country:zimbabwe

  • Zimbabwe’s black rhinos at risk as China reverses a 25-year ban on horns · Global Voices
    https://globalvoices.org/2018/11/10/zimbabwes-black-rhinos-at-risk-as-china-reverses-a-25-year-ban-on-horn

    On October 31, 2018, the Chinese government released a statement declaring the reversal of a 25-year ban on the use of tiger bones and rhino horns, making it legal to use parts “obtained from the animals in captivity for scientific, medical and cultural purposes”.

    The Chinese State Council said that powdered forms of rhino horn and bones from dead tigers could be used in “qualified hospitals by qualified doctors”. The animal products must be obtained from authorized farms, and animal parts classified as “antiques” can be used in “cultural exchanges if approved by the cultural authorities”.

    #rhino #zimbabwe #chine #rhinocéros


  • What’s Driving the Conflict in Cameroon?
    Violence Is Escalating in Its Anglophone Regions.

    In recent months, political violence in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon has escalated dramatically. So far, at least 400 civilians and 160 state security officers have been killed in the conflict between the government and an armed separatist movement that, just two short years ago, started as a peaceful strike of lawyers and teachers. How did such upheaval come to a country that has prided itself for decades as a bulwark of stability in a region of violent conflict? And why has it escalated so quickly?

    THE ROOTS OF THE VIOLENCE

    The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon have a special historical legacy that sets them apart from the country’s other eight regions: between 1922 and 1960, they were ruled as a British trust or protectorate while the rest of the territory was administered by France. This is why today, 3 million residents of the Northwest and Southwest regions—roughly 20 percent of the Cameroonian population—speak primarily English, not French. These two regions also use their own legal and educational systems, inherited from the British, and have a unique cultural identity.

    Many analysts argue that the current conflict stems from the intractable historical animosity between Cameroon’s Anglophones and Francophones. Yet if that is the case, it is strange that the violence is only occurring now. Why not in 1972, when Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, ended the federation between the Anglophone and Francophone regions, forcing the Anglophones to submit to a unitary state? Or in 1992, when current President Paul Biya held Cameroon’s first multi-party elections, and narrowly won a heavily rigged contest by four percentage points against Anglophone candidate John Fru Ndi? Furthermore, if differences in identity are the primary driver of the conflict, it is quite surprising that Cameroon—one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa—has largely avoided ethnic conflict.

    Most Anglophones themselves say that they would be happy to put their national identity above their linguistic one if they weren’t systematically neglected and repressed by Cameroon’s central government. According to a survey from the Afrobarometer, an independent polling and research network, when asked whether they identify more as Cameroonians or more with their ethnic group, the vast majority of respondents in the Northwest and Southwest regions said they identified with these categories equally. Less than five percent said they identified more with their ethnic group. Nonetheless, members of this population have long felt themselves to be treated as second-class citizens in their own country. Anglophones who go to the capital city of Yaoundé to collect government documents, for example, often report being ridiculed or turned away by public officials because they cannot speak French. Separatists argue that this mistreatment and discrimination by Yaoundé, and Francophone Cameroonians more broadly, is grounds for secession.

    Yet regional neglect and mistreatment are not enough to explain the current wave of violence. If they were the root cause, then we should also be seeing separatist movements in Cameroon’s North and Far North regions, where state violence has become endemic in the fight against Boko Haram over the past four years. Moreover, in the North and Far North regions, the poverty rate is higher (more than 50 percent in each, compared to 15 percent in the Southwest and 25 percent in the Northwest) and state investment in public goods such schools, health clinics, and roads is lower than anywhere else in the country.

    To be sure, the Anglophones’ unique linguistic and cultural identity has played a role in the rebellion. But in order to understand why the escalating violence is taking place where and when it is, we must consider not only the Anglophone regions’ exceptional political isolation and relative economic autonomy from the rest of Cameroon, but also the increasing impatience of Africans living under non-democratic regimes.
    WHY THE ANGLOPHONE REGIONS?

    Biya, who last month won his seventh term in office, has been in power since 1982, making him one of the longest ruling leaders in the world. In fact, Cameroon has only had two presidents since gaining independence in 1960. Because the country’s median age is 18, this means that the majority of Cameroonians have only ever known one president. Yet the decline of Africa’s strongmen over the past two decades—most recently Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola, and even Jacob Zuma in South Africa—has made Biya’s continued rule increasingly untenable. Democracy may have begun to lose its appeal in many parts of the world, but it remains important to most sub-Saharan Africans. Many Cameroonians with an education and a smart phone consider their president’s extended rule increasingly illegitimate. The political tide currently washing away the strongmen of Africa has made this moment an exceptional one for mobilizing people against the regime.

    In spite of these democratic headwinds, Biya has managed to maintain his legitimacy in some quarters through his cooptation of Francophone elites and control of information by means of the (largely Francophone) state-owned media. He has masterfully brought Francophone leaders into government, offering them lucrative ministerial posts and control over various government revenue streams. Importantly, he has not been excessively repressive—at least not before the current outbreak of violence—and has gone out of his way to uphold the façade of democratic legitimacy through holding regular elections, allowing a relatively unfettered (although weak) independent media, and having a general laissez-faire attitude toward governing.

    The state media and elites within the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement are stalwart defenders of the president, operating whole-heartedly on the fictitious assumption that the regime is democratic. Many Cameroonians, especially those isolated from independent media, opposition parties, or information from outside of the country, earnestly believe this narrative. Another survey by the Afrobarometer conducted in 2015 before the outbreak of violence, showed that the presidency is the second most trusted institution of the state, after the army. It also showed that only ten percent of Cameroonian respondents believe that their country is not a democracy.

    In contrast, the Anglophone regions’ relative distance from both Biya’s networks of patronage and influence and the Francophone state media puts them in a unique position to see the autocratic nature of the regime and rebel against it. Although 75.4 percent of Francophone Cameroonian respondents said they trust Biya “somewhat” or “a lot,” in the Afrobarometer poll, only 45.5 percent of Anglophones felt the same way. Part of the reason for this is easier access to criticism of the Biya government. In electoral autocracies, opposition parties are often the only institutions that consistently voice the view that the regime is not truly democratic. The strongest opposition party in Cameroon—the Social Democratic Front (SDF)—is headquartered in the Northwest region, thus further exposing Anglophones to narratives of state repression. Other parts of Cameroon do not have occasion to become as familiar with opposition party politics. In the most recent 2013 elections for the National Assembly, for example, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement ran completely unopposed in 13 of the country’s 83 electoral districts.

    In comparison to other parts of the country, such as the north, Cameroon’s Anglophone regions are also more economically autonomous from Yaoundé. They have a robust cross-border trade with Nigeria, successful plantations in the Southwest, and fertile farming land. They are not overly-reliant on the export of primary resources, such as oil or timber, which funnels through state-owned corporations. And they are not as poor as, for example, the northern regions, which face chronic food insecurity. The Anglophones thus have not only the will, but also the resources to rebel.

    THE SUCCESSION QUESTION

    Unfortunately, an end to the crisis is nowhere in sight. Last month, Biya won his seventh term as president with 71.3 percent of the vote. The already unfair election was marked by exceedingly low participation in the Anglophone regions—just five percent in the Northwest—due to security fears. Meanwhile, Biya has responded to the separatists with an iron fist. He refuses to negotiate with them, instead sending in his elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (trained by the United States and led by a retired Israeli officer), which has now been accused of burning villages and attacking civilians in the Northwest and Southwest. But as long as the violence does not spill over into the Francophone regions, the crisis will likely not affect the president’s legitimacy in the rest of the country. Moreover, Biya remains staunchly supported by the West—especially France, but also the United States, which relies strongly on Cameroon in the fight against Boko Haram. The separatists, meanwhile, remain fractured, weak, and guilty of their own atrocities against civilians. Apart from attacking security forces, they have been kidnapping and torturing teachers and students who refuse to participate in a school strike.

    It is extremely unlikely that Biya will make the concessions necessary for attacks from separatists to stop, and the fluid nature of the insurgency will make it difficult for state security forces to end the violence. The scorched earth tactics on both sides only work to further alienate the population, many of whom have fled to Nigeria. It seems likely that a resolution to the crisis can only happen once the questions of when Biya will step down and who will replace him are fully answered. Right now, there is only unsubstantiated speculation. Many assume he will appoint a successor before the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2025. But if there are any surprises in the meantime similar to the military move against Mugabe in Zimbabwe or the popular uprising against Compaoré in Burkina Faso, a transition may come sooner than expected. A post-Biya political opening might provide a way for Cameroon’ s Anglophones to claim their long-awaited autonomy.

    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cameroon/2018-11-08/whats-driving-conflict-cameroon?cid=soc-tw
    #Cameroun #conflit #Cameroun_anglophone #violence #différent_territorial #autonomie


    • Thousands sign petition asking Justice Minister to stop deportation of student facing threat of torture

      OVER 13,000 PEOPLE have signed an online petition calling for a halt to the deportation of a Dublin City University student facing the threat of torture if he returns home.

      Zimbabwean national Shepherd Machaya could be deported within days after his permission to remain in Ireland expired on 21 October.

      The former pastor fled his homeland after members of ZANU-PF, the party co-founded by Robert Mugabe, tortured and threatened to kill him in an attempt to force him to join the party.

      After he left Zimbabwe, Machaya’s sister told him that one of his best friends died after suffering catastrophic injuries when he was tortured by the party’s members.

      Machaya, a second year Management of Information Technology and Information Systems student at DCU, has been living in Direct Provision in Laois for the last nine years.

      He completed a Level 5 course in Software Development in Portlaoise College in 2017, before being admitted to DCU under the University of Sanctuary scholarship scheme, which allows refugees to study there.

      However, after his bid for asylum failed earlier this year, Machaya was told by the Department of Justice to leave Ireland by 21 October.

      “From this moment onwards, he could be deported,” DCU Students’ Union President Vito Moloney Burke tells TheJournal.ie.

      “I think we have a few days, but that’s about it.”

      Campaigners say that although his family remains in Zimbabwe, Machaya has made friends in Ireland, which he calls his “second home”, and that he has contributed to the country.

      Burke added that despite contacting Charlie Flanagan and the Department of Justice on multiple occasions, he has received no response.

      “We’ve had growing support on a national level. The most heartening thing is that members of the public are getting involved and signing the petition.

      “Hopefully more attention is brought to Shepherd’s case and this is discussed in the Dáil tomorrow.”

      http://www.thejournal.ie/shepherd-machaya-dcu-student-deportation-petition-4299636-Oct2018
      #Irlande #Dublin_City_University



  • The poachers and the treasures of the deep: diving for abalone in South Africa | Environment | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/aug/19/poachers-abalone-south-africa-seafood-divers

    Abalone is dried in clandestine cookhouses in South Africa before being sent to Hong Kong, usually via neighbouring African countries with laxer borders and no laws for policing the abalone trade. Trucks routinely cross into Namibia or Zimbabwe or Mozambique with abalone in false compartments or hidden among boxes of dried fruit. It is a bizarre supply chain, from the shores of South Africa to plates in China.

    In the last 25 years, according to Traffic, syndicates have exported more than 50,000 tonnes of the shellfish, equivalent to some 130 million abalone. The annual illicit catch exceeds 3,000 tonnes, averaging eight tonnes every single day. The legal catch, set by the South African government, is 30 times smaller.

    #trafic #braconnage #coquillages



  • Le Zimbabwe vend le visage de ses citoyens à la Chine en échange de caméras
    https://usbeketrica.com/article/le-zimbabwe-vend-le-visage-de-ses-citoyens-a-la-chine-en-echange-de-cam

    Le gouvernement du Zimbabwe a besoin de l’expertise chinoise en matière de surveillance. De son côté, CloudWalk Technology, start-up chinoise, a besoin d’images de visages de personnes noires pour perfectionner son logiciel de reconnaissance faciale, biaisé jusqu’ici, car reconnaissant mieux les visages blancs. L’accord, qui donne à la start-up chinoise l’accès aux informations biométriques des citoyens zimbabwéens, entrera en vigueur le 30 juillet, à la suite des élections présidentielles au Zimbabwe, (...)

    #WeChat #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #surveillance #vidéo-surveillance #discrimination (...)

    ##CloudWalk


  • Beijing’s Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces
    https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-brother-tech-needs-african-faces

    Zimbabwe is signing up for China’s surveillance state, but its citizens will pay the price. Daily life in China is gated by security technology, from the body scanners and X-ray machines at every urban metro station to the demand for ID numbers on social media platforms so that dangerous speech can be traced and punished. Technologies once seen as potentially empowering the public have become tools for an increasingly dictatorial government—tools that Beijing is now determined to sell to the (...)

    #ZTE #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #surveillance #vidéo-surveillance #CloudWalk #Hikvision (...)

    ##discrimination



  • Trois employés de Sodexo se battent pour sauver leur emploi à Kaboul
    Dans les quartiers Nord de Marseille, les salariés d’un McDo kidnappés et assassinés

    Les médias américains inquiets du climat de haine entretenu par un dissident chinois
    « Quoi j’ai dit quelque chose de faux ? » : la police interrompt Donald Trump en pleine interview

    Au procès d’Harvey Weinstein, le candidat de l’opposition appelle à un front anti-IBK
    Au Mali, la correspondante au ton « chaleureux » d’une des victimes présumées

    Episode de canicule déjoué en Allemagne : deux arrestations en Tunisie
    Combien d’attentats à la ricine votre département a-t-il connus ?

    Ce qu’il faut retenir de la 28ème édition des Nuits des étoiles
    Quatre planètes éclatantes à observer au Zimbabwe

    Au procès de Booba et Kaaris sous une chaleur écrasante
    Un samedi noir sur les routes de France, rappeurs contrit et avocats fougueux

    La rivière oubliée de Gaza
    Washington : un Palestinien tué lors de nouvelles violences à la frontière avec Israël

    #de_la_dyslexie_creative



  • The damning Gukurahundi dossier that Mugabe frowned upon
    http://inkjournalism.org/1555/the-damning-gukurahundi-dossier-that-mugabe-frowned-upon

    After Zimbabwe’s new President Emmerson Mnangagagwa announced that his government was determined to put a closure to the Gukurahundi massacres [in 1983], anonymous Zimbabwean journalists working with INK Centre for Investigative Journalism began an investigation into what one former senior official of an international aid agency referred to as “the untold story of the massacres”. Source: Ink Journalism


  • Khrys’presso du lundi 30 juillet
    https://framablog.org/2018/07/30/khryspresso-du-lundi-30-juillet

    Brave New World La Blockchain, utilisée par des internautes chinois pour partager du contenu censuré (subspace.club) Le Zimbabwe vend le visage de ses citoyens à la Chine en échange de caméras (usbeketrica.com) Ces caméras qui peuvent déterminer si vous êtes … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue


  • Le Venezuela s’apprête à retirer cinq zéros de sa monnaie
    https://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2018/07/26/le-venezuela-s-apprete-a-retirer-cinq-zeros-de-sa-monnaie_5336023_3222.html

    Pour faire face à cette hyperinflation, le président Nicolas Maduro a annoncé mercredi 25 juillet que le Venezuela allait bientôt supprimer cinq zéros de sa monnaie, le bolivar. « Le 20 août démarre (…) le plan de redressement économique avec la reconversion monétaire, cinq zéros en moins », a-t-il déclaré.

    Avec 4 mois de retard sur l’annonce initiale (en mars) et 2 mois sur la dernière date annoncée, https://seenthis.net/messages/679050 et 2 zéros en plus (division par 100 000 au lieu des 1 000 annoncés en mars).




  • #Zimbabwe: bambini avvelenati nelle piantagioni di tabacco

    Bambini nelle piantagioni di tabacco. Piccoli e adulti vittime di avvelenamento e con problemi respiratori. Mentre le multinazionali continuano a comprare il tabacco coltivato in queste condizioni. Human Rights Watch fa luce sul paese che si sta prepararando alle elezioni dopo il colpo di Stato contro Mugabe


    https://www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2018/05/21/zimbabwe-bambini-economia-tabacco
    #tabac #industrie_du_tabac #sigarettes #enfants #plantations #agriculture #multinationales #intoxication #British_American_Tobacco #Japan_Tobacco_Group #Imperial_Brands #nicotine
    cc @albertocampiphoto @marty


  • What is Uber up to in Africa?
    https://africasacountry.com/2018/04/what-is-uber-up-to-in-africa

    Uber’s usual tricks — to provoke price wars in an attempt to increase their share of markets, evade taxes, and undermine workers’ rights — are alive and well in Africa.

    Technophiles and liberals across the African continent are embracing the ride sharing application Uber. Their services are especially popular with the young urban middle classes. In most African cities, public transport is limited, unpredictable and often dangerous, especially after dark. Uber is also cheaper than meter-taxis. Uber’s mobile application makes taxi rides efficient and easy, and women feel safer since rides are registered and passengers rate their drivers.

    Since 2013, Uber has registered drivers in 15 cities in nine African countries: from Cape to Cairo; from Nairobi to Accra. In October last year, Uber said they had nearly two million active users on the continent. The plans are to expand. While media continues to talk about how Uber creates jobs in African cities suffering from enormous unemployment, the company prefers to couch what they do as partnership: They have registered 29,000 “driver-partners.” However, through my research and work with trade unions in Ghana and Nigeria, and a review of Uber’s practices in the rest of Africa, I found that there are many, including Uber’s own “driver partners,” who have mixed feelings about the company.

    Established taxi drivers rage and mobilize resistance to the company across the continent. While Uber claims to create jobs and opportunities, taxi drivers accuse the company of undermining their already-precarious jobs and their abilities to earn a living wage while having to cope with Uber’s price wars, tax evasion and undermining of labor rights.

    Take Ghana, for example. Uber defines its own prices, but regular taxis in Accra are bound by prices negotiated every six months between the Ghanaian Federation for Private Road Transport (GPRTU) and the government. The negotiated prices are supposed to take into account inflation, but currently negotiations are delayed as fuel prices continues rising. The week before I met Issah Khaleepha, Secretary General of the GRPRTU in February, the union held strikes against fuel price increases. Uber’s ability to set its own price gives it a distinct advantage in this environment.

    Like in most African countries the taxi industry in Ghana is part of the informal economy. Informality, however, is not straightforward. Accra’s taxis are licensed, registered commercial cars, marked by yellow license plates and painted in the same colors. Drivers pay taxes. Uber cars are registered as private vehicles, marked by white license plates, which gives them access to areas that are closed to commercial vehicles, such as certain hotels.

    Uber is informalizing through the backdoor and pushing a race to the bottom, says Yaaw Baah, the Secretary General of the Ghana Trade Union Congress (Ghana TUC). The Ghana TUC, the Ghanaian Employers Association (GEA) and the government all support the International Labor Organization’s formalization agenda, which says that the formalization of informal economy will ensure workers’ rights and taxes owed to governments.

    The fault lines in Uber’s business model have been exposed in other parts of the continent as well. In Lagos, Uber cut prices by 40% in 2017, prompting drivers to go on strike. Drivers have to give up 25 percent of their income to Uber, and most drivers have to pay rent to the car owners. Many drivers left Uber for the Estonian competitor, Taxify, which takes 15 percent of revenues. In February 2017, an informal union of Nairobi drivers forced Uber to raise their fares from 200 Kenyan Shillings to 300 (from 33 to 39 cents) per kilometer; yet still a far cry from a foundation for a living wage.

    In Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria, the fragmented and self-regulated taxi industry is associated with violence, conflicts and criminal networks. There are reports of frequent violence and threats to Uber drivers. So-called taxi wars in South Africa, which began in the 1980s, have turned into “Uber wars.” In South African, xenophobia adds fuel to the fire sine many Uber drivers are immigrants from Zimbabwe or other African countries. In Johannesburg two Uber cars were burned. Uber drivers have been attacked and killed in Johannesburg and Nairobi.

    The fragmentation and informality of the transport industry makes workers vulnerable and difficult to organize. However, examples of successes in transportation labor organizing in the past in some African countries, show that it is necessary in order to confront the challenges of the transportation sectors on the continent.

    A decade ago, CESTRAR, the Rwandan trade union confederation, organized Kigali motorcycle taxis (motos) in cooperatives that are platforms from where to organize during price negotiations, and to enable tax payment systems.

    For Uganda’s informal transport workers, unionization has had a dramatic impact. In 2006, the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union in Uganda, ATGWU, counted only 2000 members. By incorporating informal taxi and motorcycle taxes’ (boda-boda) associations, ATGWU now has over 80,000 members. For the informal drivers, union membership has ensured freedom of assembly and given them negotiating power. The airport taxis bargained for a collective agreement that standardized branding for the taxis, gave them an office and sales counter in the arrivals hall, a properly organized parking and rest area, uniforms and identity cards. A coordinated strike brought Kampala to a standstill and forced political support from President Yoweri Museveni against police harassment and political interference.

    South Africa is currently the only country in Africa with a lawsuit against Uber. There, 4,000 Uber drivers joined the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union, SATAWU, who supported them in a court case to claim status as employees with rights and protection against unfair termination. They won the first round, but lost the appeal in January 2018. The judge stressed that the case was lost on a technicality. The drivers have since jumped from SATAWU to National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (Nupsaw), and they will probably go to court again.

    Taxi operators don’t need to join Uber or to abandon labor rights in order get the efficiency and safety advantages of the technology. In some countries, local companies have developed technology adapted to local conditions. In Kigali in 2015, SafeMotos launched an application described as a mix of Uber and a traffic safety application. In Kenya, Maramoja believes their application provides better security than Uber. Through linking to social media like Facebook, Twitter and Google+, you can see who of your contacts have used and recommend drivers. In Ethiopia, which doesn’t allow Uber, companies have developed technology for slow or no internet, and for people without smartphones.

    Still, even though the transport sector in Ethiopia has been “walled off” from foreign competition, and Uber has been kept out of the local market, it is done so in the name of national economic sovereignty rather than protection of workers’ rights. By contrast, the South African Scoop-A-Cab is developed to ensure “that traditional metered taxi owners are not left out in the cold and basically get with the times.” Essentially, customers get the technological benefits, taxis companies continues to be registered, drivers pay taxes and can be protected by labor rights. It is such a mix of benefits that may point in the direction of a more positive transportation future on the continent.

    #Uber #Disruption #Afrika


  • Kenya : une faille mystérieuse interpelle les scientifiques
    https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/environnement/kenya-une-faille-mysterieuse-interpelle-les-scientifiques_2691266.html

    Comment expliquer ce phénomène ? Très vite, plusieurs experts ont avancé la thèse d’une fracture du continent africain, car cette faille se situe au beau milieu de la vallée du grand rift, une zone sismique où deux morceaux d’Afrique s’écartent loin de l’autre. Mais pour Yann Klinger, du CNRS, cette hypothèse est peu probable : « Si cette fracture était tectonique, on s’attendrait à avoir une activité sismique anormale, or aujourd’hui nous n’avons pas eu de séisme de magnitude conséquente dans la région. » Cette faille serait plutôt la conséquence de fortes pluies. La séparation de l’Afrique aura bien lieu, mais pour les scientifiques, pas avant 50 millions d’années.

    Une faille de 4km prend forme dans la prolongation du grand rift, mais non, ce n’est pas lié à la séparation de l’Afrique, parce que l’Afrique, elle va se séparer dans 50 millions d’années, du jour au lendemain.
    La faille aurait un nom, les décodeurs l’appeleraient Mélenchon, rien que pour pouvoir dire « mais nan, c’est pas lié au grand rift coco, faut pas croire les fake news, c’est pas avant 50 millions d’année que ça va se produire ».

    Je précise mon idée : la lutte contre les fake news dénature tous les articles de presse, jusqu’aux articles plus ou moins scientifiques, ou la moindre information complexe doit être « décodée » pour nous éclairer sur la « vérité ». Et en fonction du sens du vent, le journaliste va choisir de présenter les faits dans un sens ou dans un autre, de mettre en valeur le « contradicteur » qui illumine, face au « corrupteur » qui nous obscurcit...

    Ceci dit, tu regardes Google Maps en mode « image satellite », je trouve ça fort de trouver un scientifique qui parvienne à se comporter en « briseur de fakenews » suggérant que pas du tout, cette faille de 4km, elle n’a rien à avoir avec le grand rift et la séparation de l’Afrique.

    • Ce soir, minute web dans le 20h de TF1. Et ça recommence !
      « C’est compliqué ». « On s’écharpe au sujet de cette information ». « Ce n’est qu’un banc de sable qui s’effondre ». « Se méfier des fausses informations ».

      Pourquoi prennent-ils autant de soin à coller le mot « fausse information » à ce qui n’est qu’une manifestation somme toute prévisible d’un phénomène géophysique archi-documenté et sans portée politique ?

    • Rift africain : le continent se sépare en deux
      https://www.futura-sciences.com/planete/actualites/geologie-rift-africain-continent-separe-deux-70725

      Cette fracture est un signe de l’activité de la planète. Dans un article paru dans The Conversation, Lucia Perez Diaz, de l’université de Londres, fait le lien entre cet évènement et les phénomènes géologiques au niveau du rift est-africain. Du point de vue de la tectonique des plaques, ce rift marque la limite entre la plaque africaine à l’ouest et la plaque somalienne à l’est.

      La vallée du grand rift s’étend sur des milliers de kilomètres, du golfe d’Aden, au nord, jusqu’au Zimbabwe, au sud. Un rift correspond à une zone où la lithosphère s’amincit, à cause de forces d’extension horizontales. C’est la première étape avant la cassure du continent et la création d’un océan, un processus très lent.

      Ces mouvements s’accompagnent de phénomènes sismiques et volcaniques, liés à la montée de l’asthénosphère à cet endroit. Si le processus se poursuit, petit à petit, la corne de l’Afrique, avec la Somalie et des morceaux d’Éthiopie, du Kenya et de la Tanzanie, formera une île qui s’éloignera du continent africain. Mais il faudra encore attendre des dizaines de millions d’années pour que cette « île » se détache...

    • La faille qui divise les géologues - L’Express
      https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/sciences/kenya-la-faille-qui-divise-les-geologues_1997507.html

      Depuis, plusieurs géologues américains ont contredit leur confrère, dont Wendy Bohon, attribuant cette crevasse soudaine au creusement des fortes pluies qui ont frappé la localité les semaines précédentes.

      Outre-Manche, le sismologue Stephen Hicks de l’université de Southampton a indiqué qu’il n’y avait aucune preuve que l’activité sismique soit à l’origine de ce phénomène vu au Kenya.
      Une vue de la fissure terrestre à travers un champ agricole.

      Un géologue américain, Ben Andrews du Smithsonian Institut, propose une autre théorie : cette crevasse « s’est probablement formée il y a des centaines de milliers d’années » à la faveur de la tectonique des plaques, puis elle aurait ensuite été effectivement comblée par la cendre volcanique. Avant que celle-ci soit ensuite évacuée et engloutie par les pluies récentes. Peut-être de quoi réconcilier les experts.

      Le dernier géologue est en fait un tiède. Il ne veut pas reconnaitre que la moitié de ses confrères diffusent des fake news.

      C’est pas le grand rift qu’on vous dit, c’est des infiltrations... dans une faille du grand rift que la pluie a vidé de son contenu provoquant son apparition sur plus de 20 km... y-aurait pas de grand rift, y-aurait pas de faille à évacuer par la pluie. Mais cherchez pas, c’est pas le grand rift qui est en cause.

    • Ces images d’une faille au Kenya montrent-elles que l’Afrique est en train de se diviser ?
      https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/video/2018/04/03/non-ces-images-d-une-faille-au-kenya-ne-montrent-pas-que-l-afrique-est-en-tr

      Dans cinquante millions d’années, il ne devrait plus exister une, mais deux Afrique. Les scientifiques observent depuis quelques années la séparation de deux plaques tectoniques africaines au niveau de la vallée du Grand Rift. Un phénomène géologique qui s’étend de la mer Rouge au Zambèze, sur plus de 6 000 km de long.

      La découverte d’une faille près de Nairobi, au Kenya, a semblé confirmer l’avancée de la faille, selon un article publié par une chercheuse. Faux, a répondu un chercheur américain, spécialiste des plaques tectoniques de cette région. S’il y a bien un phénomène de séparation tectonique en cours, les images de la faille au Kenya n’auraient toutefois rien à voir avec lui. Il s’agirait, selon le chercheur, d’un simple affaissement de la terre, fragilisée par les fortes pluies.

      Ah ! Voilà une présentation intéressante. Une chercheuSE d’un côté. Un chercheur de l’autre, qui dit « FAUX ». Et c’est donc le chercheuR qui a raison. Je vois le mâle partout ?

      Avez-vous noté l’URL, qui dévoile le titre original de cette brève ? L’e-monde, en chasseur de fake news, même dans les débats scientifiques naissant...

      Non, ces images d’une faille au kenya ne montrent pas que l’Afrique est en train de se séparer en deux


  • #Zimbabwe : le président Mnangagwa à #Pékin pour obtenir des financements - RFI

    http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180402-zimbabwe-mnangagwa-pekin-rassurer-allie-investissements-platine

    Pour sa première visite d’Etat en #Chine, le président zimbabwéen est arrivé à Pékin. La Chine, alliée historique de Harare, a construit ces quarante dernières années une relation forte avec le Zimbabwe dont elle est aussi le premier partenaire commercial. Les échanges entre les deux pays pèsent environ un milliard de dollars. Lors de cette visite, il sera donc essentiellement question d’aide financière et d’investissement.

    #chinafrique
    La priorité aujourd’hui pour le président Mnangagwa, c’est de relancer l’économie de son pays. Au Zimbabwe, le taux de chômage se situe entre 80 et 90%, le pays n’a plus de devise propre et utilise des dollars depuis près de dix ans. La production locale est très faible, quasiment tout est importé aussi les prix sont-ils élevés.


  • BBC - Future - The hidden healing power of sugar
    http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20180328-how-sugar-could-help-heal-wounds

    Doctors are finding one way that sugar can benefit your health: it may help heal wounds resistant to antibiotics.

    By Clara Wiggins

    30 March 2018

    As a child growing up in poverty in the rural Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe, Moses Murandu was used to having salt literally rubbed in his wounds when he fell and cut himself. On lucky days, though, his father had enough money to buy something which stung the boy much less than salt: sugar.

    #sucre #santé #médicaments #et je soupçonne un peu de lobbying derrièr ce papier donc #the_corporation


  • Does China have the power to change governments in Africa?
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/03/does-china-have-the-power-to-change-governments-in-africa

    The idea that China is influencing regime change in Africa, became popular in the wake of the military coup in Zimbabwe that ended Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule there. Western media was particularly taken by this thesis. Zimbabwean Army Chief General Constantino Chiwenga, the man at the head of the coup, visited Beijing the prior week, presumably to get the approval of the Chinese Communist…


  • Is China, changing regimes in Africa?
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/03/is-china-changing-regimes-in-africa

    The idea that China is influencing regime change in Africa, became popular in the wake of the military coup in Zimbabwe that ended Robert Mugabe’s 37-year rule there. Western media was particularly taken by this thesis. Zimbabwean Army Chief General Constantino Chiwenga, the man at the head of the coup, visited Beijing the prior week, presumably to get the approval of the Chinese Communist…


  • When is a coup a coup?
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/02/when-is-a-coup-a-coup

    In recent times when militaries in Burkina Faso, Egypt, Madagascar and Mali suspended civilian rule, they were subsequently suspended by regional actors. From a continental standpoint, these suspensions were in line with the African Union’s (AU) mandate to challenge unconstitutional transitions of power. Then came Zimbabwe. On November 21st, 2017, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe stepped down from the presidency after 37 years in…


  • After Morgan Tsvangirai — the future for opposition politics in Zimbabwe
    http://africasacountry.com/2018/02/after-morgan-tsvangirai-the-future-for-opposition-politics-in-zimba

    Zimbabweans will soon vote for who will be their president for the next five years. There is no date set, but it looks like an election will take place “in four to five months.” One striking characteristic of this upcoming poll is that neither of the two figures who dominated the country’s politics for the…