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  • Le "dôme de fer" : un pognon de dingue

    Attaque de l’Iran contre Israël : comment le « Dôme de fer » a-t-il permis de contrer les missiles ?
    https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/israel/attaque-de-liran-contre-israel-comment-le-dome-de-fer-a-t-il-permis-de-

    Attaque de l’Iran contre Israël : comment le « Dôme de fer » a-t-il permis de contrer les missiles ?

    L’Iran a mené une attaque sans précédent contre Israël en lançant plus de 200 drones et missiles sur l’État Hébreu. Celui-ci s’est quant à lui félicité d’avoir « déjoué » l’attaque grâce à son système de défense aérien et l’aide de ses alliés. Au cœur de ce système : le fameux « Dôme de fer ».

    C’est une attaque directe de l’Iran sans précédent. Plus de 200 drones et missiles lancés contre Israël, son ennemi juré. L’État hébreu s’est lui félicité d’avoir « déjoué » l’attaque en interceptant « 99 % des tirs » . Au cœur de son arsenal défensif : le « Dôme de fer ». Comment fonctionne ce parapluie qu’Israël utilise aussi contre les roquettes du Hamas ? On fait le point.
    Un système performant

    Le système de défense aérienne israélien « Dôme de fer » a intercepté des milliers de roquettes depuis sa mise en service en 2011, offrant une protection essentielle en période de conflit, rappelle l’AFP.

    Il a été largement utilisé pour protéger les sites militaires et civils des tirs fréquents de roquettes en provenance de Gaza et du Liban dans le cadre de la guerre actuelle entre Israël et le mouvement islamiste palestinien Hamas.

    Israël a d’abord développé seul le « Dôme de fer » après la guerre du Liban de 2006, avant d’être rejoint par les États-Unis, qui ont apporté leur savoir-faire en matière de défense et des milliards de dollars de soutien financier.

    Le système a un taux d’interception d’environ 90 %, selon l’entreprise militaire israélienne Rafael, qui a participé à sa conception. Toutefois certains spécialistes remettent en question les chiffres fournis par Rafael.
    Un système en trois parties

    « Le Dôme de fer » est l’un des éléments du système israélien de défense antimissile à plusieurs niveaux. Il est conçu pour abattre des roquettes d’une portée allant jusqu’à 70 kilomètres, précise l’AFP.

    Chaque batterie de ce « Dôme de fer » se compose de trois parties principales : un système de détection radar, un ordinateur qui calcule la trajectoire de la roquette entrante et un lanceur qui tire des intercepteurs si la roquette est susceptible de toucher une zone bâtie ou stratégique.

    Il s’accompagne d’autres systèmes de défense antimissile tels que le système Arrow, destiné à contrer les missiles balistiques, et le système David’s Sling, dont l’objectif est de contrer les attaques de roquettes ou de missiles à moyenne portée.
    Des tirs coûteux

    La facture du Dôme de fer, pour laquelle les États-Unis contribuent largement, est salée. Chaque intercepteur du « Dôme de fer » coûte entre 40 000 et 50 000 dollars (37 500 à 46 900 €) à produire, selon le Centre d’études stratégiques et internationales, basé à Washington. Un système complet, comprenant le radar, l’ordinateur et trois ou quatre lanceurs - chacun contenant jusqu’à 20 intercepteurs - coûte environ 100 millions de dollars à produire.

    Israël dispose de 10 systèmes de ce type, selon le groupe américain d’aéronautique et de défense RTX (ex-Raytheon), qui participe à la construction du « Dôme de fer ».

    Selon d’autres estimations, ce chiffre est légèrement plus élevé.
    Un système au cœur de l’alliance américano-israélienne

    Le « Dôme de fer » est l’un des piliers stratégiques de l’alliance américano-israélienne, qui a été suivie par les administrations démocrates et républicaines successives.

    En août 2019, l’armée américaine a signé un contrat pour l’achat de deux batteries de « Dôme de fer » afin de renforcer ses propres capacités de défense contre les missiles à courte portée.

  • Inchiesta su #Ousmane_Sylla, morto d’accoglienza

    A distanza di un mese dal suicidio di Ousmane Sylla nel #Cpr di #Ponte_Galeria, il 4 febbraio 2024, sono emersi nuovi elementi sulla sua triste vicenda, non raccontati nelle prime settimane. La prima cosa che sappiamo ora per certo è che Ousmane voleva vivere. Lo dimostrano i video e le foto che ho avuto da persone che lo hanno conosciuto, che lo ritraggono mentre balla, gioca, canta, sorride e scherza con il suo compagno di stanza. La sua vita però è stata stravolta da una violenza ingiustificabile, che scaturisce dalle dinamiche perverse su cui si basa il nostro sistema di accoglienza (ma non solo) e che impongono di farsi delle domande.

    Già nei primi giorni dopo la morte si venne a sapere che Ousmane aveva denunciato maltrattamenti nella casa famiglia di cui era stato ospite, prima di essere trasferito al Cpr di Trapani. Gli avvocati che si stanno occupando del caso e alcune attiviste della rete LasciateCIEntrare hanno rintracciato la relazione psico-sociale redatta dalla psicologa A.C. del Cpr di Trapani Milo il 14 novembre 2023. Era passato un mese dal suo ingresso nella struttura, a seguito del decreto di espulsione emesso dalla prefettura di Frosinone in data 13 ottobre 2023.

    La relazione dice che Ousmane “racconta di essere arrivato in Italia sei anni fa; inizialmente ha vissuto in una comunità per minori a Ventimiglia in Liguria, poi una volta raggiunta la maggiore età è stato trasferito presso la casa famiglia di Sant’Angelo in Theodice (Cassino). Racconta che all’interno della struttura era solito cantare, ma questo hobby non era ben visto dal resto degli ospiti. Così, un giorno, la direttrice del centro decide di farlo picchiare da un ospite tunisino. In conseguenza delle percosse subite, Sylla si reca al consiglio comunale di Cassino, convinto di trovarsi in Questura, per denunciare la violenza di cui si dichiara vittima”.

    La casa famiglia di Sant’Angelo in Theodice è menzionata anche sulla scritta lasciata da Ousmane – sembrerebbe con un mozzicone di sigaretta – su una parete del Cpr di Roma, prima di impiccarsi a un lenzuolo, la notte tra il 3 e il 4 febbraio 2024.

    “LASCIATEMI PARLARE”
    Sulle cronache locali della Ciociaria, l’8 ottobre 2023 venne pubblicata la notizia di un giovane profugo africano presentatosi in consiglio comunale venerdì 6 ottobre (due giorni prima) per denunciare di aver subito violenze fisiche e maltrattamenti nella casa famiglia di cui era ospite, in questa frazione di Cassino di circa cinquecento abitanti. “Lasciatemi parlare o mi ammazzo”, avrebbe gridato, secondo Ciociaria oggi, che riferiva inoltre che “il giovane adesso ha paura di tornare nella casa famiglia”. La struttura era stata inaugurata sei mesi prima, il 3 aprile 2023, dal sindaco di Cassino Enzo Salera, originario proprio di Sant’Angelo, e dall’assessore con delega alle politiche sociali Luigi Maccaro, alla presenza del funzionario dei servizi sociali, Aldo Pasqualino Matera. Si trovano diversi articoli datati 4 aprile 2023, corredati di foto della cerimonia e della targa con il nome della casa famiglia. La struttura si chiamava Revenge, che significa rivincita ma anche vendetta.

    La casa famiglia è stata chiusa tra dicembre e gennaio per “irregolarità”; le indagini sono ancora in corso. Era gestita dalla società Erregi Progress s.r.l.s. con sede in Spigno Saturnia, in provincia di Latina; la titolare della società e responsabile della casa famiglia è Rossella Compagna (non Campagna, come riportato in alcune cronache), affiancata nella gestione dall’avvocato Michelangiolo Soli, con studio legale a Minturno. Oggi sappiamo che mancavano le autorizzazioni della Asl locale all’apertura, e altri adempimenti; e che la maggior parte degli operatori che si sono succeduti nel corso dei circa nove mesi di apertura non ha mai percepito lo stipendio, né la malattia: almeno quelli che non erano vicini alla responsabile. Alcuni di essi hanno fatto causa alla società e sono in attesa di risarcimento. Altri non avevano neanche le qualifiche per operare in una struttura per minori stranieri non accompagnati.

    Sono stata a Sant’Angelo in Theodice e ho incontrato diverse persone che hanno conosciuto Ousmane, che lo hanno seguito e aiutato durante il mese e mezzo circa della sua permanenza in paese. Grazie a loro ho potuto capire chi era Ousmane e ciò che ha vissuto in quel periodo. Ousmane è arrivato a Sant’Angelo tra la fine di agosto e l’inizio di settembre, insieme a un ragazzo marocchino, oggi maggiorenne. Provenivano da Ventimiglia, dove avevano trascorso insieme circa un mese in un campo della Croce Rossa Italiana, prima di essere trasferiti nella casa famiglia di Cassino. Ousmane non era però “da sei anni in Italia”, come trascritto dalla psicologa del Cpr di Trapani nella sua relazione. Sembrerebbe che fosse arrivato l’estate prima, nel 2023, a Lampedusa, come si intuisce anche dalla sua pagina Fb (“Fouki Fouki”). Il 3 agosto ha pubblicato un video in cui canta sulla banchina di un porto, quasi certamente siciliano. Forse era arrivato nella fase di sovraffollamento, caos e ritardi nei trasferimenti che spesso si verificano sull’isola in questa stagione. Avrebbe poi raggiunto Roma e successivamente Ventimiglia.

    Il suo “progetto migratorio” era quello di arrivare in Francia, dove ha un fratello, cantante rap e animatore d’infanzia, Djibril Sylla, che ho incontrato di recente: è venuto a Roma per riconoscere il corpo di Ousmane e consentirne il ritorno in Africa. Ousmane parlava bene il francese e lo sapeva anche scrivere, come dimostra la scritta che ha lasciato sul muro prima di uccidersi. Con ogni probabilità è stato respinto al confine francese, verso l’Italia. Ousmane non era minorenne; si era dichiarato minorenne probabilmente perché né allo sbarco né al confine con la Francia ha potuto beneficiare di un orientamento legale adeguato che lo informasse dei suoi diritti e delle possibilità che aveva. Il regolamento “Dublino”, in vigore da decenni, prevede che i migranti restino o vengano rinviati nel primo paese in cui risultano le loro impronte (ci sono delle apposite banche dati europee), impedendo loro di raggiungere i luoghi dove hanno legami e comunità di riferimento o semplicemente dove desiderano proseguire la loro vita.

    Una volta respinto, però, anziché fare domanda di protezione internazionale in Italia, Ousmane si è dichiarato minore, pur essendo ventunenne. Non sarà facile ricostruire chi possa averlo consigliato, guidato o influenzato in queste scelte e nei suoi rapporti con le autorità, dal suo arrivo in Italia in poi. Sappiamo, tuttavia, che dichiarandosi “minore” ha determinato l’inizio, incolpevole e inconsapevole, della fine della sua breve vita, non più in mano a lui da quel momento in poi.

    Dichiarandosi maggiorenne, Ousmane avrebbe potuto presentare una domanda di protezione. Nel paese da cui proveniva, la Guinea Conakry, vige una dittatura militare dal 2021. I migranti possono chiedere protezione internazionale se manifestano il timore, ritenuto fondato da chi esamina il loro caso, di poter subire “trattamenti inumani e degradanti”, ovvero un danno grave, nel proprio paese di provenienza, laddove lo Stato di cui sono cittadini non fornisca loro adeguate protezioni. A Ousmane è accaduto l’inverso: i trattamenti inumani e degradanti li ha subiti in Italia.

    Sin dal suo arrivo nella casa famiglia di Cassino, Ousmane ha patito uno stillicidio di vessazioni, minacce e deprivazioni, come ci riferiscono tutte le persone che lo hanno assistito e accompagnato in quel mese e mezzo, che testimoniano delle modalità inqualificabili con cui veniva gestita quella struttura, della brutalità con cui venivano trattati gli ospiti, del clima di squallore e terrore che vigeva internamente. Abbiamo ascoltato i messaggi vocali aggressivi che la responsabile inoltrava ai suoi operatori, sia ai danni degli operatori che degli ospiti, scarsamente nutriti e abbandonati a sé stessi, come appare anche dalle foto. Ousmane, a causa del suo atteggiamento ribelle e “resistente”, sarebbe stato punito ripetutamente con botte, privazione di cibo, scarpe, coperte e indumenti, e di servizi cui aveva diritto, non solo in quanto “minore”, ma in quanto migrante in accoglienza: per esempio, l’accesso ai dispositivi di comunicazione (telefono e scheda per poter contattare i familiari), la scuola di italiano, il pocket money.

    Tutte le persone con cui ho parlato sono concordi nel descrivere Ousmane come un ragazzo rispettoso, intelligente, altruista e sensibile; sano, dinamico, grintoso, si ispirava alla cultura rasta e cantava canzoni di rivolta e di libertà in slang giamaicano e in sousou, la sua lingua madre. La sua unica “colpa” è stata opporsi a quello che vedeva lì, riprendendo con foto e video le ingiustizie che subiva e vedeva intorno a sé. A causa di questo suo comportamento è stato discriminato dalla responsabile e da alcuni personaggi, come un ragazzo tunisino di forse vent’anni. Dopo un mese di detenzione lo stesso Ousmane raccontò alla psicologa del Cpr di Trapani che la responsabile della casa famiglia l’avrebbe fatto picchiare da un “ospite tunisino”.

    Il 6 ottobre 2023, forse indirizzato da qualche abitante del luogo, Ousmane raggiunse il consiglio comunale di Cassino, nella speranza che le autorità italiane potessero proteggerlo. Una consigliera comunale con cui ho parlato mi ha descritto lo stato di agitazione e sofferenza in cui appariva il ragazzo: con ai piedi delle ciabatte malridotte, si alzava la maglietta per mostrare i segni di percosse sul torace. Ousmane non fu ascoltato dal sindaco Salera, tutore legale dei minori non accompagnati della casa famiglia. Ousmane fu ascoltato solo dalla consigliera che comprendeva il francese, in presenza di poche persone, dopo che il sindaco e la giunta si erano allontanati. A quanto pare quel giorno si presentò in consiglio anche una delegazione di abitanti per chiedere la chiusura della struttura, ritenuta mal gestita e causa di tensioni in paese.

    Una settimana dopo, il 13 ottobre, Ousmane tornò al consiglio comunale, dichiarando di essere maggiorenne. Pare che prima avesse provato a rivolgersi alla caserma dei carabinieri – chiedeva dove fosse la “gendarmerie” – per mostrare i video che aveva nel telefono: la sua denuncia non fu raccolta, perché in quel momento mancava il maresciallo. Di nuovo, forse non sapremo mai da chi Ousmane sia stato consigliato, guidato e influenzato, nella sua scelta di rivelare la sua maggiore età. Perché non gli fu mai consentito di esporre denuncia e di ottenere un permesso di soggiorno provvisorio, per esempio per cure mediche, o per protezione speciale, visto che aveva subito danni psicofisici nella struttura di accoglienza, e che voleva contribuire a sventare dei crimini?

    Come in molte strutture per minori migranti, la responsabile era consapevole della possibilità che molti dei suoi ospiti fossero in realtà maggiorenni. “Una volta che scoprono che sono maggiorenni, devono tornare a casa loro, perché le strutture non li vogliono”, spiega in un messaggio audio ai suoi operatori. In un altro dei messaggi che ho sentito, questa consapevolezza assume toni intimidatori: “Quindi abbassassero le orecchie, perché io li faccio neri a tutti quanti”, diceva. “Io chiudo la casa, e poi riapro, con altra gente. Dopo un mese. Ma loro se ne devono andare affanculo. Tutti! Ne salvo due o tre forse. Chiudiamo, facciamo finta di chiudere. Loro se ne vanno in mezzo alla strada, via, e io faccio tutto daccapo, con gente che voglio io. Quindi abbassassero le orecchie perché mi hanno rotto i coglioni”. Nello stesso messaggio, la responsabile aggiunge: “Tu devi essere educato con me; e io forse ti ricarico il telefono; sennò prendi solo calci in culo, e io ti butto affanculo nel tuo paese di merda”.

    La minore età può essere usata come arma di ricatto. I migranti che si dichiarano minori, infatti, entrano nel circuito delle strutture per minori stranieri non accompagnati, e ottengono un permesso di soggiorno per minore età appena nominano un tutore (solitamente il sindaco). In caso di dubbio sulla minore età questi vengono sottoposti ad accertamenti psico-fisici, che consistono nella radiografia del polso e in una serie di visite specialistiche presso una struttura sanitaria.

    Per l’accoglienza di un minore straniero non accompagnato, il ministero dell’interno eroga ai comuni che ne fanno richiesta (tramite le prefetture) dai novanta ai centoventi euro al giorno, che finiscono in buona parte nelle tasche degli enti gestori (che per guadagnare possono risparmiare su cibo, servizi, personale, in quanto non sono previsti controlli davvero efficaci sulla gestione dei contributi statali). Ma anche i comuni hanno da guadagnare sull’accoglienza ai minori. A questo proposito, vale la pena richiamare le parole pronunciate dall’assessore ai servizi sociali Maccaro in occasione dell’apertura della casa famiglia e riportate in un articolo di Radio Cassino Stereo, presente in rete: “Una nuova realtà sociale al servizio del territorio è una ricchezza per tutto il sistema dei servizi sociali che vive della collaborazione tra pubblico e privato sociale. Siamo certi che questa nuova realtà potrà integrarsi in una rete sociale che in questi anni sta mostrando grande attenzione al tema dei minori”.

    Le autorità possono in qualsiasi momento sottoporre i giovani stranieri non accompagnati ad accertamento dell’età. È così che questi ragazzi divengono vulnerabili e costretti a sottostare a qualsiasi condizione venga loro imposta, poiché rischiano di perdere l’accoglienza e finire nei Cpr. Molti migranti ventenni con un viso da adolescente, come Ousmane, vengono incoraggiati a dichiararsi minori: più ce ne sono, più saranno necessarie strutture e servizi ben sovvenzionati (molto più dei servizi per maggiorenni).

    NEL LIMBO DEI CPR
    Dopo la seconda apparizione in consiglio comunale, il 13 ottobre, anziché essere supportato, tutelato e orientato ai suoi diritti, Ousmane è stato immediatamente colpito da decreto di espulsione, e subito trasferito (il 14 ottobre) nel Cpr di Trapani Milo, dove trascorrerà tre mesi. Inutile il tentativo dell’avvocato del Cpr Giuseppe Caradonna di chiederne dopo un mese il trasferimento, con una missiva indirizzata alla questura di Trapani, in cui scriveva “continua purtroppo a mantenere una condotta del tutto incompatibile con le condizioni del Centro [Cpr] (probabilmente per via di disturbi psichici derivanti da esperienze traumatiche) al punto da mettere a serio rischio la propria e l’altrui incolumità. A supporto della presente, allego una relazione psico-sociale, redatta in data odierna dalla dottoressa A.C., psicologa che opera all’interno della struttura, la quale ha evidenziato dettagliatamente la condizione in cui versa Ousmane Sylla. Pertanto, mi permetto di sollecitare un Suo intervento per far sì che quest’ultimo venga trasferito al più presto in una struttura più idonea e compatibile con il suo stato di salute mentale”.

    La psicologa aveva scritto: “Ritengo che l’utente possa trarre beneficio dal trasferimento presso un’altra struttura più idonea a rispondere ai suoi bisogni, in cui siano previsti maggiori spazi per interventi supportivi e una maggiore supervisione delle problematiche esposte”. Richiesta alla quale la questura di Trapani risponderà negativamente, con la motivazione che “lo straniero aveva fatto ingresso nella struttura munito di adeguata certificazione sanitaria che attesta l’idoneità alla vita in comunità ristretta e che costituisce condicio sine qua non per l’accesso all’interno dei Cpr”.

    Chi aveva redatto quella “adeguata certificazione sanitaria” di cui Ousmane era munito all’ingresso nel Cpr di Trapani, se ancora portava addosso i segni delle violenze subite, come testimoniato dalla consigliera cassinese che lo aveva ascoltato nella settimana precedente, rilevandone anche lo stato di estremo disagio psicologico?

    Ousmane affermava, ripetutamente, di voler tornare in Africa. Lo diceva anche alle operatrici della casa famiglia con cui abbiamo parlato: “Gli mancava la mamma”, hanno riferito, con la quale non poteva neanche comunicare, perché privato del telefono. Un’operatrice ricorda che una volta la disegnò, perché Ousmane amava anche disegnare, oltre che cantare e giocare a pallone. Studiava l’italiano con lei ed “era molto bravo”, dice, apprendeva rapidamente.

    Voleva tornare in Africa, non perché volesse rinunciare al sogno di una vita migliore in Europa, in Francia o in Italia, anche per poter aiutare la famiglia che vive in povertà in un sobborgo di Conakry (madre, sorelle e fratelli più piccoli), ma perché non aveva trovato qui alcuna forma di accoglienza degna di chiamarsi tale, se non nelle persone che lo hanno assistito, ascoltato e che testimoniano oggi in suo favore; persone che hanno fatto il possibile per lui, tuttavia non sono “bastate” a salvargli la vita; non per loro responsabilità, ma perché ignorate o sovrastate dalle istituzioni e dalle autorità che avrebbero potuto e dovuto tutelare Ousmane.

    Dopo tre mesi trascorsi nel Cpr di Trapani, Ousmane verrà trasferito a fine gennaio nel Cpr di Roma, per continuare a restare in un assurdo limbo, in condizioni “inumane e degradanti” nelle quali è ben noto versino i Cpr. L’Italia non ha accordi bilaterali con la Guinea Conakry, come con tanti altri paesi di provenienza dei migranti detenuti nei Cpr.

    Il 19 settembre 2023, il sito istituzionale integrazionemigranti.gov.it, informava che il giorno prima il Consiglio dei ministri aveva varato nuove norme contro l’immigrazione irregolare: “Si estende – come consentito dalla normativa euro-unitaria – a diciotto mesi (sei mesi iniziali, seguiti da proroghe trimestrali) il limite massimo di permanenza nei centri per il rimpatrio degli stranieri non richiedenti asilo, per i quali sussistano esigenze specifiche (se lo straniero non collabora al suo allontanamento o per i ritardi nell’ottenimento della necessaria documentazione da parte dei paesi terzi). Il limite attuale è di tre mesi, con una possibile proroga di quarantacinque giorni. […] Inoltre, si prevede l’approvazione, con decreto del presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, su proposta del ministro della difesa, di un piano per la costruzione, da parte del Genio militare, di ulteriori Cpr, da realizzare in zone scarsamente popolate e facilmente sorvegliabili”. È il cosiddetto Decreto Cutro.

    Secondo la relazione del Garante nazionale per le persone private della libertà personale, sono transitate nei Cpr 6.383 persone, di cui 3.154 sono state rimpatriate. Quelle provenienti da Tunisia (2.308), Egitto (329), Marocco (189) e Albania (58), rappresentano il 49,4%. In base allo scopo dichiarato per cui esistono i Cpr, la maggioranza è stata trattenuta inutilmente.

    Come riporta il Dossier statistico sull’immigrazione 2023, “il governo si ripromette di aprire altri dodici centri, uno per ogni regione, in luoghi lontani dai centri abitati […]. Nei dieci centri attivi in Italia possono essere ospitate 1.378 persone. Tuttavia, complici la fatiscenza delle strutture e le continue sommosse, la cifra reale si dimezza. […] Dal 2019 al 2022, otto persone sono morte nei Cpr, in circostanze diverse. Infiniti sono i casi di autolesionismo e di violenza. Numerose sono le inchieste che confermano come in questi luoghi si pratichi abuso di psicofarmaci a scopo sedativo”.

    Il caso più noto è quello del ventiseienne tunisino Wissem Ben Abdel Latif, deceduto nel novembre 2021, ancora in circostante sospette, dopo essere rimasto legato a un letto per cento ore consecutive nel reparto psichiatrico del San Camillo di Roma. La detenzione amministrativa di Ousmane si sarebbe potuta protrarre molto a lungo, inutilmente. Sono pochissimi i migranti che a oggi beneficiano dei programmi di “rimpatrio assistito”, che prevedono anch’essi accordi e progetti con i paesi di origine per la loro effettiva attuazione. Con la Guinea Conakry non ci risultano accordi neanche sui rimpatri assistiti.
    Ousmane, trovato impiccato a un lenzuolo la mattina del 4 febbraio, non vedeva forse vie di uscita e ha scelto di morire per “liberarsi”, chiedendo, nel messaggio lasciato sul muro prima di togliersi la vita, che il suo corpo venisse riportato in Africa “affinché riposi in pace” e sua madre non pianga per lui. Alcuni migranti che hanno condiviso con lui la detenzione nel Cpr di Trapani, dicono fosse stato “imbottito di psicofarmaci”. A oggi, sono ancora tanti i lati oscuri di questa vicenda, ma sono in molti a invocare verità e giustizia per Ousmane Sylla, come per tutte le persone schiacciate dall’insostenibile peso del “sistema”, al quale alcune di esse – come Ousmane – hanno provato a ribellarsi, con coraggio e dignità.

    https://www.monitor-italia.it/inchiesta-su-ousmane-sylla-morto-daccoglienza
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Italie #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #Trapani #détention_administrative #rétention

    –-

    Vu que Ousmane a été arrêté à Vintimille pour l’amener dans un centre de détention administrative dans le Sud de l’Italie et que, selon les informations que j’ai récolté à la frontière Vintimille-Menton, il avait l’intention de se rendre en France, j’ai décidé de l’inclure dans les cas des personnes décédées à la #frontière_sud-alpine.
    Ajouté donc à cette métaliste des morts à la frontière #Italie-#France (frontière basse, donc #Vintimille / #Alpes_Maritimes) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/784767

  • L’attaque qu’on a le droit (4 avril 2024) :
    https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/04/04/us-uk-france-block-un-condemnation-of-attack-on-iran-s-embassy-in

    US, UK, France block UN condemnation of attack on Iran’s embassy in Syria

    L’attaque qu’on n’a pas le droit (14 avril) :

    Secretary Antony Blinken :
    https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1779367139519897917

    The United States condemns Iran’s attack on Israel. As the President said, our commitment to Israel’s security against threats from Iran is ironclad.

    Rishi Sunak :
    https://twitter.com/RishiSunak/status/1779256852057874718

    “I condemn in the strongest terms the Iranian regime’s reckless attack against Israel.

    Iran has once again demonstrated that it is intent on sowing chaos in its own backyard.

    The UK will continue to stand up for Israel’s security and that of all our regional partners, including Jordan and Iraq.

    Alongside our allies, we are urgently working to stabilise the situation and prevent further escalation. No one wants to see more bloodshed.”

    Emmanuel Macron
    https://twitter.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1779419464389255287

    Je condamne avec la plus grande fermeté l’attaque sans précédent lancée par l’Iran contre Israël, qui menace de déstabiliser la région.

    J’exprime ma solidarité avec le peuple israélien et l’attachement de la France à la sécurité d’Israël, de nos partenaires et à la stabilité régionale.

    La France travaille à la désescalade avec ses partenaires et appelle à la retenue.

  • Mutations bloquées : Paris, département-prison pour les enseignants
    https://www.liberation.fr/societe/education/mutations-bloquees-paris-departement-prison-pour-les-enseignants-20240413

    Selon les chiffres du ministère de l’Education nationale transmis par les syndicats, dans le premier degré, 749 enseignants ont demandé à quitter Paris pour la rentrée scolaire 2023. Seules 65 demandes ont été satisfaites. Avec un taux de réussite de sortie d’à peine plus de 8,5%, Paris est devenu, pour beaucoup d’enseignants, un département-prison.

    Dans l’éducation nationale, les #mutations sont soumises à l’immuable système à points. Chaque année, selon le type d’établissement, l’ancienneté, la situation familiale et personnelle, un enseignant engrange un certain nombre de points, lui permettant ensuite de demander un changement de département. Dans le premier degré, « il faut un certain nombre de points pour sortir de son département mais aussi pour entrer dans le nouveau. Donc, selon les départements, le nombre de points nécessaire peut atteindre des sommets », précise Cécile Suel, secrétaire nationale du syndicat SE-Unsa, chargée du parcours professionnel. Exemple : pour quitter Paris à la rentrée 2023, il fallait minimum 874 points. Pour entrer dans le département de Seine-Maritime – que Marion vise – il en fallait 201. Sauf qu’après neuf ans d’enseignement, la jeune femme en a accumulés… 78. « Autant vous dire que je n’aurai jamais mon mouvement. Je sais que j’aurai #démissionné avant de l’avoir », partage-t-elle.

    A Paris, outre les convenances personnelles et les envies d’ailleurs de chacun, c’est le coût de la vie qui pousse les #enseignants outre-périphérique. Car le salaire de ces fonctionnaires (loin d’être mirobolant) est le même partout en France. « Enfin, on a quand même une prime dite d’habitation qui est de 56 euros par mois », s’étrangle Marion. Sauf qu’à Paris, « le prix des loyers n’est pas compatible avec le niveau de rémunération des professeurs des écoles. Ils ont le choix entre habiter dans une petite surface intra-muros ou aller s’installer à 1h30 et faire la route tous les matins et tous les soirs », abonde Cécile Suel.

    [...] Après vingt-cinq ans d’enseignement, Sonia s’est mise en #disponibilité de l’#éducation nationale. Accordée aux #fonctionnaires sous certaines conditions, cette situation temporaire d’arrêt de travail concernait 3% des agents en 2022-2023, selon les chiffres du ministère de l’Education nationale, et fait perdre salaire et cotisations retraite pendant une durée déterminée. Après avoir posé ses valises à #Paris en 2012, Sonia aimerait gagner les Bouches-du-Rhône pour y rejoindre sa conjointe. Ses 360 points ne lui permettant pas de prétendre au département dans l’académie d’Aix-Marseille, se mettre en disponibilité tenait, selon elle, de l’unique horizon. « C’est un sacrifice, avec des risques : plus aucun salaire, la découverte des entretiens d’embauche à la chaîne… Mais c’est la seule solution que j’ai pour qu’on accepte mon mouvement », regrette-t-elle. En plus de lui permettre de rejoindre sa conjointe, être en disponibilité est aussi, selon elle, un moyen de faire pression et d’appuyer sa demande de mouvement.

    [...] Aujourd’hui, une des seules façons de voir sa disponibilité acceptée est de faire valoir les raisons familiales et se pacser avec son conjoint installé dans une autre ville, affirment les syndicats et les enseignantes interrogés. Un secret de polichinelle de l’éducation nationale : nombreux sont ceux à avoir recours à la pratique, non pas par engagement romantique mais pour accélérer sa carrière.

    [...] Si le pacs permet de demander un rapprochement de conjoint, il permet aussi et surtout de considérablement faire gonfler son pécule. [...] Dans le détail, à la signature du pacs, l’enseignant séparé de son conjoint récolte d’emblée 150 points. Il gagne ensuite 190 points la première année de séparation, 325 la deuxième, 475 la troisième, et 600 pour quatre ans et plus de séparation. Pour Pauline, après sept années dans la grisaille parisienne, le pari est enfin gagné : grâce à son pactole, la jeune femme fera sa rentrée 2024 dans le Sud, comme souhaité.

  • Fermo Mare Jonio: il Ministro Piantedosi ha mentito al Parlamento
    https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/04/fermo-mare-jonio-il-ministro-piantedosi-ha-mentito-al-parlamento

    Giovedì pomeriggio in Senato, il Ministro dell’interno Piantedosi ha risposto all’interrogazione urgente presentata dal senatore Antonio Nicita in merito all’attacco armato da parte della motovedetta libica 658 “Fezzan”, avvenuto lo scorso 4 aprile in acque internazionali, contro naufraghi in acqua e i soccorritori della nave Mare Jonio di Mediterranea Saving Humans. Il titolare del Viminale ha affermato che la nave italiana è intervenuta in un “momento successivo, avvicinandosi alla motovedetta Fezzan quando questa aveva già assolto gli obblighi di salvataggio #In_mare”. Secondo Mediterranea, quando detto da Piantedosi, «è clamorosamente falso». Queste affermazioni sono confermate dal nuovo #Video diffuso (...)

    #Notizie #Accordo_Italia_-_Libia #Decreto_Piantedosi #Italia #Libia #Mediterraneo_centrale #Operazioni_SAR #Redazione #Violazioni_e_abusi

  • Policing migration: when “harm reduction” means “multipurpose aerial surveillance”

    The EU’s latest “#operational_action_plan” on migrant smuggling gives a central role to #Europol, which will receive data resulting from more than two dozen joint police operations launched by EU member states, EU agencies and a range of non-EU states. The UK is heavily involved in the plan, and is leading one activity. One objective is for harm reduction and assistance to victims, but the only activity foreseen is for Frontex to increase use of its “#EUROSUR_Fusion_Services, including the #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance aircraft service.”


    Police against people smuggling

    The action plan (pdf) covers the 2024-25 period and contains an outline of 25 activities listed under eight strategic goals, but offers no insight into the causes of human smuggling, and none of the activities are framed at addressing causes.

    The overall aim is to control migration flows both into the EU and within the EU, and to enhance police cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, EU agencies (Europol, #Frontex and the #EU_police_database_agency, #eu-LISA) and with countries outside the EU, through joint operations and the exchange of information and intelligence.

    Many of the activities include targets for arrests: one led by Poland, for example, foresees the arrest of 200 facilitators of irregular migration per year; another, led by Cyprus, expects at least 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”.

    In 2015, Statewatch exposed a planned EU-wide police operation against irregular migrants called ‘Mos Maiorum’, which led to significant media coverage and political controversy, as well as numerous actions to inform people of their rights and to try to map police activities. Since then, the number of such operations has skyrocketed, but attention has dwindled.

    European plan

    The 2024-25 plan is part of the #European_Multidisciplinary_Platform_Against_Criminal Threats, a now-permanent initiative (https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/eu-joint-police-operations-target-irregular-migrants-by-chris-jones) through which joint police operations are coordinated. It is managed by Europol, with political control exercised by the member states in the Council of the EU.

    A “leader” is assigned to each activity in the action plan, responsible for initiating and reporting on the relevant activity, with “key performance indicators” often indicated in respect of each one.

    The leaders include nine EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain), the UK, as well Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA and the European Police College (CEPOL).

    Europol will provide overall support across all the different activities and is specifically responsible for leading four activities.

    In many activities led by national police forces, it is specified that a goal is also to participate in other Europol initiatives, such as the “Europol Cyberpatrol to target and identify targets” and Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre. The Operational Action Plan stipulates that other, unspecified, “Europol tools” may be used “where appropriate”.

    The action plan specifies that the operational data emanating from the activities is to be shared with Europol to be processed through its Analysis Projects, further swelling the databases at its headquarters in The Hague.

    The first version of the action plan was circulated amongst member states two weeks before the European Commission published a proposal to reinforce Europol’s powers in relation to migrant smuggling, arguing that they were urgently needed – though this assessment was not shared by the member states.

    Strategic goals

    The 26 activities outlined in the plan are designed to contribute to eight strategic goals:

    - Criminal intelligence picture. The activities under this heading are for Europol to provide a “situational picture of migrant smuggling” including threat assessments, updates on migratory routes, “modi operandi” and future trends, which will be made available to member states and third countries. It will involve sharing information with Frontex. Europol also aims to “strengthen the strategic and tactical intelligence picture on the use/abuse of legal business structures by criminal networks” not only in respect of migrant smuggling, but throughout “all main crime areas affecting the EU”.
    - Investigations and judicial response. There are 11 activities planned in relation to this goal. The objective is to prepare and conduct investigations and prosecutions. Police forces of different member states lead the activities and set out specific targets by reference to the numbers of arrests, initiated investigations and identified networks. Each planned activity appears to reflect specific national or local police force priorities. Germany for instance aims to “detect 5,000 irregular migrants” per year, and arrest 500 “facilitators”, whilst France focuses on seizing 100 small boats crossing the Channel to the UK. Spain focuses on air routes, including links between human smuggling and drug trafficking; and Portugal’s aim is to disrupt “marriages of convenience abuse and associated threats” (400 cases specifically). Europol also leads an activity aimed at the development of “intelligence products in support of MS investigations” (50 per year) and Frontex aims to focus on border checks and surveillance measures on the EU external borders (with 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”).
    - Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods and services. The only activity planned in relation to this goal is by the French police forces, to improve law enforcement response against “those utilising the Dark Web and other internet messenger applications to enable illegal immigration and document fraud”. The dark web is identified as an “intelligence gap” in this context.
    - Criminal finances, money laundering and asset recovery. Led by the UK, the activity planned under this goal heading is to disrupt money flows specifically within hawaladar networks.
    - Document fraud. Frontex, as well as French and German police forces each lead activities under this goal aimed at “targeting networks or individuals” involved in document fraud. In this respect, Frontex’s “Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud” has a key role.
    – Capacity building through training, networking and innovation. This involves activities aimed at improving the skills, knowledge and expertise of law enforcement and judicial authorities, led by CEPOL, eu-LISA (on the use of SIS and Eurodac databases) and German police forces.
    - Prevention, awareness raising and harm reduction, as well as early identification and assistance to victims. The only goal that is expressed as being aimed at improving the safety of people is led by Frontex, and is focused on the detection of migrant smuggling through the “use of EUROSUR Fusion Services, including the Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance aircraft service, for [member states] and stakeholders to support more effective detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and migrant smuggling.” No mention is made of identification, assistance or victims.
    - Cooperation with non EU partners: under this last goal, one activity is led by Austrian police forces, aimed at expanding the geographical focus of the Task Force Western Balkans to Turkey and “other relevant countries of origin and transit”. The work is already based on intelligence information provided by Europol and Frontex and aims to “enhance mobile phone extractions” (the link here is not clear). The second activity listed under this last goal is led by Europol, and aims to provide a “common platform for EU agencies, military, law enforcement and other stakeholders to exchange intelligence on criminal networks operating along the migration corridors”, creating a broad and focal role for itself in information exchange with a wide range of stakeholders, including private companies.

    For the purposes of the Operational Action Plan, “migrant smuggling” is broadly defined as:

    “…the process of facilitating the unlawful entry, transit or residence of an individual in a country with or without obtaining financial or other benefits. Migrant smuggling entails the facilitation of illegal entry to the EU and of secondary movements within the EU. It can also involve facilitating the fraudulent acquisition of a residence status in the EU.”

    It therefore does not require the involvement of any benefit and includes movements within the EU.

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/april/policing-migration-when-harm-reduction-means-multipurpose-aerial-surveil
    #surveillance #surveillance_aérienne #migrations #réfugiés #données #coopération_policière #European_Police_College (#CEPOL) #European_Migrant_Smuggling_Centre #Europol_Cyberpatrol

  • German colonial genocide in Namibia the #Hornkranz massacre

    Introduction

    On 12 April 1893, German colonial troops attacked the Nama settlement of ||Nâ‡gâs, known today as Hornkranz. Their intent was to destroy the settlement and its people, after its leader, Hendrik Witbooi, refused to sign so-called ‘protection’ treaties—tools of the German colonial administration for controlling sovereign indigenous nations and their lands. As their presence in what they declared in 1885 as ‘German Southwest Africa’ grew, the German regime was increasingly unwilling to tolerate the independence and agency exercised by Hendrik Witbooi and his clan in the face of the encroaching German empire.

    In their attack on Hornkranz, the Germans wanted to both make an example of the Witbooi clan and to punish them for their defiant rejection of German rule. Curt von Francois, who led the attack, made his objective clear: ‘to exterminate the Witbooi tribe’ (Bundesarchiv, R 1001/1483, p. 46). In this premeditated act of erasure, his troops massacred almost eighty women and children before capturing another hundred, burned what remained of the settlement to the ground, and established a garrison, rendering it impossible for survivors to return.

    Though the genocide of the Nama, Ovaherero and other peoples indigenous to what is now modern-day Namibia is widely recognised to have taken place between 1904 and 1908, the Nama people remember this massacre as the true first act in the genocide against them. This is substantiated not only by the clarity of the German objective to destroy the |Khowesin as a people, but also by the retrospective reading of Hornkranz as a clear precedent of the systemic tactics of dispossession and destruction that would be used by the Germans against the Nama, the Ovaherero, the San, and others in the years to come.

    Outside of the descendant communities, the events at Hornkranz have until now been overlooked and underrepresented, as has the cultural significance of the settlement itself within the dominant historiography, broadly based on the German visual and narrative record. The site of the former Witbooi settlement was expropriated and today constitutes a private farm, access to which is possible only with special permission from its owner. The descendants of Hornkranz are rarely able to visit their own cultural heritage sites and commemorate the struggle of their ancestors.

    The faint extant traces of the Witbooi settlement at Hornkranz can be identified today only with the guidance of the descendants and the historians that learned from them. Two plaques on the site are the only indications of the Nama presence on that land. One plaque was inaugurated by the community in 1997, the only occasion on which they were able to gather to commemorate the massacre at the site where it took place. The other plaque (date unknown) glorifies the German troops, even going so far as to include an offensive slur for the Nama; the massacre is described as a ‘battle’, conveying little of the atrocities perpetrated there.

    The descendants of Hornkranz and the wider Nama community continue to struggle for justice and for opportunities to correct the historical record and tell the story of Hornkranz on their own terms. In support of their efforts to resist this erasure, we worked with descendants, who have inherited knowledge of their community’s history through oral transmission over multiple generations, to reconstruct the lost settlement and produce a new body of visual evidence about the massacre and its aftermath. Led by their testimonies, we used modelling and mapping techniques along with our own field research and a very limited archival record to situate their accounts and rematerialize Hornkranz.

    Our reconstruction of the Witbooi settlement at Hornkranz aims to underscore the vitality of oral tradition in the act of reconstituting the colonial archive and testifies to the oral transmission of inherited knowledge as an ongoing act of resistance in itself.
    Background

    The |Khowesin (Witbooi) people, a semi-nomadic subtribe of the wider Nama peoples, settled around the perennial spring at Hornkranz in 1884-1885, the very period during which the Berlin Conference, formalising the fragmentation of Africa into colonies and protectorates, was taking place. The chief of the Witbooi clan, Hendrik Witbooi, later went on to become one of the most prominent figures of anti-colonial resistance in Southwest Africa, uniting all Nama clans and later forming a coalition with the Ovaherero to fight against the German colonial regime.

    Following the establishment of their settlement in Hornkranz, the Witbooi Nama lived relatively undisturbed until 1892, when first attempts to compel Hendrik Witbooi into signing a protection treaty began. Hendrik Witbooi, aware that the true objective of the so-called ‘protection treaties’ was nothing short of subjugation, was the last leader to refuse to comply:

    What are we being protected against? From what danger or difficulty, or suffering can one chief be protected by another? […] I see no truth or sense, in the suggestion that a chief who has surrendered may keep his autonomy and do as he likes.

    The German attempt to secure control over the peoples inhabiting the colony and their land is manifested in their mapping efforts. The first map we found featuring Hornkranz dates to 1892, the same year that the Germans began demanding the Witbooi sign such treaties. Despite Witbooi’s refusal to sign, Hornkranz is labelled in these German maps as ‘proposed Crown Land’ already six months before the attack—the very act of cartographic representation prefiguring the expulsion and massacre to follow less than a year later.

    After the Germans attacked Hornkranz, the Witboois were finally forced to concede and sign one of the protection treaties they had so long been resisting.

    A decade later, in 1904, the Nama joined the Ovaherero in an anti-colonial struggle against German rule. In response, the Germans issued an extermination order against the Ovaherero and later, another against the Nama. Hendrik Witbooi died in battle on 29 October 1905. Following his death, the Nama tribes surrendered. The extermination order against the Nama was never revoked.
    12 April 1893: The Attack and Aftermath

    The German troops approached the settlement in the early hours of 12 April, planning to attack under the cover of night without any warning. They then split into three contingents—a recounting of this strategy is recorded in the diary of Kurd Schwabe, one of the perpetrators of the attack. Von Francois led the attack from the northern side, entering the village first, while Schwabe approached from the east.

    Hendrik Witbooi, who was allegedly sitting outside of his house when he noticed the approaching troops, ordered all Nama fighters to retreat and take up defensive positions along the riverbed, where he expected the ensuing battle to take place. Instead, the German troops stopped when they reached the sleeping village and proceeded to target the defenceless population that had stayed behind. The brutality of the onslaught came as a shock to Hendrik Witbooi, who had not expected the Germans to unleash such ‘uncivilised’ tactics upon another sovereign nation.

    Sixteen thousand rounds of bullets were reportedly discharged by the Germans in the span of just thirty minutes. According to the testimony of descendants and corroborated by Schwabe’s diary, some victims were burned alive in their homes.

    The canisters recovered from the site during our fieldwork in September 2023 indicate where some exchange of fire may have taken place while the Witbooi fighters were retreating. While the found bullets were identified as those used by the Witbooi Nama, their location and distribution also corroborates written descriptions of the massacre unfolding in the inhabited area of the settlement, with stored ammunition exploding from inside the burning houses.

    The massacre yielded 88 victims: ten men, including one of Hendrik Witbooi’s sons, and 78 women and children.

    The following day, the German troops returned to raze what remained of the settlement to the ground. Promptly after, a garrison was established on the ashes of the Witbooi settlement, reinforcing the Germans’ clear intention to claim the land and prevent the Witboois from ever returning.

    Over the next year, the Witbooi Nama made several attempts to return to Hornkranz, resulting in four more skirmishes on the site. Eventually, they were forced to sign a protection treaty in Naukluft in August 1894, which cemented the dispossession of their land.

    The treaty meant that the Witbooi Nama were now obliged to assist the Schutztruppen in their battles against other tribes, most devastatingly at the Battle of Waterberg in August 1904 (see our Phase 1 investigation of this event). Once the Nama realised the true genocidal intent of the Schutztruppen, they united with the Ovaherero against colonial rule. The extermination order against the Nama was issued on 22 April 1905.

    After the genocidal war ended in 1908, Hornkranz was sold off to a private owner and a police station was established on its premises. Today, the police station building is the main farmhouse.

    Nama descendants are seeking to establish the 1893 massacre as the first act of genocide against the Nama, and 12 April as the official Genocide Remembrance Day in Namibia.

    This investigation—part of a larger collaboration between Forensic Architecture, Forensis, Nama Traditional Leaders Association (NTLA) and Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA)—seeks to support the community’s broader efforts to make the site accessible for commemoration and preservation.

    Methodology
    What Remains

    Little material evidence of Hornkranz survives today. This is in part due to the scale and totality of destruction by the Germans; but it is also a testament to the Witbooi’s steadfast resistance to being documented by the colonial regime, as well as to the light footprint the Nama exerted on the land through their semi-nomadic inhabitation and subsistence. The archival record about the Witbooi and Hornkranz is also sparse and skewed. Alongside an incomplete and biased colonial description of the massacre and the settlement, the only visual representation of Hornkranz on record is a soldier’s crude sketch showing its houses set alight by the German troops on the night of the massacre. The memory of Hornkranz as it was at the time of the attack lives on instead through the descendant communities who have inherited the testimonies of their forebearers about its material culture, rituals, life and environmental practices; our reconstruction and understanding of Hornkranz is possible only insofar as we are led by their testimonies.

    Around the rectangular patch where Hendrik Witbooi’s house once stood, Maboss Ortman and Lazarus Kairabeb, NTLA advisors, identified stones they said are the ruins of the house. Right next to it is the only stone foundation in the settlement, that of a church still under construction at the time of the German assault. These two traces anchored us spatially when we began the 3D reconstruction. We were told by Zak Dirkse, a Nama historian, that Hendrik Witbooi’s house was located higher up in the settlement, with the other houses further down toward the river.

    The other remains and known landmarks of the original Hornkranz settlement help us to navigate it and determine its approximate boundaries. During our visit to the site, the farm owner pointed us to a long strip of clustered stones he explained were the remains of the settlement’s defensive walls, some 300 metres north-west of the church ruins. To the south, by the river, the settlement’s former cemetery is marked by the spread of small rectangular cut stones marking each grave. Further along the river, Maboss and Lazarus showed us the remains of two defensive ramparts, guard outposts downhill from the settlement on its outer edges. They recounted that these ramparts were identifiable to the Witbooi from a distance by a white cornerstone that stands out among the brown stones the rest of the rampart is made of. The ramparts are placed along the hill leading down to the river and would have had a wide lookout view. A few steps to the west of one of the ramparts, we found what brought the Witbooi to this area, a rare perennial spring, which acted not only as a fresh water source for the village, but as a lifeline to the fauna and flora on which the Witbooi relied to survive. Since the early 20th century, this spring has been surrounded to its north by a concrete dam. By establishing this constellation of remains and landmarks, we were able to clarify the approximate outer edges of the settlement.

    Reconstruction

    To reconstruct the Hornkranz settlement, departing from the few architectural landmarks at our disposal, we replicated the architecture of each house and the elements of family life around it, estimated the area of inhabitation within the settlement, and constructed possible layouts of house distribution within the settlement. This reconstruction was led by the close guidance of descendants of the Witbooi we met with in Gibeon, the expertise of Nama historian Zak Dirkse, and the feedback of the Witbooi Royal House council, the representative body of the Witbooi Nama. Our model represents the most comprehensive visual reconstruction of the Witbooi settlement to date.

    Architecture of the Settlement

    Houses in Hornkranz consisted mostly of round domed huts, between four and five metres in diameter, and constructed with cladding made out of reed mat or a mix of animal dung and clay. Zak explained that these huts would have been constructed on a light foundation made up of the same dung and clay mixture spread on the ground. A central pole would act as the main structural pillar on which the reed mats would rest. According to members of the Witbooi descendants, alongside these huts there would have been other houses built of stone, like that of Hendrik Witbooi. Descendants also explained that houses typically had two entrances opposite one another and positioned on an east-west axis with the main entrance facing east.

    Working with the community descendants and Zak, we used 3D modelling software to reconstruct what a typical family home would have looked like. We were told that outside the houses, many families would have had a round kraal lined with a light wooden fence where they kept smaller livestock. Close to the main entrance, they would also have had a fireplace and a simple wooden rack to hang and dry meat. The main kraal of the settlement was near the chief’s house, where a separate storage hut also stood.

    The light environmental trace of the Nama, the German colonial army’s obliteration of the settlement, the failure of subsequent administrations to engage in preservation efforts, and the conversion of the land into a private farm all make it difficult to locate definitive traces of the layout and location of homes based on what little remains at the modern-day site. Nevertheless, by closely reading the texture of the ground, we found possible traces of cleared, round areas surrounded by larger rocks, and noted areas of sparse vegetation growth, a potential indicator of the impact of the huts’ clay-dung foundations. We marked five possible sites where Witbooi homes might have stood.

    Zak explained that a defensive wall would have flanked the settlement along its more vulnerable northern and eastern fronts. We studied the contours of the landscape to estimate, based on the presence of limited remains, how the wall might have cut through the landscape. We estimate that the eastern wall may have been constructed along the peak of the hill to the settlement’s east, given its optical reach and defensive position.

    Area of Inhabitation

    To estimate the area of inhabitation and the settlement’s population, we studied the remaining ruins of the settlement, the terrain of the landscape, and the land’s geological features.

    Houses, we were told, would have been built on flatter ground. We used a 12.5 metre resolution digital elevation model (DEM) to build the terrain in our 3D model and further analysed it in geographic information system (GIS) software. From the DEM, we extracted the contour lines of the landscape and conducted a slope analysis, which calculates the percentage of slope change in the settlement. Analysis of the contours and the areas of low slope help to define the curvature of the settlement’s inhabitation.
    Contour Analysis - 1 metre contours of the site of Hornkranz derived from a digital elevation model (DEM). (Forensic Architecture/Forensis)

    We then traced and excluded uninhabitable geological features from the area of potential inhabitation, including bodies of water and large embedded rock formations. Together, the land’s features, its topography, and our estimated location of the defensive wall help establish where people may have lived.

    Layout of Hornkranz

    Building on the traces of potential houses we previously identified within the landscape and the descendant’s description of the settlement, we were able to algorithmically model potential layouts of the settlement. We used the 3D procedural modelling software application Houdini to design an algorithm that would generate possible layouts of the settlement according to a set of rules, including our defined area of potential inhabitation and the approximate space each household would need for its family life (which we approximate to be a radius of 10 metres). The rules fed to the algorithm were that the houses had to be at least 20 metres apart, each house was approximately 5 metres in size, and there were sixty houses in total with a deviation of +/- ten houses.

    According to the Hornkranz descendants, there would have been around four to six people per household. With an average of five people per household, we estimate the population to be around 300 people per household.
    Number of inhabitants

    The exact population size of Hornkranz at the time of the attack is not known. Sources provide estimates ranging from 250 up to nearly one thousand inhabitants.

    In addition to the members of the |Khowesin Nama clan, Hendrik Witbooi also gathered followers from other clans at Hornkranz, including the ǀAixaǀaen (Afrikaner Oorlams), ǁKhauǀgoan (Swartbooi Nama), Khaiǁkhaun (Red Nation Nama) and ǂAonin (Topnaar Nama). Indeed, the various Nama subtribes were elastic social entities.

    We estimated the 1893 population of Hornkranz by referencing the reported number of individuals killed and captured. Hendrik Witbooi wrote in his diary that 88 people were killed by the Germans that day, 78 of them women and children and ten of them men, with one hundred women and children captured by German colonial forces. Other sources indicate a similar number of casualties: 85 women and children, and ten men (Missonary Olpp, cited in Steinmetz 2009). Descendant narratives also mention the successful escape of some women and children during the German assault. Assuming that before the attack, women and children totalled at least 178 (according to Hendrik Witbooi’s figures), and that women and children made up around three out of five family members in an average household, we estimate there could have been around sixty households and three hundred people in Hornkranz on the dawn of the German attack.

    https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/restituting-evidence-genocide-and-reparations-in-german-colon

    #Allemagne #colonialisme #massacre #génocide #Namibie #architecture_forensique #histoire #histoire_coloniale #témoignage #Nama #Hendrik_Witbooi #Witbooi #Curt_von_Francois #Ovaherero #San

    ping @reka

  • taxi.eu -The taxi app in Kopenhagen
    https://www.taxi.eu/en/cities/kopenhagen

    Copenhagen is a mixture of a historically important port city and a young and modern student city, which attracts many visitors every year.

    Anyone visiting Copenhagen cannot do without a visit to Denmark’s most famous landmark, the Little Mermaid. The fairy tale figure from Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale is a magnetic attraction for all tourists. Equally popular are Tivoli Park, one of the oldest theme parks in the world, Christiansborg Castle, which is the seat of the Danish Parliament, and Amalienborg Castle, where Danish Queen Margrethe II resides and which invites you to watch the royal guard change of guard every day at 12 midday.

    Copenhagen has a well-developed transport network so that the urban area, which is spread over several islands, is accessible to everyone. The Copenhagen taxi dispatch centre Amager-Øbro Taxi 4×27 is the best contact to get from one place of interest to the next – quickly and anytime. Amager-Øbro Taxi 4×27 can be reached 365 days a year by phone on +45 27 27 27 27 27 or via taxi.eu, the taxi app for Europe. The taxi dispatch centre is committed to being the best English-speaking taxi dispatch centre in Denmark. That is why they are always working to improve their already excellent service level even further.

    Whether you need a taxi in Nørrebro, Østerbro, Valby, Bispebjerg, or in Vanløse – or in another city in Europe – one of the many taxis you can reach with taxi.eu is with you in a few minutes.

    Antwerp
    Barcelona
    Berlin
    Bremerhaven
    Cologne
    Hamburg
    Kopenhagen
    Luxembourg
    Madrid
    Munich
    Paris
    Vienna
    Zurich

    #Dänemark #Kopenhagen #Uber #Taxi

    LöschenBearbeiten

  • This city lost Uber, here’s how it’s doing
    https://www.cnet.com/culture/uber-copenhagen-denmark-ride-sharing

    29.7.2017 by Eric Mack - If Uber disappeared what would you do? One city’s story

    Commentary: Up to a quarter of Copenhagen’s 1.2 million residents were using Uber — until it went away. I visited to see how the Danes are coping.

    Eric Mack has been a CNET contributor since 2011. Eric and his family live 100% energy and water independent on his off-grid compound in the New Mexico desert. Eric uses his passion for writing about energy, renewables, science and climate to bring educational content to life on topics around the solar panel and deregulated energy industries. Eric helps consumers by demystifying solar, battery, renewable energy, energy choice concepts, and also reviews solar installers. Previously, Eric covered space, science, climate change and all things futuristic. His encrypted email for tips is ericcmack@protonmail.com.

    Expertise Solar, solar storage, space, science, climate change, deregulated energy, DIY solar panels, DIY off-grid life projects. CNET’s “Living off the Grid” series. https://www.cnet.com/feature/home/energy-and-utilities/living-off-the-grid Credentials

    Finalist for the Nesta Tipping Point prize and a degree in broadcast journalism from the University of Missouri-Columbia.

    When I passed through Copenhagen earlier this month and decided to visit Tivoli Gardens, I fired up the Uber app to help me navigate narrow congested alleyways. The map showed zero cute little black cars. Instead, a terse message informed me the service was no longer available in Denmark’s charming capital city.

    “Wait … what?” I literally said out loud to no one.

    Isn’t this supposed to be one of those Scandinavian techno-utopias where everything is digitized and you can visit the world’s largest 3D printer store? Isn’t that how they justify charging 12 euros for weak beer?
    bikes

    Enlarge Image
    bikes

    There is life after Uber, but it helps if your country is one of those bike-obsessed, Scandinavian techno-Utopias.
    Johanna DeBiase/CNET

    I felt a distinctly new sinking feeling — similar to the one I get when the signal on my phone switches from “LTE” to “3G,” but with added dread. No Uber means having to deal with foreign taxis and their malfunctioning meters and credit card machines, not to mention drivers who don’t have turn-by-turn directions and won’t offer me bottled water.

    For travelers and the otherwise vehicularly challenged, Uber, and competitors like Lyft, have become a convenient means of getting around cities. It’s easy to imagine the pain it would cause the peripatetic who have come to depend on ride-sharing apps were the services they provide to vanish overnight.

    Yet that’s exactly what happened in Denmark. Uber, which operates in more than 600 cities, shut down operations in Denmark on April 18 in response to new laws that would force ride-sharing drivers to essentially convert their vehicles to taxis. Major competitors like Lyft had yet to launch in the city when the law came into effect.

    “(New regulations) will not allow drivers to use their privately owned cars for ride sharing and requires the installation of expensive, old-style taximeters and seat-sensors — effectively blocking the use of modern technology, like smartphones, which can serve the same functions,” Uber said in a statement announcing its withdrawal from the Nordic nation.

    So about two and a half years into Denmark’s Uber era, some 2,000 Uber drivers and 300,000 Danish riders were plunged back into the dark ages of transit. That’s according to numbers from Uber itself. The service launched in Denmark in late 2014, but only operated in Copenhagen.

    Finally arrived in Copenhagen for #3daysofdesign - who knew Uber was banned here?!.
    — Nest.co.uk (@nest_co_uk) June 1, 2017

    What? No Uber in Copenhagen any more?! End of days!!
    — Food Geek (@FoodGeekUK) May 13, 2017

    Yet, as I learned a few months after the Danish Uberpocalypse, everyone is moving on (and around) in that city just fine.

    As it turns out, getting around Copenhagen before Uber launched there wasn’t hard. On social media, mostly foreigners and travelers lamented the loss of ride sharing, while local taxi companies and developers of at least one app designed to connect Copenhageners with taxis — similar to Uber but within the bounds of Danish law — began planning to move in on the territory now abandoned by Silicon Valley.

    Denmark isn’t the only nation to be stripped of its Uber-ing privileges. Bulgaria and Hungary have their own regulations favoring taxis, essentially forcing the world’s largest ride-hailing company to suspend operations in each country in 2016. Neither of those runs lasted as long as Uber’s time in Copenhagen, but like in the Danish city both withdrawals were met with delight from taxi companies.

    I asked a few Copenhageners how Uber’s disappearance had affected them, and for the most part, they were indifferent. Most said they hadn’t used the service much. Perhaps that’s not a surprise in the bike-crazy Vesterbro neighborhood where I asked.

    Bikes and bike lanes abound to such a degree in Copenhagen that even famously bicycle-friendly Portland, Oregon, could learn a thing or two about two-wheel transit from the Danes. Two weeks ago during the annual Distortion festival, which “celebrates youth culture” with electronic dance music and cheap beer-fueled block parties around the city, the bikes piled up on every corner, locked to every inch of fence, spilling into sidewalks.

    Clearly the locals were having little trouble getting around in the post-Uber age, but it was more of a challenge for bikeless tourists like me left bewildered by the lack of buses (many lines were temporarily suspended because of the festival).

    Even after Uber, taxis aren’t nearly as prevalent in Copenhagen as in other cities with ride sharing like New York. Waiting at a taxi stand in a busy shopping district for several minutes and then wandering the streets for several blocks hoping to come across a unoccupied cab left me and my family on foot.

    Second day in #Copenhagen with hour+ wait for taxi. Bring back #uber
    — Kenny Powers (@VMelson) May 11, 2017

    When we finally found the number of a local taxi service, the driver filled us in on the drill. Cabs are pretty quick to respond to calls and web orders (within 10 minutes in our case) and most companies have mobile apps that mimic many of the same features as the ride-sharing apps.

    After installing a few local taxi apps, I was right back to hailing and scheduling rides, as well as tracking and messaging my driver. It was all a strangely familiar experience, even if there wasn’t any bottled water.

    #Dänemark #Kopenhagen #Uber #Taxi

  • Is There Uber In Copenhagen In 2024?
    https://abackpackersworld.com/uber-copenhagen

    15.2.2024 byJosh Band -‎ Copenhagen is one of my favourite cities in the world, and I try to visit the city a few times each year.

    In the modern world, Uber is used to get around cities all across the world. But is there Uber in Copenhagen?

    The city is known for being an amazing destination to visit and it’s one of the most popular destinations in Scandinavia. But how are you going to get around?

    This is a question I had too before I visited Copenhagen. I couldn’t find a concrete answer online, and when I arrived in the city, I was surprised by the answer, so as soon as I got home, I created this guide to help you get a straight answer to this important question.
    Is There Uber In Copenhagen?

    To summarise this article and put it bluntly, no, Copenhagen does not have Uber.

    Uber is technically illegal in Denmark due to the national taxi laws which protect the local taxi firms in Denmark, including Copenhagen.

    I remember one of the guys I met in the hostel I stayed in telling me they tried to get an Uber from the airport but he wasn’t able to- well, this is why!

    It is quite frustrating that there isn’t an option to use the service in Copenhagen, especially if you use it frequently.

    Many people assume you can use Uber worldwide, and while this is somewhat true due to the large number of countries, Denmark isn’t one of them.

    The history between Uber and Danish laws is a long story. They were operating in Denmark from 2014 to 2017 like they would in any other country.

    There were some disputes between the company and the government before then, as there have been in other countries too. But when new taxi laws in 2017 made Uber technically illegal unless they changed how they operated, they pulled out of operating in Denmark.

    Since then, there has been a back and forth between the ride-hailing company and the Danish government where Uber have been trying to reach a compromise, but it seems that the final judgement is that Uber won’t be returning to Denmark or Copenhagen any time soon.
    A picture of a taxi in Copenhagen. Is there Uber Copenhagen? No.

    The reason is that the new law introduced in 2017 required all taxi cabs in Denmark to have a fare meter, video surveillance and seat sensors among other things.

    Of course, if you have been in an Uber before, you will know that the ride fee isn’t calculated using a fare meter and is paid for in advance.

    As a very modern city, it’s quite weird that there isn’t Uber in Copenhagen.

    If you ask me, the reason that the Danish government are being so strict is because they want to protect the local taxi firms and keep the money in Denmark. They have a strong economy and don’t want money generated through both locals and tourists to go to international companies.

    But it’s not the end of the world, there are other alternatives available which I will discuss in a moment, but in answer to the question “Is there Uber in Copenhagen?“, no, there isn’t.
    Equivalent Of Uber In Copenhagen

    There are a few services similar to Uber (an app-based taxi or ride-hailing app) that operate in Copenhagen. When I was in Copenhagen, I saw quite a lot of taxis, but it seemed to be mainly tourists who used them rather than locals.

    The first alternative is Viggo, a ride-hailing service which fits right in with the Copenhagen way of life. The company only uses zero-emission cars, getting you from A to B in a modern electric vehicle.

    Viggo is a relatively small taxi firm, with around 100 cars in the city, but the size does not take away from the quality. The taxis are top-class and I’d recommend using them.

    As you may be aware, Copenhagen is expensive to visit, so the price of Viggo’s taxis may seem high but it’s pretty in line with the economy in the city. Unfortunately, it’s just one of those places that are costly to visit. But worth it!
    A picture of the rates for Viggo, Copenhagen’s Uber alternative.

    If you want to travel with the environment in mind, Viggo is the perfect company. Personally, I can see them expanding outside of Scandinavia in the near future.

    Another option similar to Uber in Copenhagen is Taxa 4×35. The “preferred taxi company in Copenhagen” is definitely a fair phrase for them to use.

    During my 3 days in Copenhagen, I definitely saw the 4×35 cars the most. The taxi firm started as a regular firm but grew to have an app similar in functionality to Uber.

    It’s really easy to book a ride, you just follow the same steps as normal by putting in where you want to go, when you want to go and where you want picked up, and it’ll give you a price.

    Taxa 4×35 emailed me to let me know that they also aim to go 100% electric by 2025, with around half of their current fleet being zero-emission taxis.
    A picture of the rates for Taxa 4x35, another Uber Copenhagen alternative.

    As you can see, the prices of Viggo and Taxa 4×35 are pretty similar, so it’s a personal preference of who you wish to use in Copenhagen.

    Both companies provide a great experience. Like the rest of Copenhagen, the rides are efficient but laid-back.

    Also- if you are wondering how safe ride sharing is in Copenhagen, Copenhagen is safe 100%. It’s actually the safest city I have ever visited and one of the safest in the entire world.

    So there are two very strong options that replace Uber in Copenhagen: Viggo and Taxa 4×35.

    Even though Uber doesn’t operate in Denmark, the Copenhageners aren’t short of ride-hailing apps, that’s for sure.
    Transportation Options in Copenhagen

    If you decide not to use one of the two ride-hailing apps offered above, you may wonder what your other options for getting around Copenhagen are. There are 5 main options to choose from.

    Bus
    Walking
    Cycling
    Car Rental
    Harbour bus

    When you get to Copenhagen, you will quickly see that all the locals get around the city by cycling. Copenhagen is one of the world’s most cycle-friendly cities after all.

    Side note, taking a bike tour of Copenhagen is actually one of the best ways to see the city’s main sights.
    A picture of people cycling in Copenhagen.
    This article contains affiliate links. If you make a purchase using one of these links, I earn a small commission at no extra cost to you. It helps me to keep my site up and running! Read my disclaimer for more information.

    The public transport in Copenhagen is very reliable, prompt and affordable. So you can be sure that if you choose to use it, you will easily get from A to B.

    Public transport is also included in your Copenhagen Card! It’s one of the reasons I suggest buying the card in my Copenhagen Card review.

    And if you were wondering, the harbour buses are buses that go through Copenhagen’s harbour and canals to get you from A to B via the water. It’s a pretty cool experience! If you’re visiting Copenhagen on a budget, it’s a cheeky way to get a quick canal tour rather than paying for a proper tour.

    Thankfully, Copenhagen is an easy city to navigate and get around, and there are lots of options to do so.
    FAQs

    Below are some questions related to “Is there Uber in Copenhagen?” along with my answers.
    Is there a taxi app in Copenhagen?

    Yes, there is the Taxa 4×35 app which allows you to book a taxi on their app. Another app is the Viggo app which is a ride-hailing app using 100% zero-emission cars.
    What is Denmark version of Uber?

    There are two options to choose from as the equivalent of Uber in Denmark: Taxa 4×35 which is the main taxi firm in Copenhagen who have an app. Or Viggo, a ride-hailing company that only uses zero-emission cars for your journeys.
    Why is Uber banned in Denmark?

    Uber withdrew from operating in Denmark as new taxi laws required all taxis to have fare meters, video surveillance and seat sensors. Shortly after this law was introduced, the ride-hailing service pulled out of Denmark.
    Is there Uber Eats in Copenhagen?

    Yes, even though there are no Uber rides in Copenhagen as the service is outlawed, you can still avail of fast food delivery using the Uber Eats app.
    Conclusion

    And there you have it, a complete guide to “Is there Uber in Copenhagen?“.

    Remember, the answer is unfortunately no.

    But there are other ride-hailing apps like Taxa 4×35 and Viggo.

    And of course, the other transport options too.

    However you choose to get around Copenhagen, I hope you have a great trip even though Copenhagen has no Uber! 🙂

    Now that you know there is no Uber in the city, you can start planning other aspects of your trip. I recommend starting with how to get from Copenhagen airport to the city.

    Read more about Copenhagen:

    Is Copenhagen Worth Visiting? Things To Do & Reasons To Visit
    How Many Days In Copenhagen Is Enough?
    Copenhagen In January: Ultimate Guide & Travel Tips
    Does it snow in Copenhagen? Copenhagen in Winter
    Copenhagen Solo Travel: Ultimate Guide
    How to say Copenhagen in Danish
    Copenhagen to Legoland: Ultimate Guide

    Josh Band

    Josh Band is the founder of A Backpacker’s World. He is a full-time traveller currently on a mission to visit every country in the world. As a full-time traveller, Josh knows exactly how to make the most of any trip and shares these tips with his readers. Josh mostly travels as a backpacker on a budget, so he is also an expert when it comes to getting the most of your money while travelling.

    Who I am
    A young man with a short brown haircut and a smile stands in Amsterdam in front of a scenic canal, trees, and a clear sky, wearing a casual light blue t-shirt and carrying a dark shoulder bag.

    Hey! My name is Josh, I’m 20 years old and I travel full-time on a budget as well as run this travel blog providing tips and tricks for how you can make the most of your money while travelling.

    I’m on a mission to visit every country in the world and so far, I’ve visited 26 countries and I’m so happy to be able to say that I help tens of thousands of people save money on travel each month. Learn more about me by clicking here.
    Text saying “Follow my socials” with the Instagram, TikTok and YouTube logos. If you click the image it brings you to my social page.

    #Dänemark #Kopenhagen #Uber #Taxi

  • Fin de vie : Entretien avec François Guillemot et Bertrand Riff sur Radio Campus Lille !

    Ce Samedi 13 Avril, une heure avec l’AMD. Pour écouter l’émission en mp3, LE LIEN : https://www-radio-campus.univ-lille1.fr/ArchivesN/LibrePensee/LP240413.mp3

    La fin de vie. C’est un sujet qui fait débat en France en ce moment. La convention citoyenne sur la fin de vie a rendu ses conclusions après 27 jours de débats et d’entretiens avec une soixantaine spécialistes. Dans leur rapport, les citoyens tirés au sort déclarent : « Après en avoir largement débattu, la majorité de la Convention s’est prononcée en faveur d’une ouverture à l’aide active à mourir. »

    Si en France l’aide active à mourir n’est pas encore possible, elle l’est par contre dans un pays tout proche : la Belgique. Pour aider les Français qui souhaitent en bénéficier, l’Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité (ADMD) propose son aide. Elle dispose d’un local à Lille (Nord), à moins d’une heure de la Belgique. A Lille, c’est Monique et le docteur François Guillemot qui s’occupent des personnes et les accompagnent.

    La suite : https://actu.fr/hauts-de-france/lille_59350/depuis-lille-ils-accompagnent-des-patients-en-belgique-pour-leur-fin-de-vie_589

    Source : http://federations.fnlp.fr/spip.php?article2296

    #AMD #mort #fin_de_vie #aide_à_mourir #aide_active_à_mourir #handicap #Belgique #Santé #liberté #décès #santé #mort #mort_choisie #acharnement_thérapeutique #AMM #souffrances #femmes #radio #Hôpital #soins_palliatifs

  • « Pressentiments, sentiments et ressentiments antifrançais : itinéraire
    d’un passé qui ne passe pas »
    El Hadj Souleymane Gassama (Elgas) - Journaliste, docteur en sociologie et chercheur associé à l’IRIS.
    Extraits de la revue de l’IRIS - printemps 2024
    https://drive.google.com/file/d/19fofUU-lfVozuoB4TXUnzNcXISaoK4DB/view


    #françafrique #décolonisation #antifrançais

  • Le Parlement européen valide le pacte sur la migration et l’asile
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/04/10/le-parlement-europeen-valide-le-pacte-sur-la-migration-et-l-asile_6227089_32

    Le Parlement européen valide le pacte sur la migration et l’asile
    Après neuf ans de négociations, les eurodéputés ont adopté définitivement, mercredi, un ensemble de textes qui doivent harmoniser les procédures d’accueil des migrants.
    Par Philippe Jacqué (Bruxelles, bureau européen)
    Certains convoquent l’histoire, d’autres espèrent enfin passer à autre chose. Mercredi 10 avril, le Parlement européen a validé, quatre mois après les Etats membres, la dizaine de règlements et directives qui composent le pacte sur la migration et l’asile. Le vote a été un peu moins serré qu’attendu sur les textes les plus controversés, passant avec une trentaine de voix de majorité. Des militants de défense des droits de l’homme ont interrompu le vote pendant quelques minutes, chantant « The pact kills, vote no ! » (« Le pacte tue, votez non »).
    Neuf ans après l’arrivée de deux millions de réfugiés syriens en Europe et après plusieurs tentatives de réforme afin d’harmoniser les politiques nationales d’accueil des migrants, les Vingt-Sept ont fini par trouver un compromis sur un sujet qui a alimenté les tensions entre eux depuis des années. Ils espèrent désormais que les nouvelles règles communes permettront de mieux traiter l’arrivée des migrants aux frontières de l’Europe. En 2023, quelque 380 000 personnes ont tenté d’entrer de manière irrégulière sur le territoire européen, en hausse de 17 % par rapport à 2022.
    « C’est un énorme pas en avant pour l’Europe », a salué Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission européenne. « Ce pacte est équilibré, avec des règles plus strictes contre ceux qui abusent du système, et une attention aux plus vulnérables », a-t-elle ajouté après le vote.
    « C’est un moment de fierté, confie Ylva Johansson, la commissaire aux affaires intérieures, qui a porté le projet depuis quatre ans et demi. Ce texte fera une importante différence par rapport à la manière dont on gère aujourd’hui l’immigration irrégulière. Nous le ferons de manière ordonnée. D’un côté, nous protégerons nos frontières, tout en donnant de l’autre une protection aux personnes qui fuient la guerre et les persécutions. »
    Les Etats devront mettre en place l’enregistrement, le filtrage (y compris un examen de santé) et des procédures accélérées de demande d’asile aux frontières pour les demandeurs manifestement non éligibles à un statut de réfugié. Les pays auront six semaines pour analyser leur demande. Si celle-ci est refusée, les Etats pourront les renvoyer dans un délai de six à dix semaines. En cas de hausse soudaine de la pression migratoire, des mécanismes de solidarité entre Etats membres seront activés afin de soulager les pays en première ligne.
    Si cette série de textes a trouvé une majorité au Conseil et au Parlement – une partie de la gauche et l’extrême droite ont voté contre ou se sont abstenues, la première les jugeant trop fermes, la seconde trop laxistes –, elle est néanmoins perçue comme un durcissement sans précédent de la gestion migratoire en Europe.
    Alors qu’une grande partie des dirigeants européens saluent ce vote, d’autres acteurs la condamnent. Quelque 161 ONG de défense des droits humains ou d’aide aux réfugiés, ainsi que des spécialistes travaillant sur le sujet, appelaient au rejet du texte. Pour eux, « l’introduction de procédures frontalières obligatoires sera dangereuse, inhumaine, irréalisable et inefficace ».
    De manière générale, tous veulent néanmoins passer désormais à d’autres étapes. « La critique du pacte est légitime, mais il pose un certain nombre de règles communes. Ce n’est pas une fin en soi, mais un point de départ vers autre chose », juge Camille Le Coz, du Migration Policy Institute à Bruxelles. « Le seul côté positif de ce vote qui va rendre encore plus difficile l’accès à la protection européenne pour les réfugiés, note Catherine Woollard, du Conseil européen pour les réfugiés et les exilés, c’est que nous allons enfin pouvoir passer à autre chose. »
    Théoriquement, les Etats membres devront appliquer les nouvelles règles au plus tard en 2026. « Cela ira plus vite, pronostique Mme Johansson. La Commission va proposer en juin, trois mois avant le délai prévu, un plan d’application afin d’accélérer sa mise en œuvre. » Des Etats ont déjà mis en place certains éléments de la réforme, comme l’Espagne sur l’enregistrement des migrants arrivant aux îles Canaries, ou la Bulgarie et l’Italie sur les procédures organisées directement à la frontière.
    « Le pacte n’aura pas d’effet à court terme, estime Mme Le Coz. Cela ne va pas modifier la situation aux frontières de l’Europe. » Il est donc nécessaire de traiter de nouveaux sujets au niveau européen comme l’amélioration des retours, qui restent très faibles. Seules 21 % des personnes déboutées du droit d’asile rentrent dans leur pays. De même, l’harmonisation des voies légales d’entrée en Europe et des procédures d’asile est désormais sur la table.
    « La question des voies légales est, et doit rester, une compétence nationale, assure Mme Johansson. Nous devons mieux coopérer entre Etats, pour préparer et former en amont, dans leur pays, les personnes que nous souhaitons faire venir légalement en Europe. Je vois beaucoup de potentiel pour affiner les recrutements de cette manière, sans changer la législation européenne. » Une tâche qui est par définition extrêmement lourde.
    Sur l’asile, également du ressort exclusif de chaque Etat, l’Agence de l’Union européenne (UE) pour l’asile s’efforce d’harmoniser, par le biais de séminaires entre magistrats, la lecture du droit pour permettre une application si ce n’est uniforme, au moins cohérente dans l’ensemble de l’Europe. Par ailleurs, l’actuelle Commission a multiplié les accords avec les pays du pourtour méditerranéen et africains (Tunisie, Egypte, Mauritanie) afin que ces derniers bloquent les départs des migrants, en échange d’aides au développement économique.
    L’adoption de la réforme en pleine campagne pour les élections européennes, organisées du 6 au 9 juin, peut-elle réduire l’influence des partis d’extrême droite, qui surfent sur cette thématique ? « En adoptant le pacte, l’Europe démontre que ce sujet peut être géré de manière ordonnée, cela enlève des arguments aux partis extrémistes », juge Mme Johansson. Avant même l’adoption du pacte, des partis ont proposé pendant la campagne d’aller plus loin. Alors que le Parti populaire européen évoque dans son manifeste la possibilité d’externaliser dans des Etats tiers jugés « sûrs » toute la procédure d’asile, à l’image de ce que le Royaume-Uni tente de mettre en place avec le Rwanda, d’autres insistent davantage sur la création de voies de migration légales cohérentes et harmonisées au niveau européen.
    Les sociaux-démocrates veulent « travailler sur les voies légales, assure Nicolas Schmit, la tête de liste des socialistes européens. Je note que les pays qui sont les plus hostiles, qui essayent d’utiliser le plus ce thème de l’immigration, eux-mêmes organisent de l’immigration en provenance de pays tiers, que ce soit la Hongrie ou l’Italie ». L’Italie a décidé d’ouvrir ses portes à près de 500 000 travailleurs recrutés hors de l’UE, tandis que la Hongrie fait venir des travailleurs de l’autre bout du monde.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#UE#pacte#asile#immigration#paystiers#frontiere#droit#protection

  • Les territoires des émeutes
    https://laviedesidees.fr/Les-territoires-des-emeutes

    Le haut niveau de #ségrégation urbaine constitue le meilleur prédicteur des violences. La différence la plus marquante entre 2023 et 2005 est l’entrée en scène des villes petites et moyennes, où les adolescents de cités d’habitat social s’identifient aux jeunes des banlieues de grandes métropoles.

    #Société #jeunesse #banlieue #révolte #urbanisme #gilets_jaunes
    https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20240412_emeutes.pdf

    • Conclusion

      Le retour sur les émeutes de #2005 a permis de mettre en évidence à la fois des continuités et des changements par rapport à celles de #2023. Si de façon générale, les communes les plus défavorisées ont de plus fortes probabilités de connaître des émeutes, c’est surtout la ségrégation des situations sociales les plus précaires et des immigrés dans des quartiers spécifiques (#QPV) qui apparaît comme un élément de contexte crucial. À profil social et urbain équivalent, avoir un QPV augmente de façon très significative la probabilité de connaître des émeutes. De plus, cette #ségrégation_sociale et ethnique s’accompagne d’une forte #ségrégation_scolaire dont nous avons pu mesurer également l’impact : plus elle est importante, plus les émeutes sont intenses et violentes.

      Les quartiers en question sont ceux directement concernés par la #politique_de_la_ville (QPV, #PNRU, #NPNRU) depuis plusieurs décennies. Si des changements sont indiscutables sur le plan de l’amélioration du cadre de vie des habitants et plus particulièrement des #conditions_de_logement, un grand nombre de ces quartiers continuent de concentrer une large part de la jeunesse populaire d’origine immigrée, celle la plus touchée par la #relégation, les #discriminations et les #violences_policières, et donc celle aussi la plus concernée par les émeutes. Si la #mixité_sociale et ethnique s’est sensiblement améliorée dans certains quartiers, d’autres demeurent des espaces de très forte #homogénéité_sociale et ethnique, que l’on retrouve dans les #écoles et les #collèges. Ceux où les interventions de l’#ANRU ont été moins intenses ont même vu le nombre de ménages pauvres augmenter. En Île-de-France, la quasi-totalité des communes qui avaient connu des émeutes en 2005, pourtant concernées par la politique de la ville, en ont connu également en 2023.

      Notre approche socio-territoriale met d’autant plus en évidence les limites d’une analyse au niveau national, que les émeutes de 2023 se sont diffusées dans un plus grand nombre de petites villes et villes moyennes auparavant moins touchées par ces événements. Cette plus grande diversité territoriale est frappante lorsque l’on compare les banlieues des très grandes métropoles, à commencer par les banlieues parisiennes, aux #petites_villes et #villes_moyennes. Le poids du #logement_social, de l’immigration, la suroccupation des logements, le niveau de #pauvreté, mais aussi la façon dont ces dimensions se rattachent aux #familles_monoparentales et nombreuses, renvoient à des réalités différentes. Pourtant, dans tous les cas, la ségrégation joue un rôle déterminant.

      Cette approche contextuelle ne suffit pas à expliquer l’ensemble des mécanismes sociaux à l’œuvre et ce travail devra être complété à la fois par des analyses plus fouillées et qualitatives, ciblées sur les réseaux sociaux, la police et les profils des protagonistes, mais aussi des études de cas renvoyant aux différentes configurations socio-territoriales. Des études qualitatives locales devraient permettre de mieux comprendre comment, dans les différents contextes, les dimensions sociales et ethno-raciales interagissent lors des émeutes. Cela permettrait par exemple de mieux saisir l’importance de la mémoire des émeutes dans les quartiers populaires des banlieues des grandes métropoles, sa transmission et le rôle des réseaux militants et associatifs. Dans le cas des petites villes et des villes moyennes, la comparaison avec le mouvement des Gilets jaunes apporte un éclairage particulièrement intéressant sur l’intersection et la différenciation des formes que peuvent prendre la colère sociale et le ressentiment.

      #émeutes #violence #villes #urban_matter #violences_urbaines #banlieues #ségrégation_urbaine #violences #statistiques #chiffres

  • Der Postillon präsentiert DeppL Translate – das schlechteste KI-Übersetzungstool der Welt!
    https://www.der-postillon.com/2023/10/deppl-translate-ki.html

    Pour des traductions systématiquement hilarantes.

    In schwierigen Zeiten wie diesen ist Völkerverständigung wichtiger denn je! Aus diesem Grund hat der Postillon seine weltberühmte KI-Taskforce (bekannt aus DeppGPT und Grünen-Bashing-Überleitungsgenerator) aktiviert und mit DeppL Translate ein KI-Übersetzungstool entwickeln lassen, das seinesgleichen sucht.

    Es dürfte sich von selbst verstehen, dass es sich um das womöglich unpräziseste Übersetzungstool aller Zeiten handelt. Hier können Sie DeppL exklusiv testen und die schönsten Übersetzungen mit anderen teilen (#DeppL):

    #traduction #wtf

    • Wir haben 1000 Arbeiter damit beauftragt, den höchsten Turm der Welt zu bauen. Anschließend haben wir ihren Sprach-Output von einer künstlichen Intelligenz analysieren lassen, die ursprünglich programmiert worden war, um Gulaschrezepte zu entwickeln. Die Ergebnisse waren erstaunlich inkorrekt und unnütz – DeppL war geboren.

       :-))

  • « Notre travail, c’est du bidouillage » : la #débrouille impossible pour sauver l’#école_publique | #StreetPress

    https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1712654163-travail-bidouillage-debrouille-impossible-sauver-ecole

    #Profs absents et jamais remplacés
    « On a demandé à des #AESH de repeindre le mur du préau de l’école ! » C’était il y a longtemps, mais Florence s’en souvient très bien. « Ça m’a marquée. » Un exemple qui illustre le #bricolage permanent imposé au #personnel de l’#école. « Dans certains collèges du 93, il n’y a pas assez de #chaises pour les #élèves », lâche Yuna, professeur en école maternelle à Paris. À l’image du collège Travail Langevin à Bagnolet, dont StreetPress racontait récemment les galères. Les #murs des #locaux sont moisis et laissent passer la pluie. Il manque une #infirmière_scolaire et une #assistante_sociale.

    #lucie_inland

  • Politiques migratoires : « Des dispositifs mortels, dont l’effet est de tuer pour dissuader »
    https://migreurop.org/article3257.html

    Les textes composant le nouveau pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile sont votés par les euro-député·e·s ce 10 avril 2024 à Bruxelles. Retrouvez l’émission À l’air libre de Médiapart, par Nejma Brahim avec la participation de : Sophie-Anne Bisiaux, membre et co-présidente du réseau Migreurop, spécialiste des questions liées à l’externalisation, notamment en Afrique du Nord ; Rima Hassan, candidate LFI aux élections européennes, juriste et fondatrice de l’Observatoire des camps de réfugiés ; Sophie (...) #Décryptages

    https://www.mediapart.fr/studio/videos/emissions/l-air-libre

  • Les gardiens de prison n’ont pas réussi à sauver Brian Dorsey, exécuté au Missouri - Le Temps
    https://www.letemps.ch/monde/ameriques/les-gardiens-de-prison-n-ont-pas-reussi-a-sauver-brian-dorsey-execute-au-mis

    La particularité de ce cas ? Environ 70 de ses gardiens de prison ont imploré la clémence pour cet homme qui a reconnu le meurtre, le 23 décembre 2006, de sa cousine Sarah Bonnie et de son mari Ben, chez qui il était hébergé pour échapper à des trafiquants de drogue qui lui réclamaient de l’argent. Jade, la fille de 4 ans du couple, qui dormait dans une autre chambre, avait été épargnée. « C’est la première fois que je vois un tel soutien pour la clémence de la part d’employés pénitentiaires en activité ou à la retraite », commente Robin Maher, directrice du Death Penalty Information Center, une ONG qui documente l’usage de la peine de mort aux Etats-Unis et milite pour son abolition.

    pour info voici les crimes qui lui étaient reprochés :

    Brian Dorsey a assassiné sa cousine, Sarah Bonnie, et son mari, Ben Bonnie, au milieu de la nuit après qu’ils l’aient sauvé des trafiquants de drogue qui tentaient de recouvrer des dettes dans son appartement plus tôt dans la journée. Après les avoir assassinés, Brian Dorsey a violé le cadavre de Sarah alors que la fille de quatre ans des Bonnie, désormais orpheline, dormait dans une autre pièce.

    #détenu_modèle

  • Halten und Parken – was ist erlaubt, was ist verboten?
    https://taxi-times.com/halten-und-parken-was-ist-erlaubt-was-ist-verboten

    6.3.2024 von Remmer Witte - Taxi- und Mietwagenchauffeure bewegen sich alltäglich in einer Grauzone, denn der Vorgang des Be- und Entladens von Fahrgästen oder Kuriergut erfordert oft doch noch einen Moment länger.

    Eigentlich ist das Be- und Entladen zwar klassisch ein Halte- und kein Parkvorgang, doch wenn die angebotene Dienstleistung länger dauert, klebt manchmal ruckzuck ein Knöllchen hinterm Scheibenwischer. Die gute Nachricht zum Thema: Die Protagonisten des mobilsten Gewerbes der Welt dürfen hier manchmal doch noch einen Tick mehr als die Normalsterblichen. Was geht also, was definitiv nicht?

    Im Volksmund und auch nach der Vorgehensweise vieler Ordnungskräfte gibt es eigentlich nur eine Regel: Steht ein Auto am Fahrbahnrand, so hält es maximal drei Minuten, danach parkt es. Aus Sicht der Ordnungsbehörden sind solch klare Regelungen notwendig, denn ansonsten verkäme die Kommunikation zwischen Knöllchengeber und Knöllchennehmer zum Diskutierclub. Aber – wir sind in Deutschland – eigentlich ist es viel komplexer, und gleichzeitig schwindet die Toleranz gegenüber Falschparkern immer mehr. Also sollten sich gerade „Berufshalter“ wie Taxi- und Mietwagenfahrer ganz genau mit den diesbezüglichen Regeln auskennen.

    Dies gilt besonders, da Parkverstöße seit November 2021 deutlich schärfer bestraft werden können und sogar zu Punkten in Flensburg führen. Dies gilt zwar nur für Verstöße, die die Sicherheit des Straßenverkehrs gefährden, aber dazu gehört auch die Gefährdung von Fußgängern und Radfahrern. Der Bußgeldkatalog widmet der Aufstellung der Bußgelder für falsches Halten und Parken etliche Seiten, deswegen hier nur ein Verweis.

    Zunächst ist deswegen die Definition des Haltens notwendig: Als Halten bezeichnet man eine kurze, freiwillige Unterbrechung der Fahrt. Freiwillig bedeutet, dass diese nicht durch die Verkehrslage, Schilder, Ampeln oder Polizisten verursacht wird. Wer in einem Stau oder vor einer roten Ampel anhält, hält also nicht, sondern wartet. Und auch wer wegen einer Panne nicht weiterfahren kann, hält nicht, sondern bleibt liegen. Das freiwillige Halten ist darüber hinaus an engen und an unübersichtlichen Straßenstellen, im Bereich von scharfen Kurven, auf Einfädelungs- und auf Ausfädelungsstreifen, auf Bahnübergängen und vor und in Feuerwehrzufahrten verboten, auch wenn dies nicht explizit so ausgeschildert ist. Auf Geh- und Radwegen sowie den durch eine durchgezogene Linie abgeteilten Radfahrstreifen auf der Fahrbahn dürfen Autos ebenfalls nicht halten.

    Gemäß Straßenverkehrsordnung (StVO) gibt es für die verbleibenden Flächen das generelle Halteverbot, Schild Nr. 283, landläufig als Parkverbot bezeichnet, und das eingeschränkte Halteverbot, welches das Halten zum Zweck des Be- und Entladens gestattet, ggf. ausgewiesen durch Schild Nr. 286. Weiter definiert die StVO dann: Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf nicht länger als drei Minuten auf der Fahrbahn halten, ausgenommen zum Ein- oder Aussteigen oder zum Be- oder Entladen. Ladegeschäfte müssen ohne Verzögerung durchgeführt werden.

    Wie lange man also freiwillig halten darf, ist gesetzlich nicht klar geregelt, sondern nur der Rechtsprechung zu entnehmen. Nach der Rechtsprechung soll z. B. das Warten auf einen Fahrgast über drei Minuten hinaus zulässig sein, wenn nach der mit diesem Fahrgast getroffenen Vereinbarung zu erwarten ist, dass er in Kürze erscheint. Selbst, wenn der Fahrgast dann nicht erscheint, soll kein Verstoß vorliegen. Entscheidend ist letztendlich ausschließlich die Zweckbestimmung des Haltens, wobei es nicht darauf ankommt, ob dieser Zweck auch tatsächlich erreicht wird (Bayer. Oberstes Landesgericht, DAR 1979, 198-199 – hier ging es um ein Halten von ca. fünf bis sechs Minuten, ohne dass die Ehefrau des Fahrers am verabredeten Ort erschien).

    Ebenso soll das Halten über drei Minuten hinaus zulässig sein, wenn zum Aussteigenlassen noch unvermeidbare Nebenverrichtungen gehören, z. B. das Verbringen eines Kindes in den Kindergarten. (KG Berlin VRS 59, 230 – 233) Aber: Das Mitgehen des Fahrers zum Bahnhof ist nach OLG Karlsruhe z. B. nicht zulässig. Außerdem zu beachten ist, dass ein Halten zum Zweck des Be- oder Entladens grundsätzlich nur zulässig ist bei Gegenständen von einiger Größe oder einigem Gewicht. Ein Tragen über eine längere Strecke darf daher nicht zumutbar sein. (OLG Karlsruhe VM 75, 21 KG VRS 33, 314). Im geschäftlichen Lieferverkehr ist aber auch das Be- oder Entladen leichterer Gegenstände zulässig. Allgemeingültige Aussagen dazu, ob gehalten oder geparkt wird, können somit also gar nicht getroffenen werden, da es letztlich immer um Einzelfälle geht. Allgemein gilt aber: Je stärker der übrige Verkehr durch das haltende Fahrzeug beeinträchtigt ist, desto eher ist vom Fahrzeugführer zu verlangen, dass er von einem (weiteren) Halten Abstand nimmt.

    Aber wo sind die Lücken für das mobile Gewerbe? Taxen dürfen gemäß StVO in zweiter Reihe halten, wenn die Verkehrslage es zulässt, denn sie dürfen neben anderen Fahrzeugen, die auf dem Seitenstreifen oder am rechten Fahrbahnrand halten oder parken, Fahrgäste ein- oder aussteigen lassen. Hier ist allerdings zu beachten, dass das Fahrzeug nicht verlassen werden darf und die Regelung auch nicht für Mietwagen, sondern explizit nur für Taxen gilt. Des Weiteren finden sich Hinweise auf minimale Sonderrechte in der Rechtsprechung: „Der Vorgang des Parkens zeichnet sich durch das Halten und Verlassen eines Fahrzeugs auf unbestimmte Zeit aus. Dieser kann neben der Handlung des Ein- und Aussteigens auch geringe Nebenverrichtungen, so z. B. das Warten auf Fahrgäste umfassen, solange dies nicht länger als wenige Minuten dauert. Die Benachrichtigung sofort zum Einsteigen bereiter Fahrgäste ist als Halte- und nicht als Parkvorgang zu werten. Ebenso sind Zimmernachfragen oder der Vorgang des Gepäckausladens zu werten. Ist mit dem Erscheinen des Fahrgastes in Kürze zu rechnen, so darf das Warten auf ihn über drei Minuten hinaus – auch zum Abholen aus einer Wohnung – ausgedehnt werden, ohne dass geparkt wird. (OLG Hamm VRS 36, 77, OLG Frankfurt NJW 52, 675, Bayrisches OLG VRS 57, 140, Kommentierung bei Hentschel, Straßenverkehrsrecht, 38. Auflage).“

    Wer solche Möglichkeiten ausreizen will, sollte aber immer darauf achten, dies so unauffällig und elegant wie möglich zu bewerkstelligen. Denn wer hier auffällt oder sich rechthaberisch verhält, der wird schnell zur Ordnung gerufen werden. Wer also nur dort hält, wo das Halten nicht verboten ist, der darf dort auch das Fahrzeug verlassen, um sich kurz an der Hotelrezeption, in der Arztpraxis oder der Krankenhausinformation zu melden oder das Kuriergut abzugeben, selbst, wenn dies vielleicht sechs Minuten dauert (danach dürfte es kritisch werden). Die Unterstützung von Fahrgästen, insbesondere Patienten, wird jedoch schnell zum Risiko, solange man sich nicht mehr im direkten Sichtbereich des Fahrzeugs aufhält. Dafür darf man beim Halten zum Be- und Entladen in engen Seitenstraßen aber auch mal ganz kurz den Verkehr blockieren, eine Einfahrt blockieren oder an größeren Straßen in zweiter Reihe halten, ohne dass gleich ein Ticket riskiert wird, auch wenn andere Verkehrssteilnehmer nicht begeistert sein werden. rw

    #Deutschland #Taxi #Recht #Rechtsprechung #Verkehr #StVO #Halten #Parken

  • Pour les tenants du projet de réforme, « les allocations-chômage sont les ennemis de l’emploi et des politiques de remise en activité des chômeurs »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/04/10/pour-les-tenants-du-projet-de-reforme-les-allocations-chomage-sont-les-ennem

    0n peine à comprendre le bien-fondé d’une nouvelle #réforme de l’#assurance-chômage visant à durcir les conditions d’indemnisation des #chômeurs, doctrine dont ce double mandat présidentiel se sera fait une spécialité. Les motivations pour justifier ces coups de canif portés à l’Unédic ont varié au fil du temps.

    Ce fut l’argument financier de résorption de la #dette : s’il s’agit d’en réduire le poids, il aurait été utile que l’Etat en donnât l’exemple en remboursant à l’institution paritaire ce qu’il lui doit : le financement du chômage partiel durant la crise sanitaire et l’équivalent des cotisations sociales perdues du fait de la politique d’allégement des charges sociales conduite depuis des années par ce gouvernement et ceux qui l’ont précédé.

    Indemniser, placer, former

    L’autre argument avancé consiste à justifier cette réforme au nom du #travail avec le postulat implicite que les allocations-chômage, leur montant, leur durée sont les ennemis de l’emploi et des politiques de remise en activité des chômeurs, les fameuses politiques dites « actives ».
    Et c’est sur ce point de l’argumentation que le bât blesse lourdement, et pour plusieurs raisons. Car depuis la création des premières formes d’indemnisation des chômeurs à la création de l’Unédic en 1958, puis de celle de l’Agence nationale pour l’emploi (ANPE) en 1967 (aujourd’hui France Travail), l’indemnisation des chômeurs et leur placement sur le marché du travail ne faisaient qu’un seul et même binôme.

    Ce fut tout le sens de la mise en place d’un service public de l’emploi dans ces années-là, tout ce dont le rapport Ortoli, rédigé par un certain Jacques Delors (1925-2023), appelait de ses vœux en 1963 : mettre en place une grande politique d’infrastructure publique de l’emploi au service de la mobilité professionnelle des actifs. Pour cela il fallait avant toute chose indemniser correctement les chômeurs (Unédic), les accompagner pour les placer (ANPE) avec le recours éventuel de la formation professionnelle (Association pour la formation professionnelle des adultes). L’indemnisation, au cœur des réformes aujourd’hui, constituait l’indispensable maillon et le levier principal de ces politiques actives.

    Plus récemment, un inspecteur de l’inspection générale des affaires sociales (IGAS), Jean-Marc Boulanger, chargé par le gouvernement en 2008 d’une mission de préfiguration pour la création de Pôle emploi, présentait l’indemnisation des chômeurs comme la rémunération du travail de recherche d’emploi des chômeurs. Il rappelait, ce que l’actuel gouvernement semble ignorer, que « l’indemnisation et le placement via une politique d’intermédiation active constituaient les deux leviers à mettre en une même main pour donner corps à la volonté de donner toute sa puissance à la stratégie de sécurité des parcours dans un marché de l’emploi souple et dynamique ».

    Perte en puissance inquiétante

    Si l’indemnisation est la condition d’une politique active de l’emploi, force est de constater que la perte en puissance de ce levier, pour soutenir le revenu de remplacement des chômeurs et l’adosser à une aide active au retour à l’emploi, est pour le moins inquiétante. En effet, au cours de l’année 2023 ce sont moins de 40 % des demandeurs d’emploi qui sont couverts par le régime d’assurance-chômage. Dans ces conditions il va devenir de plus en plus difficile d’utiliser l’indemnisation comme le support d’une politique d’accompagnement et d’activation des demandeurs d’emploi.

    Pour les 60 % de chômeurs non indemnisés le risque est d’abandonner le chemin de France Travail, de renoncer à être accompagnés par ses services pour privilégier la recherche de petits boulots, souvent précaires, et subvenir ainsi à leurs besoins.

    Pour celles et ceux des chômeurs qui choisiraient de maintenir leur inscription à France Travail, ils risquent, eux, de bénéficier d’un accompagnement bien moins intensif et soutenu que les demandeurs indemnisés puisque la doxa de l’équilibre budgétaire n’a rien à gagner financièrement de leur retour à l’emploi. Pour le dire dans le jargon des politiques de l’emploi : rien ne sert de les activer, puisqu’il n’y a aucune dépense passive (l’allocation-chômage) à récupérer.

    Ils ne sont pas rares, les demandeurs d’emploi non indemnisés, qui ont le sentiment à tort ou à raison que l’accompagnement qu’ils reçoivent de #France_Travail est plus light que pour les autres chômeurs encore indemnisés. C’est du reste une norme de comportement qu’ils ont eux-mêmes intégrée provoquant un même retrait vis-à-vis de leur investissement dans la recherche d’emploi.

    Course contre la montre

    Quant aux chômeurs indemnisés qui verraient leur période d’indemnisation ramenée à douze mois maximum si cette réforme devait être adoptée, il y a fort à parier que ce sera la course contre la montre pour parvenir à être pleinement accompagné dans un laps de temps aussi court.
    Car du côté de France Travail, il faudra, pour aligner l’accompagnement sur ce timing, revoir singulièrement le processus de prise en charge des demandeurs d’emploi. Conseillers comme demandeurs d’emploi font souvent le même constat d’un manque de réactivité de l’institution à la demande des usagers. Il y a d’abord le temps de la demande d’indemnisation, puis celui de l’entretien de situation pour orienter le chômeur vers la modalité d’accompagnement la plus adaptée à son profil, puis enfin la rencontre avec son conseiller qui va l’accompagner.

    Les délais d’entrée dans les prestations se comptent souvent en semaines pouvant entraîner le renoncement à suivre la prestation en question. Mais c’est surtout sur le volet de la formation professionnelle que les délais d’entrée dans les stages sont les plus longs même si, sous l’effet du plan d’investissement dans les compétences adopté en 2018, ces délais se sont légèrement réduits. Globalement, il faut encore attendre un bon trimestre pour pouvoir intégrer la formation voulue en espérant que l’on soit indemnisé suffisamment longtemps pour pouvoir y faire face.
    Voilà donc tout l’enjeu de la période actuelle : faire du triptyque indemnisation/formation/placement une seule et même politique pour répondre aux enjeux à venir dans le champ des multiples transitions (écologiques, numériques…) qui nous attendent. Il est temps que l’idéologie cède le pas à la raison.

    Carole Tuchszirer est chercheuse au Conservatoire national des arts et métiers/Centre d’études de l’emploi et du travail (CNAM/CEET).

    • La « classe moyenne » qui s’en prend aux « chômeurs » ne s’en prend qu’à elle-même, Mathieu Grégoire, Sociologue, enseignant-chercheur à l’université Paris-Nanterre (IDHES)
      04 AVRIL 2024
      https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/mathieu-gregoire/classe-moyenne-sen-prend-aux-chomeurs-ne-sen-prend/00110237

      Pour vous, le RSA, c’est dans douze mois ? Oui : « vous ». C’est à vous que je m’adresse. Vous qui êtes salariés dans le privé (ou allez le devenir). En CDI ou en CDD, peu importe. Vous qui êtes un homme ou une femme. Vous qui êtes ouvrier, employé, technicien, ingénieur, cadre… Vous qui avez 20, 30, 40 ou 50 ans.

      Pour la plupart d’entre vous, le revenu de solidarité active (RSA), dans douze mois, ça ne rentrait pas, objectivement, dans l’univers des possibles. Mais le Premier ministre souhaite que ça le devienne en diminuant la durée maximale des indemnités servies par l’assurance chômage à 12 mois.

  • Taxe « lapin » pour limiter les rendez-vous médicaux non honorés, une fausse bonne idée ?
    https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/le-biais-d-esther-duflo/taxe-lapin-pour-limiter-les-rendez-vous-medicaux-non-honores-une-fausse-

    Nous savons bien que les humains ne sont pas motivés exclusivement par l’argent. C’est d’ailleurs pour avoir démontré l’importance des limites de la rationalité économique que Daniel Kahneman, un psychologue, qui est décédé la semaine dernière, a reçu le prix Nobel en économie. Ses travaux ont ouvert la voie à un nouveau chant de l’économie, l’économie comportementale, qui montre comment prendre en compte la psychologie nous permet de mieux comprendre pourquoi les individus ne se comportent pas toujours d’une manière parfaitement rationnelle.

    Une des leçons de Kahneman, c’est que la manière dont une décision est présentée compte beaucoup dans les décisions que nous prenons, particulièrement quand nous devons décider rapidement (ses idées sont popularisées dans le livre Système 1, système 2, les deux vitesses de la pensée).