country:jordan

Israel is ignoring the neighborly hand extended by Iran
By Zvi Bar’el
Haaretz, Sep. 10, 2013
▻http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.546058

The only country in Syria’s neighborhood that has not put its military on war alert is Iran. While the armies of Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and, of course, Israel are flexing their muscles and moving troops and chemical warfare teams toward the Syrian border, Iran gives the impression that the threatened attack on Syria does not concern it militarily. True, Iran is not a country under threat, at least not at this stage, but it is also not at all sure that Syrian President Bashar Assad can continue to protect Iran’s national interests and its position in the region.

There are increasing numbers of public pronouncements along the lines of, “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” as Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reportedly said last week in an interview with the Aseman Weekly. According to another report, Ala Al-Din Boroujerdi, the chairman of Iran’s Parliamentary Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, made it clear to Assad that “Iran has not made a deal with the West to overthrow Assad, but will also not take part in the military campaign to defend him.”

The Iranian professor and commentator Sadegh Zibakalam, who writes for the reformist paper Etemaad, presented the dilemma concerning Syria from a new and original point of view. If Syria is attacked by the West, he wrote, relations between Syria’s allies and the West will be so cold and dark that the new Iranian president, Hassan Rohani, will have no chance of reducing tensions and improving relations with the West. In such conditions, Rohani would find himself sitting alongside military officers, while detente with the West will not only be be off the agenda, but Rohan imay find himself removed from office, wrote Zibakalam. 

Mohammad Ali Subhani wrote in Bihar that the Iranian government has the responsibility to first take care of the Iranian people and fulfill its promises and commitments to its own citizens. Therefore, it should not stray from ite moderate policy and should not let events in Syria influence its internal affairs.

And when Iranian Defense Minister Gen. Hossein Dehghan states there is no need to send troops or arms to Syria, and Iran did not intend to do so since Syria does not need aid, it is possible to conclude that, instead of the previous narrative, in which an attack on Syria would be seen as an attack on Iran, a new narrative is developing: Syria is now a burden.

The election of Hassan Rohani as president had a clear, major and agreed-upon objective: To end the sanctions on Iran, so it could return to full economic activity without giving up its own "interests.” Included in the phrase “interests” is the ability to continue to develop its nuclear technology. On the face of things, these are two contradictory principles, but Rohani is striving to resolve the contradiction through renewed diplomacy - a new sort of dialogue with the West, based on a new and calming vocabulary that includes recognizing the fact of the Holocaust, New Year’s greetings to the Jews, reopening the activity of the British Embassy in Tehran and entrusting nuclear negotations to the foreign ministry and its new leader Zarif, instead of the Supreme National Security Council.

These changes are viewed in the West as cosmetic, and the West demands proof of Iran’s intentions. But even cosmetics can be strategic, especially when they have the backing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The first important international public test for Rohani will come this month, when he makes his first speech in the United Nations General Assembly; a speech, in which the world expects to hear how Iran intends to give practical expression to the new winds blowing from its direction. Rohani is not expected to announce an Iranian intention to freeze uranium enrichment in its nuclear facilities or to halt the development of nuclear technology. But an announcement of “full transparency” - including, among other things, UN inspection of the Parchin facility and other sites that have been barred to inspection until now - will be more than just a signal of a strategic change in Iran’s policies.

So far, the statements of Rohani and his senior officials give no indication of practical plans to freeze or reduce uranium enrichment; even less so the range of concessions that Khamenei will allow Rohani to make. Nonetheless, the absence of the aggressive declarations that characterized former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad - such as “Iran will never give up its right to enrich uranium” - and the discussions that Zarif is holding with EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton on setting an early date for a meeting of the P-5 Plus 1 group, could be a clear sign of more than just “cosmetic diplomacy.”

This change is waiting for a response from the West. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Shimon Peres did not bother to respond to the Rosh Hashanah greetings from the Iranian president. Instead Netanyahu chose to stick to threats and to disparage Rohani’s gesture. Israel’s fear of losing its justification for an attack on Iran and the fear that the United States may yet “fall into the trap” set by the “smooth language” of the Iranian president is driving it crazy. There is no disagreement that Iran will be judged by its actions and not its words, but even in the existing state of hostility between the two countries, it is not superfluous - and possibly even beneficial - to preserve a certain level of courtesy.

Document confirms World Zionist Organization allocates land to settlers in Jordan valley -
By Chaim Levinson
Haaretz, Sep. 9, 2013
▻http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.545856

An internal Civil Administration document confirms a Haaretz report that the World Zionist Organization has allocated to settlers in the Jordan Valley more than 5,000 dunams (1,235 acres) of private Palestinian land located east of the border fence, namely, between that fence and the actual border with the Kingdom of Jordan.

This area between the border fence and the actual border — the Jordan River — is a closed military zone that in some places is two kilometers wide. A military order prevents the Palestinian owners from accessing their lands in this area. On the other hand, Jewish settlers are allowed to farm the lands.

In January, Haaretz reported that under the aegis of this order, the WZO had allocated to settlers in the Jordan Valley over 5,000 dunams of private Palestinian lands. Following this report, the Civil Administration began to investigate how this situation had come about and how much land had been allocated in this manner.

The documents that have come into the possession of Haaretz indicate that following the June 1967 Six-Day War and after the border fence was completed, Palestinians continued to farm their lands located close to the border. But following a number of incidents in which Palestinian farmers in this area helped infiltrators to cross the border into Israeli-controlled territory, the entire area was declared a military zone. Several Palestinians who owned plots in the area submitted applications requesting permission to farm their lands; however, their requests were denied.

In 1979, the WZO’s Settlement Division submitted a request for the cultivation of these lands “in light of the shortage of farmland in the Jordan Valley, a shortage that is preventing the expansion of existing communities and the establishment of new ones.” During the first government headed by Menachem Begin, the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs authorized the cultivation of state lands or lands belonging to absentee owners.

In the wake of the committee’s decision, the Israel Defense Forces cleared the mines in this area. Plia Albeck, who directed the Civil Department of the State Prosecutor’s Office for 24 years and maintained close ties with rightist circles, issued a number of statements of professional opinion. In light of the statements she issued, the WZO was authorized to allocate some 75,000 dunams (18,750 acres) of land for farming purposes. Senior military officials, including then-GOC Central Command, Major General Amram Mitzna, approved the allocation of land for cultivation on condition that the farmers had served in the army and were permitted to bear firearms, and on condition that Palestinians would not farm the lands in their stead. It should be pointed out here that, despite the peace settlement Israel signed with Jordan in 1994, these guidelines were not reviewed and remain in effect to this day.

The Civil Administration subsequently signed three agreements with the WZO, allocating to the latter organization some 29,000 dunams (7,250 acres) for farming purposes. An examination conducted by the Civil Administration shows that a total of 8,565 dunams (2,116 acres) are cultivated beyond the border fence; of these, 4,765 dunams (1,177 acres) are Palestinian lands, 578 dunams (143 acres) are privately owned and another 3,222 dunams (796 acres) are state lands.

Discussions have recently been held in the Civil Administration and in the office of the coordinator of government activities in the territories on this matter. It is a complex legal issue, because the settlers farming these lands are not trespassers but are persons who were legally allocated the lands by the WZO. On the other hand, the lands also legally belong to their Palestinian owners. The coordinator of government activities in the territories, Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot, has instructed that all Palestinians who request compensation for the lands they cannot farm should be compensated by the Civil Administration.

A Civil Administration official has told Haaretz that the Civil Administration has no intention of initiating any action with regard to this matter. “If someone submits a petition to the Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, requesting that his lands be returned to him, we will have to decide what to do,” the official said.

Syria intervention plans fuelled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concerns | Nafeez Ahmed | Environment | theguardian.com
►http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines

In 2009 - the same year former French foreign minister Dumas alleges the British began planning operations in Syria - Assad refused to sign a proposed agreement with Qatar that would run a pipeline from the latter’s North field, contiguous with Iran’s South Pars field, through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and on to Turkey, with a view to supply European markets - albeit crucially bypassing Russia. Assad’s rationale was “to protect the interests of [his] Russian ally, which is Europe’s top supplier of natural gas.”

Instead, the following year, Assad pursued negotiations for an alternative $10 billion pipeline plan with Iran, across Iraq to Syria, that would also potentially allow Iran to supply gas to Europe from its South Pars field shared with Qatar. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the project was signed in July 2012 - just as Syria’s civil war was spreading to Damascus and Aleppo - and earlier this year Iraq signed a framework agreement for construction of the gas pipelines.

The Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline plan was a “direct slap in the face” to Qatar’s plans. No wonder Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan, in a failed attempt to bribe Russia to switch sides, told President Vladmir Putin that “whatever regime comes after” Assad, it will be “completely” in Saudi Arabia’s hands and will “not sign any agreement allowing any Gulf country to transport its gas across Syria to Europe and compete with Russian gas exports”, according to diplomatic sources. When Putin refused, the Prince vowed military action.

It would seem that contradictory self-serving Saudi and Qatari oil interests are pulling the strings of an equally self-serving oil-focused US policy in Syria, if not the wider region. It is this - the problem of establishing a pliable opposition which the US and its oil allies feel confident will play ball, pipeline-style, in a post-Assad Syria - that will determine the nature of any prospective intervention: not concern for Syrian life.

#Syrie #Russie #Arabie_saoudite #Iran #Europe #Bandar #gazoducs #pipelines

Verify chemical weapons use before unleashing the dogs of war | The Daily Caller
▻http://dailycaller.com/2013/08/29/verify-chemical-weapons-use-before-unleashing-the-dogs-of-war

The Obama administration has selectively used intelligence to justify military strikes on Syria, former military officers with access to the original intelligence reports say, in a manner that goes far beyond what critics charged the Bush administration of doing in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war.

According to these officers, who served in top positions in the United States, Britain, France, Israel, and Jordan, a Syrian military communication intercepted by Israel’s famed Unit 8200 electronic intelligence outfit has been doctored so that it leads a reader to just the opposite conclusion reached by the original report.

[…]

According to the doctored report, the chemical attack was carried out by the 155th Brigade of the 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army, an elite unit commanded by Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother.

However, the original communication intercepted by Unit 8200 between a major in command of the rocket troops assigned to the 155th Brigade of the 4th Armored Division, and the general staff, shows just the opposite.

The general staff officer asked the major if he was responsible for the chemical weapons attack. From the tone of the conversation, it was clear that “the Syrian general staff were out of their minds with panic that an unauthorized strike had been launched by the 155th Brigade in express defiance of their instructions,” the former officers say.

According to the transcript of the original Unit 8200 report, the major “hotly denied firing any of his missiles” and invited the general staff to come and verify that all his weapons were present.

Plus loin:

An Egyptian intelligence report describes a meeting in Turkey between military intelligence officials from Turkey and Qatar and Syrian rebels. One of the participants states, “there will be a game changing event on August 21st” that will “bring the U.S. into a bombing campaign” against the Syrian regime.

The chemical weapons strike on Moudhamiya, an area under rebel control, took place on August 21. “Egyptian military intelligence insists it was a combined Turkish/Qatar/rebel false flag operation,” said a source familiar with the report.

Une nouvelle carte géopolitique arabe ? Pr. K. CHATER - Transversaux
▻http://www.diploweb.com/Geopolitique-arabe-une-nouvelle.html

http://www.diploweb.com/IMG/verluise2.png

Comment lire la nouvelle carte géopolitique du monde arabe ? Le Professeur K. Chater présente les évolutions, les repositionnements, les lignes de démarcation des alliances ... et les questions en suspens.

LE paysage arabe est marqué par le "printemps arabe" et ses effets sur les relations régionales. Les pays du Golfe et en particulier l’Arabie Saoudite craignent la contagion du processus de changement politique et expriment leur méfiance vis-à-vis des nouveaux pouvoirs en Egypte, en Tunisie et en Libye. En revanche, le Qatar, à la recherche d’un rôle international, transgresse les alliances naturelles et perturbe l’ordre au sein du Conseil Golfe et bien au-delà. La Syrie est l’enjeu d’une lutte régionale, qui a ses retombées sur les pays du voisinage : le Liban est désormais l’arrière-scène de cette guerre, alors que la Jordanie et l’autorité palestinienne tentent d’affirmer leur neutralité. L’Irak post-Saddam Hussein relativise ses ambitions. L’Egypte, préoccupée par ses problèmes internes, s’accommode de son nouveau statut qui limite ses marges de manœuvre. Les données objectives s’accommodant du mythe de l’union de l’oumma, la communauté arabe, portée par "la géopolitique de l’émotion" qui marque l’opinion dans cette aire, les dés sont désormais jetés. La révision de la carte géopolitique du Moyen-Orient est à l’ordre du jour.

I. La réactualisation de la guerre froide dans l’aire arabe
Continuité de la guerre froide au Moyen-Orient [1], ses pays ont maintenu leurs régimes soit dans l’alignement avec l’Est (Syrie, Irak, Libye), soit dans l’alignement avec l’Ouest (pays du Golfe, Egypte, Jordanie). Pendant cette période, trois capitales : Le Caire, Damas et Bagdad s’étaient érigées en puissances régionales, dominant l’aire arabe. Engagée avec le soutien des pays du Golfe, la guerre contre l’Irak, en mars 2003, a assuré l’hégémonie américaine sur les plus importantes réserves d’hydrocarbures de la région. Elle a consolidé ses alliances avec les principaux pays du Moyen-Orient, à l’exception de la Syrie et de l’Iran. D’autre part, le Président G. W. Bush (fils) a engagé, dans le cadre du suivi de l’occupation américaine de l’Irak, son projet du Grand Moyen-Orient, qui avait pour objectif de remodeler une vaste zone géographique allant du Maroc au Pakistan. Le "printemps arabe" a- t- il permis à l’hyperpuissance de finaliser ce projet ?

L’actualité fait valoir la démarcation idéologique entre la Syrie et ses alliés Hizb Allah, au Liban et Hamas, sur le territoire palestinien, qui incarnent le camp de la résistance et l’aile modérée, formée par les pays du Golfe, la Jordanie et dans une moindre mesure l’Irak et l’Egypte. En effet, le rapprochement « naturel » de l’Irak avec l’Iran chiite et la pause stratégique conjoncturelle de l’Egypte, limitent leurs engagements géostratégiques. Le soutien des Etats-Unis à la résistance syrienne et la défense russe du régime de Bachar al-Assad réactualisent au Moyen-Orient la guerre froide. Peut-on, d’autre part, définir l’alliance entre l’hyperpuissance et les régimes islamiques qui ont pris le pouvoir à la faveur des "révolutions" arabes ? L’analyse des relations attestent l’existence d’un compromis entre le régime américain et les nouveaux acteurs.

#printemps_arabe
#démarcation (lignes)
#alliances

The Contested Energy Future of Amman, Jordan : Between Promises of Alternative Energies and a Nuclear Venture, par Eric Verdeil
►http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00857506
Version post-print d’un article publié par la revue Urban Studies

Metropolitan authorities and local business elites are often seen as major players in the energy transition in the city. Such energy transitions are mostly conceived of as low carbon technologies, which permit the retrofitting of urban infrastructure and the rebundling of metabolic circuits. This article contests these views by highlighting the major role of non-urban energy sector institutions and actors. By examining the connections between technology, space and energy politics , and by using a relational understanding of the urban, this article explores the case of Amman’s energy transition. The growth of consumption coupled with new energy practices face a problematic supply because shifts in regional geopolitics prompted energy transition policies, among which are included a green growth program and the building of a nuclear power plant at the edge of the city. The article analyses the socio-political assemblages that shape those policies and unravel the competing interests at stake. It demonstrates the political and highly unruly nature of energy transitions.

Palestine News & Info Agency - WAFA - Abbas Ends Official Visit to Qatar
▻http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail

DOHA, August 29, 2013 (WAFA) – President Mahmoud Abbas ended Thursday an official visit to Qatar during which he held talks with the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and other officials.

Abbas, who arrived in Qatar on Wednesday following a short visit to Jordan where he also held talks with King Abdullah, discussed with Qatari officials the latest developments in the region and the peace process.

Saeb Erekat, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization in charge of negotiations with Israel, accompanied Abbas on this visit.

Faut-il intervenir en Syrie ? Ce qu’en pensent les réfugiés syriens en Jordanie | La mer blanche - البحر الأبيض
Publié le 31 août 2013 par EmilieB
▻http://merblanche.com/faut-il-intervenir-en-syrie-ce-quen-pensent-les-refugies-syriens-en-jord

Dans la ville d’Irbid au nord de la Jordanie, à une vingtaine de kilomètres de la Syrie, les réfugiés syriens sont partout. Ceux qui ne sont pas dans des camps, ont élu domicile dans des immeubles du centre-ville. Certains tiennent des restaurants, vendent des téléphones portables, s’improvisent glaciers.
A Irbid aujourd’hui, la majorité de la population est soit palestinienne, soit syrienne.
En deux ans, près de 500 000 Syriens ont trouvé refuge en Jordanie selon le Haut commissariat aux Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, dont 120 000 dans le camp de Zaatari (le deuxième plus grand camp au monde après Daba au Kenya). Selon les prévisions, la Jordanie pourrait même compter jusqu’à un million de réfugiés syriens d’ici la fin de l’année.

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Au Liban, les réfugiés syriens espèrent une intervention occidentale contre Damas
RFI Avec notre envoyé spécial à Beyrouth, Daniel Vallot
▻http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20130831-liban-refugies-syriens-esperent-une-intervention-occidentale

Les réfugiés rencontrés à Beyrouth sont tous en faveur d’une intervention américaine contre le régime de Damas. Pour eux, il faut punir Bachar el-Assad pour les crimes qui lui sont imputés. Il faut également réduire les capacités militaires du régime syrien pour aider la rébellion.

Le 8 Mars croit en l’imminence d’une frappe occidentale en Syrie... – Scarlett Haddad
▻http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/830087/le-8-mars-croit-en-limminence-dune-frappe-occidentale-en-syrie.html

Ayant eu vent de ces préparatifs, le régime a mené mercredi dernier une opération préventive à Ghouta et il a réussi à occuper les tours abbassides qui surplombent la capitale et en même temps la région de Jobar. Cette opération a d’ailleurs été appelée « Le bouclier de la capitale » et l’armée a mobilisé pour cela cinq unités blindées. Si elle avait été menée à son terme, elle aurait permis aux forces du régime de remporter une nouvelle victoire stratégique, pacifiant toute la région allant de la capitale vers la Jordanie et le Liban, en passant par Zabadani et Qaboun, et arrivant pratiquement jusqu’au jurd de Ersal.

Les milieux du 8 Mars sont ainsi convaincus que l’affaire des armes chimiques a été immédiatement lancée pour contraindre le régime à arrêter son offensive et permettre ainsi aux forces de l’opposition de reprendre leur souffle et se réorganiser. Ceux qui appuient l’opposition syrienne seraient désormais convaincus que celle-ci ne sera pas en mesure de reprendre l’initiative sur le terrain sans une intervention étrangère. L’idée est toutefois de trouver un juste équilibre entre l’affaiblissement du régime, sans pour autant aboutir à une victoire des extrémistes du Front al-Nosra, dont les Américains ne veulent pas, le chef d’état-major le général Dempsey l’ayant répété à plusieurs reprises. C’est d’autant plus délicat que, sur le terrain, les extrémistes sont en train d’écarter l’Armée syrienne libre. Par exemple, c’est la brigade « al-Baraa », affiliée au Front al-Nosra et qui dépend directement du colonel Allouche, qui assure la protection de la commission d’enquête internationale dans la zone sous contrôle de l’opposition à Ghouta, alors que théoriquement c’est l’ASL et son chef régional Khaled Hbous qui auraient dû le faire.

Last news
▻http://www.syriatruth.org/news/tabid/93/Article/10422/Default.aspx

السعوديون ينشرون آلاف “الجهاديين” شمال “رويشد”، والأردنيون ينشرون ثلاثة آلاف مسلح قبالة"القطاع الجنوبي" من الجولان تمهيدا لدخول الجميع بعد العدوان المرتقب

Les Saoudiens déploient des milliers de « djihadistes » au nord de Ruweishad et les Jordaniens, 3 000 combattants en face de la ’bande sud’ du Golan en prévision de leur entrée après l’attaque [occidentale] prévue.

La source (Syriatruth) est plutôt sérieuse dans ses infos, assez largement vérifiées. Des sources en Jordanie affirment que des chars saoudiens y stationnent depuis des semaines. Gardez ces cartes, elles pourront servir dans les jours qui viennent !

▻http://www.syriatruth.org/Portals/0/north_jordan_israeli_tanks_track_map_inter.jpg

▻http://www.syriatruth.org/Portals/0/jordan_saudi_forces_map.jpg

The Middle East’s Arc of Prosperity by Anne-Marie Slaughter - Project Syndicate
▻http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-cooperation-between-israel-and-palestine-by-anne-marie-s

This is most true in high-tech industries, the sector in which the Middle East lags the most. The author of the Forbes article describes a scene in Ramallah that is “indistinguishable from one in Austin or San Francisco,” where “twentysomething Palestinians sip cocktails, their laptops open, their smartphones on.”

Il y a eu il y a quelques jours un (bon) article du même tonneau à propos de la Jordanie (▻http://www.lemonde.fr/le-magazine/article/2013/08/23/silicon-amman_3464758_1616923.html) : la (pas si) nouvelle doctrine de l’administration américaine est claire, vendez-leur du Hi-Tech pour résoudre la question moyen-orientale (et israélo-palestinienne au passage)...
Une seule remarque pour les spin-doctors made in USA : « arc de prospérité » cela rappelle un peu trop l’arc chiite du roi Abdallah de Jordanie !

Version française de l’article, sur L’Orient-Le Jour bien entendu : ▻http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/830104/un-arc-de-prosperite-pour-le-moyen-orient.html et je pense que pour la trad arabe, ce devrait être Al-Hayat !

« Silicon Amman », plaque tournante des nouvelles technologies au Moyen-Orient
▻http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/le-magazine/article/2013/08/23/silicon-amman_3464758_1616923.html
Pour @gonzo

Pour un peu, on se croirait dans l’une de ces start-up stars de la côte Ouest des Etats-Unis. Toboggan en guise d’escalier, table de ping-pong au sous-sol, citations aux murs, mobilier rétro design, jeunes en jean et baskets... Chez Oasis 500, tous les codes sont scrupuleusement respectés, sans oublier les poufs. Ils trônent un peu partout dans les « espaces rencontres », les coins « réflexion », les salles « relaxation »... Comme une preuve ultime de geekitude. Sauf que 12 000 kilomètres séparent la Silicon Valley de la Silicon Wadi ("vallée" en arabe). C’est ainsi qu’a été officieusement baptisée Amman, la capitale de la Jordanie, « plaque tournante des nouvelles technologies au Moyen-Orient », s’enthousiasme Usama Fayyad, 48 ans, le président exécutif de l’incubateur Oasis 500 (aide à la création d’entreprises), créé il y a trois ans. Boule à zéro, carrure de basketteur et débit mitraillette, l’homme est une pointure du Web mondialement reconnue, notamment pour avoir été vice-président de Yahoo !. Cela fait maintenant cinq ans que ce docteur en informatique, diplômé de l’université du Michigan, a regagné sa patrie d’origine, convaincu de son potentiel.

Très - trop- brève évocation des liens potentiels entre Silicon Wadi et Tel Aviv :

La Jordanie, terre d’accueil virtuelle des réfugiés du Web ? Pas si sûr. Question politique, Wael Attili fait désormais profil bas : « Nous avons été accusés de rouler pour les francs-maçons, d’être téléguidés par le Mossad [les services secrets israéliens], d’être payés par les Américains... La nouvelle génération comprend ce que nous faisons, mais l’ancienne se sent vite insultée par notre ton sarcastique. »

Et la question de la liberté d’expression

Depuis septembre 2012, un décret royal, approuvant les amendements à la loi sur la presse votée par le Parlement, impose aux publications en ligne d’obtenir un permis gouvernemental et donne également le droit aux pouvoirs publics de censurer certains contenus et de poursuivre les journalistes. Le département de la presse et de la publication a précisé que cette décision ne visait pas « à restreindre les libertés » mais à « organiser le travail de ces sites ». Reste que sur une échelle de 1 (grande liberté) à 7 (aucune liberté), l’organisation Freedom House, basée à Washington, a donné la note de 5,5 à la Jordanie et le statut « not free » (pas libre). Face à la grogne, le gouvernement fait la sourde oreille. Début juillet, il annonçait avoir bloqué 254 sites locaux d’information tandis que 111 autres obtenaient leur « licence ». Difficile de miser sur le Web tout en entravant la liberté d’expression. Le roi Abdallah ii va devoir choisir, l’avenir de la Silicon Wadi en dépend.

#Jordanie
#internet
#censure

Selon le Figaro, des « commandos israéliens » en Syrie, ainsi que des « hommes de la CIA ». Syrie : l’opération anti-Assad a commencé
▻http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/08/22/01003-20130822ARTFIG00438-syrie-l-operation-anti-assad-a-commence.php

Selon les informations recueillies par Le Figaro, les premiers contingents syriens formés à la guérilla par les Américains en Jordanie seraient entrés en action depuis la mi-août dans le sud de la Syrie, dans la région de Deraa. Un premier groupe de 300 hommes, sans doute épaulés par des commandos israéliens et jordaniens, ainsi que par des hommes de la CIA, aurait franchi la frontière le 17 août. Un second les aurait rejoints le 19. Selon des sources militaires, les Américains, qui ne veulent ni mettre de soldats sur le sol ­syrien, ni armer des rebelles en partie contrôlés par les islamistes radicaux, forment discrètement depuis plusieurs mois, dans un camp d’entraînement installé à la frontière jordano-syrienne, des combattants de l’ASL, l’Armée syrienne libre, triés sur le volet.

(Évidemment, via Angry Arab.)

Introduction d’un système de carte de rationnement pour exclure les réfugiés syriens du bénéfice des subventions sur la farine en Jordanie
Gov’t set on smart cards to regulate bread subsidies — Halawani | The #Jordan Times
▻http://jordantimes.com/govt-set-on-smart-cards-to-regulate-bread-subsidies----halawani

The government confirmed on Monday that it would use a smart card mechanism to direct bread subsidies to Jordanians.

Through the targeted subsidy system, the government seeks to direct support only to Jordanians, as there are over 2.5 million foreigners living in the Kingdom, according to the minister.

According to Halawani bread prices in Jordan are the lowest in the world. The minister noted that the continuous flow of Syrians into Jordan has increased the country’s imports of wheat by an estimated 14,000 tonnes a month

#pain
#alimention
#subventions
#réfugiés
#Syrie

Accord et choix du constructeur pour un réacteur nucléaire d’étude de 5 MW en Jordanie
Korean consortium to build Jordan’s first nuclear reactor | The Jordan Times
▻http://jordantimes.com/korean-consortium-to-build-jordans-first-nuclear-reactor

A South Korean consortium has been officially licensed to build Jordan’s first nuclear reactor following over two years of technical and legal delays.

#nucléaire
#Jordanie
#électricité

Egypt’s identity crisis - The Washington Post
▻http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts-identity-crisis/2013/08/16/70d1459c-0524-11e3-88d6-d5795fab4637_print.html

Remarquable article de #Shibley_Telhami, rarement lu dans un MSM,

Over the past decade, I’ve conducted opinion polls in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and have found two consistent trends. First, citizens identify less and less with their countries and identify more and more with Islam and as Arabs. Second, Egyptians see themselves as the most religious people in the world.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which began the post-Mubarak era with justified confidence in its superior political organization, surely must have interpreted such trends as great support for its cause. (This belief was expressed by the group’s former murshed, or guide, as early as 2006 when he said, “Tuz fi Misr,” roughly, “To hell with Egypt.”) But the group drew the wrong lessons from these trends.

Arabs, like most people, have many contending collective identities, and the weight of each shifts over time; there is rarely a lasting equilibrium. Over the past decade, the rise in people identifying primarily as Muslim was not all or even mostly due to expanding Islamist aspirations. Instead, it resulted mainly from declining identification with the state, thanks to government failings on domestic and foreign policy. Also, the extraordinarily long tenures of individual leaders — Moammar Gaddafi ruled for 42 years and Mubarak for 30 — made it difficult for people to separate state from unpopular ruler. But a vote against something is not the same as a vote in favor of something else.

Moreover, when Islam itself appears under assault from external forces — as Muslims overwhelmingly perceived it to be in the decade after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — it becomes especially difficult to separate religious identity from popular defiance. You are what you have to defend. For some Egyptians, claiming Islamic identity is about faith, but for many others it is merely about asserting the right to be Muslim and to accept sharia law in the face of Western assault. Muslims do not want to apologize for who they are, for their faith and for all it entails.

Even attitudes about sharia are easily misunderstood. In my May 2012 poll, two-thirds of respondents said they supported making sharia the basis of Egyptian law. But when I probed more deeply, things became less clear: Of those who supported sharia as the basis of law, only 17 percent said they preferred applying it literally, while 83 percent said they favored applying the spirit of sharia but adapted to modern times. Little surprise that Egyptian commentator Muhammad Hassanein Heikal describes Egypt as a “civil-secular country that loves religion.”

For the overwhelming majority of Arabs, as for any broadly defined group, collective aspirations help determine the relative power of identities. When Pan Arabism seemed a more effective vehicle for the attainment of dignity at home and abroad in the 1950s, for instance, a shift toward an Arab identity became evident. Similarly, when Islam appeared to be the better vehicle, a shift occurred in that direction. The moves from one identity to another, from Arab to Egyptian to Muslim, reflect citizens’ assessment of their chances to reach their goals. And if there was anything clear after Morsi’s first year in office, it was that the public’s aspirations were dashed by the government’s domestic and international failures.

Islamists may have also misunderstood Arab attitudes about democracy. When Egyptians are asked which country they would want their own nation to look like, their top choice has been Turkey, a democratic Islamic nation ruled by an Islamist party. And in 2011 and 2012, Egyptians and other Arabs identified Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as the leader they most admired outside their own country.

It is easy to misinterpret such admiration as Arabs seeking only the right mix of Islam and democracy. But the reasons are far more complex, as I found in my polling results. Arabs want a combination of many things that Turkey’s model offered: a country that balances democracy and culture, but also a stable, strong, prosperous nation, and one that makes them feel proud on the world stage. Erdogan, who personally symbolized the mix of Islam and democracy in many Arab minds — at least until the recent upheavals in Turkey — was not selected by Arabs as the favorite leader until he was seen as standing up to Israel on the 2008-09 Gaza war.

Overall, the resonance of political Islam in the Arab world — and in Egypt in particular — has been exaggerated. To win the presidency last year, the Muslim Brotherhood could rely on its political machinery and the disarray of its opponents; it didn’t need to win the hearts of most Egyptians. But as Morsi learned too late, it couldn’t govern without broader public support.

However, if Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood overestimated the Islamists’ appeal, Egypt’s transitional rulers seem ready to dismiss it too easily. Public rejection of the Brotherhood does not translate into an embrace of the generals. Gen. Abdel Fatah al-Sissi’s popularity could be fleeting: Despite the Egyptian public’s long-held admiration of the military as an institution, especially immediately after the revolution, their opinion of the generals changed within months, with only 18 percent of Egyptians polled saying they had advanced the goals of the revolution by May 2012.

...

#islam #arabes #islam_politique #dictature #impérialisme #Égypte #aspirations #dignité #identité #appartenances

Dans le monde arabo-musulman, la colère des manifestants, le silence des diplomaties

▻http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/08/16/dans-le-monde-arabo-musulman-la-colere-des-manifestants-le-silence-des-diplo

La dispersion dans le sang des pro-Morsi, mercredi, suscite également la colère de manifestants dans le monde musulman. Vendredi, jour de prière, a vu l’organisation de rassemblements à Jérusalem, en Jordanie, au Soudan, en Indonésie ou encore au Pakistan. Partout, les slogans visaient le chef de l’armée égyptienne, Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi, nouvel homme fort d’Egypte.

La #Jordanie submergée de #réfugiés #syriens

Selon le #HCR, dans les #camps, les réfugiés sont confrontés aux risques de recrutement comme #enfants-soldats, aux #violences_sexuelles et à l’#exploitation comme main-d’œuvre.

▻http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/La-Jordanie-submergee-de-refugies-syriens-2013-08-11-997198

Dans un #camp_de_réfugiés syriens en Jordanie, on trouve les #Champs-Elysées et l’avenue Foch

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BROWE18CIAEKN1l.jpg:large

▻https://twitter.com/paulaubriat/status/365801005000040448/photo/1

#carte #cartographie

Online Arabic encyclopaedia seeks to publish university research | The Jordan Times
▻http://jordantimes.com/online-arabic-encyclopaedia-seeks-to-publish-university-research

The Talal Abu-Ghazaleh Organisation has started approaching major universities in Jordan and across the Arab world to publish their scientific research on TAGIPEDIA, an online encyclopaedia launched in the Kingdom.

#édition_numérique

Discrimination awaits #Palestinians fleeing the Syrian conflict

Leah Morrison, MA student in Development and Emergency Practice at Oxford Brookes University, is an advocate for refugee rights. She is currently writing her dissertation on discriminatory treatment towards Palestinians fleeing the Syrian conflict.

Among those who have fled the conflict in Syria are tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees who have been uprooted once again. Their statelessness makes Palestinians doubly vulnerable to the horrors that have characterised the situation in Syria.

While the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) retains the core responsibility for Palestinian refugees in host states, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated to protect Syrian refugees elsewhere. The difference in the treatment of Syrian refugees and Palestinians from Syria is evidence of new levels of discrimination against Palestinian refugees.

Although the border to Jordan remains partially open to Syrian refugees, it has been closed to Palestinian refugees from Syria since August 2012. The Palestinian refugees admitted before the closing of the border were sent to the Cyber City, an industrial complex near Ramtha, and are only permitted to leave if they are returning to Syria. The government of Jordan fears that an influx of Palestinian refugees may tilt the demographic balance in Jordan even more towards the Palestinians, who already comprise the majority of the population. Samih Maaytah, Jordanian government spokesman, noted that the matter of Palestinian refugees from Syria is ‘purely political, before discussing any humanitarian aspect.’

Similarly, Lebanon has allowed free entry to Syrian nationals. Palestinians from Syria, on the other hand, are only free to enter if they have relatives residing in the country. Syrians are free to work, stay for six months, and renew their work permits without cost in Lebanon. Palestinians from Syria must pay 17 USD for a permit, which must be renewed every three months even though there are no public services for Palestinians and their ability to work is extremely limited.

Space has been allocated for Syrian refugees, while Palestinians fleeing the Syrian conflict have been forced to reside in the already overcrowded Palestinian camp of Burj al-Barajneh in south Beirut, home to tens of thousands packed into a slum measuring one square kilometer. There is a widespread fear among the Lebanese that granting Palestinians more rights would lead to the disruption of the country’s balanced system of sectarian politics.

In Egypt, the situation is even worse. UNRWA is mandated to assist Palestinians refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Egypt has not been a ‘host country’ for UNRWA for decades; therefore Palestinians should be protected by the mandate of UNHCR. Proposals made over the past several months for the recognition of Palestinian refugees under the ambit of UNHCR’s mandate have been rejected by the government of Egypt. It will not permit UNHCR to take this responsibility. While Syrians are being given food through ATM cards provided by the World Food Programme, the Palestinians from Syria are not permitted to receive assistance.

Turkey remains the only host country in the region that has not discriminated against Palestinians from Syria.

▻http://frlan.tumblr.com/post/54334245587/discrimination-awaits-palestinians-fleeing-the-syrian

#Syrie #palestiniens #discrimination #réfugiés #asile #guerre

Les nouvelles négociations israélo-palestiniennes | Le blog de Charles Enderlin

▻http://geopolis.francetvinfo.fr/charles-enderlin/2013/07/29/les-nouvelles-negociations-israelo-palestiniennes.html

Mais, en fait, il y a une autre raison pour laquelle la diplomatie américaine, l’union Européenne, la Ligue arabe – qui a relancé son plan de paix - ont fait un tel effort pour la reprise des pourparlers. Tous craignent l’effondrement de l’Autorité autonome et l’annonce par l’OLP, qu’en raison de l’importance de la colonisation, la paix avec Israël est impossible. Cela signifierait la remise en question des traités avec l’Égypte et la Jordanie, censés faire partie d’un processus de paix régionale. En d’autres termes, personne ne veut plonger le Proche Orient dans une nouvelle crise. Rendez-vous dans neuf mois…

#israel #palestine #enderlin

Displaced Syrians stranded along Jordanian border; humanitarian crisis feared

AMMAN, Jordan — Relief officials warned Tuesday of a brewing humanitarian crisis in southern Syria as rising violence reportedly continued to strand thousands of would-be refugees along the border with Jordan.

▻http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-refugees-stranded-along-jordanian-border-humanitarian-crisis-feared/2013/07/23/829a5368-f3ae-11e2-a2f1-a7acf9bd5d3a_story.html

#Jordanie #frontière #Syrie #réfugiés #migration #asile #fermeture_frontière

Facebook : Egypte premier utilisateur en nombre, Tunisie en qualité

L’Egypte détient le premier rang du nombre d’utilisateurs arabes du réseau Facebook, mais la Tunisie est le pays arabe qui a « le mieux utilisé les réseaux sociaux pour provoquer la révolution », indique une étude, citée vendredi dans le journal marocain Assabah.

Dans le classement par pays, la Tunisie arrive, par le nombre d’utilisateurs de Facebook, à la cinquième place dans le monde arabe après l’Égypte, l’Arabie saoudite, le Maroc, et les Émirats arabes unis, mais devant l’Algérie, la Jordanie, et le Liban, écrit l’Institut de prospective économique du monde méditerranéen (Ipemed) dans une étude récemment publiée.

« Même si elle se classe au 5e rang arabe par le nombre d’utilisateurs de Facebook rapporté à la population (20%), la Tunisie est le pays arabe qui a le mieux utilisé les réseaux sociaux pour provoquer la révolution », souligne cet observatoire.

Début 2011, Facebook comptait « plus de 20 millions d’utilisateurs dans le monde arabe contre quelques 30.000 blogs en 2005 », note l’étude de cet observatoire présidé par le Tunisien Radhi Meddeb, à laquelle ont participé plusieurs chercheurs sur le Maghreb contemporain et économistes à l’Agence française de développement (AFD).

En nombre de Facebookers rapporté au nombre total de la population, le Qatar (59,7%) est premier au classement, suivi par les Emirats (42%), Bahrein (36,9%, le Liban (23,4%), la Tunisie (20%), l’Egypte (16,5%), le Maroc (7,6%), l’Algérie (4,6%) et la Libye (4,5%).

Les auteurs de l’étude font d’autre part remarquer que « la Tunisie et l’Egypte font partie des pays sud-méditerranéens où le poids du secteur des Tic (Technologie de l’information et de la communication) est parmi les plus élevés de la région ».

« Les pays qui luttent encore contre la destitution de leurs pouvoirs (la Syrie, le Yémen, la Libye) sont des pays où le secteur des Tic est inférieur à 5% » souligne l’Ipemed, sans pour autant établir un lien de causalité entre Tic et révolution.

« Si en Tunisie et en Égypte, le renversement des régimes a été si rapide, c’est en partie au moins, du fait de ces moyens de communication et des médias accessibles à un grand nombre ».

Début 2011, le Maroc comptait 2,45 millions d’utilisateurs Facebook (sur une population totale d’environ 35 millions d’habitants), révèle par ailleurs le journal marocain, citant l’étude.

Source : AFP

#Egypte #Tunisie #Internet #révolutions_arabes #Facebook #médias #medialab