#Morocco, #EU resume talks on fisheries #deal : International
▻http://www.nerve.in/news:2535004188843
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Defying the gaze of others in Abu Bakr Shawky’s Yomeddine |
Adham Youssef
June 1, 2018
MadaMasr▻https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/06/01/feature/culture/defying-the-gaze-of-others-in-abu-bakr-shawkys-yomeddine
After finishing my interview with director Abu Bakr Shawky and producer Dina Emam at this year’s Cannes Film Festival, I move to my next scheduled meeting — a group discussion with a Kenyan director about her film, which is screening in the Un Certain Regard competition. Shawky is conducting an interview with a foreign journalist nearby, and I can’t help but overhear their conversation. The reporter asks him about the “political and religious messages” behind his debut feature and Palme d’Or contender, Yomeddine (2018).
Later, when I meet with Shawky again, I ask him to comment on that question. “Wherever there is a good story I will go,” he says. “There is an expectation from Middle Eastern films that they have to be about politics and religion, but I don’t want to do that anymore. Not because they are irrelevant, but I watch films from the United States, Europe and Asia that are not political, and I like them. So why can’t a Middle Eastern film not be political in the traditional sense and still be considered enjoyable and significant?”
There were three other Arabic-language films in Cannes this year; Nadine Labaki’s Cafarnaüm (2018), a Lebanese drama about poor children and migrants in the informal housing areas of Beirut; Gaya Jiji’s My Favourite Fabric (2018), a film that tackles female sexuality and the Syrian revolution (guaranteed to be a hit with Western audiences); and Sofia, Meryem BenMbarek’s story about premarital pregnancy in Morocco. Yomeddine stood out among them as a different narrative that is placed within a specific context, yet is universally appealing and relatable nonetheless.
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.:Middle East Online:: :.
▻http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=88300Sixteen percent of teenage girls who marry in Morocco do so under the legal age of 18 compared to no more than 3 percent in Algeria and Tunisia who have the same minimum age for women, according to activists.
Morocco had hoped to curb child marriages by raising the legal age to 18 from 16 in 2004, yet numbers since then have surged nearly 50 percent to 27,205 in 2016, justice ministry data shows. Activists say the number is higher.
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Was Juan Goytisolo really an anti-orientalist?
▻http://africasacountry.com/2018/02/was-juan-goytisolo-really-an-anti-orientalistOn June 5 last year, the Spanish novelist Juan Goytisolo was buried in the Spanish cemetery of Larache in northern Morocco, his tomb overlooking the Atlantic Ocean and right next to that of Jean Genet. Spanish and Moroccan officials, and local writers and artists, paid homage to the Spanish author, reading extracts of his work. An outpouring in the Moroccan media paid homage to the…
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Was the Spanish novelist Juan Goytisolo really an anti-orientalist?
▻http://africasacountry.com/2018/02/was-the-spanish-novelist-juan-goytisolo-really-an-anti-orientalistOn June 5 last year, the Spanish novelist Juan Goytisolo was buried in the Spanish cemetery of Larache in northern #Morocco, his tomb overlooking the Atlantic Ocean and right next to that of Jean Genet. Spanish and Moroccan officials, and local writers and artists, paid homage to the Spanish author, reading extracts of his work. An outpouring in the Moroccan media paid homage to the…
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Stampede at Ceuta Crossing Point Kills 2 Moroccan Women
▻https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/01/238383/stampede-ceuta-crossing-point-kills-2-moroccan-womenRabat – Two Moroccan women died while several others suffered injuries on Monday, January 15 after a stampede at one of the entrance gates of the Ceuta’s crossing border.
Moroccan authorities have opened an investigation to determine the circumstances of the incident, local authorities of M’diq-Fnidq prefecture pointed out in a statement.
Monday’s stampede was the first incident recorded in 2018.
Three reported stampedes happened in 2017. The first incident occurred on March 28, 2017, when a woman tragically lost her life in a stampede, while the second incident dates back to April 24, when a 50-year old woman died under the same circumstances. The third tragedy occurred took place on August 28, when two Moroccan women died while others suffered injuries.
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Après Sebta, de nouvelles victimes parmi les porteadores de #Melilla
Plusieurs personnes ont été blessées, dont une est décédée, lors d’une bousculade ce lundi à la frontière entre le Maroc et l’enclave espagnole de Melilla, ont indiqué les autorités espagnoles et un groupe de défense des droits humains.
▻https://ledesk.ma/encontinu/apres-sebta-de-nouvelles-victimes-parmi-les-porteadores-de-melilla -
The women who risk their lives crossing Ceuta’s Spain-Morocco border for less than €20
▻https://lacuna.org.uk/economy/women-risk-death-spain-morocco-border-ceuta
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Europe’s most fortified border is in Africa
The death trap that separates Europe and Africa still can’t stop everyone.
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=LY_Yiu2U2Ts
#murs #frontières #vidéo #film #Melilla #Ceuta #Espagne #Maroc #asile #migrations #réfugiés
cc @reka-
Spain / Morocco. Africa’s gateway to Europe
If you zoom really far in on a map of Morocco, you’ll notice a little wedge of land that doesn’t belong to Morocco at all. It belongs to Spain. It’s a small city called Melilla. And it’s one of two Spanish enclaves in Morocco, marking Europe’s only land border with Africa.
Melilla feels just like the rest of Spain: the same language, food, architecture, and currency. You might as well be in mainland Europe.
It’s only when you walk to the periphery of town that you are reminded you’re on a different continent. There, you will see one of the most fortified barriers on the planet.
Right outside this obstacle, in the forests surrounding Melilla, you’ll find makeshift camps, constructed from scraps of tarp and trash. They are home to sub-Saharan Africans, biding their time, preparing for the day they will attempt to jump this barrier and set foot on European soil, where they hope to find a better life and benefit from the European Union’s migrant protection programs.
These migrants are a handful of the millions leaving their countries in Africa and the Middle East in hopes of reaching Europe. In recent years, a record number of displaced people have been fleeing war, famine, and political violence. They take many paths, each as dangerous as the next (and in many parts of Europe they face an increasingly hostile reception by nations which simply don’t want them).
The difficult path through Melilla is one of those routes.
I went to Melilla to see how Spain is handling this influx of migrants. While some countries are working hard to open their doors, others instead are building higher walls. This video explores what it’s like to be one of the people trying to scale this barrier separating Africa from Europe:
▻https://www.vox.com/a/borders/spain-morocco
#murs #visualisation #frontières #cartographie #routes_migratoires #parcours_migratoires
signalé par @isskein
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Touching the ‘Other’
This becomes particularly pertinent when talking about migration and xenophobia in Morocco but in any other country facing similar issues: if we want to imagine a multi-ethnic, multicultural society, then we also need to imagine the spaces required to foster familiarity via physical contact and interaction with the various ‘Others’. The matter then expands beyond creating opportunity in terms of socioeconomic means: it must include provisions for shared spaces, and an infrastructure that facilitates moving about and around such spaces.
▻https://inthesameboatmorocco.wordpress.com/2016/01/20/295
#espace #géographie #rencontres #altérité #xénophobie #racisme #espace_public #radicalisation #Maroc #Casablanca
Ce texte est tirée d’une critique du #film #Horses_of_god (en français : #Les_chevaux_de_dieu) :
Yassine a 10 ans lorsque le Maroc émerge à peine des années de plomb. Sa mère, Yemma, dirige comme elle peut toute la famille. Un père dépressif, un frère à l’armée, un autre presque autiste et un troisième, Hamid, petit caïd du quartier et protecteur de Yachine. Quand Hamid est emprisonné, Yachine enchaîne les petits boulots. Pour les sortir de ce marasme où règnent violence, misère et drogue, Hamid, une fois libéré et devenu islamiste radical pendant son incarcération, persuade Yachine et ses copains de rejoindre leurs « frères ». L’Imam Abou Zoubeir, chef spirituel, entame alors avec eux une longue préparation physique et mentale. Un jour, il leur annonce qu’ils ont été choisis pour devenir des martyrs…
▻http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2369047 -
Coming to the aid of drowning migrants? Get ready to be treated like a criminal | Lorena Gazzotti | Opinion | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/20/aid-drowning-migrants-criminal-activists-ngo-witness-brutal-border-poli
Activists and NGOs defending migrants’ rights will remember 2017 as the year in which they were targeted by legal systems in Europe and north Africa. Take the case of Helena Maleno Garzón, a Spanish journalist and human rights advocate. You may not have heard of her. But authorities on both sides of the strait of Gibraltar know her well.
Maleno, who has been living in Tangier since 2001, will on 27 December face a hearing as part of an investigation by Moroccan authorities into her alleged collusion with smuggling and human-trafficking networks. Central to the case are the calls that Maleno has been making to the Spanish and the Moroccan coastguards since 2007 about boats in distress in the strait and the Alboran Sea. Because of their proximity to migrant communities in northern Morocco, Maleno and other activists regularly receive distress calls, and they relay the signals to naval authorities, a vital step in ensuring migrants’ rescue.
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MIGRATORY FLOWS IN NOVEMBER : ARRIVALS DOWN IN ITALY AND GREECE, RISE IN SPAIN
▻http://frontex.europa.eu/pressroom/news/migratory-flows-in-november-arrivals-down-in-italy-and-greece-rise-in▻http://frontex.europa.eu/thumb/Images_News/2017/B33I4720.prop_300x.fe14a18856.JPG
In November, 13 500 irregular border crossings were detected on the four main migratory routes into the EU, 27% fewer than a year ago.
The total number of migrants detected on these routes in the first eleven months of this year fell by 62% to around 186 500 from the same period in 2016.
Central Mediterranean
The number of migrants arriving in Italy via the Central Mediterranean route in November fell by a tenth from the previous month to 5 300 due to worse weather conditions, following a usual seasonal pattern.
The total number of arrivals for the first 11 months of 2017 dropped by a third to around 116 400 compared to the same period of last year. Nigerians made up the largest number of irregular migrants coming to Italy so far this year, accounting for one of every seven arrivals. They were followed by nationals of Guinea, Ivory Coast and Bangladesh.
Western Mediterranean
Spain continued to see a high number of irregular migrants, with 3 900 arriving in November, more than three times the figure from a year ago. This was also the highest monthly number of migrants detected on this route since Frontex began collecting data in 2009.
More than half of the migrants were nationals of Algeria and Morocco, whose numbers have been on the rise since the middle of this year. Most of the remaining migrants on this route come from Western Africa.
Between January and November, there were more than 21 100 detections of irregular border crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, up 140% from the same period of last year.
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Killing Net Neutrality Has Brought On a New Call for Public Broadband
▻https://theintercept.com/2017/12/15/fcc-net-neutrality-public-broadband-seattleThe Federal Communications Commission’s 3-2 vote to repeal net neutrality rules has many worried that internet service providers will now build the same sort of tiered internet that some other countries have — where individual providers can collude to throttle traffic to certain websites and services in order to shake money from consumers or the companies themselves — or both. For instance, in Morocco last year, multiple internet service providers worked together to briefly block voice chat (...)
#Comcast #neutralité #WhatsApp #Skype #FCC
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$2bn EU-Africa ’anti-migration’ fund too opaque, say critics
Trust fund intended to prevent migration by tackling insecurity and poverty suffers from lack of clarity, say observers
▻https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/31/2bn-eu-africa-anti-migration-fund-too-opaque-say-critics?CMP=Share_Andr
#trust_fund #Afrique #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers
Le nom en français de ce #fonds :
« #fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence de l’Union européenne pour l’Afrique » (►http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6056_fr.htm) #fond_fiduciaire_d'urgence-
Juncker : « les États membres contribuent trop peu au fonds pour l’Afrique »
Après un premier tour de négociations lors du premier jour du Conseil, le président de la Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, a prévenu devant la presse que l’action extérieure de l’UE atteignait ses limites à cause d’un manque de financement.
▻https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/juncker-member-states-committed-too-little-for-africa-fund
#fonds_pour_l'afrique -
“EU-Africa migration funds were used on Libya’s coast guard patrol vessels »
Genoa - EU international cooperation funding destined for development projects in Africa was used to refurbish patrol boats for Libya’s coast guard, and handed over to Libyan militia units who practice torture and extrajudicial killings, in violation of Libyan and international standards.
▻http://www.themeditelegraph.com/en/markets/finance-and-politics/2017/11/16/africa-migration-funds-were-used-libya-coast-guard-patrol-vessels-ZxeIfzI2rMZYW6ixGchHKP/index.html
#Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement
–-> je ne sais pas si le fonds dans lequel il est question ici c’est aussi celui qui est mentionné dans le premier article de la liste... @isskein : tu en sais plus ?
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Europe’s Plan to Close Its Sea Borders Relies on Libya’s Coast Guard Doing Its Dirty Work, Abusing Migrants
When a Libyan coast guard officer raised his hands and pointed, as if holding a rifle, Thomas Schaible wasn’t too worried. It wasn’t his first violent encounter with the Libyan coast guard, but this time, with a helicopter from the Italian navy overhead and Italian and French warships nearby, Schaible knew it was an empty threat.
►https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/libya-coast-guard-europe-refugees
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Libya human bondage risks overshadowing Africa-EU summit
#Mogherini was questioned about the EU’s strategy of outsourcing the migration crisis to foreign countries such as Libya and Turkey, which received billions to prevent Syrian refugees from crossing to Greece.
She said the situation was different on two counts: first, the migrants stranded in Libya were not legitimate asylum seekers like those fleeing the war in Syria. And second, different international bodies were in charge.
“When it comes to Turkey, it is mainly refugees from Syria; when it comes to Libya, it is mainly migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the relevant international laws apply in different manners and the relevant UN agencies are different – the UNHCR on one side, especially in Turkey, and the IOM especially in Libya.”
►https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/libya-human-bondage-risks-overshadowing-africa-eu-summit
#IOM #OIM #HCR #Libye #Turquie #migrants_économiques #réfugiés #tri #catégorisationEn lien avec cela, lire:
▻http://seen.li/dn2v
#mixed_migrations -
Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouveaux programmes
Trois nouveaux programmes d’un montant de 29,6 millions d’euros ont été adoptés dans le cadre du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique. Ces programmes complètent l’action de l’UE visant à relever les défis de la migration en Méditerranée. Ces nouveaux programmes intensifieront le travail en cours de l’UE pour renforcer la protection des migrants, soutenir leur réintégration durable et permettre une augmentation du nombre de retours volontairement assistés depuis la Libye. Ils contribueront également à la lutte contre les réseaux criminels dans la région.
Three new programmes worth €29.6 million have been adopted in the framework of the EU Trust Fund for Africa as part of EU work in addressing migration challenges in the Mediterranean. A set of priorities for 2018 have also been agreed.
These new programmes will step up the EU’s ongoing work to strengthening protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration and provide assisted voluntary returns. The programmes will also contribute to fight criminal networks across the region.
High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini said: “Last week we established a joint EU/AU/UN Task Force to accelerate our work to protect migrants and refugees and fight the criminal networks. With these new programmes, we will step up our commitments, save lives, guarantee the respect of human rights and of international standards, provide alternatives to those wishing to return to their homes and support to host communities. We already assisted over 14,000 people stranded in Libya to return and will support an additional 15,000 returns by February 2018. And we will support our partners to counter traffickers and smugglers, assisting them in bringing peace and security to the region.”
Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn said: “The current challenges in the Mediterranean Sea remain a top priority for the European Union. The EU Trust Fund for Africa continues to take action to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and to defend the rights of people who risk falling into the hands of traffickers and smugglers. With our new programmes, we will help dismantle criminal networks in North of Africa, support migrants who wish to return to their home countries and facilitate access for migrants to legal advice. We will also promote socio-economic integration in Morocco and will foster socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities”.
Regional programme - Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa, €10 million
This programme will be implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and will further contribute to the ongoing efforts under the assistance voluntary return scheme. It will strengthen protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration systems in North Africa and provide assisted voluntary return to migrants wishing to return to their home from Northern Africa. This Facility is conceived as a regional flexible mechanism able to adapt to the specific needs of the countries. This is yet another action towards enhancing support to stranded migrants as well as reinforcing national return and reintegration systems across the North of Africa region.
Regional programme - Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, €15 million
This project will focus on regional dimension of fight against smugglers and traffickers. It will target the public sector of the countries in the region (in particular the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and Health). Under this programme, implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), capacity-building as well as light equipment, such as IT and forensic tools, will be provided to actors dealing with law enforcement and criminal justice. The final beneficiaries will be the general public, victims of trafficking, smuggled migrants, and families of the latter two categories.
Morocco - Legal Empowerment for migrants, €4.58 million
This programme implemented by the Belgian Technical Cooperation will reinforce the protection and resilience of migrants and refugees, displaced persons and host communities in Morocco. Whilst strengthening awareness on their rights and access to legal counselling, the project will also contribute to promote the socio-economic integration of migrants and facilitate migrants’ integration in the Moroccan society. This is a new very specific action complementing the EU support to the implementation of the Moroccan National Strategy on Migration (SNIA). The programme will support actors who help migrants and refugees access to their rights, such as lawyers, students, civil society associations and justice staff. It will develop and create legal clinics in Rabat, Casablanca, Tanger and Oujda.
Objectives for 2018
The Commission also outlined the priorities of the EUTF/North of Africa window for 2018. The situation in Libya will remain a top priority, with on the one hand increased efforts for the protection of migrants and refugees, including through the support for additional assisted voluntary returns and support for evacuation of the most vulnerable ones (in line with the recent decision of the EU-African Union summit); and on the other hand support to host communities. More specifically, funding will be provided to the UNHCR’s evacuation mechanism through the EUTF and discussions with the IOM on additional measures under the assisted voluntary return scheme are being finalised. The Commission is also working together with Italy on a new initiative to be presented to the Operational Committee early in 2018, which is aimed at fostering the socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities, on the basis of needs of local authorities and in close coordination with the PC/Government of National Accord (GNA).
▻http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-
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Come viene usato il Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa?
“Vertice UE-Africa: l’Europa non paga”. Così titolava il settimanale tedesco Der Spiegel alla vigilia del Summit di Abidjan di fine novembre, evidenziando un problema crescente nell’approccio europeo al contenimento dei flussi migratori: come reperire le risorse con cui finanziare il Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa. Perché se da un lato aumentano obiettivi e programmi da finanziare, dall’altro non cresce il coinvolgimento economico dei governi europei.
▻http://openmigration.org/analisi/come-viene-usato-il-fondo-fiduciario-per-lafrica
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2.12.2017 – Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouvelles actions pour renforcer la stabilité dans la corne de l’Afrique
Le Comité opérationnel du Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique a adopté une nouvelle série de 13 programmes d’un montant de 174,4 millions d’euros pour la région de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique
▻http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-
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Fondo Africa, quelle risorse destinate a progetti lontani dall’aiuto allo sviluppo
Il dossier realizzato sugli atti di delibera e ottenuto grazie alla richiesta dell’Associazione per gli Studi giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) e sulla risposta del sottosegretario agli Esteri Della Vedova all’interrogazione del PD sull’utilizzo delle risorse stanziate. Risorse spese in Tunisia, Niger e Libia che pongono, secondo ActionAid, problemi di costituzionalità e trasparenza
▻http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/2017/12/18/news/fondo_africa-184514509
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Libyan coast guard attacks rescuers after training by EU military operation
▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/dec/eu-libyan-coast-guard-eu-training-abuses-hunko-pr-18-12-17.pdf
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A ‘blind spot’ in the migration debate? International responsibility of the EU and its Member States for cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and militias
The discussion on the restrictive migration management policies of the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) has so far focused on the potential violation of the primary rules of international law that determine the conduct of subjects of international law. The question of applicability of the secondary rules of international responsibility that provide for the consequences of the commitment of a wrongful act has attracted less attention. The main question in the current context is whether the cooperation of the EU and its MS with the Libyan coastguard and militias with the view of stemming irregular migration flows to Europe generates international responsibility for the above actors. More specifically, it is asked whether there is an autonomous basis in the law of international responsibility for holding the EU and its the MS responsible for the violations of human rights occurring in Libya, even if they do not exercise directly jurisdiction over migrants. Three aspects of this theme will be developed here: first, the nature and scope of the cooperation of the EU and its MS, in particular Italy, with the Libyan authorities, coastguard and militias in view of restricting the access of migrants to the EU; second, the extent of human rights violations of migrants in Libya; and third, the alleged complicity and responsibility of the EU and MS for the violations of these rights.
▻http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-blind-spot-in-the-migration-debate-international-responsibility
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L’Europe affirme que la formation des gardes-côtes libyens avance
La formation des gardes-côtes libyens, notamment pour le sauvetage de migrants, avance, a déclaré jeudi à Tunis le commandant de l’opération navale européenne Sophia, chargée de lutter contre les passeurs.
« La formation se passe bien », a affirmé Enrico Credendino, commandant de la force navale européenne en Méditerranée (Sophia).
« Les gardes-côtes libyens ont été très actifs, en particulier au cours du second semestre 2017. Ils ont secouru beaucoup de migrants, presque 18.000 alors qu’en 2015 par exemple, ils en avaient secouru seulement 800 », a-t-il précisé.
Lancée en 2015 par l’UE, l’opération navale Sophia est chargée de lutter contre les passeurs et de former les gardes-côtes libyens.
Sa mission a été reconduite en juillet par le Conseil européen jusqu’en décembre 2018.
Déchirée par les rivalités entre groupes armés et les autorités qui se disputent le pouvoir, la Libye a sombré dans le chaos depuis la chute du régime de Mouammar Kadhafi en 2011.
Des centaines de milliers de migrants, certains fuyant des conflits, d’autres la pauvreté tentent de traverser la Méditerranée depuis la Libye pour rejoindre l’Europe. Depuis le début de l’année, au moins 337 d’entre eux sont morts ou disparus au large de la Libye, selon l’Organisation internationale des migrations.
▻https://www.voaafrique.com/a/migrations-formations-de-garde-cotes-libyens-avance/4300524.html
#Opération_sophiaA mettre en lien avec cet article :
La guardia costiera libica minaccia l’ong Proactiva Open Arms
►https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/03/16/guardia-costiera-libica-open-arms -
Un film de #Andrea_Segre, à voir absolument. Il montre les manoeuvres italiennes en Libye :
L’ordine delle cose (L’ordre des choses) :Rinaldi, policier italien de grande expérience, est envoyé par son gouvernement en Libye afin de négocier le maintien des migrants sur le sol africain. Sur place, il se heurte à la complexité des rapports tribaux libyens et à la puissance des trafiquants exploitant la détresse des réfugiés.
Au cours de son enquête, il rencontre dans un centre de rétention, Swada, une jeune somalienne qui le supplie de l’aider. Habituellement froid et méthodique, Rinaldi va devoir faire un choix douloureux entre sa conscience et la raison d’Etat : est-il possible de renverser l’ordre des choses ?
▻https://lordinedellecose.it▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_b8mp4N4Blw
Il est actuellement en salle à Grenoble...
#film
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Migranti, gli occhi della Libia sui radar europei nel Mediterraneo
A dicembre 2016 un ufficiale di collegamento della guardia costiera libica è entrato nel cuore del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Network, il sistema di monitoraggio dell’Unione per il controllo delle frontiere Sud del Mediterraneo e che vede in prima linea l’Italia. Ma il governo libico era ritenuto inaffidabile dalla Commissione Ue nel 2015 ed escluso dal progetto. Ora perché è coinvolto? E a quale titolo?
Occhi elettronici. Radar potenti e sofisticati. Satelliti militari in grado di scansionare ogni centimetro quadrato del Mediterraneo centrale, quel pezzo di mare tra la Libia e l’Italia divenuto tomba per migliaia di migranti, morti mentre cercavano di fuggire alle guerre dei loro paesi e alle torture dei carcerieri libici. Mezzi straordinariamente potenti, soprattutto se messi in rete, formando un flusso di dati in grado di salvare vite – avvistando ogni piccolo gommone che tenta la traversata – e di bloccare i traffici. Non solo di esseri umani, ma anche di petrolio, droga, armi. Si chiama Sea Horse Mediterranean Network ed è l’asset più prezioso della rete di controllo della frontiera sud dell’Europa.
Un progetto costato milioni di euro, promosso direttamente dall’Unione europea e che vede un ruolo da protagonista dell’Italia. Una rete che – stando a documenti consultati da Famiglia Cristiana – potrebbe però cadere in pessime mani. Quelle delle milizie libiche, ovvero le forze di Tripoli che compongono quella stessa Guardia costiera pronta ad usare le armi contro le Ong, accusata un anno fa dalle Nazioni Unite di essere stata complice in alcuni casi degli stessi trafficanti. Il progetto in origine riguardava l’area dell’Atlantico. La responsabilità, in quel caso, era stata affidata alla Guardia Civil spagnola e l’area interessata era sostanzialmente il tratto di mare a sud delle Canarie, una delle rotte delle migrazioni via mare attive fino a una decina di anni fa. Il sistema permette di «scambiare informazioni via satellite per combattere l’immigrazione irregolare via mare», si legge in un documento delle autorità spagnole che abbiamo consultato, creando dei punti di contatto in ogni paese coinvolto «per accedere a questa rete sicura».
Le informazioni raccolte sono estremamente sensibili e costituiscono una base di conoscenza e di intelligence sicuramente strategica. Dopo l’avvio di una prima fase sulla zona atlantica, il progetto Sea Horse punta, dal 2015, al Mediterraneo. Tre i paesi del nord Africa coinvolti: l’Egitto, la Tunisia e la Libia. Nel novembre del 2015 il commissario europeo Dimitris Avramopoulos aveva risposto ad una interrogazione delle deputate europee Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL), spiegando che il progetto era in una fase di stallo. Il problema principale riguardava proprio la Libia: «A causa della situazione d’insicurezza e alla mancanza di stabilità del governo nazionale libico – si legge nella risposta all’interrogazione pubblicata sul sito del Parlamento europeo – tutte le attività per installare il #National_Contact_Point in Libia sono sospese. Di conseguenza le autorità libiche interessate non sono collegate al #Mebocc, che sarà ospitato dal centro di coordinamento italiano per la sorveglianza delle frontiere».
La sigla Mebocc sta per #Mediterranean_Border_Cooperation_Center, ed è il cuore della rete di controllo del mare tra Italia e Libia. La collocazione di questo centro, come ha spiegato il commissario europeo, è prevista nel nostro paese, con un backup a Malta. Tutto, però, sembrava fermo fino al novembre del 2015.
Un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime
Alla fine del 2016, dopo il cambio ai vertici del ministero dell’Interno e l’arrivo di Marco Minniti, il progetto ha subito un’accelerazione. Nella “Relazione sulla performance per il 2016” del Viminale c’è un paragrafo dove si annuncia l’operatività del progetto: «L’infrastruttura satellitare», si legge nel documento, «è stata installata nel #Centro_Interforze_di_Gestione_e_Controllo (#CIGC) #SICRAL di Vigna di Valle, teleporto principale del Ministero della Difesa, mentre presso il Centro Nazionale di Coordinamento per l’immigrazione “Roberto Iavarone” – #EUROSUR, sede del MEBOCC, sono stati installati gli altri apparati funzionali alla rete di comunicazione. Al 31 dicembre 2016, quello dell’Italia risultava essere l’unico nodo realmente attivo e pronto per le comunicazioni».
Tutto pronto, dunque, per operare. Pronto e operativo, a quanto sembra, era anche il governo libico, che solo un anno prima veniva definito instabile dalla Commissione europea. Si legge nel rapporto del Ministero dell’Interno, documento che Famiglia Cristiana ha consultato: «Si segnala inoltre che nel 2016, nell’ambito del progetto Sea Horse Mediterranean Network, quattro ufficiali della Guardia Costiera – Marina Militare Libica sono stati ospitati in Italia, in qualità di osservatori, uno presso l’#ICC - #International_Coordination_Center, altri due imbarcati sull’assetto spagnolo “#Rio_Segura” durante il mese di settembre e uno presso il Centro nazionale di coordinamento – EUROSUR della Direzione Centrale per l’Immigrazione dal 5 al 9 dicembre, con funzioni di collegamento con le autorità libiche e per migliorare/stimolare la cooperazione nella gestione degli eventi di immigrazione irregolare provenienti dalla Libia».
Dunque un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime del Mediterraneo poco più di un anno fa. Fatto che potrebbe avere come conseguenza la possibilità di accesso al sistema Sea Horse da parte del governo di Tripoli, impegnato, come abbiamo visto, nel respingimento in mare dei migranti che fuggono dal Nord Africa verso l’Europa. La sensibilità delle informazioni che il network raccoglie e gestisce è evidente. Un mese fa è stata presentata una seconda interrogazione al Parlamento europeo per capire se i libici già sono in grado di accedere ai dati dei satelliti che monitorano il Mediterraneo: «Dove, in Libia o in Italia, sono stati realizzati i Centri Operativi (ad esempio il Mebocc) e quali autorità o milizie sono coinvolte?», hanno chiesto i deputati Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst. Al momento non hanno ottenuto nessuna risposta. La Libia è sempre più vicina.
▻http://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-gli-occhi-della-libia-sui-radar-europei-nel-mediterraneo.
#Egypte #Tunisie #Libye #images_satellitaires -
Migranti, affidarne i soccorsi alla Libia significa respingerli
Un verbale della riunione dell’ Organizzazione mondiale del mare del 30 ottobre scorso svela la contrarietà di creare un coordinamento libico dei salvataggi nel Mediterraneo. Ma giovedì scorso la nave della Ong spagnola Open Arms è stata affidata proprio alle motovedette di Tripoli come ha spiegato anche la Guardia Costiera italiana. Ora cominciano i respingimenti collettivi per conto terzi?
▻http://m.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-affidarne-i-soccorsi-in-mare-alla-libia-significa-respi
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EU Trust Fund for Africa: five new programmes adopted for the Sahel and Lake Chad region
The European Commission has adopted five new programmes worth over €141 million under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.
Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica said: "Our new EU programmes, worth €141 million, are particularly focusing on important opportunities for young people. They will furthermore support our #G5-Sahel partners to strengthen development and stability in border areas, as well as help us to save more lives and fight human traffickers, who take advantage of vulnerable people’s despair. We also continue our actions to support partner countries to better manage migration and to develop civil registries. Those needs do not decrease, and the resources from the EU Trust Fund are quickly depleting”
At the regional level, two programmes totalling €75 million will seek to shore up stability and youth participation in the G5 #Sahel countries (#Burkina_Faso, Chad, #Mali, Mauritania and #Niger). A new €70 million Emergency programme will increase people’s access to social services in border areas. The programme was designed under the Sahel Alliance and responds directly to the needs voiced by the G5 Sahel countries under the #Priority_Investment_Programme. Another €5 million will ensure the implementation of the second phase of “#The_Voices_of_young_people_in_the_Sahel” programme, which was launched in 2017 and contributes to integrating youth organisations into the processes of designing and implementing development and social policies.
A new €7.6 million programme in Niger will further boost migrant protection on migratory routes and support host communities. Also in Niger, the ongoing AJUSEN budget support programme in the justice, security and border management sectors will receive an additional €10 million to continue this work.
In Senegal, a €9 million initiative will help tackle criminal networks that are linked to irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and enhance regional cooperation in this area.
In #Côte_d'Ivoire, a new programme worth €30 million will support the country’s ongoing efforts to create a coherent and robust civil registry system that will help improve the management of public policies, enable people to exercise their fundamental rights and improve their access to public services, including the facilitation of voluntary return and the sustainable reintegration of migrants.
Last but not least, the #Technical_Cooperation_Facility covering all Trust Fund regions and the Research and Evidence Facility covering the Sahel and Lake Chad and the North of Africa regions have been reinforced with an additional amount of €12 million. In line with the evidence-based approach under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to ensure strategic and efficient interventions, this additional funding will facilitate more studies and research, as well as technical support when necessary.
The five programmes adopted today bring the total number of programmes adopted since December 2015 for the Sahel and Lake Chad region to 91, with a total value of €1.7 billion.
Background
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in 2015 to address the root causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement. Resources currently allocated to this Trust Fund are €4.1 billion from EU institutions, European Member States and other donors.
Today’s assistance adds to the 165 programmes already approved across the three regions (North of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad region and Horn of Africa), worth a total of €3,157 million. These funds were divided up as follows: Sahel/Lake Chad €1,549 million (86 programmes); Horn of Africa €1,141.3 million (58 programmes); North of Africa €467.1 million (17 programmes). This amount includes 4 cross-region programmes (€145.1 million).
▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6447_en.htm?locale=EN
#Tchad #Mauritanie #jeunesse #Sénégal #réintégration #retours_volontaires #retour_volontaire
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“Nile Hilton Incident” tops box offices everywhere but Egypt
▻http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/10/egyptian-director-talks-on-censorship-of-nile-hilton.html
“I’m not a martyr. I’m not a victim. I don’t feel brave,” Tarik Saleh, the award-winning Egyptian/Swedish director of one of the year’s most controversial films, “The Nile Hilton Incident,” told Al-Monitor in a Skype interview.
“I never went to prison in Egypt; I feel very privileged. Filmmakers and writers who are still working there … they are the ones paying a high price,” he said.
An expertly crafted film noir about a corrupt police officer that unveils an even larger web of corruption that involves the police, the justice system and the highest echelons of Egyptian society, Saleh’s movie made headlines in the international press. Although the film was initially approved, several scenes that painted an unflattering portrait of the Egyptian police caused filming to be blocked by Egypt’s state security, forcing the production to move to Morocco.
Several months after winning the World Cinema Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance film festival, this Swedish production has become one of the biggest art-house hits of the year, drawing an attendance of nearly 400,000 in France alone.
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Yemen War Archives and Reports
The Saudi kingdom and its coalition declared a war against Yemen on March 26, 2015. The coalition members included: Saudi, UAE, USA, UK, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan. Other countries provided their support to the coalition through the sale of weapons, logistical and/or intelligence services. These include: France, Malaysia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Spain, Germany, Canada and Australia.
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Foreign ministry says Africa-Israel Summit postponed due to Palestinian pressure
Sept. 11, 2017 7:59 P.M. (Updated: Sept. 11, 2017 7:59 P.M.)
▻http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=779061RAMALLAH (Ma’an) — The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Monday it was instrumental in leading a boycott campaign against the Africa-Israel Summit planned for next month, after organizers of the summit announced the event was “postponed” without providing a future date.
Last month, reports emerged that several African countries were planning to boycott the summit. South African Ambassador to Lebanon and Syria Sean Benfeldt reportedly said that the country would not take part because the summit was viewed as a step by Israel to normalize relations between Africa and an “occupation state.” Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania also decided to boycott the gathering.
A statement released by the Israeli foreign ministry Monday morning said that the decision to “postpone” the event, set to take place in Lome in October, came “following the request of the President of Togo and after mutual consultations with the Prime Minister.”
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8,500 people lost in Mediterranean since death of three-year-old Alan Kurdi | World news | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/01/alan-kurdi-khaled-hosseini-mediterranean-refugees-sea-prayer
At least 8,500 people have died or disappeared while attempting to cross the Mediterranean since the death of Alan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian boy whose body washed ashore in Turkey in 2015, drawing global attention to the plight of refugees.
According to the latest figures released by the UN’s refugee agency, 4,337 people are believed to have drowned since September 2016 while attempting to reach European shores. Most departed from Libya bound for Italy, from Turkey bound for Greece or, more recently, from Morocco bound for Spain. A further 4,185 people died in the previous 12 months, from 1 September 2015 until the end of August 2016.
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The U.S. wants to deport more Eritreans. Here’s what would happen if they were forced to return.
“Our goal is to get countries to agree to accept the return of their nationals,” David Lapan, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spokesman, told reporters Wednesday.
▻https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/24/the-us-wants-to-deport-more-eritreans-heres-what-would-happen-to-the
#renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #réfugiés_érythréens #Etats-Unis
On y apprend ici (▻http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/23/4-countries-sanctioned-because-of-refusal-to-accep) qu’il y a 12 pays considérés comme #récalcitrants par les USA:
Twelve countries are currently on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s list of “recalcitrant” nations that seriously hinder deportations: China, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Iran, Guinea, Cambodia, Eritrea, Myanmar, Morocco, Hong Kong and South Sudan.
#Chine #Cuba #Vietnam #Laos #Iran #Guinée #Cambodge #Erythrée #Myanmar #Birmanie #Maroc #Hong_Kong #Soudan_du_Sud #Sud_Soudan
Les possibles #sanctions?
He wouldn’t name the four countries that will be hit with visa sanctions, saying it is up to the State Department to decide how severely to punish the countries, but under the law at least some of their citizens — if not all — could be denied the ability to obtain immigrant or visitor visas to travel to the U.S.
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‘We would rather die than stay there’: the refugees crossing from Morocco to Spain | World news | The Guardian
▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/23/we-would-rather-die-than-stay-there-the-refugees-crossing-from-morocco-On the hilltops of Tarifa, the Spanish city that faces Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar and mainland Europe’s southernmost point, gusts of wind power the turbines dotting the landscape.
For the surfers who pack the city’s hotels, the wind is a welcome sign of challenging waves. But for the Spanish coastguard and NGOs, the gusts are a warning that the record numbers of migrants and refugees attempting to cross the 10-mile strait are in grave danger.
#maroc #espagne #réfugiés #migrations #méditerranée #mourir_en_mer
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Quelques références trouvées dans le livre Violent Borders de Reece Jones (excellent, par ailleurs), sur les #statistiques des décès de migrants (certains, voire beaucoup déjà signalés sur seenthis):
Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border
This report is the result of a cooperative agreement entered into by Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties to explore and use binational strategies to protect the human rights of immigrants in the border region. The report describes the unacceptable human tragedy that takes place daily in this region. The study was conducted and written by immigration and border policy advocate Maria Jimenez who resides in Houston, Texas.
▻https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/humanitarian-crisis-migrant-deaths-us-mexico-border
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
In October 2013, over 400 people lost their lives in two shipwrecks close to the Italian island of Lampedusa. While these two events were highly publicized, sadly they are not isolated incidents; the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2013 and 2014 nearly 6,500 migrants lost their lives in border regions around the world. Because many deaths occur in remote areas and are never reported, counts of deaths fail to capture the full number of lives lost.
Despite recognition that actions must be taken to stop more unnecessary deaths, as yet there remains very little information on the scale of the problem. The vast majority of governments do not publish numbers of deaths, and counting lives lost is largely left to civil society and the media. Drawing upon data from a wide range of sources from different regions of the world, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration investigates how border-related deaths are documented, who is documenting them, and what can be done to improve the evidence base to encourage informed accountability, policy and practice.
Regionally focused chapters present most recent statistics and address a number of key questions regarding how migrant border-related deaths are enumerated. Chapters address: migration routes through Central America to the United States, with a focus on the United States–Mexico border region; the southern European Union bordering the Mediterranean; routes from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa; routes taken by migrants emigrating from the Horn of Africa towards the Gulf or Southern Africa; and the waters surrounding Australia.
Numbers have the power to capture attention, and while counts of border-related deaths will always be estimates, they serve to make concrete something which has been left vague and ill-defined. In a way, through counting, deaths too often invisible are given existence. More complete data can not only serve to highlight the extent of what is taking place, but is also crucial in guiding effective policy response.
▻https://publications.iom.int/fr/books/fatal-journeys-tracking-lives-lost-during-migration
#fatal_journeysBeyond Walls and Cages: Prisons, Borders, and Global Crisis
The crisis of borders and prisons can be seen starkly in statistics. In 2011 some 1,500 migrants died trying to enter Europe, and the United States deported nearly 400,000 and imprisoned some 2.3 million people―more than at any other time in history. International borders are increasingly militarized places embedded within domestic policing and imprisonment and entwined with expanding prison-industrial complexes. Beyond Walls and Cages offers scholarly and activist perspectives on these issues and explores how the international community can move toward a more humane future.Working at a range of geographic scales and locations, contributors examine concrete and ideological connections among prisons, migration policing and detention, border fortification, and militarization. They challenge the idea that prisons and borders create safety, security, and order, showing that they can be forms of coercive mobility that separate loved ones, disempower communities, and increase shared harms of poverty. Walls and cages can also fortify wealth and power inequalities, racism, and gender and sexual oppression.As governments increasingly rely on criminalization and violent measures of exclusion and containment, strategies for achieving change are essential. Beyond Walls and Cages develops abolitionist, no borders, and decolonial analyses and methods for social change, showing how seemingly disconnected forms of state violence are interconnected. Creating a more just and free world―whether in the Mexico-U.S. borderlands, the Morocco-Spain region, South Africa, Montana, or Philadelphia―requires that people who are most affected become central to building alternatives to global crosscurrents of criminalization and militarization.
▻https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Walls-Cages-Geographies-Transformation/dp/0820344125The Human Costs of Border Control (2007)
This article outlines the relationship between irregular immigration, increased border control, and the number of casualties at Europe’s maritime borders. The conclusion is that the number of fatalities is increasing as a result of increased border control. The author argues that States have a positive obligation under international law to address this issue, and formulates concrete proposals to monitor the number of border deaths.
▻http://thomasspijkerboer.eu/migrant-deaths-academic/the-human-costs-of-border-control-2007
#migrations #asile #réfugiés #chiffres #décès #morts #rapport #USA #Etats-Unis #frontières #Mexique
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Fatal Journeys Volume 3 Part 1: Improving Data on Missing Migrants
Since 2014, more than 22,500 migrant deaths and disappearances have been recorded by the International Organization for Migration globally. The real figure could be much higher, but many deaths are never recorded. Fatal Journeys Volume 3 – Part 1 provides a global review of existing data sources, and illustrates the need for improvements in the ways that data on missing migrants are collected, analysed and communicated.
The report highlights three key ways in which to improve the collection, sharing and reporting of data on missing migrants. First, a growing number of innovative sources of data on missing migrants, such as “big data”, could be used to improve data on migrant fatalities. Second, much more could be done to gather data to increase identification rates, such as developing intraregional mechanisms to share data more effectively. Third, improving data on missing migrants also requires more thought and improved practice in the use and communication of such data. Improving information and reporting on who these missing migrants are, where they come from, and above all, when they are most at risk, is crucial to building a holistic response to reduce the number of migrant deaths.
https://publications.iom.int/sites/default/files/books/fatal_journeys_volume_3_part_1_0.jpg 
https://i.imgur.com/hRzxP6m.png 
https://i.imgur.com/meKzIfo.png ►https://publications.iom.int/books/fatal-journeys-volume-3-part-1-improving-data-missing-migrants
#données #rapport #médias #journalisme #presse #couverture_médiatique #identification #corps #ceux_qui_restent #fatal_journeys #celleux_qui_restent -
Nouveau rapport de l’OIM « Fatal journeys » (publié en 2017)
Fatal Journeys Volume 3 PART 2
https://i.imgur.com/1ezg6Bn.png 
https://i.imgur.com/ku5UbaM.png 
https://i.imgur.com/c8QDzex.png 
https://i.imgur.com/TZTilQi.png 
https://i.imgur.com/IljLuAu.png 
https://i.imgur.com/l9nedVQ.png 
https://i.imgur.com/ZPTp6vz.png 
https://i.imgur.com/l3Uqck7.png 
https://i.imgur.com/fbSvE7H.png 
https://i.imgur.com/nX35Qtz.png ▻https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fatal_journeys_3_part2.pdf
#cartographie #visualisation
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Morocco and Algeria keep building more barriers | The Economist
▻http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21725576-fences-make-neighbours-poorer-morocco-and-algeria-keep-building-AD Algeria and Morocco honoured their agreement back in 1989 to form an economic union, along with Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, they would be among the Middle East’s largest economies. Their poor border regions would be booming crossroads. Over the decade to 2015, reckons the World Bank, their two economies would each have almost have doubled in size.
Instead, Algeria grew only by 33% and Morocco by 37%, as both governments instead reinforced their barricades. Their north-west corner of Africa remains “the most separated region on the continent”, says Adel Hamaizia, an Algerian economist. While sub-Saharan countries agree common currencies and trade zones, Algeria digs deeper ditches. Morocco revamps its berms and renews its razor wire. Concrete walls rise on both sides. Frustrated families shout greetings across the divide. Tantalisingly, both have built hundreds of kilometres of east-west highways which stop short of their common border.
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Algeria Starts Construction On ‘High-Tech’ Border Wall At Moroccan Border
The official aim of the wall is to fight against drug trafficking and strengthen the country’s internal security, reported local new outlet Algerie Focus. The wall will include a technological surveillance system with a network of cameras and radar designed in Algeria in partnership with a German firm.
▻http://afkinsider.com/141319/algeria-starts-construction-high-tech-border-wall-moroccan-border
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This is why Arab states are conspicuously silent on Temple Mount crisis - Israel News - Haaretz.com
▻http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.802834
The Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount, like the Kaaba in Mecca and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, is an Islamic site that is inseparable from the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They are sites that, when harmed, spark public outrage that can put the regimes in Arab and other Muslim states on a collision course with Islamic movements in their countries.
It also puts them in conflict with a sensitive Muslim public that can delegitimize closer ties between Israel and Arab countries, and places them in conflict with a secular Arab public that views the events as a deliberate attempt by Israel to take over Palestinian sites.
The recognition of people power and the threat that Arab public opinion poses is one of the most important by-products of the Arab Spring, particularly when it concerns Israel and the holy sites. Such matters constitute a loose, but perhaps only, common denominator that these parts of public opinion share.
Up to now, the Arab and Muslim rage in these countries has not been translated into public displays in the form of mass demonstrations or harshly critical articles. Events on the Temple Mount over the past week or so have indeed garnered headlines in most of the Arab world, but at this point – for possibly the first time – we haven’t seen the customary anti-Israel protests on the streets of Cairo, Amman and Morocco. -
The #Rif and the Moroccan State’s Economic Pressure Cooker
▻https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/07/14/the-rif-and-the-moroccan-states-economic-pressure-cookerAlthough these demands were drafted to respond to the concerns of the Rif, they echo similar ones carried by social movements throughout #Morocco. The #Hirak emerged from similar economic injustices found throughout the wide margins of the Makhzenist state, the neglected “backlands” that actually constitute the vast majority of the country. It should come as no surprise then that their movement has spread more easily to villages and towns in the Atlas (Central Morocco) and Asammr (Southeast) than to the former colonial metropolises (Rabat-Casablanca). Vestiges of colonialism, roads and train lines point to these wealthy urban centers, taking capital, raw resources and cheap migrant labor from the margins in return for remittances, “development” aid and weak tourism.
In these epicentres of Moroccan capital, business goes on as usual. The neoliberal war waged on the poor rages on, encouraged and facilitated by institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Today, the state works diligently to meet the requirements of their international debtors, beginning to sketch out the grounds for a new social contract. “It is time for the state to take its hands off certain sectors, like health and education” declared former Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane at the African Bank of Development’s 2014 conference, “the role of the state should be limited to assisting private operators who wish to engage in these sectors.”
Indeed, the state has began to savagely privatize the education sector, making the 1984 fee hike of $5 appear miniscule. In the last few years, public elementary and secondary schools have been closing left and right. According to a report by militant organisations, 191 have closed in Casablanca and Rabat alone between 2008 and 2013. Those that remain are seeing overcrowding with some classrooms sometimes holding more than 70 students. Meanwhile, students at public universities will begin to pay subscription fees and graduate students will begin to pay tuition.
Public health has also been undermined with the state completely disengaging itself from the sector — no new public hospitals are planned, increasingly fewer doctors are employed and equipment is rarely purchased or renewed. Instead, the state works in favor of expensive private clinics which escape regulations and controls. Public water and electricity services have also been privatized, with the public National Office for Electricity and Potable Water (ONEE) seeing entire cities taken off its grid, its tax-funded infrastructures given almost for free to foreign multinationals like France’s Suez Environnement and Veolia.
#Privatization has meant increasing costs across the board, while the minimum wage has remained low at $250 per month. And that’s if you’re not part of the 10.7% that is unemployed, reaching 25.5% amongst younger Moroccans. Meanwhile, higher costs of rent, subsidy cuts on fuel (with more to come on other basic goods) and increasing costs of living in general have ravaged both proletarian and middle class households. Even lentils, considered the food of the poor, have almost tripled in price from about $1 to almost $3 per kilogram.
Yet, it is not difficult to see why the state has so fully embraced these #neoliberal policies despite the anger they provoke. Rampant liberalization of the public sector has generally meant its recuperation by multinationals owned by the private Societé Nationale d’Investissement (SNI), the royal investment holding: from mining corporations like Managem, to banks like Attijariwafa Bank, to real estate giants like Addoha.
Cracks in the Pressure Cooker
In this context of capitalist predation, the uprising in the Rif should be seen as a justified expression of the popular anger which has been boiling both, under and over the surface for decades. But the last decade demarks itself as a period of unprecedented proliferation in social, political and even environmental movements. According to sociologist Abderrahman Rachik Social, labor-related protests and strikes have shot up by 200% since 2012, while the totality of protest actions in the country have gone from 700 protests in 2005 to 18,000 last year.
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G20: Launch of Africa Partnership and supporting protection in “regions of origin”
Last week’s G20 meeting concluded with two initiatives towards migration and displacement. The first is the launch of the #G20_Africa_Partnership, the second, a commitment to step up “Coordination and Cooperation on Displacement and Migration.”
Among the objectives of the G20 Africa Partnership is to address root causes of migration by improving inclusive economic growth and employment, developing quality infrastructure, especially in the energy sector and strengthening the framework for private finance in the form of investment compacts. Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Tunisia have already presented their commitments for entering “#Investment_Compacts.”
The G20 Africa partnership has received criticism among others by Barbara Sennholz- Weihard of Oxfam Germany who stated: “The narrative is: More investment will lead to jobs being created and then people stay in their home countries. However, it is wrong to see private investment and development cooperation as a way to contain migration. (As it) dismisses many lessons learned during the past decades on how sustainable development cooperation should be done. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that migration makes a positive contribution to development due to migrants’ #remittances.”
▻https://www.ecre.org/g20-launch-of-africa-partnership-and-supporting-protection-in-regions-of-origi
#externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Afrique #G20 #développement #investissements #infrastructure #croissance_économique #économie #travail #énergie #emploi #remises
cc @rekaIci le texte de l’accord:
▻https://www.g20.org/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2017-g20-annex-partnership-africa-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 -
Punish the smuggler or reward the smuggler? Recent refugee arrivals in Greece
Media coverage of the refugee situation in Greece focuses heavily on the Syrians and secondarily on Afghans and Iraqis. While these are indeed the three most highly represented nationalities among asylum seekers in Greece, the past six to twelve months have seen a gradual shift.
Fast forward to 2017, taking the period from 10 May to 27 June 2017, a total of 982 asylum seekers reached the island of Lesvos. The top nationalities were: DRC (202), Syria (160), Iraq (116), Afghanistan (61). The rest were from Iran, Kuwait (Bidoon), Palestine, Guinea, Eritrea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Yemen, Togo, Gambia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Sudan and Nigeria. One person each came from Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa, Haiti and Uganda. Similar trends are noted on the other islands which act as the entry point to Greece.
Those of us acquainted with Moria reception and identification centre in Lesvos have noticed the nationality change among the new arrivals over the last two years: many more Africans and less Arabs. Groups of Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans are still coming grouped together, while Africans from different nationalities arrive in different groups with other nationalities. The smuggling fees vary according to nationality.
One may wonder why people from Africa, whether northern or sub-Sahara, take the route to Europe through Greece, rather than the intuitively more direct route to Italy or Spain. A look at flight routes and visa regimes provides the answer. One may reach the Greek islands from as far away as central Africa, using Turkish Airlines, a Turkish visa and a smuggler picked at Istanbul airport or the Aegean coast, for less than 1,500 dollars total.
Turkish Airlines has 200 destinations worldwide and at reasonable prices. For example, one way flight from Kinshasa to Istanbul costs 833 dollars, Abidjan to Istanbul, 709 dollars and Casablanca to Istanbul 458 dollars.
Secondly, visas for Turkey are generally easily obtained. From the nationalities arriving in Lesvos in June, all except Cubans and Palestinians, depending on where they were registered, are exempt from any visa requirement or need only an electronic visa, easily obtained online for the cost of 20 dollars.
Eritreans are often rejected asylum seekers from Israel, deported to Rwanda with cash, which they use to escape again through the Aegean route. Women from the Dominican Republic are usually trafficked to Turkey and once they manage to escape to Greece, seek assistance to return to their country. Citizens of sub-Saharan Africa come from a number of conflicts in the region, both internal and cross-border, including purges in the DRC and the Boko Haram. North Africans face chronic instability in their countries.
▻https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/fotini-rantsiou/punish-smuggler-or-reward-smuggler-recent-refugee-arrivals-in-greece
#Grèce #mer_Egée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #parcours_migratoires #Turquie #routes_migratoires #Afrique #réfugiés_syriens #Turkish_airlines #visas #réfugiés_érythtréens
