• Tunisie : Kaïs Saïed, l’allié embarrassant de la politique migratoire européenne, prêt à sa réélection
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/10/01/tunisie-kais-saied-l-allie-embarrassant-de-la-politique-migratoire-europeenn

    Tunisie : Kaïs Saïed, l’allié embarrassant de la politique migratoire européenne, prêt à sa réélection
    Par Nissim Gasteli (Tunis, correspondance)
    Quelques planches de bois éparpillées sur le sol et des bâches déchirées : il ne reste plus grand-chose de la cabane qui servait d’abri de fortune à Ibrahim (un prénom d’emprunt) et ses proches. Le camp de migrants, comme il en existe de nombreux dans les environs de la bourgade d’El-Amra sur le littoral de l’est de la Tunisie, où ce Sierra-Léonais de 29 ans s’est installé depuis environ dix mois, a été balayé au cours du mois de septembre par de fortes pluies.Les quelques centaines d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants originaires de plusieurs pays d’Afrique anglophone, qui vivaient déjà dans des conditions d’insalubrité, sans eau courante, sans électricité et sans sanitaires, ont presque tout perdu. Ils n’ont même plus de quoi manger. « Quelques Tunisiens ont de l’empathie et nous donnent un peu de nourriture, mais c’est très rare, déplore Ibrahim. Notre vie est misérable ici. »
    La terre est encore humide en ce jour de la mi-septembre. Il n’y a, à l’horizon, que des oliviers. A l’est, une vaste plage s’ouvre sur la mer et l’espoir qu’elle représente. « Nous voulons juste partir ! Nous ne sommes pas venus pour nous installer ici mais pour rejoindre l’Italie », soutient Ibrahim. Mais la forte présence policière, sur terre comme en mer, complique cette échappée vers l’Europe.Les corridors migratoires, qui sillonnent le continent africain et convergent vers l’île italienne de Lampedusa, située à seulement une centaine de kilomètres, butent désormais sur le dispositif sécuritaire mis en place grâce à un accord signé le 16 juillet 2023 entre le président Kaïs Saïed et ses partenaires européens. Depuis début 2024, les arrivées en Italie en provenance de la Tunisie ont chuté de 82 % selon le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés.
    Alors que M. Saïed apparaît comme le grand favori du scrutin présidentiel prévu le 6 octobre, au cours duquel seuls deux candidats – dont l’un est emprisonné – lui seront opposés, l’Union européenne (UE) peine à adopter une position claire face au glissement autoritaire du chef de l’Etat tunisien.
    Dans une note diffusée le 7 juillet aux vingt-sept ministres des affaires étrangères, que Le Monde s’est procurée, le service diplomatique européen s’inquiète, entre autres, d’une « nette détérioration du climat politique et un espace civique qui se rétrécit » avec près de « trente politiciens, activistes, journalistes, avocats et hommes d’affaires arrêtés », d’un « régime unipersonnel avec un système politique présidentiel hautement centralisé » et du « traitement des migrants, des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés [qui] suscite une préoccupation croissante ».
    Depuis que M. Saïed s’est approprié l’ensemble des pouvoirs le 25 juillet 2021, en démantelant les institutions démocratiques et en réprimant sévèrement ses opposants, ses partenaires européens montrent de l’embarras. Mais leur préoccupation a rapidement été dépassée par une autre urgence lorsque, début 2023, la Tunisie est devenue le premier point de départ de migrants irréguliers à destination de l’Europe.
    Pour juguler les arrivées sur son territoire, la présidente du Conseil italien, Giorgia Meloni, a noué une relation privilégiée avec M. Saïed, ponctuée de quatre visites en Tunisie, où elle a soigneusement évité d’aborder la question des droits humains et des libertés individuelles. Ce sont ces voyages qui ont débouché sur la signature en juillet 2023 du mémorandum d’entente entre l’UE et la Tunisie. Etaient alors aussi présents la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, et le premier ministre néerlandais, Mark Rutte.
    L’accord, assorti d’environ 260 millions d’euros d’aides, qui scelle un partenariat politique et économique sonstruit autour de cinq axes dont la migration, a-t-il convaincu la Tunisie de reprendre en main le contrôle, presque inexistant jusque-là, de sa frontière maritime ? Bien qu’il ait maintes fois affirmé que la Tunisie ne sera pas le « garde-frontière » de l’Europe et qu’elle ne sera ni « une terre de transit ni une terre d’accueil pour les migrants », M. Saïed a tenu les objectifs du mémorandum.« Kaïs Saïed a un langage électoraliste et populiste, destiné à ses partisans, à travers lequel il affirme sa souveraineté vis-à-vis des Européens. Mais, derrière, il signe avec eux », analyse Ghazi Ben Ahmed, président du groupe de réflexion Mediterranean Development Initiative (MDI) et auteur de Echos de Tunisie : populisme, transition et espoirs de démocratie (éd. L’Harmattan, 2024).
    « Avec la migration, son objectif est simple : réduire la pression de ses partenaires européens et, de fait, c’est ce qui se passe aujourd’hui car il ne reçoit que très peu de critiques publiques », observe pour sa part l’analyste politique Hatem Nafti, auteur de Notre ami Kaïs Saïed, essai sur la démocrature en Tunisie (éd. Riveneuve, 2024).
    La réduction des flux migratoires s’est faite pourtant au prix d’un coût humain très élevé. Des milliers de personnes ont été abandonnées dans le désert au cours de vastes campagnes d’expulsions et au moins vingt-neuf personnes en sont mortes, selon une enquête du Monde et de ses partenaires de Lighthouse Reports, publiée en mai 2024. Ces pratiques valent aujourd’hui à Tunis une demande d’enquête pour de « potentiels crimes contre l’humanité », déposée mardi 24 septembre devant la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) par un collectif lié à l’opposition tunisienne.
    Par ailleurs, la ville portuaire de Sfax, dans le centre-est du pays, a été vidée de la majorité de ses migrants subsahariens par les forces de l’ordre tunisiennes qui ont procédé à de nombreux refoulements vers la région d’El-Amra, abandonnant des centaines de personnes comme Ibrahim dans une plus grande précarité, tout en empêchant l’aide d’associations et d’activistes locaux. Ces derniers sont « constamment surveillés », dénonce un membre de la société civile sfaxienne qui préfère conserver l’anonymat par peur des autorités.
    Des dirigeants d’organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) ont été arrêtés en mai alors que certaines de leurs structures recevaient des financements de l’UE. Le mémorandum d’entente « n’implique pas la société civile tunisienne, regrette la source précédemment citée. Nos partenaires européens ont opté pour un accord qui vient ériger Kaïs Saïed en joueur incontournable pour fermer les frontières européennes et renforcer son appareil sécuritaire, celui-là même qui réprime la population locale ». L’Union européenne est bien consciente de la dérive autoritaire du chef de l’Etat tunisien mais craint plus encore une rupture qui pourrait l’amener à privilégier d’autres alliés, comme la Russie, la Chine et l’Iran, avec lesquels il a déjà multiplié les contacts au cours de son premier mandat. Dès lors, préserver le partenariat euro-tunisien, estime le service diplomatique européen dans sa note interne, « impliquera de trouver un équilibre de plus en plus difficile entre la crédibilité de l’UE en termes de valeurs et son intérêt à rester engagé de manière constructive avec les autorités tunisiennes ».

    #Covid-19#migration#migrant#tunie#UE#italie#droit#accordmigratoire#fluxmigratoire#corridormigratoire#securité#violence#sante

  • Libye : 1 500 migrants vont être évacués vers l’Italie - InfoMigrants
    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/54164/libye--1-500-migrants-vont-etre-evacues-vers-litalie

    Plus de 90 migrants ont été évacués de Libye vers l’Italie le 25 novembre 2022, par un vol humanitaire. Crédit : HCR
    Par La rédaction Publié le : 28/12/2023
    Un corridor humanitaire a été acté entre Rome et Tripoli pour assurer l’évacuation de 1 500 personnes de la Libye vers l’Italie. Les transferts, qui s’étaleront sur trois ans, visent en priorité les femmes, enfants et personnes vulnérables. Mille cinq cents migrants demandeurs d’une protection internationale vont pouvoir être évacués de Libye vers l’Italie. Un protocole d’accord entre Rome et Tripoli actant ces évacuations a été signé le 20 décembre, annonce le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR). Les transferts s’étaleront sur trois ans.
    L’ouverture de ce corridor humanitaire engage la coopération des ministères de l’Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères des deux pays, du HCR, mais aussi des organisations civiles comme l’ONG Arci, et religieuses comme la Communauté de Sant’Egidio et la Fédération des Églises évangéliques.
    Les transferts s’adressent aux personnes contraintes de fuir « en raison de la guerre et de la violence et qui se trouvent temporairement en Libye », décrit le HCR dans son communiqué du 20 décembre. Quels profils seront prioritaires ? En premier lieu, « des enfants, des femmes victimes de trafic, des personnes qui ont survécu à la violence et à la torture et des personnes dans des conditions de santé graves », qui seront identifiées par les différents acteurs engagés dans le protocole. Une fois en Italie, sur les 1 500 personnes évacuées, 600 seront intégrées au système italien d’accueil et d’intégration (SAI), financées par le ministère de l’Intérieur, détaille l’agence de Nations Unies.
    La majorité, soit 900 personnes, sera quant à elle prise en charge par des associations « selon le modèle du corridor humanitaire et réparties sur tout le territoire national » souligne le communiqué. Des quotas ont déjà été déterminés par le protocole : la Communauté de Sant ’Egidio accueillera 400 exilés, l’Arci 300, et la Fédération des Églises évangéliques, 200. Le dernier protocole de ce type avait été signé en 2021. Il faisait lui-même suite à un précédent accord, acté en 2017. En six ans, le HCR comptabilise ainsi près de 1 400 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile évacués ou réinstallés de Libye vers l’Italie, « grâce à des mécanismes d’évacuation ou via des couloirs humanitaires ».
    D’autres corridors humanitaires ont été mis en place par l’Italie, au-delà de la Libye. Ainsi, selon la Communauté de Sant’Egidio, plus de 5 000 demandeurs d’asile de Libye, du Liban et du Pakistan sont arrivés en Italie depuis le lancement de ces couloirs en 2016. Un mécanisme encore largement insuffisant selon Médecins sans frontières. Dans un rapport publié en juin 2022, intitulé « Out of Libya », l’ONG soulignait que « les rares voies de sortie légale vers des pays sûrs mises en place par le HCR et l’Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations (OIM) sont très lentes et restrictives. (...) L’accès à ce service est quasiment inexistant en dehors de Tripoli et dans les centres de détention et le nombre de places dans les pays de destination est très limité ».
    En outre, les autorités libyennes imposent aussi des restrictions. Elles « ne nous autorisent pas à inclure dans nos programmes plus que les neuf nationalités qu’ils considèrent comme ’vulnérables’ », déplorait MSF. Ainsi, seuls les ressortissants palestiniens, yéménites, syriens, somaliens, érythréens ou soudanais ont une chance d’embarquer un jour dans les avions humanitaires ou de réinstallation", dénonçait par exemple à l’été 2022 Djamal Zamoum, alors chef de mission adjoint du HCR en Libye, auprès d’InfoMigrants.
    Néanmoins, l’agence des Nations Unies « procède, à titre exceptionnel, à l’enregistrement d’un nombre très limité de réfugiés d’autres nationalités lorsqu’il s’avère que ceux-ci sont extrêmement vulnérables et exposés à des risques de violations accrus », nuançait Caroline Gluck, porte-parole du HCR en Libye. Pour autant, les évacuations restent « une mesure salvatrice et un signe important de solidarité et d’humanité (...) Nous devons continuer à travailler ensemble pour élargir les voies sûres, y compris la réinstallation, permettant aux réfugiés de reconstruire leur vie dans la sécurité et la dignité », soutient Chiara Cardoletti, représentante du HCR pour l’Italie, à propos du nouvel accord signé le 20 décembre. Le HCR estime qu’en cette fin d’année 2023, « plus de 2,4 millions de réfugiés » dans le monde seraient prioritaires pour une réinstallation. Soit une « augmentation de 36 % par rapport aux exigences de 2022 », note l’agence.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#italie#libye#HCR#corridorhumanitaire#sante#refugie#vulnerabilite

  • #Gaza : le #droit_international comme seule boussole

    Le 7 octobre, le #Hamas a lancé une attaque sans précédent sur le sud d’Israël, semant la terreur et perpétrant de nombreux #crimes_de_guerre contre des #civils israéliens. En réponse à cette attaque, Israël a lancé une #opération_militaire d’une violence inédite sur la #bande_de_Gaza, alliant déplacements forcés de population et frappes indiscriminées, également constitutifs de crimes de guerre. Si rien ne peut justifier les crimes de guerre, quel que soit le camp, cette séquence s’inscrit cependant dans un contexte qu’il est indispensable de prendre en compte pour comprendre ce qu’elle représente et les conséquences dévastatrices qu’elle peut avoir.

    La bande de Gaza est, avec la Cisjordanie, l’une des deux composantes du #Territoire_palestinien_occupé. Après la Guerre des Six Jours, elle a, comme la Cisjordanie, fait l’objet d’une colonisation par Israël, avant que ce dernier ne l’évacue unilatéralement en 2005. L’année suivante, le Hamas gagnait les élections législatives à Gaza. L’UE exclut tout contact avec le Hamas compliquant la formation d’un gouvernement palestinien. S’en suit une guerre intra palestinienne entre Fatah et Hamas dans la bande de Gaza, qui se termine en 2007 par la prise de contrôle du territoire par le Hamas. Depuis cette date, un blocus est exercé par Israël sur Gaza, imposant ainsi une punition collective à 2,3 millions de Palestiniens et de Palestiniennes, à laquelle s’ajoutent depuis 2009 des bombardements réguliers et indiscriminés, qu’ils ne peuvent fuir. En conséquence de ces sévères restrictions à la liberté de mouvement des personnes et des biens, 97% de l’eau courante à Gaza est impropre à la consommation, le taux de chômage est de 47%, et 80% de la population dépend de l’aide internationale (données Oxfam).

    Ce #blocus est l’un des aspects du régime d’#apartheid qu’Israël impose à l’ensemble du peuple palestinien, c’est-à-dire un régime institutionnalisé d’#oppression et de #domination systématiques, établi dans l’intention de maintenir la #domination d’un groupe racial sur un autre, l’intention de le maintenir et qui comprend l’existence d’actes inhumains commis comme partie intégrante de ce régime, tels que l’ont récemment qualifiés de nombreux rapports Amnesty, Human Rights Watch et des Rapporteurs spéciaux de l’ONU.

    En décembre dernier, un gouvernement d’#extrême_droite a pris le pouvoir en Israël, renforçant ce régime d’apartheid et intensifiant la colonisation israélienne en Cisjordanie et à Jérusalem-Est. Au cours de l’année 2023, avant le 7 octobre, plus de 200 Palestiniens et Palestiniennes avaient déjà été tués par l’#armée_israélienne ou les colons, surtout en Cisjordanie mais aussi à Gaza. La #violence des colons a augmenté, autorisée et alimentée par le gouvernement israélien, menant à de nombreuses attaques sur des villages palestiniens. Sous les jougs conjugués d’ordres d’#expulsion et de la violence exercée par les colons, des communautés palestiniennes entières de la #zone_C ont été déplacées de force. Au sein de la société israélienne, mais aussi parmi les responsables politiques israéliens, les appels à la haine et au meurtre des Arabes palestiniens sont de plus en plus fréquents.

    Face à cette exacerbation de la violence, la communauté internationale, et l’UE en particulier, n’a réussi qu’à condamner, par des formules creuses et répétitives les multiples violations du droit international commises par Israël, sans jamais prendre de #sanctions.

    Tout cela, c’était avant le 7 octobre et l’attaque meurtrière du Hamas, qui tue plus de 1000 #victimes_civiles israéliennes et prend en #otages entre 120 et 200 personnes. Dans plusieurs lieux, des #meurtres_collectifs ont lieu, sans aucun doute constitutifs de crimes de guerre. Ces faits choquent l’opinion publique internationale et entraînent de nombreux messages de soutien à Israël de la part des responsables politiques, entre autres européens. Certains, tel le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, prennent la peine d’appeler à une réponse « proportionnée ». D’autres, comme la Présidente de la Commission européenne, se contentent d’apporter leur soutien sans faille à Israël, sans même rappeler les obligations qui lui incombent au regard du droit international.

    Depuis le début de la réponse militaire israélienne, les officiels israéliens multiplient les déclarations déshumanisant les Palestiniens, punissant collectivement la population de Gaza pour les crimes commis par le Hamas :

    Lundi 9 octobre, #Yoav_Gallant, le Ministre israélien de la Défense a déclaré : « J’ai ordonné un siège complet de la bande de Gaza. Il n’y aura pas d’électricité, pas de nourriture, pas de carburant, tout est fermé. Nous combattons des animaux humains et nous agissons en conséquence ».

    Mardi 10 octobre, le chef de la Coordination de l’administration civile dans les territoires (COGAT), le général #Ghassan_Alian a annoncé opérer un #blocus_complet sur la bande de Gaza, coupant le territoire en #électricité et en #eau, ne lui promettant que des dommages, et déclarant à l’adresse du Hamas : « Vous avez voulu l’enfer, vous aurez l’enfer ! ».

    Jeudi 12 octobre, le ministre israélien de l’Energie #Israël_Katz a déclaré : « Aucun interrupteur électrique ne sera allumé, aucune pompe à eau ne sera mise en route et aucun camion de carburant n’entrera tant que les Israéliens enlevés ne seront pas rentrés chez eux (…). Et personne ne peut nous faire la morale ».

    Vendredi 13 octobre, le gouvernement israélien a ordonné une #évacuation de toute la population du nord de la Bande de Gaza, soit 1,1 million de Palestiniens, vers le sud de la Bande de Gaza. Il s’agit d’un #déplacement_forcé de la moitié de la population de Gaza, déjà coupée d’électricité, d’eau et de carburant. Les organisations humanitaires ont tout de suite dénoncé l’impossibilité que cela puisse se passer sans conséquences catastrophiques. Depuis vendredi, plusieurs organes et responsables de l’ONU, l’UNRWA, l’OMS, le chef de l’aide humanitaire de l’ONU sont sortis de leur réserve habituelle et tirent la sonnette d’alarme. MSF multiplie également les déclarations pour dénoncer l’insoutenabilité de la situation sanitaire. Les témoignages qui nous viennent de Gaza sont glaçants : rationnement en eau des enfants, un boulanger qui ne peut plus faire de pain faute d’électricité, les cadavres qui ne trouvent plus de place dans les morgues, ou qui pourrissent sous les décombres.

    Depuis le début de l’attaque militaire israélienne contre Gaza, quelques 2778 Palestiniens sont morts, 9 938 personnes sont blessées, dans un système de santé qui s’est totalement effondré
    (données du 16 octobre).

    Pour rappel, 70% de la population de Gaza sont des #réfugiés, c’est-à-dire que leurs familles ont été chassées de leurs maisons par les Israéliens lors de la #Nakba (mot arabe qui signifie la « catastrophe » et qui désigne, pour les Palestiniens, l’exil forcé de 700 000 d’entre eux, lors de la proclamation de l’État d’Israël en 1948). Ils attendent depuis de pouvoir exercer leur #droit_au_retour, consacré par la Résolution 194 de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Même si un #corridor_humanitaire était mis en place, nombreux sont celles et ceux qui refuseraient de partir, estimant que quitter la Palestine signifierait ne jamais y revenir. C’est en effet le sort subi par tous les populations palestiniennes déplacées depuis la Nakba de 1948.
    Ce qui se risque de se passer à Gaza est qualifié par de nombreuses voix palestiniennes, dont PNGO, le réseau des ONG palestiniennes mais aussi la Rapporteuse spéciale des Nations Unies Francesca Albanese, comme du #nettoyage_ethnique, comme une nouvelle Nakba. Par ailleurs, pour les principales organisations palestiniennes de défense des droits humains (Al Haq, Al Mezan, PCHR), il devient évident « qu’Israël impose délibérément au peuple palestinien des conditions de vie susceptibles d’entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle ». Ces organisations « appellent les États tiers à intervenir de toute urgence pour protéger le peuple palestinien contre le #génocide ». Ce constat rencontre celui de la Fédération internationale des droits humains (FIDH) qui qualifie l’#ordre_d’évacuation des 1,1 million de Palestiniens du nord de la bande de Gaza de « tentative de déplacement forcé et illégal de civil⋅es pouvant refléter une intention génocidaire ». Cette qualification est également appuyée par un historien spécialisé dans l’étude de l’Holocauste et du génocide, Raz Segal. Selon lui, « l’assaut contre Gaza peut également être compris en d’autres termes : comme un cas d’école de génocide se déroulant sous nos yeux ».

    Pendant ce temps, la situation en Cisjordanie et à #Jérusalem-Est se détériore aussi. Comme le fait remarquer Yehuda Shaul, le fondateur de l’ONG Breaking the Silence, et directeur du think tank israélien Ofek, « les crimes de guerre du Hamas sont l’occasion pour la droite israélienne de faire avancer son programme messianique au-delà de la réponse de l’armée israélienne à Gaza. De la reconstruction des colonies à Gaza à l’intensification de la prise de contrôle du Haram al Sharif [l’Esplanade des mosquées]-Montagne du Temple, en passant par les pogroms en Cisjordanie ». En Cisjordanie, 55 Palestiniens ont été tués par les colons et par l’armée en une semaine.

    En Israël même, la situation de la population palestinienne et de celles et ceux qui défendent leurs #droits devient très difficile. Suite à l’attaque du Hamas et les appels à la #revanche partout dans la société israélienne, les Palestiniens d’Israël (18% de la population) craignent de sortir de chez eux. Les Israéliens et Israéliennes du « camp de la paix » vivent aussi des moments compliqués, d’une part parce que de nombreuses victimes du Hamas étaient des militants et militantes pour la paix, d’autre part parce que la défense de la population civile palestinienne de Gaza et la nécessité d’une réponse israélienne mesurée n’est même plus audible dans l’opinion publique actuelle en Israël.

    "En refusant systématiquement d’obliger Israël à respecter le droit international et en laissant les violations impunies, la communauté internationale porte une responsabilité écrasante dans la situation désespérée que nous connaissons aujourd’hui."

    Face au drame qui se déroule sous nos yeux, la boussole de la Belgique et de l’Union européenne doit plus que jamais rester le droit international et la protection de la vie, de la dignité et des droits humains. Pour l’UE et la Belgique, la priorité doit aujourd’hui être de mettre tout en œuvre pour obtenir un cessez-le-feu, la protection de toutes les populations civiles, et un accès à l’aide internationale pour la population gazaouie actuellement en urgence humanitaire absolue. Elles doivent également appeler à la libération de tous celles et ceux qui ont été illégalement privés de leur liberté, les otages retenus par le Hamas, comme les prisonniers politiques palestiniens arrêtés dans le cadre de la répression de la résistance à l’occupation. L’UE et la Belgique doivent en outre exiger d’Israël la levée du siège de la bande de Gaza, et cela dans une perspective de levée du blocus et d’une reconnexion du territoire avec le reste du territoire palestinien occupé. Elles doivent également s’attaquer aux causes structurelles du présent conflit en adoptant des mesures contraignantes contre Israël afin qu’il mette fin à l’occupation, à la colonisation et à l’apartheid contre le peuple palestinien, à commencer par la fin du commerce avec les colonies israéliennes. Enfin, la Belgique, pionnière historique de la lutte contre l’impunité en matière de crimes de guerre, doit apporter un soutien politique et financier à l’enquête en cours à la Cour pénale internationale sur la situation en Palestine et encourager le procureur de la Cour pénale à en faire une priorité afin que tous les criminels de guerre soient rapidement tenus responsables.

    https://www.cncd.be/gaza-le-droit-international-comme-seule-boussole
    #à_lire #Israël #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #histoire

  • La valle che accoglie

    Viaggio nella più antica chiesa protestante italiana, minoranza un tempo perseguitata, che oggi è in prima linea nell’accoglienza dei migranti e nelle battaglie per i diritti delle donne e delle coppie omosessuali.

    Un corteo composto esce da un edificio giallo e bianco in stile inglese: religiosi e delegati marciano in silenzio. Davanti al gruppo, alcuni indossano delle toghe nere, gli abiti lunghi dei pastori; al collo le facciole, dei fiocchi bianchi, nonostante le temperature proibitive che stanno colpendo le Alpi e le prealpi italiane alla fine di agosto. Il corteo attraversa il giardino, poi la strada, quindi svolta per entrare in un altro edificio che ricorda una chiesa anglicana: il tempio di Torre Pellice, dove si svolgerà il rito che aprirà il sinodo annuale della più antica chiesa protestante italiana, la chiesa valdese, che è anche la più progressista del paese.

    Non è possibile sapere di cosa esattamente discuterà il sinodo prima che cominci, perché perfino l’ordine del giorno è deciso dai 180 delegati che da tutta Italia sono arrivati a Torre Pellice, una cittadina a 55 chilometri da Torino. “Abbiamo una maniera di decidere le cose molto democratica”, spiega la pastora e teologa Daniela Di Carlo, che si definisce “femminista, antispecista, ecologista” e cita più volte la femminista statunitense Donna Haraway e il filosofo spagnolo Paul B. Preciado.

    Un ruolo centrale

    È arrivata nella val Pellice da Milano, la città di cui è la guida spirituale per le chiese protestanti e responsabile dei rapporti con le altre religioni. “Al sinodo dei valdesi non partecipa solo il clero: dei 180 delegati solo novanta sono pastori, gli altri novanta sono fedeli, che sono eletti localmente dalle diverse chiese. Questo significa che l’assemblea può ribaltare i pronostici e non si può mai davvero prevedere quello che succederà durante la riunione. Se non si è d’accordo su qualcosa, si va avanti a discutere a oltranza”, assicura la pastora, seduta nella stanza rossa della Casa valdese, la sede della chiesa valdese e della sala del sinodo, circondata dai quadri che rappresentano i benefattori della chiesa.

    I valdesi hanno consacrato la prima pastora nel 1967 in un paese in cui la chiesa cattolica, che è maggioritaria, non riconosce il sacerdozio femminile. Di Carlo studiava architettura all’università, ma poi ha deciso di dedicare la sua vita alla chiesa negli anni ottanta, dopo un’esperienza di volontariato durante il terremoto in Irpinia. “Mi interessavano più le persone delle case”, scherza. “Nel Vangelo Gesù ha affidato alle donne l’annuncio della sua resurrezione, voleva per le donne un ruolo centrale”, continua.

    “Quando Gesù incontra le sorelle di Lazzaro, Marta e Maria, è molto chiaro. Marta si lamenta perché la sorella Maria si è messa ad ascoltare le sue parole, invece di aiutarla nelle faccende domestiche, ma Gesù le risponde di lasciarla stare, perché Maria si è seduta ‘nella parte buona, che non le sarà tolta’”, continua Di Carlo, secondo cui la possibilità di diventare pastore per le donne era presente già agli albori della chiesa valdese, addirittura prima che questa aderisse alla riforma protestante nel cinquecento, per essere prima abolita, quindi ripristinata nella seconda metà del novecento. Come guida spirituale della sua comunità non si sente discriminata in quanto donna. “Tranne nei casi in cui partecipo alle cerimonie ecumeniche, specialmente nel rito ortodosso ci sono molti limiti che ancora escludono le donne dalla liturgia”, spiega.

    I valdesi sono stati i primi a benedire le unioni tra persone dello stesso sesso e nel sinodo di quest’anno potrebbero discutere della gestazione per altri (gpa), una pratica riproduttiva che divide anche le femministe e per cui il governo italiano guidato da Giorgia Meloni ha proposto addirittura l’istituzione del “reato universale”. “Abbiamo affidato a una commissione l’indagine sul tema e ne dovremmo discutere. Potrebbero esserci delle divisioni, come avvenne al tempo del riconoscimento delle unioni civili, ma si troverà un accordo”, assicura Di Carlo. Nel sinodo di quest’anno si discuterà anche della mancata presa di distanza dal fascismo nel sinodo del 1943, che si svolse dal 6 al 10 settembre durante i giorni dell’armistizio dell’8 settembre. Nel sinodo, ancora oggi, alcuni vorrebbero che si chiedesse perdono per non aver preso una decisione netta in quell’occasione.

    “Noi siamo una chiesa che include: siamo impegnati contro l’omotransfobia, contro il razzismo, contro la violenza sulle donne”, continua. “Per noi Gesù è inclusione, è accoglienza. Crediamo in un Dio che è diventato uomo per amare e accogliere e la nostra missione è provare a essere come lui”, sottolinea. Proprio per questo motivo, racconta, le capita di incontrare nella chiesa di Milano persone che si convertono al protestantesimo, perché non si sentono accolte in altre chiese: “Arrivano da noi perché sono divorziati, oppure sono omosessuali e non si sentono accettati in altri contesti, ma sono religiosi e vogliono trovare un posto in cui possano esserlo insieme con gli altri”, conclude.

    L’Europa dei valdesi

    I valdesi prendono il loro nome da un mercante di tessuti del dodicesimo secolo chiamato Valdo, che viveva a Lione ed era diventato estremamente ricco con l’usura. “La sua storia è simile a quella di Francesco di Assisi”, assicura Davide Rosso, direttore della fondazione Centro culturale valdese, mentre fa strada, camminando su un sentiero nel villaggio di Angrogna, un paese di montagna a pochi chilometri da Torre Pellice, che nel cinquecento era diventato il centro più esteso nelle valli valdesi.

    Ad Angrogna è conservata una grotta, che è possibile visitare, in cui i valdesi delle origini si riunivano per celebrare il rito domenicale o si nascondevano quando erano perseguitati, la Gheisa d’la tana (la chiesta della tana). “Oggi è possibile visitare questi luoghi a piedi, perché sono stati riconosciuti come percorso turistico dal Consiglio europeo, che li considera costitutivi della storia europea”, spiega Rosso. Nel 2015 papa Francesco ha visitato per la prima volta un tempio valdese a Torino e ha chiesto perdono per le persecuzioni contro i valdesi, condotte dai cattolici nel corso dei secoli. In quell’occasione è stata Alessandra Trotta, moderatrice della Tavola valdese originaria di Palermo, a dare la benedizione finale a cui ha partecipato anche Bergoglio.

    All’inizio i valdesi, chiamati i “poveri di Lione”, furono tollerati dalle gerarchie ecclesiastiche romane: nel 1180 Valdo rinunciò a tutte le sue ricchezze, distribuì i beni ai poveri e cominciò a predicare e a mendicare. Quando gli chiedevano perché lo avesse fatto, rispondeva: “Se vi fosse dato di vedere e credere i tormenti futuri che ho visto e in cui credo, forse anche voi vi comportereste in modo simile”. Da subito ebbe dei seguaci che, come lui, abbandonavano le ricchezze e la vita mondana, per farsi poveri. Inizialmente erano appoggiati dal vescovo di Lione, ma poi furono scomunicati nel 1184 dal papa Lucio III, perché avevano la “presunzione” di predicare in pubblico pur non essendo consacrati e furono considerati eretici dalla chiesa di Roma.

    Molti valdesi dovettero fuggire dalle persecuzioni e si rifugiarono nelle valli delle alpi Cozie, tra l’Italia e la Francia. Quel territorio diventò una base del movimento religioso, durante secoli di pericoli. Nel sinodo valdese del 1532 proprio ad Angrogna la chiesa aderì alla riforma protestante. “Questo diede ai valdesi un appoggio importante dal punto di vista internazionale e anche una maggiore solidità dal punto di vista teologico”, spiega Rosso, mentre mostra il monumento di Chanforan, un obelisco eretto nei campi di Angrogna, che ricorda il luogo in cui si svolse quel sinodo.

    “In quel momento si decise di tradurre la Bibbia in francese e la traduzione fu affidata a Olivetano, con un grande sforzo economico da parte dei valdesi”, racconta Rosso. Con l’adesione alla riforma, i valdesi vennero allo scoperto e cominciarono a costruire anche dei templi, ma questo favorì le persecuzioni nei loro confronti da parte dei Savoia, spesso per ragioni meramente economiche e politiche.

    “Il seicento è stato un secolo particolarmente difficile: nel 1655 il duca di Savoia condusse una campagna, che aveva come obiettivo lo sterminio dei valdesi”, spiega Davide Rosso, mentre cammina tra le stradine di montagna in una giornata caldissima di agosto. “Le loro case furono distrutte, le persone massacrate o imprigionate e i loro beni confiscati. Molti furono costretti a fuggire in Svizzera o in Francia”. Della questione si occuparono anche i britannici Oliver Cromwell, lord protettore del Commonwealth, e il ministro degli affari esteri, il poeta John Milton, che inviò una serie di lettere ai sovrani e ai governi europei per chiedere che si interessassero della causa valdese.

    Cromwell scrisse addirittura al re di Francia, Luigi XIV, minacciando di interrompere le trattative di amicizia in corso con il Regno Unito, se il re francese non avesse fatto pressione sui Savoia per far ottenere ai valdesi la libertà di culto. Ma solo nel 1848 il re Carlo Alberto di Savoia concesse i diritti civili e politici al gruppo. “Tuttavia la libertà di culto vera e propria è arrivata solo nel 1984, con la firma delle intese con lo stato italiano, anche se era già prevista in teoria dall’articolo 8 della costituzione”, spiega Rosso. Fu la prima intesa di questo tipo firmata in Italia con una minoranza religiosa.

    Per lo storico valdese è importante comprendere i legami dei valdesi con le altre chiese protestanti e i loro rapporti internazionali che gli hanno permesso di sopravvivere pur essendo una minoranza perseguitata. Non è un caso, dice Rosso, che “Altiero Spinelli abbia pronunciato a Torre Pellice il suo primo discorso europeista, dopo la scrittura del manifesto di Ventotene”. Il teorico del federalismo europeo era sfollato a Torre Pellice, a casa di una famiglia valdese di Milano, e Rosso sostiene che in parte sia stato influenzato dall’atmosfera cosmopolita di queste valli.

    “Per decenni i valdesi non hanno potuto studiare, frequentare le scuole pubbliche, perché non avevano diritti civili, quindi era normale per loro trasferirsi in altri paesi europei per studiare. Parlavano almeno tre lingue. Per sopravvivere hanno dovuto emigrare, spostarsi. Ma questo li ha resi poliglotti e gli ha permesso di sviluppare uno spirito europeo. Poi l’idea della federazione è tipica del protestantesimo: le chiese protestanti sono sorelle”, continua Rosso, che accompagnerà il presidente della repubblica italiana Sergio Mattarella nel suo viaggio a Torre Pellice, il 31 agosto. In quell’occasione sarà commemorato il discorso di Spinelli sull’Europa. “È interessante guardare alle elezioni europee del prossimo anno e a quel che rimane del progetto europeo da queste valli”, conclude Rosso.

    Dall’Afghanistan alla val Pellice

    Parwana Kebrit apre la porta di un appartamento luminoso al primo piano di un palazzo che ha le porte di ferro battuto. C’è molto caldo, ma l’interno della casa di Kebrit è fresco e in ombra. La donna è arrivata nella val Pellice cinque mesi fa dal Pakistan, insieme al marito Jawan, con un corridoio umanitario. Originaria di un piccolo paese dell’Afghanistan si è rifugiata in Pakistan per la prima volta nel 2001, insieme alla sua famiglia di origine.

    “È lì che io e le mie sorelle siamo andate a scuola per la prima volta, in Afghanistan la maggior parte delle ragazze non poteva studiare. E al di là dei taliban, il 90 per cento degli afgani pensa che per le donne non sia giusto studiare”, racconta. Poi con la famiglia è tornata a Kabul, dove ha frequentato l’università ed è diventata un’attivista per i diritti delle donne. Ma con il ritorno dei taliban nella capitale afgana nell’agosto del 2021, Kebrit e il marito sono stati costretti a scappare di nuovo. “Per noi non era sicuro rimanere nel paese”, racconta.

    Dal Pakistan è arrivata in Piemonte, accolta dalla Diaconia valdese, che la sta aiutando a riprendere gli studi e a imparare l’italiano, oltre che a farsi riconoscere i titoli di studio del paese di origine. Ha una grande passione per il disegno e la pittura e mostra orgogliosa i suoi quadri, esposti uno vicino all’altro. Uno di questi, l’unico dipinto con i colori a olio, l’ha portato con sé nel viaggio dal Pakistan. Mostra delle donne afgane con i pugni alzati che marciano tenendo una bandiera e schiacciano degli uomini. “Sono le donne che combattono per i loro diritti”, spiega. In un disegno che ha realizzato in Italia, invece, si vedono sei gabbie con dentro degli uccelli, una delle gabbie è rossa ed è aperta, l’uccello è volato via. Nel quadro successivo l’uccello rosso vola dopo essersi liberato. Parwana Kebrit si sente così, finalmente libera. La sua intenzione ora è quella di continuare a studiare. Il suo inglese è fluente e i suoi occhi brillano di fiducia.

    “Amo l’Italia, sono stati tutti gentili e disponibili con noi. Voglio rimanere qui”, assicura. Dal 2016 i valdesi sono promotori, insieme alla Federazione delle chiese evangeliche in Italia e alla comunità di sant’Egidio dei cosiddetti corridoi umanitari, dei ponti aerei che hanno permesso di portare legalmente in Italia 4.244 rifugiati dall’Afghanistan, dal Libano e dalla Libia, in accordo con lo stato italiano. Nove persone arrivate in Italia con i corridoi umanitari sono al momento ospitati nella val Pellice, grazie alla Diaconia valdese. “Si tratta di due famiglie afgane”, spiega Alice Squillace, responsabile dell’accoglienza per la Diaconia. La famiglia di Kebrit e quella di Abdul Mutaleb Hamed, un medico afgano che lavorava con un’ong italiana, il Cospe. “Lavoriamo molto sulla loro inclusione e il rapporto con la comunità ospitante”, assicura. E negli anni non ci sono mai stati grandi problemi.

    “In questo momento in cui si torna a parlare di emergenza migranti in Italia (sono stati superati i centomila arrivi nel 2023, ndr), ci sembra che tutto sia strumentale. Guardare per esempio all’esperienza dei corridoi umanitari mostra che lavorare in maniera umana con piccoli gruppi di persone non produce mai situazioni difficili o ingestibili”, conclude. “Siamo stati rifugiati come valdesi in Svizzera e in Germania e sappiamo quali siano le sofferenze del viaggio e della cattiva accoglienza”, assicura Francesco Sciotto, pastore della chiesa valdese di Messina e presidente della Diaconia valdese, seduto ai tavolini del bar, allestito dalla chiesa valdese durante il sinodo, nel giardino del quartier generale di Torre Pellice. “Per questo i valdesi sono particolarmente impegnati nell’accoglienza e per questo vogliono evitare che altri subiscano le conseguenze di una cattiva accoglienza”.

    Oggi in Italia vivono circa ventimila valdesi e la maggioranza è concentrata nelle tre valli del Piemonte: la val Chisone, la valle Germanasca e la val Pellice. “Come tutte le chiese, anche i valdesi hanno una crisi di fedeli e di vocazioni. Sono sempre di meno i ragazzi e le ragazze che decidono di diventare pastori”, racconta Michel Charbonnier, pastore di Torre Pellice.

    “È una crisi che in larga parte dipende dalla secolarizzazione e che noi vediamo di più in queste valli che nelle chiese delle città in giro per l’Italia”. Secondo Charbonnier, in val Pellice molte persone di famiglia valdese hanno smesso di frequentare la chiesa, ma è un processo che va avanti da decenni.

    “Ne parleremo anche nel sinodo. Ma per certi versi per i valdesi questo è un problema meno urgente che per altre chiese: per noi infatti tutti possono predicare e siamo abituati a essere in pochi”. La chiesa è molto più impegnata nelle questioni di tipo sociale che nelle questioni meramente religiose. “Fermo restando la separazione netta tra lo stato e la chiesa in cui crediamo”, conclude Charbonnier. “Sappiamo che si può incidere, anche se siamo in pochi”.

    https://www.internazionale.it/essenziale/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2023/08/24/valdesi-sinodo-torre-pellice

    #vaudois #église_vaudoise #Italie #protestantisme #sinodo #Val_Pellice #religion #accueil #réfugiés #histoire #Angrogna #réforme_protestante #Olivetano #persécution #extermination #Savoie #minorité_religieuse #minorités #corridor_humanitaire #diaconia_valdese #val_Chisone #valle_Germanasca

  • L’OIM réclame un corridor humanitaire pour les migrants coincés au Niger - InfoMigrants
    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/51227/loim-reclame-un-corridor-humanitaire-pour-les-migrants-coinces-au-nige

    Des tentes de fortune abritant des migrants sont vues à Assamaka, au Niger, le 29 mars 2023 (Image d’illustration). Crédit : Stanislas Poyet/AFP
    L’OIM réclame un corridor humanitaire pour les migrants coincés au Niger
    Par RFI Publié le : 21/08/2023
    C’est une conséquence des sanctions ouest-africaines contre le Niger. Avec la fermeture des frontières, les migrants, notamment maliens et guinéens, ne peuvent plus sortir de ce pays sahélien.Les centres d’accueil de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM) sont débordés au Niger. Le pays sahélien aux six frontières est traditionnellement un pays de transit pour les migrations notamment professionnelles des citoyens d’Afrique de l’Ouest, mais ceux qui devaient repartir dans leur pays ont été bloqués par la fermeture brutale de ces frontières, au lendemain du coup d’État. Plus de 1 000 retours volontaires de migrants ouest-africains étaient en particulier prévus par l’OIM au cours des dix derniers jours, principalement vers la Guinée et le Mali. Ils n’ont pas pu se concrétiser.
    Désormais, l’organisation intergouvernementale s’inquiète à mesure que le nombre de personnes en transit qui ont besoin d’aide grandit sur le sol nigérien, alors que les ressources de l’OIM diminuent.Selon elle, plus de 1 800 personnes attendent aux portes de ses centres de transit. Ces centres sont au nombre de sept, dont trois à Niamey et quatre à Agadez, et ils hébergeaient déjà 5 000 migrants en attente de retour. C’est pourquoi l’OIM appelle à l’établissement rapide d’un corridor humanitaire pour qu’ils puissent rentrer chez eux.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#niger#frontiere#crise#OIM#niamey#agadez#guinee#mali#sahel#corridorhumanitaire#transit#postcovid

  • Nagorno Karabakh, è crisi idrica
    https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Nagorno-Karabakh/Nagorno-Karabakh-e-crisi-idrica-225180

    Il Nagorno Karabakh e un parte di Azerbaijan dipendono dall’approvvigionamento idrico del bacino di Sarsang, il primo per l’energia elettrica, il secondo per l’irrigazione dei campi agricoli. La siccità di questo periodo ma soprattutto il blocco del corridoio di Lachin hanno causato uno sfruttamento intensivo del bacino idrico

  • Trento, gli effetti del Pnrr sul progetto della Circonvallazione ferroviaria
    https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/lemanisullaripartenza-circonvallazione-trento-pnrr

    Dal 2003 Rfi vuole un progetto ferroviario per potenziare il trasporto merci. Un’opera inutile che passa da terreni mai bonificati. Il Pnrr, però, può velocizzarne la costruzione. Nonostante le voci contrarie Clicca per leggere l’articolo Trento, gli effetti del Pnrr sul progetto della Circonvallazione ferroviaria pubblicato su IrpiMedia.

  • Eclairage public, nuisances et solutions

    Trame noire : quand les enjeux de la transition énergétique croisent les enjeux #biodiversité
    https://vimeo.com/563639384

    Webinaire réalisé pour les acteurs de TOTEn (Territoires d’Occitanie pour la transition énergétique) donc assez technique. On y trouve les prescriptions et obligations des éclairages et les angles morts de la réglementation, notamment sur la publicité lumineuse.

    Documents à télécharger sur
    https://toten-occitanie.fr/les-webinaires-du-reseau/8-juin-2021-webinaire-2-2021

    https://toten-occitanie.fr/IMG/pdf/webinaire_tramenoire_080621_compte-rendu.pdf

    #trame_noire #environnement #réglementation #territoires #lumières #nuisances_lumineuses #seuil_d'accessiblité #écologie #cartographie #corridors_écologiques #pollution_lumineuse
    #ciel_étoilé
    #nuit et https://www.lightpollutionmap.info

    Bonus
    Décryptage : l’arrêté ministériel « nuisances lumineuses » - Contexte

    https://www.cerema.fr/fr/actualites/decryptage-arrete-ministeriel-nuisances-lumineuses-contexte

    • Tarbes coupe l’éclairage des rues intérieures des quartiers résidentiels à 23h depuis le 1er juillet, pour réduire la facture et la pollution lumineuse.

      J’y vois aussi des discriminations spatiales et un couvre-feu implicite pour les femmes de certains quartiers.

      Repenser un éclairage public avec des sources moins hautes, mieux orientées et équipées en LED avec la bonne longueur d’onde serait plus efficace et surtout bien plus cher. Et on oublie aussi les enjeux sociologiques de l’éclairage public.

  • More Afghans with protection guaranteed to reach Germany in coming months

    German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has said she expects more Afghans to be brought to Germany in the near future, following a new agreement with Pakistan.

    Annalena Baerbock announced on Thursday (June 23) that a new agreement with Pakistan will create a legal exit route via Pakistan to Germany for thousands of people who have been promised protection in Germany, adding that work on implementing the agreement was proceeding at full speed.

    The foreign minister said that those who had already been promised protection by the German government would be the main beneficiaries of this new exit route. She highlighted that the personal information of those who will benefit from the new arrangement was known to German authorities, which will facilitate their quick transfer to Germany from Pakistan.

    Ambitious action plan

    Baerbock also gave an interim assessment of the government’s “Afghanistan Action Plan,” which she first presented six months ago, shortly after accepting her position as foreign minister.

    She said that about two-thirds of the people who had been granted protection had managed to make their way to Germany. This is equivalent to a total of more than 21,000 Afghan nationals.

    The number of departures from Afghanistan and neighboring countries has almost doubled since the action plan was implemented at beginning of the year. More than 12,000 people have been brought to Germany since then. However according to some reports, help came too late for some, resulting in a series of deaths.

    Afghanistan mission ’not in vain’

    In her statement, Baerbock also welcomed the Bundestag’s planned Afghanistan inquiry committee, which is expected to begin its work on July 7. She said that it was important to learn from the mistakes of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan in the past two decades without blaming anyone. Baerbock emphasized that the Afghanistan mission “was not in vain.”

    Germany’s Bundeswehr withdrew from Afghanistan alongside various other international forces at the end of June 2021, having had a continuous presence in the country for almost 20 years. International forces led by the US had declared war on Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

    Following the ouster of the militant Islamist Taliban government during that war, whom the US had accused of harboring the mastermind of the attack, Osama bin Laden, thousands of international troops remained in Afghanistan to help the country with its nation-building efforts while also trying to minimize attacks by militants.

    After taking power in August 2021 amid the power vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of international troops, the Taliban have restricted civil liberties, increasingly excluding girls and women in particular from public life. There have also been reports of violence against people who had collaborated with the international forces in the country over the past 20 years.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/41452/more-afghans-with-protection-guaranteed-to-reach-germany-in-coming-mon

    #Allemagne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #corridors_humanitaires #réfugiés_afghans #Afghanistan #Pakistan #voies_légales #Afghanistan_Action_Plan

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Human Rights Violations Against Migrants in Yemen Increase Amid Soaring Arrivals
    https://mailchi.mp/32f5e7091dc8/human-rights-violations-against-migrants-in-yemen-increase-amid-soaring-arri

    Human Rights Violations Against Migrants in Yemen Increase Amid Soaring Arrivals
    Women migrants walk along a highway in Yemen en route to the border with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Photo: Rami Ibrahim/IOM 2022
    Aden – At least 27,800 people have crossed from the Horn of Africa to war-torn Yemen in the first five months of 2022, more than the total who made the journey all of last year along what was the world’s busiest maritime migration route prior to COVID-19, according to the International Organization for Migration’s (OIM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).
    IOM last year reported that an estimated 27,700 migrants entered Yemen through the so-called Eastern Route, down from 138,000 in 2019 due to heightened COVID-19 mobility restrictions. Approximately 37,500 made the journey in 2020. The rise in arrivals is cause for alarm in a country now grappling with its eighth year of conflict. “We are increasingly concerned about the safety and well-being of people moving through Yemen,” said Christa Rottensteiner, IOM Yemen’s Chief of Mission. “Our teams meet migrants every day who have been injured in the conflict or become stranded on their journeys.”
    A variety of factors may be influencing this year’s increase, including a loosening of COVID-19 mobility restrictions, more favorable weather conditions, and the security situation and drought in Ethiopia, where most migrants originate from. Upon arriving in Yemen, migrants face perilous onward journeys to Gulf countries in search of work. They often travel across conflict frontlines and face grave human rights violations such as detention in inhumane conditions, exploitation and forced transfers across lines of control. Women and girls often report experiencing gender-based violence, abuse or exploitation, usually at the hands of traffickers and smugglers.  In the north of the country, IOM’s partners and the local community have reported that over 1,000 migrants – including women and children – have been injured or killed by attacks this year. Every month, hundreds are treated for gunshot wounds at an IOM-supported hospital near the border town of Sa’dah. In Ma’rib – some 25 kilometres from one of the conflict’s frontlines – approximately 4,500 migrants are stranded, unable to continue their journey onward or return back. More than 900 migrants departed on Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) flights from Aden in May (as of 31/05 mid-day), but greater funding is needed to help thousands of others waiting to leave from Aden, Sana’a and Ma’rib.
    “One of the main ways we can offer relief and protection is to open more opportunities for migrants who wish to return home to do so, and to provide life-saving assistance and medical aid to those in need,” said Rottensteiner. “At a time when funding for the Yemen response is on a decline, we must not turn our backs on stranded migrants who are often forgotten in times of crisis. We urgently require greater funding to ease the suffering of more than 190,000 migrants in need of assistance in Yemen.”
    IOM is currently appealing for USD 7.5 million to support thousands of stranded migrants to voluntarily return from Yemen to Ethiopia, through IOM’s VHR programme. The Organization also requires USD 9 million to continue its displacement and mobility tracking activities

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#yemen#ethiopie#sante#routemigratoire#corridor#retour#violence#genre#humanitaire#conflit

  • Regione Adriatico-Ionica: alla ricerca dei corridoi ecologici
    https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Italia/Regione-Adriatico-Ionica-alla-ricerca-dei-corridoi-ecologici-215049

    Infrastrutture verdi, corridoi ecologici. Cosa sono e come potrebbero contribuire a migliorare l’ambiente nella regione Adriatico-Ionica? Ne abbiamo parlato con Senad Oprašić, responsabile del dipartimento sulla tutela ambientale del ministero del commercio estero e relazioni economiche della Bosnia Erzegovina e coordinatore di una della ree tematiche di lavoro di EUSAIR

  • #Shingal

    En août 2014, L’État islamique attaque le peuple Yézidis dans la région montagneuse de Shingal, et perpétue un véritable massacre dans cette région au nord-ouest de l’Irak. Asmail, son frère Mazlum et leurs familles sont des leurs. Comme nombre d’autres Yézidis, ils vont devoir fuir vers ce refuge ancestral que sont les montagnes de Shingal et lutter pour la survie de leurs familles et de leur peuple...

    Si la crise humanitaire qui a découlé de cette tragédie est relativement connue de tous, de nombreuses zones d’ombre persistent quant aux éléments qui ont conduit au génocide et à l’exode de toute une population.
    Tout au long de cet album, Tore Rørbæk et Mikkel Sommer donnent corps à un peuple méconnu, victime de la barbarie, et tentent de faire la lumière sur ces éléments souvent passés sous silence...

    https://www.la-boite-a-bulles.com/book/618
    #BD #bande_dessinée #livre

    #monts_Shingal #montagne #Yézidis #Irak #Siba #peshmerga #Gerzerik #daesh #territoires_contestés #Kurdistan #Al-Qaïda #yézidisme #Snouni #Sikeniye #massacre #génocide #Ousman_Pacha #conversion_forcée #histoire #viols #exécutions_de_masse #esclavage_sexuel #aide_humanitaire #corridor_humanitaire #réfugiés #camp_de_Newroz #Newroz #Essian #Dohuk #Kurdistan_irakien #Etat_islamique #religion #résistance #ISIS #Etat_islamique

    • La montagna sola. Gli ezidi e l’autonomia democratica di Şengal

      Gli ezidi sono diventati noti a livello internazionale dopo il massacro subito dall’Isis nell’agosto del 2014. Un popolo di cui si è sempre saputo pochissimo – anche per l’assenza di testi scritti dovuta a un ferreo ricorso alla tradizione orale – è stato preso come esempio della brutalità dello Stato islamico e usato per giustificare l’intervento militare occidentale. Relegando gli ezidi al ruolo di vittime senza speranza né capacità di pensiero politico. Questo libro ne ricostruisce la storia millenaria, la cultura e la religione, e ne riporta la voce diretta raccolta dalle autrici nei loro viaggi a Şengal, di cui uno compiuto insieme a Zerocalcare, autore dell’illustrazione in copertina.
      Şengal è l’unica montagna che si staglia nella vasta piana di Ninive, al confine con Siria e Turchia. In Iraq la chiamano «la montagna sola», come solo è sempre stato il popolo ezida che la abita, società divenuta introversa a seguito delle numerose persecuzioni subite. Dalla loro resistenza contro l’Isis e dalla liberazione di Şengal, grazie all’aiuto del Partito dei lavoratori del Kurdistan e delle unità curde del Rojava, è nata un’esperienza di autogoverno ispirata al confederalismo democratico, ancora in fieri e minacciata dalle stesse forze che nel 2014 permisero il massacro.
      Sulla montagna sola si respira la voglia di una vita finalmente libera dalla paura insieme all’entusiasmo di chi ha preso in mano le redini del proprio destino. Una popolazione chiusa al mondo esterno, conservatrice e legata alle proprie pratiche ha saputo costruire una forma di autogestione del proprio territorio secondo un paradigma estremamente moderno e allo stesso tempo adattabile alle peculiari e antiche caratteristiche dei popoli mediorientali – perché è da lì che trae origine e ispirazione.

      https://edizionialegre.it/product/la-montagna-sola

  • Singapore to open travel corridors with US, UK, six other ‘living with Covid’ nations | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3151761/singapore-open-travel-corridors-us-uk-six-other-living-covid

    Singapore to open travel corridors with US, UK, six other ‘living with Covid’ nations In major easing of travel restrictions, Singapore will open travel corridors with the US, UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Denmark. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in televised speech predicts current record wave of cases will take up to six months to stabilise Singapore and eight Western nations including the United States and Britain will soon open quarantine-free travel lanes for vaccinated travellers, authorities said on Saturday, marking the country’s most extensive easing of travel restrictions since borders were shut last March. Canada, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Denmark will also open “vaccinated travel lanes” with the island nation. These lanes will begin operations starting October 19. The new travel corridors were unveiled as Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in a televised address that Singapore, a vaccine pacesetter, would press on with its “living with Covid-19” plan even amid a surge that has caused record daily caseloads and a spike in deaths.
    Lee said it would take Singapore “at least three months, and perhaps as long as six months” to get the relatively restriction-free state that much of Europe and the West was currently enjoying.The prime minister underscored that countries that prematurely lifted restrictions had “paid for it dearly, losing many lives along the way”. Still, he said the country could not “stay locked down and closed off indefinitely”, and acknowledged that business disruptions, job losses and the separation of families across borders had caused “psychological and emotional strain and mental fatigue”. Collectively, the 11 countries – among Singapore’s top 20 trading partners – make up about 10 per cent of Changi Airport’s pre-Covid annual passenger arrivals, Transport Minister S. Iswaran said.“While still a far cry from where we were pre-Covid, this is a significant step in the reopening of our borders, and crucial to reclaiming and rebuilding our status as an international aviation hub with global connectivity,” Iswaran added.
    Singapore’s coronavirus cases ‘could reach 10,000 a day’. In a further boost for travellers, countries involved in these corridors will require just two polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests – one upon arrival and another on departure. Under existing arrangements, vaccinated travel lane users in Singapore have to undergo four tests, including one the third day of their stay and another on the seventh day.
    Singapore-based economist Song Seng Wun told This Week in Asia the expected increase in visitor arrivals via the slew of new vaccinated travel lanes would likely have a material positive impact on the country’s gross domestic product, given its traditional dependence on “external demand for goods and services”.“A busier Changi Airport will mean a busier Merlion too,” the CIMB Private Banking economist said, referring to the iconic tourist attraction at the heart of Singapore’s Marina Bay waterfront district.
    Shortly after the announcement, Singapore Airlines said it would begin operating designated flights to 14 cities that would serve travellers using the vaccinated travel lanes. Nuno Guerreiro, the regional director for the South Asia Pacific region for Booking.com, said the new lanes represented “a positive step forward towards the overall revival of travel”.Guerreiro said Booking.com’s own research showed “pent up demand for travel” in the country, with Singaporeans indicating they would not travel until they had been fully vaccinated.Before the pandemic, Singapore residents were among Asia’s most avid travellers, with many of them taking advantage of Changi Airport’s hub status and the burgeoning of budget airline routes to Southeast Asian destinations. The city state since the end of May said it wanted to transition to an endemic Covid – with a relatively low number of daily cases – as its vaccination rate soared.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#singapour##etatsunis#grandebretagne#france#italie#paysbas#espagne#canada#danemark#sante#corridorsanitaire#bulledevoayage#frontiere#circulation#vaccination

  • Paradise cost: high prices and strict rules deflate Palau-Taiwan travel bubble | Taiwan | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/15/palau-taiwan-travel-bubble-high-prices-strict-rules
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/f0501341a2515c045858669c06653b7907a6cc0c/0_212_3911_2346/master/3911.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    Palau-Taiwan Quarantine Free Travel Starts - 01 Apr 2021Mandatory Credit: Photo by Daniel Tsang/SOPA Images/REX/Shutterstock (11840467d) A woman waits to collect specimen samples for the first flight connecting Taiwan to Palau as Taiwan and Palau start a travel bubble scheme exempting visitors to undergo quarantine. The scheme allows Taiwanese people and Palauans to travel to each country without having to quarantine but gatherings and visits to crowded areas are prohibited whilst self management is compulsory for 9 days upon arrival to their home countries. But a COVID test before boarding the aircraft is required. Palau-Taiwan Quarantine Free Travel Starts - 01 Apr 2021It launched with a presidential escort and the promise of rare international travel to a postcard-perfect tropical island, but the Taiwan-Palau travel bubble has deflated after just a couple weeks, with Taiwanese bookings dwindling to single figures.
    Travel agents, consumers and health authorities have blamed the high cost of the tours and the Taiwanese government’s strict rules for returning travellers.The “sterile corridor” of bilateral tourism guaranteed travel between the two archipelagos, which are both otherwise closed to all tourists, on strictly managed, twice-weekly package tours.
    The inaugural flight, packed with nearly 100 passengers including Palauan president Surangel Whipps Jr, boded well, but this week China Airlines announced it had cancelled an upcoming flight from Taipei after just two people booked tickets. The airline told the Guardian it was constantly assessing the situation but it couldn’t guarantee further cancellations.
    Trans-Tasman travel bubble between New Zealand and Australia to start on 19 AprilTo go on the Palau holiday from Taiwan, tourists must make several health declarations, pay for Covid tests, and not have left Taiwan in the last six months. Upon return they had to complete 14 days of “self-health management”, including five “enhanced” management days banned from public transport and spaces. On Wednesday health authorities announced it was dropping the enhanced requirement, and agencies are hoping it’s enough to restore interest.
    One of the six agencies contracted to run the tours, Phoenix travel, told the Guardian they’d had “sporadic” individual bookings and inquiries about future tours, “but the momentum is not as good as expected”.“The fare is higher than normal, plus the cost of two PCR tests, and the inconvenience of health management after returning home are the reasons why most travellers maintain a wait-and-see attitude,” the spokesperson said.Gibsen Lin, marketing manager of Lifetour travel, said they had received many more inquiries for the upcoming summer holiday period from May to July, and that uncertainty about the process had also discouraged early take-up.
    “Many details were not determined at the beginning. They changed the rules of the game … and then gave consumers less time to react in the market,” Lin said.Taiwanese passengers pay between $2,100 and $2,800 plus associated costs for the group tour which runs for fewer than eight days, keeps the tourists away from crowded locations and local people, and doesn’t allow for autonomous activity.
    On Wednesday evening Whipps welcomed the easing and said returnees who didn’t show signs of fever and hadn’t been in the presence of anyone who did, could “go about their daily lives as usual”.Whipps also said costs had also been decreased, but did not detail by how much. He claimed the presence of Tropical Storm Surigae had also affected bookings, but that the two governments were working closely together to improve the bubble.
    He said his office had been “assured” that the next scheduled flight on 21 April would have more passengers. The Guardian has contacted the Taiwan government for confirmation of the changes and comment.Palau has recorded zero cases of Covid, and is on track to have 80% of its population vaccinated by the summer, while about 90% of Taiwan’s 1,062 cases were recently arrived people in quarantine, and there is no community transmission.The travel bubble was hailed as a lifeline for Palau’s tourism industry, which contributes almost half of its GDP, but had been completely stalled by the pandemic. Taiwanese made up the third-largest proportion of tourists in pre-Covid times, behind people from China and Japan.
    “We seek everyone’s support and patience as we continue to address challenges and improve the sterile corridor. Challenges help us improve customer experience and increase demand,” said Whipps.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#palau#taiwan#australie#nouvellezelande#sante#bulledevoyage#corridorsterile#circulation#frontiere#tourisme#economie

  • Another lockdown was inevitable. We have to get this one right | Coronavirus | The Guardian
    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jan/05/vaccines-pandemic-covid-variant-lockdown
    https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/ccc68d13ed82ff7c64195eed215e9366e9c64871/0_137_4104_2462/master/4104.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=85&auto=format&fit=crop&overlay-ali

    A third lockdown for England was inevitable. Pressure on the NHS is growing as it deals with new infections from a variant of the coronavirus that scientists estimate is 50-70% more transmissible. New infections continue to climb past 50,000 each day, and daily deaths are in the hundreds. A few weeks ago, many felt optimistic that vaccines could return England to normal by the spring. Instead, it seems we are entering a dangerous new chapter of this pandemic. It’s easy to feel frustrated by the government’s response to this pandemic, and wonder why it hasn’t acted sooner. Ministers wasted an opportunity to suppress the virus in the summer when cases were low, and instead chose to open up quickly and recklessly after the first national lockdown. The government subsidised people to eat out in restaurants and bars, and encouraged holidays abroad via “travel corridors” without any kind of testing or quarantine restrictions for when travellers returned. It was always likely that, if uncontrolled, the virus that causes Covid-19 would mutate. High prevalence created more opportunities for a variant to emerge that now appears to be spreading at a worrying pace.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#grandebretagne#sante#confinement#corridor#circulation#bullevoyage#test#quarantaine#virusmutant

  • Des « corridors verts » entre pays pour éviter la quarantaine des voyageurs d’affaires
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2021/01/04/des-corridors-verts-entre-pays-pour-eviter-la-quarantaine-des-voyageurs-d-af

    Dans le grand bazar des restrictions aux frontières, des pays tentent de faire place nette pour accueillir leurs partenaires privilégiés. Le 23 octobre, l’Allemagne et Singapour ont ainsi annoncé la mise en place d’un « corridor vert » autorisant les voyages d’affaires entre les deux pays. Ils permettent, sous conditions sanitaires strictes (tests) et harmonisées, d’éviter la quarantaine aux voyageurs.En Europe, cette « green lane » représente actuellement la seule porte d’entrée vers la seconde place financière d’Asie. Si Singapour a déjà conclu des accords de ce type avec la Corée ou la Malaisie, l’Allemagne est le premier pays européen à bénéficier de cette régulation. Face à la deuxième vague du Covid-19 en Europe, la cité-Etat asiatique a barricadé ses frontières : comme en Chine ou au Qatar, les voyageurs européens sont devenus persona non grata, même pour le business.
    Alors que la sortie de crise s’annonce très progressive, quelques pays testent la mise en place de « couloirs sanitaires », offrant des garanties suffisantes pour ne pas faire entrer le virus sur le territoire. Les pays baltes ont soufflé la première « bulle de voyage » européenne, ouvrant dès le 15 mai 2020 leurs frontières internes.Cet automne, un parterre de pays ouest-européens (l’Espagne, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et les Pays-Bas) ont réfléchi afin de mettre au point un protocole sanitaire commun pour faciliter les déplacements au sein de l’Union européenne. Une tentative vite balayée par le déferlement de la deuxième vague sur le Vieux Continent. Tous les acteurs du « mobility management » l’affirment : les restrictions aux frontières sont le principal frein au redémarrage des voyages d’affaires. Dans un sondage mené par la Global Business Travel Association (GBTA) en octobre, 43 % des acheteurs voyages citent les mesures de quarantaine comme premier frein à la reprise de l’activité.Des restrictions qui risquent de perdurer. Si les tests rapides (antigéniques) sont en train d’être déployés au niveau des aéroports européens, la plupart des destinations ne les considèrent pas assez fiables pour prouver que le voyageur n’est pas atteint par le Covid-19. Afin d’harmoniser les consignes sanitaires pour faciliter les déplacements, un « code couleur » a été mis en place au niveau européen selon la situation épidémiologique des pays. Mais les consignes demeurent indicatives. Les règles continuent à différer au jour le jour, selon les destinations.
    « On aura du mal à avoir une homogénéisation des règles, car les restrictions aux frontières ne reposent pas que sur des enjeux sanitaires, souligne Didier Bréchemier, associé du cabinet Roland Berger. Elles sont aussi des choix politiques et économiques. » Très dépendante du tourisme, la France a ainsi décidé d’ouvrir grand ses frontières cet été, tandis que la Chine a maintenu de sévères restrictions. Dans une Europe en rouge, les corridors verts offrent une première porte de sortie. D’autres accords sont en discussion. Au demeurant, les bons résultats affichés par les parties prenantes sur le plan sanitaire semblent loin d’être le seul critère pris en compte. Selon le quotidien britannique The Independant, le prochain pays européen qui devrait bénéficier de la « green lane » vers Singapour serait le Royaume-Uni. Un accord-cadre a été signé également avec la France le 16 décembre 2020 pour travailler à l’installation d’un tel corridor.

    #Covid-19#migrant1migration#france#europe#chine#corridorsanitaire#protocolesanitaire#sante#bussiness#economie#frontiere

  • Les Canaries comptent sur les tests obligatoires pour sauver la haute saison touristique
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2020/11/13/les-canaries-comptent-sur-les-tests-obligatoires-pour-sauver-la-haute-saison

    Le taux d’incidence de l’épidémie de Covid-19 aux Canaries, de 80 pour 100 000 habitants, est l’un des plus bas d’Europe. Néanmoins, cela ne suffit pas à réactiver le tourisme, qui représente 35 % du produit intérieur brut (PIB) et 40 % de l’emploi de l’archipel espagnol. Le 24 octobre, l’Allemagne a certes retiré les Canaries de sa liste des destinations à risque, nourrissant l’espoir des hôteliers, mais elle a aussitôt recommandé à ses ressortissants de ne pas sortir de chez eux. De même, le 25 octobre, le Royaume-Uni a inclus les Canaries dans sa liste des régions sûres dispensées de quarantaine… pour finalement confiner les Britanniques à domicile le 1er novembre.

    « Nous accueillons en ce moment moins de 10 % des touristes habituels, résume José Maria Mañaricua, président de la Fédération des hôteliers de Grande Canarie (FEHT). Notre drame est que le gouvernement espagnol n’a pas assez travaillé pour créer des corridors touristiques sûrs, même au départ de zones rouges, garantis grâce à des tests obligatoires au départ », estime-t-il.
    La situation est en passe de changer. A compter de samedi 14 novembre, il est indispensable de disposer d’un test Covid négatif (PCR, sérologique ou antigène) de moins de soixante-douze heures pour loger dans les établissements hôteliers des îles Canaries. Si le voyageur n’a pas fait de test avant de partir, il devra rester isolé dans sa chambre le temps d’en subir un. En cas de résultat positif, il sera confiné dans une zone de l’hôtel habilitée à cette fin, puisque le gouvernement régional oblige les hôtels à réserver 10 % de leurs chambres à ces personnes.La décision d’imposer les tests, prise directement par les autorités régionales après des mois passés à l’exiger, en vain, du gouvernement espagnol, a un objectif clair : contrôler au mieux la propagation du virus, aussi bien pour rassurer les voyageurs que pour préserver les îles, et sauver ainsi la saison touristique hivernale. Celle-ci est la plus importante pour l’archipel ensoleillé, situé au large des côtes africaines et au climat doux, même en décembre.
    « Nous sommes un archipel, ce qui limite la mobilité et facilite le contrôle de l’épidémie, rappelle le président du gouvernement régional, le socialiste Angel Victor Torres, lequel cherche à présent un mécanisme pour contrôler les Espagnols qui rentreront passer Noël aux Canaries avec leur famille. Nous devons être prêts pour la réouverture car nous savons que la demande est là, sous-jacente. Quand l’Allemagne et le Royaume-uni nous ont sortis de leur liste, nous avons reçu 260 000 demandes de séjour en un seul week-end, ajoute-t-il. Nous espérons à présent que le 2 décembre, le Royaume-Uni laisse sortir les Britanniques. »
    Si la demande ne repart pas, les faillites risquent de se multiplier. Certains n’ont d’ailleurs pu l’éviter que grâce aux indemnités qu’ils perçoivent du gouvernement pour accueillir les migrants africains, arrivés massivement sur l’archipel, ces deux derniers mois, à bord d’embarcations de fortune. Au complexe trois étoiles Vista Flor, plus de 500 migrants sont ainsi hébergés dans des appartements touristiques, et son patron, Domingo Espino, a ainsi pu sortir ses 72 employés du chômage partiel.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#canaries#allemagne#espagne#grandebretagne#afrique#sante#tourisme#corridorsanitaire#migrationirruguliere

  • The Frontier Within: The European Border Regime in the Balkans

    In the summer of 2015, the migratory route across the Balkans »entered into the European spotlight, and indeed onto the screen of the global public« (Kasparek 2016: 2), triggering different interpretations and responses. Contrary to the widespread framing of the mass movement of people seeking refuge in Europe as ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹ of unseen proportions, we opt for the perspective of »the long Summer of Migration« (Kasparek/Speer 2015) and an interpretation that regards it as »a historic and monumental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobilities have disrupted the European regime of border control« (Stierl/Heller/de Genova 2016: 23). In reaction to the disobedient mass mobilities of people, a state-tolerated and even state-organized transit of people, a »formalized corridor« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016), was gradually established. To avoid the concentration of unwanted migrants on their territory, countries along the route—sometimes in consultation with their neighboring countries and EU member states, sometimes simply by creating facts—strived to regain control over the movements by channeling and isolating them by means of the corridor (see e.g. Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Speer 2017; Tošić 2017). »Migrants didn’t travel the route any more: they were hurriedly channeled along, no longer having the power to either determine their own movement or their own speed« (Kasparek 2016). The corridor, at the same time, facilitated and tamed the movement of people. In comparison to the situation in Serbia, where migrants were loosely directed to follow the path of the corridor (see e.g. Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017; Kasparek 2016: 6), migrants in other states like North Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia were literally in the corridor’s power, i.e. forced to follow the corridor (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Chudoska Blazhevska/Flores Juberías 2016: 231–232; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47; Petrović 2018). The corridor was operative in different and constantly changing modalities until March 2016. Since then, migration through the Balkan region still takes place, with migrants struggling on a daily basis with the diverse means of tightened border controls that all states along the Balkan route have been practicing since.

    This movements issue wants to look back on these events in an attempt to analytically make sense of them and to reflect on the historical rupture of the months of 2015 and 2016. At the same time, it tries to analyze the ongoing developments of bordering policies and the struggles of migration. It assembles a broad range of articles reaching from analytical or research based papers shedding light on various regional settings and topics, such as the massive involvement of humanitarian actors or the role of camp infrastructures, to more activist-led articles reflecting on the different phases and settings of pro-migrant struggles and transnational solidarity practices. In an attempt to better understand the post-2015 border regime, the issue furthermore presents analyses of varying political technologies of bordering that evolved along the route in response to the mass mobilities of 2015/2016. It especially focuses on the excessive use of different dimensions of violence that seem to characterize the new modalities of the border regime, such as the omnipresent practice of push-backs. Moreover, the articles shed light on the ongoing struggles of transit mobility and (transnational) solidarity that are specifically shaped by the more than eventful history of the region molded both by centuries of violent interventions and a history of connectivity.

    Our transnational editorial group came together in the course of a summer school on the border regime in the Balkans held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2018. It was organized by the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies (kritnet), University of Göttingen, Department of Cultural Anthropology/European Ethnology (Germany), the Research Centre of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Slovenia), the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research (Croatia), and the Institute of Ethnography SASA (Serbia). The summer school assembled engaged academics from all over the region that were involved, in one form or another, in migration struggles along the route in recent years.1 The few days of exchange proved to be an exciting and fruitful gathering of critical migration and border regime scholars and activists from different regional and disciplinary backgrounds of the wider Balkans. Therefore, we decided to produce this movements issue by inviting scholars and activists from the region or with a deep knowledge on, and experience with, regional histories and politics in order to share their analyses of the Balkan route, the formalized corridor, and the developments thereafter. These developments have left a deep imprint on the societies and regional politics of migration, but they are very rarely taken into consideration and studied in the West as the centuries long entanglements that connect the Balkan with the rest of Europe.

    In this editorial, we will outline the transnational mobility practices in the Balkans in a historical perspective that includes the framework of EU-Balkan relations. With this exercise we try to historize the events of 2015 which are portrayed in many academic as well as public accounts as ›unexpected‹ and ›new‹. We also intend to write against the emergency and escalation narrative underlying most public discourses on the Balkans and migration routes today, which is often embedded in old cultural stereotypes about the region. We, furthermore, write against the emergency narrative because it erodes the agency of migration that has not only connected the region with the rest of the globe but is also constantly reinventing new paths for reaching better lives. Not only the history of mobilities, migrations, and flight connecting the region with the rest of Europe and the Middle East can be traced back into the past, but also the history of political interventions and attempts to control these migrations and mobilities by western European states. Especially the EU accession processes produce contexts that made it possible to gradually integrate the (Western) Balkan states into the rationale of EU migration management, thus, setting the ground for today’s border and migration regime. However, as we will show in the following sections, we also argue against simplified understandings of the EU border regime that regard its externalization policy as an imperial top-down act. Rather, with a postcolonial perspective that calls for decentering western knowledge, we will also shed light on the agency of the national governments of the region and their own national(ist) agendas.
    The Formalized Corridor

    As outlined above, the formalized corridor of 2015 reached from Greece to Northern and Central Europe, leading across the states established in the 1990s during the violent breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, today, are additionally stratified vis-à-vis the EU. Slovenia and Croatia are EU member states, while the others are still in the accession process. The candidate states Serbia, North Macedonia and Montenegro have opened the negotiation process. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—still not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia and some EU member states—have the status of potential candidates. However, in 2015 and 2016, the states along the corridor efficiently collaborated for months on a daily basis, while, at the same time, fostering separate, sometimes conflicting, migration politics. Slovenia, for example, raised a razor-wire fence along the border to Croatia, while Croatia externalized its border to Serbia with a bilateral agreement (Protokol) in 2015 which stated that the »Croatian Party« may send a »train composition with its crew to the railway station in Šid [in Serbia], with a sufficient number of police officers of the Republic of Croatia as escort« (Article 3 Paragraph 2).

    Despite ruptures and disputes, states nevertheless organized transit in the form of corridor consisting of trains, buses, and masses of walking people that were guarded and directed by the police who forced people on the move to follow the corridor’s direction and speed. The way the movements were speedily channeled in some countries came at the cost of depriving people of their liberty and freedom of movement, which calls for an understanding of the corridor as a specific form of detention: a mobile detention, ineligible to national or EU legislation (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47). In the context of the corridor, camps became convergence points for the heterogeneous pathways of movements. Nevertheless, having in mind both the proclaimed humanitarian purpose of the corridor, and the monumental numbers of people to whom the corridor enabled and facilitated movement, the corridor can be designated as an unprecedented formation in recent EU history. In other words: »The corridor – with all its restrictions – remains a historical event initiated by the movement of people, which enabled thousands to reach central Europe in a relatively quick and safe manner. […] But at the same time it remained inscribed within a violent migration management system« (Santer/Wriedt 2017: 148).

    For some time, a broad consensus can be observed within migration and border studies and among policy makers that understands migration control as much more than simply protecting a concrete borderline. Instead, concepts such as migration management (Oelgemoller 2017; Geiger/Pécoud 2010) and border externalization (as specifically spelled out in the EU document Global Approach to Migration of 2005) have become increasingly important. In a spatial sense, what many of them have in common is, first, that they assume an involvement of neighboring states to govern migration in line with EU migration policies. Second, it is often stated that this leads to the creation of different zones encircling the European Union (Andreas/Snyder 2000). Maribel Casas-Cortes and Sebastian Cobarrubias, for instance, speak of four such zones: the first zone is »formed by EU member states, capable of fulfilling Schengen standards«, the second zone »consists of transit countries« (Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias 2019), the third zone is characterized by countries such as Turkey, which are depicted by emigration as well as transit, and the fourth zone are countries of origin. While Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias rightly criticize the static and eurocentric perspective of such conceptualizations, they nevertheless point to the unique nature of the formalized corridor because it crisscrossed the above mentioned zones of mobility control in an unprecedented way.

    Furthermore, the corridor through the Balkans can be conceived as a special type of transnational, internalized border. The internalized European borders manifest themselves to a great extent in a punctiform (see Rahola 2011: 96–97). They are not only activated in formal settings of border-crossings, police stations, or detention centers both at state borders and deep within state territories, but also in informal settings of hospitals, hostels, in the streets, or when someone’s legal status is taken as a basis for denying access to rights and services (i.e. to obtain medical aid, accommodation, ride) (Guild 2001; Stojić Mitrović/Meh 2015). With the Balkan corridor, this punctiform of movement control was, for a short period, fused into a linear one (Hameršak/Pleše 2018).

    The rules of the corridor and its pathways were established by formal and informal agreements between the police and other state authorities, and the corridor itself was facilitated by governmental, humanitarian, and other institutions and agencies. Cooperation between the countries along the route was fostered by representatives of EU institutions and EU member states. It would be too simple, though, to describe their involvement of the countries along the route as merely reactive, as an almost mechanical response to EU and broader global policies. Some countries, in particular Serbia, regarded the increasing numbers of migrants entering their territory during the year 2015 as a window of opportunity for showing their ›good face‹ to the European Union by adopting ›European values‹ and, by doing so, for enhancing their accession process to the European Union (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017). As Tošić points out, »this image was very convenient for Serbian politicians in framing their country as ›truly European‹, since it was keeping its borders open unlike some EU states (such as Hungary)« (2017: 160). Other states along the corridor also played by their own rules from time to time: Croatia, for example, contrary to the Eurodac Regulation (Regulation EU No 603/2013), avoided sharing registration data on people in transit and, thus, hampered the Dublin system that is dependent on Eurodac registration. Irregular bureaucracies and nonrecording, as Katerina Rozakou (2017) calls such practices in her analysis of bordering practices in the Greek context, became a place of dispute, negotiations, and frustrations, but also a clear sign of the complex relationships and different responses to migration within the European Union migration management politics itself.

    Within EU-member states, however, the longer the corridor lasted, and the more people passed through it, the stronger the ›Hungarian position‹ became. Finally, Austria became the driving force behind a process of gradually closing the corridor, which began in November 2015 and was fully implemented in March 2016. In parallel, Angela Merkel and the European Commission preferred another strategy that cut access to the formalized corridor and that was achieved by adopting a treaty with Turkey known as the »EU-Turkey deal« signed on 18 March 2016 (see Speer 2017: 49–68; Weber 2017: 30–40).

    The humanitarian aspect for the people on the move who were supposed to reach a safe place through the corridor was the guiding principle of public discourses in most of the countries along the corridor. In Serbia, »Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić officially welcomed refugees, spoke of tolerance, and compared the experience of refugees fleeing war-torn countries to those of refugees during the wars of Yugoslav Succession« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 315). Similar narratives could also be observed in other countries along the corridor, at least for some period of time (see, for Slovenia, Sardelić 2017: 11; for Croatia, Jakešević 2017: 184; Bužinkić 2018: 153–154). Of course, critical readings could easily detect the discriminatory, dehumanizing, securitarizing, and criminalizing acts, practices, tropes, and aspects in many of these superficially caring narratives. The profiling or selection of people, ad hoc detentions, and militarization—which were integral parts of the corridor—were, at the time, only denounced by a few NGOs and independent activists. They were mostly ignored, or only temporarily acknowledged, by the media and, consequently, by the general public.

    Before May 2015, ›irregular‹ migration was not framed by a discourse of ›crisis‹ in the countries along the route, rather, the discourse was led by a focus on ›separate incidents‹ or ›situations‹. The discursive framing of ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹, accompanied by reports of UN agencies about ›unprecedented refugee flows in history‹, has been globally adopted both by policy makers and the wider public. »In the wake of the Summer of Migration, all involved states along the Balkan route were quick to stage the events as an ›emergency‹ (Calhoun 2004) and, in best humanitarian fashion, as a major humanitarian ›crisis‹, thus legitimizing a ›politics of exception‹« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). Following the logic that extraordinary situations call for, and justify, the use of extraordinary measures, the emergency framework, through the construction of existential threats, resulted, on the one hand, in a loosely controlled allocation of resources, and, on the other hand, in silencing many critical interpretations, thus allowing various ›risk management activities‹ to happen on the edge of the law (Campesi 2014). For the states along the route, the crisis label especially meant a rapid infusion of money and other resources for establishing infrastructures for the urgent reception of people on the move, mainly deriving from EU funds. Politically and practically, these humanitarian-control activities also fastened the operational inclusion of non-EU countries into the European border regime.

    As Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek have pointed out, the politics of proclaiming a ›crisis‹ is at the heart of re-stabilizing the European border regime, »making it possible to systematically undermine and lever the standards of international and European law without serious challenges to date« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). The authors:

    »have observed carefully designed policy elements, which can be labelled as anti-litigation devices. The design of the Hungarian transit zones is a striking case in point. They are an elementary part of the border fence towards Serbia and allow for the fiction that the border has not been closed for those seeking international protection, but rather that their admission numbers are merely limited due to administrative reasons: each of the two transit zones allows for 14 asylum seekers to enter Hungary every day« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66; on the administrative rationale in Slovenia see e.g. Gombač 2016: 79–81).

    The establishment of transit zones was accompanied by a series of legislative tightenings, passed under a proclaimed ›crisis situation caused by mass immigration‹, which, from a legal point of view, lasts until today. Two aspects are worth mentioning in particular: First, the mandatory deportation of all unwanted migrants that were detected on Hungarian territory to the other side of the fence, without any possibility to claim for asylum or even to lodge any appeal against the return. Second, the automatic rejection of all asylum applications as inadmissible, even of those who managed to enter the transit zones, because Serbia had been declared a safe third country (Nagy/Pál 2018). This led to a completely securitized border regime in Hungary, which might become a ›role model‹, not only for the countries in the region but also for the European border regime as a whole (ECtHR – Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary Application No. 47287/15).
    The Long Genealogy of the Balkan Route and its Governance

    The history of the Balkan region is a multiply layered history of transborder mobilities, migration, and flight reaching back as far as the times of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires connecting the region with the East and Western Europe in many ways. Central transportation and communication infrastructures partially also used by today’s migratory projects had already been established at the heydays of Western imperialism, as the Orient Express, the luxury train service connecting Paris with Istanbul (1883), or the Berlin-Baghdad railway (built between 1903 and 1940) indicate. During World War II, a different and reversed refugee route existed, which brought European refugees not just to Turkey but even further to refugee camps in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and was operated by the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA).

    The Yugoslav highway, the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity (Autoput bratstva i jedinstva) often simply referred to as the ›autoput‹ and built in phases after the 1950s, came to stretch over more than 1,000 km from the Austrian to the Greek borders and was one of the central infrastructures enabling transnational mobilities, life projects, and exile. In the 1960s, direct trains departing from Istanbul and Athens carried thousands of prospective labor migrants to foreign places in Germany and Austria in the context of the fordist labor migration regime of the two countries. At the end of that decade, Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia, fostering and formalizing decades long labor migrations from Croatia, Serbia, and other countries to Germany (Gatrell 2019, see e.g. Lukić Krstanović 2019: 54–55).

    The wars in the 1990s that accompanied the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the consequent establishment of several new nation states, created the first large refugee movement after the Second World War within Europe and was followed by increasing numbers of people fleeing Albania after the fall of its self-isolationist regime and the (civil) wars in the Middle East, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. As the migratory route did not go north through the Balkan Peninsula, but mainly proceeded to Italy at the time, the label Balkan route was mostly used as a name for a drugs and arms smuggling route well known in the West. Although there was migration within and to Europe, the Balkan migratory route, with the exception of refugee movements from ex-Yugoslavia, was yet predominantly invisible to the broader European public.

    Sparse ethnographic insights from the beginning of the 2000s point this out. Academic papers on migrant crossings from Turkey to the island of Lesbos mention as follows: »When the transport service began in the late 1980s it was very small and personal; then, in the middle of the 1990s, the Kurds began to show up – and now people arrive from just about everywhere« (Tsianos/Hess/Karakayali 2009: 3; see Tsianos/Karakayali 2010: 379). A document of the Council of the European Union from 1997 formulates this as following:

    »This migration appears to be routed essentially either through Turkey, and hence through Greece and Italy, or via the ›Balkans route‹, with the final countries of destination being in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several suggestions were put forward for dealing with this worrying problem, including the strengthening of checks at external borders, the stepping up of the campaign against illegal immigration networks, and pre-frontier assistance and training assignments in airports and ports in certain transit third countries, in full cooperation with the authorities in those countries« (ibid. quoted in Hess/Kasparek 2020).

    During this time, the EU migration management policies defined two main objectives: to prevent similar arrivals in the future, and to initiate a system of control over migration movements toward the EU that would be established outside the territories of the EU member states. This would later be formalized, first in the 2002 EU Action Plan on Illegal Immigration (see Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 13–14) and later re-confirmed in the Global Approach to Migration (2005) framework concerning the cooperation of the EU with third states (Hess/Kasparek 2020). In this process, the so-called migratory routes-approach and accompanying strategies of controlling, containing, and taming the movement »through epistemology of the route« (Hess/Kasparek 2020) became a main rationale of the European border control regime. Thus, one can resume that the route was not only produced by movements of people but also by the logic, legislation, investment etc. of EU migration governance. Consequently, the clandestine pathways across the Balkans to Central and Western Europe were frequently addressed by security bodies and services of the EU (see e.g. Frontex 2011; Frontex 2014), resulting in the conceptual and practical production of the Balkan as an external border zone of the EU.

    Parallel to the creation of ›Schengenland‹, the birth of the ›Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‹ inter alia as an inner-EU-free-mobility-zone and EU-based European border and migration regime in the late 1990s, the EU created the Western Balkans as an imaginary political entity, an object of its neighborhood and enlargement policy, which lies just outside the EU with a potential ›European future‹. For the purpose of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) initiated in 1999, the term Western Balkan was launched in the EU political context in order to include, at that moment, ›ex-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia plus Albania‹ and to presumably avoid potential politically sensitive notions. The Western Balkans as a concept represents a combination of a political compromise and colonial imagery (see Petrović 2012: 21–36). Its aim was to stabilize the region through a radical redefinition that would restrain from ethno-national toponyms and to establish a free-trade area and growing partnership with the EU. The SAP set out common political and economic goals for the Western Balkan as a region and conducted political and economic progress evaluations ›on a countries’ own merits‹. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 strengthened the main objectives of the SAP and formally took over elements of the accession process—institutional domains and regulations that were to be harmonized with those existing in the EU. Harmonization is a wide concept, and it basically means adopting institutional measures following specific demands of the EU. It is a highly hierarchized process in which states asked to ›harmonize‹ do not have a say in things but have to conform to the measures set forth by the EU. As such, the adoption of the EU migration and border regime became a central part of the ongoing EU-accession process that emerged as the main platform and governmental technology of the early externalization and integration of transit and source countries into the EU border regime. This was the context of early bilateral and multilateral cooperation on this topic (concerning involved states, see Lipovec Čebron 2003; Stojić Mitrović 2014; Župarić-Iljić 2013; Bojadžijev 2007).

    The decisive inclusion of the Western Balkan states in the EU design of border control happened at the Thessaloniki European Summit in 2003, where concrete provisions concerning border management, security, and combating illegal migration were set according to European standards. These provisions have not been directly displayed, but were concealed as part of the package of institutional transformations that respective states had to conduct. The states were promised to become members of the EU if the conditions were met. In order to fulfill this goal, prospective EU member states had to maintain good mutual relations, build statehoods based on ›the rule of law‹, and, after a positive evaluation by the EU, begin with the implementation of concrete legislative and institutional changes on their territories (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019). The control of unwanted movements toward the EU was a priority of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan states from the very beginning (Kacarska 2012). It started with controlling the movement of their own nationals (to allow the states to be removed from the so-called Black Schengen list) during the visa facilitation process. If they managed to control the movement of their own nationals, especially those who applied for asylum in the EU via biometric passports and readmission obligations (asylum seekers from these states comprise a large portion of asylum seekers in the EU even today), they were promised easier access to the EU as an economic area. Gradually, the focus of movement control shifted to third-country nationals. In effect, the Western Balkan states introduced migration-related legislative and institutional transformations corresponding to the ones already existing in the EU, yet persistent ›non-doing‹ (especially regarding enabling access to rights and services for migrants) remained a main practice of deterrence (Valenta/Zuparic-Iljic/Vidovic 2015; Stojić Mitrović 2019).

    From the very beginning, becoming an active part of the European border regime and implementing EU-centric migration policies, or, to put it simply, conducting control policies over the movements of people, has not been the goal of the states along the Balkan route per se but a means to obtain political and economic benefits from the EU. They are included into the EU border regime as operational partners without formal power to influence migration policies. These states do have a voice, though, not only by creating the image of being able to manage the ›European problem‹, and accordingly receive further access to EU funds, but also by influencing EU migration policy through disobedience and actively avoiding conformity to ›prescribed‹ measures. A striking example of creative state disobedience are the so-called 72-hour-papers, which are legal provisions set by the Serbian 2007 Law on Asylum, later also introduced as law in North Macedonia in June 2015: Their initial function was to give asylum seekers who declared their ›intention to seek asylum‹ to the police the possibility to legally proceed to one of the asylum reception centers located within Serbia, where, in a second step, their asylum requests were to be examined in line with the idea of implementing a functioning asylum system according to EU standards. However, in practice, these papers were used as short-term visas for transiting through North Macedonia and Serbia that were handed out to hundreds of thousands of migrants (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 17–19, 36).

    Furthermore, the introduction of migration control practices is often a means for achieving other political and economic goals. In the accessing states, migration management is seen as services they provide for the EU. In addition, demands created by migration management goals open new possibilities for employment, which are essential to societies with high unemployment rates.

    Besides direct economic benefits, migration has been confirmed to be a politically potent instrument. States and their institutions were more firmly integrated into existing EU structures, especially those related to the prevention of unwanted migration, such as increased police cooperation and Frontex agreements. On a local level, political leaders have increasingly been using migration-related narratives in everyday political life in order to confront the state or other political competitors, often through the use of Ethno-nationalist and related discourses. In recent times, as citizens of the states along the Balkan route themselves migrate in search for jobs and less precarious lives, migration from third states has been discursively linked to the fear of foreigners permanently settling in places at the expense of natives.
    Contemporary Context

    According to a growing body of literature (e.g. Hess/Kasparek 2020; Lunaček Brumen/Meh 2016; Speer 2017), the Balkan route of the year 2015 and the first months of 2016 can be conceptualized in phases, beginning with a clandestine phase, evolving to an open route and formalized corridor and back to an invisible route again. It is necessary to point to the fact that these different phases were not merely the result of state or EU-led top-down approaches, but the consequence of a »dynamic process which resulted from the interplay of state practices, practices of mobility, activities of activists, volunteers, and NGOs, media coverage, etc. The same applies for its closure« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 6).

    The closure of the corridor and stricter border controls resulted in a large transformation of the Balkan route and mobility practices in the recent years, when push-backs from deep within the EU-territory to neighboring non-EU states, erratic movements across borders and territories of the (Western) Balkan states, or desperate journeys back to Greece and then back to the north became everyday realities. In the same period, the route proliferated into more branches, especially a new one via Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proliferation lead to a heightened circulation of practices, people, and knowledge along these paths: a mushrooming of so-called ›jungle camps‹ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an escalation of border violence in Croatia, chain push-backs from Slovenia, significant EU financial investments into border control in Croatia and camp infrastructures in neighboring countries, the deployment of Frontex in Albania, etc. As the actual itineraries of people on the move multiplied, people started to reach previously indiscernible spots, resulting in blurring of the differences between entering and exiting borders. Circular transit with many loops, involving moving forward and backwards, became the dominant form of migration movements in the region. It transformed the Balkan route into a »Balkan Circuit« (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 540; see also Stojić Mitrović/Ahmetašević/Beznec/Kurnik 2020). The topography changed from a unidirectional line to a network of hubs, accommodation, and socializing spots. In this landscape, some movements still remain invisible—undetected by actors aiming to support, contain, and even prevent migration. »We have no information about persons who have money to pay for the whole package, transfer, accommodation, food, medical assistance when needed, we have no idea how many of them just went further«, a former MSF employee stressed, »we only see those who reach for aid, who are poor or injured and therefore cannot immediately continue their journey.« Some movements are intentionally invisibilized by support groups in order to avoid unwanted attention, and, consequently, repressive measures have also become a common development in border areas where people on the move are waiting for their chance to cross. However, it seems that circular transnational migration of human beings, resulting directly from the securitarian practices of the European border regime, have also become a usual form of mobility in the region.

    The Balkan route as a whole has been increasingly made invisible to spectators from the EU in the last years. There were no mass media coverage, except for reports on deplorable conditions in certain hubs, such as Belgrade barracks (Serbia), Vučjak camp (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or violent push-backs from Croatia that received global and EU-wide attention. However, this spectacularization was rarely directly attributed to the externalization of border control but rather more readily linked to an presumed inability of the Balkan states to manage migration, or to manage it without the blatant use of violence.

    As Marta Stojić Mitrović and Ana Vilenica (2019) point out, practices, discourses, knowledge, concepts, technologies, even particular narratives, organizations, and individual professionals are following the changed topography. This is evident both in the securitarian and in the humanitarian sector: Frontex is signing or initiating cooperation agreements with non-EU member Balkan states, border guards learn from each other how to prevent movements or how to use new equipment, obscure Orbanist legislative changes and institutionalized practices are becoming mainstream, regional coordinators of humanitarian organizations transplant the same ›best practices‹ how to work with migrants, how to organize their accommodation, what aid to bring and when, and how to ›deal‹ with the local communities in different nation-states, while the emergency framework travels from one space to another. Solidarity groups are networking, exchanging knowledge and practices but simultaneously face an increased criminalization of their activities. The public opinion in different nation states is shaped by the same dominant discourses on migration, far-right groups are building international cooperations and exploit the same narratives that frame migrants and migration as dangerous.
    About the Issue

    This issue of movements highlights the current situation of migration struggles along this fragmented, circular, and precarious route and examines the diverse attempts by the EU, transnational institutions, countries in the region, local and interregional structures, and multiple humanitarian actors to regain control over the movements of migration after the official closure of the humanitarian-securitarian corridor in 2016. It reflects on the highly dynamic and conflicting developments since 2015 and their historical entanglements, the ambiguities of humanitarian interventions and strategies of containment, migratory tactics of survival, local struggles, artistic interventions, regional and transnational activism, and recent initiatives to curb the extensive practices of border violence and push-backs. In doing so, the issue brings back the region on the European agenda and sheds light on the multiple historical disruptions, bordering practices, and connectivities that have been forming its presence.

    EU migration policy is reaffirming old and producing new material borders: from border fences to document checks—conducted both by state authorities and increasingly the general population, like taxi drivers or hostel owners—free movement is put in question for all, and unwanted movements of migrants are openly violently prevented. Violence and repression toward migrants are not only normalized but also further legalized through transformations of national legislation, while migrant solidarity initiatives and even unintentional facilitations of movement or stay (performed by carriers, accommodation providers, and ordinary citizens) are increasingly at risk of being criminalized.

    In line with this present state, only briefly tackled here, a number of contributions gathered in this issue challenge normative perceptions of the restrictive European border regime and engage in the critical analysis of its key mechanisms, symbolic pillars, and infrastructures by framing them as complex and depending on context. Furthermore, some of them strive to find creative ways to circumvent the dominance of linear or even verbal explication and indulge in narrative fragments, interviews, maps, and graphs. All contributions are focused and space- or even person-specific. They are based on extensive research, activist, volunteer or other involvement, and they are reflexive and critical towards predominant perspectives and views.

    Artist and activist Selma Banich, in her contribution entitled »Shining«, named after one of her artistic intervention performed in a Zagreb neighborhood, assembles notes and reflections on her ongoing series of site-specific interventions in Zagreb made of heat sheet (hallmarks of migrants’ rescue boats and the shores of Europe) and her personal notes in which she engages with her encounters with three persons on the move or, rather, on the run from the European border control regime. Her contribution, formulated as a series of fragments of two parallel lines, which on the surface seem loosely, but in fact deeply, connected, speaks of the power of ambivalence and of the complexities of struggles that take place everyday on the fringes of the EU. Andrea Contenta visualizes and analyzes camps that have been mushrooming in Serbia in the recent years with a series of maps and graphs. The author’s detailed analysis—based on a critical use of available, often conflicting, data—shows how Serbia has kept thousands of people outside of the western EU territory following a European strategy of containment. Contenta concludes his contribution with a clear call, stating: »It is not only a theoretical issue anymore; containment camps are all around us, and we cannot just continue to write about it.« Serbia, and Belgrade in particular, is of central importance for transmigration through the Balkans. On a micro-level, the maps of Paul Knopf, Miriam Neßler and Cosima Zita Seichter visualize the so-called Refugee District in Belgrade and shed light on the transformation of urban space by transit migration. On a macro-level, their contribution illustrates the importance of Serbia as a central hub for migrant mobility in the Balkans as well as for the externalization of the European border regime in the region. The collective efforts to support the struggle of the people on the move—by witnessing, documenting, and denouncing push-backs—are presented by the Push-Back Map Collective’s self-reflection. In their contribution to this issue, the Push-Back Map Collective ask themselves questions or start a dialogue among themselves in order to reflect and evaluate the Push-Back map (www.pushbackmap.org) they launched and maintain. They also investigate the potentials of political organizing that is based on making an invisible structure visible. The activist collective Info Kolpa from Ljubljana gives an account of push-backs conducted by the Slovenian police and describes initiatives to oppose what they deem as systemic violence of police against people on the move and violent attempts to close the borders. The text contributes to understanding the role of extralegal police practices in restoring the European border regime and highlights the ingenuity of collectives that oppose it. Patricia Artimova’s contribution entitled »A Volunteer’s Diary« could be described as a collage of diverse personal notes of the author and others in order to present the complexity of the Serbian and Bosnian context. The genre of diary notes allows the author to demonstrate the diachronic line presented in the volunteers’ personal engagements and in the gradual developments occurring in different sites and states along the route within a four-year period. She also traces the effects of her support for people on the move on her social relations at home. Emina Bužinkić focuses on the arrest, detention, and deportation of a non-EU national done by Croatia to show the implications of current securitization practices on the everyday lives and life projects of migrants and refugees. Based on different sources (oral histories, official documentation, personal history, etc.), her intervention calls for direct political action and affirms a new genre one could provisionally call ›a biography of a deportation‹. In her »Notes from the Field« Azra Hromadžić focuses on multiple encounters between the locals of Bihać, a city located in the northwestern corner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people on the move who stop there while trying to cross into Croatia and the EU. Some of the sections and vignettes of her field notes are written as entries describing a particular day, while others are more anthropological and analytical reflections. Her focus lies on the local people’s perspectives, the dynamics of their daily encounters with migrants and alleged contradictions, philigram distinctions, as well as experiences of refugeeness that create unique relationships between people and histories in Bihać. Karolína Augustová and Jack Sapoch, activists of the grassroots organization No Name Kitchen and members of the Border Violence Monitoring Network, offer a systematized account of violence towards people on the move with their research report. The condensed analysis of violent practices, places, victims, and perpetrators of the increasingly securitized EU border apparatus is based on interviews conducted with people on the move in border areas with Croatia, Šid (Serbia) and Velika Kladuša (BiH). They identify a whole range of violence that people on the move are facing, which often remains ignored or underestimated, and thus condoned, in local national settings as well as on the EU and global level. They conclude that border violence against people on the move cannot be interpreted as mere aggression emanating from individuals or groups of the police but is embedded in the states’ structures.

    We also gathered scientific papers discussing and analyzing different aspects of the corridor and the years thereafter. In their article, Andrej Kurnik and Barbara Beznec focus on assemblages of mobility, which are composed of practices of migrants and local agencies that strive to escape what the authors call ›the sovereign imperative‹. In their analysis of different events and practices since 2015, they demonstrate how migratory movements reveal the hidden subalternized local forms of escape and invigorate the dormant critique of coloniality in the geopolitical locations along the Balkan route. In their concluding remarks, the authors ask to confront the decades-long investments into repressive and exclusionary EU migration policies and point to the political potential of migration as an agent of decolonization. The authors stress that post-Yugoslav European borderland that has been a laboratory of Europeanization for the last thirty years, a site of a ›civilizing‹ mission that systematically diminishes forms of being in common based on diversity and alterity is placed under scrutiny again. Romana Pozniak explores the ethnography of aid work, giving special attention to dynamics between emotional and rational dimensions. Based primarily on interviews conducted with humanitarians employed during the mass refugee transit through the Balkan corridor, she analyzes, historizes, and contextualizes their experiences in terms of affective labor. The author defines affective labor as efforts invested in reflecting on morally, emotionally, and mentally unsettling affects. She deals with local employment measures and how they had an impact on employed workers. Pozniak discusses the figure of the compassionate aid professional by it in a specific historical context of the Balkan corridor and by including personal narrations about it. The article of Robert Rydzewski focuses on the situation in Serbia after the final closure of the formalized corridor in March 2016. Rydzewski argues that extensive and multidirectional migrant movements on the doorstep of the EU are an expression of hope to bring a ›stuckedness‹ to an end. In his analysis, he juxtaposes the representations of migrant movements as linear with migrant narratives and their persistent unilinear movement despite militarized external European Union borders, push-backs, and violence of border guards. Rydzewsky approaches the structural and institutional imposition of waiting with the following questions: What does interstate movement mean for migrants? Why do migrants reject state protection offered by government facilities in favor of traveling around the country? In her article, Céline Cantat focuses on the Serbian capital Belgrade and how ›solidarities in transit‹ or the heterogeneous community of actors supporting people on the move emerged and dissolved in the country in 2015/2016. She analyzes the gradual marginalization of migrant presence and migration solidarity in Belgrade as an outcome of imposing of an institutionalized, official, camp-based, and heavily regulated refugee aid field. This field regulates the access not only to camps per se, but also to fundings for activities by independent groups or civil sector organizations. Teodora Jovanović, by using something she calls ›autoethnography of participation‹, offers a meticulous case study of Miksalište, a distribution hub in Belgrade established in 2015, which she joined as a volunteer in 2016. The transformation of this single institution is examined by elaborating on the transformation within the political and social contexts in Serbia and its capital, Belgrade, regarding migration policies and humanitarian assistance. She identifies three, at times intertwined, modes of response to migration that have shaped the development of the Miksalište center in corresponding stages: voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization. She connects the beginning and end of each stage of organizing work in Miksalište by investigating the actors, roles, activities, and manners in which these activities are conducted in relation to broader changes within migration management and funding.

    Finishing this editorial in the aftermath of brutal clashes at the borders of Turkey and Greece and in the wake of the global pandemic of COVID-19—isolated in our homes, some of us even under curfew—we experience an escalation and normalization of restrictions, not only of movement but also of almost every aspect of social and political life. We perceive a militarization, which pervades public spaces and discourses, the introduction of new and the reinforcement of old borders, in particular along the line of EU external borders, a heightened immobilization of people on the move, their intentional neglect in squats and ›jungles‹ or their forceful encampment in deplorable, often unsanitary, conditions, where they are faced with food reductions, violence of every kind, and harrowing isolation. At the same time, we witness an increase of anti-migrant narratives not only spreading across obscure social networks but also among high ranked officials. Nonetheless, we get glimpses of resistance and struggles happening every day inside and outside the camps. Videos of protests and photos of violence that manage to reach us from the strictly closed camps, together with testimonies and outcries, are fragments of migrant agency that exist despite overwhelming repression.

    https://movements-journal.org/issues/08.balkanroute
    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #revue #humanitarisme #espoir #attente #mobilité #Belgrade #Serbie #solidarité #Miksaliste #Bihac #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #encampement #corridor #cartographie #visualisation

  • Introduction. Pour une lecture territoriale des #corridors de #transport en Europe — Géoconfluences

    http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/dossiers-regionaux/territoires-europeens-regions-etats-union/rte-t/introduction

    Les Réseaux transeuropéens de transport (RTE-T) reposent sur l’idée que l’intégration européenne ne peut se faire qu’avec des liaisons efficaces entre les pays membres. Derrière cette apparente évidence se cache une très grande complexité pour connecter entre elles les infrastructures nationales et faire coopérer les acteurs et les opérateurs à toutes les échelles. C’est cette difficulté que notre dossier se propose d’éclairer.

    Mobilité #communications #routes #voies_ferrées

  • Refugee protection at risk

    Two of the words that we should try to avoid when writing about refugees are “unprecedented” and “crisis.” They are used far too often and with far too little thought by many people working in the humanitarian sector. Even so, and without using those words, there is evidence to suggest that the risks confronting refugees are perhaps greater today than at any other time in the past three decades.

    First, as the UN Secretary-General has pointed out on many occasions, we are currently witnessing a failure of global governance. When Antonio Guterres took office in 2017, he promised to launch what he called “a surge in diplomacy for peace.” But over the past three years, the UN Security Council has become increasingly dysfunctional and deadlocked, and as a result is unable to play its intended role of preventing the armed conflicts that force people to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Nor can the Security Council bring such conflicts to an end, thereby allowing refugees to return to their country of origin.

    It is alarming to note, for example, that four of the five Permanent Members of that body, which has a mandate to uphold international peace and security, have been militarily involved in the Syrian armed conflict, a war that has displaced more people than any other in recent years. Similarly, and largely as a result of the blocking tactics employed by Russia and the US, the Secretary-General struggled to get Security Council backing for a global ceasefire that would support the international community’s efforts to fight the Coronavirus pandemic

    Second, the humanitarian principles that are supposed to regulate the behavior of states and other parties to armed conflicts, thereby minimizing the harm done to civilian populations, are under attack from a variety of different actors. In countries such as Burkina Faso, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia, those principles have been flouted by extremist groups who make deliberate use of death and destruction to displace populations and extend the areas under their control.

    In states such as Myanmar and Syria, the armed forces have acted without any kind of constraint, persecuting and expelling anyone who is deemed to be insufficiently loyal to the regime or who come from an unwanted part of society. And in Central America, violent gangs and ruthless cartels are acting with growing impunity, making life so hazardous for other citizens that they feel obliged to move and look for safety elsewhere.

    Third, there is mounting evidence to suggest that governments are prepared to disregard international refugee law and have a respect a declining commitment to the principle of asylum. It is now common practice for states to refuse entry to refugees, whether by building new walls, deploying military and militia forces, or intercepting and returning asylum seekers who are travelling by sea.

    In the Global North, the refugee policies of the industrialized increasingly take the form of ‘externalization’, whereby the task of obstructing the movement of refugees is outsourced to transit states in the Global South. The EU has been especially active in the use of this strategy, forging dodgy deals with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan and Turkey. Similarly, the US has increasingly sought to contain northward-bound refugees in Mexico, and to return asylum seekers there should they succeed in reaching America’s southern border.

    In developing countries themselves, where some 85 per cent of the world’s refugees are to be found, governments are increasingly prepared to flout the principle that refugee repatriation should only take place in a voluntary manner. While they rarely use overt force to induce premature returns, they have many other tools at their disposal: confining refugees to inhospitable camps, limiting the food that they receive, denying them access to the internet, and placing restrictions on humanitarian organizations that are trying to meet their needs.

    Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic of the past nine months constitutes a very direct threat to the lives of refugees, and at the same time seems certain to divert scarce resources from other humanitarian programmes, including those that support displaced people. The Coronavirus has also provided a very convenient alibi for governments that wish to close their borders to people who are seeking safety on their territory.

    Responding to this problem, UNHCR has provided governments with recommendations as to how they might uphold the principle of asylum while managing their borders effectively and minimizing any health risks associated with the cross-border movement of people. But it does not seem likely that states will be ready to adopt such an approach, and will prefer instead to introduce more restrictive refugee and migration policies.

    Even if the virus is brought under some kind of control, it may prove difficult to convince states to remove the restrictions that they have introduced during the COVD-19 emergency. And the likelihood of that outcome is reinforced by the fear that the climate crisis will in the years to come prompt very large numbers of people to look for a future beyond the borders of their own state.

    Fifth, the state-based international refugee regime does not appear well placed to resist these negative trends. At the broadest level, the very notions of multilateralism, international cooperation and the rule of law are being challenged by a variety of powerful states in different parts of the world: Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and the USA, to name just five. Such countries also share a common disdain for human rights and the protection of minorities – indigenous people, Uyghur Muslims, members of the LGBT community, the Kurds and African-Americans respectively.

    The USA, which has traditionally acted as a mainstay of the international refugee regime, has in recent years set a particularly negative example to the rest of the world by slashing its refugee resettlement quota, by making it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to claim refugee status on American territory, by entirely defunding the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency and by refusing to endorse the Global Compact on Refugees. Indeed, while many commentators predicted that the election of President Trump would not be good news for refugees, the speed at which he has dismantled America’s commitment to the refugee regime has taken many by surprise.

    In this toxic international environment, UNHCR appears to have become an increasingly self-protective organization, as indicated by the enormous amount of effort it devotes to marketing, branding and celebrity endorsement. For reasons that remain somewhat unclear, rather than stressing its internationally recognized mandate for refugee protection and solutions, UNHCR increasingly presents itself as an all-purpose humanitarian agency, delivering emergency assistance to many different groups of needy people, both outside and within their own country. Perhaps this relief-oriented approach is thought to win the favour of the organization’s key donors, an impression reinforced by the cautious tone of the advocacy that UNHCR undertakes in relation to the restrictive asylum policies of the EU and USA.

    UNHCR has, to its credit, made a concerted effort to revitalize the international refugee regime, most notably through the Global Compact on Refugees, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and the Global Refugee Forum. But will these initiatives really have the ‘game-changing’ impact that UNHCR has prematurely attributed to them?

    The Global Compact on Refugees, for example, has a number of important limitations. It is non-binding and does not impose any specific obligations on the countries that have endorsed it, especially in the domain of responsibility-sharing. The Compact makes numerous references to the need for long-term and developmental approaches to the refugee problem that also bring benefits to host states and communities. But it is much more reticent on fundamental protection principles such as the right to seek asylum and the notion of non-refoulement. The Compact also makes hardly any reference to the issue of internal displacement, despite the fact that there are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees under UNHCR’s mandate.

    So far, the picture painted by this article has been unremittingly bleak. But just as one can identify five very negative trends in relation to refugee protection, a similar number of positive developments also warrant recognition.

    First, the refugee policies pursued by states are not uniformly bad. Countries such as Canada, Germany and Uganda, for example, have all contributed, in their own way, to the task of providing refugees with the security that they need and the rights to which they are entitled. In their initial stages at least, the countries of South America and the Middle East responded very generously to the massive movements of refugees out of Venezuela and Syria.

    And while some analysts, including the current author, have felt that there was a very real risk of large-scale refugee expulsions from countries such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Lebanon, those fears have so far proved to be unfounded. While there is certainly a need for abusive states to be named and shamed, recognition should also be given to those that seek to uphold the principles of refugee protection.

    Second, the humanitarian response to refugee situations has become steadily more effective and equitable. Twenty years ago, it was the norm for refugees to be confined to camps, dependent on the distribution of food and other emergency relief items and unable to establish their own livelihoods. Today, it is far more common for refugees to be found in cities, towns or informal settlements, earning their own living and/or receiving support in the more useful, dignified and efficient form of cash transfers. Much greater attention is now given to the issues of age, gender and diversity in refugee contexts, and there is a growing recognition of the role that locally-based and refugee-led organizations can play in humanitarian programmes.

    Third, after decades of discussion, recent years have witnessed a much greater engagement with refugee and displacement issues by development and financial actors, especially the World Bank. While there are certainly some risks associated with this engagement (namely a lack of attention to protection issues and an excessive focus on market-led solutions) a more developmental approach promises to allow better long-term planning for refugee populations, while also addressing more systematically the needs of host populations.

    Fourth, there has been a surge of civil society interest in the refugee issue, compensating to some extent for the failings of states and the large international humanitarian agencies. Volunteer groups, for example, have played a critical role in responding to the refugee situation in the Mediterranean. The Refugees Welcome movement, a largely spontaneous and unstructured phenomenon, has captured the attention and allegiance of many people, especially but not exclusively the younger generation.

    And as has been seen in the UK this year, when governments attempt to demonize refugees, question their need for protection and violate their rights, there are many concerned citizens, community associations, solidarity groups and faith-based organizations that are ready to make their voice heard. Indeed, while the national asylum policies pursued by the UK and other countries have been deeply disappointing, local activism on behalf of refugees has never been stronger.

    Finally, recent events in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe have raised the question as to whether refugees could be spared the trauma and hardship of making dangerous journeys from one country and continent to another by providing them with safe and legal routes. These might include initiatives such as Canada’s community-sponsored refugee resettlement programme, the ‘humanitarian corridors’ programme established by the Italian churches, family reunion projects of the type championed in the UK and France by Lord Alf Dubs, and the notion of labour mobility programmes for skilled refugee such as that promoted by the NGO Talent Beyond Boundaries.

    Such initiatives do not provide a panacea to the refugee issue, and in their early stages at least, might not provide a solution for large numbers of displaced people. But in a world where refugee protection is at such serious risk, they deserve our full support.

    http://www.against-inhumanity.org/2020/09/08/refugee-protection-at-risk

    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #protection #Jeff_Crisp #crise #crise_migratoire #crise_des_réfugiés #gouvernance #gouvernance_globale #paix #Nations_unies #ONU #conflits #guerres #conseil_de_sécurité #principes_humanitaires #géopolitique #externalisation #sanctuarisation #rapatriement #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #droits_humains #Global_Compact_on_Refugees #Comprehensive_Refugee_Response_Framework #Global_Refugee_Forum #camps_de_réfugiés #urban_refugees #réfugiés_urbains #banque_mondiale #société_civile #refugees_welcome #solidarité #voies_légales #corridors_humanitaires #Talent_Beyond_Boundaries #Alf_Dubs

    via @isskein
    ping @karine4 @thomas_lacroix @_kg_ @rhoumour

    –—
    Ajouté à la métaliste sur le global compact :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/739556

  • Coronavirus : la peur de la deuxième vague de contaminations relance la question des frontières européennes
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/08/01/coronavirus-la-peur-de-la-deuxieme-vague-de-contaminations-relance-la-questi

    En Espagne, les autorités continuent pourtant de clamer haut et fort que le pays reste une destination touristique sûre. Le gouvernement négocie toujours avec Londres la mise en place de « corridors sanitaires » pour les archipels des Baléares et des Canaries, relativement épargnés par la pandémie. Très prisées des Britanniques, ces îles ont « un niveau de contagion bien inférieur aux données épidémiologiques du Royaume-Uni », a déclaré la ministre espagnole des affaires étrangères, Arancha Gonzalez Laya.Le pays n’impose, en tout cas, aucune restriction de voyage vers d’autres pays européens mais il pourrait changer d’avis. Après des avertissements lancés par la France, la quarantaine imposée par le Royaume-Uni et la décision de l’Allemagne, Mme Gonzalez Laya a indiqué, jeudi, que Madrid pourrait changer ses recommandations de voyage « vers les régions d’Europe où il faut être plus prudent ». La Belgique impose, elle, un test et une quarantaine à ses ressortissants qui ont séjourné dans les provinces de Lleida, en Catalogne, et de Huesca, en Aragon. Ce sont avec Leicester, au Royaume-Uni, les seules zones actuellement visées par les autorités du royaume. Les touristes belges rentrant d’autres régions d’Europe – dont les Pays-de-Loire et l’Ile-de-France – se voient conseiller – mais pas obliger – d’effectuer un test et de se mettre en quarantaine.

    #Covid-19#migration#migrant#UE#espaceschengen#corridorsanitaire#tourisme#ressortissant#quarantaine#sante

  • Portfolio : de l’Ethiopie au Yémen, sur la « route des larmes »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/07/17/portfolio-de-l-ethiopie-au-yemen-sur-la-route-des-larmes_6046507_3212.html

    Arrivés d’Ethiopie, des centaines d’hommes et de femmes traversent à pied la frontière de Djibouti pour gagner la côte. Ils avancent, certains en tongs, en bermuda, dans ce désert de roches brûlantes. Ceux qui survivent atteignent le golfe d’Aden. Ils s’y embarquent à bord de boutres jusqu’à Ras Al-Arah, sur la côte sud du Yémen.Les candidats au monde meilleur passent sur l’autre rive, changent de continent. Certains vont être enlevés, torturés, rançonnés. De cette traversée de l’enfer, les deux journalistes ont rapporté un documentaire rare, d’une tristesse qui prend à la gorge (Yémen : à marche forcée, 2019, disponible en replay sur Arte). Lorsque ce travail a été réalisé, plus de 20 000 personnes passaient chaque mois, sans aide extérieure, sans organisations humanitaires ni témoins. Désormais, la « route de la mort » est coupée. Ce que l’épidémie de choléra qui a endeuillé le Yémen ces dernières années (plus de 1 million de cas, 2 000 morts) n’était pas arrivée à faire, le Covid-19 y est parvenu : les passeurs yéménites ont cessé leur activité. Restent, en souffrance, des milliers de ces voyageurs bloqués à Aden, les plus abandonnés des abandonnés.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#yemen#ethopie#djibouti#sante#corridormigratoire#humanitaire

  • 124 Cameroonians Come Home Safely from Niger; Over 6,000 Assisted during Pandemic through European Union Support | International Organization for Migration
    https://www.iom.int/news/124-cameroonians-come-home-safely-niger-over-6000-assisted-during-pandemic-thro
    https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/styles/highlights/public/press_release/media/avrr_cameroon_niger_dsc_0196.jpg?itok=Jpm5PDjc

    In partnership with the Governments of Niger and Cameroon, IOM negotiated the opening of a humanitarian corridor to allow the Cameroonians to return home so they can reunite with their families.
    All the migrants were tested for COVID-19 prior to their departure from Niamey and upon their arrival in Yaoundé. None of them were declared positive by health authorities. The returnees were also given healthcare kits including face masks and hydroalcoholic solutions. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, mobility has continued along dangerous migratory routes, leaving thousands of migrants exposed not only to abuse and exploitation, but also to COVID-19.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#cameroun#niger#retour#corridorhumanitaire#sante#routemigratoire

  • #University_corridors and the role of academia in opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe

    In this blog I discuss the potential contribution of EU universities to opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe. I describe the example of a recent project in Italy called ‘University Corridors for Refugees’ and argue that the expansion and scaling up of this initiative can save lives and partially remedy the inequality of opportunity that many refugees face.

    What can universities do for refugees?

    Since the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015, universities across the EU started various refugee-related initiatives. Many contributed in the conventional way through research on topics like reception and integration. Some developed more practice-oriented solutions and opened their doors to forced migrants. Recognized refugees were given access to full-time study programs and asylum seekers were allowed to enroll in single university courses. In the majority of cases this was accompanied by softening rigorous intake procedures and removing financial barriers. One example here is the Incluusion program of Utrecht University, which in the last years has provided free access to a wide range of courses for hundreds of students with a refugee background. While attempts for large-scale and coordinated cross-national initiatives were not absent, solutions usually emerged bottom-up, driven by the active engagement of university management, academic staff and student communities.

    These attempts, however, have an important limitation – they have been focused on the access to higher education for forced migrants who have already made their journey to the EU. A recent estimation by Amnesty International showed that about 80% of all refugees live in developing regions, while one third of the global refugee population resides in the world’s poorest countries. Even the most brilliant refugee students among these approximately 20 million people face disproportionate and unjustified burdens in their attempts to pursue higher education at EU universities. Rather than limited to lack of finances, as many would correctly suggest, these burdens often involve bureaucratic issues, which eventually deprive refugees from the equality of opportunity they deserve based on their own efforts, knowledge and skills.

    How could EU universities, or at least those who have already demonstrated their commitment to assisting refugees, provide a remedy to this problem? My argument is that they can do so by extending their engagement beyond the EU borders and by opening university corridors for refugee students residing in third countries. Initially, universities can be the protagonists in creating coalitions of local civil society and private sector actors ready to provide material and social support to refugee students who want to continue their education in Europe. Subsequently, they can collaborate with international organizations and national authorities for the removal of bureaucratic obstacles that disproportionately affect refugees.

    The evidence upon which I build my argument comes from a recent initiative called University Corridors for Refugees. It started as a small pilot project at the University of Bologna in 2019, and within just a year expanded to ten other higher education institutions across Italy. In brief, it is a wide partnership between public institutions, civil society and private sector actors that supports refugees to pursue a post-graduate degree in Italy in the following way. Each of the participating universities prepares a call for applications for a range of Master’s programmes for refugees residing in Ethiopia. UNHCR, with the assistance of NGOs, helps disseminate the calls among refugees who have recently graduated at Ethiopian universities and who live either in camps or in urban areas across the country. After a merit-based selection procedure conducted by the host universities, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation issues a study visa to the successful applicants. Once they have arrived on campus, the refugee students are welcomed and supported by a network of local partners. NGOs, regional/local authorities and churches provide study equipment, a public transport subscription, language classes and integration assistance. Universities award a tuition fee waiver and support the beneficiaries of the project with accommodation, while tutors selected among the local students help the newcomers adapt to the new environment. Finally, private sector partners facilitate the access to internships and training programs during their studies, with the potential for permanent employment after graduation. While the University of Bologna has already welcomed its first refugee students arriving through the University Corridors, the rest of the Italian universities participating in the project expect their successful candidates to join them in the following months.

    Opening university corridors for refugees is not a novel idea. In fact, the Student Refugee Program in Canada has been operating for more than 40 years and has helped more than 2000 refugee students pursue higher education in nearly 100 Canadian universities. The Canadian model, however, makes part of the country’s private-sponsorship-program, which means that the arriving refugee students are at the same time permanently resettled. On the contrary, the Italian model described above allows refugees to continue their education in Italy on a study visa. In any case, and especially given the participation of private sector actors in the University Corridors project, it is very likely that the fresh refugee graduates will be able to transfer their visas into work permits and therefore remain in the country after their studies. In this way, the participating universities de facto contribute to opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe.
    The birth of University Corridors for Refugees

    Why is the University Corridors for Refugees project so important and why should it be expanded and scaled up? My answer here is twofold. Firstly, because university corridors can potentially save lives. Secondly, because they can also, at least partially, remedy the inequality of opportunity that even the most devoted, hardworking and gifted refugee students face. The best way to demonstrate the added value of opening more university corridors to Europe is by sharing the little-known story behind the birth of the project in Italy.

    In 2004, a young Italian PhD student named Stefania visited Ethiopia for a course in tropical medicine. One day, while traveling to the Blue Nile Falls, she met a twelve year old local Ethiopian boy, who eventually helped her cross the river. The two exchanged contacts and stayed in touch, while the family of Stefania decided to start sponsoring the education of the boy. This helped him complete high school and then enroll into a graduate program at the University of Addis Ababa.

    At the university the Ethiopian boy met his two best friends. Both of them were refugees, who had recently fled the dictatorship in nearby Eritrea in quest for realizing their dream – to study journalism. Ethiopia’s open policy towards refugees allowed the two young men to follow courses along with their new Ethiopian friend. All three of them excelled in their studies and graduated together in 2014.

    By that time, the young Italian PhD student had become an assistant professor at the University of Bologna. With her support, her Ethiopian friend prepared his documents and applied for a Master’s programme at the same institution. Eventually, he got accepted. Despite all bureaucratic obstacles faced, he received his study visa and arrived on time for the start of the semester. Exactly ten years after the boy had helped Stefania cross the Blue Nile, she returned the favor by helping him to safely and legally cross the Mediterranean and continue his education.

    His two Eritrean refugee friends, however, were not so fortunate. They did not lag behind in terms of knowledge or skills and they were perfectly qualified for enrolling into a post-graduate program at an Italian university too. What they lacked was a valid passport. The only travel document they could obtain by the Ethiopian authorities was the Geneva passport, which is issued to recognized refugees. However, the Italian authorities repeatedly refused granting them study visas in these circumstances. It should be noted, that the Geneva passport is a valid travel document issued by all countries that have signed the Refugee Convention. In theory, therefore, there is no legal obstacle preventing refugees who have such passports to apply for and eventually obtain a visa to travel to Europe. After a long period of negotiations and with the immense efforts of Stefania and the intervention of UNHCR, one of the two Eritrean refugees was issued a study visa and flew to Italy where he started his Masters. By that time, the other refugee graduate had already chosen to take an alternative journey. He had already moved to Sudan on his way to Libya and then Italy. Fortunately, and again with the assistance of UNHCR, the Italian embassy in Khartoum provided him the necessary study visa and in September 2016 he arrived in Bologna. Following the steps of his two friends he obtained a merit-based scholarship, passed all his exams and graduated exactly two years later.

    In the meanwhile, the persistence and personal engagement of Stefania had created the foundations of a wide network that supported the two Eritrean refugee students all the way from Ethiopia to their graduation at the University of Bologna. Local NGOs and individuals provided financial, material and social support. A crowdfunding campaign and a small concert helped cover the tuition fees. UNHCR, as already noted, took care of the legal issues and the communication with the Italian authorities.

    Inspired by the positive experience, the university management decided to build upon this personal initiative and launched the UNI-CO-RE (University Corridors for Refugees) pilot project. The already existing partnership was further expanded and strengthened. The Catholic church and an international NGO supported the selected students during the preparation of their documents in Ethiopia, covering also the cost of their flight to Italy. The University of Bologna provided full tuition fee waivers and scholarships (again with the support of the Catholic church), while the Regional Agency for the Right to Higher Education in Emilia-Romagna offered accommodation in a student house. Local civil society organizations took over the integration of the beneficiaries, providing also psychological support. In addition, two associations of managers operating in the industrial, trade and service sectors agreed to provide internships and eventually employment to prospective refugee students. Ultimately, after a selection procedure with merit-based criteria, five more Eritrean refugees arrived in 2019 in Bologna to pursue their Master’s degrees in Engineering and Economics, while one more joined LUISS University in Rome. Few months later, with the support of UNHCR and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation the project was extended to 10 more universities and 20 new refugee students are expected to arrive in Italy in the autumn semester of 2020.
    No need to passively wait

    Returning to the question on the importance of expanding the university corridors, one can now ask what would have happened if Stefania’s efforts had not resulted in removing the barriers that the two refugee students faced in their attempts to continue their education in Europe? It would be a speculation to claim that the Eritrean refugee who had started his journey to Libya would end up in the depths of the sea. It is a fact though that since 2014 more than 20,000 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean. Some probably remember the boy from Mali, who drowned on April 18, 2015 with his school report card sewn into his pocket. His story became widely known when an Italian newspaper published a cartoon depicting the boy under water, showing his report to fish and mollusks who replied “Wow…All tens! What a rare pearl!”. Few years after his death five schools in Rome put stumbling stones in memory of the boy stating “To the young man from Mali, who died with a report card on his heart. This school would have welcomed him and other people who drowned while trying to cross the sea." Schools in other Italian cities also developed similar initiatives.

    As I have argued above, some solutions already exist and there is no need to passively wait for similar unnecessary tragedies to occur. Universities across Europe have a unique chance to provide at least a partial remedy to the problem, by opening university corridors for refugees. They can demonstrate their leadership, unite efforts with local civil society, private sector partners and international organizations, and work together towards the removal of the various barriers depriving refugee students from equal opportunities. Importantly, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation eventually recognized the added value of university corridors and became one of the leading partners in the project. This shows that national authorities can be responsive to bottom-up solutions that improve migration governance in general and facilitate safe and legal pathways to Europe in particular. In the same way in which the persistence of a single person gave birth to the university corridors in Italy, the protagonism of European universities can help expand the initiative and build new bridges for refugee students that will provide them the chance to access higher education.

    https://www.uu.nl/en/opinion/blog-university-corridors-and-the-role-of-academia-in-opening-safe-and-legal-path

    #université #réfugiés #asile #migrations #solidarité #voies_légales #corridors

    Ajouté à cette métaliste générale sur les villes-refuge:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145#message766829