country:oman

  • Israël a rétabli ses liens avec Oman, annonce le chef du Mossad
    OLJ/AFP - 01/07/2019
    https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1177129/israel-a-retabli-ses-liens-avec-oman-annonce-le-chef-du-mossad.html

    Yossi Cohen, chef des services secrets israéliens, le Mossad. Photo d’archives. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun

    Le climat actuel crée « une opportunité sans précédent, peut-être même la première de l’histoire du Moyen-Orient, pour atteindre une entente régionale qui pourrait mener à un accord de paix global », souligne Yossi Cohen.

    Israël a rétabli des « relations officielles » avec le sultanat d’Oman, médiateur discret dans plusieurs crises régionales, a annoncé lundi le chef des services secrets israéliens, le Mossad.

    « Tout récemment, le rétablissement de relations officielles avec Oman a été annoncé ainsi que la mise en place d’un bureau de représentation du ministère (israélien) des Affaires étrangères dans ce pays », a déclaré Yossi Cohen, lors d’une conférence à Herzliya, près de Tel-Aviv.

    Dans les années 1990, Israël et Oman avaient ouvert chacun un bureau de représentation commerciale avant que le sultanat ne décide de les fermer en 2000, dans le sillage de la deuxième Intifada palestinienne.

    Le rétablissement des liens entre les deux pays est « la partie visible d’un effort bien plus large, qui reste secret », selon M. Cohen.

    Cette annonce intervient quelques jours après une conférence à Bahreïn sur le volet économique d’un plan américain censé ouvrir la voie à un règlement du conflit israélo-palestinien. L’Autorité palestinienne a boycotté cette rencontre, accusant Washington de partialité pro-Israël. Israël n’a pas dépêché de représentant officiel, mais fait sans précédent, des chercheurs et des journalistes israéliens, invités par la Maison Blanche, y côtoyaient, dans les grandes salles, des officiels des pays du Golfe. Des représentants du sultanat d’Oman étaient également présents.

    Jeudi, le chef de la diplomatie bahreïnie a déclaré que l’Etat hébreu faisait partie de « l’héritage de cette région historiquement » et que « le peuple juif a une place parmi nous », des déclarations inédites. (...)

  • To Evade Sanctions on Iran, Ships Vanish in Plain Sight - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/world/middleeast/china-oil-iran-sanctions.html

    A week ago, a small tanker ship approached the Persian Gulf after a 19-day voyage from China. The captain, as required by international rules, reported the ship’s position, course, speed and another key detail: It was riding high in the water, meaning it was probably empty.

    Then the Chinese-owned ship, the Sino Energy 1, went silent and essentially vanished from the grid.

    It reported in again on Sunday, near the spot where it had vanished six days earlier, only now it was heading east, away from the Strait of Hormuz near Iran. If past patterns hold, the captain will soon report that it is riding low in the water, meaning its tanks are most likely full.

    @simplicissimus

  • Oman veut ouvrir une ambassade en Cisjordanie - moyen orient
    Publié le 26-06-2019 - RFI
    http://www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20190626-oman-veut-ouvrir-ambassade-cisjordanie

    Le sultanat d’Oman va ouvrir une ambassade dans les Territoires palestiniens. L’annonce a été faite ce mercredi 27 juin alors que le pays est de plus en plus présent dans le dossier israélo-palestinien.

    Le ministère omanais des Affaires étrangères a indiqué dans un communiqué qu’une mission se rendrait à Ramallah en Cisjordanie, siège de l’Autorité palestinienne, pour préparer l’ouverture de cette mission diplomatique.Avec cette représentation, Oman va devenir le cinquième pays arabe, mais le premier du Golfe, à ouvrir une ambassade dans ce territoire palestinien occupé par Israël depuis plus de 50 ans.

    Ce geste de « soutien au peuple palestinien », comme le présente le ministère omanais des Affaires étrangères, est aussi l’occasion pour le sultanat de renforcer sa présence dans les Territoires palestiniens et possiblement de se poser en tant que médiateur avec les Israéliens, relève notre correspondant à Jérusalem, Guilhem Delteil.

    Car Mascate est de plus en plus présent dans le dossier israélo-palestinien. En octobre dernier, le sultan , Qabus ibn Saïd a notamment reçu à tour de rôle le président de l’Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, et le Premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahu. Oman n’entretient pourtant pas de relation diplomatique avec Israël. (...)

  • U.A.E. Splits With U.S. Over Blame for Oil Tanker Attack in May - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-26/u-a-e-splits-with-u-s-over-blame-for-oil-tanker-attack-in-may


    A U.S. Navy vessel guards the Japanese oil tanker Kokuka Courageous in the Gulf of Oman.
    Photographer: Mumen Khatib/AFP via Getty Images

    The United Arab Emirates appeared to distance itself from U.S. claims that pinned attacks on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz on Iran.

    Honestly we can’t point the blame at any country because we don’t have evidence,” Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan said on Wednesday in Moscow. “If there is a country that has the evidence, then I’m convinced that the international community will listen to it. But we need to make sure the evidence is precise and convincing.

    While an investigation by the U.A.E., Norway and Saudi Arabia concluded that a “state actor” was most likely behind the incident in May, no nation was singled out. Still, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton has said that Iran was almost certainly responsible.

  • صدمة في البنتاغون بسبب نجاح إيران في إسقاط تاج الصناعة العسكرية الأمريكية طائرة ” Global Hawk” والتساؤل : بأي صاروخ أسقطته هل روسي أم محلي الصنع؟ | رأي اليوم
    https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%d8%b5%d8%af%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%aa%d8%a

    Le drône US abattu par les Iraniens est un bel engin qui a coûté 270 millions de dollars.L’armée US n’en aurait qu’une dizaine d’exemplaires. Et elle aimerait bien savoir comment les Iraniens l’ont abattu. Cela explique peut-être la "retenue américaine".

    #magicien_d'ormuz #iran

  • Donald Trump annule au dernier moment des frappes militaires sur l’Iran
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/06/21/trump-annule-au-dernier-moment-des-frappes-sur-l-iran_5479488_3210.html

    Au lendemain de l’attaque d’un drone américain, le président américain a approuvé une opération militaire avant de se raviser, selon le « New York Times ».

    Le président américain Donald Trump qui poursuit sa politique de « pression maximum » sur l’Iran. Il a approuvé une opération militaire devant cibler des installations iraniennes, vendredi, avant de se raviser et d’annuler les frappes au dernier moment, écrit le New York Times, vendredi 21 juin. Le quotidien cite des représentants de l’administration américaine ayant pris part ou étant informés des discussions.

    D’après le journal, le président américain a validé une offensive contre un éventail de cibles iraniennes, telles que des radars ou des batteries de missiles, puis s’est ravisé alors que les avions de chasse avaient décollé et les navires de guerre s’étaient mis en position.

    Aucun missile n’a été tiré, avant que l’opération ne soit annulée, à 19 h 30, heure de Washington (1 h 30 du matin, à Paris), a déclaré un membre de l’administration, cité par le journal. La Maison Blanche et le Pentagone ont refusé de commenter l’information.
    Le New York Times ajoute ne pas savoir à l’heure actuelle si une offensive américaine contre l’Iran est toujours programmée, indiquant ne pas avoir établi si Donald Trump avait changé d’avis ou si le revirement était dû à des interrogations stratégiques ou logistiques.

    Les craintes de confrontation directe entre Washington et Téhéran ont été ravivées jeudi après que l’Iran a abattu un drone RQ-4 Global Hawk américain se trouvant selon lui dans son espace aérien, près du détroit d’Ormuz, ce que contestent les Etats-Unis.
    L’Iran affirme disposer de preuves « irréfutables » montrant que le drone américain a abattu jeudi était entré dans son espace aérien. « Des débris du drone ont même été retrouvés dans les eaux territoriales de l’Iran », a maintenu le ministre des affaires étrangères adjoint Abbas Araghchi lors d’une discussion avec l’ambassadeur de Suisse à Téhéran, qui représente les intérêts américains.

  • Golfe : le tanker japonais cible d’une mine-ventouse propre « à celles utilisées par l’Iran » (armée américaine) | Connaissances des énergies
    https://www.connaissancedesenergies.org/afp/golfe-le-tanker-japonais-cible-dune-mine-ventouse-propre-ce

    Le tanker japonais Kokuka Courageous a été touché en mer d’Oman par une mine-ventouse « semblable à celles utilisées par l’Iran », a assuré mercredi le commandant de la marine américaine Sean Kido, qui a ajouté que ses experts avaient récupéré des empreintes.

    Ce type de « mine-ventouse est reconnaissable et ressemble en tous points aux mines iraniennes visibles dans des défilés militaires iraniens », a dit l’officier au cours d’une conférence de presse à Fujairah (Emirats Arabe Unis), où le navire japonais est ancré.

    Les iraniens, on sait qu’ils sont vraiment trèméchan à ce genre de détails : ils laissent leur signature partout où ils font des vilénies barbares et non-civilisées.

  • Voici les nouvelles images publiées par le Pentagone devant accuser l’Iran de l’attaque en mer d’Oman (Sputnik)
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/international/16149-voici-les-nouvelles-images-publiees-par-le-pentagone-devant-accuser

    Les États-Unis ont publié ce lundi 17 juin de nouvelles photos présentées comme incriminant l’Iran dans les attaques contre deux pétroliers en mer d’Oman. Suite à la publication de ce nouveau lot de documents, le Pentagone a annoncé le déploiement de 1.000 militaires supplémentaires au Moyen-Orient.

    La tension continue de monter entre Washington et Téhéran après l’incident en mer d’Oman. Le Pentagone a dévoilé de nouvelles images qui montrent, selon l’armée américaine, les conséquences des explosions sur le pétrolier Kokuka Courageous.

    Les 11 nouvelles photos rendues publiques par le Pentagone montreraient notamment un objet métallique circulaire de près de huit centimètres de diamètre attaché à la coque du pétrolier japonais. Cet objet est présenté comme l’un des aimants ayant permis de poser la (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_internationales #Actualités_Internationales

  • Au sujet de la « guerre contre les pétroliers » dans le Golfe, il est intéressant de noter que deux commentateurs peu suspects d’alignement sur les États-Unis voient considèrent comme très crédible la responsabilité de l’Iran, acculée par les sanctions contre ses exportations de pétrole.

    Le Golfe est confronté à un scénario de guerre à petite échelle : pas de solution évidente – Elijah J. Magnier
    https://ejmagnier.com/2019/06/16/le-golfe-est-confronte-a-un-scenario-de-guerre-a-petite-echelle-pas-de-so

    Mais la “guerre contre les pétroliers” n’a certainement pas pris fin avec cette dernière attaque dans le Golfe d’Oman.

    L’Iran est bien sûr le principal suspect derrière ces attentats, mais aucune preuve tangible n’en a été apportée à ce jour. Enlever si rapidement et si facilement une mine ventouse inconnue, comme le montre la vidéo étatsunienne – est tout à fait extraordinaire, même pour des experts en explosifs. Aucun expert – même s’il connaît très bien ces mines – ne toucherait à des munitions non explosées sans prendre la précaution de déjouer lentement et attentivement tous les éventuels pièges et de se prémunir contre un éventuel déclenchement à distance. On a besoin de preuves solides, et non pas d’une analyse simpliste, car les implications de cette attaque sont très graves. 

    Alors, y a-t-il un moyen de sortir de ce cycle d’escalade ? L’Iran ne fait pas confiance aux Nations Unies parce que l’administration américaine a réduit le rôle et l’efficacité de cette organisation. Il ne fait pas confiance à l’Europe, qui a choisi de rester les bras croisés, divisée et soumise aux sanctions et aux brimades américaines. L’Iran ne fait pas confiance à Trump qui a révoqué l’accord nucléaire et est accusé dans son pays de ne pas “respecter le droit ou les institutions démocratiques “.

    Trump ne peut pas se coordonner avec la Russie parce que cela serait utilisé contre lui pendant sa campagne électorale. Il ne peut pas non plus laisser la main à la Chine, c’est le plus important concurrent économique, l’un des plus grands pays du monde et le cauchemar des Etatsuniens. La seule porte de sortie pourrait se trouver dans le Golfe. Tous les pays Arabes ne sont pas des ennemis et certains entretiennent de bonnes relations avec l’Iran et les États-Unis : L’Irak, le Qatar, le Koweït et Oman, par exemple. Si les États-Unis refusent de s’appuyer l’un de ces pays pour entamer des négociations sérieuses en vue d’alléger les sanctions contre l’Iran, la petite guerre actuelle pourrait bien prendre des dimensions plus importantes dans les semaines à venir.

    How Trump’s "Maximum Pressure" Campaign Against Iran Now Works Against Him
    https://www.moonofalabama.org/2019/06/how-trumps-maximum-pressure-campaign-now-works-against-him.html

    Iran calculates that Trump will see the danger and recognize that such a conflict would ruin his presidency. That he will accept that he has to revoke the sanctions and rejoin the nuclear deal to avoid to be blamed for unprecedented oil prices and catastrophic consequences for the global economy.

    We can expect that the cat and mouse game will continue throughout the next twelve month. Trump will be under pressure from both sides. Next spring or summer is the latest point for him to decide either way. Until then we will see more casualties of this new tanker war.

    Iran’s enemies as well as Iran itself now have an interest that more attacks on tankers happen. But unless there is very convincing independent evidence we will never know who will have committed these. There are simply too many players who have motives and the capabilities to make such attacks happen. All of them have plausible reasons to damage more ships. All of them have plausible deniability. It is this what makes the current situation so dangerous. Luckily the problem can be easily solved.

    The one who caused this conflict is Donald Trump. He is also the one who can immediately end it.

  • Des ronds carrés dans l’eau du Potomac
    https://www.dedefensa.org/article/des-ronds-carres-dans-leau-du-potomac

    Des ronds carrés dans l’eau du Potomac

    15 juin 2019 – L’idée de l’hypothèse d’un falseflag d’origine américaniste ou associés à propos des attaques dans le Golfe est envisagée avec une certaine générosité d’esprit, presque du libéralisme de cette sorte dont est faite cette vieillerie pré-postmoderne de Premier Amendement de la Constitution des États-Unis ; une hypothèse qui ne choque pas grand’monde finalement, et c’est une belle et franche nouveauté, – comme si la bienpensance égarait de plus en plus souvent, grâce à l’aide de l’administration Trump, ses anathèmes anti-“complotistes”, – croiriez-vous cela, ô bienpensants ?

    L’hypothèse a l’avantage de bien correspondre aux événements et circonstances en cours, aux habitudes désormais bien établies de l’administration Trump reprenant une tradition américaniste (...)

    • En effet, dans ce cas l’explication de l’attaque dans le Golfe serait, à notre sens, moins de provoquer les Iraniens en les chargeant de cette vilenie […] que d’empêcher le vote des résolutions du Sénat contre des vente d’armes aux deux pays du Golfe du Qatar et de Bahrein.
      […]
      • Alors que des résolutions bloquant des ventes d’armes au Qatar et à Oman étaient assurées de passer au Sénat, les attaques de la journée de jeudi ont poussé la direction républicaine, qui est contre, à précipiter le vote ne doutant pas, – ce fut le cas, – que sous l’influence émotionnelle de la nouvelle des attaques, certains sénateurs partisans des résolutions changeraient de campo. Ce fut le cas, et d’ailleurs aussi bien pour des démocrates que pour quelques-uns des républicains favorables à la résolution, et cela malgré l’intervention passionnée de Rand Paul. Les résolutions ont donc été repoussées et l’administration a gagné un répit, mais de justesse, mais seulement pour le Qatar et Bahrein, et l’offensive va se poursuivre au Sénat même, et également et surtout à la Chambre comme l’a annoncé Pelosi... Voici pour jeudi :
      « Lors de deux votes surprenants jeudi, le Sénat a rejeté les projets de loi du sénateur Rand Paul (R-KY) visant à bloquer les ventes d’armes américaines à Bahreïn et au Qatar. Le vote de Bahreïn a été de 43-56 et celui du Qatar de 42-57.
      [...]
       » Les deux votes étaient considérés comme hautement susceptibles de passer lorsque la décision inattendue et précipitée de la direction du Sénat a été prise pour qu’ils aient lieu jeudi. La décision est sans aucun doute liée aux attaques dans le golfe d’Oman, qui a incité un certain nombre de sénateurs à voter en faveur de la poursuite des ventes d’armes.

       » D’autres votes sont attendus la semaine prochaine sur la cessation de ventes d’armes américaines à l’Arabie saoudite. Les votes saoudiens sont considérés comme assurés de passer.... »

  • Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect - Iran - Haaretz.com

    Oman attack: Iran is the immediate, but unlikely, suspect
    U.S. officials rushed to point to Tehran, but somehow the world’s leading intelligence services failed to discover who is actually behind the strike. And even if they knew, what could be done without risking all-out war?
    Zvi Bar’el | Jun. 14, 2019 | 8:36 AM | 3
    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran/.premium-oman-attack-iran-is-the-immediate-but-unlikely-suspect-1.7368134


    A unnamed senior U.S. Defense Department official was quick to tell CBS that Iran was “apparently” behind the Thursday attack on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, followed by State Secretary Mike Pompeo who later told reported that it was his government’s assessment. There’s nothing new about that, but neither is it a decisive proof.

    Who, then, struck the tankers? Whom does this strike serve and what can be done against such attacks?

    In all previous attacks in the Gulf in recent weeks Iran was naturally taken to be the immediate suspect. After all, Iran had threatened that if it could now sell its oil in the Gulf, other countries would not be able to ship oil through it; Tehran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, and in any case it’s in the sights of the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel. But this explanation is too easy.

    The Iranian regime is in the thrones of a major diplomatic struggle to persuade Europe and its allies, Russia and China, not to take the path of pulling out of the 2015 nuclear agreement. At the same time, Iran is sure that the United States is only looking for an excuse to attack it. Any violent initiative on Tehran’s part could only make things worse and bring it close to a military conflict, which it must avoid.

    Iran has announced it would scale back its commitments under the nuclear deal by expanding its low-level uranium enrichment and not transferring the remainder of its enriched uranium and heavy water to another country, as the agreement requires. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s reports reveal that it has indeed stepped up enrichment, but not in a way that could support a military nuclear program.

    It seems that alongside its diplomatic efforts, Iran prefers to threaten to harm the nuclear deal itself, responding to Washington with the same token, rather than escalate the situation to a military clash.

    Other possible suspects are the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, who continue to pound Saudi targets with medium-range missiles, as was the case last week with strikes on the Abha and Jizan airports, near the Yemeni border, which wounded 26 people. The Houthis have also fired missiles at Riyadh and hit targets in the Gulf. In response, Saudi Arabia launched a massive missile strike on Houthi-controlled areas in northern Yemen.

    The strike on the oil tankers may have been a response to the response, but if this is the case, it goes against Iran’s policy, which seeks to neutralize any pretexts for a military clash in the Gulf. The question, therefore, is whether Iran has full control over all the actions the Houthis take, and whether the aid it gives them commits them fully to its policies, or whether they see assaults on Saudi targets as a separate, local battle, cut off from Iran’s considerations.

    The Houthis have claimed responsibility for some of their actions in Saudi territory in the past, and at times even took the trouble of explaining the reasons behind this assault or the other. But not this time.

    Yemen also hosts large Al-Qaida cells and Islamic State outposts, with both groups having a running account with Saudi Arabia and apparently the capabilities to carry out strikes on vessels moving through the Gulf.

    In the absence of confirmed and reliable information on the source of the fire, we may meanwhile discount the possibility of a Saudi or American provocation at which Iran has hinted, but such things have happened before. However, we may also wonder why some of the most sophisticated intelligence services in the world are having so much trouble discovering who actually carried out these attacks.

    Thwarting such attacks with no precise intelligence is an almost impossible task, but even if the identity of those responsible for it is known, the question of how to respond to the threat would still arise.

    If it turns out that Iran initiated or even carried out these attacks, American and Saudi military forces could attack its Revolutionary Guards’ marine bases along the Gulf coast, block Iranian shipping in the Gulf and persuade European countries to withdraw from the nuclear deal, claiming that continuing relations with Iran would mean supporting terrorism in general, and maritime terrorism in particular.

    The concern is that such a military response would lead Iran to escalate its own and openly strike American and Saudi targets in the name of self-defense and protecting its sovereignty. In that case, a large-scale war would be inevitable. But there’s no certainty that U.S. President Donald Trump, who wants to extricate his forces from military involvement in the Middle East, truly seeks such a conflict, which could suck more and more American forces into this sensitive arena.

    An escape route from this scenario would require intensive mediation efforts between Iran and the United States, but therein lies one major difficulty – finding an authoritative mediator that could pressure both parties. Russia or China are not suitable candidates, and ties between Washington and the European Union are acrimonious.

    It seems that all sides would be satisfied if they could place responsibility for the attacks on the Houthis or other terror groups. That is not to say that the United States or Saudi Arabia have any magic solutions when it comes to the Houthis; far from it. The war in Yemen has been going on for five years now with no military resolution, and increased bombardment of concentrations of Houthi forces could only expand their efforts to show their strength. But the United States would pay none of the diplomatic or military price for assaults on the Houthis it would for a forceful violent response against Iran itself.

    If sporadic, small-scale attacks raise such complex dilemmas, one can perhaps dream of an all-out war with Iran, but it is enough to look at the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan to grow extremely cautious of the trajectory in which such dreams become a nightmare that lasts for decades.❞
    #Oman #Iran
    https://seenthis.net/messages/786937

    • UPDATE 1-"Flying objects" damaged Japanese tanker during attack in Gulf of Oman
      Junko Fujita – June 14, 2019
      (Adds comments from company president)
      By Junko Fujita
      https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-tanker-japan-damage/update-1-flying-objects-damaged-japanese-tanker-during-attack-in-gulf-of-om

      TOKYO, June 14 (Reuters) - Two “flying objects” damaged a Japanese tanker owned by Kokuka Sangyo Co in an attack on Thursday in the Gulf of Oman, but there was no damage to the cargo of methanol, the company president said on Friday.

      The Kokuka Courageous is now sailing toward the port of Khor Fakkan in the United Arab Emirates, with the crew having returned to the ship after evacuating because of the incident, Kokuka President Yutaka Katada told a press conference. It was being escorted by the U.S. Navy, he said.

      “The crew told us something came flying at the ship, and they found a hole,” Katada said. “Then some crew witnessed the second shot.”

      Katada said there was no possibility that the ship, carrying 25,000 tons of methanol, was hit by a torpedo.

      The United States has blamed Iran for attacking the Kokuka Courageous and another tanker, the Norwegian-owned Front Altair, on Thursday, but Tehran has denied the allegations.

      The ship’s crew saw an Iranian military ship in the vicinity on Thursday night Japan time, Katada said.

      Katada said he did not believe Kokuka Courageous was targetted because it was owned by a Japanese firm. The tanker is registered in Panama and was flying a Panamanian flag, he said.

      “Unless very carefully examined, it would be hard to tell the tanker was operated or owned by Japanese,” he said. (...)

  • UK maritime group warns of incident in the Gulf of Oman | News | Al Jazeera
    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/uk-maritime-group-warns-incident-gulf-oman-190613054602630.html

    A United Kingdom maritime safety group is warning that an unspecified incident has taken place in the Gulf of Oman and is urging “extreme caution” amid heightened United States-Iran tensions.

    The UK’s Maritime Trade Operations, which is run by the British navy, put out the alert early on Thursday. It did not elaborate further, but said it was investigating the incident.

    Joshua Frey, a spokesman for the US Navy’s Bahrain-based 5th Fleet, said his command was “aware” of a reported incident in the area.

    “We are working on getting details,” Frey told The Associated Press.

    Iranian media reported, without offering any evidence, that there had been an explosion in the area targeting oil tankers.

  • Crise dans le #Golfe : les enjeux géostratégiques du #détroit_d’Ormuz
    https://www.france24.com/fr/20190514-crise-golfe-enjeux-geostrategiques-detroit-ormuz-iran-oman-emirat

    Le détroit d’#Ormuz, qui permet aux navires de quitter le Golfe, est un petit bras de mer large de 50 km environ, 40 km dans sa partie la plus étroite. Ses eaux étant peu profondes (pas plus de 60 m de profondeur), les navires en provenance de l’océan Indien doivent emprunter un premier chenal de navigation entre les îles omanaises de Quoin et Ras Dobbah, en face de la péninsule du Musandam, avant de s’engager dans un chenal parsemé de trois îles : la Grande Tomb, la Petite Tomb et Abou Moussa. Ces dernières sont contrôlées par l’Iran depuis 1971, et revendiquées depuis par les Émirats arabes unis.

    C’est par ces chenaux de navigation, qui mesurent près de 3 km de largeur chacun, qu’ont transité plus de 18 millions de barils de #pétrole (brut et condensat) par jour pendant le premier semestre de 2018, soit plus de 35 % du pétrole transitant par voie maritime dans le monde, selon l’Agence d’information sur l’énergie du gouvernement américain (AIE). Un chiffre auquel il faut ajouter, selon un rapport du Service de recherches du Congrès américain, 4 millions de barils de produits pétroliers par jour, et plus de 300 millions de mètres cubes de #gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) par jour.

    En moyenne, plus d’une trentaine de pétroliers et méthaniers quittent le Golfe par le détroit chaque jour, majoritairement en direction des pays asiatiques, notamment la Chine, le Japon, l’Inde et la Corée du Sud. Les pays de l’Union européenne et les #États-Unis figurent également parmi les clients des #pétromonarchies du Golfe. Selon les experts, une fermeture du détroit équivaudrait à retirer une dizaine de millions de barils de pétrole par jour du marché international. Par ailleurs, le détroit est également une porte d’entrée commerciale vitale pour les pays de la région, très dépendants des importations, ce qui en fait un des principaux corridors du #commerce international.

    Si ses eaux sont partagées entre la République islamique d’Iran et le sultanat d’Oman, le détroit d’Ormuz est un couloir international, et en principe tous les navires, quel que soit leur pavillon, bénéficient du droit de passage en transit, conformément à la Convention des #Nations_unies sur le droit de la mer, adoptée en 1982, et au droit international coutumier de la mer. Le Golfe est l’une des régions les plus militarisées au monde, qui concentre une grande partie des importations mondiales d’armement. De leur côté, les États-Unis disposent dans la région d’une forte présence militaire, à travers plusieurs bases hautement stratégiques. Ainsi la Ve Flotte américaine est stationnée à Bahreïn, tandis que le Qatar accueille la plus grande base aérienne américaine au #Moyen-Orient. La France, quant à elle, compte une base militaire à Abu Dhabi, dans les Émirats arabes unis. Ces derniers jours, le #Pentagone a dépêché dans la région un porte-avions, un navire de #guerre, des bombardiers B-52 et une batterie de missiles Patriot, évoquant des menaces de l’Iran ou de ses alliés contre des ressortissants ou des intérêts américains au Moyen-Orient.

  • Deux autres navires de guerre américains se rendent dans le golfe Persique alors que les tensions avec l’Iran s’exacerbent (Zerohedge)
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/international/16035-deux-autres-navires-de-guerre-americains-se-rendent-dans-le-golfe-p

    Lors de la dernière provocation contre Téhéran par les États-Unis, deux destroyers de la Marine sont entrés dans le Golfe Persique alors que l’armée américaine continue d’accroître ses moyens dans la région pour empêcher toute "agression" prévue, rapporte l’USNI.

    L’USS McFaul et l’USS Gonzalez ont traversé le détroit d’Ormuz jeudi après-midi sans être défiés par les forces des IRGC dans la région. Ils rejoignent l’USS Abraham Lincoln, stationné dans le golfe d’Oman, ainsi qu’une force de frappe comprenant plusieurs bombardiers B-52, alors que les États-Unis continuent à renforcer leur présence militaire dans la région. Un autre porte-avions, l’USS Kearsarge, est ancré au large des côtes des EAU.

    Selon l’USNI, si les États-Unis voulaient attaquer (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_internationales #Actualités_Internationales

  • Oman’s Boiling Yemeni Border

    The Yemeni province of #Mahra, on the border with Oman, has not been reached by the war so far. However, Saudi Arabia – as Oman used to do to defend its influence – has started to support a large number of Mahari tribes. This has led to large community divisions in local tribal society, for the first time in the history of this eastern province. This support is not limited to the financial domain but also extends to the military. The spread of armed tribal groups has become a new feature in Mahra in light of the indirect Saudi-Emirati-Omani competition for regional leverage.

    In 2015, Yemen’s president, Abdurabo Mansour Hadi, fled to the Yemen-Oman border when the Houthis, along with their former ally Ali Abdullah Saleh, decided to invade Aden to arrest him. The president traveled to the remote provinces of the desert until he arrived in Mahra, through which he crossed the border into Oman. In the meantime, the Saudi-led coalition began its military operations to restore the legitimacy that the Houthis had gained.

    The border strip between Mahra and the Omani province of Dhofar is 288 kilometers long, starting from the coast of Haof district and ending in the heart of the desert at the border triangle between Yemen, Oman and Saudi Arabia: beyond the desert, there are few agricultural zones and the population lives along the border strip. Although the border area is divided between the two countries, the frontier communities in Mahra and Dhofar appear to be an ecosystem: tribes descend from a single tribe and share many historical, social and cultural constituents. In addition, they speak another language beside Arabic, namely “Mahriya” or “Jabali”, which is a Semitic language not spoken by the rest of Yemenis.

    This social cohesion in border areas has led Oman to deal with this ecosystem as a first line of defense to protect its security from any break-in. To this end, Oman has strengthened its relationships with Mahra society and provided Omani citizenship for many personalities in the area, especially after signing the border agreement with Yemen in 1992. It has also made it easier for those who do not have Omani citizenship to move to Oman. Despite Yemen’s upheavals since 2011, Mahra province has not been affected economically because it relied on Omani markets to obtain fuel and food, depending especially on a major shared market, the Al-Mazyounah, which is a few kilometers from Yemen’s Shihen border-crossing. This explains why Mahra province managed to remain economically autonomous from the other provinces. At the same time, this contributed to protecting the Omani border from any security breakthrough by extremist groups: most tribes are also grateful to the Omani state for this status quo. This does not mean that illegal activities are absent from this area: the smuggling of goods and vehiclesis widespread and recently many human trafficking cases in Dhofar were also recorded, but all the people involved in such activities are Mahris.

    However, the consequences of the war have extended to the border of Mahra province since mid-2015. The Houthis reduced the financial allowances of Mahra employees to a quarter of the amount required for the province, causing non-payment of salaries for many civil and military employees: many of them, especially non-Mahris, had to leave and return to their areas. This provoked a severe shortage of employees in security and service institutions: as a result, the then governor of Mahra handed out Mahra crossings to the tribes, surrounding the areas to take over the management of ports at a governorate level and transfer customs fees to the province’s account. Moreover, Oman provided the necessary fuel for the service facilities and distributed regular food aid to the population. In 2017, the tribes of Zabanout and Ra’feet began to quarrel over control of the Shihen crossing, each tribe claiming the port as part of its tribal area.

    The United Arab Emirates (UAE) began to be present in the province of Mahra a few months later at the beginning of the military intervention in Yemen. In 2015 the UAE trained about 2,500 new recruits from among Mahra inhabitants, although they reportedly did not create an elite force due to tribal refusal, while providing a lot of assistance to rebuild the local police and existing security services. It also distributed food baskets and humanitarian aid to the residents of Mahra districts through the UAE Red Crescent Society.

    In the eyes of the sultanate, the UAE presence at its Yemeni border is perceived as unjustified: the two countries have disputes on several issues, most notably the border, especially after Oman accused Abu Dhabi of planning a coup in 2011 to overthrow Sultan Qaboos, which the UAE denied.

    The collapse of Yemeni state institutions and the military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition stunned Muscat, which found itself having to cope with new dynamics and a no more effective border strategy: these concerns have turned into reality. In January 2016 the Omani authorities closed the ports in the Shihen and Surfeet areas, and a few months later al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized control of the city of Mukalla, the capital of Mahra’s neighboring region of Hadramout. The stated rationale for Oman’s move was to protect its border security from any breakthrough of extremist groups. It is here worth noting that AQAP has never been close to Mahra or its border areas, due to local society, strongly attached to traditional Sufism, which has never accepted al-Qaeda’s ideology. In late 2017, when a group of Saudi-backed Salafists tried to establish a religious education center in Mahra’s Qashan, protests were held against them because locals reject this type of religious belief.

    However, observers believe that the real reason for the temporary closure of the ports was the result of political choices made by president Hadi and Khaled Bah’hah, the prime minister at the time: leaders of security and military services in Mahra were replaced by new leaders and the sultanate was uncertain regarding the future political direction of these appointments. It should be noted that, over the past few years, tensions have arisen between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Oman on the other, because the sultanate adopted political attitudes not aligned with the Saudi-UAE politics in the region, especially in relation to Qatar and Iran.

    Oman was also accused by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi of providing access to arms and communications devices to be delivered to the Houthis. In August 2015 Marib province authorities seized a shipment of arms and ammunition for the Houthis at one of its checkpoints. In October 2015, the governor of Marib declared that military forces took possession of Iranian military equipment (including advanced communications equipment) in the province: according to their statement, this shipment was coming by land from the Sultanate of Oman. In November 2015, the Yemeni army dismantled an informal network involved in the smuggling of arms and explosives, as well as of military communications equipment, which entered through Mahra ports, said the army. In October 2016, Western and Iranian officials stated that Iran had stepped up arms transfer to the Houthis, and most of the smuggling crossed Oman and its Yemeni frontier, including by land routes. This was denied by the Sultanate of Oman in a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arguing that “the news of arms smuggling through Oman is baseless and no arms are passing through the lands of Sultanate”.

    Despite these allegations, there are smuggling routes towards Yemen that seem easier than passing through the sultanate’s borders. The Yemeni coastal strip on the Arabian Sea extends over 1,000 kilometers: this is a security vacuum area and is closer in terms of distance to the Houthis’ strongholds. In any case, smuggled arms or goods cannot reach the Houthis in northern Yemen without the help of smuggling networks operating in areas controlled by the legitimate government forces.

    In October 2017 the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed faction of the Southern Movement seeking independence for southern Yemen, tried to convince the former governor, Abdullah Kedda, to join the council, but he refused, asserting that he supports the authority of the legitimate government led by president Hadi. This disappointed the Saudi-led coalition, especially the UAE, which intends to promote the STC as the only entity representing the Southern Movement: the STC embraced the UAE’s agenda in the south.

    The Omani influence on the tribes of Mahra was a major motivation for Saudi Arabia’s military reinforcement in the region. In November 2017 Saudi forces entered the province and took over its vital facilities, including al-Ghaidha airport, Nashton port and the ports of Srfeet and Shihen on the border with Oman. The Saudis also deployed their forces in more than 12 locations along the coast of Mahra, and dismissed the airport employees.

    These developments worried Mahra inhabitants,pushing thousands into the streets in April 2018: they staged an open protest in the city of Ghaidha, demanding that Saudi forces to leave the facilities and institutions, handing them over to local authorities. Even famous Mahris such as Shiekh Ali Harizi, Shikh Al Afrar and Ahmed Qahtant, described the Saudis as an "occupation power"seeking to seize the resources of the province.

    Therefore, the war in Yemen has opened a subtle but acute season of popular discontent and regional rivalry in Mahra, stuck in a three-players game among Saudis, Emiratis and Omanis.


    https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/omans-boiling-yemeni-border-22588
    #Yémen #Oman #frontières #conflit #guerre

  • Which countries have the most immigrants?

    The proportion of immigrants varies considerably from one country to another. In some, it exceeds half the population, while in others it is below 0.1%. Which countries have the most immigrants? Where do they come from? How are they distributed across the world? We provide here an overview of the number and share of immigrants in different countries around the world.

    According to the United Nations, the United States has the highest number of immigrants (foreign-born individuals), with 48 million in 2015, five times more than in Saudi Arabia (11 million) and six times more than in Canada (7.6 million) (figure below). However, in proportion to their population size, these two countries have significantly more immigrants: 34% and 21%, respectively, versus 15% in the United States.

    Looking at the ratio of immigrants to the total population (figure below), countries with a high proportion of immigrants can be divided into five groups:

    The first group comprises countries that are sparsely populated but have abundant oil resources, where immigrants sometimes outnumber the native-born population. In 2015, the world’s highest proportions of immigrants were found in this group: United Arab Emirates (87%), Kuwait (73%), Qatar (68%), Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman, where the proportion ranges from 34% to 51%.

    The second group consists of very small territories, microstates, often with special tax rules: Macao (57%), Monaco (55%), and Singapore (46%).

    The third group is made up of nations formerly designated as “new countries”, which cover vast territories but are still sparsely populated: Australia (28%) and Canada (21%).

    The fourth group, which is similar to the third in terms of mode of development, is that of Western industrial democracies, in which the proportion of immigrants generally ranges from 9% to 17%: Austria (17%), Sweden (16%), United States (15%), United Kingdom (13%), Spain (13%), Germany (12%), France (12%), the Netherlands (12%), Belgium (11%), and Italy (10%).

    The fifth group includes the so-called “countries of first asylum”, which receive massive flows of refugees due to conflicts in a neighbouring country. For example, at the end of 2015, more than one million Syrian and Iraqi refugees were living in Lebanon, representing the equivalent of 20% of its population, and around 400,000 refugees from Sudan were living in Chad (3% of its population).

    Small countries have higher proportions of immigrants

    With 29% immigrants, Switzerland is ahead of the United States, while the proportion in Luxembourg is even higher (46%). Both the attractiveness and size of the country play a role. The smaller the country, the higher its probable proportion of foreign-born residents. Conversely, the larger the country, the smaller this proportion is likely to be. In 2015, India had 0.4% of immigrants and China 0.07%.

    However, if each Chinese province were an independent country – a dozen provinces have more than 50 million inhabitants, and three of them (Guangdong, Shandong, and Henan) have about 100 million – the proportion of immigrants would be much higher, given that migration from province to province, which has increased in scale over recent years, would be counted as international and not internal migration. Conversely, if the European Union formed a single country, the share of immigrants would decrease considerably, since citizens of one EU country living in another would no longer be counted. The relative scale of the two types of migration – internal and international – is thus strongly linked to the way the territory is divided into separate nations.

    The number of emigrants is difficult to measure

    All immigrants (in-migrants) are also emigrants (out-migrants) from their home countries. Yet the information available for counting emigrants at the level of a particular country is often of poorer quality than for the immigrants, even though, at the global level, they represent the same set of people. Countries are probably less concerned about counting their emigrants than their immigrants, given that the former, unlike the latter, are no longer residents and do not use government-funded public services or infrastructure.

    However, emigrants often contribute substantially to the economy of their home countries by sending back money and in some cases, they still have the right to vote, which is a good reason for sending countries to track their emigrant population more effectively. The statistical sources are another reason for the poor quality of data on emigrants. Migrant arrivals are better recorded than departures, and the number of emigrants is often estimated based on immigrant statistics in the different host countries.

    The number of emigrants varies considerably from one country to another. India headed the list in 2015, with nearly 16 million people born in the country but living in another (see the figure below); Mexico comes in second with more than 12 million emigrants living mainly in the United States.

    Proportionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina holds a record: there is one Bosnian living abroad for two living in the country, which means that one-third of the people born in Bosnia and Herzegovina have emigrated (figure below). Albania is in a similar situation, as well as Cape Verde, an insular country with few natural resources.

    Some countries are both immigration and emigration countries. This is the case of the United Kingdom, which had 8.4 million immigrants and 4.7 million emigrants in 2015. The United States has a considerable number of expatriates (2.9 million in 2015), but this is 17 times less in comparison to the number of immigrants (48 million at the same date).

    Until recently, some countries have been relatively closed to migration, both inward and outward. This is the case for Japan, which has few immigrants (only 1.7% of its population in 2015) and few emigrants (0.6%).
    Immigrants: less than 4% of the world population

    According to the United Nations, there were 258 million immigrants in 2017, representing only a small minority of the world population (3.4%); the vast majority of people live in their country of birth. The proportion of immigrants has only slightly increased over recent decades (30 years ago, in 1990, it was 2.9%, and 55 years ago, in 1965, it was 2.3%). It has probably changed only slightly in 100 years.

    But the distribution of immigrants is different than it was a century ago. One change is, in the words of Alfred Sauvy, the “reversal of migratory flows” between North and South, with a considerable share of international migrants now coming from Southern countries.


    #migrations_nord-sud #migrations_sud-sud #migrations_sud-nord #migrations_nord-nord #visualisation

    Today, migrants can be divided into three groups of practically equal size (figure above): migrants born in the South who live in the North (89 million in 2017, according to the United Nations); South-South migrants (97 million), who have migrated from one Southern country to another; and North-North migrants (57 million). The fourth group – those born in the North and who have migrated to the South – was dominant a century ago but is numerically much smaller today (14 million). Despite their large scale, especially in Europe, migrant flows generated since 2015 by conflicts in the Middle East have not significantly changed the global picture of international migration.

    https://theconversation.com/which-countries-have-the-most-immigrants-113074
    #statistiques #migrations #réfugiés #monde #chiffres #préjugés #afflux #invasion

    signalé par @isskein

  • Ça manquait dans le tableau…
    Encore un coup de MbS ? (d’ailleurs on n’entend plus parler de la transformation du Qatar en île…)

    La FIFA veut 48 équipes au Mondial 2022, le Qatar devra partager avec ses voisins
    https://www.lemonde.fr/sport/article/2019/03/15/la-fifa-veut-48-equipes-au-mondial-2022-le-qatar-devra-partager-avec-ses-voi


    GianninInfantino, le président de la FIFA, assure que l’ajout de seize matchs ne modifiera pas le calendrier du tournoi, censé être organisé sur 28 jours (du 21 novembre au 18 décembre 2022).
    RHONA WISE / AFP

    A la Fédération internationale de football (FIFA), on ne s’en cache même plus : l’organisation du Mondial 2022 au Qatar est devenue un « sac de nœuds ». L’attribution controversée du tournoi à l’émirat (par 14 voix contre 8 pour les Etats-Unis en décembre 2010) connaît un nouvel épisode, puisque le conseil (gouvernement) de la FIFA a approuvé, vendredi 15 mars, à Miami, une « étude de faisabilité » relative à une possible extension du tournoi de 32 à 48 équipes dès l’édition 2022.

    Voté en 2017, cet élargissement du format du Mondial est l’une des réformes phares de Gianni Infantino, le président de la FIFA, et ne devait s’appliquer qu’à partir du Mondial 2026, attribué aux Etats-Unis, au Mexique et au Canada. Mais, en quête de nouveaux revenus (jusqu’à 400 millions de dollars de recettes additionnelles sont attendues en cas d’élargissement dès 2022), le dirigeant a décidé d’accélérer la mise en place de cette mesure.

    Cette extension anticipée sera soumise au vote des 211 fédérations nationales membres du congrès de la FIFA, le 5 juin, à Paris. Ce jour-là, M. Infantino sera l’unique candidat à sa succession pour un deuxième mandat.

    Réalisée par les équipes techniques de l’administration de la FIFA, l’étude de faisabilité conclut qu’un changement de format n’est possible dès 2022 qu’à une condition : pour organiser 80 matchs, au lieu des 64 initialement programmés, il faut que le Qatar partage le tournoi avec au moins l’un de ses voisins.

    Parmi les candidats potentiels figurent le Bahreïn, le Koweït, l’Arabie saoudite, Oman et les Emirats Arabes Unis. « Toute décision d’inclure de potentiels pays hôtes nécessite l’accord du Qatar », relève toutefois la fédération.

    L’étude pointe à ce propos la situation géopolitique de l’émirat gazier, isolé en raison du boycott diplomatique et économique que lui imposent, depuis juin 2017, Bahreïn, l’Arabie saoudite et les Emirats arabes…

    #paywall #diplomatie_du_football (?)

    #nuit_torride

  • Israeli Leader Sees ’Common Interest’ in Confronting Iran - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/02/13/world/middleeast/ap-ml-mideast-meeting-israel.html

    Israel’s prime minister on Wednesday sent out a belligerent rallying cry to his Arab partners at a U.S.-backed Mideast conference, saying he planned to focus on the “common interest” of confronting Iran.

    Netanyahu made the comments during an off-the-cuff interview with reporters on a Warsaw street, shortly after meeting Oman’s foreign minister.

    Un tweet vite effacé est encore plus explicite :

  • Aerolíneas de EAU, Omán y Baréin barajan reanudar vuelos a Damasco | HISPANTV
    https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/siria/408460/vuelos-directos-damasco-emiratos-bahrein-oman

    Petite chronique de la #normalisation accélérée en #syrie...
    – Oman va reprendre ses vols vers les Syrie, rapidement suivi par les Emirats et Bahreïn
    – d’ailleurs, et avec toutes sortes de circonvolutions d’usage, le ministre des AE de Bahreïn finit par dire que son pays n’est pas totalement contre le régime syrien (https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/%d8%a8%d9%86-%d8%ac%d8%a7%d8%b3%d9%85-%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%aa-%d8%b6%d8%af-%d8)
    – enfin, Ahmed Jarba, le chef d’une des forces d’opposition syrienne très soutenues à l’étranger (il est chevalier de la Légion d’honneur par exemple !) serait prêt à négocier avec « le régime de Bachar » (http://www.almayadeen.net/news/politics/927865/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8)...

  • The roundabout revolutions

    The history of these banal, utilitarian instruments of traffic management has become entangled with that of political uprising, #Eyal_Weizman argues in his latest book

    This project started with a photograph. It was one of the most arresting images depicting the May 1980 #Gwangju uprising, recognised now as the first step in the eventual overthrow of the military dictatorship in South Korea. The photograph (above) depicts a large crowd of people occupying a roundabout in the city center. Atop a disused fountain in the middle of the roundabout a few protestors have unfurled a South Korean flag. The roundabout organised the protest in concentric circles, a geometric order that exposed the crowd to itself, helping a political collective in becoming.

    It had an uncanny resonance with events that had just unfolded: in the previous year a series of popular uprisings spread through Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, #Oman, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. These events shared with Gwangju not only the historical circumstances – they too were popular protests against military dictatorships – but, remarkably, an urban-architectural setting: many of them similarly erupted on roundabouts in downtown areas. The history of these roundabouts is entangled with the revolutions that rose from them.

    The photograph of the roundabout—now the symbol of the “liberated republic” – was taken by #Na_Kyung-taek from the roof of the occupied Provincial Hall, looking toward Geumnam-ro, only a few hours before the fall of the “#Gwangju_Republic”. In the early morning hours of the following day, the Gwangju uprising was overwhelmed by military force employing tanks and other armed vehicles. The last stand took place at the roundabout.

    The scene immediately resonates with the well-known photographs of people gathering in #Tahrir_Square in early 2011. Taken from different high-rise buildings around the square, a distinct feature in these images is the traffic circle visible by the way it organises bodies and objects in space. These images became the symbol of the revolution that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 – an event described by urban historian Nezar AlSayyad as “Cairo’s roundabout revolution”. But the Gwangju photograph also connects to images of other roundabouts that erupted in dissent in fast succession throughout the Middle East. Before Tahrir, as Jonathan Liu noted in his essay Roundabouts and Revolutions, it was the main roundabout in the capital of Tunisia – subsequently renamed Place du 14 Janvier 2011 after the date on which President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country. Thousands of protesters gathered at the roundabout in Tunis and filled the city’s main boulevard.

    A main roundabout in Bahrain’s capital Manama erupted in protests shortly after the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. Its central traffic island became the site of popular protests against the government and the first decisive act of military repression: the protests were violently broken up and the roundabout itself destroyed and replaced with a traffic intersection. In solidarity with the Tahrir protests, the roundabouts in the small al-Manara Square in Ramallah and the immense Azadi Square in Tehran also filled with protesters. These events, too, were violently suppressed.

    The roundabouts in Tehran and Ramallah had also been the scenes of previous revolts. In 2009 the Azadi roundabout in Iran’s capital was the site of the main protests of the Green Movement contesting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection. Hamid Dabashi, a literature professor at Columbia University and one of the most outspoken public intellectuals on these revolutions, claims that the Green Movement was inspirational for the subsequent revolutionary wave in the Arab world. In Palestine, revolt was a permanent consequence of life under occupation, and the al-Manara roundabout was a frequent site of clashes between Palestinian youth and the Israeli military. The sequence of roundabout revolutions evolved as acts of imitation, each building on its predecessor, each helping propel the next.

    Roundabouts were of course not only exhilarating sites of protest and experiments in popular democracy, but moreover they were places where people gathered and risked their life. The Gwangju uprising is, thus, the first of the roundabout revolutions. Liu wrote: “In all these cases, the symbolism is almost jokingly obvious: what better place to stage a revolution, after all, then one built for turning around?” What better way to show solidarity across national borders than to stage protests in analogous places?

    Why roundabouts? After all, they are banal, utilitarian instruments of traffic management, certainly not prone to induce revolutionary feeling. Other kinds of sites – squares, boulevards, favelas, refugee camps – have served throughout history as the setting for political protest and revolt. Each alignment of a roundabout and a revolution has a specific context and diverse causes, but the curious repetition of this phenomenon might give rise to several speculations. Urban roundabouts are the intersection points of large axes, which also puts them at the start or end of processions.

    Occupying a roundabout demonstrates the power of tactical acupuncture: it blocks off all routes going in and out. Congestion moves outward like a wave, flowing down avenues and streets through large parts of the city. By pressuring a single pivotal point within a networked infrastructure, an entire city can be put under siege (a contemporary contradistinction to the medieval technique of surrounding the entire perimeter of a city wall). Unlike public squares, which are designed as sites for people to gather (therefore not interrupting the flow of vehicular traffic) and are usually monitored and policed, roundabout islands are designed to keep people away. The continuous flow of traffic around them creates a wall of speeding vehicles that prohibits access. While providing open spaces (in some cities the only available open spaces) these islands are meant to be seen but not used.

    Another possible explanation is their symbolic power: they often contain monuments that represent the existing regime. The roundabouts of recent revolutions had emblematic names – Place du 7 Novembre 1987, the date the previous regime took power in Tunisia; “Liberty” (Azadi), referring to the 1979 Iranian Revolution; or “Liberation” (Tahrir), referring to the 1952 revolutions in Egypt. Roundabout islands often had statues, both figurative and abstract, representing the symbolic order of regimes. Leaders might have wished to believe that circular movement around their monuments was akin to a form of worship or consent. While roundabouts exercise a centripetal force, pulling protestors into the city center, the police seek to generate movement in the opposite direction, out and away from the center, and to break a collective into controllable individuals that can be handled and dispersed.

    The most common of all centrifugal forces of urban disorganisation during protests is tear gas, a formless cloud that drifts through space to disperse crowds. From Gwangju to Cairo, Manama to Ramallah, hundreds of tear-gas canisters were used largely exceeding permitted levels in an attempt to evict protesters from public spaces. The bodily sensation of the gas forms part of the affective dimension of the roundabout revolution. When tear gas is inhaled, the pain is abrupt, sharp, and isolating. The eyes shut involuntary, generating a sense of disorientation and disempowerment.

    Protestors have found ways to mitigate the toxic effects of this weapon. Online advice is shared between activists from Palestine through Cairo to Ferguson. The best protection is offered by proper gas masks. Improvised masks made of mineral water bottles cut in half and equipped with a filter of wet towels also work, according to online manuals. Some activists wear swim goggles and place wet bandanas or kaffiyehs over their mouths. To mitigate some of the adverse effects, these improvised filters can be soaked in water, lemon juice, vinegar, toothpaste, or wrapped around an onion. When nothing else is at hand, breathe the air from inside your shirt and run upwind onto higher ground. When you have a chance, blow your nose, rinse your mouth, cough, and spit.


    https://www.iconeye.com/opinion/comment/item/12093-the-roundabout-revolutions
    #révolution #résistance #giratoire #carrefour #rond-point #routes #infrastructure_routière #soulèvement_politique #Corée_du_Sud #printemps_arabe #Egypte #Tunisie #Bahreïni #Yémen #Libye #Syrie #Tahrir

    Du coup : #gilets_jaunes ?

    @albertocampiphoto & @philippe_de_jonckheere

    This project started with a photograph. It was one of the most arresting images depicting the May 1980 #Gwangju uprising, recognised now as the first step in the eventual overthrow of the military dictatorship in South Korea. The photograph (above) depicts a large crowd of people occupying a roundabout in the city center. Atop a disused fountain in the middle of the roundabout a few protestors have unfurled a South Korean flag. The roundabout organised the protest in concentric circles, a geometric order that exposed the crowd to itself, helping a political collective in becoming.

    –-> le pouvoir d’une #photographie...

    signalé par @isskein

    ping @reka

  • Exclusive: Khashoggi murder further complicates ’Arab NATO’ plan - U.S. sources | Reuters

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mideast-alliance-exclusive/exclusive-khashoggi-murder-further-complicates-arab-nato-plan-u-s-sources-i

    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Donald Trump’s strategy to contain Iranian power in the Middle East by forging Arab allies into a U.S.-backed security alliance was in trouble even before the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Now, three U.S. sources said, the plan faces fresh complications.

    FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S. March 20, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo
    Khashoggi’s murder on Oct. 2 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul has drawn international outrage against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Turkish officials and some U.S. lawmakers accusing the kingdom’s de facto ruler of ordering the killing.

    The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) aims to bind Sunni Muslim governments in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan in a U.S.-led security, political and economic pact to counter Shi’ite Iran. 

    But feuds among Arab allies, especially a Saudi-led economic and political boycott of Qatar, have hampered the founding of the alliance since Riyadh proposed it last year.

    A summit meeting in the United States where Trump and the Arab leaders would sign a preliminary accord on the alliance was expected in January. But the three U.S. sources and a Gulf diplomat said the meeting now looks uncertain. It has already been postponed several times, they added. 

    Khashoggi’s murder raised “a whole bunch of problems” to be solved before the plan - informally referred to as the “Arab NATO” - can move forward, one U.S. source said. One issue is how the Americans could have the Saudi crown prince, who goes by the initials MbS, attend the summit without causing widespread outrage.

    “It’s not palatable,” the source said.

  • Les échanges israélo-marocains ? Un secret de Polichinelle qui se répand
    Middle East Eye - Sebastian Shehadi - Dernière mise à jour : 08 novembre 2018
    https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/reportages/les-changes-isra-lo-marocains-un-secret-de-polichinelle-qui-se-r-pand
    https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/Morocco+Israel%20illustration%20%281%29.jpg

    Les échanges israélo-marocains « secrets » le sont de moins en moins, en dépit du fait que le Maroc n’a aucune relation officielle avec Israël et que, dans le pays, une opposition politique se développe contre le renforcement des liens avec Israël.

    Les récentes divergences statistiques constituent un bon début. Bien que les données officielles des échanges commerciaux du Maroc n’aient jamais mentionné Israël, les archives israéliennes font état de 37 millions de dollars d’échanges avec le Maroc en 2017, selon les données publiées par le Bureau central israélien des statistiques cette année.

    Cela signifie que, sur les 22 partenaires commerciaux africains d’Israël, le Maroc figure parmi les quatre premiers pays en termes d’importations, et au neuvième rang des exportations, selon le Bureau central des statistiques. Cependant, avec 149 millions de dollars d’échanges commerciaux entre 2014 et 2017, ce partenariat n’est pas nouveau.

    Le premier investissement étranger déclaré d’Israël dans le monde arabe est plus inhabituel : le géant israélien de la technologie agricole Netafim a créé une filiale pour 2,9 millions de dollars au Maroc l’année dernière, créant ainsi dix-sept emplois, selon fDi Markets, un service de données du Financial Times qui surveille les investissements de création transfrontaliers dans le monde entier depuis 2003. L’investissement de création désigne une entreprise établissant ses opérations dans un pays étranger à partir de zéro.

    Cette évolution pourrait s’inscrire dans les tendances régionales plus larges. Les relations israélo-arabes s’améliorent, d’une part en raison de l’alliance de plus en plus forte contre l’Iran. La récente visite à Oman de Benyamin Nentanyaou, le Premier ministre israélien, illustre parfaitement ce réchauffement. (...)

    #IsraelMaroc

  • Les dictateurs arabes vont à marche forcée vers la normalisation avec l’État sioniste
    Abdel Bari Atwan – 28 octobre 2018 – Raï al-Yaoum – Traduction : Chronique de Palestine
    http://www.chroniquepalestine.com/dictateurs-arabes-a-marche-forcee-vers-normalisation-avec-etat-s

    Trois douloureux coups ont été récemment infligés à ce qui restait d’amour-propre aux États arabes.

    Le premier était la participation d’une délégation israélienne à un tournoi sportif au Qatar. Le second était l’envoi d’une autre délégation sportive dans l’émirat d’Abou Dhabi, dirigée par la ministre de la Culture israélienne notoirement raciste et haineuse, Miri Regev. Mais le coup le plus dur et le plus douloureux a été la visite officielle du Premier ministre de l’État d’occupation, Binyamin Netanyahu, à Oman, où lui et la délégation qui l’accompagnait ont reçu un accueil chaleureux et ont rencontré le sultan Qaboos.

    Il s’agit d’une opération de normalisation coordonnée menée sous la pression des États-Unis. Cela n’a absolument rien à voir avec la paix israélo-palestinienne, mais tout à voir avec la réalisation d’une paix « sans frais » entre Israël et les gouvernements arabes. Ceci est un prélude à l’imposition de ce qui subsiste du « Deal of the Century« , qui revient à exploiter l’effondrement de l’ordre arabe officiel pour liquider la cause palestinienne, mettre fin au conflit israélo-arabe et reconnaître Israël comme un pays « frère » du Moyen-Orient.

    C’est le dernier et peut-être le plus important épisode d’un processus planifié, ce qui explique les raisons qui ont conduit à la destruction de l’Irak, puis de la Syrie, puis de la Libye et, plus tard du Yémen, et à la paralysie de l’Égypte. Sans la destruction de ces pays, sous divers faux prétextes, ce plan ne pourrait être mis à exécution et nous n’aurions jamais vu ses douloureuses conséquences sous la forme d’étapes de normalisation. (...)

  • L’Arabie saoudite a telles utilisées des armes chimiques au Yémen ?
    https://www.crashdebug.fr/international/15227-l-arabie-saoudite-a-telles-utilisees-des-armes-chimiques-au-yemen

    Le journaliste saoudien Jamal Khashoggi a-t-il été assassiné parce qu’il en savait trop sur la guerre sans pitié menée par MBS au Yémen ? Analyse du chercheur Sébastien Boussois.

    Sébastien Boussois est docteur en sciences politiques, chercheur sur le Moyen-Orient sur les relations euro-arabes, le terrorisme et la radicalisation, enseignant en relations internationales, collaborateur scientifique du CECID (Université Libre de Bruxelles), de l’OMAN (UQAM Montréal) et du CPRMV (Centre de prévention de la radicalisation menant à la violence/Montréal).

    Le Yémen pourrait constituer le cimetière des ambitions mondiales de Mohamed Ben Salmane, prince héritier d’Arabie Saoudite. Mais il ne serait pas le seul mouillé dans l’affaire.

    Si l’on en croit les révélations d’un proche ami de (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_internationales #Actualités_Internationales

  • שרת התרבות והספורט מירי רגב במגד שייח זייד באבו דאבי - YouTube
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&time_continue=14&v=uZ_qkKpBQD0

    Miri Reguev, ministre israélienne, parle de paix depuis la mosquée du cheikh Zayed au Emirats (arabes) unis... Pendant ce temps-là, Nétanyahou est reçu au sultanat d’Oman. Hier, dimanche, trois palestiniens âgés de 12 à 14 ans ont été abattus parce qu’ils s’approchaient de la clôture de leur cage (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/28/gaza-three-boys-killed-in-israeli-airstrike-say-palestinian-medics).

    Signes parlants de la #catastrophe_arabe