mediterraneo con droni, compare #Sovereign_Global_Uk azienda riconducibile all’imprenditore #Fenech, arrestato per aver violato l’embargo sulla vendita di armi ai libici.

    (#paywall)

    https://www.editorialedomani.it/politica/mondo/per-sorvegliare-i-migranti-lue-fa-affari-con-i-contractor-pe98utxb

    #frontières #UE #migrations #réfugiés #armes #armement #commerce_d'armes #complexe_militaro-industriel #Libye #Méditerranée #drones

  • I costi nascosti delle nuove “guerre remote” di Stati Uniti ed Europa

    Le forze occidentali sperimentano in Somalia e in Sahel un tipo di conflitto che non prevede l’invio di nutriti contingenti armati e utilizza al suo posto nuclei speciali, droni, contractors. Tra le controindicazioni un aumento delle vittime civili.

    Nel settembre 2019 membri di al-Shabaab, un gruppo terrorista con base in Somalia, hanno attaccato un convoglio italiano nella capitale Mogadiscio e la base militare statunitense di Baledogle. Due attacchi tanto imprevisti quanto sottovalutati. La ragione di questa analisi insufficiente dipende in gran parte dalla natura delle recenti azioni in teatri di guerra stranieri: Paesi come Stati Uniti e Italia dispiegano un numero limitato di forze per affrontare gruppi ribelli o terroristi, con l’obiettivo di contenere i costi per le proprie truppe. Gli attacchi, tuttavia, non andrebbero letti come un incidente isolato ma come sintomo di un problema più ampio. E dovrebbero spingere il governo statunitense e i vari governi europei coinvolti in conflitti esteri a rivalutare la presunta assenza di rischio, non solo per le proprie truppe ma anche per la stabilità dei Paesi oggetto di intervento a distanza.

    I due attacchi sono una perfetta illustrazione dei pericoli legati alla “guerra remota”, quella che si combatte quando l’intervento non avviene attraverso l’invio di grandi contingenti armati. La definizione è dell’Oxford Research Group (ORG), un istituto di ricerca con sede a Londra: secondo i ricercatori di ORG, guerra remota è “lo sforzo da parte di attori esterni di evitare il modello di contro-insorgenza (COIN) associato all’intervento statunitense in Afghanistan e Iraq e di focalizzarsi invece su altri modelli, quali l’invio di forze speciali, l’utilizzo di droni armati -l’arma simbolo di questo approccio-, il dispiegamento di contractors privati, l’assistenza attraverso il servizio di intelligence, l’invio di attrezzature e il training a milizie locali”.

    Paesi come Stati Uniti e Italia dispiegano un numero limitato di forze per affrontare gruppi ribelli o terroristi, con l’obiettivo di limitare i costi per le proprie truppe

    L’utilizzo di droni in particolare è legato all’interpretazione legale di “guerra globale al terrore”, applicata dagli Stati Uniti per giustificare uccisioni mirate in Pakistan, Siria, Yemen e Somalia. Non solo Usa, però: anche Israele, Turchia, Cina, Nigeria, Regno Unito, Francia e ora anche l’Italia fanno un uso globale di droni armati. Dan Gettinger del Center for the Study of the Drone a Washington riporta che la spesa per droni statunitense è salita del 21% nel 2018 rispetto al 2017. Phil Finnegan di Teal Group afferma che “la produzione globale di droni dovrebbe più che raddoppiare in un decennio, da 4,9 miliardi di dollari nel 2018 a 10,7 miliardi nel 2027, con un tasso di crescita annuo del nove per cento”. L’Unione europea intanto sta per lanciare il suo primo Fondo per la Difesa: se approvato dal Parlamento europeo, dovrebbe ammontare a circa 13 miliardi di euro in sette anni.

    Ma nessuna guerra può essere chirurgica, priva di costi ed efficace allo stesso tempo: portare avanti guerre remote può essere percepito come vantaggioso, ma ha delle ricadute che aggravano il bilancio dell’intervento. Sia in Sahel sia in Somalia, dove è in corso un peggioramento della situazione di sicurezza, esacerbato da altre dinamiche interne, è vitale per gli attori esterni che hanno scelto di intervenire farlo con una strategia coerente e che tenga conto soprattutto di quelli che sono i bisogni della popolazione locale.

    10,7 miliardi di dollari: il valore stimato del mercato dei droni nel 2027. Nel 2018 si è fermato a 4,9 miliardi

    Le forze italiane attaccate a fine settembre del 2019 facevano parte di EUTM Somalia, una “missione militare dell’Unione europea che ha il compito di contribuire all’addestramento delle forze armate nazionali somale (Somali National Armed Forces, o SNA)”. La Somalia è una delle aree d’intervento delle politiche di sicurezza e difesa (CSDP) dell’Unione Europea. Paul Williams del Wilson Center osserva che “per oltre un decennio, una dozzina di Stati e organizzazioni multilaterali hanno investito tempo, sforzi, attrezzature e centinaia di milioni di dollari per costruire un’efficace esercito nazionale somalo. Finora hanno fallito”. Lo SNA conta “circa 29mila unità sul suo libro paga” ma molti sono soldati fantasma e quando le forze della missione dell’Unione africana in Somalia (AMISOM) si ritirano dai territori “la sicurezza tende a deteriorarsi in modo significativo ed è al-Shabaab a colmare il vuoto”. Gravi problemi affliggono anche l’impegno del comando africano degli Stati Uniti (AFRICOM) nel Paese. Ella Knight di Amnesty International ha documentato almeno sei casi in cui si ritiene che gli attacchi aerei statunitensi in Somalia abbiano provocato vittime civili e tutto questo in un’area geografica limitata.

    Nessuna guerra può essere chirurgica, priva di costi ed efficace allo stesso tempo: portare avanti guerre remote ha ricadute che aggravano il bilancio delle operazioni

    Nel caso dell’intervento europeo e americano in Somalia le questioni aperte sono due: prima di tutto il training delle milizie governative locali ha portato a soprusi verso la popolazione, accrescendo paradossalmente la reputazione di al-Shabaab. Inoltre, la guerra remota attraverso droni ha fatto un numero ancora imprecisato di vittime civili, non riconosciute dagli Stati Uniti, contribuendo alla percezione negativa che la popolazione civile ha di questi interventi armati. In ultima istanza, anche le truppe (in questo caso italiane e statunitensi) sul territorio sono vittima di rappresaglie da parte di gruppi armati.

    Anche il Sahel è un teatro di conflitti, dove sempre più Paesi, non solo occidentali, stanno intervenendo con le tattiche della guerra remota. Ma anche qui il costo dell’intervento non è da sottovalutare. Il 25 novembre scorso in Mali due elicotteri delle forze armate francesi si sono scontrati, uccidendo tredici soldati. La presenza delle truppe francesi rimanda a quanto accaduto nel dicembre 2013: allora, truppe francesi sotto l’egida dell’Operazione Serval erano intervenute in Mali per fermare l’avanzata di milizie armate verso la capitale Bamako; l’operazione, conclusa con successo, aveva dato il via a un altro intervento francese nella regione. A partire dal 2014 l’Operazione Barkhane intende fornire supporto nel lungo termine all’intera regione.

    L’impegno internazionale sembra spesso esacerbare l’instabilità. L’abuso di Stato reale o percepito è un fattore alla base della decisione di unirsi a gruppi estremisti violenti

    La missione di stabilizzazione integrata multidimensionale delle Nazioni Unite in Mali (MINUSMA) è stata istituita nel 2013 anche al fine di addestrare le forze regionali della Joint Force G5 Sahel. L’Unione europea ha istituto tre missioni di sicurezza e difesa in Mali e Niger, e sta procedendo a una maggiore regionalizzazione della propria presenza attraverso le Cellule Regionali di Consiglio e Coordinazione (RACC).
    L’European Union Training Mission in Mali, in particolare, rientra nella definizione di assistenza a forze di sicurezza, in quanto fornisce addestramento militare a forze armate maliane. Tale contributo fa parte di uno sforzo più ampio per condurre operazioni a distanza nella regione: anche gli Stati Uniti hanno da poco costruito la base aerea 201 ad Agadez, un futuro hub per droni armati e altri velivoli. La presenza degli Stati Uniti nel Sahel è notevolmente aumentata negli ultimi anni, così come quella tedesca, britannica e italiana.

    In Niger la presenza militare straniera ha avuto impatti negativi sulla libertà di parola e molti leader dell’opposizione hanno lamentato la mancanza di controllo parlamentare

    L’impegno internazionale però sembra spesso esacerbare l’instabilità, come hanno affermato alcuni gruppi della società civile. International Alert riporta che tra giovani Fulani nelle regioni di Mopti (Mali), Sahel (Burkina Faso) e Tillabéri (Niger) “l’abuso di stato reale o percepito è il fattore numero uno alla base della decisione di unirsi a gruppi estremisti violenti. L’Unione europea sta attualmente addestrando truppe locali senza (però) esercitare pressioni sul governo di Bamako per introdurre riforme strutturali”. Proprio in Mali la questione è particolarmente problematica: secondo Abigail Watson dell’Oxford Research Group “forze armate e governo maliani sono accusati di favorire un gruppo etnico rispetto ad un altro”. Favorire un particolare gruppo all’interno di conflitti tra diverse etnie si è dimostrato essere estremamente dannoso per la sicurezza a lungo termine. Il governo nigerino ha accolto con favore la presenza di truppe statunitensi, purché contribuiscano allo sradicamento dell’attività terroristica nel Paese. La società civile in Niger però sembra diffidare di tale presenza. Un’inchiesta del Guardian nel 2018 segnalava che la presenza militare straniera ha avuto impatti negativi sulla libertà di parola e molti leader dell’opposizione hanno lamentato la mancanza di controllo parlamentare ogni volta che la presenza straniera è autorizzata. Gli Stati Uniti non hanno chiarito le loro intenzioni strategiche a lungo termine, mentre sia la Francia sia l’Ue lo hanno fatto: l’intenzione è quella di sostituire all’operazione Barkhane e alle missioni europee la G5 Sahel Joint Force. Non sembra tuttavia esserci un progetto strategico chiaro per il raggiungimento di tale obiettivo, il che porta inevitabilmente ad aspre critiche. Infine, come mostrano recenti ricerche, la “guerra dall’impronta leggera” ha comportato una serie di sfide che si riflettono su trasparenza e responsabilità pubblica. Come sottolineano Goldsmith e Waxman nel loro articolo “The Legal Legacy of Light- Footprint Warfare”, pubblicato da The Washington Quarterly nel 2016, “la guerra di impronta leggera non attira lo stesso livello di scrutinio congressuale e soprattutto pubblico rispetto a guerre più convenzionali”.

    Tra le considerazioni che i Paesi europei e l’Unione stessa dovrebbero fare è necessario inserire un dialogo costante con la società civile del Paese in cui si sta intervenendo, ma soprattutto una chiara definizione della strategia e un’analisi del tipo di guerra che si vuole condurre, tenendo conto dei rischi che questo comporta.

    https://altreconomia.it/guerra-remota
    #guerre #drones #Somalie #Sahel #expérimentation #drones #contractors #complexe_militaro-industriel #armes #guerre_à_distance #drones_armés #contractors #intelligence #milices

    ping @albertocampiphoto @wizo @etraces

  • Empire’s Labor. The Global Army That Supports U.S. Wars

    In a dramatic unveiling of the little-known world of contracted military logistics, #Adam_Moore examines the lives of the global army of laborers who support US overseas wars. Empire’s Labor brings us the experience of the hundreds of thousands of men and women who perform jobs such as truck drivers and administrative assistants at bases located in warzones in the Middle East and Africa. He highlights the changes the US military has undergone since the Vietnam War, when the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel was roughly 1:6. In Afghanistan it has been as high as 4:1. This growth in logistics contracting represents a fundamental change in how the US fights wars, with the military now dependent on a huge pool of contractors recruited from around the world. It also, Moore demonstrates, has social, economic, and political implications that extend well beyond the battlefields.

    Focusing on workers from the Philippines and Bosnia, two major sources of “#third_country_national” (TCN) military labor, Moore explains the rise of large-scale logistics outsourcing since the end of the Cold War; describes the networks, infrastructures, and practices that span the spaces through which people, information, and goods circulate; and reveals the experiences of foreign workers, from the hidden dynamics of labor activism on bases, to the economic and social impacts these jobs have on their families and the communities they hail from. Through his extensive fieldwork and interviews, Moore gives voice to the agency and aspirations of the many thousands of foreigners who labor for the US military.


    https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501742170/empires-labor
    #armée #armée_américaine #contractors #travail #Philippines #Bosnie #livre

  • Peeling back the layers on the role of private security companies in Africa

    Private military and security companies have been regular fixtures in conflicts across the globe. For Africa, these corporations became increasingly visible with their role in civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone.

    More recently, reports in 2015 indicated the Nigerian government contracted a number of companies to aid in counterinsurgency efforts targeting #Boko_Haram.

    And a Russian contractor, the #Wagner_Group, has been actively involved in Sudan and the Central African Republic. Its involvement has included signing contracts that grant it access to potential diamond and gold deposits. Such agreements have been typical of private military and security companies, particularly in Africa. This was the case with Executive Outcomes’ deal with Sierra Leone’s government in the early 1990s.

    But understanding when and why these corporations are able to deliver effective services to clients has remained an elusive task.
    What are they?

    Private military and security companies are defined as legal entities that provide clients with a wide array of military and security services. This includes combat-oriented tasks, military or security training, logistical support and armed security and guarding. It can also include weapons procurement and installation.

    As a multibillion dollar industry, the list of companies is continually growing, as is demand for their services. In late 2018, the US Department of Defense reported nearly 50,000 contractors working under the auspices of such companies. Over 28,000 were in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.

    Beyond the obvious role of combat support, these companies have also been increasingly used in services as diverse as anti-poaching efforts and combating maritime piracy.

    Civil war role

    For many governments, private military and security companies can become an attractive resource. This is particularly true in cases where the capacity of national armed forces is low and the government faces strong threats.

    But, how well do they perform?

    One recent investigation argued that contracting private military and security companies during wartime can actually increase military effectiveness – and with it, the intensity of conflict. Other scholars have explored their impact on the duration of conflicts. This research has suggested that conflicts in which higher numbers of these companies are contracted by a government are likely to be shorter than those with few or none.

    The rationale here is that a more competitive market incentivises the companies to perform better so they can win more contracts.

    Our recent assessment of private military activity, along with work from academics Deborah Avant and Kara Kingma Neu, questions this logic.

    We set out to try and understand how these companies interact. We also wanted to know the effect of these interactions.

    Competition or complementary?

    Private military and security companies frequently do compete over contracts. But we also found that once they were contracted they often collaborated. This was especially likely when a task was very big or when specialised services were needed.

    Observing and evaluating the delivery of specific services is difficult. Some research has compounded this difficulty by assessing effectiveness with generic measures such as conflict duration rather than whether the terms of the contract were met.

    It’s difficult accessing the terms of specific contracts because all the entities involved are private companies. This means that identifying how well they’re meeting the requirements of a specified contract is often unknown. This is a huge challenge for researchers who rely primarily on quantitative assessments to explore these dynamics.

    We also drew attention to how quantitative analyses, in the absence of in-depth investigation, could lead scholars to miss important dynamics in how these companies influence conflicts.

    Exploring the evidence

    We looked at Sierra Leone’s civil war, which began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front invaded the country from neighbouring #Liberia.

    Our analysis shows that at no time during the conflict were rival private military and security companies operating simultaneously in the country. For example, the #Gurkha_Security_Guards was contracted in early 1994. But it quickly exited when rebels ambushed and killed their leader. After the company had left, Executive Outcomes was contracted to thwart the #Revolutionary_United_Front threat. In the data, presence in the same year is inaccurately treated as competition.

    We also found that when multiple groups were contracted simultaneously, their repertoire of services didn’t overlap. In other words, they weren’t competing with one another because their services were complementary. From our perspective this increased their ability to execute their mission effectively.

    For instance, #Executive_Outcomes owned and operated a number of subsidiaries, including groups like #LifeGuard_Management and #Ibis_Air. It used these groups to carry out specialised services such as mine security and air transport. These were pivotal in providing Executive Outcomes the best opportunity to regain territory from the Revolutionary United Front while training the Sierra Leone military.

    But the simultaneous presence of each of the companies is not indicative of competition.

    We also found that although hiring the companies shifted the balance of power in the government’s favour by 1996, the conflict wouldn’t end completely until 2002.

    Our qualitative assessment highlighted that, instead of the companies helping to bring the conflict to an end, the same data could actually indicate that they simply managed its intensity.

    This analysis underscores the need to really come to grips with the concept of effectiveness of private military and security companies. It also suggests that more work needs to be done on uncovering insights on contract terms and conditions, however aspirational a task.
    Conclusions

    We are not suggesting that private military and security companies should be avoided. They have proven to be useful alternatives for organisations such as the #UN and the #World_Food_Programme. Rather, our analysis points to the need to fully understand the intricacies of their interactions – not only with the entities that contract them, but with one another.

    This is particularly important in Africa. Foreign investment by both Russia and China is likely to see an increase in private military and security companies hired to protect their investments.

    This might increase security in the region. But depending on the terms of the contracts and the clients these organisations are accountable to, it may not be in the best interests of the states where they operate.

    In addition, a more complete understanding of the roles undertaken by private military and security companies during conflict is necessary to fully understand their effects on conflict dynamics, including duration.

    Recent work has moved in this direction with event datasets like the Private Security Event Database. This provides information on where these companies operate, their clients and the services they provide. Though real time information on contracts and events is likely to prove difficult to get, using historical datasets like this can increase our understanding of their influence.

    For governments, the expanding list of services in an increasingly globalised market allows for greater opportunity to fill real or perceived gaps in security. In certain cases, private military and security companies may be used to insulate a regime from collapse.

    Regardless of the reasons, the interactions between the companies and the influence they have on conflict and stability will continue to be important.

    https://theconversation.com/peeling-back-the-layers-on-the-role-of-private-security-companies-i
    #privatisation #armées #milices #guerres #guerres_civiles #Angola #Sierra_Léone #contractors #Afrique #Russie #FAO #Chine

    ping @albertocampiphoto

  • Military #Contractors Behind New Pressure Group Targeting Presidential Candidates
    https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/09/military-contractors-form-group-pressure-2016-candidates-adopt-hawkish-po

    Former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers has formed a new pressure group, now active in Iowa and New Hampshire, to serve as the “premiere national security and foreign policy organization during the 2016 debate” and to “help elect a president who supports American engagement and a strong foreign policy.”

  • Quand j’étais jeune (il y a une dizaine d’années), on disait encore « #mercenaires » ; maintenant on dit « #contractors » : 500 ou 600 privés pour assurer la sécurité de l’aéroport de Kandahar
    http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2014/10/09/kandahar-12610.html

    Elle concerne la sécurité de la totalité de l’aéroport militaire de Kandahar, le Kandahar Airfield, (tours de garde, postes d’accès et patrouilles, 24h/24). Cet aéroport figure dans la liste des bases du Bilateral Security Agreement qui seront occupées par les forces étrangères à partir de 2015.

    Le projet prévoit le déploiement de 500/600 gardes armés (encadrement compris) fournis par une société privée.

    Ces gardes doivent, à au moins 30%, provenir des 5 pays du Five Eyes International Intelligence Sharing Network Nations (USA, GB, Canada, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande), le reste venant de pays contributeurs au contingent de l’ISAF, ce qui exclut des recrutements « exotiques » et donc bon marché.

  • Un revers intéressant de l’affaire Stevens. CIA, security contractors... Homeland style

    CIA Takes Heat for Role in Libya - WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204712904578092853621061838.html

    “The U.S. effort in Benghazi was at its heart a CIA operation, according to officials briefed on the intelligence. Of the more than 30 American officials evacuated from Benghazi following the deadly assault, only seven worked for the State Department. Nearly all the rest worked for the CIA, under diplomatic cover, which was a principal purpose of the consulate, these officials said.

    The coordinated attacks stirred up a political hornet’s nest over whether the administration provided adequate security and whether it was forthcoming with its assessment of what happened. In the election season, that cast a shadow over the Obama administration’s foreign policy record.”

    #CIA #Libye #Benghazi #Christopher Stevens #Contractors

  • Number of DoD #Contractors in #Afghanistan at a Record High | Secrecy News
    http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2011/03/contractors_high.html

    The number of private security contractors employed by the Department of Defense in Afghanistan has reached a new record high, according to DoD statistics in a recently updated report (pdf) from the Congressional Research Service.

    “In Afghanistan, as of December 2010, there were 18,919 private security contractor (PSC) personnel working for DOD, the highest number since DOD started tracking the data in September 2007. The number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has more than tripled since June 2009,” the CRS report said.

    #états-unis #cdp