• Coop Exchange | One of the world’s most cited computer scientists wants cooperatives to be the future of how data is owned (Nov 2020)

    The current data economy is based on apathetic approval - everyone clicking on “I Accept The Terms And Conditions” without reading them, let alone bargaining for better terms and conditions. However, a small movement spearheaded by the MIT professor Alex Pentland has another idea on how things could work. Pentland is one of the most cited computer scientists in the world and played a key role in the introduction of GDPR, an EU regulation that has been dubbed the “greatest shake-up of privacy legislation in more than 20 years”. According to Alex, the answer lies in cooperative ownership of data, and the force best positioned to bring this change is the credit union movement. The first chapter of this article seeks to describe the vision laid out by Pentland and his colleagues at MIT, while the second chapter provides some new ideas on how it could foster a further shift towards an economic system where cooperatives would play a more prominent part.

    Existing technology would easily enable credit union members to download software on their phones and laptops that would request all the data extracted from them and have it stored in a personal data storage or a “vault”. Credit unions could also help members grow their vault by requesting other information collected from them to be stored in their vaults. The example Pentland uses is that of medical information. In the US, everyone has explicit legal rights to their medical information, but hospitals often make it difficult to obtain. It would be easier to obtain it by joining a data cooperative that would request the information on behalf of many members, instead of having each individual member go through the process separately.

    The pooling of data also makes it more valuable. It is not very valuable for an individual member to know how much cat food they buy. But pool data together with others, and the credit union could enable all members who regularly purchase cat food to do so collectively and bargain a lower price. Pentland sees this sort of collective bargaining for “bundled offers” as one of the key tangible economic benefits data cooperatives could provide to attract credit union members to join.

    Dommage que cette idée d’achat groupé soit bidon (c’est le principe de base des hypers et de la FNAC à sa création... et ils ont plus de consommateurs encore pour mieux négocier). La liberté de ne pas être tracé ne doit pas être un outil de « négociation », mais bien un droit fondamental.

    Data cooperatives should be utilised to foster new ways of member-to-member mutual support. This could happen members forming cooperatives and other mutual aid networks through which they provide goods and services to each other. In the previous chapter I described how data cooperatives could be used to enable 10 members who buy a chainsaw to bargain a discount through a bulk-purchase of 10 chainsaws. But we could go one step further - for example, we could help members form a cooperative where they buy one good chainsaw, and share it with each other, instead of having 10 lower quality chainsaws that are only seldom used.. Gradually it could be expanded into a larger tool-sharing cooperative, where members don’t have to buy a $100 chainsaw or a drill; they can simply pay a deposit of $200, lend a chainsaw or a drill worth $200 from the cooperative, and get their money back once they return it unharmed, perhaps with some payment to compensate for the administrative costs and natural depreciation.

    Ah, les ingénieurs sociaux qui ont toujours une belle solution apolitique pour changer le monde...

    #Données_personnelles #Coopératives #Credit_Union

  • Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to #Tibet

    Introduction and Summary

    In 2019 and 2020, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) introduced new policies to promote the systematic, centralized, and large-scale training and transfer of “rural surplus laborers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the first 7 months of 2020, the region had trained over half a million rural surplus laborers through this policy. This scheme encompasses Tibetans of all ages, covers the entire region, and is distinct from the coercive vocational training of secondary students and young adults reported by exile Tibetans (RFA, October 29, 2019).

    The labor transfer policy mandates that pastoralists and farmers are to be subjected to centralized “military-style” (军旅式, junlüshi) vocational training, which aims to reform “backward thinking” and includes training in “work discipline,” law, and the Chinese language. Examples from the TAR’s Chamdo region indicate that the militarized training regimen is supervised by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants, and training photos published by state media show Tibetan trainees dressed in military fatigues (see accompanying images).

    Poverty alleviation reports bluntly say that the state must “stop raising up lazy people.” Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process “strengthens [the Tibetans’] weak work discipline” and reforms their “backward thinking.” Tibetans are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion.” This is aided by a worrisome new scheme that “encourages” Tibetans to hand over their land and herds to government-run cooperatives, turning them into wage laborers.

    An order-oriented, batch-style matching and training mechanism trains laborers based on company needs. Training, matching and delivery of workers to their work destination takes place in a centralized fashion. Recruitments rely, among other things, on village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered in the TAR by Chen Quanguo (陈全国), and later used in Xinjiang to identify Uyghurs who should be sent to internment camps (China Brief, September 21, 2017). Key policy documents state that cadres who fail to achieve the mandated quotas are subject to “strict rewards and punishments” (严格奖惩措施, yange jiangcheng cuoshi). The goal of the scheme is to achieve Xi Jinping’s signature goal of eradicating absolute poverty by increasing rural disposable incomes. This means that Tibetan nomads and farmers must change their livelihoods so that they earn a measurable cash income, and can therefore be declared “poverty-free.”

    This draconian scheme shows a disturbing number of close similarities to the system of coercive vocational training and labor transfer established in Xinjiang. The fact that Tibet and Xinjiang share many of the same social control and securitization mechanisms—in each case introduced under administrations directed by Chen Quanguo—renders the adaptation of one region’s scheme to the other particularly straightforward.

    Historical Context

    As early as 2005, the TAR had a small-scale rural surplus labor training and employment initiative for pastoralists and farmers in Lhasa (Sina, May 13, 2005). The 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) then specified that this type of training and labor transfer was to be conducted throughout the TAR (PRC Government, February 8, 2006). From 2012, the Chamdo region initiated a “military-style training for surplus labor force transfer for pastoral and agricultural regions” (农牧区富余劳动力转移就业军旅式培训, nongmuqu fuyu laodongli zhuanyi jiuye junlüshi peixun) (Tibet’s Chamdo, October 8, 2014). Chamdo’s scheme was formally established in the region’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), with the goal of training 65,000 laborers (including urban unemployed persons) during that time (Chamdo Government, December 29, 2015).

    By 2016, Chamdo had established 45 related vocational training bases (TAR Government, November 17, 2016). Starting in 2016, the TAR’s Shannan region likewise implemented vocational training with “semi-military-style management” (半军事化管理, ban junshihua guanli) (Tibet Shannan Net, April 5, 2017). Several different sources indicate that Chamdo’s military-style training management was conducted by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants.[1]

    Policies of the 2019-2020 Militarized Vocational Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan

    In March 2019, the TAR issued the 2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan (西藏自治区2019-2020年农牧民培训和转移就业行动方案, Xizang Zizhiqu 2019-2020 Nian Nongmumin Peixun he Zhuanyi Jiuye Xingdong Fang’an) which mandates the “vigorous promotion of military-style…[vocational] training,” adopting the model pioneered in Chamdo and mandating it throughout the region. [2] The vocational training process must include “work discipline, Chinese language and work ethics,” aiming to “enhance laborers’ sense of discipline to comply with national laws and regulations and work unit rules and regulations.”

    Surplus labor training is to follow the “order-oriented” (订单定向式, dingdan dingxiangshi) or “need-driven” (以需定培, yi xu dingpei) method, [3] whereby the job is arranged first, and the training is based on the pre-arranged job placement. In 2020, at least 40 percent of job placements were to follow this method, with this share mandated to exceed 60 percent by the year 2024 (see [2], also below). Companies that employ a minimum number of laborers can obtain financial rewards of up to 500,000 renminbi ($73,900 U.S. dollars). Local labor brokers receive 300 ($44) or 500 ($74) renminbi per arranged labor transfer, depending whether it is within the TAR or without. [4] Detailed quotas not only mandate how many surplus laborers each county must train, but also how many are to be trained in each vocational specialty (Ngari Government, July 31, 2019).

    The similarities to Xinjiang’s coercive training scheme are abundant: both schemes have the same target group (“rural surplus laborers”—农牧区富余劳动者, nongmuqu fuyu laodongzhe); a high-powered focus on mobilizing a “reticent” minority group to change their traditional livelihood mode; employ military drill and military-style training management to produce discipline and obedience; emphasize the need to “transform” laborers’ thinking and identity, and to reform their “backwardness;” teach law and Chinese; aim to weaken the perceived negative influence of religion; prescribe detailed quotas; and put great pressure on officials to achieve program goals. [5]

    Labor Transfers to Other Provinces in 2020

    In 2020, the TAR introduced a related region-wide labor transfer policy that established mechanisms and target quotas for the transfer of trained rural surplus laborers both within (55,000) and without (5,000) the TAR (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). The terminology is akin to that used in relation to Xinjiang’s labor transfers, employing phrases such as: “supra-regional employment transfer” (跨区域转移就业, kuaquyu zhuanyi jiuye) and “labor export” (劳务输出, laowu shuchu). Both the 2019-2020 Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan and the TAR’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) only mention transfers outside the TAR in passing, without outlining a detailed related policy or the use of terminology akin to that found in related documents from Xinjiang. [6]

    In the first 7 months of 2020, the TAR trained 543,000 rural surplus laborers, accomplishing 90.5% of its annual goal by July. Of these, 49,900 were transferred to other parts of the TAR, and 3,109 to other parts of China (TAR Government, August 12). Each region is assigned a transfer quota. By the end of 2020, this transfer scheme must cover the entire TAR.

    Specific examples of such labor transfers identified by the author to other regions within the TAR include job placements in road construction, cleaning, mining, cooking and driving. [7] Transfers to labor placements outside the TAR include employment at the COFCO Group, China’s largest state-owned food-processing company (Hebei News, September 18, 2020).

    The central terminology employed for the labor transfer process is identical with language used in Xinjiang: “unified matching, unified organizing, unified management, unified sending off” (统一对接、统一组织、统一管理、统一输送 / tongyi duijie, tongyi zuzhi, tongyi guanli, tongyi shusong). [8] Workers are transferred to their destination in a centralized, “group-style” (组团式, zutuanshi), “point-to-point” (点对点, dianduidian) fashion. The policy document sets group sizes at 30 persons, divided into subgroups of 10, both to be headed by (sub-)group leaders (TAR Human Resources Department, July 17). In one instance, this transport method was described as “nanny-style point-to-point service” (“点对点”“保姆式”服务 / “dianduidian” “baomu shi” fuwu) (Chinatibet.net, June 21). As in Xinjiang, these labor transfers to other provinces are arranged and supported through the Mutual Pairing Assistance [or “assist Tibet” (援藏, Yuan Zang)] mechanism, albeit not exclusively. [9] The transferred laborers’ “left-behind” children, wives and elderly family members are to receive the state’s “loving care.” [10]

    Again, the similarities to Xinjiang’s inter-provincial transfer scheme are significant: unified processing, batch-style transfers, strong government involvement, financial incentives for middlemen and for participating companies, and state-mandated quotas. However, for the TAR’s labor transfer scheme, there is so far no evidence of accompanying cadres or security personnel, of cadres stationed in factories, or of workers being kept in closed, securitized environments at their final work destination. It is possible that the transfer of Tibetan laborers is not as securitized as that of Uyghur workers. There is also currently no evidence of TAR labor training and transfer schemes being linked to extrajudicial internment. The full range of TAR vocational training and job assignment mechanisms can take various forms and has a range of focus groups; not all of them involve centralized transfers or the military-style training and transfer of nomads and farmers.

    The Coercive Nature of the Labor Training and Transfer System

    Even so, there are clear elements of coercion during recruitment, training and job matching, as well as a centralized and strongly state-administered and supervised transfer process. While some documents assert that the scheme is predicated on voluntary participation, the overall evidence indicates the systemic presence of numerous coercive elements.

    As in Xinjiang, TAR government documents make it clear that poverty alleviation is a “battlefield,” with such work to be organized under a military-like “command” structure (脱贫攻坚指挥部, tuopin gongjian zhihuibu) (TAR Government, October 29, 2019; Xinhua, October 7, 2018). In mid-2019, the battle against poverty in the TAR was said to have “entered the decisive phase,” given the goal to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of 2020 (Tibet.cn, June 11, 2019). Since poverty is measured by income levels, and labor transfer is the primary means to increase incomes—and hence to “lift” people out of poverty—the pressure for local governments to round up poor populations and feed them into the scheme is extremely high.

    The Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan cited above establishes strict administrative procedures, and mandates the establishment of dedicated work groups as well as the involvement of top leadership cadres, to “ensure that the target tasks are completed on schedule” (see [2]). Each administrative level is to pass on the “pressure [to achieve the targets] to the next [lower] level.” Local government units are to “establish a task progress list [and] those who lag behind their work schedule… are to be reported and to be held accountable according to regulations.” The version adopted by the region governed under Shannan City is even more draconian: training and labor transfer achievements are directly weighed in cadres’ annual assessment scores, complemented by a system of “strict rewards and punishments.” [11] Specific threats of “strict rewards and punishments” in relation to achieving labor training and transfer targets are also found elsewhere, such as in official reports from the region governed under Ngari City, which mandate “weekly, monthly and quarterly” reporting mechanisms (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    As with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, overcoming Tibetans’ resistance to labor transfer is an integral part of the entire mechanism. Documents state that the “strict military-style management” of the vocational training process causes the “masses to comply with discipline,” “continuously strengthens their patriotic awareness,” and reforms their “backward thinking.” [12] This may also involve the presence of local cadres to “make the training discipline stricter.” [13]

    Because the military-style vocational training process produces discipline and transforms “backward employment views,” it is said to “promote labor transfer.” [14] Rural laborers are to be transformed from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming willing to participate, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion,” which is said to induce passivity (TAR Commerce Department, June 10). The poverty alleviation and training process is therefore coupled with an all-out propaganda effort that aims to use “thought education” to “educate and guide the unemployed to change their closed, conservative and traditional employment mindset” (Tibet’s Chamdo, July 8, 2016). [15] One document notes that the poverty alleviation and labor transfer process is part of an effort to “stop raising up lazy people” (TAR Government, December 18, 2018).

    A 2018 account from Chamdo of post-training follow-up shows the tight procedures employed by the authorities:

    Strictly follow up and ask for effectiveness. Before the end of each training course, trainees are required to fill in the “Employment Willingness Questionnaire.” Establish a database…to grasp the employment…status of trainees after the training. For those who cannot be employed in time after training, follow up and visit regularly, and actively recommend employment…. [16]

    These “strict” follow-up procedures are increasingly unnecessary, because the mandated “order-oriented” process means that locals are matched with future jobs prior to the training.

    “Grid Management” and the “Double-Linked Household” System

    Coercive elements play an important role during the recruitment process. Village-based work teams, an intrusive social control mechanism pioneered by Chen Quanguo, go from door to door to “help transform the thinking and views of poor households.” [17] The descriptions of these processes, and the extensive government resources invested to ensure their operation, overlap to a high degree with those that are commonly practiced in Xinjiang (The China Quarterly, July 12, 2019). As is the case in Xinjiang, poverty-alleviation work in the TAR is tightly linked to social control mechanisms and key aspects of the security apparatus. To quote one government document, “By combining grid management and the ‘double-linked household’ management model, [we must] organize, educate, and guide the people to participate and to support the fine-grained poverty alleviation … work.” [18]

    Grid management (网格化管理, wanggehua guanli) is a highly intrusive social control mechanism, through which neighborhoods and communities are subdivided into smaller units of surveillance and control. Besides dedicated administrative and security staff, this turns substantial numbers of locals into “volunteers,” enhancing the surveillance powers of the state. [19] Grid management later became the backbone of social control and surveillance in Xinjiang. For poverty alleviation, it involves detailed databases that list every single person “in poverty,” along with indicators and countermeasures, and may include a “combat visualization” (图表化作战, tubiaohua zuozhan) feature whereby progress in the “war on poverty” is visualized through maps and charts (TAR Government, November 10, 2016). Purang County in Ngari spent 1.58 million renminbi ($233,588 dollars) on a “Smart Poverty Alleviation Big Data Management Platform,” which can display poverty alleviation progress on a large screen in real time (TAR Government, February 20, 2019).

    Similarly, the “double-linked household” (双联户, shuang lian hu) system corrals regular citizens into the state’s extensive surveillance apparatus by making sets of 10 “double-linked” households report on each other. Between 2012 and 2016, the TAR established 81,140 double-linked household entities, covering over three million residents, and therefore virtually the region’s entire population (South China Morning Post, December 12, 2016). An August 2020 article on poverty alleviation in Ngari notes that it was the head of a “double-linked” household unit who led his “entire village” to hand over their grassland and herds to a local husbandry cooperative (Hunan Government, August 20).

    Converting Property to Shares Through Government Cooperatives

    A particularly troubling aspect of the Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan is the directive to promote a “poverty alleviation industry” (扶贫产业, fupin chanye) scheme by which local nomads and farmers are asked to hand over their land and herds to large-scale, state-run cooperatives (农牧民专业合作社, nongmumin zhuanye hezuoshe). [20] In that way, “nomads become shareholders” as they convert their usage rights into shares. This scheme, which harks back to the forced collectivization era of the 1950s, increases the disposable incomes of nomads and farmers through share dividends and by turning them into wage laborers. They are then either employed by these cooperatives or are now “free” to participate in the wider labor transfer scheme. [21] In Nagqu, this is referred to as the “one township one cooperative, one village one cooperative ” (“一乡一社”“一村一合” / “yixiang yishe” “yicun yihe”) scheme, indicating its universal coverage. [22] One account describes the land transfer as prodding Tibetans to “put down the whip, walk out of the pasture, and enter the [labor] market” (People.cn, July 27, 2020).

    Clearly, such a radical transformation of traditional livelihoods is not achieved without overcoming local resistance. A government report from Shuanghu County (Nagqu) in July 2020 notes that:

    In the early stages, … most herders were not enthusiastic about participating. [Then], the county government…organized…county-level cadres to deeply penetrate township and village households, convening village meetings to mobilize people, insisted on transforming the [prevailing attitude of] “I am wanted to get rid of poverty” to “I want to get rid of poverty” as the starting point for the formation of a cooperative… [and] comprehensively promoted the policy… Presently… the participation rate of registered poor herders is at 100 percent, [that] of other herders at 97 percent. [23]

    Importantly, the phrase “transforming [attitudes of] ‘I am wanted to get rid of poverty’ to ‘I want to get rid of poverty’” is found in this exact form in accounts of poverty alleviation through labor transfer in Xinjiang. [24]

    Given that this scheme severs the long-standing connection between Tibetans and their traditional livelihood bases, its explicit inclusion in the militarized vocational training and labor transfer policy context is of great concern.

    Militarized Vocational Training: Examining a Training Base in Chamdo

    The Chamdo Golden Sunshine Vocational Training School (昌都市金色阳光职业培训学校, Changdushi Jinse Yangguang Zhiye Peixun Xuexiao) operates a vocational training base within Chamdo’s Vocational and Technical School, located in Eluo Town, Karuo District. The facility conducts “military-style training” (军旅式培训, junlüshi peixun) of rural surplus laborers for the purpose of achieving labor transfer; photos of the complex show a rudimentary facility with rural Tibetan trainees of various ages, mostly dressed in military fatigues. [25]

    Satellite imagery (see accompanying images) shows that after a smaller initial setup in 2016, [26] the facility was expanded in the year 2018 to its current state. [27] The compound is fully enclosed, surrounded by a tall perimeter wall and fence, and bisected by a tall internal wire mesh fence that separates the three main northern buildings from the three main southern ones (building numbers 4 and 5 and parts of the surrounding wall are shown in the accompanying Figure 4). The internal fence might be used to separate dormitories from teaching and administrative buildings. Independent experts in satellite analysis contacted by the author estimated the height of the internal fence at approximately 3 meters. The neighboring vocational school does not feature any such security measures.


    In both Xinjiang and Tibet, state-mandated poverty alleviation consists of a top-down scheme that extends the government’s social control deep into family units. The state’s preferred method to increase the disposable incomes of rural surplus laborers in these restive minority regions is through vocational training and labor transfer. Both regions have by now implemented a comprehensive scheme that relies heavily on centralized administrative mechanisms; quota fulfilment; job matching prior to training; and a militarized training process that involves thought transformation, patriotic and legal education, and Chinese language teaching.

    Important differences remain between Beijing’s approaches in Xinjiang and Tibet. Presently, there is no evidence that the TAR’s scheme is linked to extrajudicial internment, and aspects of its labor transfer mechanisms are potentially less coercive. However, in a system where the transition between securitization and poverty alleviation is seamless, there is no telling where coercion stops and where genuinely voluntary local agency begins. While some Tibetans may voluntarily participate in some or all aspects of the scheme, and while their incomes may indeed increase as a result, the systemic presence of clear indicators of coercion and indoctrination, coupled with profound and potentially permanent change in modes of livelihood, is highly problematic. In the context of Beijing’s increasingly assimilatory ethnic minority policy, it is likely that these policies will promote a long-term loss of linguistic, cultural and spiritual heritage.

    Adrian Zenz is a Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Washington, D.C. (non-resident), and supervises PhD students at the European School of Culture and Theology, Korntal, Germany. His research focus is on China’s ethnic policy, public recruitment in Tibet and Xinjiang, Beijing’s internment campaign in Xinjiang, and China’s domestic security budgets. Dr. Zenz is the author of Tibetanness under Threat and co-editor of Mapping Amdo: Dynamics of Change. He has played a leading role in the analysis of leaked Chinese government documents, to include the “China Cables” and the “Karakax List.” Dr. Zenz is an advisor to the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and a frequent contributor to the international media.


    [1] See for example https://archive.is/wip/4ItV6 or http://archive.is/RVJRK. State media articles from September 2020 indicate that this type of training is ongoing https://archive.is/e1XqL.

    [2] Chinese: 大力推广军旅式…培训 (dali tuiguang junlüshi…peixun). See https://bit.ly/3mmiQk7 (pp.12-17). See local implementation documents of this directive from Shannan City (https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, pp.15-24), Xigatse (https://archive.is/7oJ7p) and Ngari (https://archive.is/wip/R3Mpw).

    [3] See also https://archive.is/wip/eQMGa.

    [4] Provided that the person was employed for at least 6 months in a given year. Source: https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [5] See the author’s main work on this in section 6 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [6] See https://archive.is/wip/Dyapm.

    [7] See https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx, https://archive.is/wip/NehA6, https://archive.is/wip/KMaUo, https://archive.is/wip/XiZfl, https://archive.is/RdnvS, https://archive.is/w1kfx.

    [8] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [9] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd and https://archive.is/wip/8afPF.

    [10] See https://archive.is/KE1Vd.

    [11] See https://bit.ly/32uVlO5, p.24.

    [12] See https://archive.is/wip/fN9hz and https://archive.is/NYMwi, compare https://archive.is/wip/iiF7h and http://archive.is/Nh7tT.

    [13] See https://archive.is/wip/kQVnX. A state media account of Tibetan waiters at a tourism-oriented restaurant in Xiexong Township (Chamdo) notes that these are all from “poverty-alleviation households,” and have all gone through “centralized, military-style training.” Consequently, per this account, they have developed a “service attitude of being willing to suffer [or: work hard]”, as is evident from their “vigorous pace and their [constant] shuttling back and forth” as they serve their customers. https://archive.is/wip/Nfxnx (account from 2016); compare https://archive.is/wip/dTLku.

    [14] See https://archive.is/wip/faIeL and https://archive.is/wip/18CXh.

    [15] See https://archive.is/iiF7h.

    [16] See https://archive.is/wip/ETmNe

    [17] See https://archive.is/wip/iEV7P, see also e.g. https://archive.is/wip/1p6lV.

    [18] See https://archive.is/e45fJ.

    [19] See https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/securitizing-xinjiang-police-recruitment-informal-policing-and-ethnic-minority-cooptation/FEEC613414AA33A0353949F9B791E733 and https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet.

    [20] E.g. https://archive.is/R3Mpw. This scheme was also mentioned in the TAR’s 13th 5-Year-Plan (2016-2020) (https://archive.is/wip/S3buo). See also similar accounts, e.g. https://archive.is/IJUyl.

    [21] Note e.g. the sequence of the description of these cooperatives followed by an account of labor transfer (https://archive.is/gIw3f).

    [22] See https://archive.is/wip/gIw3f or https://archive.is/wip/z5Tor or https://archive.is/wip/PR7lh.

    [23] See https://archive.is/wip/85zXB.

    [24] See the author’s related work on this in section 2.2 of: “Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Long-Term Scheme of Coercive Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk (Vol. 7, No. 12), December 2019. https://www.jpolrisk.com/beyond-the-camps-beijings-long-term-scheme-of-coercive-labor-poverty-allev.

    [25] Located as part of the 昌都市卡若区俄洛镇昌都市职业技术学校 campus. See https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc; compare https://archive.is/wip/uUTCp and https://archive.is/wip/lKnbe.

    [26] See https://archive.is/wip/WZsvQ.

    [27] Coordinates: 31.187035, 97.091817. Website: https://bit.ly/2Rr6Ekc. The timeframe for construction is indicated by historical satellite imagery and by the year 2018 featured on a red banner on the bottom-most photo of the website.


    #Chine #transfert_de_population #déplacement #rural_surplus_laborers #formaation_professionnelle #armée #travail #agriculture #discipline #discipline_de_travail #Chamdo #préjugés #terres #salariés #travailleurs_salariés #Chen_Quanguo #Xinjiang #Oïghours #camps #pauvreté #contrôle_social #pastoralisme #Farmer_and_Pastoralist_Training_and_Labor_Transfer_Action_Plan #minorités #obédience #discipline #identité #langue #religion #COFCO_Group #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire #Mutual_Pairing_Assistance #pauvreté #Shannan_City #Ngari_City #surveillance #poverty_alleviation #coopératives #salaire #Nagqu #Chamdo_Golden_Sunshine_Vocational_Training_School #Eluo_Town

  • Gustav Landauer
    Appel au socialisme

    Renaud Garcia


    Il est peu de textes alliant au même degré profondeur philosophique, acuité politique et beauté stylistique. Joyau de la littérature socialiste, l’Appel au socialisme de Gustav Landauer est de ceux-là. Né en 1870 à Karlsruhe, en Allemagne, Landauer fut un révolutionnaire sa vie durant, toujours à contretemps des tendances idéologiques de son époque. Lecteur de Spinoza, Schopenhauer et Nietzsche, il est exclu de l’université à vingt-trois ans et considéré par les services de l’empire comme l’« agitateur le plus important du mouvement révolutionnaire radical ». Il collabore à plusieurs journaux, participe à la fondation de théâtres populaires, essuie des peines de prison au tournant du siècle pour incitation à l’action révolutionnaire — temps pendant lequel il se livre notamment à la traduction des écrits du mystique médiéval Maître Eckhart. Par la suite, il se fera passeur décisif en langue allemande de textes de Proudhon, Kropotkine, Mirbeau, La Boétie, avant d’être à l’origine de multiples expérimentations (notamment le journal Der Sozialist) et groupements socialistes, dont le plus connu fut l’Alliance socialiste (qui aurait compté à son apogée une quinzaine de groupes de dix à vingt membres chacun). Commissaire à l’Instruction publique et à la Culture fortement impliqué dans la république des conseils de Bavière, Landauer meurt lynché par un groupement de corps francs en mai 1919. (...)

    #Gustav_Landauer #Renaud_Garcia #socialisme #anarchisme #Allemagne #Maître_Eckhart #révolution #communauté #marxisme #décroissance #Jacques_Ellul #consommation #coopératives #Moyen_Âge #Anthropocène

  • Toilet Paper Wars and the Shithouse of Capitalism

    The run on toilet paper has brought the failings of capitalism front and center to the bathroom of every house across Australia, a trend that has now spread to other countries. We are witnessing, in real-time and with stunning consequence, the stone-cold fact that markets are an ineffective mediator of resources, prone to the worst vagaries of herd mentality. Perceived impending shortages of toilet paper owing to the spread of COVID-19 set off widespread panic. We might be inclined to laugh at the implausibility of the whole scenario, but whether the situation is real or imagined is beside the point. The truth, which in this case may appear stranger than fiction, is that markets operate in the sweet spot between scarcity and fear.

    Those who stockpiled toilet paper are in no danger of running out, and many undoubtedly have way more rolls than they could ever hope to use in the course of several months. These individuals have successfully avoided catastrophe while stuffing up their fellow citizens in the process. The whole situation is quite literally a stinking mess. What is particularly tragic though, is that this story of scarcity and hoarding is a common one. It is the story of capitalism itself.

    Let’s pretend that we are talking about housing rather than toilet paper for a moment. The same principles actually apply. Those who got into the property market early, or have the ability to enter into the housing market at this stage, are the big winners. By early, we are talking several generations ago when land was cheaper and people were far fewer. It was a time when savvy buyers could accumulate vast portfolios. The payoff is that their children and grandchildren had to do very little to maintain the wealth that they inherited, other than continuing to extract value in the form of rent from the properties they owned.

    This is Donald Trump’s story, and it is one of extreme privilege and exploitation. His critics are often appalled by his lack of empathy, but Trump appears to have no conception of caring for the poor precisely because he doesn’t have to. In a similar fashion, if you have a good stockpile of toilet paper, you’re likely not so worried about what everyone else in your neighborhood might be doing. You’re just looking out for number one, so you can continue to do your number twos in peace. Much like the run on toilet paper produced winners and losers by creating a situation of scarcity, so too does the housing market have the same effect.

    Few can afford housing precisely because there has been a decades-long run on this commodity. The extension of the time scale makes it less obvious as to what is going on, but it is the exact same mechanism at play. Those who got into housing first have nothing to fear. They are not prone to the uncertainties that plague the experiences of those who lost out. Insecurity often comes in the form of inflated prices. While there have been examples of people trying to sell toilet paper at exorbitant prices on eBay, so far the demand has not matches sellers’ exploitative expectations. Housing is another matter, where those who did not get in early must pay inflated prices, subject themselves to an ongoing extraction of their means in the form of rent, or find themselves homeless.

    The fact that there are fistfights in grocery stores is the tip of the iceberg in terms of the desperation that a populace can express when placed in a context of crisis. Violence becomes inevitable, which is a terrifying thought when we recognize that housing is a systemic crisis. On the one hand people turning on each other is a reflection of an individualist society, a cultural understanding that only emboldens the wealthy. The poor seldom form solidarities that encourage them to turn on their oppressors by organizing events like rent strikes. They are too busy fighting each other over scraps to make ends meet.

    Who does hoarding hurt? The answer should be clear. Whether in housing or in toilet paper, it is poor people and working families living paycheck-to-paycheck who are worst affected. They can’t afford to stock up on commodities like toilet paper because they are continually paying rent so that they can have access to the most basic, and yet most hoarded commodity of all: housing.

    The toilet paper apocalypse is already prompting people to reconsider their strategies for managing their bodily needs in ways that do not fall prey to further hoarding, paying huge ransoms, or resorting to violence. There is, for example, a lot of discussion on social media about the benefits of bidets. While responding to a shortage of toilet paper might seem trivial in the grand scheme of capitalism, it has provided us with a small glimpse into what it means to explore other ways of being in the world. In the context of housing, such experimentation comes in the form of cooperatives, intergenerational living arrangements, and even housing squats.

    There is a key difference between toilet paper and housing though. Toilet paper shortages are unlikely to be a prolonged phenomenon. The boom will soon bust. Major retailers have already begun placing limits on the amount people can buy. They have intervened in the market, recognizing that any supposed invocation of it being “free” is a dystopian fantasy that is detrimental to the community as a whole. The housing situation, on the other hand, is a protracted affair, and one that leaves many people out in the cold. It is not going to fix itself, and successive governments all around the world have proven that they are unwilling to regulate in ways that are equitable. In the face of such ineffectuality and inequality, the question then becomes: how much shit are people willing to take?

    #papier_toilettes #coronavirus #confinement #Simon_Springer #capitalisme #marché #mentalité_de_troupeau #panique #PQ #rareté #peur #privilèges #exploitation #prix #logement #violence #crise #crise_systémique #individualisme #solidarité #pauvres #riches #classes_sociales #bidets #coopératives #squats #inégalités #pénurie

  • Pierre Bourdieu, en 1998, sur le néolibéralisme :

    Le néolibéralisme est un programme de destruction méthodique des collectifs [...] visant à mettre en question toutes les structures collectives capables de faire obstacle à la logique du marché pur : nation, dont la marge de manœuvre ne cesse de décroître ; groupes de travail, avec, par exemple, l’individualisation des salaires et des carrières en fonction des compétences individuelles et l’atomisation des travailleurs qui en résulte ; collectifs de défense des droits des travailleurs, syndicats, associations, coopératives ; famille même, qui, à travers la constitution de marchés par classes d’âge, perd une part de son contrôle sur la consommation.

    #travail #économie #néolibéralisme

  • En Grèce, dans une usine autogérée, le travail devient un « lieu de solidarité et de liberté »

    Au mur du petit bureau, Dimitris pointe une photo jaunie d’Alexis Tsipras, premier ministre depuis 2015, et qui vient d’être battu aux élections législatives du 7 juillet. Le patron de Syriza avait visité l’usine lors de sa campagne électorale en 2014. « Il nous a promis de légaliser notre statut. Il nous a assuré qu’on était des travailleurs modèles, sur qui ils s’appuieraient pour leur projet économique. Cinq ans plus tard, rien n’a changé. »

    Après huit ans de lutte, les ouvriers de Vio Me sont toujours dans l’illégalité. En 2014, ils ont créé une société coopérative qui s’est dotée d’un compte en banque. Mais elle n’est ni propriétaire ni locataire des actifs. « Sur le papier, on est toujours considérés comme les employés d’une entreprise en faillite. Depuis six ans, notre travail n’est pas reconnu », peste Makis.

    « On voudrait exporter vers l’Amérique Latine, mais c’est impossible sans cadre légal. L’absence de statut freine notre développement. »

    #Zanon #savons #lessives #écologie#BTP #crise #huile_d_olive #organisation_collective #espace_social #distribution_militante #réseau #solidarité #assemblées #centres_sociaux #coopératives #faillite #illégalité #société_coopérative #statut #projet_économique #Syriza #Tsipras #production #autogestion #coopératives_ouvrières #structures_autogérées #Grèce #mouvement_des_places #réappropriation_industrielle #Vio Me #usine #lutte


  • Territori partecipativi

    Verso una geografia per la partecipazione
    Tiziana Banini, Marco Picone

    Orti urbani tra partecipazione e retorica. Il caso del #Comun’Orto di #Rovereto
    Angela Alaimo

    Sperimentazioni di pianificazione partecipata: #cross-action all’#Officina_dei_Saperi a #Ferrara
    Valentina Albanese, Domenico Casellato
    #planification #aménagement_du_territoire

    Associazioni e territorio: tracce partecipative nella #Valle_dell’Aniene
    Tiziana Banini

    I processi partecipativi nell’esperienza del Piano Paesaggistico Regionale del #Friuli-Venezia_Giulia
    Alma Bianchetti, Andrea Guaran

    Vulnerabilità e partecipazione in una piccola comunità della foresta amazzonica guyanese
    Elisa Bignante
    #Guyane #Amazonie #vulnérabilité

    Partecipazione e identità territoriale. Il caso di #Castel_del_Giudice (Molise)
    Stefano De Rubertis, Angelo Belliggiano, Marilena Labianca

    Tra didattica partecipata e “nuove” forme partecipative dell’abitare: l’esperienza di un docufilm
    Isabelle Dumont
    #film_documentaire #habiter

    Progettualità e partecipazione nella Strategia Nazionale per le #Aree_Interne: il #Basso_Sangro-Trigno
    Valentina Evangelista

    The City of the Sensitive and the Brave. Personal Stories, #Art and Place-Making in #Cluj, #omania
    Kinga Xénia Havadi-Nagy, Oana-Ramona Ilovan

    La participation pour la protection de l’#eau en #Bretagne: quelle place pour les “territoires”?
    Emmanuelle Hellier

    Sviluppo locale e pratiche partecipative: tra aspettative deluse e innovazioni territoriali inaspettate
    Marina Marengo
    #développement_local #innovation #innovations_territoriales

    Innovazione sociale e istituzionalizzazione: l’esempio delle cooperative di comunità nell’area interna dell’Appennino Emiliano
    Maria Giulia Pezzi, Giulia Urso
    #innovations_sociales #coopératives #Apennins

    Roll-with-Participation. Il caso di #ProMondello a #Palermo
    Marco Picone

    Processi partecipativi glocal. Il caso di #Isernia
    Emilia Sarno

    La #participation_citoyenne via un appel à projets: interprétation libre ou imposée de la participation, de l’#identité et de la #convivialité villageoise?
    Serge Schmitz

    Coesione e partecipazione territoriale per un rinnovato concetto di cittadinanza attiva. Il caso di #Urban_Experience
    Silvia Siniscalchi
    #cohésion_territoriale #citoyenneté #citoyenneté_active

    Identità, conflitti e riqualificazione: i processi partecipativi nel quartiere #Bolognina a #Bologna
    Diana Sprega, Emanuele Frixa, Matteo Proto

    #requalification #Bologne

    #géographie #revue #participation #Italie #territoire

  • #Pesticides : pourquoi la #France en consomme de plus en plus

    En France, l’utilisation de pesticides a augmenté de 12 % entre 2014 et 2016. Pourtant, depuis 2008 et le Grenelle de l’environnement, le gouvernement s’était fixé l’objectif de réduire de moitié l’utilisation de pesticides d’ici à 2018, puis à 2025. Sans succès. Pire : non seulement l’utilisation de pesticides ne diminue pas, mais elle continue d’augmenter constamment. Pourquoi ? La faute en grande partie au système des coopératives, mis en place au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale. Explications en vidéo.



    Dans l’esprit des théoriciens du début du XIXe siècle, les coopératives de consommation sont la première brique (avec les coopératives de production et les mutuelles) d’une société alternative au capitalisme, alors en plein essor. Ils espèrent qu’elles vont devenir rapidement dominantes par dissémination. Mais si ces coopératives ont pu se développer de façon conséquente, elles n’ont jamais atteint une taille leur permettant de s’affranchir totalement des logiques capitalistes. La coopération est révolutionnaire car elle appelle les consommateurs et les producteurs à s’unir sur une base égalitaire pour s’autogérer sans patron ou État interposés. Mais dans les faits, elle est réformiste car elle doit tenir compte de la législation et du système économique dominant.
    Dès le milieu du XIXe siècle, des coopératives se créent dans beaucoup de pays européens, mais aussi aux États-Unis, au Japon… À Lyon, la Société des Travailleurs Unis (créée en 1849), possède, après seulement deux ans, un magasin de gros, sept épiceries, une boulangerie, deux boucheries, deux magasins de charbon, un entrepôt de vin, une pâtisserie et une fabrique de chocolat. Les bénéfices réalisés sont en totalité attribués à des œuvres d’éducation et de solidarité : elle finance ainsi deux écoles primaires et une caisse des invalides du travail. Mais dès le coup d’état de Louis-Napoléon (décembre 1851), le nouveau pouvoir ordonne la liquidation de toutes les sociétés ouvrières dites fraternelles, à ses yeux foyers potentiels de républicanisme et de révolution.

    #coopératives #SCOP #autogestion

  • Journal breton - saison 2 : Les #agriculteurs sous la pression de la #FNSEA

    « On aura les moyens de vous faire rentrer dans les rangs. » Trois agriculteurs racontent comment les #coopératives et la FNSEA amènent les éleveurs à produire toujours plus et abandonnent ceux qui ne s’y résignent pas.

    A travers l’histoire de sa #vache Penn Gwenn, Christiane Pouliquen, ancienne productrice de #lait, raconte comment son activité a cessé lorsque la coopérative pour laquelle elle travaillait n’a plus trouvé rentable de venir chercher le lait des petits éleveurs laitiers.

    René Louail a critiqué l’utilisation d’#OGM par sa coopérative. En réponse, de manière insidieuse et pour le mettre en défaut, celle-ci a effectué cinquante et un contrôles qualité en un an sur son exploitation, au lieu de quatre habituellement.

    Marie raconte pourquoi, suite à la maladie de l’un de ses enfants, elle a décidé de quitter l’#agriculture_intensive et de se reconvertir à la biodynamie. Elle décrit les pressions et menaces qu’elle a alors subies de la part de la FNSEA et de ses voisins adhérents à ce syndicat.

    #confédération_paysanne #Pieds_sur_terre #audio #radio #Inès_Léraud #Bretagne

  • #Agriculture and Autonomy in the Middle East

    In Rojava, a region in Syria also known as North #Kurdistan, a groundbreaking experiment in communal living, social justice, and ecological vitality is taking place. Devastated by civil war, Syria is a place where a cessation of hostilities often seems like the most that can be hoped for. But Rojava has set its sights much higher. What started as a movement for political autonomy in the city of Kobane has blossomed into an attempt to build a radical pluralist democracy on the principles of communal solidarity — with food security, equality for women, and a localized, anti-capitalist economy at its core.

    #autonomy #Moyen-Orient #Rojava #Mesopotamian_Ecology_Movement #résistance #coopératives #anti-capitalisme #économie_locale #économie

  • SMart welcomes Michel Bauwens for a 3 year research and development residency | P2P Foundation

    Readers of our blog and wiki will have noted various references to the labour mutual SMart. We find this an important movement and mutualistic solution for the autonomous workers that are becoming more and more numerous, but also ever more precarious, in our western societies. SMart membership converts income into wages, and thus into access to social protection, while also guaranteeing the payment of the invoices through a mutual guarantee fund, along with a number of other mutualized support services. Between the figure of the lone competitive entrepreneur who takes all the risks without social protections, and represents the fastest pauperized population sector in the western economy (autopreneurs in France, ZZP in Netherlands), but also as an alternative to work subordination in the classic salariat, we believe SMart represents a very fruitful third way towards collective and cooperative enterprise. Hence we believe that SMart is potentially the new form of solidarity and social power for the form that work is taking in the 21st century, while also being animated with a vision of social change. In short, I believe labour mutuals are the form of self-organization appropriate for 21st workers, which not only fights for just distribution, but also for a more just and sustainable society, in which the commons orientation plays a vital role. The leadership of SMart agrees with this vision.

    Starting last November, I have accepted a consulting association with SMart and the press announcement below explains the strategic priorities of this engagement:

    #Coopératives _emploi #mutuelles #P2P #Michel_Bauwens

  • Cara Mineo, la commissione d’inchiesta: «Chiudere subito la struttura e revocare il direttore indagato per truffa»

    La commissione nazionale sul sistema di accoglienza approva all’unanimità, da Forza Italia al Pd, la relazione sul centro di accoglienza: «Sprechi fin dalla nascita del sito». Nel mirino gli alfaniani, Palazzotto di Sinistra Italiana: «Il sottosegretario Castiglione si dimetta». Anche Corrao dei 5 stelle chiede un passo indietro dell’esponente di Alternativa popolare

    #fraude #Mineo #CARA #asile #migrations #Italie #Sicile #réfugiés #logement #hébergement

  • L’expérience Cecosesola | Association Autogestion

    En 1983, la coopérative El Triunfo tentera alors de créer un supermarché populaire appelé « feria ». Cette formule a immédiatement connu un énorme succès et permettra de susciter la création de coopératives de production agricole qui alimenteront ces ferias. Tout récemment, le complexe Cecosesola a été capable d’ouvrir un hôpital qui dispense des soins à prix raisonnables. Aujourd’hui 1200 personnes travaillent dans le cadre des coopératives de Cecosesola. La loi coopérative de 2001 a permis à Cecosesola de se débarrasser définitivement de la notion de dirigeants élus, les coopératives fonctionnant plus que jamais sur la base de l’absence de hiérarchie et du salaire unique.

    Le film de Ronan Kerneur et David Ferret permet de saisir dans le vif ce qui fait l’originalité de Cecosesola : une expérience entrepreneuriale certes, mais surtout une aventure humaine dans laquelle l’implication de chacun, tant en terme de travail que de participation démocratique, est la clé du succès. Le film alterne des prises de vue sur l’activité propre des coopératives de Cecosesola et des interviews de personnages. Si Gustavo Salas Romer, que l’on pourrait assimiler au théoricien de cette expérience, est présent, ce sont surtout Teofilo, Angel, Felipe, Noël, José, Josue, Inès, Manuel, Gaudi, Omar, Pedro, Sneida, Crismar, Antony, Tere, Jorge, Yolanda, quelques coopérateurs parmi d’autres qui savent nous parler de leur vécu au sein des coopératives, des personnes à l’image de ce qu’est aujourd’hui la société vénézuélienne mais porteurs d’une conscience en la nécessaire libération de l’être humain par le collectif. Régulièrement l’éducation reçue à l’école est questionnée dans ses fondements mercantiles. Les délibérations vont bon train et sont le pendant d’une activité pleinement assumée. On notera tout particulièrement la partie du film sur le choc entre la culture anti-étatique de Cecosesola et le coopérativisme lancé par l’Etat vénézuélien à l’époque d’Hugo Chávez, coopérativisme qui sera abandonné par la suite.

    #coopératives #communs

  • On a testé le supermarché qui fait travailler ses clients

    Depuis 6 mois, pour remplir son frigo, notre journaliste a remplacé les traditionnelles enseignes de distribution par le supermarché coopératif La Louve, situé dans le 18e arrondissement de Paris. Premier bilan.

    « Nous partîmes cinq cents ; mais par un prompt renfort »... nous nous vîmes 5000 coopérateurs ! La citation de Corneille - largement revue et corrigée - décrit à merveille la fulgurance des inscriptions, ces derniers mois, à La Louve, le supermarché coopératif. Et de plus en plus d’initiatives similaires voient le jour dans toute la France. En décembre dernier, interpellé par la promesse de se nourrir mieux pour moins cher, notre journaliste a décidé de se lancer dans l’aventure. Même si la phase de test n’est pas encore terminée, de plus en plus de consommateurs font leur courses dans cet établissement du 18e arrondissement de Paris au fonctionnement bien particulier. Pour avoir le droit de consommer les produits qui y sont vendus, il faut acheter des parts de l’entreprise et y travailler 3 heures par mois. L’avantage : être sûr de payer ses achats au prix juste. Promesse tenue ?


  • Appel de Longo maï pour soutenir la ZAD
    de Notre-Dame-des-Landes


    Cela fait plusieurs années que la lutte qui se déroule à Notre-Dame-des-Landes, à quelques kilomètres de Nantes, en Bretagne, nous interpelle, nous ravit et nous remplit d’espoir.

    Les 1 650 hectares de bocage qui y constituent la ZAD (zone à défendre) sont devenus l’un des territoires européens où s’expriment avec la plus grande force et clarté à la fois la contestation contre l’escalade techno-industrielle et à la surconsommation, et une immense envie d’expérimentation sociétale.

    En 1973, dans son texte « La crise, une offensive », Longo maï posait le constat d’un avenir désenchanté pour la jeunesse et la nécessité de s’approprier des espaces ruraux désertés pour y expérimenter d’autres formes de vie et y développer les bases matérielles d’une autonomie dans une optique de solidarité active et de changement de société. Cette initiative a permis, au cours du temps, la création de dix coopératives autogérées dans cinq pays d’Europe.

    À Notre-Dame-des-Landes, depuis plus de quarante ans, on refuse la construction par Vinci (premier groupe mondial de travaux publics) d’un aéroport de plus et le monde qui va avec (...)

    #coopératives_européennes #Longo_maï #solidarité #ZAD #Notre-Dame-des-Landes

  • Les #start-up, le fantasme de la réussite pour tous | L’Humanité

    Arthur Muller attire ses salariés en leur proposant un projet et une autre organisation du travail, horizontale. « Beaucoup de jeunes aiment travailler dans ces structures, parce qu’il y a une culture de l’échange, de la collaboration. On n’est pas que le maillon d’une chaîne. Mais il faut aussi savoir faire preuve d’autonomie, parfois changer de rôle, c’est exigeant et cela ne plaît pas à tout le monde. » Et le start-upper de reconnaître : « Vous savez, l’écosystème français est très favorable pour les start-up. Mais c’est vrai que pour qui veut monter une entreprise de BTP ou une boulangerie, il n’y a pas toutes ces aides… » D’autres modèles existent pourtant. « C’est vrai que beaucoup de jeunes ne veulent plus de patron et recherchent les moyens d’être créatifs, explique Yann Le Pollotec. Mais, pour cela, les modèles coopératifs de l’économie sociale et solidaire, tout comme les lieux alternatifs comme les #fab_labs, sont bien plus adaptés que les start-up. »

    #ess #coopératives

    • Pour cela, il promet de nouvelles réductions d’impôts pour ceux qui investissent dans les start-up. Et, en cas de perte de capital, il suggère de demander au fisc de rembourser 50 % des montants investis. Une mesure plus qu’inquiétante, 9 start-up sur 10 disparaissant dans les trois ans après leur création… « C’est la privatisation des profits et la mutualisation des pertes, reconnaît Charles Degand. Et puis, c’est la menace de créer une bulle spéculative autour des start-up qui seront valorisées des millions alors qu’elles ne gagneront pas un euro… »

  • Aménagement numérique, #Fibre optique : le dessous des cartes

    [Le présent article a été en grande partie écrit en avril 2016 et légèrement retouché et actualisé en décembre] Publié originellement sur : http://blog.spyou.org Après quatre ans à fréquenter des élus et fonctionnaires de ma nouvelle campagne d’adoption, et plus généralement toute personne avec qui je me suis entretenu à propos de numérique ou, plus […]

    #Economie #Rainbow_Hat #Technos #Tribunes #coopératives_internet #FFDN #numérique_rural #THD

  • La carte des supermarchés coopératifs de France et de Belgique

    Les supermarchés coopératifs appartiennent à ceux qui le fréquentent et le font vivre. Ils sont le fruit d’un travail collectif et d’une ambition commune : consommer malin, sans se ruiner, dans un esprit de convivialité. Si l’idée de rejoindre l’aventure vous séduit, jetez un oeil à cette carte publiée par le site Consocollaborative. Qui sait, vous y trouverez peut-être un magasin tout près de chez vous !

    #coopératives #grande_distribution

    http://zinc.mondediplo.net/messages/44384 via BoOz

  • Réapproprions-nous l’#énergie ! - #Attac France

    La libéralisation du marché européen de l’énergie est ambivalente : véhicule de la remise en cause de nos vieux #services_publics de l’énergie, elle est également utilisée dans la perspective d’une réappropriation citoyenne de la production, distribution et consommation de l’énergie. La création de centrales citoyennes et de sociétés #coopératives de production d’#énergie_renouvelable, citoyenne et locale en est un des exemples. Présentation et explication en exemples.

  • Les inégalités démocratiques entre coopératives, mutuelles, entreprises privées et publiques | Revue du Mauss permanente

    L’économie sociale et solidaire (ESS) est parfois considérée seulement une humanisation du capitalisme, or elle peut permettre une véritable alternative à ce système. Cette mutation relève prioritairement de la démocratisation économique. En effet, tant que cette dernière ne sera pas atteinte, la démocratie politique restera majoritairement dominée par la puissance des élites économiques. Car comme l’expliquait Marx, les infrastructures économiques et les infrastructures de classe déterminent et dominent les superstructures que sont l’État, le droit, les médias, l’école…

    L’idéal de la démocratie est fondé sur l’égalité de tous dans les décisions. En effet, la démocratie chez les Grecs conjugue, le Krâtos le pouvoir, avec celui du Dêmos, le peuple. Abraham Lincoln définissait ainsi la démocratie « Le gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple ». De même, Bernstein estime que la démocratie « est le régime politique où la souveraineté est exercée par le peuple » [1]. Pour Delannoi, la démocratie est le « gouvernement des citoyens » [2]. Si nous élargissons cette définition à toutes les situations de décision collective, la démocratie est donc la puissance de tous les individus d’un espace commun (un territoire, une organisation…). La démocratie peut donc être définie comme le gouvernement de tous, par tous. Il s’agit d’un idéal inatteignable dès qu’un individu ne vit plus seul. Liberté, égalité et ordre collectif, sont les trois grands principes qui structurent les différents systèmes de politiques économiques. Ces trois principes forment un triangle de forces relativement antagonistes et complémentaires, c’est-à-dire, un « équilibre dynamique ».

    Les coopératives peuvent servir de modèle à une démocratisation de l’économie. Néanmoins, il s’agit de bien analyser le fonctionnement démocratique de celles-ci et surtout leurs limites. Aussi, la question à laquelle nous allons chercher à répondre est celle-ci : quelles sont les conditions de la légitimité démocratique dans une unité de production en particulier dans les coopératives et les mutuelles ? Après avoir définit juridiquement, sociologiquement et philosophiquement, ces différentes formes d’unités de production, nous comparerons la réalité et les conditions nécessaires à leur mise en œuvre de la démocratie interne. Enfin, nous comparerons les différents types de légitimité démocratique au sein des coopératives, des mutuelles, des entreprises publiques et privées.

  • Le mythe de la conception léniniste du #parti ou Qu’ont-ils fait à Que faire ?

    Détachement d’intellectuels, élitiste, centraliste. Le parti léniniste est taxé de tous les maux que le stalinisme a fait peser sur le mouvement ouvrier. Dans ce texte de 1990, Hal Draper revient sur le mythe qui entoure la conception léniniste du parti et notamment sur Que faire ?, en ayant à coeur de souligner le dynamisme de la pensée de #Lénine. Draper nous invite alors à un retour au texte pour nous montrer que Lénine n’avait en rien cherché à construire une secte semblable aux groupuscules actuels. Il a construit un pôle révolutionnaire au sein d’un parti ouvrier large, dont le degré de discipline devait varier avec la conjoncture. Draper permet ainsi de relire les débats classiques sur l’organisation avec un regard neuf, qui peut nourrir un travail de recomposition politique encore à l’ordre du (...)


    • Moi ma préférée des 21 Conditions d’admission des Partis dans l’ #Internationale_Communiste, édictées par Lénine et ses amis en Juillet 1920, c’est la numéro 12 :

      12. Les Partis appartenant à l’Internationale Communiste doivent être édifiés sur le principe de la centralisation démocratique. A l’époque actuelle de guerre civile acharnée, le Parti Communiste ne pourra remplir son rôle que s’il est organisé de la façon la plus centralisée, si une discipline de fer confinant à la discipline militaire y est admise et si son organisme central est muni de larges pouvoirs, exerce une autorité incontestée, bénéficie de la confiance unanime des militants .

      Même si la numéro 13 est pas mal aussi :

      13. Les Partis Communistes des pays où les communistes militent légalement doivent procéder à des épurations périodiques de leurs organisations , afin d’en écarter les éléments intéressés et petit-bourgeois.

      Oh mais la numéro 1 n’est pas sans qualités :

      [...] La presse périodique ou autre et tous les services d’éditions doivent être entièrement soumis au #Comité_Central_du_Parti , que ce dernier soit légal ou illégal. Il est inadmissible que les organes de publicité mésusent de l’autonomie pour mener une politique non conforme à celle du Parti. [...]

      La numéro 9 rappelle l’attachement aux désirs d’émancipation et d’autonomie des individus :

      9. Tout Parti désireux d’appartenir à l’Internationale Communiste doit poursuivre une propagande persévérante et systématique au sein des #syndicats, #coopératives et autres organisations des masses ouvrières. Des #noyaux_communistes doivent être formés, dont le travail opiniâtre et constant conquerra les syndicats au communisme . Leur devoir sera de révéler à tout instant la trahison des social-patriotes et les hésitations du « centre ». Ces noyaux communistes doivent être complètement subordonnés à l’ensemble du Parti.


      Nan vraiment le pauvre #Lénine et ses camarades #Trotski et #Staline ont vraiment été diffamés, leurs conceptions étaient si émancipatrices ! Ce n’est qu’à partir de 1924 et à cause des bureaucrates à la solde du méchant Staline que les choses ont dérapé.

      Sinon ce livre publié en 1921 pourrait vous intéresser :

      Les #Soviets trahis par les #bolcheviks - Rudolf Rocker

  • Yourope. Les #terres_agricoles, objets de toutes les convoitises

    Enquête sur un nouvel or vert, les terres agricoles de l’#Europe_de_l'Est : en Pologne où des mesures de protection arrivent à leur terme ; en #Roumanie, où les étrangers peuvent acheter des terrains depuis 2014 ; en #Hongrie où l’État vend des terres nationalisées aux plus offrants et en #Bulgarie où une #résistance s’organise.


    #terres #agriculture #Allianz #Fielmann #Benetton #Chine #land-grabbing #coopératives (en Bulgarie)
    cc @odilon

    Evolution du prix du foncier en Allemagne de l’Est :

    #BVVG, société publique qui vend et loue des terres qui appartenaient à l’Etat avant la chute du mur :

    Journaliste hongrois qui enquête sur l’#accaparement_des_terres : #Gabor_Vago

  • El Salvador - La carotte, le bâton et les semences : la politique d’aide au développement des États-Unis rencontre de la résistance

    Ce texte croise deux thématiques souvent évoquées par DIAL ces dernières années, celle de l’agriculture autour, ici, de la question des semences, et celle du développement et de « l’aide au développement ». Le gouvernement d’El Salvador (FMLN) qui souhaite favoriser l’achat de semences destinées à l’approvisionnement des petits agriculteurs auprès de #coopératives salvadoriennes, se heurte ainsi aux pressions des États-Unis qui conditionnent leur #aide au #développement à l’inclusion des #multinationales états-uniennes parmi les producteurs de #semences auprès desquels le ministère de l’agriculture salvadorien s’approvisionne… Martha Pskowski, originaire de Washington, vit à Mexico. Texte publié sur le site du Programme des Amériques le 15 août 2014.

    #Salvador #agriculture

  • La #Grande_Muraille_verte trace doucement son chemin au #Sénégal

    Lancé en 2008 sous l’égide de l’#Union_africaine, le projet a pour objectif de restaurer les écosystèmes sahéliens menacés par la désertification. Il se résume le plus souvent en une bande de #reboisement de 15 km de large traversant le continent d’est en ouest, de Djibouti à Dakar.

    « Le terme “Grande Muraille”, c’est pour frapper les esprits. Ici, ça ne ressemble pas à ça », explique le sergent Ndiaye, du service des eaux et forêts sénégalaises, superviseur du projet dans le Kooyah. « Ce sont des parcelles éparses d’environ 600 hectares chacune pour laisser circuler le bétail, mais entourées de fils de fer barbelés pour protéger les jeunes plants. »

    Débutée il y a huit ans dans le nord du Sénégal, l’installation des parcelles s’est accompagnée d’un long travail de sensibilisation. Le but était de faire adhérer les populations au projet. « Eleveurs transhumants, les Peuls sont moins attachés à la terre qu’à leur bétail », résume Abdou Ka, sociologue pour les Observatoires hommes-milieux Tessékéré (OHMI), fruit d’une coopération entre le CNRS et l’université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar.

    #agriculture_vivrière #coopératives #élevage #désertification #changement_climatique #adaptation #démographie