country:sudan

  • State land grabs fuel Sudan’s crisis

    Al-Noor Othman, a farmer in Sudan’s South Kordofan province, was hoping for a good harvest. He had bills to pay.

    His father needed glaucoma surgery on his left eye and he was saving up for his wedding.

    But there would be no harvest that season. “One cloudy morning [in 2008], I saw some people dividing our farm, claiming that we have not paid the fees of the ownership renewal — even though we inherited the land; we used to live in a part of it and farm the other area. But overnight we became homeless,” Othman told Ayin.

    The Othmans were one of 500 families forced to leave their land to make way for the #Habilla_Agricultural_Project, east of #Dilling city. He felt helpless — until he became a rebel.

    Othman joined an armed movement operating from the #South_Kordofan and #Blue_Nile states, to protect his land from further #pillage.

    Sudan is one of the “leading” countries in which authorities confiscate land from citizens, according to the World Bank. Between 2004 and 2013, roughly four million hectares of land was redistributed to local and foreign investors.

    https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-04-00-state-land-grabs-fuel-sudans-crisis
    #accaparement_de_terres #terres #Soudan #propriété #confiscation #résistance #Sudan_People’s_Liberation_Movement #SPLM

    cc @odilon

    Article traduit en italien par le journal Internazionale (https://www.internazionale.it/sommario), mais pas disponible sur leur site internet.
    Une page a été mise sur twitter par @francofontana43 :

  • Sudan, Libya, Chad and Niger sign border protection agreement

    The Foreign Minister for the Libyan Government of National Accord, Mohamed Taher Siala, said an agreement to control and monitor borders among Libya, Sudan, Chad and Niger has been signed in Ndjamena.

    In a statement issued on Friday, Siala said the agreement was reached to promote cooperation, to protect the joint borders and in order to achieve peace, security, economic and social development.

    He said the agreement would enhance joint efforts of the four countries to secure the borders, stressing Libya’s keenness to support all efforts to fight against terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking and all forms of cross-border crime.

    In a meeting held last April, Sudan, Chad, Libya and Niger agreed to “coordinate the actions” of their armed forces to fight against the transnational “crime” in the region.

    The four countries agreed “on the establishment of a cooperation mechanism for border security and the fight against transnational organized crime”.

    Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Boko Haram pose a serious threat to Niger and Chad while Sudan seeks to prevent trafficking of arms to Darfur and migration of mercenaries to Libya.

    Sudan is not part of the multi-national military force in Africa’s Sahel region dubbed “#G5_Sahel force” which includes Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

    The UN-backed force is tasked with policing the Sahel region in collaboration with 4,000 French troops deployed there since intervening in 2013 to fight an insurgency in northern Mali.


    http://en.alwasat.ly/news/libya/208006

    #frontières #contrôles #frontaliers #surveillance_des_frontières #accord #terrorisme #militarisation_des_frontières #Sahel #Burkina_Faso #Mauritanie
    #Soudan #Libye #Tchad #Niger
    cc @isskein

  • Sudan’s Many Nouras. Teenager Noura Hussein Faces Death for Killing Husband Who Raped Her

    International media has rightly focused on the case of Noura Hussein, a 19-year-old Sudanese woman sentenced to death for killing her husband – whom she’d been forced to marry – as he tried to rape her.

    The court which tried Noura apparently had no regard to the fact that her husband had previously raped her violently with the help of his family members, or that she was forced into the marriage by her own family at just 16. Instead, it convicted her of murder and sentenced her to death by hanging after the man’s family opted for death over diya, or compensation. The United Nations and rights groups have appealed for clemency, and #justicefornoura is trending.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/15/sudans-many-nouras
    #Soudan #mariage_forcé #viol #femmes

  • The far-right nationalist movement roiling Eritreans in Israel

    The far-right Agazian movement seeks to establish a Tigrinyan Orthodox-Christian state in what is now Eritrea and part of Ethiopia. Its anti-Muslim, militant politics are deepening the divisions within the already fractious Eritrean opposition.


    https://972mag.com/the-far-right-nationalist-movement-roiling-eritreans-in-israel/135179
    #Israfrique #Israël #réfugiés_érythréens #Erythrée #extrême_droite #nationalisme
    cc @sinehebdo

  • Khartoum preparing upcoming visit of China’s president to Sudan: Ambassador

    April 22, 2018 (KHARTOUM) Sudan’s Foreign Ministry on Sunday said arrangements are underway for the upcoming visit of China’s President Xi Jinping to Sudan during this year.


    http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article65248
    #Soudan #Chine #Chinafrique

  • Des demandeurs d’asile soudanais torturés dans leur pays après avoir été expulsés par la #France

    Une enquête du New York Times a révélé dimanche soir que plusieurs demandeurs d’asile soudanais renvoyés par la France, l’#Italie et la #Belgique, avaient été torturés à leur retour dans leur pays d’origine.

    https://www.lejdd.fr/international/des-demandeurs-dasile-soudanais-tortures-dans-leur-pays-apres-avoir-ete-expuls
    #torture #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_soudanais #Soudan

    via @isskein sur FB

    • Et ici l’article du New York Times, repris par Lejdd :

      By Stifling Migration, Sudan’s Feared Secret Police Aid Europe

      At Sudan’s eastern border, Lt. Samih Omar led two patrol cars slowly over the rutted desert, past a cow’s carcass, before halting on the unmarked 2,000-mile route that thousands of East Africans follow each year in trying to reach the Mediterranean, and then onward to Europe.

      His patrols along this border with Eritrea are helping Sudan crack down on one of the busiest passages on the European migration trail. Yet Lieutenant Omar is no simple border agent. He works for Sudan’s feared secret police, whose leaders are accused of war crimes — and, more recently, whose officers have been accused of torturing migrants.

      Indirectly, he is also working for the interests of the European Union.

      “Sometimes,” Lieutenant Omar said, “I feel this is Europe’s southern border.”

      Three years ago, when a historic tide of migrants poured into Europe, many leaders there reacted with open arms and high-minded idealism. But with the migration crisis having fueled angry populism and political upheaval across the Continent, the European Union is quietly getting its hands dirty, stanching the human flow, in part, by outsourcing border management to countries with dubious human rights records.

      In practical terms, the approach is working: The number of migrants arriving in Europe has more than halved since 2016. But many migration advocates say the moral cost is high.
      To shut off the sea route to Greece, the European Union is paying billions of euros to a Turkish government that is dismantling its democracy. In Libya, Italy is accused of bribing some of the same militiamen who have long profited from the European smuggling trade — many of whom are also accused of war crimes.

      In Sudan, crossed by migrants trying to reach Libya, the relationship is more opaque but rooted in mutual need: The Europeans want closed borders and the Sudanese want to end years of isolation from the West. Europe continues to enforce an arms embargo against Sudan, and many Sudanese leaders are international pariahs, accused of committing war crimes during a civil war in Darfur, a region in western Sudan

      But the relationship is unmistakably deepening. A recent dialogue, named the Khartoum Process (in honor of Sudan’s capital) has become a platform for at least 20 international migration conferences between European Union officials and their counterparts from several African countries, including Sudan. The European Union has also agreed that Khartoum will act as a nerve center for countersmuggling collaboration.

      While no European money has been given directly to any Sudanese government body, the bloc has funneled 106 million euros — or about $131 million — into the country through independent charities and aid agencies, mainly for food, health and sanitation programs for migrants, and for training programs for local officials.

      “While we engage on some areas for the sake of the Sudanese people, we still have a sanction regime in place,” said Catherine Ray, a spokeswoman for the European Union, referring to an embargo on arms and related material.

      “We are not encouraging Sudan to curb migration, but to manage migration in a safe and dignified way,” Ms. Ray added.

      Ahmed Salim, the director of one of the nongovernmental groups that receives European funding, said the bloc was motivated by both self-interest and a desire to improve the situation in Sudan.

      “They don’t want migrants to cross the Mediterranean to Europe,” said Mr. Salim, who heads the European and African Center for Research, Training and Development.

      But, he said, the money his organization receives means better services for asylum seekers in Sudan. “You have to admit that the European countries want to do something to protect migrants here,” he said.

      Critics argue the evolving relationship means that European leaders are implicitly reliant on — and complicit in the reputational rehabilitation of — a Sudanese security apparatus whose leaders have been accused by the United Nations of committing war crimes in Darfur.

      “There is no direct money exchanging hands,” said Suliman Baldo, the author of a research paper about Europe’s migration partnership with Sudan. “But the E.U. basically legitimizes an abusive force.”

      On the border near Abu Jamal, Lieutenant Omar and several members of his patrol are from the wing of the Sudanese security forces headed by Salah Abdallah Gosh, one of several Sudanese officials accused of orchestrating attacks on civilians in Darfur.

      Elsewhere, the border is protected by the Rapid Support Forces, a division of the Sudanese military that was formed from the janjaweed militias who led attacks on civilians in the Darfur conflict. The focus of the group, known as R.S.F., is not counter-smuggling — but roughly a quarter of the people-smugglers caught in January and February this year on the Eritrean border were apprehended by the R.S.F., Lieutenant Omar said.

      European officials have direct contact only with the Sudanese immigration police, and not with the R.S.F., or the security forces that Lieutenant Omar works for, known as N.I.S.S. But their operations are not that far removed.

      The planned countertrafficking coordination center in Khartoum — staffed jointly by police officers from Sudan and several European countries, including Britain, France and Italy — will partly rely on information sourced by N.I.S.S., according to the head of the immigration police department, Gen. Awad Elneil Dhia. The regular police also get occasional support from the R.S.F. on countertrafficking operations in border areas, General Dhia said.

      “They have their presence there and they can help,” General Dhia said. “The police is not everywhere, and we cannot cover everywhere.”

      Yet the Sudanese police are operating in one unexpected place: Europe.

      In a bid to deter future migrants, at least three European countries — Belgium, France and Italy — have allowed in Sudanese police officers to hasten the deportation of Sudanese asylum seekers, General Dhia said.

      Nominally, their official role is simply to identify their citizens. But the officers have been allowed to interrogate some deportation candidates without being monitored by European officials with the language skills to understand what was being said.

      More than 50 Sudanese seeking asylum in Europe have been deported in the past 18 months from Belgium, France and Italy; The New York Times interviewed seven of them on a recent visit to Sudan.

      Four said they had been tortured on their return to Sudan — allegations denied by General Dhia. One man was a Darfuri political dissident deported in late 2017 from France to Khartoum, where he said he was detained on arrival by N.I.S.S. agents.

      Over the next 10 days, he said he was given electric shocks, punched and beaten with metal pipes. At one point the dissident, who asked that his name be withheld for his safety, lost consciousness and had to be taken to the hospital. He was later released on a form of parole.
      The dissident said that, before his deportation from France, Sudanese police officers had threatened him as French officers stood nearby. “I said to the French police: ‘They are going to kill us,’” he said. “But they didn’t understand.”

      European officials argue that establishing Khartoum as a base for collaboration on fighting human smuggling can only improve the Sudanese security forces. The Regional Operational Center in Khartoum, set to open this year, will enable delegates from several European and African countries to share intelligence and coordinate operations against smugglers across North Africa.

      But potential pitfalls are evident from past collaborations. In 2016, the British and Italian police, crediting a joint operation with their Sudanese counterparts, announced the arrest of “one of the world’s most wanted people smugglers.” They said he was an Eritrean called Medhanie Yehdego Mered, who had been captured in Sudan and extradited to Italy.

      The case is now privately acknowledged by Western diplomats to have been one of mistaken identity. The prisoner turned out to be Medhanie Tesfamariam Berhe, an Eritrean refugee with the same first name as the actual smuggler. Mr. Mered remains at large.

      Even General Dhia now admits that Sudan extradited the wrong man — albeit one who, he says, admitted while in Sudanese custody to involvement in smuggling.

      “There were two people, actually — two people with the same name,” General Dhia said.

      Mr. Berhe nevertheless remains on trial in Italy, accused of being Mr. Mered — and of being a smuggler.

      Beyond that, the Sudanese security services have long been accused of profiting from the smuggling trade. Following European pressure, the Sudanese Parliament adopted a raft of anti-smuggling legislation in 2014, and the rules have since led to the prosecution of some officials over alleged involvement in the smuggling business.

      But according to four smugglers whom I interviewed clandestinely during my trip to Sudan, the security services remain closely involved in the trade, with both N.I.S.S and R.S.F. officials receiving part of the smuggling profits on most trips to southern Libya.

      The head of the R.S.F., Brig. Mohammed Hamdan Daglo, has claimed in the past that his forces play a major role in impeding the route to Libya. But each smuggler — interviewed separately — said that the R.S.F. was often the main organizer of the trips, often supplying camouflaged vehicles to ferry migrants through the desert.

      After being handed over to Libyan militias in Kufra and Sabha, in southern Libya, many migrants are then systematically tortured and held for ransom — money that is later shared with the R.S.F., each smuggler said.

      Rights activists have previously accused Sudanese officials of complicity in trafficking. In a 2014 report, Human Rights Watch said that senior Sudanese police officials had colluded in the smuggling of Eritreans.

      A British journalist captured by the R.S.F. in Darfur in 2016 said that he had been told by his captors that they were involved in smuggling people to Libya. “I asked specifically about how it works,” said the journalist, Phil Cox, a freelance filmmaker for Channel 4. “And they said we make sure the routes are open, and we talk with whoever’s commanding the next area.”

      General Dhia said that the problem did not extend beyond a few bad apples. Sudan, he said, remains an effective partner for Europe in the battle against irregular migration.

      “We are not,” he said, “very far from your standards.”

      https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/22/world/africa/migration-european-union-sudan.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSo
      #externalisation

    • Soudan : des demandeurs d’asile torturés après avoir été expulsés par la France

      Un dissident politique du #Darfour, expulsé par la France fin 2017, affirme notamment avoir été électrocuté, battu et frappé avec des tuyaux en métal pendant dix jours.
      En Belgique, c’est un scandale. En France, le silence est... assourdissant. Dans une grande enquête, publiée dimanche 22 avril, le « New York Times » révèle que des demandeurs d’asile soudanais renvoyés par la France, l’Italie et la Belgique, ont été torturés à leur retour dans leur pays.

      Une enquête de Streetpress, publiée en octobre dernier, révélait déjà que la police française collaborait étroitement, et depuis 2014, avec la dictature soudanaise, et favorisait « le renvoi à Khartoum d’opposants politiques réfugiés en France ». Le titre de Streetpress parlait de lui-même : « Comment la France a livré des opposants politiques à la dictature soudanaise ».
      Le quotidien américain a de son côté retrouvé des demandeurs d’asile et a publié les témoignages de quatre d’entre eux. Ils ont été arrêtés dès leur retour puis torturés par le régime soudanais. Un dissident politique du Darfour expulsé par la France fin 2017, affirme ainsi avoir été électrocuté, battu et frappé avec des tuyaux en métal pendant dix jours. Il affirme qu’avant son expulsion, des officiers de police soudanais l’ont menacé en présence d’officiers français :
      ""Je leur ai dit : ’Ils vont nous tuer’, mais ils n’ont pas compris.""
      Des policiers soudanais dans des centres de rétention

      Interrogé par le « New York Times », le régime du général Omar el-Béchir dément. Le dictateur, qui dirige depuis 28 ans le Soudan, est visé par un mandat d’arrêt en 2008 de la Cour pénale internationale pour génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre, comme le rappelle « le Journal du dimanche ».

      Comme l’écrit le quotidien américain, la Belgique, la France et l’Italie ont autorisé des « officiels soudanais » à pénétrer dans leurs centres de rétention et à interroger des demandeurs d’asile soudanais. Ces « officiels » étaient en réalité des policiers soudanais. Selon le « New York Times », les entretiens dans les centres de rétention entre les « officiels » soudanais et les demandeurs d’asile se seraient faits « en l’absence de fonctionnaire capable de traduire les propos échangés ».

      En Belgique, les révélations sur les expulsions de demandeurs d’asile soudanais ont provoqué de vives tensions. En septembre dernier, le Premier ministre belge Charles Michel a reconnu devant une commission d’enquête de son Parlement que les polices de plusieurs pays européens collaboraient étroitement avec la dictature soudanaise d’Omar el-Béchir.

      https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20180424.OBS5650/soudan-des-demandeurs-d-asile-tortures-apres-avoir-ete-expulses-par-la-fr

    • Et, signalé par @isskein sur FB, un communiqué de Migreurop qui date d’il y a une année. Rappel :

      L’Europe collabore avec un dictateur pour mieux expulser vers le Soudan

      Migreurop demande l’arrêt immédiat de toutes les collaborations initiées par l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres avec la dictature d’Omar El-Béchir et avec tout Etat qui bafoue les droits fondamentaux.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2837.html

  • Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica #Mogherini at the European Parliament plenary session on the Progress on the UN Global Compact for safe, regular and orderly migration and UN Global Compact on refugees

    Let me start with a good news, a good story for once; a little, big European achievement of the last few months. You might remember, last December I came to Strasbourg and here, in this hemicycle we talked about detention centres in Libya. I took in front of you, and most of all, in front of all those people who are suffering inside these detention centres in Libya, the commitment to bring back to their homes 15.000 migrants from within the detention centres to their countries or origin, in a safe manner with Assisted Voluntary Returns, made with our assistance, through the IOM [International Organisation for Migration].

    At that moment we had just reached an unprecedented agreement between our European Union, the African Union, and the United Nations, in particular the United Nations’ agencies for migrants and refugees – at our EU-Africa Union Summit in Abidjan. Thanks to this agreement, in the first two months of this year – so January and February - we managed to rescue and free more than 16.000 people from the camps in Libya. In two months, we managed to achieve more than in the previous year and already in 2017, the results were ten times better than the previous year.

    Now, in the detention camps, there are still some 4.000 to 5.000 people. It is far too much and we are going to continue our work with the United Nations and with the African Union to empty the camps. We have managed to bring out from there 16.000 people in two months, I believe we can make it and empty them completely, within the, at maximum, coming next couple of months.

    This has been possible for one reason: we joined forces – first of all within Europe, second with our African partners and friends, and on a global scale, within the UN system. I am glad to start with this positive note - while acknowledging that there is still work to be done -because sometimes we forget to focus on the achievements we managed to build. I think the achievements are important to lead us towards the solution.

    https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/41272/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-european-par
    #Libye #camps #centres_de_détention #détention #asile #migrations #réfugiés #vide #plein

    Commentaire de Marie Martin via la mailing list Migreurop :

    No resettlement from Libya to the EU was mentioned, if anyone has information on this it will be welcome

    #réinstallation

    @reka :
    ça rentre aussi peut-être dans tes réflexions sur la #géographie_du_vide et #géographie_du_plein

  • Sudan — Ethiopian and Somali Migrants in Transit Desk Review Report (April 2018)

    this snapshot only focuses on Somali and Ethiopian migrants in transit, more precisely in Sudan. Different field locations for data collection activities were chosen and Sudan was selected as one of the transit countries. Sudan was chosen as case study under this project because of its geographical and strategic significance in the context of migration journeys from Ethiopia and Somalia towards Europe. Significant numbers of migrants from the Horn of Africa (in particular from Ethiopia and Somalia) travelling by land are known to travel through Sudan as a transit country. Available estimates of the numbers of Ethiopians going to Sudan each year range from 18,000 up to 100,000. A total of 1,197 interviews with migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia were conducted in Sudan between late November 2017 and the end of December 2017. Data was collected in the area of Khartoum, Sudan.The sample size consisted of 403 Somali and 794 Ethiopian migrants who had recently migrated from their home countries and were, at the time of data collection, passing through Sudan to reach their intended destination country in Europe.

    https://displacement.iom.int/reports/sudan-%E2%80%94-ethiopian-and-somali-migrants-transit-desk-review-
    #Soudan #réfugiés_éthiopiens #réfugiés_somaliens #réfugiés #asile #migrations #rapport #Corne_de_l'Afrique #statistiques #chiffres #transit #push-factors #facteurs_push #pays_de_transit

  • Diamonds in Sudan meteorite ’are remnants of lost planet’ | Science | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/apr/17/diamonds-in-sudan-meteorite-are-remnants-of-lost-planet

    Diamonds found in a meteorite that exploded over the Nubian desert in Sudan a decade ago were formed deep inside a “lost planet” that once circled the sun in the early solar system, scientists say.

    Microscopic analyses of the meteorite’s tiny diamonds revealed they contain compounds that are produced under intense pressure, suggesting the diamonds formed far beneath the surface of a planet.

    In this case, the mysterious world was calculated to be somewhere between Mercury and Mars in size.
    […]
    The #Almahata_Sitta #meteorite was the first to be tracked by telescopes as it sped towards Earth and exploded over the Nubian desert in 2008. The event prompted a recovery effort by the University of Khartoum, which gathered 480 pieces of the meteorite amounting to 4kg of battered material.

  • Blue Nile Dam Nears Completion ; Tripartite Agreement Remains Contentious | IPI Global Observatory
    https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/03/blue-nile-dam-completion-agreement-contentious

    The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project—due to be completed later this year—has required lengthy negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. In recent weeks, the government of Sudan has attempted to continue tripartite meetings after talks stalled in November. The $5 billion project reached 60 percent completion the same month and is expected to take between five and 15 years to fill—in a process Egypt is certain will jeopardize its primary water supplies.

    #barrages #eau #nil #ethiopie #égypte #nil_bleu

  • Renaissance Dam discussions in Sudan expected to produce shared initial understanding | MadaMasr

    https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/04/04/feature/politics/renaissance-dam-discussions-in-sudan-expected-to-produce-shared-initial-un

    Diplomatic sources close to arrangements for the tripartite meetings on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that began on Wednesday in Khartoum say the portfolio of understanding that is expected to come out of the talks includes directions such as a partial reservoir filling of the dam by Ethiopia, Egypt’s resort to national water reserves and guarantees granted to Sudan for its development projects.

    The diplomatic sources, who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity, say that there is “political will” on all sides for the meetings to result in positive initial understandings on the Ethiopian development project, which has strained relations between Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Cairo. 

    Attending the two-day summit are the foreign ministers, irrigation ministers and intelligence chiefs from the three countries, who will focus on the effects of completing the construction of the dam and making it operational in the second half of 2018. 

    An Egyptian source, who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity, says the talks are expected to produce three main outcomes. Firstly, Ethiopia will fill the reservoir with just enough water to allow the first two turbines to become operational in the short term (this had been a point of tension previously, as Egyptian officials were concerned that Addis Ababa had begun “early filling” of the dam). Levels of water in the reservoir would then increase incrementally, along with the rise in the number of operational electrical turbines. Secondly, Egypt would ensure it has strategic water reserves in Lake Nasser. And thirdly, Sudan would receive guarantees that its neighbors would support its agricultural projects and other developmental projects it needs to boost its economy.

  • What is behind the economic crisis in #Sudan?
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/03/current-sudan-crisis

    In October 2017, the Sudanese public was thrilled after the decision by US President Donald Trump to lift economic sanctions against the country, in place since 1997. Sudanese social media buzzed with great expectations. This enthusiasm was legitimate given the drastic impacts of two-decades of sanctions on Sudanese society, but how realistic was the Sudanese…

    #POLITICS

  • Egypt and Sudan: Diplomatic pacification, unresolved affairs | MadaMasr

    https://madamirror.appspot.com/www.madamasr.com/en/2018/03/08/feature/politics/egypt-and-sudan-diplomatic-pacification-unresolved-affairs/?platform=hootsuite

    Quietly and without an official announcement is how Osama Shaltout, Egypt’s ambassador to Sudan, returned to his post in Khartoum on Tuesday. On the same day, Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Halim, Sudan’s ambassador to Egypt, returned to Cairo two months after he was recalled due to tension between the neighboring countries.

    Shaltout spent the better part of two months in Cairo, as the Egyptian government worked to resolve the tension. Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ahmed Abu Zeid told Mada Masr on Wednesday morning that the reason for the ambassador’s stay in Cairo had been to “take part in official meetings.” Abu Zeid also stressed that Cairo did not recall Shaltout, either in response to Khartoum’s January decision or at any point since.

    Although the return of both ambassadors to their respective posts is an indication of the end of the public escalation of tensions, several Egyptian and Western diplomats as well as observers believe that the matters which originally triggered the crisis earlier this year have yet to be settled, even if the restoration of diplomatic relations is a step in the right direction.

    “The kind of escalation we saw in the January [between Sudan and Egypt] was kind of a negotiation being carried out in public, with a ratcheting up of rhetoric that didn’t necessarily match what was happening on the ground,” International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Analyst Magnus Taylor tells Mada Masr. “Of course, there are some real structural problems in the relationship on the Renaissance Dam, on the Muslim Brotherhood, the border conflict over Halayeb. But I’ve never really seen any of those issues as escalating into a border war or proxy war.”

  • COMPARING SYRIA TO OTHER CRISES.
    https://www.acleddata.com/2018/03/02/comparing-syria-to-other-crises

    Many believe Syria constitutes the worst crisis in a decade. Indeed, the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner has stopped counting fatalities in 2014,[1] the amount of US (2017) and Russian (2016) airstrikes is unprecedented[2] and after distinct crises such as Sinjar, Khan Shaykhun new ones continue to arise (Eastern Ghouta, Afrin). How ‘bad’ is Syria in a comparative perspective?

    Syria is very bad compared to other spaces. Syria averages 70 violent reported events per day, and is currently as violent as all African conflicts plus South Asian fragile countries combined (see visual). To comprehend this number, take a combination of Kenya and Burundi’s lingering unrest, with the Congo’s emerging war, the continuing crises in CAR, Somalia, both Sudan’s, conflict in Nigeria, AQIMS increasing presence in West-Africa and Libya’s continuing problems, and still you do not equal the number of clashes and attacks in Syria’s conflict. Or consider that the number of events during one week of the Afrin offensive (the week of February 5, 2018) is similar in intensity to all violence in the Middle East (with active conflicts like Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq) plus all protests/incidents in South-East Asia.

    While scholars will contest over competing explanations for the decades to come, ACLED conflict data suggest two key insights. First, Syria is not special because its violence profile is very different. Syria shares a similar violence profile with Iraq and Yemen, meaning that actors engage in the same type of violence but just with an incredible intensity. Second, Syria is not more violent because it gets better reported on. Our ‘overlap-scores’ suggest that the detection rate of violence in Syria is not very different from other contexts. What may instead be a fruitful avenue is the finding that conflict size and intensity seem to be distributed according to an exponential function.[3] That means that the vast majority of conflicts experience (comparatively) little violence while some conflicts at the very tail end of the distribution are incredibly violent (see visual).[4] Syria unfortunately belongs to this latter category.

  • Ethiopia reaffirms open-door refugee policy amid continuing refugee influx

    Ethiopia has reaffirmed its open-door policy for refugees that are flocking into the East African country mainly from its unsettled neighboring countries.

    The Ethiopian refugee agency (ARRA) said Monday that even though the country presently shelters more than 900,000 refugees, it will maintain its open door policy towards refugees and “continue to receive new arrivals from several of its neighbors, notably from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Yemen.”

    Ethiopia, which is home to the second largest refugee population in Africa next to Uganda, further affirmed its commitment to improving refugee lives through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and the Nine Significant Pledges it has made in September 2016.

    “As a country proud for its long-standing history of hosting refugees and home to the second largest refugee population in Africa, our commitment to improving refugee lives will continue unabated in light of the CRRF and the Nine Significant Pledges we made in September 2016,” Zeynu Jemal, Deputy Director of Ethiopian Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), told journalists on Monday.

    http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/27/c_137003872.htm
    #ouverture_Des_Frontières #frontières_ouvertes #Ethiopie #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • Sampling bias in climate–conflict research
    http://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-0068-2

    Critics have argued that the evidence of an association between #climate change and #conflict is flawed because the research relies on a dependent variable sampling strategy. Similarly, it has been hypothesized that convenience of access biases the sample of cases studied (the ‘streetlight effect’). This also gives rise to claims that the climate–conflict literature stigmatizes some places as being more ‘naturally’ violent. Yet there has been no proof of such sampling patterns. Here we test whether climate–conflict research is based on such a biased sample through a systematic review of the literature. We demonstrate that research on climate change and violent conflict suffers from a streetlight effect. Further, studies which focus on a small number of cases in particular are strongly informed by cases where there has been conflict, do not sample on the independent variables (climate impact or risk), and hence tend to find some association between these two variables. These biases mean that research on climate change and conflict primarily focuses on a few accessible regions, overstates the links between both phenomena and cannot explain peaceful outcomes from climate change. This could result in maladaptive responses in those places that are stigmatized as being inherently more prone to climate-induced violence.

    • A growing number of policymakers, journalists and scholars are linking climate change to violent conflict9. Nevertheless, scientific evidence of this relationship remains elusive due to heterogeneous research designs, variables, data sets and scales of analysis10,11. Amid the array of disparate findings is a core of meta-analyses that are based on statistical methods12,13 as well as several in-depth studies linking climate change to highly prominent conflicts such as those in Darfur or Syria14,15.

      Critics of this research point to an array of methodological problems, and to a lesser extent a deeper underlying problem with a study design that selects only cases where conflict is present or where data are readily available1,2,3,4,10. Researchers have, for instance, intensively studied the impact of a multi-year drought on the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, while there is little analysis of responses to the same drought in Jordan or Lebanon, where no large-scale violence erupted16. So, if the evidence of a causal association between climate and violent conflict is informed only by exceptional instances where violent conflict arises and climate also varies in some way, it is unable to explain the vastly more ubiquitous and continuing condition of peace under a changing climate.

      Other critics of the research claiming a link between climate change and violent conflict have pointed to the way it stigmatizes some places—most often ‘Africa’ or a few African countries—as being more naturally violent than others. It does this ignoring the many similar and/or proximate places where peaceful responses are the norm, and the complex political, economic and institutional factors that cause violence and peace4,6,8,17. Such ‘mappings of danger’ can undermine the confidence of investors, local people and international donors and hence undermine sustainable development. They change the climate policy challenge from being one of adaptation with and in the interests of local people, to one of interventions to secure peace in the interests of those who fear the risk of contagious conflict and instability6,18.

      So, it is important to understand whether the research claiming a link between climate change and violent conflict is based on a biased sampling strategy. Yet the extent to which this is the case remains untested. We therefore survey the relevant academic literature for the period 1990–2017 using the Scopus database and a systematic review—a method often used to analyse large bodies of literature with a high degree of rigour and replicability, and which is described in the Methods section with data provided in Supplementary Datasets 1 and 219,20.

      The analysis of the relevant literature shows that Africa is by far the most frequently mentioned continent (77 mentions), followed by Asia (45) (see Table 1). The dominant focus on Africa in the literature is largely stable over time (see Fig. 1). This is surprising given that Asia is also home to places that are politically fragile and highly vulnerable to climate change21,22, but much more populous. Other continents with significant vulnerabilities to climate change (and that are at least in some places also prone to violent conflict), such as South America or Oceania, are hardly considered at all21.
      Table 1 Most frequently mentioned continents and world regions in climate–conflict publications
      Full size table
      Fig. 1: Frequency of mentions of continents in the climate–conflict literature per year.
      Fig. 1

      The bars illustrate how frequently a continent was mentioned in the climate–conflict literature per year (2007–2017). No bar indicates that the continent was not mentioned in this year.
      Full size image

      With respect to world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa was by far most frequently mentioned in the literature analysed (44 times), although the Middle East (22) and the Sahel (22) were also discussed often (see Table 1). At the country level, Kenya and Sudan were most frequently analysed by climate–conflict researchers (11 mentions), followed by Egypt (8) as well as India, Nigeria and Syria (7). Complete lists of the continents, world regions and countries discussed in climate–conflict research can be found in Supplementary Dataset 1.

      To check whether the selection of cases is biased towards the dependent variable, we run a number of Poisson regressions (see Supplementary Tables 1–3 for the full results) using data on, among others, the number of times a country is mentioned in the literature and on battle-related deaths between 1989 and 201522. Although the battle-related deaths data set is far from perfect and tends to underestimate small-scale violence (which many scholars believe is likely to be the most affected by climate change), it is currently the best global data set on violent conflict prevalence available.

      The correlation between the number of mentions and a high death toll is positive and significant in all models (Fig. 2). This suggests that studies on climate–conflict links that research one or a few individual countries are disproportionally focusing on cases that are already experiencing violent conflict. Holding other factors constant, we estimate that countries with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths are mentioned almost three times as often as countries with a lower death toll. This is further supported by a comparison of the top ten countries of each list (Table 2). Six of the ten most-often-mentioned countries are also among the ten countries with the most battle-related deaths. The four remaining countries are also characterized by significant numbers of battle-related deaths, ranging from 2,775 (Egypt) to 8,644 (South Sudan).
      Fig. 2: Changes in the frequency of mentions in the climate–conflict literature depending on country characteristics.
      Fig. 2

      Relative changes in the frequency with which countries are mentioned in the climate–conflict literature depending on climatic and other characteristics (estimated incidence rate ratios are shown, with 95% confidence intervals in grey). Estimated changes are not significant at the 5% level where confidence intervals cross the dashed line. Model 1 analyses the full sample. Model 2 includes English-speaking country instead of former British colony. Model 3 replaces Agriculture>25% of GDP with Agriculture>25% of employment. Model 4 uses high vulnerability rather than high exposure to climate change. Model 5 drops Kenya and Sudan from the analysis. Model 6 includes only African countries.
      Full size image
      Table 2 Countries most often mentioned in climate–conflict literature and countries with most battle-related deaths
      Full size table

      In contrast, the sampling of countries to be studied seems to be barely informed by the independent variable. A high exposure and a high vulnerability to climate change according to the ND-GAIN index23 are negatively, but not significantly, correlated with the number of times a country is mentioned (Fig. 2). The same holds true for the correlation with our climate risk measure based on the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI)24, although correlations are mostly significant here (Fig. 2), indicating that countries less at risk from climate change are more often discussed in the climate–conflict literature.

      Table 3 adds further evidence to this claim. None of the ten most climate change-affected countries according to the ND-GAIN exposure score or the CRI are among the top ten countries considered in the climate–conflict literature. Further, the literature on climate change and conflict does not discuss 11 of these 20 high-climate risk-countries at all (Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Seychelles, Tuvalu and Yemen), despite many of them being characterized by significant political instability. There may be several reasons for these disparities, which include a greater interest in conflict-prone countries, issues of accessibility (discussed in the next paragraph) and a preference for studying countries with a higher global political relevance.
      Table 3 Countries most often mentioned in the climate–conflict literature compared with the countries most exposed to and at risk from climate change
      Full size table

      The literature largely agrees that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ that aggravates existing tensions. It would hence make little sense to focus predominantly on countries that are politically very stable. Also, several analyses explicitly select their cases based on a number of scope conditions that are hypothesized to make climate–conflict links more likely16,25. But if studies (especially when analysing a small number of cases) focus on places that are already suffering from intense violent conflict, while highly vulnerable countries receive little attention, results may be distorted and significant knowledge gaps left unaddressed. In line with this, we find that further climate sensitivity measures such as the contribution of the agricultural sector to employment (negative, insignificant effect) and to gross domestic product (GDP; slightly positive and significant, but not robust effect) are weak predictors for the number of mentions (Fig. 2).

      Our results further indicate a streetlight effect in climate–conflict research, that is, researchers tend to focus on particular places for reasons of convenience5. On the continent level, the availability of conflict data might have played an important role, especially as statistical analyses are very widespread in climate–conflict research10. Large geo-referenced conflict data sets spanning several countries and longer time periods were until very recently only available for Africa26. Indeed, when just considering statistical studies (n = 35 in our sample), the focus on Africa as a continent (65%) and Sub-Saharan Africa as a region (57%) is even stronger than in the full sample.

      On the country level, all models reveal a positive and significant correlation between the numbers of mentions in the literature and countries that are former British colonies (Fig. 2). A likely explanation for this finding is that countries formerly colonized by Great Britain have better data (for example, historic weather records), which makes research more convenient5. Further, in four of the six most-mentioned countries (Sudan, Kenya, India and Nigeria). English is an official language (which makes research more practicable for many Western scholars). However, the positive correlation between these two factors indicated by model 2 (Fig. 2) is not significant. The presence of a streetlight effect in climate–conflict research is a reason for concern as it suggests that case selection (and hence knowledge production) is driven by accessibility rather than concerns for the explanation or practical relevance27.

      One should note that the database we used for the literature search (Scopus) mainly captures journal articles that are written in English. Including French and Spanish language journals would probably yield a different picture of countries and regions most frequently mentioned.

      The statistical findings provided by this study are robust to the use of different model specifications, the inclusion of further control variables, and the removal of the two most frequently mentioned countries (Kenya and Sudan) from the analysis (see Fig. 2 and the Supplementary Information for further information). Results also hold when analysing Africa only, hence suggesting that the detected sampling biases occur not only on a global scale, but are also valid for the continent most intensively discussed in climate–conflict research.

      To conclude, critics have warned for some time that environmental security and climate–conflict research tend to choose cases on the dependent variable2,3,28. Our study provides the first systematic, empirical evidence that such claims are warranted. Studies focusing on one or a few cases tend to study places where the dependent variable (violent conflict) is present and hardly relate to the independent variable (vulnerability to climate change). In addition, climate–conflict research strongly focuses on cases that are most convenient in terms of field access or data availability.

      To be clear, we do not intent to criticize individual studies, which often have good reasons to focus on specific regions, countries and phenomena. However, the sampling biases of the climate–conflict research field as a whole are deeply problematic for at least four reasons.

      First, they convey the impression that climate–conflict links are stronger or more prevalent than they actually are3. This is especially the case for studies using few cases. Large-N studies usually contain a large number of non-conflict cases in their sample, although they draw all of these cases from a few regions or countries (see below).

      Second, focusing strongly on cases of violent conflict limits the ability of (qualitative) researchers to study how people adapt peacefully to the impacts of climate change or carry out the associated conflicts non-violently4,29. Such knowledge, however, would be particularly valuable from a policy-making perspective.

      Third, evidence of climate–conflict links comes primarily from few regions and countries that are convenient to access, such as (Sub-Saharan) Africa. This is even more of an issue in large-N, statistical analyses. While such a bias is not problematic per se as considerable parts of (Sub-Saharan) Africa are vulnerable to both climate change and conflict, this also implies that other very vulnerable regions, for instance in Asia and especially in South America and Oceania, receive little scholarly attention.

      Finally, over-representing certain places leads to them being stigmatized as inherently violent and unable to cope with climate change peacefully4,6. This is particularly the case for Africa as a continent, the world regions Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, and countries such as Kenya, Sudan or Egypt. Such stigmatization might contribute to the re-production of colonial stereotypes, especially as 81% of the first authors in our sample were affiliated with institutions in countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). And it can also provide legitimation for the imposed security responses in certain places at the expense of co-produced adaptation responses in all places at risk from climate change17,18,30.

  • UNHCR - Global report: 10 most under-reported humanitarian crises of 2017

    http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/1/5a659f6ca/global-report-10-under-reported-humanitarian-crises-2017.html

    a new report highlighting 2017’s ten most under-reported humanitarian crises. The report “Suffering in Silence” found that the humanitarian situation in North Korea received the least media attention globally. While much media focus has been on nuclear brinkmanship, the humanitarian situation has been overlooked. Other crises that rarely made the headlines were:

    Eritrea
    Burundi
    Sudan
    Central African Republic
    DRC
    Mali
    Lake Chad Basin (Niger, Cameroon, Chad)
    Vietnam
    Peru.

    Fichier pdf ici : https://www.dropbox.com/s/8k5q24cqtnpl71l/Suffering_In_Silence_WEB.pdf?dl=0

    “We all know that a single photo can make the world turn its attention to an issue. But the people in the countries featured in CARE’s report are far away from the cameras and microphones of this world”, says Laurie Lee, CARE International’s Interim Secretary General. “These crises might not make the media headlines, but that does not mean we can forget about them.”

    #crise_humanitaire #guerre #conflits #pauvreté

  • Doctors, pilots and rabbis: Opposition grows to Israel’s plan to deport refugees - Israel News - Haaretz.com
    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/opposition-grows-to-israel-s-plan-to-deport-african-refugees-1.5763832

    Psychologists have joined the growing ranks of professionals, academics and religious figures urging the Israeli government to nix a plan to expel tens of thousands of asylum seekers or announcing they would actively work to foil forced deportations.

    Over the last week, demonstrations have been staged and protests have mounted after reports emerged that the government was planning to begin deporting refugees in the next weeks, having signed agreements with Rwanda and Uganda to take in some 35,000 refugees who have reached Israel over the last few years, mainly from Eritrea and Sudan.

    In their letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 530 psychologists wrote that the plan “will add the State of Israel to the cycle of harm done to the refugees,” the Israeli news site Walla reported on Wednesday. “A large proportion of asylum seekers have already gone through difficult experiences, including persecution in their countries of origin under repressive and authoritarian regimes.”

    #Israël #expulsion #déportation #exilés #résistance #manifestation

  • Sudanese armed forces ready to ‘repel any threat’ from Eritrea border

    Deputy Chairman of the Security and Defence Committee in the Sudanese Parliament, Brigadier Ibrahim Hamad Ali Al-Toum, said that it has detected military activity in Eritrea near Sudan’s eastern border.

    General Al-Toum said Sudanese armed forces are ready to monitor and repel any threat there, adding that the border area is guarded and secured.

    The Sudanese President Assistant Ibrahim Mahmoud said earlier that the government has decided to close border crossings with Eritrea over “potential threats” by Egypt and Eritrea.

    https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180117-sudanese-armed-forces-ready-to-repel-any-threat-from-eri

    #frontières #conflits #Soudan #Erythrée

    Et sur la #fermeture_des_frontières entre Erythrée et Soudan, v. ici :
    http://seen.li/akm7

  • Ethiopia : Confronting urban hardship

    The traditional image of refugees in sprawling rural settlements and camps no long accurately depicts the reality of today’s refugee situation. With more than half of the world’s refugees living in cities and urban areas, the refugee experience itself has changed in many ways. The life of a forced migrant in an urban environment is often one invisibility and simultaneous exposure. Urban refugees and asylum seekers constantly face protection risks and are often denied access to basic services, exposing them to unique social vulnerabilities.

    Ethiopia, which hosts over 830,000 displaced individuals, is experiencing a rise in numbers of urban refugees. Crises in neighbouring countries such as South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Yemen have contributed to these rising numbers. In fact, according to the UNHCR, there are over 20,000 urban refugees in the capital city of Addis Ababa, most of them from Eritrea.

    Urban refugees residing in Addis Ababa and all over the world face alternative challenges to those living in camps where basic amenities such as food, water, and shelter are often available. High priced city living, limited access to social and economic services, lack of skills training, employment opportunities, and insufficient support contributes to the poor living conditions of the urban refugee experience.

    In response to these harsh circumstances, JRS started the first and only urban Refugee Community Centre (RCC) in Addis Ababa in 1996. The RCC responds to the unmet needs of urban refugees and asylum seekers with a range of services and support. The vocational skills training, day care service, English language courses, psychosocial services, sports and recreation, music therapy, and emergency food and material assistance offered by RCC helps displaced persons heal, learn, and thrive in their new environments.

    The RCC project provides educational support to the Somali community residing in Addis Ababa, because illiteracy is widespread among many Somali refugees. The English and computer classes, and sports activities and community services offered by JRS help many refugees improve their living situations. These educational courses and social integration programs are relevant to everyday life, as many urban refugees are unable to obtain these resources on their own. “Even if there is no money that can be given, JRS talks to us and makes us feel good despite the hardships,” said a refugee woman at the centre.

    During the 2016 Leaders’ Summit on Refugees, Ethiopia made pledges to address the socio-economic needs of refugees and host communities. Accordingly, the pledges will amend Ethiopia’s national law to expand the out-of-camp policy and issue work permits to refugees. JRS RCC is adapting its projects in response to the changing context, especially those activities that involve language, business, and occupational skills trainings to facilitate and empower refugee participation.

    “What’s really nice about the project is that it’s the only community space for refugees. There are some people who have been coming to the centre since childhood. There’s also a great relationship there between us (JRS) and the people we serve. This trust and transparency isn’t seen with many other organisations,” says Liana Tepperman, Director of Programs at JRS/USA.

    The effectiveness of the services provided by JRS are recognized by urban refugee stakeholders, including UNHCR who recently helped fund the opening of a new urban Child Protection Centre in July 2017. Several prominent individuals like the UN General Assembly President, and officials from the European Union and US government have made visits to the RCC. They encouraged JRS to continue to take a strong leadership role in urban refugee discussions and actions, as there is still more change to be made.

    https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-confronting-urban-hardship
    #Ethiopie #urban_refugees #réfugiés_urbains #réfugiés #asile #migrations

  • Proxies Aside; A closer look at the war in Yemen
    http://www.warscapes.com/conversations/proxies-aside-closer-look-war-yemen

    The Saudi-led coalition pummeling Yemen has announced that its campaign is in the final stages - preparing to declare “victory,” some sources report - with the country in shambles and none of the issues driving the war resolved. The devastating civil war is playing out in one of the most internally complex nations in the Middle East, Yemen’s intricate mix of tribes, religious sects and decades-deep power struggles driving a conflict intensified by the outside intervention of regional rivals. The Saudi-led air military coalition, “Operation Decisive Storm,” has introduced some 100 warplanes and 100 thousand troops into the already volatile mix, with Egypt, Morroco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and now even Colombia making war in one of the poorest, yet most culturally rich, countries in the region as they combat the Houthi movement, which has received some degree of support from Iran. Airstrikes have killed more than 1,100 people, the majority civlians, and devastated Yemen’s already tenuous infrastucture, while at least one in four Yemenis was in need of humanitarian assistance even before Cyclone Chapala slammed Yemen’s southern coast on November 4, adding thousands of fleeing coastal residents to the already nearly 1.5 million Yemenis internally displaced by the war.

    Yet, for all the outside intervention, this is not a proxy war, according to leading Yemeni scholar and conflict specialist Nadwa Al-Dawsari. The founder of Partners Yemen, the local affiliate center of Partners for Democratic Change International, Al-Dawsari’s work has taken her deep into Yemen’s tribal areas. Warscapes turns to her to better understand the deeper forces driving the seemingly hopeless conflict.

    Michael Bronner: Thanks again for doing this. Can you tell me a little bit about your area of expertise as we get started?

    Nadwa Dawsari: My main expertise is in the area of conflict and local security, mainly in tribal areas in Yemen. I have worked extensively with civil society and created a civil society organization in 2009. I have done research and field assessments on areas related to local security and justice, both formal and informal, and the relationships between the formal and informal justice and security mechanisms. I’ve written articles and reports on tribes, tribal conflicts, security and justice, al-Qaeda, tribes and al-Qaeda, tribes and the Houthis, political issues in Yemen. My work on the ground involves spending a lot of time building relationships with locals.

  • What’s in A Name? Exploring the Role of Law and Bureaucracy in The Everyday Construction of Holot, an ’Open Detention Facility’ for ’Infiltrators’ in Israel | Oxford Law Faculty
    https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/11/whats-name

    Approximately 38,000 asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea currently reside in Israel. All entered Israel since 2005 through non-authorized border points, and most claim to have fled persecution in Sudan or human rights abuses in Eritrea. In 2013, Israel established Holot ‘open detention facility’ in the middle of the Negev desert, approved by the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament). To date, approximately 10,000 people have been detained in Holot. Detainees must report to Holot for a year-long detention, under the 5th amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law. Detainees must be present for head counts in the mornings, evenings and sleep in the facility, while during the day, they are allowed outside the center’s confines. Israel’s Prison Authority runs the facility. Breach of disciplinary guidelines is punishable by sanctions, including removal to a closed facility, Saharonim, located across the road.

    During interviews, three legal terms were frequently used by state employees or legal professionals to describe Holot as a non-punitive arrangement. I expand briefly on each term to trace how a punitive effect takes place, despite the claimed neutrality and administrative nature of these legal terms.

    Administrative detention, which includes the arrest and detention of persons without an indictment, trial or access to judicial review, has existed since the state’s founding in 1948. The early days of Israeli statehood were characterised by the mass movement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who had been displaced during the 1947-8 war. Those who crossed the border without the new State’s authorisation were titled ‘infiltrators.’ Increased organized smuggling by militant groups called Fedayeen in the early years of the state, led to the legislation of the Prevention of Infiltration Law in 1954. Since 2012 this law was expanded, contested in court, and amended to regulate asylum seekers who entered the country through non-authorised border points, and enable their detention.

    State employees and legislators insist that administrative detention is not punitive, and therefore does not need to comply with individual criminal law procedures and protections. However, similarities between administrative detention and penal incarceration came under scrutiny in Israel’s Supreme Court and in legislative committees. As explained in the final verdict on detention in Holot by Justice Vogelman: “Long periods of detention cross the border between a ‘disciplinary’ sanction which is largely carried out for the sake of deterrence and a ‘penal’ sanction which is punitive in its essence” (author’s translation). This observation was picked up by scholars, activists and lawyers questioning the legislative aim of detention, its covert and overt goals.

    The blurred or intersecting border between criminal law and immigration law has been vastly explored under the term crimmigration. Juliet Stumpf has written about the ways in which ‘the process is the punishment in crimmigration law’, drawing on Malcolm Feeley’s 1979 work. Stumpf identifies two criteria to ascertain when processes of crimmigration law may become punitive: when those subjected to the process experience it as punitive, and when the process is enacted as a sanction by the state.

  • Il “vicedittatore” eritreo, aggredito a Roma: è colui che ha ordinato il mio rapimento in Somalia

    Il 5 luglio scorso a Roma all’uscita da un ristorante l’ambasciatore dello Stato di Eritrea,
    Petros Fessazion, è stato aggredito da alcune persone, quasi certamente suoi connazionali
    stanchi di un regime repressivo che nega le libertà fondamentali dell’uomo.
    Ma con l’ambasciatore Petros, probabilmente c’era Yemane Gebrehab, il numero due della dittatura
    al potere nell’ex colonia italiana, rimasto gravemente ferito a uno zigomo.

    Ma nell’ospedale romano dove è stato ricoverato non risulta nessuno con quel nome.
    Che abbia dato generalità false per evitare di essere riconosciuto è assai probabile, ma, ovviamente
    non è certo. Per altro la presenza di Yemane era prevista in numerose iniziative in Europa
    dove il “vice-dittatore” non è comparso. Massimo Alberizzi scrive a Petros e a Yemane,
    che a suo tempo l’aveva condannato a morte e fatto rapire in Somalia.


    http://www.africa-express.info/2017/07/17/il-vicedittatore-eritreo-aggradito-roma-ha-ordinato-il-mio-rapiment

    #Petros_Fessazion #Erythrée #Yemane_Gebreab #Isaias_Afeworki

    Et quelques #victimes du régime:

    Dove sono finiti in miei amici #Petros_Solomon, #Haile_Woldensaye, #Mohammed_Sharifo , ex ministri, o #Isaac_Dawit, giornalista, solo per citarne alcuni, arrestati e messi in qualche arroventata galera dell’infuocato bassopiano? E Aster, la moglie di Petros? Avete ingannato anche lei, una combattente per la libertà, una vostra compagna d’armi.

    #Aster_Yohannes

    • Et un article sur Yemane Gebreab, numéro 2 du régime érythréen, reçu via la newsletter de Human Rights Concern Eritrea, 15.11.2017 :
      Yemane Gebreab’s Deadly Schemes and Network of Terror

      Various media outlets have reported that Yemane Gebreab (the Eritrean President’s Advisor) was not allowed to address the Eritrean government supporters’ public seminar, in Arlington, on 8 October 2017, during his visit in the United States. He was denied entry to the seminar venue by US law enforcement officers. It seems plausible that he was in violation of a US Executive Order which listed him as a person who threatened US national security and foreign policy with regard to the Somalia situation. Human Rights Concern Eritrea (HRCE) has previously written about the danger Yemane Gebreab poses to Eritreans inside and outside Eritrea and the international community at large. In particular, Yemane Gebreab set-up an unsuccessful assassination attempt in Somalia on an Italian journalist who lived to tell the story.

      Whilst the flier which was distributed to advertise the event at which Yemane Gebreab was going to be present, alongside Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, the official website of the Eritrean Government reported that Osman Saleh alone conducted the seminar. Since the news that Yemane Gebreab was detained spread quickly, it appears the Eritrean Government tried to cover up this embarrassing turn of events. Manufacturing after-the-fact appearances is no new thing for the Eritrean government.

      The UN conducted an inquiry into human rights violations in Eritrea and concluded in June 2016 that crimes against humanity were both widespread and systematic. The country is a one-party state, run by the top members of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), whose chairman is also the current and only president since 1991, Isaias Afewerki. His personal advisor is Yemane Gebreab, the man who proposes policies and implements them. Except that he does much more.

      Yemane Gebreab is widely known as the Presidential Advisor in Eritrea and head of Political Affairs in the PFDJ. However, these titles are nominal and only some of the roles he plays. Not only is Yemane Gebreab one of the main political minds behind the PFDJ, but his activities also range as widely in scope and depth as they do in nefariousness. He is active both at national and international level. HRCE has previously called for his arrest, and has since spoken to and received confidential testimonies from agents who in the past were deployed by Yemane Gebreab himself. They confirmed what most Eritreans already knew about him, through word of mouth or partial first-hand experience.

      On the international front, Yemane Gebreab is perhaps most infamous for masterminding and establishing the Young PFDJ (YPFDJ), a youth organisation which has parallels with the Balilla organisation which existed in Fascist Italy during the first half of the 20th century. YPFDJ even has enforcers called Eri-Blood, who intimidate anyone who expresses discontent with the Eritrean government and its practices. However, intimidation is not the only purpose of this organisation. Through the YPFDJ, whose members are not necessarily only youth, the PFDJ organises propaganda campaigns and spreads misinformation among the diaspora and other groups which interact with the Eritrean community abroad. Just as the YPFDJ meetings, often headed by Yemane Gebreab himself, spread false propaganda, they also serve as a means to fundraise and host events where money is either directly collected or obtained through sales of tickets or other items. This alone should have landed Yemane Gebreab in a US jail in the years since the standing executive order was first issued in 2010 by the then president Barack Obama.

      Most of the funds raised by the YPFDJ and PFDJ in the diaspora come from the older segments of the Eritrean community abroad. Worryingly, however, Yemane Gebreab organises these supporters to act as his informants. The former-agents whom HRCE has spoken with say that even middle-aged or elderly women, or other members of the Eritrean community abroad who might not raise suspicion, are used to spy on fellow Eritreans in the diaspora. Though many Eritreans knew this already, the testimony HRCE has received confirms the extent to which this tactic is systematic and widespread. Whilst the ordinary civilian may be used as an informant for Yemane Gebreab, trained individuals ranging from youth to middle-aged are deployed in the diaspora community.

      These youth, invariably members of the YPFDJ, but not necessarily openly so, are individuals who are carefully selected and sent to training camps inside Eritrea, often under the pretence of a vacation visit. They are trained using a program run by Yemane Gebreab which is intended to produce cadres fiercely loyal to the regime. These youth are taken around the country in a program called Zura-Hagerka, to the youth festival in Sawa Military Camp, to Nakfa (the old bastion town during the war for independence) to camps around Asmara (such as Asha Golgol) and other towns where their training is conducted. Not all of these youth are selected to become Yemane Gebreab’s agents. However, those who are selected are deployed in the diaspora and made to inform on the community, infiltrate organisations or set-up money laundering businesses, or even become part of the Eri- Blood.

      It is worrying that Eritrean youth from the diaspora willingly and voluntarily choose to partake in these criminal affairs, although the PFDJ regime has become expert at targeting the more vulnerable and disillusioned amongst the youth abroad. Unlike them, however, there are other Eritreans who also operate in the diaspora but have no choice in the matter. These are conscripts who hail from within the country and are trained in special cadre programs. These Eritreans might get brainwashed to the level of accepting the rhetoric fed them by Yemane Gebreab, although most are deeply aware that they have no choice but to obey, for it is not only their lives which are endangered; they also fear for their families. Few who manage to escape the grip of Yemane Gebreab’s network manage to share inside information. They are unambiguous about the fact that Yemane Gebreab runs these programs, participates in training and brainwashing cadres, as well as being the person who has the final word in all decision-making.

      The cadres deployed outside Eritrea by Yemane Gebreab have a slightly different job from the YPFDJ youth who are trained in the country and then sent back to their diaspora communities, although it must be kept in mind that often their roles overlap. These agents are told the country depends on them and that their training and job has been entrusted to them by the Eritrean people. They are made to believe they are the true inheritors of the legacy which led to the country’s independence and are instructed in no uncertain terms to put the country before their lives. Of course, by “country” Yemane Gebreab means the interests of himself, Isaias Afwerki and their kleptocratic clique. In fact, veneration of Isaias Afwerki is part of their training as they are assured that if it were not for Isaias Afwerki and the PFDJ, the country would be lost.

      Thus trained, involuntarily conscripted men and women from Eritrea are often sent to work in embassies, consulates or other PFDJ offices around the world. The former agents whom HRCE spoke with clarify that these cadres are assigned the job of spying and watching every move of ambassadors, consuls and other staff in these offices. The sources recall how, during their training, Yemane Gebreab would warn them to watch very closely Eritrean officials, diplomats and other leadership figures who visit from Eritrea. He would caution them that they are to monitor these diplomats’ movements as if they were a cancerous tumour. Accordingly, he instructs the agents he sends abroad to record what Eritrean diplomats and officials say in meetings and at public events, keeping an eye out for any sign of dissent or criticism. If these officials show any hint of discontent, they are to be reported and are consequently recalled back to the country.

      While abroad, the cadres deployed from Eritrea are also made to monitor and report on Eritrean-owned businesses and Eritrean individuals. They may receive orders to repatriate individuals targeted by the PFDJ and Yemane Gebreab. In practice, this translates to finding ways to undermine these individuals and business owners so that either their immigration status or licences are revoked. It may even extend to outright abduction and enforced disappearance. This practice seems to be done more in African and middle-eastern countries, where some of governments might even co-operate with the PFDJ in deporting targeted individuals. Examples of this can be found in neighbouring countries such as Sudan, where, throughout the years, abductions of Eritreans from Sudanese territory are conducted by Eritrean agents.

      Moreover, agents who answer to and co-operate with Yemane Gebreab can also be foreign nationals. Recalling the assassination attempt on the Italian journalist mentioned above, the Somalis who allowed the journalist to escape were reprimanded by Yemane Gebreab. Furthermore, part of the reason his name is the only non-Somali name on the list in the Executive Order concerning the turmoil in Somalia is due to his and his agents’ work in the region.

      However, the international activities by Yemane Gebreab form only part of the picture, as he is also deeply entrenched in the terror his activities within the country cause to the Eritrean People. As mentioned in a previous article, Yemane Gebreab admits in an interview that he and the PFDJ arrested without due legal process and detained incommunicado a group of journalists and his former colleagues and senior ministers known as the G11 in 2001. (The G11 were part of the G15, a group of senior government officials who publicly called for democracy and change, but only 11 of them were in the country at the time of arrest, and few are thought to survive to this day). Though this case is the most famous internationally, Yemane Gebreab is co-perpetrator of other persecutions and enforced disappearances within the country.

      Inside Eritrea, Yemane Gebreab is one of the main political minds behind the PFDJ, and as such, he plans and implements various repressive internal policies. He plays a crucial role in the establishment and running of youth programs, including the national service and the National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students (NUEYS), the internal equivalent of the YPFDJ and the organisation which handles all Eritrean youth affairs before they are conscripted into the military, which occurs before they even finish secondary education. This includes participation in PFDJ organised events and the release or withholding of the ID card all students must have before they are conscripted, on penalty of detention and early conscription into the military.

      Whilst Gebreab partakes in shaping such national policies to the extent that he is known as second-in-command in the country after Isaias Afewerki, the cadres he controls are put to work even inside Eritrea. The espionage network in Eritrea is as unnerving as possible, but what makes it even more fearsome for those who have to live under it is that elements like those organised and deployed by Yemane Gebreab do not fall under the control of any normal intelligence agency. They receive orders and respond solely to the president’s office and to Yemane Gebreab. For years the Eritrean population has lived in dread of accidentally offending one of these informants or any other covert agents infiltrated within the population.

      A particular terrorising effect is achieved by the agents of Yemane Gebreab inside Eritrea by the fact that they not only spy on the population but also demand that citizens inform on each other. The testimonies received by HRCE clarify that the cadres and agents trained and deployed by Yemane Gebreab are often given quotas and targets to monitor. Consequently, they follow the target in public places such as cafes, places of work, churches, mosques, etc. In such places, these agents approach the persons running the locales, businesses or places of worship and force them to inform on the targeted citizens. This creates a daily atmosphere of terror in the population, because no one can be sure if their colleague, their waiter, their church leader or their imam is watching their every move and reporting to these agents. To use a recent development within the country as a further example, it appears that the PFDJ regime is now assigning one family in each neighbourhood to act as informants on a group of surrounding families, reporting the comings and goings of each member of the assigned families they watch.

      At this point it is important to remind the reader that Eritreans live in terror of the consequences that may befall them if they appear to know anything unauthorised or do not cooperate with the demands made of them. In such ways Yemane Gebreab instils fear among Eritreans so that no one dares to speak to their neighbour openly, let alone organise to demand their rights or change the system. There is now an entire generation born and raised in such conditions of fear, and Yemane Gebreab is the main actor pulling the strings of the mechanisms that have terrorised many of the young people as well as most of the adult population for their entire lives, both inside and outside Eritrea. Gebreab has committed crimes against humanity and used people who have been forced into slavery to partake in his schemes. He is one of the main persons, perhaps only the second after Isaias Afwerki, to have illegitimately detained and directly caused the deaths of hundreds accused of dissenting against the PFDJ, of whom the most famous are amongst the G11 and journalists forcibly disappeared in September 2001.

      It baffles the mind then that Yemane Gebreab has thus far been allowed to enter Europe and the United States of America freely. European leaders and representatives of other United Nations member states should refuse to interact with such a criminal and should denounce him. The UN has recommended that those who systematically perpetrate crimes against humanity in Eritrea should face prosecution and Yemane Gebreab should be one of the most wanted men in Eritrea, detained immediately upon setting foot outside Eritrea and prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (ICC). HRCE recognises that some steps such as sanction and seizure of financial assets have been taken by the United States. However, it is feared that the seriousness of Yemane Gebreab’s crimes are grossly underestimated by the leaders of such countries and international organisations.

      HRCE appeals to all countries to deny entry to Yemane Gebreab and to refuse political and financial cooperation with him and the party he represents. It seems that Yemane Gebreab has been set free losing a major opportunity to detain him. However, if the U.S, European or other country’s authorities get another chance to put him in custody, HRCE recommends that instead of being released to perpetrate further crimes against humanity, he should be detained until he is brought before the ICC to answer for the major role he has played in terrorising and eliminating innocent Eritreans.