• NocoDB | Turns your SQL database into a Nocode platform. Free & Open Source.

    Open Source #Airtable Alternative
    NocoDB is an open source NoCode platform that turns any #database (MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQL Server, SQLite & MariaDB) into a smart #spreadsheet

    – Search, sort, filter, hide columns with uber ease
    – Create Views : Grid, Gallery, Kanban, Gantt, Form
    – Share Views : public & password protected
    – Personal & locked Views
    – Upload images to cells (Works with S3, Minio, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean, Linode, OVH, BackBlaze)
    – Roles : Owner, Creator, Editor, Viewer, Commenter, Custom Roles.
    – Access Control : Fine-grained access control even at database, table & column level.


  • ryangjchandler/orbit: A flat-file database driver for Eloquent.

    Orbit is a flat-file driver for Laravel Eloquent. It allows you to replace your generic #database with real #files that you can manipulate using the methods you’re familiar with.

    Orbit is a driver-based package, making it very easy to change the storage format of your data.

    Out of the box, Orbit provides the following drivers:
    – md -> Orbit\Drivers\Markdown
    – json => Orbit\Drivers\Json
    – yaml => Orbit\Drivers\Yaml
    – md_json => Orbit\Drivers\MarkdownJson

    Orbit comes with convenient #Git integration out of the box. This means that any changes made to your content can be automatically persisted back to your Git repository, keeping everything up-to-date.

    #php #flat_file_database

  • Hosting SQLite databases on Github Pages (or any static file hoster) - Apr 17, 2021

    I was writing a tiny website to display statistics of how much sponsored content a Youtube creator has over time when I noticed that I often write a small tool as a website that queries some data from a database and then displays it in a graph, a table, or similar. But if you want to use a database, you either need to write a backend (which you then need to host and maintain forever) or download the whole dataset into the browser (which is not so great when the dataset is more than 10MB).

    In the past when I’ve used a backend server for these small side projects at some point some external API goes down or a key expires or I forget about the backend and stop paying for whatever VPS it was on. Then when I revisit it years later, I’m annoyed that it’s gone and curse myself for relying on an external service - or on myself caring over a longer period of time.

    Hosting a static website is much easier than a “real” server - there’s many free and reliable options (like GitHub, GitLab Pages, Netlify, etc), and it scales to basically infinity without any effort.

    So I wrote a tool to be able to use a real SQL database in a statically hosted website. Here’s a demo using the World Development Indicators dataset - a dataset with 6 tables and over 8 million rows (670 MiByte total).


    – article https://github.com/phiresky/sql.js-httpvfs
    – lib https://phiresky.github.io/blog/2021/hosting-sqlite-databases-on-github-pages

    #git #database #sql #api

  • Glocal Climate Change

    Global warming is not only about melting icebergs or expanding deserts. It is something which does happen in our backyard as well. Data and estimates on the mean temperatures at the local level indicate that climate change has been affecting almost every corner of Europe, as mean temperatures have increased by more than 2°C in half a century in multiple areas.


    Les données sont présentées au niveau de la commune, ici par exemple Grenoble :

    #carte #cartographie #visualisation #changement_climatique #climat #local #Europe #températures #données #database #statistiques #chiffres #commune

    ping @reka @visionscarto @simplicissimus

  • EU : One step closer to the establishment of the ’#permission-to-travel' scheme

    The Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement on rules governing how the forthcoming #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation System (#ETIAS) will ’talk’ to other migration and policing databases, with the purpose of conducting automated searches on would-be travellers to the EU.

    The ETIAS will mirror systems such as the #ESTA scheme in the USA, and will require that citizens of countries who do not need a #visa to travel to the EU instead apply for a “travel authorisation”.

    As with visas, travel companies will be required to check an individual’s travel authorisation before they board a plane, coach or train, effectively creating a new ’permission-to-travel’ scheme.

    The ETIAS also includes a controversial #profiling and ’watchlist’ system, an aspect not mentioned in the Council’s press release (full-text below).

    The rules on which the Council and Parliament have reached provisional agreement - and which will thus almost certainly be the final text of the legislation - concern how and when the ETIAS can ’talk’ to other EU databases such as #Eurodac (asylum applications), the #Visa_Information_System, or the #Schengen_Information_System.

    Applicants will also be checked against #Europol and #Interpol databases.

    As the press release notes, the ETIAS will also serve as one of the key components of the “interoperability” scheme, which will interconnect numerous EU databases and lead to the creation of a new, biometric ’#Common_Identity_Repository' on up to 300 million non-EU nationals.

    You can find out more about the ETIAS, related changes to the Visa Information System, and the interoperability plans in the Statewatch report Automated Suspicion: https://www.statewatch.org/automated-suspicion-the-eu-s-new-travel-surveillance-initiatives


    The text below is a press release published by the Council of the EU on 18 March 2020: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/18/european-travel-information-and-authorisation-system-etias-council-

    European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS): Council Presidency and European Parliament provisionally agree on rules for accessing relevant databases

    The Council presidency and European Parliament representatives today reached a provisional agreement on the rules connecting the ETIAS central system to the relevant EU databases. The agreed texts will next be submitted to the relevant bodies of the Council and the Parliament for political endorsement and, following this, for their formal adoption.

    The adoption of these rules will be the final legislative step required for the setting up of ETIAS, which is expected to be operational by 2022.

    The introduction of ETIAS aims to improve internal security, prevent illegal immigration, protect public health and reduce delays at the borders by identifying persons who may pose a risk in one of these areas before they arrive at the external borders. ETIAS is also a building bloc of the interoperability between JHA databases, an important political objective of the EU in this area, which is foreseen to be operational by the end of 2023.

    The provisionally agreed rules will allow the ETIAS central system to perform checks against the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Entry/Exit System (EES), Eurodac and the database on criminal records of third country nationals (ECRIS-TCN), as well as on Europol and Interpol data.

    They allow for the connection of the ETIAS central system to these databases and set out the data to be accessed for ETIAS purposes, as well as the conditions and access rights for the ETIAS central unit and the ETIAS national units. Access to the relevant data in these systems will allow authorities to assess the security or immigration risk of applicants and decide whether to issue or refuse a travel authorisation.

    ETIAS is the new EU travel information and authorisation system. It will apply to visa-exempt third country nationals, who will need to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application.

    The information submitted in each application will be automatically processed against EU and relevant Interpol databases to determine whether there are grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. If no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, the travel authorisation will be issued automatically and quickly. This is expected to be the case for most applications. If there is a hit or an element requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.

    A travel authorisation will be valid for three years or until the end of validity of the travel document registered during application, whichever comes first. For each application, the applicant will be required to pay a travel authorisation fee of 7 euros.


    #interopérabilité #base_de_données #database #données_personnelles #migrations #mobilité #autorisations #visas #compagnies_de_voyage #VIS #SIS #EU #UE #union_européenne #biométrie

    ping @etraces @isskein @karine4

    • L’UE précise son futur système de contrôle des voyageurs exemptés de visas

      Les modalités du futur système de #contrôle_préalable, auquel devront se soumettre d’ici fin 2022 les ressortissants de pays tiers pouvant se rendre dans l’Union #sans_visa, a fait l’objet d’un #accord annoncé vendredi par l’exécutif européen.

      Ce dispositif, baptisé ETIAS et inspiré du système utilisé par les Etats-Unis, concernera les ressortissants de plus de 60 pays qui sont exemptés de visas pour leurs courts séjours dans l’Union, comme les ressortissants des Etats-Unis, du Brésil, ou encore de l’Albanie et des Emirats arabes unis.

      Ce système dit « d’information et d’autorisation », qui vise à repérer avant leur entrée dans l’#espace_Schengen des personnes jugées à #risques, doit permettre un contrôle de sécurité avant leur départ via une demande d’autorisation sur internet.

      Dans le cadre de l’ETIAS, les demandes en ligne coûteront 7 euros et chaque autorisation sera valable trois ans pour des entrées multiples, a indiqué un porte-parole de la Commission.

      Selon les prévisions, « probablement plus de 95% » des demandes « donneront lieu à une #autorisation_automatique », a-t-il ajouté.

      Le Parlement européen avait adopté dès juillet 2018 une législation établissant le système ETIAS, mais dans les négociations pour finaliser ses modalités opérationnelles, les eurodéputés réclamaient des garde-fous, en le rendant interopérable avec les autres systèmes d’information de l’UE.

      Eurodéputés et représentants des Etats, de concert avec la Commission, ont approuvé jeudi des modifications qui permettront la consultation de différentes #bases_de_données, dont celles d’#Europol et d’#Interpol, pour identifier les « menaces sécuritaires potentielles, dangers de migration illégale ou risques épidémiologiques élevés ».

      Il contribuera ainsi à « la mise en oeuvre du nouveau Pacte (européen) sur la migration et l’asile », a estimé le porte-parole.

      « Nous devons savoir qui franchit nos #frontières_extérieures. (ETIAS) fournira des #informations_préalables sur les voyageurs avant qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières de l’UE afin d’identifier les risques en matière de #sécurité ou de #santé », a souligné Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, citée dans un communiqué.

      Hors restrictions dues à la pandémie, « au moins 30 millions de voyageurs se rendent chaque année dans l’UE sans visa, et on ne sait pas grand chose à leur sujet. L’ETIAS comblera cette lacune, car il exigera un "#background_check" », selon l’eurodéputé Jeroen Lenaers (PPE, droite pro-UE), rapporteur du texte.

      L’accord doit recevoir un ultime feu vert du Parlement et des Vingt-Sept pour permettre au système d’entrer en vigueur.

      #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes

  • Machine-Readable Refugees

    Hassan (not his real name; other details have also been changed) paused mid-story to take out his wallet and show me his ID card. Its edges were frayed. The grainy, black-and-white photo was of a gawky teenager. He ran his thumb over the words at the top: ‘Jamhuri ya Kenya/Republic of Kenya’. ‘Somehow,’ he said, ‘no one has found out that I am registered as a Kenyan.’

    He was born in the Kenyan town of Mandera, on the country’s borders with Somalia and Ethiopia, and grew up with relatives who had escaped the Somali civil war in the early 1990s. When his aunt, who fled Mogadishu, applied for refugee resettlement through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, she listed Hassan as one of her sons – a description which, if understood outside the confines of biological kinship, accurately reflected their relationship.

    They were among the lucky few to pass through the competitive and labyrinthine resettlement process for Somalis and, in 2005, Hassan – by then a young adult – was relocated to Minnesota. It would be several years before US Citizenship and Immigration Services introduced DNA tests to assess the veracity of East African refugee petitions. The adoption of genetic testing by Denmark, France and the US, among others, has narrowed the ways in which family relationships can be defined, while giving the resettlement process the air of an impartial audit culture.

    In recent years, biometrics (the application of statistical methods to biological data, such as fingerprints or DNA) have been hailed as a solution to the elusive problem of identity fraud. Many governments and international agencies, including the UNHCR, see biometric identifiers and centralised databases as ways to determine the authenticity of people’s claims to refugee and citizenship status, to ensure that no one is passing as someone or something they’re not. But biometrics can be a blunt instrument, while the term ‘fraud’ is too absolute to describe a situation like Hassan’s.

    Biometrics infiltrated the humanitarian sector after 9/11. The US and EU were already building centralised fingerprint registries for the purposes of border control. But with the start of the War on Terror, biometric fever peaked, most evidently at the borders between nations, where the images of the terrorist and the migrant were blurred. A few weeks after the attacks, the UNHCR was advocating the collection and sharing of biometric data from refugees and asylum seekers. A year later, it was experimenting with iris scans along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier. On the insistence of the US, its top donor, the agency developed a standardised biometric enrolment system, now in use in more than fifty countries worldwide. By 2006, UNHCR agents were taking fingerprints in Kenya’s refugee camps, beginning with both index fingers and later expanding to all ten digits and both eyes.

    Reeling from 9/11, the US and its allies saw biometrics as a way to root out the new faceless enemy. At the same time, for humanitarian workers on the ground, it was an apparently simple answer to an intractable problem: how to identify a ‘genuine’ refugee. Those claiming refugee status could be crossed-checked against a host country’s citizenship records. Officials could detect refugees who tried to register under more than one name in order to get additional aid. Biometric technologies were laden with promises: improved accountability, increased efficiency, greater objectivity, an end to the heavy-handed tactics of herding people around and keeping them under surveillance.

    When refugees relinquish their fingerprints in return for aid, they don’t know how traces of themselves can travel through an invisible digital architecture. A centralised biometric infrastructure enables opaque, automated data-sharing with third parties. Human rights advocates worry about sensitive identifying information falling into thehands of governments or security agencies. According to a recent privacy-impact report, the UNHCR shares biometric data with the Department of Homeland Security when referring refugees for resettlement in the US. ‘The very nature of digitalised refugee data,’ as the political scientist Katja Jacobsen says, ‘means that it might also become accessible to other actors beyond the UNHCR’s own biometric identity management system.’

    Navigating a complex landscape of interstate sovereignty, caught between host and donor countries, refugee aid organisations often hold contradictory, inconsistent views on data protection. UNHCR officials have long been hesitant about sharing information with the Kenyan state, for instance. Their reservations are grounded in concerns that ‘confidential asylum-seeker data could be used for non-protection-related purposes’. Kenya has a poor record of refugee protection. Its security forces have a history of harassing Somalis, whether refugees or Kenyan citizens, who are widely mistrusted as ‘foreigners’.

    Such well-founded concerns did not deter the UNHCR from sharing data with, funding and training Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs (now the Refugee Affairs Secretariat), which since 2011 has slowly and unevenly taken over refugee registration in the country. The UNHCR hasconducted joint verification exercises with the Kenyan government to weed out cases of double registration. According to the anthropologist Claire Walkey, these efforts were ‘part of the externalisation of European asylum policy ... and general burden shifting to the Global South’, where more than 80 per cent of the world’s refugees live. Biometrics collected for protection purposes have been used by the Kenyan government to keep people out. Tens of thousands of ethnic Somali Kenyan citizens who have tried to get a Kenyan national ID have been turned away in recent years because their fingerprints are in the state’s refugee database.

    Over the last decade, biometrics have become part of the global development agenda, allegedly a panacea for a range of problems. One of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is to provide everyone with a legal identity by 2030. Governments, multinational tech companies and international bodies from the World Bank to the World Food Programme have been promoting the use of digital identity systems. Across the Global South, biometric identifiers are increasingly linked to voting, aid distribution, refugee management and financial services. Countries with some of the least robust privacy laws and most vulnerable populations are now laboratories for experimental tech.

    Biometric identifiers promise to tie legal status directly to the body. They offer seductively easy solutions to the problems of administering large populations. But it is worth asking what (and who) gets lost when countries and international bodies turn to data-driven, automated solutions. Administrative failures, data gaps and clunky analogue systems had posed huge challenges for people at the mercy of dispassionate bureaucracies, but also provided others with room for manoeuvre.

    Biometrics may close the gap between an ID and its holder, but it opens a gulf between streamlined bureaucracies and people’s messy lives, their constrained choices, their survival strategies, their hopes for a better future, none of which can be captured on a digital scanner or encoded into a database.

    #biométrie #identité #réfugiés #citoyenneté #asile #migrations #ADN #tests_ADN #tests_génétiques #génétique #nationalité #famille #base_de_donnée #database #HCR #UNHCR #fraude #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #iris #technologie #contrôle #réinstallation #protection_des_données #empreintes_digitales #identité_digitale

    ping @etraces @karine4
    via @isskein

  • Deportation Union: Rights, accountability and the EU’s push to increase forced removals

    Deportation Union provides a critical examination of recently-introduced and forthcoming EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. It focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex.

    There has long-been coordinated policy, legal and operational action on migration at EU level, and efforts to increase deportations have always been a part of this. However, since the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 there has been a rapid increase in new initiatives, the overall aim of which is to limit legal protections afforded to ‘deportable’ individuals at the same time as expanding the ability of national and EU authorities to track, detain and remove people with increasing efficiency.

    The measures and initiatives being introduced by the EU to scale up deportations will require massive public expenditure on technology, infrastructure and personnel; the strengthening and expansion of state and supranational agencies already-lacking in transparency and democratic accountability; and are likely to further undermine claims that the EU occupies the moral high ground in its treatment of migrants. Anyone wishing to question and challenge these developments will first need to understand them. This report attempts to go some way towards assisting with that task.

    #machine_à_expulser #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #UE #EU #rapport #union_européenne #renvois_forcés #rapport #Statewatch #Frontex #database #base_de_données #données_biométriques #Directive_Retour #return-opticon #Joint_return_operations (#JROs) #Collecting_return_operations #National_return_operations #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #European_Centre_for_Returns #statistiques #chiffres #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @etraces

  • Le #joli_rouge

    Le Joli Rouge est animé par la volonté de transmettre et de faire découvrir des #ouvrages autour de l’#anarchisme, du #féminisme ou de l’#éthique_animale.

    Ici, vous trouverez bientôt une boutique proposant différents ouvrages sur ces thèmes.
    Cette page propose des articles, textes et ouvrages diponibles gratuitement.


    Interview à l’initiateur du site :

    #textes #documents #livres #database #base_de_données

  • Automated suspicion: The EU’s new travel surveillance initiatives

    This report examines how the EU is using new technologies to screen, profile and risk-assess travellers to the Schengen area, and the risks this poses to civil liberties and fundamental rights.

    By developing ‘interoperable’ biometric databases, introducing untested profiling tools, and using new ‘pre-crime’ watchlists, people visiting the EU from all over the world are being placed under a veil of suspicion in the name of enhancing security.

    Watch the animation below for an overview of the report. A laid-out version will be available shortly. You can read the press release here: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/july/eu-to-deploy-controversial-technologies-on-holidaymakers-and-business-tr


    Executive summary

    The ongoing coronavirus pandemic has raised the possibility of widespread surveillance and location tracking for the purpose of disease control, setting alarm bells ringing amongst privacy advocates and civil rights campaigners. However, EU institutions and governments have long been set on the path of more intensive personal data processing for the purpose of migration control, and these developments have in some cases passed almost entirely under the radar of the press and civil society organisations.

    This report examines, explains and critiques a number of large-scale EU information systems currently being planned or built that will significantly extend the collection and use of biometric and biographic data taken from visitors to the Schengen area, made up of 26 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. In particular, it examines new systems being introduced to track, analyse and assess the potential security, immigration or public health risks posed by non-EU citizens who have to apply for either a short-stay visa or a travel authorisation – primarily the #Visa_Information_System (#VIS), which is being upgraded, and the #European_Travel_Information_and_Authorisation_System (#ETIAS), which is currently under construction.

    The visa obligation has existed for years. The forthcoming travel authorisation obligation, which will cover citizens of non-EU states who do not require a visa, is new and will massively expand the amount of data the EU holds on non-citizens. It is the EU’s equivalent of the USA’s ESTA, Canada’s eTA and Australia’s ETA.[1] These schemes represent a form of “government permission to travel,” to borrow the words of Edward Hasbrouck,[2] and they rely on the extensive processing of personal data.

    Data will be gathered on travellers themselves as well as their families, education, occupation and criminal convictions. Fingerprints and photographs will be taken from all travellers, including from millions of children from the age of six onwards. This data will not just be used to assess an individual’s application, but to feed data mining and profiling algorithms. It will be stored in large-scale databases accessible to hundreds of thousands of individuals working for hundreds of different public authorities.

    Much of this data will also be used to feed an enormous new database holding the ‘identity data’ – fingerprints, photographs, names, nationalities and travel document data – of non-EU citizens. This system, the #Common_Identity_Repository (#CIR), is being introduced as part of the EU’s complex ‘interoperability’ initiative and aims to facilitate an increase in police identity checks within the EU. It will only hold the data of non-EU citizens and, with only weak anti-discrimination safeguards in the legislation, raises the risk of further entrenching racial profiling in police work.

    The remote monitoring and control of travellers is also being extended through the VIS upgrade and the introduction of ETIAS. Travel companies are already obliged to check, prior to an individual boarding a plane, coach or train, whether they have the visa required to enter the Schengen area. This obligation will be extended to include travel authorisations, with travel companies able to use the central databases of the VIS and ETIAS to verify whether a person’s paperwork is in order or not. When people arrive at the Schengen border, when they are within the Schengen area and long after they leave, their personal data will remain stored in these systems and be available for a multitude of further uses.

    These new systems and tools have been presented by EU institutions as necessary to keep EU citizens safe. However, the idea that more personal data gathering will automatically lead to greater security is a highly questionable claim, given that the authorities already have problems dealing with the data they hold now.

    Furthermore, a key part of the ‘interoperability’ agenda is the cross-matching and combination of data on tens of millions of people from a host of different databases. Given that the EU’s databases are already-known to be strewn with errors, this massively increases the risks of mistakes in decision making in a policy field – immigration – that already involves a high degree of discretion and which has profound implications for peoples’ lives.

    These new systems have been presented by their proponents as almost-inevitable technological developments. This is a misleading idea which masks the political and ethical judgments that lie behind the introduction of any new technology. It would be fairer to say that EU lawmakers have chosen to introduce unproven, experimental technologies – in particular, automated profiling – for use on non-EU citizens, who have no choice in the matter and are likely to face difficulties in exercising their rights.

    Finally, the introduction of new databases designed to hold data on tens of millions of non-citizens rests on the idea that our public authorities can be trusted to comply with the rules and will not abuse the new troves of data to which they are being given access. Granting access to more data to more people inevitably increases the risk of individual abuses. Furthermore, the last decade has seen numerous states across the EU turn their back on fundamental rights and democratic standards, with migrants frequently used as scapegoats for society’s ills. In a climate of increased xenophobia and social hostility to foreigners, it is extremely dangerous to assert that intrusive data-gathering will counterbalance a supposed threat posed by non-citizens.

    Almost all the legislation governing these systems has now been put in place. What remains is for them to be upgraded or constructed and put into use. Close attention should be paid by lawmakers, journalists, civil society organisations and others to see exactly how this is done. If all non-citizens are to be treated as potential risks and assessed, analysed, monitored and tracked accordingly, it may not be long before citizens come under the same veil of suspicion.



    #suspects #suspicion #frontières #rapport #StateWatch #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne
    #surveillance #profiling #database #base_de_données #données_personnelles #empreintes_digitales #enfants #agences_de_voyage #privatisation #interopérabilité

    ping @mobileborders @isskein @etraces @reka

  • Datenbank der im Sklavenhandel involvierten Schweizer

    Cooperaxion fördert die nachhaltige Entwicklung und den interkulturellen Austausch entlang der einstigen Sklavenhandelsrouten.

    Die Datenbank von Cooperaxion dokumentiert auf einzigartige Weise die Geschäfte der verschiedenen Schweizer Akteure während des transatlantischen Sklavenhandels des 17. bis 19. Jahrhunderts.
    Zur Zeit sind über 260 Datensätze veröffentlicht, bei weiteren stehen noch Recherchen an.

    Die Suchfunktion findet Stichwörter nach Name, Herkunftskanton, Tätigkeitsregion, Detailinformation oder dem Zeitraum.

    Sie können die Tabelle sortieren, indem Sie auf den entsprechenden Spaltentitel klicken.

    Mit dem Detail-Link gelangen Sie auf eine Seite mit ausführlichen Informationen zur Person oder (Personen-)Gruppe.

    Thematisch vertiefte Hintergrund-Informationen zur Rolle der Schweiz im transatlantischen Sklavenhandel und Kolonialismus finden Sie unter Dokumentation: https://cooperaxion.org/?lang=fr.



    Avec des fiches pour chaque entrée, ici par exemple Auguste de Stael :

    #esclavage #commerce_triangulaire #Suisse #base_de_données #database #commerce_d'esclaves #histoire #liste


    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la Suisse coloniale :

    ping @reka @cede

  • List of nuraghi


    Lavorando al mio sito web Tharros.info sulla Sardegna mi è venuta l’idea di realizzare un database degli innumerevoli nuraghi che si trovano sull’isola. Un censimento esauriente delle torri dell’età del bronzo non esisteva ancora. Secondo le stime di alcuni archeologi si contano dai 6000 agli 8000 nuraghi in tutta l’isola. I censimenti eseguiti in passato hanno interessato territori più o meno delimitati senza estendersi comunque all’intero territorio della regiona Sardegna. Appassionati di archeologia hanno preso l’iniziativa di segnalare tutti i nuraghi utilizzando il sito di Wikimapia, una mappa pubblica dove si possono segnalare luoghi di interesse culturale, di bellezza naturale o di utilità economica. Nel 2009 ho cominciato a lavorare al database e a annotare la posizione geografica dei nuraghi sia su una mappa Google che in un elenco, creando la possibilità di ritrovare i monumenti basandosi sui nomi di questi o sul nome del comune di appartenenza. In questo articolo spiego il metodo di ricerca che ho attuato per compilare l’elenco dei nuraghi di Tharros.info.



    #Nuraghe #sardaigne #archéologie #carte #database #cartographie

  • Impacts of COVID-19 on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: Insights from the ground

    Delve has organized this dedicated COVID-19 space to share information and resources about the impacts on the ASM sector. The space will also profile initiatives by partners to assist small-scale miners and their communities during the pandemic. We are organizing an exploratory COVID-19 Working Group to further share information. The Working Group’s first meeting was convened on April 6th and will continue to share information on an ongoing basis.


    #mines #covid-19 #coronavirus #artisanal_miner_or small-scale_miner (#ASM) #Orpaillage #database #base_de_données

    ping @albertocampiphoto @reka

  • Migrants contributing to #covid-19 responses


    We are collecting data/stories from across the world on #migrants contributing to #COVDI19 response, in #healthcare and beyond.
    Excited to work with @fedfragapane towards a visualization, in the meantime here is the tracker-use it and send us suggestions

    Voici le doc partagé :

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés

    #database #données
    ping @reka @fil @simplicissimus @isskein @karine4


    Ajouté à ce fil de discussion :

  • Coronavirus : l’Allemagne se tourne vers les migrants pour anticiper une pénurie de soignants

    Bastion de l’AfD, le parti nationaliste et anti-migrants allemand, la région #Saxe se tourne vers ses #médecins_étrangers n’ayant pas encore obtenu de licence pour exercer afin de prévenir une #pénurie de #soignants en pleine pandémie de coronavirus. Plusieurs centaines d’entre eux se sont déjà portés volontaires pour aider.

    « Je suis extrêmement heureux de voir que je peux faire quelque chose pour le pays dans lequel je vis. » A 29 ans, Shadi Shahda se tient prêt à intervenir en pleine pandémie de coronavirus. Le jeune Syrien a expliqué à Reuters être arrivé en Allemagne en avril dernier avec un visa pour les demandeurs d’emploi hautement qualifiés et une expérience de trois ans comme médecin interne en ORL.

    Avant de pouvoir commencer à exercer en Saxe, sa province d’adoption, il ne lui restait plus qu’à passer un examen de langue ce moi-ci, lequel a été annulé pour cause de coronavirus. C’est donc tout naturellement que Shadi Shahda a répondu à une annonce du Sächsischen Landesärztekammer, le Conseil médical de la région de Saxe. « J’ai envoyé ma candidature, j’attends leur appel », s’est réjoui le jeune Syrien, soulagé de pouvoir mettre ses compétences à profit.

    Safwan aussi attend des nouvelles. Cet autre jeune migrant a fait des études de médecine générale en Syrie avant de s’installer à Leipzig, il y a trois ans. Il devait également passer son test de langue prochainement. « Je ne m’imagine pas rester les bras croisés, si j’ai voulu faire médecine, c’est avant tout pour aider les gens », explique-t-il à InfoMigrants.

    Alors que le gouvernement allemand se veut rassurant en affirmant notamment qu’il est en capacité de doubler son nombre de lits en soins intensifs et de produire davantage de respirateurs, le manque de #personnels_soignants apparaît comme le point faible de sa stratégie de lutte contre le coronavirus.

    C’est dans ce contexte que le Sächsischen Landesärztekammer a lancé, sur sa page Facebook, un appel aux migrants ayant des compétences de soignants. « Les docteurs étrangers qui se trouvent déjà en Saxe mais qui n’ont pas encore reçu leur licence pour pratiquer dans la région peuvent nous aider dans les soins pour combattre le coronavirus », a écrit l’organisme dans une publication datant du 17 mars.

    #réfugiés #intégration_professionnelle #travail #Allemagne #asile #migrations #médecins #soins #santé #pénurie

    ping @karine4 @isskein @thomas_lacroix @_kg_

    • Refugees to the rescue? Germany taps migrant medics to battle virus

      Five years ago the arrival of a wave of refugees caused much consternation and fuelled support for Germany’s far-right. Now, the country is turning to its migrant community to plug an anticipated shortage of medical staff battling the coronavirus.

      The German government says it can double its number of intensive care beds, and even produce more ventilators but a medical staffing crunch is shaping up as the Achilles heel of its strategy to fight the coronavirus.

      In Saxony, the heartland of the nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD), the regional medical board is advertising for migrant doctors to help tackle an expected rise in cases.

      “Foreign doctors who are in Saxony but do not yet have a license to practice medicine can help with corona(virus) care,” read a Facebook appeal. here

      The push to tap migrant medics in Saxony comes despite the AfD enjoying a surge in support in a regional election there last year, harnessing voter anger over refugees to come second behind Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservatives.

      Merkel’s 2015 decision to open Germany’s borders to some 1 million migrants fleeing war in the Middle East - the defining moment of her chancellorship - was widely criticised by the AfD and even many of her own conservatives.

      A new film, ‘Merkel - Anatomy of a Crisis’, also takes a critical look at her handling of the refugee influx.

      But the coronavirus epidemic means medics of all backgrounds are in demand.

      Saxony’s regional medical board reported on Monday that 300 volunteers had responded to its appeal for help, including “many foreign doctors whose licensing procedures are not yet completed, whose help is very welcome.”

      As of Tuesday, there were 31,554 cases of coronavirus in Germany, with 149 deaths, the Robert Koch Institute for infectious diseases said. The government says Germany is still at the beginning of the epidemic.

      Shadi Shahda, 29, is one migrant medic ready to help.

      He came to Germany last April on a visa for highly-qualified job seekers and with three years’ experience as an ENT (ear, nose, throat) medical resident in Syria. But a language exam he needed to take this month to work as a doctor in Saxony was cancelled due to the coronavirus.

      He jumped at the medical board’s Facebook post and says: “I am waiting for their call ... I was very happy when I saw that I could do something in the country where I am living.”


    • Berliner Behörde überlastet - Ausländische Mediziner trotz Coronakrise ohne Arbeitserlaubnis
      Von Claudia van Laak
      5-6 Minuten

      Allein in Berlin warten aktuell 1.058 ausländische Ärzte und 1.180 Pflegekräfte auf Anerkennung ihrer Berufsabschlüsse – manche sogar schon seit Jahren. Doch trotz Corona-Krise und dringend benötigten medizinischen Fachpersonal wird sich daran wohl so schnell nichts ändern.

      „Notruf: Mehr von uns ist besser für alle!“ steht bei einer Demonstration von streikendem Pflegepersonal an der Berliner Charite - Campus Virchow Klinikum auf einem Transparent. (imago images / Seeliger)

      Bereits vor der Corona-Krise herrschte in Deutschland der Pflegenotstand. Doch ausländisches medizinisches Fachpersonal wartet hierzulande oft sehr lange, bis die Arbeitserlaubnis kommt.

      Wir brauchen jede helfende Hand, bitte melden Sie sich bei den Landesärztekammern. Dieser flehentliche Appell von Ärztekammerpräsident Klaus Reinhardt richtet sich an pensionierte Mediziner und an Studierende. Doch was ist mit den ausländischen Ärzten? Ihre Abschlüsse – und auch die der Pflegekräfte – müssen zum Beispiel im Land Berlin vom Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales anerkannt werden. Auf den Schreibtischen der Entscheider liegen nicht weniger als 1.058 Anträge ausländischer Ärzte sowie 1.180 Anträge von Pflegekräften. Und diese Anträge liegen dort nicht erst seit gestern. Die Verfahren dauern viel zu lange, sagt Catherina Pieroth, gesundheitspolitische Sprecherin der Grünen-Fraktion im Abgeordnetenhaus.

      „Die Anerkennungsverfahren dauern zum Teil ein Jahr oder länger. In Einzelfällen sogar drei bis vier Jahre.“

      Bereits vor Corona gab es einen Ärzte- und Pfleger-Mangel, trotzdem mussten diese Fachkräfte Jahr für Jahr länger auf ihre Berufserlaubnis warten. Die entsprechende Abteilung im Berliner Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales LaGeSo ist überlastet. Tim Zeelen, gesundheitspolitischer Sprecher der CDU-Fraktion im Abgeordnetenhaus.

      „Es gibt den Aufruf auch des Bundesministers Jens Spahn, Rentner zu reaktivieren, wir wissen, dass Medizinstudenten jetzt geschult werden sollen, um Aufgaben im Gesundheitswesen zu übernehmen. Das sind alles gute Belege dafür, dass wir jeden brauchen, der qualifiziert ist mitzuhelfen. Und das gilt für Menschen, die im Ausland ihre Abschlüsse erworben haben, umso mehr. Auch die könnten jetzt ganz konkret unserem Gesundheitswesen in Berlin helfen.“

      Wer in Polen seine Ausbildung gemacht hat, hat das Nachsehen

      Noch eine weitere Gruppe könnte helfen – das sind Ärztinnen und Ärzte, die vor kurzem im Nachbarland Polen ihren Abschluss gemacht haben, darunter auch viele Deutsche. Sie erhalten von den Berliner Landesbehörden keine Approbation, weil Polen seine Medizinerausbildung zuvor verändert hatte.

      Catherina Pieroth von den mitregierenden Grünen:

      „Aktuell sind 60 Ärztinnen und Ärzte aus diesem Kontingent arbeitslos. Dieses Jahr werden weitere 350 Ärzte in Polen fertig, die gerne nach Deutschland kommen würden, dabei handelt es sich auch um Deutsche, die in Stettin studieren, weil sie in Deutschland keinen Medizin-Studienplatz bekommen haben.“

      Vorläufige Anerkennung gefordert

      Die oppositionelle CDU fordert vom rot-rot-grünen Berliner Senat eine schnelle Entscheidung. Ausländische Ärzte und Pflegekräfte müssen eine vorläufige Anerkennung erhalten, um sofort mit ihrer Arbeit beginnen zu können, sagt Tim Zeelen.

      „Jetzt geht es darum, in einem Ad-hoc-Verfahren diese Genehmigung sehr sehr schnell möglich zu machen.“
      Berliner Gesundheitsverwaltung stellt sich quer

      Die zuständige, von der SPD geleitete Gesundheitsverwaltung und das ihr unterstellte Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales lehnen das rundheraus ab. Auch in Krisenzeiten dürfe man nicht von den Regeln abweichen, die der Bund festgelegt habe. Zitat:

      „Die Anforderungen können landesrechtlich nicht verändert oder temporär angepasst werden. Derzeit gibt es bundesweit Überlegungen, ob und wie die Anerkennungsverfahren vereinfacht oder beschleunigt werden können.“

      Und weiter: Aus Gründen des Patienten- und auch des Gesundheitsschutzes sei es unverantwortlich, ohne entsprechende Prüfungen vorläufige Berufserlaubnisse für Ärzte und Pfleger zu erteilen. Der CDU-Gesundheitspolitiker Tim Zeelen sieht dies anders, denn:

      „Von den Menschen, die mit einem im Ausland erworbenen Abschluss kommen, ist die Anerkennungsquote nahezu 100 Prozent.“

      1.058 ausländische Ärztinnen und Ärzte warten allein im Land Berlin auf die Anerkennung ihres Abschlusses. Bei manchen fehlt nur noch die bestandene Fachsprachenprüfung. Diese Prüfungen finden allerdings gerade nicht statt – wegen der Corona-Epidemie.


    • Refugees to the rescue? Germany taps migrant medics to battle virus

      Five years ago the arrival of a wave of refugees caused much consternation and fueled support for Germany’s far-right. Now, the country is turning to its migrant community to plug an anticipated shortage of medical staff battling the coronavirus.

      The German government says it can double its number of intensive care beds, and even produce more ventilators but a medical staffing crunch is shaping up as the Achilles heel of its strategy to fight the coronavirus.

      In Saxony, the heartland of the nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD), the regional medical board is advertising for migrant doctors to help tackle an expected rise in cases.

      “Foreign doctors who are in Saxony but do not yet have a license to practice medicine can help with corona(virus) care,” read a Facebook appeal. here

      The push to tap migrant medics in Saxony comes despite the AfD enjoying a surge in support in a regional election there last year, harnessing voter anger over refugees to come second behind Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservatives.

      Merkel’s 2015 decision to open Germany’s borders to some 1 million migrants fleeing war in the Middle East - the defining moment of her chancellorship - was widely criticized by the AfD and even many of her own conservatives.

      A new film, ‘Merkel - Anatomy of a Crisis’, also takes a critical look at her handling of the refugee influx.

      But the coronavirus epidemic means medics of all backgrounds are in demand.

      Saxony’s regional medical board reported on Monday that 300 volunteers had responded to its appeal for help, including “many foreign doctors whose licensing procedures are not yet completed, whose help is very welcome.”

      As of Tuesday, there were 31,554 cases of coronavirus in Germany, with 149 deaths, the Robert Koch Institute for infectious diseases said. The government says Germany is still at the beginning of the epidemic.

      Shadi Shahda, 29, is one migrant medic ready to help.

      He came to Germany last April on a visa for highly-qualified job seekers and with three years’ experience as an ENT (ear, nose, throat) medical resident in Syria. But a language exam he needed to take this month to work as a doctor in Saxony was canceled due to the coronavirus.

      He jumped at the medical board’s Facebook post and says: “I am waiting for their call ... I was very happy when I saw that I could do something in the country where I am living.”


    • Germany calls on migrant medics to help tackle coronavirus

      Country has 14,000 Syrian refugee doctors waiting for qualifications to be approved.

      Germany’s health authorities are appealing to medically qualified migrants to help them tackle the coronavirus.

      As increasing numbers of doctors and nurses fall ill or are quarantined, the shortage of medical staff is putting pressure on a usually well-resourced health service.

      Government initiatives have already increased the number of intensive care beds from about 24,000 to 40,000, most of them with ventilators. Staff are being retrained and non-essential operations across the country have been cancelled.

      But the health system still needs more medical personnel to care for patients, increase the levels of testing, and track down people who have been in contact with those who are sick. The Robert Koch Institute, which advises the government on public health, has said 2,300 doctors are believed to be off sick or in quarantine. But with no central collation of data, the real figure is believed to be much higher. In the state of Bavaria alone, 244 doctors’ practices have had to close because of coronavirus infections.

      Match4Healthcare, a website backed by medical authorities which was created by a volunteer team of students and hackers, seeks to match healthcare workers and volunteers – both citizens and foreigners living in Germany – to clinics and care homes needing support.

      The eastern state of Saxony is at the forefront of a campaign calling on foreign doctors, including the thousands of refugees who arrived in 2015, to help. According to the Facebook group Syrian Doctors in Germany there are 14,000 Syrian doctors waiting for their qualifications to be approved.

      “We are keen for anyone to get in touch who is in a position to help,” said a spokesman for the medical association in Leipzig (SLAEK), the capital of Saxony. “It could be someone who does not yet have their medical licence, but is on their way to getting it,” he said. “To date around 400 have been in touch.”
      Germany’s devolved logic is helping it win the coronavirus race
      Read more

      Saxony, with a population of just over 4 million, has not been as badly hit by the virus as other regions, but concern is growing. By Friday, there were almost 4,000 confirmed cases and 76 of them had died. “Right now the situation is still under control, but as it gets worse we need to prepare for that,” the spokesman said.

      In its Facebook appeal the medical association calls on German-speaking “foreign doctors already living in Saxony but who have not yet got their medical licence to help with coronavirus support”.

      What makes Saxony’s plea salient is that it is the home of Pegida, the anti-Islam protest movement, and the heartland of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland party. The AfD rose to prominence – becoming the largest opposition in parliament in 2017 – on the back of voter anger over Angela Merkel’s decision to allow almost 1 million refugees into the country in 2015.

      The chancellor’s resistance to closing Germany’s borders prompted a huge backlash against her Christian Democrats’ refugee policy, with many accusing Merkel of undermining national security. Now, although the government was initially reluctant to do so, closing the national border to most neighbouring countries is regarded as a matter of national safety, to prevent the spread of coronavirus.

      Opponents of the government’s open door policy argued refugees would be a drain on the economy and compromise national security. Those in favour said that, as the majority were young, they would help plug a growing skills shortage caused by an ageing population.

      Safwan Adnan Ali arrived from Syria in July 2016. He studied general surgery in Latakia for four years, then moved to Iraq to avoid military service, where he worked as a general practitioner for a year.

      Since arriving in Germany as a refugee, he has been learning the language and preparing for exams which will allow his qualifications to be recognised.

      “I was waiting for the exam for medical language use, but then the coronavirus came and everything has ground to a halt,” the 37-year-old said. “When the appeal was announced … I thought I’d really like to help. I need to do something useful, and I’d like to give something back to the country which has helped me so much, so I sent off my CV immediately.”

      He has also applied to help Bavaria, one of the worst-hit regions, which recently announced that doctors without medical licences would be given immediate permission to work there for a year. In recent days other states have announced easier access to exam procedures and a relaxation on qualification rules.

      Adnan Ali said: “I’m prepared to go anywhere I’m needed. Although as I have my wife and one-year-old daughter in Saxony, I’d prefer to work here close to them if I can.”

      His WhatsApp group of Syrian doctors living in Germany has been debating whether access to the medical system due to the pandemic will shorten their wait to enter the profession.

      “I really hope this will make it easier by maybe cutting down some of the unwieldy bureaucratic procedures,” he said.

      Ahmad Dahhan, 35, said when he arrived in Germany from Syria in December 2015 he hoped to be able to resume his medical career as soon as possible. “Everyone has their dreams,” he said, “but bureaucracy has made things very difficult and slow, and it has been an extremely frustrating time.”

      Dahhan studied biochemistry at the University of Aleppo before training as a gynaecologist at Damascus University. “They say they are in need of doctors, even when there isn’t a health crisis, but it’s not at all straightforward to get into the profession.”

      He has studied German, spent two months working alongside doctors at a gynaecology department in Leipzig, and attended courses of advanced training for foreign doctors, but since the coronavirus struck, he has been confined to his apartment.

      “It is extremely discouraging to know that I could be doing something far more useful,” he said. “So I welcome the opportunity to be able to do so and hope that will help Germany recognise we can also be helpful even when there is not a crisis on.”

      Germany’s health ministry said it was in the process of “investigating all possible legal options” to speed up the applications of qualified doctors, especially those who only required a medical language exam.


    • Aux #Etats-Unis...

      Governor Murphy Signs Executive Order to Remove Barriers to Health Care Professionals Joining New Jersey’s COVID-19 Response and Provide Protections for Front Line Health Care Responders

      Governor Phil Murphy today signed Executive Order No. 112, authorizing the Division of Consumer Affairs to temporarily reactivate the licenses of recently retired health care professionals and grant temporary licenses to doctors licensed in foreign countries. The executive order also temporarily permits certain health care professionals to perform acts outside of their ordinary scope of practice and grants broad civil immunity to health care professionals and facilities providing services in support of New Jersey’s COVID-19 response efforts who are acting in good faith.

      “My Administration is working tirelessly with our hospital systems and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to expand bed capacities, reopen closed hospitals, and erect field medical stations to prepare for additional COVID-19 cases,” said Governor Murphy. “We need trained, experienced medical personnel to ensure proper staffing as we build out this new capacity, which is why we have put out the call to retired health care professionals to join our fight and support our existing workforce. By signing this executive order, we are removing bureaucratic roadblocks to quickly bring more health care professionals into our efforts and provide additional flexibility and protections for our front line responders to aid in New Jersey’s response to COVID-19.”

      The executive order supplements the State’s existing health care workforce by:

      Authorizing the Division of Consumer Affairs to temporarily reactivate the licensees of healthcare professionals previously licensed in the State within the last five years. This will enable doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals who have recently retired or have allowed their licenses to lapse to temporarily reactivate their license.
      Authorizing the Division of Consumer Affairs to grant temporary medical licenses to doctors who are licensed and in good standing in foreign countries.
      Temporarily waiving certain scope of practice restrictions on Advanced Practice Nurses (APNs) related to physician collaboration, including a rule requiring that an APN enter into a joint protocol with a collaborating physician and a rule requiring APNs to obtain authorization from a collaborating physician in order to dispense narcotic drugs.
      Temporarily waiving certain scope of practice restrictions on Physician Assistants (PAs) related to physician supervision, including a rule requiring PAs to obtain physician authorization prior to prescribing a controlled dangerous substance.

      This order will take effect immediately.


  • A quoi sert la gréve ?
    [part1] A faire un boulot de dingue que nos « patrons » ne nous demandent pas ;) Voir par exemple la base de données caféïnée par Maxime Reynié : MAINTIEN DE L’ORDRE

    Doctrine | Grenades | Lanceurs | Effectifs
    Tout comprendre sur le maintien de l’ordre

    Ce site a pour objectif d’apporter le plus d’informations possible sur le maintien de l’ordre français pour que tout le monde puisse s’y documenter et le comprendre facilement. Il sera régulièrement mis à jour pour apporter les dernières informations et modifications sur les éléments du maintien de l’ordre.

    Précisions de @Maxime_Reynie sur twitter :

    Ce n’est pas entièrement fini, il doit rester plusieurs coquilles me connaissant mais voilà, c’est un début ❤️
    On va dire que c’est une béta.
    Je compte aussi rajouter l’armement des polices municipales avec les lanceurs 44mm. Comment s’organise le maintien de l’ordre à Paris avec toutes les unités qu’on y retrouve. etc etc etc etc
    Pour ce qui est des coquilles je vous invite à me DM si vous en trouvez. <3 [ou mail sur le site, note]
    Dernière chose. Le site est lent, même très lent. J’ai pris l’hébergement le moins cher par défauts donc ça risque de ramer si vous êtes plus de 2.
    Pour le COUGAR, un équivalent plus petit existe me rappelle @akraland, ça sera corrigé asap
    /.../ Pour « sources et documents » c’est pas complet encore, je dois m’y retrouver dans les 9798678 pdf que j’ai stocké /.../


    Bon par contre, contrairement à ce qu’il dit sur twitter, ça n’est pas un wikipedia, sa mise à jour dépend donc uniquement de lui et sa disponibilité !
    Un gros boulot donc qui vient esthétiquement compléter celui du collectif Desarmons-les https://desarmons.net qui est sans surprise sa première source ! Desarmons-les qui lance une initiative essentielle : une collecte transparente pour les mutilé-e-s : https://desarmons.net/index.php/2019/01/13/collecte-de-desarmons-les-pour-les-blesse-es-par-des-armes-de-police (je vais faire un billet à part pour plus de visibilité)

    #maintien_de_l'ordre #armes #armes_non_letales #armement #police #CRS #repression #violences_policieres #flashball #LBD #grenades #lacrymo #Maxime_Reynié

  • Base de données sur le rôle de la France
    dans le génocide des Tutsi


    But de cette base de données

    FgtDb comme France Genocide Tutsi Database est une base de données relative au rôle de la France dans le génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda en 1994.

    Le génocide des Tutsi a été exécuté par des Rwandais. Mais nous formulons les hypothèses :

    1) Le génocide n’aurait pas eu lieu si la France n’était pas intervenue militairement au Rwanda, si elle n’avait pas fourni des armes et entraîné l’armée gouvernementale rwandaise, et si elle n’avait pas soutenu les politiciens et militaires rwandais qui depuis 1990 voulaient éliminer les Tutsi.

    2) Le coup d’État des 6-8 avril 1994, qui a coûté la vie au président Habyarimana, au Premier ministre Agathe Uwilingiyimana et à d’autres ministres et personnalités politiques n’aurait pu réussir qu’avec le soutien de la France par son ambassadeur à Kigali et sa représentation au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

    3) À tout moment du 7 avril au 18 juillet, la France aurait pu commander à ses alliés de cesser les massacres.

    Partis d’une démarche de citoyens français responsables, nous nous efforçons de tester ces hypothèses de manière aussi scientifique que possible en rassemblant des documents. Nous n’excluons pas a priori des documents qui vont à l’encontre de nos hypothèses, pourvu qu’ils rapportent des faits vérifiables.

    Sur ce site web http://francegenocidetutsi.org plus de 9.000 documents sont accessibles, triés par date, auteur, journal ou source. Un moteur de recherche permettant d’interroger suivant plusieurs critères et d’accéder à la fiche descriptive des documents est accessible ici

    Ces documents ont été réunis depuis 2001 pour la rédaction du livre La France au coeur du génocide des Tutsi, publié en 2010 en quelques 300 exemplaires, épuisé depuis, mais restant déchargeable à l’adresse : http://francegenocidetutsi.org/FranceCoeurGenocideTutsi-IP.pdf

    L’idée initiale était de donner au lecteur du livre en format pdf de Adobe l’accès à une copie du document original en utilisant les pointeurs hypertextes pris en compte par Acrobat reader ou les logiciels équivalents.

    De là est née la conception d’une fiche descriptive des documents et la préoccupation de les étudier pour eux-mêmes dans un souci d’objectivité.

    Depuis de nouveaux documents ont été trouvés qui débordent maintenant de beaucoup la portée de ce livre. Le besoin de les publier comme preuve s’en est fait sentir.

    Cette base de données, commencée début 2013, existe sur un ordinateur. Elle répertorie environ 24.000 documents, 4.000 auteurs provenant de 700 journaux ou sources et d’une centaine de fonds d’archives.

    Il reste à faire une publication systématique des documents sur le web, ce qui est une exigence de chercheur mais qui est encore largement à faire. Les collaborations sont souhaitées.

    Avant avril 2016, ce site web était à l’adresse http://www.francerwandagenocide.org/documents

  • Innovations sociales en montagne

    Vous êtes sur la plateforme de l’innovation sociale en montagne.

    Vivre en montagne, c’est bien souvent vivre différemment. C’est s’attacher à des enjeux de climat, de relief, de mobilités, d’enclavement, de saisonnalité.
    Vivre en montagne, c’est faire face à des conditions qui peuvent aussi devenir des ressources spécifiques.
    Les territoires de montagne sont confrontés, peut-être plus fortement qu’ailleurs, à l’urgence de la transition écologique et sociétale.

    Les territoires de montagne sont autant de sociétés locales avec leurs aspirations et leurs besoins particuliers.
    La recherche d’une meilleure adaptation aux contraintes, d’une meilleure qualité de vie et d’une harmonie entre les populations et leur environnement nous conduisent à une quête d’innovations sociales.

    Ces innovations sociales renforcent la capacité à agir de tous les participants à la société locale, dans un souci de partenariat et d’intérêt général.

    Pour donner de la visibilité à ces projets qui donnent de l’espoir aux territoires de montagne, nous souhaitons, à travers cette plateforme, aider chacun à les connaître, à les comprendre et à les répercuter.

    Et une liste des #initiatives :
    #innovation_sociale #innovations_sociales #montagne #plateforme #base_de_données #database #cartographie #visualisation

  • Bibliothèque numérique kurde

    The Kurdish Institute maintains the largest Kurdish Library in the Western World.

    This library contains over 10,000 monographs about the Kurds, in 25 languages, several tens of thousands of published documents, collections of reviews and newspapers, photographs, videos, post cards and posters, as well as audio archives and music recordings.

    This rich documentation fills over a third of the Institute’s premises as well as a substantial part of its warehouse, located in a Paris suburb. References to these monographs and the principal documents have been computerized.

    #bibliothèque #database #base_de_données #catalogue #digitalisation #livres #Kurdes #Kurdistan #bibliothèque_numérique

    ping @isskein @reka
    via @wizo

  • A Calais, la frontière tue ! In Calais, the border kills !


    Deaths at the Calais Border

    Uncountable lives are wasted and suffer at the hands of the Calais border regime. There is no accurate count of how many people have died. This is a list of people known in Calais or from news reports.

    For sure there will have been more, their deaths ignored, the facts covered up or altogether unreported. Many already go unnamed, without vigils and protests, without families or friends to advocate on their behalf.

    But we will never let these deaths be silenced. We will not forgive and we will never forget.

    These borders kill! One death is too many!


    #morts #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #Calais #France #frontières #Angleterre #UK #migrations #asile #réfugiés #base_de_données #database #liste #timeline #ligne_du_temps #mourir_dans_la_forteresse_Europe #visualisation #infographie #frise #frise_chronologique #time-line #chronologie

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4

    • Un article de février 2018

      The deadly roads into Calais

      Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
      The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.

      He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.

      But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.

      Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.

      Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.

      The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.

      Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.

      The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”

      During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.

      The victims are often young men’

      For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.

      For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.

      Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.

      Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”

      Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”

      Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.

      “The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.

      Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”

      Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.

      Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”

      Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”

      Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”

      ’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’

      While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.

      During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”

      Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.

      A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”

      Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.



      En français :
      A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants

    • Voir Calais et mourir

      Si, depuis quelques années, militants et chercheurs commencent à compter les morts sur les routes migratoires, ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’arc méditerranéen, négligeant la frontière franco-britannique que l’on pourrait qualifier de nasse calaisienne. Accords européens, traités bilatéraux et leurs corollaires sécuritaires font en effet de cette frontière un mur meurtrier. Et les migrants n’ont d’autre choix que de prendre toujours plus de risques pour le franchir… au péril de leur vie.

      Nawall Al Jende avait 26 ans. Elle était originaire de Nawa, une ville située à une trentaine de kilomètres de Deraa, dans le sud de la Syrie. Elle avait fui la guerre et laissé derrière elle son époux et deux de ses enfants. Avec son troisième enfant, Mohamed, âgé de 9 ans, et le frère de son mari, Oussama, son périple l’avait amenée à traverser neuf pays avant d’atteindre Calais. Sa sœur, Sawson, avait réalisé un parcours quasi similaire deux mois plus tôt et l’attendait de l’autre côté de la Manche. Nawall est décédée le 15 octobre 2015, après avoir été percutée par un taxi sur l’autoroute A16, alors qu’elle tentait de se glisser dans un camion afin de franchir la frontière franco-britannique. Comme sur les autres routes de l’exil, des personnes migrantes meurent à Calais et dans sa région. Depuis 1999, on estime qu’au moins 170 personnes sont décédées en tentant de franchir cet espace frontalier reliant la France à l’Angleterre.

      Pourquoi prêter attention aux personnes mortes en migration à la frontière franco-britannique ? Il n’existe pas de données officielles à ce sujet. Par conséquent, participer au travail de collecte d’informations contribue à documenter l’histoire du fait migratoire dans la région. En l’espace de quelques années, la question des exilés morts aux frontières s’est imposée dans le débat public. Elle a été d’abord portée, par des acteurs militants, à l’image des travaux réalisés par United for Intercultural Action, Fortress Europe ou encore Watch the Med. Puis, des journalistes se sont intéressés au sujet (The Migrants Files), ainsi que des chercheurs (Deaths at the Borders Database). Aujourd’hui, une institution officielle telle que l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) commence à recenser les personnes mortes en migration. Toutefois, dans ces différents relevés, la situation à la frontière franco-britannique est peu prise en compte, le focus étant davantage dirigé sur la mortalité aux portes de l’Europe, dans l’arc qui va des Iles Canaries à la mer Égée, en passant par le détroit de Gibraltar et le canal de Sicile. Par conséquent, travailler à la collecte d’informations sur les personnes mortes à Calais et dans la région répond à un réel besoin et rend visible une réalité méconnue.
      Redonner un nom aux morts

      Ce travail d’enquête ne veut pas s’en tenir au traitement simplement comptable ou anecdotique de la question des morts en migration. Il cherche, quand cela est possible, à redonner une identité et une histoire à ces « corps sans nom » ou à ces « noms sans histoire ». Tenter de reconstituer des récits de vie, (re)donner une dimension personnelle à chaque décès est un moyen d’éviter leur dilution dans ce qu’on nomme communément, de façon globalisante, les « drames de la migration ». Il s’agit également de rompre avec l’idée que cette hécatombe résulterait de la fatalité. Réduire ces tragédies à des accidents (accident de la route, noyade, etc.), à des violences ou des règlements de compte entre migrants est une façon d’occulter la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics dans une situation qui dure depuis plus de vingt ans dans le nord de la France. Au contraire, c’est bien l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique qui a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier. De même, considérer que les seules violences exercées à l’encontre des exilés sont dues aux « réseaux de passeurs » est une manière d’occulter celles qui sont liées aux conditions de vie et à l’absence de dispositifs d’accueil adaptés, au harcèlement policier et à la surenchère de dispositifs de surveillance de la frontière.

      On constate en effet que la majorité des décès sont liés aux tentatives de passage, qu’ils soient immédiats ou qu’ils surviennent des suites de blessures que ces tentatives occasionnent. Le long de la frontière franco-britannique, les exilés meurent principalement après avoir été percutés par un train sur le site d’Eurotunnel, renversés par un véhicule – parfois volontairement – sur un axe routier non loin d’un point de passage ou écrasés sous l’essieu d’un poids lourd. Et finalement, les « règlements de compte » ou les violences « inter ou intra-communautaires » se concluant par des morts restent des événements marginaux.

      La majeure partie des exilés tentent de passer la frontière cachés dans la remorque d’un camion ou en dessous. Cette méthode s’avère extrêmement dangereuse et les risques de mourir écrasé par le contenu de la marchandise, par suffocation ou en tombant du camion (en particulier une fois arrivé sur le territoire britannique) sont importants. On pense notamment aux 58 personnes migrantes de nationalité chinoise cachées dans un camion frigorifique et découvertes mortes par asphyxie à Douvres en juin 2000. Un événement qui fait terriblement écho à la tragédie survenue 15 ans plus tard en Autriche, quand 71 exilés syriens cachés dans un camion furent abandonnés sur le bord d’une autoroute par le conducteur et décédèrent par suffocation.

      Même si le phénomène reste minoritaire, on recense plusieurs cas de noyades. Si quelques-unes se sont produites à la suite de rixes ou afin d’échapper à des violences policières, la plupart sont survenues pendant des tentatives de franchissement de la frontière. On observe ainsi plusieurs cas désespérés, et finalement mortels, survenus lors de la traversée du détroit du Pas-de-Calais, par embarcation ou à la nage. Le 12 juin 2002, un exilé russe parti en canoë s’est noyé dans la Manche. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé et le camarade qui l’accompagnait est resté accroché pendant cinq heures à l’embarcation à la dérive avant d’être secouru. Le précieux travail d’investigation du journaliste norvégien Anders Fjellberg [1] a permis de retracer le parcours de deux exilés syriens, Mouaz Al Balkhi et Shadi Omar Kataf. Après plusieurs semaines passées entre les Jungles de Calais et de Grande-Synthe et une douzaine de tentatives de passage « classiques » ratées, les deux compatriotes optèrent pour une autre stratégie. Le 7 octobre 2014, ils se procurèrent une combinaison de plongée au magasin Décathlon de Calais. Leurs corps ont été retrouvés quelques semaines plus tard, l’un sur une plage de Norvège, l’autre sur une plage des Pays-Bas.
      Petits arrangements entre voisins

      Les modes de franchissement de la frontière évoluent en fonction de son niveau de sécurisation. Plus un point de passage est rendu inaccessible, plus il y a de prises de risque et plus ces tentatives impliquent le recours à un « tiers », le passeur. En septembre 2014, le ministre de l’intérieur français, Bernard Cazeneuve, signait avec son homologue britannique, Theresa May, un accord bilatéral « incluant une contribution britannique de 5 millions d’euros par an pendant trois ans » dont l’une des mesures principales visait à « renforcer la sécurité, à la fois autour du port et dans la zone portuaire [2] ». Cet accord visait à empêcher, d’une part, les tentatives d’intrusions collectives sur le site portuaire et, d’autre part, les incursions sur la rocade accédant au port, technique consistant à profiter des embouteillages pour se cacher dans la remorque d’un camion La mise en œuvre du versant « sécurisation » de cet accord a été confiée à l’entreprise Zaun, une firme britannique [3], et s’est déroulée en plusieurs étapes. Dans un premier temps, à partir d’octobre 2014, les barrières ont été doublées à l’intérieur du site portuaire. Puis, au printemps 2015, sur une distance de deux kilomètres le long de la rocade accédant à la zone portuaire, a été érigée une double clôture, l’une de 4 mètres de haut et l’autre d’un peu moins de 3 mètres, équipée d’une rampe d’accès incurvée pour éviter qu’on ne s’y s’agrippe, et surmontée d’un fil barbelé. Entre les deux clôtures, un espace de détection infrarouge a été installé. La mise en place de cet arsenal autour de la zone portuaire a obligé les exilés à se détourner du port pour trouver d’autres voies de passage, plus dangereuses, notamment celle du tunnel sous la Manche. Les conséquences ne se sont pas fait attendre : alors qu’aucun des 17 décès recensés en 2014 n’avait eu lieu sur le site d’Eurotunnel, on en comptait 15 sur les 25 enregistrés en 2015. Il serait difficile d’en conclure que plus on boucle la frontière franco-britannique, plus celle-ci devient meurtrière. En effet, l’augmentation significative du nombre de morts entre 2014 et 2015 s’explique aussi par celle du nombre d’exilés présents dans le Calaisis. Les militants locaux estiment qu’il a crû, en un an, de 1 500 à environ 5 000 personnes. Il est en revanche certain qu’à la multiplication des barrières et des dispositifs dissuasifs, se sont ajoutées les désastreuses conditions de vie des exilés, obligés de survivre dans une extrême précarité et dans un contexte de surpopulation croissante, tout en tentant d’échapper aux violences policières : un cocktail explosif qui les a poussés plus nombreux à prendre des risques pour espérer passer. En août 2015, un nouvel accord franco-britannique fut signé dans lequel les deux ministres reconnaissaient que « depuis la fin du mois de juin, en raison de la sécurisation du port, les migrants ont changé de stratégie, cherchant au péril de leur vie, à s’introduire au niveau des points d’entrée dans le tunnel sous la Manche ». Mais qu’imaginent-ils pour remédier à ce constat inquiétant ? Que « la France renforce l’actuel dispositif de sécurité et l’action de ses policiers et de ses gendarmes, grâce au déploiement d’unités mobiles additionnelles » et que le Royaume-Uni alloue des moyens supplémentaires pour « sécuriser le périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, grâce à un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux » tout en « [aidant] la société Eurotunnel à augmenter nettement ses effectifs en charge de la sécurité et de la protection du site [4] ». Ce qui s’est traduit par l’installation de 29 kilomètres de nouvelles barrières et le « renforcement » de 10 kilomètres déjà existants. Le paysage du site d’Eurotunnel a été radicalement bouleversé : 100 hectares ont été rasés afin de faciliter la surveillance et une partie de cette zone a été volontairement inondée « pour créer des obstacles naturels qui empêchent l’accès aux clôtures » [5].

      Cette séquence n’est finalement qu’une étape supplémentaire dans la longue histoire de la fortification de la frontière franco-britannique. Elle a commencé avec le code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code ISPS) régissant les zones portuaires fournissant des services internationaux et s’est prolongée, depuis le début des années 1990, par une succession d’accords bilatéraux. Alors que le protocole de Sangatte (1991) avait initié la mise en place de contrôles juxtaposés français et britanniques des deux côtés de la frontière, son protocole additionnel (2000) les a étendus aux principales gares du nord de la France et du sud de l’Angleterre.

      Au tournant des années 2000, la fortification de la frontière prend une autre dimension. Du côté du site portuaire, « en 2000, un premier programme de 6 millions d’euros est engagé pour clôturer une partie du port, installer un réseau de vidéo surveillance ainsi qu’un bâtiment spécifique au département sûreté ». Jusqu’alors, la zone portuaire n’était que très sommairement clôturée. « À partir de 2005, un deuxième programme d’investissement de 7 millions d’euros est engagé […] [permettant] de finaliser l’année suivante, un réseau de 48 caméras fixes et mobiles de vidéo surveillance [6]. » De son côté, Eurotunnel renforce la surveillance de son site à partir du printemps 2001 et bénéficie, en février 2002, du prêt d’un radar PMMW (système à détection thermique) de l’armée britannique. Tandis que la signature du traité du Touquet (2003) étend les dispositions relatives aux contrôles juxtaposés à tous les ports de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, « l’arrangement » franco-britannique de 2009 accentue le recours aux dispositifs de détection et crée un centre de coordination conjoint « chargé de recueillir et partager toutes les informations nécessaires au contrôle des biens et de personnes circulant entre la France et le Royaume-Uni » [7]. Les accords franco-britanniques de 2014 et 2015 sont venus compléter cet empilement de textes.

      Retracer de manière précise et tenter de cartographier l’évolution des dispositifs mis en place autour de la frontière franco-britannique n’est pas chose aisée. En effet, l’accès à l’information est relativement restreint, du fait notamment de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués (services de l’État, gestionnaires des sites portuaires et du tunnel, prestataires de sécurité privés, etc.) et du manque de transparence qui en résulte. Dans ses déclarations, le porte-parole d’Eurotunnel indique que « depuis l’apparition des clandestins [sic] dans le Calaisis, Eurotunnel a, au-delà de ses obligations contractuelles, investi massivement dans les moyens physiques (clôtures, éclairages, caméras, barrières infrarouges) et humains de protection du terminal de Coquelles : plus de 160 millions d’euros, dont 13 millions d’euros au premier semestre 2015 » [8]. Difficile d’évaluer finement ce que coûte cette surenchère. Cette question fait l’objet d’une bataille de communication, notamment entre l’État et Eurotunnel, le premier reprochant au second de ne pas en faire assez en matière de sûreté tandis que le second réclame toujours plus d’aides pour protéger le site. L’affaire, connue sous le nom de « contentieux de Sangatte », s’est d’ailleurs conclue devant les tribunaux en 2003 par une victoire d’Eurotunnel qui a obtenu de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne une indemnisation pour les investissements qu’il avait consentis à cet effet [9].

      Du coût humain, il n’en est bien entendu pas question. Aux morts recensées s’ajoutent celles qui n’ont pu l’être. Par manque de sources, car « il y a suffisamment à faire avec les vivants [10] » ou par oubli tout simplement. Et puis il y a les personnes blessées, « des jeunes aux mains et aux jambes lacérées par les barbelés qui entourent le site d’Eurotunnel […] ces clôtures [qui] déchiquettent la peau de manière anarchique [11] ». Mutilées ou accidentées, ces personnes n’entrent dans aucun décompte. Le 21 octobre 2001, dans La Voix du Nord, la journaliste Sophie Leroy titrait son article « Assez de mort aux frontières » [12] en reprenant l’un des slogans de la manifestation organisée à Calais par le collectif C’Sur [13] pour dénoncer cette frontière meurtrière. Quinze années plus tard, la liste des morts n’a cessé de s’allonger.