• #Seoul says inter-Korean talks needed to resolve #Mount_Kumgang issue despite Pyongyang’s refusal | Yonhap News Agency

    SEOUL, Oct. 30 (Yonhap) — A face-to-face meeting is necessary to discuss the fate of a long-suspended joint tour program to Mount Kumgang on North Korea’s east coast, the unification ministry said Wednesday, despite Pyongyang’s refusal to hold such a meeting.

    On Tuesday, North Korea turned down Seoul’s offer to hold working-level talks, which was made in response to the North’s demand that all South Korean-built facilities at the mountain resort be removed “on an agreed-upon date.”

    #corée_du_nord #corée_du_sud

  • Corée du Nord : selon un ex-haut diplomate nord-coréen, le régime pourrait s’effondrer d’ici 20 ans
    Aude Solente, BFMTV, le 20 juin 2019

    Sachant que la fin du monde est prévue pour #2030, cela indique que la #Corée_du_Nord survivra dix ans de plus que le reste du monde, probablement grâce à la sagesse et à la vision de Kim Jong Un...

    On l’ajoute à la troisième compilation :

    #effondrement #collapsologie #catastrophe #fin_du_monde #it_has_begun #Anthropocène #capitalocène

  • North Korean diplomats in Spain : CIA implicated in attack on North Korean embassy in Madrid | In English | EL PAÍS

    Les assaillants de l’ambassade nord-coréenne à Madrid liés à la #CIA, selon la presse - L’Orient-Le Jour

    Au moins deux des dix personnes qui ont pris d’assaut en février l’ambassade de #Corée_du_Nord à Madrid, dérobant des ordinateurs, sont liés à la CIA américaine, affirme mercredi le quotidien espagnol El Pais.

    « Au moins deux des dix assaillants, qui ont frappé et interrogé les huit personnes qui étaient dans la légation, ont été identifiés et ont des liens avec les services secrets des #Etats-Unis », a assuré El Pais, citant des sources policières et au sein du contre-espionnage espagnol (CNI).

  • Rapprochement intercoréen : la diplomatie des agrumes (et des champignons) - Asialyst


    Le ballet des hercules C-130 aura duré deux jours. Depuis ce dimanche 11 novembre, ce sont près de 200 tonnes de mandarines sud-coréennes qui ont été livrées à Pyongyang via un pont aérien destiné à renforcer le rapprochement intercoréen. Un échange de bonnes intentions après les deux tonnes de champignons des pins envoyés par le Nord à Séoul en septembre dernier.
    Le palais présidentiel à Séoul.
    Ce sont des fruits dont on retrouve la trace dès le XIIIème siècle à la table des rois de Corée. Un fruit de saison rarement consommé en Corée du Nord, a expliqué le porte-parole de la Maison Bleue
    , et qui n’entrerait pas dans la liste des produits sous embargo de l’ONU. Un avis que ne partagent pas les conservateurs à Séoul. Au total : 20 000 cartons d’agrumes ont été avalés par les avions cargos de l’armée sud-coréenne pour être transportés en Corée du Nord. Une telle quantité s’apparente à de l’exportation, estiment celles et ceux qui voient d’un mauvais œil la politique de rapprochement vis-à-vis du voisin nord-coréen, menée par le président Moon Jae-in, et donc un geste qui violerait les sanctions imposées au régime de Pyongyang.

    #corée_du_sud #corée_du_nord

  • “You Cry at Night but Don’t Know Why”. Sexual Violence against Women in North Korea

    Oh Jung Hee is a former trader in her forties from Ryanggang province. She sold clothes to market stalls in Hyesan city and was involved in the distribution of textiles in her province. She said that up until she left the country in 2014, guards would regularly pass by the market to demand bribes, sometimes in the form of coerced sexual acts or intercourse. She told Human Rights Watch:

    I was a victim many times … On the days they felt like it, market guards or police officials could ask me to follow them to an empty room outside the market, or some other place they’d pick. What can we do? They consider us [sex] toys … We [women] are at the mercy of men. Now, women cannot survive without having men with power near them.

    She said she had no power to resist or report these abuses. She said it never occurred to her that anything could be done to stop these assaults except trying to avoid such situations by moving away or being quiet in order to not be noticed.

    Park Young Hee, a former farmer in her forties also from Ryanggang province who left North Korea for the second time in 2011, was forced back to North Korea from China in the spring of 2010 after her first attempt to flee. She said, after being released by the secret police (bowiseong) and put under the jurisdiction of the police, the officer in charge of questioning her in the police pre-trial detention facility (kuryujang) near Musan city in North Hamgyong province touched her body underneath her clothes and penetrated her several times with his fingers. She said he asked her repeatedly about the sexual relations she had with the Chinese man to whom she had been sold to while in China. She told Human Rights Watch:

    My life was in his hands, so I did everything he wanted and told him everything he asked. How could I do anything else? … Everything we do in North Korea can be considered illegal, so everything can depend on the perception or attitude of who is looking into your life.

    Park Young Hee said she never told anybody about the abuse because she did not think it was unusual, and because she feared the authorities and did not believe anyone would help.

    The experiences of Oh Jung Hee and Park Young Hee are not isolated ones. While sexual and gender-based violence is of concern everywhere, growing evidence suggests it is endemic in North Korea.

    This report–based largely on interviews with 54 North Koreans who left the country after 2011, when the current leader, Kim Jong Un, rose to power, and 8 former North Korean officials who fled the country–focuses on sexual abuse by men in official positions of power. The perpetrators include high-ranking party officials, prison and detention facility guards and interrogators, police and secret police officials, prosecutors, and soldiers. At the time of the assaults, most of the victims were in the custody of authorities or were market traders who came across guards and other officials as they traveled to earn their livelihood.

    Interviewees told us that when a guard or police officer “picks” a woman, she has no choice but to comply with any demands he makes, whether for sex, money, or other favors. Women in custody have little choice should they attempt to refuse or complain afterward, and risk sexual violence, longer periods in detention, beatings, forced labor, or increased scrutiny while conducting market activities.

    Women not in custody risk losing their main source of income and jeopardizing their family’s survival, confiscation of goods and money, and increased scrutiny or punishment, including being sent to labor training facilities (rodong danryeondae) or ordinary-crimes prison camps (kyohwaso, literally reform through labor centers) for being involved in market activities. Other negative impacts include possibly losing access to prime trading locations, being fired or overlooked for jobs, being deprived of means of transportation or business opportunities, being deemed politically disloyal, being relocated to a remote area, and facing more physical or sexual violence.

    The North Koreans we spoke with told us that unwanted sexual contact and violence is so common that it has come to be accepted as part of ordinary life: sexual abuse by officials, and the impunity they enjoy, is linked to larger patterns of sexual abuse and impunity in the country. The precise number of women and girls who experience sexual violence in North Korea, however, is unknown. Survivors rarely report cases, and the North Korean government rarely publishes data on any aspect of life in the country.

    Our research, of necessity conducted among North Koreans who fled, does not provide a generalized sample from which to draw definitive conclusions about the prevalence of sexual abuse by officials. The diversity in age, geographic location, social class, and personal backgrounds of the survivors, combined with many consistencies in how they described their experiences, however, suggest that the patterns of sexual violence identified here are common across North Korea. Our findings also mirror those of other inquiries that have tried to discern the situation in this sealed-off authoritarian country.

    A 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) concluded that systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations committed by the North Korean government constituted crimes against humanity. These included forced abortion, rape, and other sexual violence, as well as murder, imprisonment, enslavement, and torture on North Koreans in prison or detention. The UN COI stated that witnesses revealed that while “domestic violence is rife within DPRK society … violence against women is not limited to the home, and that it is common to see women being beaten and sexually assaulted in public.”

    The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a South Korean government think tank that specializes in research on North Korea, conducted a survey with 1,125 North Koreans (31.29 percent men and 68.71 percent women) who re-settled in South Korea between 2010 and 2014. The survey found that 37.7 percent of the respondents said sexual harassment and rape of inmates at detention facilities was “common,” including 15.9 percent that considered it “very common.” Thirty-three women said they were raped at detention and prison facilities, 51 said they witnessed rapes in such facilities, and 25 said they heard of such cases. The assailants identified by the respondents were police agents–45.6 percent; guards–17.7 percent; secret police (bowiseong) agents –13.9 percent; and fellow detainees–1.3 percent. The 2014 KINU survey found 48.6 percent of the respondents said that rape and sexual harassment against women in North Korea was “common.”

    The North Koreans we spoke with stressed that women are socialized to feel powerless to demand accountability for sexual abuse and violence, and to feel ashamed when they are victims of abuse. They said the lack of rule of law and corresponding support systems for survivors leads most victims to remain silent–not seek justice and often not even talk about their experiences.

    While most of our interviewees left North Korea between2011 and 2016, and many of the abuses date from a year or more before their departure, all available evidence suggests that the abuses and near-total impunity enjoyed by perpetrators continue to the present.

    In July 2017, the North Korean government told the UN committee that monitors the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that just nine people in all of North Korea were convicted of rape in 2008, seven in 2011, and five in 2015. The government said that the numbers of male perpetrators convicted for the crime of forcing a woman who is his subordinate to have sexual intercourse was five in 2008, six in 2011, and three in 2015. While North Korean officials seem to think such ridiculously low numbers show the country to be a violence-free paradise, the numbers are a powerful indictment of their utter failure to address sexual violence in the country.

    Sexual Abuse in Prisons and Detention Facilities

    Human Rights Watch interviewed eight former detainees or prisoners who said they experienced a combination of verbal and sexual violence, harsh questioning, and humiliating treatment by investigators, detention facility personnel, or prison guards that belong to the police or the secret police (bowiseong).

    Six interviewees had experienced sexual, verbal, and physical abuse in pre-trial detention and interrogation facilities (kuryujang)–jails designed to hold detainees during their initial interrogations, run by the MSS or the police. They said secret police or police agents in charge of their personal interrogation touched their faces and their bodies, including their breasts and hips, either through their clothes or by putting their hands inside their clothes.

    Human Rights Watch also documented cases of two women who were sexually abused at a temporary holding facility (jipkyulso) while detainees were being transferred from interrogation facilities (kuryujang) to detention facilities in the detainees’ home districts.

    Sexual Abuse of Women Engaged in Trade

    Human Rights Watch interviewed four women traders who experienced sexual violence, including rape, assault, and sexual harassment, as well as verbal abuse and intimidation, by market gate-keeper officials. We also interviewed 17 women who were sexually abused or experienced unwanted sexual advances by police or other officials as they traveled for their work as traders. Although seeking income outside the command economy was illegal, women started working as traders during the mass famine of the 1990s as survival imperatives led many to ignore the strictures of North Korea’s command economy. Since many married women were not obliged to attend a government-established workplace, they became traders and soon the main breadwinners for their families. But pursuing income in public exposed them to violence.

    Traders and former government officials told us that in North Korea traders are often compelled to pay bribes to officials and market regulators, but for women the “bribes” often include sexual abuse and violence, including rape. Perpetrators of abuses against women traders include high-ranking party officials, managers at state-owned enterprises, and gate-keeper officials at the markets and on roads and check-points, such as police, bowiseong agents, prosecutors, soldiers, and railroad inspectors on trains.

    Women who had worked as traders described unwanted physical contact that included indiscriminately touching their bodies, grabbing their breasts and hips, trying to touch them underneath their skirts or pants, poking their cheeks, pulling their hair, or holding their bodies in their arms. The physical harassment was often accompanied by verbal abuse and intimidation. Women also said it was common for women to try to help protect each other by sharing information about such things, such as which house to avoid because it is rumored that the owner is a rapist or a child molester, which roads not to walk on alone at night, or which local high-ranking official most recently sexually preyed upon women.

    Our research confirms a trend already identified in the UN COI report:

    Officials are not only increasingly engaging in corruption in order to support their low or non-existent salaries, they are also exacting penalties and punishment in the form of sexual abuse and violence as there is no fear of punishment. As more women assume the responsibility for feeding their families due to the dire economic and food situation, more women are traversing through and lingering in public spaces, selling and transporting their goods.

    The UN COI further found “the male dominated state, agents who police the marketplace, inspectors on trains, and soldiers are increasingly committing acts of sexual assault on women in public spaces” and “received reports of train guards frisking women and abusing young girls onboard.” This was described as “the male dominated state preying on the increasingly female-dominated market.”

    Almost all of the women interviewed by Human Rights Watch with trading experience said the only way not to fall prey to extortion or sexual harassment while conducting market activities was to give up hopes of expanding one’s business and barely scrape by, be born to a powerful father with money and connections, marry a man with power, or become close to one.

    Lack of Remedies

    Only one of the survivors of sexual violence Human Rights Watch interviewed for this report said she had tried to report the sexual assault. The other women said they did not report it because they did not trust the police and did not believe police would be willing to take action. The women said the police do not consider sexual violence a serious crime and that it is almost inconceivable to even consider going to the police to report sexual abuse because of the possible repercussions. Family members or close friends who knew about their experience also cautioned women against going to the authorities.

    Eight former government officials, including a former police officer, told Human Rights Watch that cases of sexual abuse or assault are reported to police only when there are witnesses and, even then, the reports invariably are made by third parties and not by the women themselves. Only seven of the North Korean women and men interviewed by Human Rights Watch were aware of cases in which police had investigated sexual violence and in all such cases the victims had been severely injured or killed.

    All of the North Koreans who spoke to Human Rights Watch said the North Korean government does not provide any type of psycho-social support services for survivors of sexual violence and their families. To make matters worse, they said, the use of psychological or psychiatric services itself is highly stigmatized.

    Two former North Korean doctors and a nurse who left after 2010 said there are no protocols for medical treatment and examination of victims of sexual violence to provide therapeutic care or secure medical evidence. They said there are no training programs for medical practitioners on sexual assault and said they never saw a rape victim go to the hospital to receive treatment.

    Discrimination Against Women

    Sex discrimination and subordination of women are pervasive in North Korean. Everyone in North Korea is subjected to a socio-political classification system, known as songbun, that grouped people from its creation into “loyal,” “wavering,” or “hostile” classes. But a woman’s classification also depends, in critical respects, on that of her male relatives, specifically her father and her father’s male relations and, upon marriage, that of her husband and his male relations. A woman’s position in society is lower than a man’s, and her reputation depends largely on maintaining an image of “sexual purity” and obeying the men in her family.

    The government is dominated by men. According to statistics provided by the DPRK government to the UN, as of 2016 women made up just 20.2 percent of the deputies selected, 16.1 percent of divisional directors in government bodies, 11.9 percent of judges and lawyers, 4.9 percent of diplomats, and 16.5 per cent of the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    On paper, the DPRK says that it is committed to gender equality and women and girl’s rights. The Criminal Code criminalizes rape of women, trafficking in persons, having sexual relations with women in a subordinate position, and child sexual abuse. The 2010 Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women bans domestic violence. North Korea has also ratified five international human rights treaties, including ones that address women and girl’s rights and equality, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and CEDAW.

    During a meeting of a North Korean delegation with the CEDAW Committee, which reviewed North Korean compliance between 2002 and 2015, government officials argued all of the elements of CEDAW had been included in DPRK’s domestic laws. However, under questioning by the committee, the officials were unable to provide the definition of “discrimination against women” employed by the DPRK.

    Park Kwang Ho, Councilor of the Central Court in the DPRK, stated that if a woman in a subordinate position was forced to engage in sexual relations for fear of losing her job or in exchange for preferential treatment, it was her choice as to whether or not she complied. Therefore, he argued, in such a situation the punishment for the perpetrator should be lighter. He later amended his statement to say that if she did not consent to having sexual relations, and was forced to do so, the perpetrator was committing rape and would be punished accordingly.

    #abus_sexuels #violence_sexuelle #viols #Corée_du_nord #femmes #rapport

  • ’They considered us toys’: North Korean women reveal extent of sexual violence | World news | The Guardian

    Women in North Korea are routinely subjected to sexual violence by government officials, prison guards, interrogators, police, prosecutors, and soldiers, according to a new report, with groping and unwanted advances a part of daily life for women working in the country’s burgeoning black markets.

    The widespread nature of abuse by North Korea officials was documented in a new report by Human Rights Watch that interviewed 54 people who fled North Korea since 2011, the year Kim Jong-un came to power. It took more than two years amass the stories collected in the report, with subjects interviewed in countries across Asia.


  • #Kaesong entre deux Corées

    En février 2016, la Corée du Sud décide de fermer le complexe industriel intercoréen de Kaesong pour protester contre les #essais_nucléaires et balistiques nord-coréens. Elle n’avait pas fait auparavant de la #dénucléarisation un préalable à la collaboration des deux Corées – un changement de cap qui pourrait se révéler peu judicieux.

    #Corée_du_nord #corée_du_sud #résistance #nucléaire
    ping @simplicissimus @reka

  • Corée : un dégel sous la menace d’un revirement des États-Unis | Lutte de classe #mensuelLO

    Soixante-cinq ans après la fin de la guerre de #Corée qui a partagé le pays, on a vu le 27 avril dernier les dirigeants des deux États coréens officiellement toujours en guerre se rencontrer au poste-frontière de Panmunjom, dans la zone dite démilitarisée, pour parler de paix et s’amuser devant les caméras à franchir la fameuse frontière, dans un sens et dans un autre. Donald #Trump, le président américain, dirigeant de la puissance tutélaire du régime du Sud depuis sa création, s’est réjoui de cette rencontre en s’en attribuant le mérite, lui qui quelques mois auparavant menaçait de destruction la #Corée_du_Nord. Tout cela illustre à quel point le danger de guerre nucléaire, évoqué autant par le dirigeant nord-coréen #Kim_Jong_un que par Trump, était de la mise en scène de part et d’autre...

  • Four possible outcomes in Korea – Sasha Trubetskoy


    Je n’y crois pas mais je référence pour le archives.

    The Panmunjom Declaration is an exciting step towards peace on the Korean peninsula—a goal many have worked hard towards across many decades. We have forecasted four scenarios of potential developments as a result of future summits, closed-door deliberations, and agreements. A realistic view of current developments would mean that the future most likely lies somewhere between Scenarios 1 and 2.

    #corée #corée_du_nord

  • Japan, China and South Korea hold talks on North Korea and trade - World Socialist Web Site


    Leaders of Japan, China and South Korea met in Tokyo on Wednesday in their first trilateral summit for two-and-half years. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and South Korean President Moon Jae-in held talks on North Korea, as well as trade in the region. The three leaders each held one-on-one meetings with their counterparts on the sidelines.

    The summit was portrayed as a renewal of relations between the three countries. Li is the first Chinese leader to visit Japan in seven years, while Moon is the first South Korean president to do so in six-and-a-half years.

    #corée_du_nord #japon #chine #corée_du_sud
    In a joint statement, the three said they “strongly hope that, building on the results of the Inter-Korean summit, further efforts by relevant parties, in particular through the upcoming US-DPRK (North Korea) Summit, will contribute to comprehensive resolution of concerns of the parties for peace and stability in the region.”

  • Les connexions maritimes de la Corée du Nord. Recompositions territoriales dans la péninsule Coréenne et dynamiques régionales en Asie du Nord-Est | Cairn.info

    Les connexions maritimes de la Corée du Nord. Recompositions territoriales dans la péninsule Coréenne et dynamiques régionales en Asie du Nord-Est
    parCésar Ducruet

    Erasmus University Rotterdam

    etValérie Gelézeau

    École des hautes études en sciences sociales

    etStanislas Roussin

    Seric Corée


  • North Korea’s nuclear test site has collapsed ... and that may be why Kim Jong-un suspended tests | South China Morning Post

    North Korea’s mountain nuclear test site has collapsed, putting China and other nearby nations at unprecedented risk of radioactive exposure, two separate groups of Chinese scientists studying the issue have confirmed. 

    The collapse after five nuclear blasts may be why North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared last Friday that he would freeze the hermit state’s nuclear and missile tests and shut down the site, one researcher said. 

    The last five of Pyongyang’s six nuclear tests have all been carried out under Mount Mantap at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea’s northwest.

    A research team led by Wen Lianxing, a geologist with the University of Science and Technology of China in Hefei, concluded the collapse occurred following the detonation last autumn of North Korea’s most powerful thermal nuclear warhead in a tunnel about 700 metres (2,296 feet) below the mountain’s peak. 

    The test turned the mountain into fragile fragments, the researchers found.

    Ah ! souvenirs de Beryl…

    • La page web de l’Université de science et technologie de Chine vue dans la vidéo est celle-ci



      中国科学技术大学地震与地球内部物理实验室温联星研究组通过分析地震记录,确认朝鲜自2009年以来一直用于核试验的丰溪里万塔山已塌陷。该研究成果于2018年4月23日被国际地球物理权威学术期刊《地球物理研究快报》(Geophysical Research Letters) 接收。该研究组博士生田冬冬、姚家园为共同第一作者。研究还确认,2017年9月23日和10月12日在丰溪里试验场发生的三个小事件为核试验触发的、发生在万塔山之外的一个天然地震群。



    • La page web mentionne un article publié dans le numéro du 16 avril 2018 de Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 45, Issue 7

      Article publié en ligne le 14 mars 2018

      North Korea’s 2017 Test and its Nontectonic Aftershock - Liu - 2018 - Geophysical Research Letters - Wiley Online Library

      Seismology illuminates physical processes occurring during underground explosions, not all yet fully understood. The thus‐far strongest North Korean test of 3 September 2017 was followed by a moderate seismic event (mL 4.1) after 8.5 min. Here we provide evidence that this aftershock was a nontectonic event which radiated seismic waves as a buried horizontal closing crack. This vigorous crack closure, occurring shortly after the blast, is studied in the North Korea test site for the first time. The event can be qualitatively explained as rapid destruction of an explosion‐generated cracked rock chimney due to cavity collapse, although other compaction processes cannot be ruled out.

      Plain Language Summary
      North Korea detonated its strongest underground nuclear test in September 2017. It attracted the public interest worldwide not only due to its significant magnitude (6.3 mb) but also because it was followed 8.5 min later by a weaker event. Was the delayed shock a secondary explosion, an earthquake provoked by the shot, or something else? We answer these questions, thanks to unique data from near‐regional broadband stations. We basically solve a simple problem—fitting observed seismograms by synthetics. The good fit means that we understand why and how the seismic waves are radiated. According to our model, the explosion created a cavity and a damaged “chimney” of rocks above it. The aftershock was neither a secondary explosion nor a triggered tectonic earthquake. It occurred due to a process comparable to a “mirror image” of the explosion, that is, a rock collapse, or compaction, for the first time documented in North Korea’s test site. Interestingly, shear fault motions, typical for natural earthquakes, were extremely small both in the explosion and in the aftershock. Small natural earthquakes also occur at the test site, and geotechnical works might trigger them. Thus, all studies related to rock stability of the site, and prevention of radioactive leakage, are important.

    • Figure 4
      Inferred interpretation of (a–c) mainshock and (d–f) nontectonic aftershock. Dominant body forces equivalent to seismic radiation are shown for an assumed depth of 1.5 km. The force couples are annotated with their relative size. Scaling factors for mainshock and aftershock are 5.33e17 and 3.40e16 Nm, respectively. The events radiated as an opening and closing horizontal crack, with a significant compensated linear vector dipole contribution. Schematic sketch (g) shows the structural elements and processes, discussed in the text. (h) Vertical components of normalized full‐band raw data of Event 1 (red) and Event 2 (black). Traces of Event 2 are plotted with opposite sign; thus, the surface waves match with Event 1. It illustrates the “mirror‐image” character of the two sources. Note also the absence of high‐frequency body phases in the records of Event 2, similar to “collapse” events (Engdahl, 1972; Ryall & Savage, 1969; Willis, 1963). Origin time is at t = 0.

    • La fermeture du site et l’effondrement de la cheminée ne convainquent pas tout le monde…

      Optimism About Korea Will Kill Us All – Foreign Policy

      Last week’s inter-Korean summit, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s declaration that he would “close” his nuclear test site by May, were greeted widely with celebration. But contrary to the hoopla, we have now arrived at an especially dangerous moment in Washington’s relationship with Pyongyang. We are on the verge of letting our hopes get in the way of our survival.

      Consider the now widespread view that North Korea’s test site is unusable or that the mountain that contains it has collapsed. This was always garbage reporting. You can download the two academic papers that are said to have originally made these claims — they say nothing of the kind. What the papers do is prove that, after North Korea’s big nuclear test in September 2017, the cavity created by the explosion collapsed in on itself. We already knew that probably happened (although it is cool to see it demonstrated through seismology).

      But the collapsing of the cavity and shrinking of the mountain do not mean the tunnels leading to it collapsed, let alone that the mountain itself had done so. And, of course, there are two other nuclear test complexes underneath entirely different mountains at the site. Kim was quoted as making this point himself: “Some said we will dismantle unusable facilities, but there are two more larger tunnels [in addition to] the original one and these are very in good condition as you will get to know that when coming and seeing them.” But commentators in the West, hoping for a diplomatic breakthrough (whether for political or more idealistic reasons), still heard what they wanted to hear about the condition of North Korea’s program.

      Les articles signalés sont d’une part celui pointé ci-dessus et aussi celui-ci (27/04/2018)

      Collapse and Earthquake Swarm after North Korea’s 3 September 2017 Nuclear Test - Tian - - Geophysical Research Letters - Wiley Online Library

      North Korea’s 3 September 2017 nuclear test was followed by several small seismic events, with one eight‐and‐a‐half minutes after the test and three on and after 23 September 2017. Seismic analysis reveals that the first event is a near vertical on‐site collapse toward the nuclear test center from 440±260 m northwest of the test site, with its seismic source best represented by a single force with a dip angle of 70°‐75° and an azimuth of ~150°, and the later events are an earthquake swarm located 8.4±1.7 km north of the test site within a region of 520 m, with a focal depth of at least 2.4 km and a focal mechanism of nearly pure strike‐slip along the north‐south direction with a high dip angle of 50°‐90°. The occurrence of the on‐site collapse calls for continued monitoring of any leaks of radioactive materials from the test site.

      (pdf téléchargeable : que de la technique…)

  • Two Koreas Discuss Official End to 68-Year War, Report Says - Bloomberg

    No peace treaty has been signed to replace the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War, and the U.S. and North Korea have been at loggerheads since formal hostilities ended. A successful summit between Moon and Kim could pave the way for a meeting between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump — the first between a sitting American president and a North Korean leader.


  • #Corée_du_Nord : questions sur un extravagant sommet Trump-Kim

    Kim Jong-un, au centre. © Korean central news agency Selon l’agence Bloomberg, le dirigeant nord-coréen #Kim_Jong-Un est à Pékin depuis lundi. Au menu des discussions : un possible sommet avec #Donald_Trump sur la question de la dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord. Des rencontres préparatoires viennent aussi d’être organisées en Finlande et en Suède. Le sommet est prévu fin mai. Se tiendra-t-il ? Des questions cruciales doivent au préalable être réglées.

    #International #sommet_Etats-Unis/Corée_du_Nord

  • Cartoonist #Choi_Seong-guk: Expression that breaks down barriers

    Choi says that prejudice is the biggest concern facing North Korean defectors in the South, and works to challenge this through his popular online cartoon strip, Rodong Shimmun: The Enthusiastic Resettlement Diaries of a Male North Korean Defector.

    #Corée_du_Nord #BD #dessin #préjugés
    cc @reka

  • En Corée, les pom-pom girls venues du Nord mettent le Sud mal à l’aise

    Non seulement les pom-pom girls nord-coréennes donnent de la voix, toutes habillées de la même couleur, elles dansent aussi suivant une chorégraphie aussi millimétrée que leurs sourires. Et il faut bien avouer qu’elle assure le spectacle, aussi bien sur les sites des épreuves olympiques en Corée du Sud, que dans le reste du monde. Une simple recherche sur YouTube permet ainsi de tomber sur de nombreuses vidéos de leurs performances, parfois admiratives, parfois moqueuses.


  • L’avion de combat russe abattu en Syrie augure d’une guerre plus large _ WSWS.Org - Peter Symonds - 6 février 2018 *

    L’avion de combat russe abattu dans le nord de la Syrie samedi menace d’intensifier dramatiquement l’affrontement entre Washington et Moscou dans la guerre par procuration soutenue par les États-Unis pour évincer le régime du président Bachar al-Assad soutenu par la Russie. Les médias russes et de hauts responsables politiques accusent déjà les États-Unis d’y être impliqués.

    Le ministère russe de la défense a rapporté qu’un Sukhoi Su-25 avait été touché par un missile sol-air portatif, ou MANPAD, dans la province d’Idlib, dans le nord de la Syrie. Le pilote, qui n’a pas été nommé, a été éjecté de l’avion mais a été tué sur le terrain lors d’une « bagarre avec des terroristes ». Le Su-25 est un avion d’attaque au sol à basse altitude.

    Tharir al-Sham, groupe affilié à Al-Qaïda, a revendiqué la responsabilité, affirmant que l’un de ses combattants avait réussi à abattre l’avion à l’aide d’un missile antiaérien tiré à l’épaule. Le ministère russe de la défense a annoncé que des frappes de représailles contre les forces anti-Assad dans la région ont tué plus de 30 combattants.

    Le sénateur russe Frants Klintsevich, vice-président de la commission de la défense et de la sécurité du Conseil de la Fédération de Russie, a tenu les États-Unis responsables de l’acte. « Je suis absolument convaincu […] qu’aujourd’hui les militants ont des MANPAD, et qu’ils ont été fournis par les Américains par l’intermédiaire de pays tiers », a-t-il dit.

    Klintsevich a appelé à une enquête rigoureuse pour déterminer le type de MANPAD qui ont été fournis et les « circonstances de la destruction du Su – 25 ». Il a averti que « la perte d’un avion n’est rien, mais cela a une grande importance et de grande conséquences. »
    Le parlementaire russe Dmitry Sablin a blâmé un pays non identifié, voisin de la Syrie, pour avoir fourni le MANPAD utilisé pour abattre l’avion. « Les pays par lesquels transitent les armes qui sont ensuite utilisées contre les militaires russes, doivent comprendre que cela ne restera pas impuni », a-t-il déclaré.

    Le Pentagone a rapidement nié avoir fourni des MANPAD aux milices soutenues par les États-Unis et a réitéré le mensonge selon lequel ses opérations de combat se concentrent uniquement sur l’État islamique (ÉI), désormais vaincu. « Les États-Unis n’ont pas équipé leurs forces armées partenaires en Syrie d’armes sol-air et n’ont aucune intention de le faire à l’avenir », a déclaré samedi le porte-parole du Pentagone, Eric Pahon, aux médias russes.

    Ce déni ne résiste pas à un examen sérieux. Rien que le mois dernier, les États-Unis ont annoncé qu’ils armeraient et équiperaient une « force frontalière » de 30 000 hommes constituée principalement d’unités de protection du peuple kurdes (YPG) afin de se tailler de fait une enclave dans le nord de la Syrie, à partir de laquelle des attaques pourront être lancées contre le régime d’Assad.

    Les plans américains sont en pleine déroute. La Turquie, qui qualifie les YPG de terroristes alignés sur le parti séparatiste des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), a lancé une offensive à grande échelle dans l’enclave kurde. En même temps, les forces gouvernementales syriennes, soutenues par la Russie, ont lancé leurs propres attaques contre des milices appuyées par les pays occidentaux qui cherchent à s’accrocher à ce qu’il reste du territoire contrôlé par l’opposition.

    Un long éditorial du New York Times mercredi dernier, intitulé « Alors que les alliés des États-Unis s’affrontent, la lutte contre l’ÉI faiblit », a passé en revue la politique incohérente et contradictoire de Washington qui a mené à des combats entre la Turquie, son allié au sein de l’OTAN, et les forces par procuration américaines en Syrie. Dans une tentative de résoudre ce problème insoluble, les États-Unis ont donné le feu vert à l’offensive turque, mais ils ont fixé une ligne à ne pas franchir à la ville syrienne de Manbij, où sont basés des centaines de soldats américains, ainsi que des milices kurdes.

    En conclusion, le New York Times a sévèrement critiqué la Russie et l’Iran pour avoir manœuvré « afin d’assurer une présence et une influence permanentes » et a accusé les États-Unis, en réalité le président Donald Trump, de « se soustraire à sa responsabilité pour l’avenir politique de la Syrie ». Cet éditorial ne peut être interprété que comme un appel à l’action pour contenir la Russie et l’Iran afin d’empêcher que les États-Unis soient encore plus marginalisés dans le bourbier syrien qu’ils ont créé. Quelques jours plus tard, la réponse apparaissait sous la forme de cet avion de combat russe abattu alors qu’il attaquait les forces alignées sur les États-Unis.

    Dans le monde trouble des intrigues de l’opposition syrienne, où les milices de droite alignées sur Al-Qaïda collaborent ouvertement avec des groupes pro-occidentaux, la CIA et les forces spéciales américaines, il est impossible de savoir précisément qui a fourni le MANPAD et qui a pris la décision de le tirer, ou même qu’elle milice l’a fait.

    Le site Debkafile, qui a des liens étroits avec les services secrets israéliens, a rapporté le mois dernier que le Pentagone « envoyait aux YPG [milices kurdes] des systèmes de défense aérienne portatifs – des MANPAD – particulièrement efficaces contre les avions et les hélicoptères volant à basse altitude ».

    Dans un article intitulé « Qui a déclenché le tir contre l’avion de chasse russe dans une zone de guerre tapissée d’armes ? », Al Arabiya a souligné qu’un certain nombre de milices de l’opposition syrienne avaient accès à des missiles antiaériens. Il a déclaré que les FIM-92 Stingers américains, un des modèles de MANPAD, ont été fabriqués sous licence en Turquie par la société Roketsan et, selon l’analyste américain Theodore Karasik, ont été livrés à « de nombreuses forces d’opposition syriennes, comme l’Armée syrienne libre [alignée sur l’occident], autour d’Idlib ».

    Indépendamment de qui a précisément appuyé sur la gâchette, ce dernier incident souligne la situation extrêmement tendue dans laquelle les forces militaires russes et américaines se font face de près, de part et d’autre des belligérants dans la désastreuse guerre civile syrienne.

    Le danger d’un conflit entre les deux puissances nucléaires a été grandement exacerbé par la publication du gouvernement Trump d’une nouvelle Stratégie de défense nationale en janvier, qui déclarait que « la compétition stratégique interétatique », et non le terrorisme, était « maintenant la préoccupation principale ». Elle a qualifié la Chine et la Russie de « puissances révisionnistes » et a déclaré que les États-Unis doivent « donner la priorité à la préparation à la guerre ».

    Cela a été encore renforcé vendredi dernier avec la publication de la dernière Nuclear Posture Review (Étude sur la position nucléaire) des États-Unis. Elle désigne la Russie, avec la Chine, la Corée du Nord et l’Iran, comme des menaces potentielles et appelle à une expansion de l’arsenal nucléaire américain. Elle recommande le développement d’une gamme de nouvelles armes qui pourraient être utilisées dans des situations autres que la guerre nucléaire à grande échelle, ce qui nuirait aux accords visant à faire reculer les arsenaux nucléaires.

    La guerre civile syrienne n’est que l’une des poudrières au Moyen-Orient et dans le monde entier qui pourraient toutes déclencher un conflit catastrophique pendant que toutes les parties manœuvrent et intriguent pour renforcer leur présence et leur influence. La responsabilité principale pour cette situation, cependant, revient à l’impérialisme américain. Au cours du dernier quart de siècle, il a mené une guerre d’agression après l’autre, transformant la Syrie, le Yémen, l’Irak et toute la région en une poudrière instable.

    (Article paru en anglais le 5 février 2018)

    #MANPAD #Syrie #Guerre#états-unis #world_socialist_web_site #journalisme #russie #Chine #Corée_du_Nord #Iran #Pentagone #Stingers #stratégie #Israel #Agression #F16 #Daech #USA #Front Al-Nosra #tsahal

  • Northern accent: Urbanism and ephemera in North Korea | Thinkpiece | Architectural Review

    Going beyond military threat, famine and dictatorship discussions, two new books give a more multi-faceted sense of North Korea

    Pyongyang is commonly imagined as the ultimate Potemkin city. A supercharged amalgamation of Mao’s Beijing, Stalin’s Moscow and Walt’s Disneyland, arranged around stupefying axes leading to enormous monuments to the Kims, and to the ‘Juche Idea’ (roughly translated as ‘Self-Reliance’, Juche replaced Marxism-Leninism as North Korea’s official ideology at the end of the 1970s), with people starving behind the curtain. Explanations have to be sought for the apparent splendour of this capital in a country which is assumed to be economically dysfunctional. Urban myths are reinforced by the tight regulation of foreign visits – for instance, it was widely (and wrongly) believed that Pyongyang’s palatial Moscow-style Metro only had two stops, as these were the only stations tourists were allowed to see. Two new books try to go beyond the ultra-totalitarian surface, to give a more multi-faceted sense of what Pyongyang is actually like.


    Outrage: Zones charting unhappy political realities should not be turned into tasteless tourist spectacles | Thinkpiece | Architectural Review

    Separating North and South Korea, the curious no man’s land of the Demilitarised Zone has become a political theme park

    It was difficult to see the view from the panoramic terrace as the fifth coachload of tourists arrived at the Dora Observatory in South Korea, jostling to gawp at the evil empire to the north. A long rank of coin-operated telescopes stood lined up, pointing towards North Korea like a battery of guns poised to fire, while loud-speakers pumped out garish K-Pop tunes at full volume. ‘You’ll notice there are fewer trees in the north’, said one American tourist, as crowds of selfie-stick wielding visitors posed for photos. ‘That’s because people there are so hungry they have to eat them.’


  • Fragile détente olympique entre les deux Corées

    À la sortie du pont de la grande unification, au sud de la zone démilitarisée qui sépare les deux Corées, lundi 15 janvier 2017. © Reuters Après une année 2017 explosive, les deux Corées ont entamé une timide désescalade. Pour Séoul, qui s’efforçait depuis des mois de convaincre Pyongyang, ces premiers pas sont une occasion de parvenir, à long terme, à une solution négociée à la crise nucléaire.

    #International #Corée_du_Nord #Corée_du_sud

  • Running out of time | John J. Hamre - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

    I am dismayed by our rhetoric in Washington. We are talking like frightened little rabbits, afraid of a wolf in the forest. We have nothing to be afraid of, and the more we act like frightened little critters, the more we reward North Korea for pursuing a dead-end strategy. We tried a policy of dissuasion for the past 15 years, and it has failed. But a strategy of deterrence has worked and will continue to work.

    (John J. Hamre was elected president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th US deputy secretary of defense.)

    #corée_du_nord #nucléaire #équilibre_de_la_terreur