• Aerolíneas de EAU, Omán y Baréin barajan reanudar vuelos a Damasco | HISPANTV

    Petite chronique de la #normalisation accélérée en #syrie...
    – Oman va reprendre ses vols vers les Syrie, rapidement suivi par les Emirats et Bahreïn
    – d’ailleurs, et avec toutes sortes de circonvolutions d’usage, le ministre des AE de Bahreïn finit par dire que son pays n’est pas totalement contre le régime syrien (
    – enfin, Ahmed Jarba, le chef d’une des forces d’opposition syrienne très soutenues à l’étranger (il est chevalier de la Légion d’honneur par exemple !) serait prêt à négocier avec « le régime de Bachar » (

  • The roundabout revolutions

    The history of these banal, utilitarian instruments of traffic management has become entangled with that of political uprising, #Eyal_Weizman argues in his latest book

    This project started with a photograph. It was one of the most arresting images depicting the May 1980 #Gwangju uprising, recognised now as the first step in the eventual overthrow of the military dictatorship in South Korea. The photograph (above) depicts a large crowd of people occupying a roundabout in the city center. Atop a disused fountain in the middle of the roundabout a few protestors have unfurled a South Korean flag. The roundabout organised the protest in concentric circles, a geometric order that exposed the crowd to itself, helping a political collective in becoming.

    It had an uncanny resonance with events that had just unfolded: in the previous year a series of popular uprisings spread through Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, #Oman, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. These events shared with Gwangju not only the historical circumstances – they too were popular protests against military dictatorships – but, remarkably, an urban-architectural setting: many of them similarly erupted on roundabouts in downtown areas. The history of these roundabouts is entangled with the revolutions that rose from them.

    The photograph of the roundabout—now the symbol of the “liberated republic” – was taken by #Na_Kyung-taek from the roof of the occupied Provincial Hall, looking toward Geumnam-ro, only a few hours before the fall of the “#Gwangju_Republic”. In the early morning hours of the following day, the Gwangju uprising was overwhelmed by military force employing tanks and other armed vehicles. The last stand took place at the roundabout.

    The scene immediately resonates with the well-known photographs of people gathering in #Tahrir_Square in early 2011. Taken from different high-rise buildings around the square, a distinct feature in these images is the traffic circle visible by the way it organises bodies and objects in space. These images became the symbol of the revolution that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 – an event described by urban historian Nezar AlSayyad as “Cairo’s roundabout revolution”. But the Gwangju photograph also connects to images of other roundabouts that erupted in dissent in fast succession throughout the Middle East. Before Tahrir, as Jonathan Liu noted in his essay Roundabouts and Revolutions, it was the main roundabout in the capital of Tunisia – subsequently renamed Place du 14 Janvier 2011 after the date on which President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country. Thousands of protesters gathered at the roundabout in Tunis and filled the city’s main boulevard.

    A main roundabout in Bahrain’s capital Manama erupted in protests shortly after the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. Its central traffic island became the site of popular protests against the government and the first decisive act of military repression: the protests were violently broken up and the roundabout itself destroyed and replaced with a traffic intersection. In solidarity with the Tahrir protests, the roundabouts in the small al-Manara Square in Ramallah and the immense Azadi Square in Tehran also filled with protesters. These events, too, were violently suppressed.

    The roundabouts in Tehran and Ramallah had also been the scenes of previous revolts. In 2009 the Azadi roundabout in Iran’s capital was the site of the main protests of the Green Movement contesting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection. Hamid Dabashi, a literature professor at Columbia University and one of the most outspoken public intellectuals on these revolutions, claims that the Green Movement was inspirational for the subsequent revolutionary wave in the Arab world. In Palestine, revolt was a permanent consequence of life under occupation, and the al-Manara roundabout was a frequent site of clashes between Palestinian youth and the Israeli military. The sequence of roundabout revolutions evolved as acts of imitation, each building on its predecessor, each helping propel the next.

    Roundabouts were of course not only exhilarating sites of protest and experiments in popular democracy, but moreover they were places where people gathered and risked their life. The Gwangju uprising is, thus, the first of the roundabout revolutions. Liu wrote: “In all these cases, the symbolism is almost jokingly obvious: what better place to stage a revolution, after all, then one built for turning around?” What better way to show solidarity across national borders than to stage protests in analogous places?

    Why roundabouts? After all, they are banal, utilitarian instruments of traffic management, certainly not prone to induce revolutionary feeling. Other kinds of sites – squares, boulevards, favelas, refugee camps – have served throughout history as the setting for political protest and revolt. Each alignment of a roundabout and a revolution has a specific context and diverse causes, but the curious repetition of this phenomenon might give rise to several speculations. Urban roundabouts are the intersection points of large axes, which also puts them at the start or end of processions.

    Occupying a roundabout demonstrates the power of tactical acupuncture: it blocks off all routes going in and out. Congestion moves outward like a wave, flowing down avenues and streets through large parts of the city. By pressuring a single pivotal point within a networked infrastructure, an entire city can be put under siege (a contemporary contradistinction to the medieval technique of surrounding the entire perimeter of a city wall). Unlike public squares, which are designed as sites for people to gather (therefore not interrupting the flow of vehicular traffic) and are usually monitored and policed, roundabout islands are designed to keep people away. The continuous flow of traffic around them creates a wall of speeding vehicles that prohibits access. While providing open spaces (in some cities the only available open spaces) these islands are meant to be seen but not used.

    Another possible explanation is their symbolic power: they often contain monuments that represent the existing regime. The roundabouts of recent revolutions had emblematic names – Place du 7 Novembre 1987, the date the previous regime took power in Tunisia; “Liberty” (Azadi), referring to the 1979 Iranian Revolution; or “Liberation” (Tahrir), referring to the 1952 revolutions in Egypt. Roundabout islands often had statues, both figurative and abstract, representing the symbolic order of regimes. Leaders might have wished to believe that circular movement around their monuments was akin to a form of worship or consent. While roundabouts exercise a centripetal force, pulling protestors into the city center, the police seek to generate movement in the opposite direction, out and away from the center, and to break a collective into controllable individuals that can be handled and dispersed.

    The most common of all centrifugal forces of urban disorganisation during protests is tear gas, a formless cloud that drifts through space to disperse crowds. From Gwangju to Cairo, Manama to Ramallah, hundreds of tear-gas canisters were used largely exceeding permitted levels in an attempt to evict protesters from public spaces. The bodily sensation of the gas forms part of the affective dimension of the roundabout revolution. When tear gas is inhaled, the pain is abrupt, sharp, and isolating. The eyes shut involuntary, generating a sense of disorientation and disempowerment.

    Protestors have found ways to mitigate the toxic effects of this weapon. Online advice is shared between activists from Palestine through Cairo to Ferguson. The best protection is offered by proper gas masks. Improvised masks made of mineral water bottles cut in half and equipped with a filter of wet towels also work, according to online manuals. Some activists wear swim goggles and place wet bandanas or kaffiyehs over their mouths. To mitigate some of the adverse effects, these improvised filters can be soaked in water, lemon juice, vinegar, toothpaste, or wrapped around an onion. When nothing else is at hand, breathe the air from inside your shirt and run upwind onto higher ground. When you have a chance, blow your nose, rinse your mouth, cough, and spit.
    #révolution #résistance #giratoire #carrefour #rond-point #routes #infrastructure_routière #soulèvement_politique #Corée_du_Sud #printemps_arabe #Egypte #Tunisie #Bahreïni #Yémen #Libye #Syrie #Tahrir

    Du coup : #gilets_jaunes ?

    @albertocampiphoto & @philippe_de_jonckheere

    This project started with a photograph. It was one of the most arresting images depicting the May 1980 #Gwangju uprising, recognised now as the first step in the eventual overthrow of the military dictatorship in South Korea. The photograph (above) depicts a large crowd of people occupying a roundabout in the city center. Atop a disused fountain in the middle of the roundabout a few protestors have unfurled a South Korean flag. The roundabout organised the protest in concentric circles, a geometric order that exposed the crowd to itself, helping a political collective in becoming.

    –-> le pouvoir d’une #photographie...

    signalé par @isskein

    ping @reka

  • Exclusive: Khashoggi murder further complicates ’Arab NATO’ plan - U.S. sources | Reuters

    WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Donald Trump’s strategy to contain Iranian power in the Middle East by forging Arab allies into a U.S.-backed security alliance was in trouble even before the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Now, three U.S. sources said, the plan faces fresh complications.

    FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S. March 20, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo
    Khashoggi’s murder on Oct. 2 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul has drawn international outrage against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with Turkish officials and some U.S. lawmakers accusing the kingdom’s de facto ruler of ordering the killing.

    The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) aims to bind Sunni Muslim governments in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan in a U.S.-led security, political and economic pact to counter Shi’ite Iran. 

    But feuds among Arab allies, especially a Saudi-led economic and political boycott of Qatar, have hampered the founding of the alliance since Riyadh proposed it last year.

    A summit meeting in the United States where Trump and the Arab leaders would sign a preliminary accord on the alliance was expected in January. But the three U.S. sources and a Gulf diplomat said the meeting now looks uncertain. It has already been postponed several times, they added. 

    Khashoggi’s murder raised “a whole bunch of problems” to be solved before the plan - informally referred to as the “Arab NATO” - can move forward, one U.S. source said. One issue is how the Americans could have the Saudi crown prince, who goes by the initials MbS, attend the summit without causing widespread outrage.

    “It’s not palatable,” the source said.

  • Les échanges israélo-marocains ? Un secret de Polichinelle qui se répand
    Middle East Eye - Sebastian Shehadi - Dernière mise à jour : 08 novembre 2018

    Les échanges israélo-marocains « secrets » le sont de moins en moins, en dépit du fait que le Maroc n’a aucune relation officielle avec Israël et que, dans le pays, une opposition politique se développe contre le renforcement des liens avec Israël.

    Les récentes divergences statistiques constituent un bon début. Bien que les données officielles des échanges commerciaux du Maroc n’aient jamais mentionné Israël, les archives israéliennes font état de 37 millions de dollars d’échanges avec le Maroc en 2017, selon les données publiées par le Bureau central israélien des statistiques cette année.

    Cela signifie que, sur les 22 partenaires commerciaux africains d’Israël, le Maroc figure parmi les quatre premiers pays en termes d’importations, et au neuvième rang des exportations, selon le Bureau central des statistiques. Cependant, avec 149 millions de dollars d’échanges commerciaux entre 2014 et 2017, ce partenariat n’est pas nouveau.

    Le premier investissement étranger déclaré d’Israël dans le monde arabe est plus inhabituel : le géant israélien de la technologie agricole Netafim a créé une filiale pour 2,9 millions de dollars au Maroc l’année dernière, créant ainsi dix-sept emplois, selon fDi Markets, un service de données du Financial Times qui surveille les investissements de création transfrontaliers dans le monde entier depuis 2003. L’investissement de création désigne une entreprise établissant ses opérations dans un pays étranger à partir de zéro.

    Cette évolution pourrait s’inscrire dans les tendances régionales plus larges. Les relations israélo-arabes s’améliorent, d’une part en raison de l’alliance de plus en plus forte contre l’Iran. La récente visite à Oman de Benyamin Nentanyaou, le Premier ministre israélien, illustre parfaitement ce réchauffement. (...)


  • Les dictateurs arabes vont à marche forcée vers la normalisation avec l’État sioniste
    Abdel Bari Atwan – 28 octobre 2018 – Raï al-Yaoum – Traduction : Chronique de Palestine

    Trois douloureux coups ont été récemment infligés à ce qui restait d’amour-propre aux États arabes.

    Le premier était la participation d’une délégation israélienne à un tournoi sportif au Qatar. Le second était l’envoi d’une autre délégation sportive dans l’émirat d’Abou Dhabi, dirigée par la ministre de la Culture israélienne notoirement raciste et haineuse, Miri Regev. Mais le coup le plus dur et le plus douloureux a été la visite officielle du Premier ministre de l’État d’occupation, Binyamin Netanyahu, à Oman, où lui et la délégation qui l’accompagnait ont reçu un accueil chaleureux et ont rencontré le sultan Qaboos.

    Il s’agit d’une opération de normalisation coordonnée menée sous la pression des États-Unis. Cela n’a absolument rien à voir avec la paix israélo-palestinienne, mais tout à voir avec la réalisation d’une paix « sans frais » entre Israël et les gouvernements arabes. Ceci est un prélude à l’imposition de ce qui subsiste du « Deal of the Century« , qui revient à exploiter l’effondrement de l’ordre arabe officiel pour liquider la cause palestinienne, mettre fin au conflit israélo-arabe et reconnaître Israël comme un pays « frère » du Moyen-Orient.

    C’est le dernier et peut-être le plus important épisode d’un processus planifié, ce qui explique les raisons qui ont conduit à la destruction de l’Irak, puis de la Syrie, puis de la Libye et, plus tard du Yémen, et à la paralysie de l’Égypte. Sans la destruction de ces pays, sous divers faux prétextes, ce plan ne pourrait être mis à exécution et nous n’aurions jamais vu ses douloureuses conséquences sous la forme d’étapes de normalisation. (...)

  • L’Arabie saoudite a telles utilisées des armes chimiques au Yémen ?

    Le journaliste saoudien Jamal Khashoggi a-t-il été assassiné parce qu’il en savait trop sur la guerre sans pitié menée par MBS au Yémen ? Analyse du chercheur Sébastien Boussois.

    Sébastien Boussois est docteur en sciences politiques, chercheur sur le Moyen-Orient sur les relations euro-arabes, le terrorisme et la radicalisation, enseignant en relations internationales, collaborateur scientifique du CECID (Université Libre de Bruxelles), de l’OMAN (UQAM Montréal) et du CPRMV (Centre de prévention de la radicalisation menant à la violence/Montréal).

    Le Yémen pourrait constituer le cimetière des ambitions mondiales de Mohamed Ben Salmane, prince héritier d’Arabie Saoudite. Mais il ne serait pas le seul mouillé dans l’affaire.

    Si l’on en croit les révélations d’un proche ami de (...)

    #En_vedette #Actualités_internationales #Actualités_Internationales

  • שרת התרבות והספורט מירי רגב במגד שייח זייד באבו דאבי - YouTube

    Miri Reguev, ministre israélienne, parle de paix depuis la mosquée du cheikh Zayed au Emirats (arabes) unis... Pendant ce temps-là, Nétanyahou est reçu au sultanat d’Oman. Hier, dimanche, trois palestiniens âgés de 12 à 14 ans ont été abattus parce qu’ils s’approchaient de la clôture de leur cage (

    Signes parlants de la #catastrophe_arabe

  • Netanyahou à Oman. Opération normalisation d’Israël dans le Golfe | Courrier international

    Le sultan d’Oman, Qabous ben Saïd, sert la main du Premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahou, en visite surprise dans le sultanat, le 26 octobre 2018. Photo : Omani Royal Palace / AFP

    La présence du Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou à Mascate a pris de court de nombreux observateurs. Pourtant, les pas vers une normalisation des relations se multiplient dans tous les pays du Golfe.

    #IsraelOman #catastrophe_arabe

    • Le ministre israélien des sports aux Émirats arabes unis se joindra à l’équipe d’Abu Dhabi pour un tournoi de judo
      26 octobre 2018

      Le ministre israélien de la Culture et des Sports Miri Regev s’est rendu aux Emirats Arabes Unis (EAU) pour accompagner l’équipe de judo israélienne au Grand Chelem d’Abu Dhabi 2018 alors que les pays arabes de la région réchauffent considérablement leurs relations avec le régime de Tel Aviv après des rapports de contacts secrets.

      Mme Regev est arrivée à Abu Dhabi vendredi matin, et elle doit participer à la cérémonie d’ouverture de l’événement international qui se tiendra demain à Zayed Sports City, la capitale émiratie, a rapporté une agence de presse palestinienne de langue arabe, Ma’an.


      Palestine Alqadi
      ‏ @ALQadiPAL - 07:43 - 28 oct. 2018

      ويستمر مسلسل التطبيع بعد قطر وعمان

      وزيرة الثقافة والرياضة الصهيونية ميري ريجيف في لحظة امتنان مع رئيس الجودو الإماراتي،

      الوزيرة عملت كمتحدثة باسم جيش الاحتلال، تكره العرب ، لإحظوا ، اين يركز نظره خجلا

      ليش يا عرب ليش تطعنو القدس بظهرها ؟

    • La visite d’une ministre israélienne aux Émirats interroge sur les relations d’Israël avec le Golfe
      Nadda Osman - 30 octobre 2018

      En moins d’une semaine, trois hauts responsables israéliens, dont le Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou, se sont rendus en visite officielle dans le Golfe

      La visite officielle de la ministre israélienne Miri Regev aux Émirats arabes unis ce week-end a suscité des réactions mitigées sur les réseaux sociaux. Les internautes se demandaient si cela marquait le début du réchauffement des relations entre Israël et les EAU.

      Regev, la ministre israélienne de la Culture et des Sports, a assisté dimanche au grand tournoi de judo à Abou Dabi, où l’un des athlètes israéliens a remporté l’or. Cet événement a particulièrement attiré l’attention car c’était la première fois que l’hymne national israélien, Hatikvah, était joué aux Émirats.

      Regev a ensuite tweeté : « Nous avons fait l’histoire. Le peuple d’Israël vit ! »

      Bien que les Israéliens aient déjà assisté à des événements sportifs dans le Golfe auparavant, leur participation était souvent subordonnée à l’absence de symboles nationaux.

      L’année dernière, la Fédération internationale de judo a toutefois menacé d’annuler le grand chelem d’Abou Dabi si les athlètes israéliens ne bénéficiaient pas des mêmes droits que les autres concurrents.
      La visite de la ministre est survenue quelques jours seulement après le voyage surprise du Premier ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou à Oman pour rencontrer le sultan Qaboos, marquant la première visite d’un dirigeant israélien dans ce pays du Golfe depuis 1996.
      La rencontre de Mascate portait plus sur le désir d’Oman de jouer un rôle dans la région que sur la conclusion d’un accord de paix entre Israéliens et Palestiniens, a déclaré à MEE une source diplomatique occidentale.

      « Oman tente de jouer un rôle régional entre les divers parties et axes de la région et considère Israël comme un acteur important concernant diverses questions régionales », a déclaré le diplomate.

      Ce mardi, un troisième haut responsable israélien s’est rendu dans un pays du Golfe. Le ministre israélien des Communications, Ayoub Kara, participe en ce moment à la Conférence de plénipotentiaires de l’Union internationale des télécommunications à Dubaï, où il a appelé à la « paix et la stabilité » dans la région.


  • Exclusive: Mesa to include nine countries while prioritising Iran threat - The National

    S Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Gulf Affairs Tim Lenderking has spent the last three weeks in shuttle regional diplomacy across the Gulf to lay the groundwork for a US-hosted summit in January that would launch the Middle East Strategic Alliance (Mesa), a concept similar to an Arab Nato.

    In an interview with The National on Wednesday, Mr Lenderking divulged details about the structure of Mesa and its long term prospects. He said besides the Gulf Cooperation Council members – Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman – the US and both Egypt and Jordan would be members of such an alliance.

    Mr Lenderking said that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will be hosting a GCC + 2 meeting on the margins of United Nations General Assembly on Friday to prepare for the January summit.

    “This stems from the Riyadh summit in 2017 where everyone agreed that the US and the GCC would meet on an annual basis...we added on top of that the keen interest on both sides in building Mesa,” Mr Lenderking explained. The alliance would be based on a security, economic and political agreement that would bind together the GCC countries, along with the US, Egypt and Jordan.

    Notwithstanding the different policy priorities within the GCC itself, Mr Lenderking said the idea of Mesa is “it builds a good strong shield against threats in the Gulf,” naming Iran, cyber concerns, attacks on infrastructure, and coordinating conflict management from Syria to Yemen as part of its agenda.

    “The more we have coordinated efforts, the more effective in enhancing stability,” he said, adding that Iran was the “number one threat” on the Mesa list.

    The senior US official confirmed that the US would be part of the alliance and “we [US] would like to agree on the concept of Mesa by the January summit.”

    He cautioned, however, that these conversations are still in their early stages and “if we find we need to change dates we need to be flexible on that”.

  • L’Etat français sera-t-il le sauveur ou le fossoyeur de Manurhin ?

    13/06/2018, 6:56
    Bruno Le Maire sera-t-il sauveur de Manurhin, une entreprise centenaire ? Le ministre de l’Economie a promis mardi de trouver « toutes les solutions » pour le fabricant de machines de munitions « Made in France », placé sous le régime de la sauvegarde depuis juin 2017. D’autant que le président du directoire de Manurhin, Rémy Thannberger. qui emploie 190 salariés, a rendez-vous mercredi tôt à la chambre commerciale du Tribunal de grande instance de Mulhouse pour une nouvelle audience cruciale pour son avenir, dont l’issue pourrait être le dépôt de bilan ou bien prolongation de la période d’observation.


    Selon nos informations, le groupe allemand Rheinmetall serait dans les starting-blocks pour s’offrir à moindre coût l’entreprise mulhousienne à la barre du tribunal. Avec l’appui de l’Etat ? En revanche, de source proche du dossier, une solution avant dépôt de bilan pourrait venir d’un important client du Golfe de Manurhin, Oman. Ce poker menteur pourrait être in fine préjudiciable à l’entreprise mulhousienne.

  • Oman’s Port Strategy – LobeLog

    Within the Arabian Peninsula, Duqm and Salalah have much potential to further shape geopolitical relations amid strategic shifts in the regional balance of power. Any major investments by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Duqm (and other Omani projects) should be watched closely for their effect on intra-Gulf politics. Some analysts contend that both countries are attempting to restrict the Sultanate’s geopolitical maneuverability as Muscat and Tehran try to maintain cooperative relations. As Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may use their petro-dollars to influence Oman’s future position in an increasingly polarized Gulf, they could use investments in Omani infrastructure projects as another way to gain leverage. Likewise, Oman’s trade infrastructure proved highly useful to Qatar last year when Doha needed alternatives to Jebel Ali as a logistics hub linking the emirate to the global economy.

    It goes without saying that Iran itself is a key factor in this equation. If tensions in the Strait of Hormuz escalate, Duqm and Salalah would need to prepare for any trade-related ramifications. The Omani government must stay vigilant and aware of any escalations of friction amid increasingly harsh rhetoric from Washington and Tehran that threaten to unleash an armed conflict in or near the strait. Yet the ports’ advantageous geographic locations could help Gulf states continue to sell their oil and gas in the event of such a crisis, as shipments via Duqm and Salalah will not need to travel through the strait. Whereas Saudi Arabia has its Red Sea coast and the UAE has one Emirate (Fujairah) outside the strait, which would enable these two states to continue exporting oil in the event of the strait’s closure, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar are fully dependent on that artery for their hydrocarbon exports. As Amer No’man Ashour, chief analyst and economist at CNBC Arabia, explains:

    We all know that more than 30 per cent of oil shipments pass through the Strait of Hormuz and with this shift via the Port of Fujairah and the Duqm port, the GCC countries will ensure that their oil shipments are safe, and this will decrease the risk and the cost of insurance on ships… Al-Duqm Port is one of the best ever solutions to the oil issue… It is 800 kilometres away from UAE borders. We know that the UAE has had a partial solution via Fujairah with a capacity of 1.1 million barrels per day, but the production of the UAE is almost 3 million barrels per day. Most of Kuwait, Qatari and Saudi oil is produced in the eastern parts of the Gulf area and this new Omani port will be very suitable for exporting oil to the world.

    #oman #grand_jeu

  • Les exportations israéliennes vers les pays du Golfe auraient atteint les 1 milliard $ – Site de la chaîne AlManar-Liban

    Le site en ligne d’informations israélien i24 s’est targué que les exportations israéliennes en direction de pays du Golfe auraient atteint les un milliard de dollars. Et ce en dépit de l’absence d’un accord de paix et de relations bilatérales officielles entre eux. Le média israélien a rapporté cette information à partir de l’Institut Tony Blair pour le changement international.

    Selon ses chiffres datant depuis 2016, la valeur des produits israéliens exportés vers les pays membres du Conseil de coopération des pays du Golfe dépasse celle vers les pays alliés, et des économies plus importantes à l’instar de la Russie et Japon.
    Cette instance compte dans ses rangs le Bahreïn, le Koweït, Oman, le Qatar, l’Arabie saoudite et les Emirats arabes unis.

    #israël #golfe

  • ’Five years ago there was nothing’: inside Duqm, the city rising from the sand | Cities | The Guardian

    Potential investors examine a map of future plans for Duqm. All photographs: Wade Shepard

    by Wade Shepard in Duqm

    Oman’s sparsely inhabited coast of fishing villages and Bedouin camps is being transformed into industrial city with port, luxury hotels and housing for 111,000

    Five yers ago there was nothing here,” says Hamad Said Al Rawahi as he drives fast along a stretch of freshly paved highway in Oman’s coastal desert. He just picked me up from the side of the road in his shiny black Mercedes. I am hitchhiking – the closest thing to public transport out here.

    We are in Duqm, a nascent city about 300 miles (480km) from the capital, Muscat, that was a fishing village prior to 2011, when Oman reimagined it, along with a stretch of uninterrupted coastline and Bedouin camps, as a new special economic zone.

    #oman #extension_urbaine #urban_matter #teritoires_de_l_extension_urbaine #urbanisation ... syndrome chinois avec des projets pharaoniques du genre de “Forest City” en Malaisie aux ports de Singapour.

  • Red-hot planet: All-time heat records have been set all over the world during the past week

    No single record, in isolation, can be attributed to global warming. But collectively, these heat records are consistent with the kind of extremes we expect to see increase in a warming world.


  • The Gulf Impasse’s One Year Anniversary & the Changing Regional Dynamics – Gulf International Forum

    Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.

    A year has passed since the Qatar News Agency was hacked and implanted with ‘fake news’. Ten days later this hacking was followed by the diplomatic and economic embargo of Qatar by four regional states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt. The element of surprise strategy applied by the Quartet was intended to shock the Qatari government into acceding to their demands. Now, one year later this approach is misplaced as Qatar proved more resilient than anticipated. Rather than isolating Qatar regionally and internationally, the crisis has widened the cracks in the Gulf into a chasm and has generated unintended consequences that risk inflicting generational damage on its political and social fabric. As with the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the blockade of Qatar is an era-rupturing event that will reverberate through the regional politics and international relations of the Gulf for years to come.

    Evolving Threat Perceptions
    The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981 largely in response to regional security threats triggered by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. The six states that came together in Abu Dhabi to form the GCC often differed in their foreign policy outlook. The five smallest Gulf States shared varying degrees of wariness toward Saudi Arabia, reflecting in part a history of border disputes. For example, Kuwait was put under Saudi blockade in the 1920s and 1930s, Oman and Abu Dhabi had territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia from the 1950s to the 1970s, and as recently as 1992 and 1993 skirmishes occurred on the Saudi-Qatari border. Simmering unease in smaller Gulf capitals at the prospect of Saudi domination of GCC structures hampered attempts to construct collective military and security policies such as the Peninsula Shield Force or a common internal security agreement.

    And yet, throughout the three major wars in the Gulf – the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the Gulf War (1991), and the war and subsequent US-led occupation of Iraq (2003-11), the GCC remained a bastion of relative stability in a region gripped by conflict and insecurity. During this tumultuous period, all six GCC states retained a common threat perception enabling them to overcome instances of intra-GCC friction, such as Saudi and Emirati attempts to reverse the 1995 succession of Qatar’s Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani or the Emirati walkout from the planned GCC monetary union in 2010 after Riyadh was chosen over Abu Dhabi as the site of the prospective GCC central bank. Indeed, GCC states have always worked best together in the face of external threats that draw together the six ruling families’ common interest in political survival – evidenced by the decision in 2011 to revive and dispatch the Peninsula Shield Force to Bahrain to assist in the restoration of order and the creation of a $10 billion GCC fund to assist Bahrain and Oman in the wake of Arab Spring unrest.

  • As Google and AWS kill domain fronting, users must find a new way to fight censorship - TechRepublic

    Google and Amazon have both made technical changes to stop the practice of domain fronting, which Signal uses to circumvent censorship in certain countries.
    The technique has also been used by a Russian state-sponsored attack group.

    Recent changes in the software stack of Google App Engine broke a technique called “domain fronting,” which had been used most notably by the privacy-focused messaging service Signal. The app had used the technique since 2016 to allow users in Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to continue using the app, despite apparent attempts to block Signal.

    Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting


    We describe “domain fronting,” a versatile censorship circumvention technique that hides the remote endpoint of a communication. Domain fronting works at the application layer, using HTTPS, to communicate with a forbidden host while appearing to communicate with some other host, permitted by the censor. The key idea is the use of different domain names at different layers of communication. One domain appears on the “outside” of an HTTPS request—in the DNS request and TLS Server Name Indication—while another domain appears on the “inside”—in the HTTP Host header, invisible to the censor under HTTPS encryption. A censor, unable to distinguish fronted and non-fronted traffic to a domain, must choose between allowing circumvention traffic and blocking the domain entirely, which results in expensive collateral damage. Domain fronting is easy to deploy and use and does not require special cooperation by network intermediaries. We identify a number of hard-to-block web services, such as content delivery networks, that support domain-fronted connections and are useful for censorship circumvention. Domain fronting, in various forms, is now a circumvention workhorse. We describe several months of deployment experience in the Tor, Lantern, and Psiphon circumvention systems, whose domain-fronting transports now connect thousands of users daily and transfer many terabytes per month.

    #internet #censure

  • St Helena’s cherished lifeline ship to return as anti-piracy armory

    The Royal Mail Ship St Helena lies berthed in Cape Town harbour, South Africa April 17, 2018.
    REUTERS/Mike Hutchings

    The RMS St. Helena, Britain’s last working postal ship, was for nearly three decades the main source of contact between one of humanity’s remotest islands and the outside world.

    Now the ship, cherished by the 4,500 residents of British-ruled St. Helena, will start a new life as a floating armory, packed with automatic weapons, bullet-proof jackets and night vision goggles, all stored for maritime security operatives.

    Renamed the MNG Tahiti, the 340-foot ship will undergo some tweaks before sailing to the Gulf of Oman where it will be used to ferry guns and guards to passing vessels navigating stretches of water lurking with pirates, its new operator said on Tuesday.

  • Bahrain’s Biggest Oil Find Since 1932 Dwarfs Reserves - Bloomberg

    • Kingdom currently has two fields, one shared with Saudi Arabia
     • New undersea deposit lies off Gulf nation’s western coast

    Bahrain, the smallest energy producer in the Persian Gulf, discovered its biggest oil field since it started producing crude in 1932, according to the country’s official news agency.

    The shale oil and natural gas discovered in a deposit off the island state’s west coast “ is understood to dwarf Bahrain’s current reserves, ”Bahrain News Agency reported, without giving figures. U.S. consultants DeGolyer & MacNaughton Corp. evaluated the field, and Bahrain plans to provide additional details on Wednesday about the reservoir’s “size and extraction viability,” BNA reported.
    Bahrain discovered the offshore Khaleej Al Bahrain Basin as it seeks to expand output capacity at its wholly owned Bahrain Field to 100,000 barrels a day by the end of the decade. The country is pumping about 45,000 barrels of oil a day from its Bahrain Field, and it shares income from a deposit with Saudi Arabia that produces about 300,000 barrels a day, according to figures from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

    • Bahrain Seeks Big Oil’s Help to Develop New Shale Discovery - Bloomberg

      The amount of oil and gas that can be recovered from hard-to-reach pockets in shale rocks under the sea is uncertain, and development is potentially an expensive proposition. Halliburton Co. will drill two wells this year in the offshore Khaleej Al Bahrain Basin to appraise how much of the oil contained underground is actually recoverable.

      Only a fraction of the 80-plus billion barrels is likely to be recoverable,” Tom Quinn, senior analyst for Middle East upstream at consultant Wood Mackenzie Ltd., said by email. “The oil will also be technically challenging and potentially high cost to develop,” while Bahrain’s previous oil contracts offered meager returns for international oil companies, he said.

      Elsewhere in the Middle East, differences between estimated shale resources and the amounts that are exploitable can be great. Oman’s Rub Al-Khali Basin area contains an estimated 24 billion barrels of oil, but only 1.2 billion barrels are “technically recoverable,” according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Jordan’s Wadi Sirhan Basin resource holds about 4 billion barrels, and just 100 million can be extracted, according to the EIA. Both deposits are onshore.

      In addition Bahrain’s sole wholly owned field, the country shares income from a separate deposit with Saudi Arabia that produced 153,500 barrels a day in 2016, according to the International Energy Agency. The government needs oil at $118 a barrel, almost twice the current price, to balance this year’s budget.

      The newly discovered field should provide support for Bahrain’s “very strained fiscal situation,” said John Sfakianakis, director of economic research at the Gulf Research Center in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. “It will provide additional cushion, depending on when the stream of oil comes into play and the price of oil at that point.

    • Bahrain Shale Find Puts Oil Market on Notice

      The Global Oil Market Is About to Be Upended - Bloomberg

      Bahrain discovered the first oil on the Arab side of the Gulf in 1932. It took a long time for the small island to find anything of similar significance, but its recent announcement of an enormous shale oil resource under its shallow waters should not be underestimated: Commercial offshore shale oil production would be a first for the worldwide industry.

      Perhaps more significant is that this discovery has the potential to boost Middle East output, while raising the odds that shale oil production outside the U.S. and Canada finally takes off. The Middle East has the advantages of good geology, existing petroleum infrastructure, and a lack of environmental or community opposition.

  • Container Fire Reported On U.S.-Flagged Maersk Kensington in Gulf of Aden – gCaptain

    A fire has been reported in a below-deck container on board the U.S.-flag containership Maersk Kensington in the eastern Gulf of Aden, the second such incident to hit a Maersk Line vessel in recent weeks. 

    All crew are safe and the fire is contained, Maersk Line has confirmed.
    The incident is the second cargo fire on board a Maersk containership in as many weeks.

    On March 6, Maersk Line’s 2017-built Maersk Honam suffered a devastating fire in its forward cargo holds while heading west in the Arabian Sea approximately 900 nautical southeast of Salalah, Oman. Tragically, five crew members lost their lives in the incident. The response to that incident is still on-going in the Arabian Sea.

    The Maersk Honam, an ultra-large containership, is carrying a total of 7,860 containers, corresponding to 12,416 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent).
    Maersk Kensington is currently at anchor outside the port of Salalah, and is getting assistance from shore. The vessel is carrying 3518 containers (corresponding to 5616 TEU). In case of cargo delays all impacted customers will be contacted directly.
    In late February, another Maersk vessel, the Maersk Shanghai, lost 76 containers overboard during heavy weather off the U.S. East Coast. One of the containers lost at sea was reportedly carrying about 5,900 pounds of sulfuric acid.

  • Oman: UN experts denounce detention of journalist Yousuf Al Haj and warn against restrictions on freedom of the press in the country | Alkarama Foundation

    Geneva (February 12, 2018) – The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD ) has  today published an Opinion on the high-profile case of Omani journalist Yousuf Al Haj, stating that his almost 15 month-long arbitrary detention was “clearly connected to his activity as a journalist”.
    The Opinion – adopted on November 24, 2017, and made public on February 12, 2018 – came after the Alkarama Foundation referred Al Haj’s case to the WGAD in March 2017. Alkarama requested that the UN experts call upon the Omani authorities to release Al Haj and to respect freedom of the press in the country.
    The WGAD considered Al Haj’s case after his October 2017 release, and expressed concern that “his conviction may serve as the legal precedent for the arrest, detention and punishment or threat thereof to silence critics in the future.”
    Establishing a posteriori the arbitrary nature of Al Haj’s detention, the WGAD found that the Omani authorities committed multiple violations of minimum fail trial guarantees and due process, and that Al Haj’s detention stemmed directly from his legitimate activity as a journalist. In this regard, the WGAD called upon the Omani authorities to provide Al Haj and his colleagues from Al Zaman newspaper with their right to compensation.

  • How Qatar Is Winning The Diplomatic War In Its Dispute With Saudi Arabia And The UAE

    The diplomatic efforts of Qatar to circumvent the economic and political embargo on the country by a number of erstwhile allies in the region appears to be working, with the US government now emphasizing its support for Doha while still calling for all sides to compromise.

    The embargo was launched on Qatar in June last year by Bahrain, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with the last two of these countries the driving force behind the move. They accuse Qatar of supporting terrorism and destabilizing the region. Qatar rejected the accusations and has moved quickly to deepen its ties with other countries inside the region – such as Iran, Oman and Turkey – and those further afield, including the US.

    Those efforts appear to be paying off, with a strategic dialogue held this week in Washington at which senior US administration figures emphasized the close ties between the two countries.

    #nuit_torride clap de fin ?

  • Le Louvre Abu Dhabi raye le Qatar de ses cartes

    C’est le genre de « détail » qui fait tache. A peine deux mois après l’ouverture en fanfare du Louvre Abu Dhabi, une carte exposée dans le musée des enfants qu’abrite l’institution fait polémique. Et pour cause : une presqu’île a disparu, comme engloutie par la mer. Il s’agit tout bonnement du Qatar, gommé de la péninsule arabique. Un choix étonnant pour un musée qui se veut universel, qui plus est dans une section qui se prétend éducative… Une petite pierre supplémentaire dans l’escalade des tensions entre le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis, qui, aux côtés de l’Arabie saoudite, ont rompu les liens diplomatiques avec Doha.

    Selon l’accord signé en 2007, le Louvre doit être consulté à toutes les étapes de la conception et de la réalisation du musée, y compris pour les espaces pédagogiques. Pour Alexandre Kazerouni, cet incident est à rapprocher de l’achat par les autorités d’Abou Dhabi du Sal­vator Mundi, le tableau attribué à Leonard de Vinci qui a récemment battu tous les ­records : « La partie française n’était pas informée de cet achat, dont on ne sait toujours rien des dessous. Signe que le pouvoir émirati s’est approprié politiquement le musée. »

    Utiliser la culture pour diffuser des fausses nouvelles ;-)

    #Louvre #Abu_Dhabi #Fake_news

  • Le #Louvre_Abu_Dhabi raye le #Qatar de ses cartes

    1. La carte géographique présentée au Louvre Abu Dhabi où le Qatar a disparu
    Photo : Simon Henderson

    (note : la photo ci-dessus n’est pas celle retenue par Le Monde qui choisit de représenter une photo extérieure du musée…)

    C’est le genre de « détail » qui fait tache. A peine deux mois après l’ouverture en fanfare du Louvre Abu Dhabi, une carte exposée dans le musée des enfants qu’abrite l’institution fait polémique. Et pour cause : une presqu’île a disparu, comme engloutie par la mer. Il s’agit tout bonnement du Qatar, gommé de la péninsule arabique. Un choix étonnant pour un musée qui se veut universel, qui plus est dans une section qui se prétend éducative… Une petite pierre supplémentaire dans l’escalade des tensions entre le Qatar et les Emirats arabes unis, qui, aux côtés de l’Arabie saoudite, ont rompu les liens diplomatiques avec Doha.

    Le 17 janvier, un article du Washington Institute for Near-East Policy (Winep), un think tank pro-israélien basé à Washington, met le feu aux poudres. Son auteur, Simon Henderson, y signale la suppression du Qatar de la carte accrochée dans l’espace pédagogique du Louvre Abu Dhabi, indiquant qu’une telle ­décision est « probablement incompatible avec l’accord permettant à Abou Dhabi d’utiliser le nom du Louvre ».

    La Tribune de l’Art d’où provient l’image ci-dessus fournit, en comparaison, la carte réelle…

    2. La carte réelle, avec la péninsule du Qatar
    Photo : Wikipedia