• Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes

    How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
    In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.

    What do all these people have in common?

    All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.

    Since the summer of 2015,
    Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
    when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
    Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
    And much of this money is being spent in Africa.

    Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.

    However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.

    The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?

    At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.

    In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.

    If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.

    This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?

    This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.

    For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?

    While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
    in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.

    Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
    Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’

    It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.

    But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.

    It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.

    The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
    the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
    the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
    the French president, to Mark Rutte,

    the Dutch prime minister.

    Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
    ‘No data available’

    But let’s get back to those funding streams.

    The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.

    But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”

    Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
    but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
    or “no data available”.

    The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,

    the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.

    This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”

    At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
    Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti

    “There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”

    This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.

    Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.

    The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.

    Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.

    The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.

    Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.

    Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
    in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.

    In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
    the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.

    But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.

    Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.

    But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.

    The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
    The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.

    But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.

    To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”

    (DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

    Still with me?

    Because this was just the Netherlands.

    Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).

    Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.

    This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.

    Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.

    Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.

    Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.

    Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,

    which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.

    And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
    organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.

    This is the European migration spaghetti.
    How we managed to compile a list nonetheless

    By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?

    We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?


    We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).

    No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.

    In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
    This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
    was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.

    So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.

    More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.

    For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

    What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?

    Each country has its own way of categorising projects.

    There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.

    When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.

    While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
    1) Where is the money going?

    In Nigeria, we found

    If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
    50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.

    Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
    more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative

    to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.

    The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities

    in Nigeria: at least €92m.

    Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.

    We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
    Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
    Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.

    2) Where isn’t the money going?

    When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.

    “The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.

    See their website here.
    “Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”

    We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.

    Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.

    But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”

    Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.

    3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?

    We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?

    Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.

    One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”

    Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
    And we’ve only looked at one country ...

    That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.

    When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?

    Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?

    But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP

    called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.

    Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.

    But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.

    So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    Et ajouté à la métaliste développement/migrations :

    ping @isskein @isskein @pascaline @_kg_

  • Jad Chaaban د. جاد شعبان sur Twitter : “When the non-bank $ exchange rate exceeds 2000LBP, a 30% #devaluation, those who are losing first are: - Lebanese poor, more than 1.5 million - Lebanese paid in LBP, almost 700,000 - Refugees, 1.5 million Syrians & 200,000 Palestinians - Migrant workers, >300,000 who send $ home.” / Twitter

    Jad Chaaban د. جاد شعبان
    When the non-bank $ exchange rate exceeds 2000LBP, a 30% devaluation, those who are losing first are:
    – Lebanese poor, more than 1.5 million
    – Lebanese paid in LBP, almost 700,000
    – Refugees, 1.5 million Syrians & 200,000 Palestinians
    – Migrant workers, >300,000 who send $ home.


  • Why Development Will Not Stop Migration

    #Hein_de_Haas discusses the myths of ’South-North’ migration and the relationship between development and migration.

    Among the many myths perpetuated about migration, one of the most common is that ‘South–North’ migration is essentially driven by poverty and underdevelopment. Consequently, it is often argued that stimulating economic development would reduce migration from developing countries to North America and Europe. However, this ignores evidence that most migration neither occurs from the poorest countries nor from the poorest segments of the population. In fact, the paradox is that development and modernization initially leads to more migration.

    Historical experiences show that societies go through migration transitions as part of broader development processes. In their seminal study of large-scale European migration to North America between 1850 and 1913, The Age of Mass Migration, Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson found that trans-Atlantic migration was driven by the mass arrival of cohorts of young workers on the labour market, increasing incomes and a structural shift of labour out of agriculture towards the urban sector. The rapidly industrializ­ing Northwestern European nations therefore initially dominated migration to North America, with lesser developed Eastern and Southern European nations fol­lowing suit only later.

    This pattern also seems to apply to contemporary migration. Recent advances in data and analysis have improved insights about the relationship between devel­opment and migration. In 2010, newly available global data on migrant populations enabled me to do the first global assessment of the relationship between levels of development and migration. The figure below shows how levels of emigration and immi­gration are related to development levels, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI). The pattern for immigration is linear and intuitive: more developed countries attract more migrants. The relation between levels of human development and emigration is non-linear and counter-intuitive: middle-income countries tend to have the highest emigration levels. This finding has been confirmed by later studies using global migration data covering the 1960–2015 period, which all demonstrate that increases in levels of economic and human development are initially associated with higher levels of emigration.

    Only when countries achieve upper-middle income status, such as has recently been the case with Mexico and Turkey, does emigration decrease alongside increasing immigra­tion, leading to their transformation from net emigration to net immigration coun­tries. In a recent paper, Michael Clemens estimated that, on average, emigration starts to decrease if countries cross a wealth-threshold of per-capita GDP income levels of $7,000–8,000 (corrected for purchasing power parity), which is roughly the current GDP level of India, the Philippines and Morocco.

    Development in low-income countries boosts internal and international migration because improvements in income, infrastructure and education typically increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. Particularly international migration involves significant costs and risks which the poorest generally cannot afford, while education and access to informa­tion typically increases people’s material aspirations. Education and media exposure also typically accelerate cultural change which changes people of the ‘good life’ away from rural and agrarian lifestyles towards urban lifestyles and jobs in the industrial and service sectors. The inevitable result is increasing migration to towns, cities and foreign lands.

    Middle-income countries therefore tend to be the most migratory and international migrants predominantly come from relatively better-off sections of origin populations. Although these are averages that cannot be blindly applied to individual countries, it seems therefore very likely that any form of development in low-income countries such as in sub-Saharan Africa, South- and South-East and Central America will lead to more emigration in the foreseeable future. More generally, this shows the inadequacy of traditional push-pull models to explain migration and the need for research-driven views on migration.

    #réfugiés #migrations #développement #mythe #pauvreté #push-factors #push_factors #facteur_push

    Ajouté à la métaliste migrations / développement :

  • Le développement personnel, nouvel opium du peuple ? – Mondes Sociaux

    par Natacha Guay · Publié 18/02/2019

    Avez-vous déjà rêvé de vivre une vie heureuse et épanouissante ? Oui ? Cela tombe bien : c’est ce que proposent de nombreux coachs et chercheurs spécialistes en psychologie dite « positive », et plus précisément en développement personnel. Livres, applications mobiles, cours de méditation, séances de coaching et séminaires spécialisés sont autant de biens et services proposés aux individus et aux organisations (y compris les entreprises) pour s’épanouir.

    Suffit-il d’écouter les « experts » du bonheur pour être heureux ? Que cache le marché florissant du bien-être ? Quels individus et groupes considèrent le bonheur comme une idée utile ? Quels intérêts et quels postulats idéologiques cette idée sert-elle activement ? Quelles en sont les conséquences économiques et politiques ? C’est ce qu’étudient la sociologue Eva Illouz et le psychologue José Cabanas dans Happycratie.

    #idéologie #santé #libéralisme

  • EU aid and development funding has provided €215 million for border security in Morocco since 2001

    Since 2001, almost €215 million has been provided to Morocco by the EU to finance border security projects. Human rights abuses against migrants and refugees committed by Moroccan authorities call into question whether financial support from the EU to Moroccan border security should continue.


    Initial EU funding efforts worth some €68 million took place between 2001 and 2010 and, despite an interlude in which financial support was concerned with reform of the country’s migration policy, in 2018 funding for border security returned with a vengeance, with €140 million promised to Morocco - half of which comes from the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

    The strengthening of the EU-Morocco relationship on migration control has coincided with a crackdown on migrant presence in the north of Morocco, during which at least 8,000 people have been arrested and internally displaced to the south by the Moroccan police.

    People on the move have often faced violence at the hands of the Moroccan authorities in the name of enforcing the country’s migration policy. Nevertheless, the European Commission is reticent to acknowledge that it may have contributed in some way to operations by the Moroccan security forces in which human rights have been violated - an official told Statewatch that Morocco “advocates for a humanistic approach that considers human rights and integration as its first priority.”

    There is little publicly-available information on the results of these funding programmes and the evaluation report for just one project is publicly available. However, the activities foreseen for each project - contained in documents released to Statewatch - indicate that development aid has been used to increase the capacity of Moroccan state institutions to control the country’s land and sea borders, to exchange and coordinate information with both African and European partners. It seems like that the projects currently being implemented will continue in this vein.

    #Maroc #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières #asile #migrations #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #fermeture_des_frontières #frontières

    ping @isskein @karine4

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur développement et migrations :

  • La renaissance de l’humain est la seule croissance qui nous agrée

    Raoul Vaneigem


    Les coups de boutoir que la liberté porte à l’hydre capitaliste, qui l’étouffe, font fluctuer sans cesse l’épicentre des perturbations sismiques. Les territoires mondialement ponctionnés par le système du profit sont en butte à un déferlement des mouvements insurrectionnels. La conscience est mise en demeure de courir sus à des vagues successives d’événements, de réagir à des bouleversements constants, paradoxalement prévisibles et inopinés.

    Deux réalités se combattent et se heurtent violemment. L’une est la réalité du mensonge. Bénéficiant du progrès des technologies, elle s’emploie à manipuler l’opinion publique en faveur des pouvoirs constitués. L’autre est la réalité de ce qui est vécu quotidiennement par les populations.

    D’un côté, des mots vides travaillent au jargon des affaires, ils démontrent l’importance des chiffres, des sondages, des statistiques ; ils manigancent de faux débats dont la prolifération masque les vrais problèmes : les revendications existentielles et sociales. Leurs fenêtres médiatiques déversent chaque jour la banalité de magouilles et de conflits d’intérêts qui ne nous touchent que par leurs retombées négatives. (...)

    #conscience #réalités #mensonge #dévastation #violence #La_Boétie #vie_quotidienne #souveraineté #capitalisme #explosion #Mirbeau #autonomie #auto-organisation #autodéfense #offensive #insurrections #écologistes #utopie #Gilets_jaunes #Chili #zapatistes #Rojava #Catalogne #Iran

    • Pour information, dans le mail qui accompagnait ce texte.

      A toutes et à tous,

      Je prépare l’édition d’un petit livre intitulé Textes et entretiens sur l’insurrection de la vie quotidienne, qui doit paraître aux éditions Grevis, en avril 2020. J’ai ajouté à ces interventions, qui vont de novembre 2018 à août 2019, des remarques susceptibles de contribuer aux débats et aux luttes en cours en France et dans le monde.

      La date tardive de parution du livre m’a suggéré de diffuser dès maintenant sur les réseaux sociaux ces propos sur la renaissance de l’humain. Leur lecture peut être utile avant la comédie étatique des élections municipales françaises, et en raison des flux et des reflux insurrectionnels où la moindre initiative d’individus et de collectivités, animés par la redécouverte de la vie et du sens humain, revêt une importance croissante.

      Libre à vous d’en faire (ou non) l’usage qui vous plaira.
      #raoul_vaneigem #vaneigem

  • Liban : « La stabilité du taux de change doit être défendue coûte que coûte » économiste avec l’économiste Albert Dagher

    Pourquoi faut-il éviter à tout prix une dévaluation ? 

    Pour éviter des répercussions sociales d’une extrême violence, la stabilité du taux de change doit être défendue coûte que coûte, quitte à descendre dans la rue. Si on laisse la livre flotter, le dollar pourrait passer à 3000 livres libanaises selon certains scénarios. Le prix des biens importés augmenterait alors de 100 %. Celui des produits fabriqués localement suivrait car les industriels libanais répercuteraient eux aussi la hausse subie du coût des matières premières ou des produits intermédiaires. Avec la dépréciation du taux de change, interviendrait alors un phénomène d’hyper inflation – c’est-à-dire quand l’inflation approche ou dépasse les 100 % - laquelle se traduira directement par une chute du pouvoir d’achat, des salaires ou des autres revenus des Libanais d’au moins 50 %.

    #Liban #dévaluation

  • Why return from Europe is causing problems for The Gambia

    Roughly 38,500 Gambians left the country through ‘irregular’ means between 2013 and 2017. Today, almost every family has ties abroad. The influx of immigrants to Europe and elsewhere was caused by political oppression under the long-serving former president Yahya Jammeh. His oppressive politics also severely affected the economic prospects of The Gambia’s young population.

    As a result, a large number of citizens, mostly young men, sought asylum in Europe. But very few have been allowed to stay. Even more were turned away when Jammeh was toppled after elections in 2017 and the country returned to democracy. More recently, there has been a big push from European Union (EU) member states to return failed asylum seekers back home to The Gambia.

    The question of returns is particularly volatile in the west African nation of 2 million people, reflected in the country’s and European press.

    A slight increase in Gambian deportations began in November 2018 after the EU and the government agreed on a ‘good practice’ agreement for efficient return procedures.

    This intensified cooperation became possible due to the governmental change in 2017, with President Adama Barrow becoming President after the elections, as we found in our research on the political economy of migration governance in The Gambia.

    Despite initial cooperation with the EU on returns, in March 2019 Barrow’s government imposed a moratorium on any further deportations of its nationals from the EU. After a standoff of several months, the moratorium has now been lifted. Though only temporary, the moratorium was an important tool for the government to manage problems with its domestic legitimacy.
    Relationship challenges

    Jammeh’s ousting ended years of severe repression and corruption that had discouraged donor countries from cooperating with The Gambia. When he left, the country quickly established positive relations with the EU which has become its most important development partner. It provides €55 million in budgetary support and runs three projects to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration. But the moratorium was a stress test for this new relationship.

    Before the moratorium was imposed in March 2019, the government had started to tentatively cooperate with the EU on return matters. For example, it sent regular missions to Europe to issue nationals with identification documents to facilitate their return.

    Relations began to sour when European governments increased returns in a way that authorities in The Gambia viewed as inconsistent with the ‘good practice’ agreement. The agreement stipulates that return numbers should not overstretch the country’s capacity to receive returnees. It also states that adequate notice must be given before asylum seekers are returned. Both of these provisions were allegedly breached.
    Problems at home

    The incoming returns quickly led to heated debates among the population and on social media. The rumblings peaked in February 2019 with one particular return flight from Germany. Authorities in Banjul claimed they had not been well informed about it and initially refused entry. Public demonstrations followed in March. The moratorium, which European partners had already been notified about, was declared shortly afterwards.

    The moratorium can be linked to diplomatic and technical inefficiencies, but it is also based on a more fundamental problem for Barrow’s government. By cooperating with the EU on returns, they risk their domestic legitimacy because by and large, most Gambians in Europe do not want to return home.

    The initial euphoria that surrounded the democratic transition is wearing off. Many reform processes such as in the security sector and in the media environment are dragging. The economic situation of many has not improved. Allowing more deportations from the EU is perceived as betrayal by many migrants and their families.

    The government is frequently suspected to play an active role in returns and is accused of witholding information about their dealings with the EU and member states like Germany. Incidentally, President Barrow is currently seeking to extend his rule beyond the three-year transition period originally agreed upon, ending in January 2020. Opposition to these plans is widespread.

    In these politically tense times, pressing a pause button on returns fulfilled a symbolic function by defending Gambians against foreign national interests. The recent lifting of the moratorium is politically very risky. It paves the way for more of the deeply unpopular chartered return operations.

    What next?

    On the whole, The Gambia has little room to manoeuvre. It is highly dependent on the EU’s goodwill and financial support for its reforms process. In line with the development focus of the EU, the position of the government is to prepare the ground for more “humane” repatriations, which will need more time and joint efforts.

    This would include better and more comprehensive reintegration opportunities for returned migrants. Reintegration is already the focus of various projects funded by the European Union Trust Fund. Programmes like the International Organisation for Migration’s ‘Post-Arrival Reintegration Assistance’ for returnees from Europe are up and running. However, they only serve a limited number of returnees and cannot meet all their needs.

    It is important to note that the role of the Gambian state in providing reintegration support has been marginal.

    With the lifting of the moratorium EU-Gambia cooperation stands at a crossroads. If EU member states maintain their hardline returnee approach The Gambia’s new government will continue to struggle with its legitimacy challenges. This could potentially jeopardise democratisation efforts.

    In the alternative, the EU could take a more cooperative stance by working on more holistic, development-oriented solutions. A starting point would be to move away from plans to return high numbers of failed asylum seekers. Sending back large numbers of migrants has never been feasible.

    The Gambian government will be more honest about its migration dealings with the EU if the agreements are fair and practical. Most importantly, if Gambians had access to fair and practical migration pathways this would lessen cases of irregular migration, which continue to remain high.

    Without a greater share of legal migration, the issue of return will continue to be particularly contentious.

    #Gambie #retour #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_gambiens #développement #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #conditionnalité_de_l'aide #Allemagne #moratoire #réintégration #European_Union_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Post-Arrival_Reintegration_Assistance #OIM #IOM
    ping @karine4 @_kg_

    J’ai ajouté « #deportees » dans la liste des #mots autour de la migration :
    Et plus précisément ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/414225#message812066
    #terminologie #vocabulaire
    ping @sinehebdo

    Ajouté à la métaliste développement-migrations, autour de la conditionnalité de l’aide :

  • AI For Good Is Often Bad. Trying to solve poverty, crime, and disease with (often biased) technology doesn’t address their root causes.

    After speaking at an MIT conference on emerging #AI technology earlier this year, I entered a lobby full of industry vendors and noticed an open doorway leading to tall grass and shrubbery recreating a slice of the African plains. I had stumbled onto TrailGuard AI, Intel’s flagship AI for Good project, which the chip company describes as an artificial intelligence solution to the crime of wildlife poaching. Walking through the faux flora and sounds of the savannah, I emerged in front of a digital screen displaying a choppy video of my trek. The AI system had detected my movements and captured digital photos of my face, framed by a rectangle with the label “poacher” highlighted in red.

    I was handed a printout with my blurry image next to a picture of an elephant, along with text explaining that the TrailGuard AI camera alerts rangers to capture poachers before one of the 35,000 elephants each year are killed. Despite these good intentions, I couldn’t help but wonder: What if this happened to me in the wild? Would local authorities come to arrest me now that I had been labeled a criminal? How would I prove my innocence against the AI? Was the false positive a result of a tool like facial recognition, notoriously bad with darker skin tones, or was it something else about me? Is everyone a poacher in the eyes of Intel’s computer vision?

    Intel isn’t alone. Within the last few years, a number of tech companies, from Google to Huawei, have launched their own programs under the AI for Good banner. They deploy technologies like machine-learning algorithms to address critical issues like crime, poverty, hunger, and disease. In May, French president Emmanuel Macron invited about 60 leaders of AI-driven companies, like Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, to a Tech for Good Summit in Paris. The same month, the United Nations in Geneva hosted its third annual AI for Global Good Summit sponsored by XPrize. (Disclosure: I have spoken at it twice.) A recent McKinsey report on AI for Social Good provides an analysis of 160 current cases claiming to use AI to address the world’s most pressing and intractable problems.

    While AI for good programs often warrant genuine excitement, they should also invite increased scrutiny. Good intentions are not enough when it comes to deploying AI for those in greatest need. In fact, the fanfare around these projects smacks of tech solutionism, which can mask root causes and the risks of experimenting with AI on vulnerable people without appropriate safeguards.

    Tech companies that set out to develop a tool for the common good, not only their self-interest, soon face a dilemma: They lack the expertise in the intractable social and humanitarian issues facing much of the world. That’s why companies like Intel have partnered with National Geographic and the Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation on wildlife trafficking. And why Facebook partnered with the Red Cross to find missing people after disasters. IBM’s social-good program alone boasts 19 partnerships with NGOs and government agencies. Partnerships are smart. The last thing society needs is for engineers in enclaves like Silicon Valley to deploy AI tools for global problems they know little about.

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    The deeper issue is that no massive social problem can be reduced to the solution offered by the smartest corporate technologists partnering with the most venerable international organizations. When I reached out to the head of Intel’s AI for Good program for comment, I was told that the “poacher” label I received at the TrailGuard installation was in error—the public demonstration didn’t match the reality. The real AI system, Intel assured me, only detects humans or vehicles in the vicinity of endangered elephants and leaves it to the park rangers to identify them as poachers. Despite this nuance, the AI camera still won’t detect the likely causes of poaching: corruption, disregarding the rule of law, poverty, smuggling, and the recalcitrant demand for ivory. Those who still cling to technological solutionism are operating under the false assumption that because a company’s AI application might work in one narrow area, it will work on a broad political and social problem that has vexed society for ages.

    Sometimes, a company’s pro-bono projects collide with their commercial interests. Earlier this year Palantir and the World Food Programme announced a $45M partnership to use data analytics to improve food delivery in humanitarian crises. A backlash quickly ensued, led by civil society organizations concerned over issues like data privacy and surveillance, which stem from Palantir’s contracts with the military. Despite Palantir’s project helping the humanitarian organization Mercy Corps aid refugees in Jordan, protesters and even some Palantir employees have demanded the company stop helping the Immigration and Customs Enforcement detain migrants and separate families at the US border.

    Even when a company’s intentions seem coherent, the reality is that for many AI applications, the current state of the art is pretty bad when applied to global populations. Researchers have found that facial recognition software, in particular, is often biased against people of color, especially those who are women. This has led to calls for a global moratorium on facial recognition and cities like San Francisco to effectively ban it. AI systems built on limited training data create inaccurate predictive models that lead to unfair outcomes. AI for good projects often amount to pilot beta testing with unproven technologies. It’s unacceptable to experiment in the real world on vulnerable people, especially without their meaningful consent. And the AI field has yet to figure out who is culpable when these systems fail and people are hurt as a result.

    This is not to say tech companies should not work to serve the common good. With AI poised to impact much of our lives, they have more of a responsibility to do so. To start, companies and their partners need to move from good intentions to accountable actions that mitigate risk. They should be transparent about both benefits and harms these AI tools may have in the long run. Their publicity around the tools should reflect the reality, not the hype. To Intel’s credit, the company promised to fix that demo to avoid future confusion. It should involve local people closest to the problem in the design process and conduct independent human rights assessments to determine if a project should move forward. Overall, companies should approach any complex global problem with the humility in knowing that an AI tool won’t solve it.

    #IA #intelligence_artificielle #pauvreté #développement #technologie #root_causes #API #braconnage #wildlife #éléphants #droits_humains

  • A Dakar, l’immigration s’invite dans les débats entre gouvernements français et sénégalais

    Après une longue séquence polémique dans l’hexagone, le thème de l’immigration s’est invité dimanche au 4e séminaire intergouvernemental entre la France et le Sénégal à Dakar, où Edouard Philippe est arrivé pour s’entretenir aussi avec le président Macky Sall de la lutte antijihadiste au Sahel.

    Deux ans après la dernière édition de ces rencontres de haut niveau, à Matignon, M. Philippe et six de ses ministres sont arrivés dimanche dans la capitale sénégalaise pour nourrir la relation « singulière » entre les deux pays, dixit le chef du gouvernement.

    Quatre feuilles de route sont sur la table de ce séminaire : elles portent sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense ; l’éducation, la jeunesse et la formation ; l’émergence du Sénégal ; la mobilité et la migration.

    Sept semaines après un débat au Parlement français sur l’immigration voulu par Emmanuel Macron, qui a notamment abouti à de nouvelles mesures concernant l’offre de soins et la future instauration de quotas d’immigration professionnelle, l’issue des négociations entre les deux gouvernements sera attendue.

    « La migration doit être choisie et non subie, telle est notre conviction », a résumé M. Philippe, qui a été accueilli à la mi-journée par M. Sall au palais présidentiel.

    Selon Matignon, « la pression venant du Sénégal », pays à la fois de départ et de transit, « reste élevée » sur l’immigration irrégulière, alors que le pays est jugé « sûr ».

    « Le Sénégal est au 15e rang des nationalités interpellées pour les 9 premiers mois de l’année 2019 », assure-t-on encore de même source, tout en notant que les demandes d’asile ont augmenté de « plus de 50% » l’an passé.

    Parmi les leviers dont dispose la France, l’aide publique au développement, dont le budget total doit atteindre 0,55% du PIB en 2022. Environ 2 milliards d’euros de cette aide ont été distribués au Sénégal depuis 2007 : des « efforts » qui doivent « produire des résultats sur l’immigration irrégulière », souligne Matignon.

    « La coopération entre nos deux pays est bonne mais elle peut encore s’améliorer dans la logique d’engagement réciproque », a insisté M. Philippe dimanche.

    Concernant l’immigration légale, Matignon salue la « vraie dynamique », « de l’ordre de 7% », d’admission d’étudiants sénégalais (12.500 en 2019) dans l’enseignement supérieur français.

    – Trois patrouilleurs vendus -

    M. Philippe a aussi mis en avant dimanche son souhait « d’augmenter le nombre de passeports talents », réservés aux étrangers disposant de certaines qualifications, « et de visas de circulation de longue durée ». Il s’est aussi engagé à réduire de moitié dès début 2020 les délais de traitement des demandes de visas.

    Sur le volet économique, alors que la France est le premier partenaire commercial et le premier investisseur étranger au Sénégal, un accord a été signé pour la vente de trois patrouilleurs hauturiers du groupe français Kership. Un contrat de plusieurs centaines de millions d’euros qui se double de la vente de missiles du groupe européen basé en France MBDA.

    La cérémonie comportera une dimension symbolique avec la restitution du sabre d’El Hadj Oumar Tall, un chef de guerre et érudit musulman qui a conquis au XIXe siècle un immense territoire à cheval sur le Sénégal, la Guinée et le Mali, et a lutté contre l’armée coloniale française.

    « Comment ne pas voir également dans ce sabre le sang que les tirailleurs sénégalais ont versé au côté des soldats français pour défendre notre pays », a souligné M. Philippe.

    Dans un contexte sécuritaire très dégradé au Sahel marqué par plusieurs attaques jihadistes, les questions militaires rebondiront lundi lors de l’ouverture du Forum international de Dakar sur la paix et la sécurité en Afrique.

    Le Sénégal, qui partage des frontières avec la Mauritanie et le Mali, « joue un rôle très important de c ?ur de réseau », estime-t-on à Matignon. Alors que les attaques menacent de se propager, le Sénégal, membre de la Mission des Nations unies au Mali (Minusma), fait office de « pôle de stabilité ».

    « Les terribles événements survenus au Mali depuis le début du mois de novembre montrent que les groupes qui se revendiquent de l’Etat islamique résistent encore et qu’il ne faut pas baisser la garde », a averti M. Philippe dimanche.

    Et Dakar, qui doit porter l’effectif de son armée de terre de 20.000 à 30.000 hommes d’ici à 2025 « a vocation à faire partie du partenariat pour la sécurité et la stabilité (au Sahel) annoncé lors du G7 de Biarritz » en août, dont « les modalités sont en cours d’élaboration », ajoute-t-on à Matignon. A ce titre, le Sénégal pourra apporter un soutien aux forces du G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Mauritanie, Tchad et Burkina Faso).


    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #France #Sénégal #migration_choisie #migration_subie #pays_sûr #développement #étudiants #étudiants_sénégalais #passeports_talents #visas

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le lien entre migrations et développement :

  • Au Liban, des stations-service en rupture de stock contraintes de fermer et de rationner le carburant - L’Orient-Le Jour

    Vendredi, la ministre sortante de l’Énergie, Nada Boustani, avait réaffirmé son opposition à toute augmentation du prix de l’essence, deux jours après avoir refusé d’ajuster les prix du carburant pour tenir compte des coûts supplémentaires auxquels les distributeurs affirment devoir faire face suite à la hausse du cours du dollar dans les bureaux de change.

    Jeudi, les propriétaires de stations-service, de camions-citernes et autres distributeurs intermédiaires avaient annoncé qu’ils allaient continuer de vendre le carburant déjà stocké au prix imposé par l’État, mais qu’ils allaient suspendre les nouvelles commandes jusqu’à ce qu’une réponse positive à leurs revendications soit apportée par les responsables concernés. Les représentants du secteur n’ont pas précisé la quantité des stocks disponibles. Selon une source proche du dossier, les sociétés importatrices de carburant ne seraient en effet pas alignées sur cette position et devraient continuer à alimenter les stations-service dépendant directement d’elles.

    En soirée, ces sociétés ont publié un communiqué dans lequel elles « répondent aux rumeurs selon lesquelles les importateurs ont arrêté d’importer de l’essence et du diesel ». Elles ont précisé avoir importé des quantités de ces matières « durant les derniers jours » et que « des navires déchargeront leur marchandise au profit de quatre compagnies aujourd’hui, demain et après-demain ». Elles soulignent enfin que d’autres navires transportant des hydrocarbures devront arriver dans les prochains jours et que les importations se font en coordination avec les banques.

    #LIBAN #carburant #dévaluation

  • Seules au front, les banques engagées dans une course contre la montre - Kenza OUAZZANI - L’Orient-Le Jour

    Cet article explique pas mal de choses sur la crise bancaire en cours

    Acculées, faisant face à une crise sans précédent, les banques tentent de gagner du temps. Elles ont annoncé hier qu’elles fermeront de nouveau leurs portes aujourd’hui et lundi (jour férié). De quoi leur donner un peu de répit alors qu’elles ont fait l’objet tout au long de cette semaine et surtout ces deux derniers jours d’une pression croissante de leurs clients et qu’aucune avancée ne se profile sur la scène politique. Suite à des rumeurs faisant état d’une fermeture prolongée des banques, le président de l’Association des banques du Liban, Salim Sfeir, a opposé un démenti. Mais des sources bancaires issues de six différents établissements ont indiqué à L’Orient-Le Jour que les banques comptent bien rester fermées tant qu’un nouveau gouvernement ne sera pas formé et qu’elles n’auront pas de visibilité politique.

    Sur le plan financier, l’incertitude politique se traduit par une aggravation de la crise de liquidités en dollars qui préexistait au début de la révolte le 17 octobre et à la démission du gouvernement Hariri III une semaine plus tard. Les banques sont contraintes d’accentuer de plus en plus leurs mesures restrictives en l’absence d’un contrôle formel des capitaux, les mettant en porte-à-faux face à leurs clients, qui, paniqués, se ruent encore plus sur les banques.

    Alors que certains établissements avaient autorisé des transferts à l’étranger en fin de semaine dernière, ils ont tous pris la décision d’arrêter ces opérations depuis lundi. En ce qui concerne les retraits (via les distributeurs automatiques et les guichets), les banques ont revu une nouvelle fois à la baisse hier leurs plafonds quotidiens et hebdomadaires pour les deux monnaies. Certaines ont même arrêté complètement les retraits de dollars. Ce qui ne manque pas d’augmenter encore davantage la panique et la perte de confiance. Un véritable cercle vicieux. Toutes les banques ne sont pas confrontées au même problème de liquidités. Elles peuvent normalement faire appel à leurs réserves placées auprès de leurs banques correspondantes ou à leurs dépôts placés auprès de la banque centrale. Mais, pour la plupart d’entre elles, leurs réserves auprès des banques correspondantes sont très minimes car elles ont préféré les placer à la BDL, avec des rémunérations plus importantes et des maturités à long terme, ce qui les rend inaccessibles aujourd’hui. Elles pourraient toutefois décider de renoncer à ces rémunérations pour les débloquer, mais au vu du manque de visibilité politique, elles ne s’y risquent pas. D’autant plus que la BDL ne pourrait pas être en mesure de débloquer ces dépôts, puisqu’elle doit elle-même minutieusement gérer ses réserves en devises.

    (Lire aussi : Pour la Banque mondiale, les pertes liées à la crise sont « énormes » pour l’économie libanaise)

    Celles, plus conservatrices, qui ont préféré garder leurs réserves auprès des banques correspondantes, sont les seules qui ont pu autoriser des transferts à l’étranger la semaine dernière. Mais elles ont aussi dû arrêter d’effectuer ces transferts cette semaine face à la forte demande.

    En parallèle, les banques qui continuent de recevoir des dépôts en dollars les placent auprès de la BDL, car elles n’ont pas d’autre choix : la banque centrale refuse leurs transferts à l’étranger. Ce sont ces mêmes dépôts que la BDL utilise pour prêter des liquidités en dollars aux banques qui perdent des dépôts. Mais l’ouverture de ces lignes de crédit auprès de la BDL coûte très cher à ces dernières qui doivent s’acquitter d’une commission de 20 % là-dessus.

    Autrement, les banques en besoin de liquidités peuvent contracter des prêts à court terme auprès d’autres banques, mais le taux interbancaire applicable sur ces transactions a atteint cette semaine 100 %.

    Parallèlement, le gouverneur de la BDL, Riad Salamé, a demandé aux banques de rapatrier les dépôts de leurs filiales à l’étranger, qui s’élèvent à 9 milliards de dollars. « Il leur demande de le faire en partie à travers la circulaire émise lundi par la banque centrale », qui demande aux banques de ne pas redistribuer à leurs actionnaires les profits réalisés en 2019 et d’augmenter de 20 % leurs fonds propres, confie un des banquiers interrogés. Certaines banques essaient de négocier et de repousser le délai de la première augmentation (de 10 %) prévu pour fin décembre (la deuxième doit avoir lieu avant fin juin 2020), mais d’autres sont plus sceptiques quant à sa faisabilité. « Pour certaines banques, c’est l’équivalent de 500 millions de dollars en six mois. Et rien n’oblige les actionnaires à accepter de le faire de par la loi », prévient-il, avant d’affirmer que pour certaines banques « une augmentation de 20 % de leur capital ne sera pas suffisante pour les protéger contre un risque de solvabilité ».

    (Lire aussi : Repenser la réforme pour relancer l’économie)

    Une situation qui pousse les banques à prioriser du mieux que possible leur gestion de leurs liquidités en devises. Le problème le plus urgent auquel elles doivent faire face n’est autre que les dépôts arrivés à maturité (et ceux qui y arrivent dans les semaines qui viennent). Dans le contexte actuel, elles n’arrivent à céder à leurs clients qu’une partie de ces dépôts et leur demandent de patienter avant de récupérer le reste du montant. Mais légalement et en l’absence d’un contrôle formel des capitaux, elles sont dans l’obligation de débloquer la totalité des dépôts, sinon leurs clients peuvent leur intenter un procès pouvant mener à une procédure de mise en faillite. C’est ainsi qu’une citoyenne américaine a pu obtenir cette semaine d’une des plus grandes banques du pays le rapatriement de son dépôt de 20 millions de dollars hors du pays, après avoir menacé de porter plainte contre elle aux États-Unis, a confié un banquier opérant dans cette même banque.

    Aujourd’hui, c’est donc une véritable course contre la montre qu’engagent les banques pour empêcher certaines d’entre elles de se retrouver en défaut de paiement. « La BDL pourra en sauver une ou deux, mais pas plusieurs. D’autant plus qu’elle n’a aucune obligation de le faire, si on instaure un contrôle de change et un contrôle de capitaux. Ces banques pourront être mises en liquidation, et cela n’impactera pas le reste du secteur bancaire », explique un banquier.

    La course contre la montre est aussi engagée pour le reste de l’économie, puisque les mesures restrictives imposées par les banques impactent significativement les activités de l’ensemble des acteurs économiques, eux-mêmes endettés auprès des banques, et risquant d’être en défaut de paiement vis-à-vis d’elles.

    La seule issue immédiate qui permettra de réduire la panique et la crise de confiance est la formation d’un nouveau gouvernement qui puisse mettre en place des mesures fortes dans le cadre d’un plan de sauvetage. Mais en attendant, le président Michel Aoun a convoqué plusieurs acteurs du secteur bancaire (dont le gouverneur de la BDL et les membres du conseil d’administration de l’ABL) à une réunion aujourd’hui au palais de Baabda, afin de « trouver des solutions » à la crise bancaire actuelle...

    #banque #crise_de_liquidités #banque_du_Liban #devises
    Voir aussi : https://seenthis.net/messages/808290

    • Voir également cet article de Jad Chaabane
      Why Aren’t Lebanese Banks Giving You Back Your Money ?

      The Central Bank and the Association of Banks have a major historical responsibility to protect depositors and provide transparent regulations going forward.


      Après avoir analysé la complicité entre la Banque centrale, le gouvernement et les banques privés, il souligne aussi la responsabilité (ou la complicité) des déposants à titre individuel :

      And it is somehow your fault too. When the banks kept on increasing the interest rate on deposits to attract dollar savings, people gladly joined in. Between 2015 and 2019 deposits by residents in Lebanon in foreign currencies (mainly dollars) increased by $20 billion, mostly in high-interest earning term deposits averaging one year.

      In parallel, the depositors enjoyed low taxes on wealth and interest income, which was barely increased recently, but still much lower than many other countries. This income many Lebanese earned was spent on mostly imported, expensive and non-essential commodities, increasing the country’s need for more dollars to finance these imports.

      So what can be done? You can start by limiting your unnecessary consumption, taking less loans, and accepting that interest rates on your savings go down –of course, the big depositors should lead by example first. You should also not run to the bank to withdraw cash you don’t need, since this might actually cause more panic and less money for everyone. And you should keep on protesting, since a new “clean” government is a cornerstone to regaining trust in the system and reinvigorating our economy.

  • Agustín García Calvo et La Société du bien-être

    Tomás Ibáñez


    La Société du bien-être suivie de « Dieu et l’Argent »
    et « Plus de rails, moins de routes »

    Parlant de Castoriadis il y a déjà quelques années, Edgar Morin n’hésita pas à le qualifier de véritable « Titan de la pensée », mon sentiment est que cette expression qui me semble on ne peut plus heureuse dans ce cas pourrait s’appliquer tout aussi bien à Agustín García Calvo.

    Peu connu en France, mais auréolé d’un indéniable prestige dans la mouvance contestataire d’outre Pyrénées, Agustín García Calvo est probablement le penseur le plus original et le plus créatif de tous ceux qui ont agité la pensée espagnole au cours du dernier demi-siècle.

    Expulsé en 1965 de sa chaire à l’Université de Madrid pour avoir attisé les révoltes étudiantes et avoir inspiré le groupe des jeunes « Acrates », il ne la récupéra qu’à la mort du dictateur, après un long exil à Paris. C’est de ce séjour en France que datent des textes devenus célèbres tels que La Commune antinationaliste de Zamora ou le Communiqué urgent contre le gaspillage. (...)

    #García_Calvo #société #argent #Luis_Bredlow #État #Capital #développement #progrès #réalité #abstraction #individu #peuple #pouvoir

  • #Leslie_Chan

    In this regard it is interesting that you switched the term “developing countries” to “Global South” in your question. The term has multiple meanings but one of them refers to “spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization”.2 This usage focuses our attention on the nature of power and marginalization within global capitalism, and this is appropriate when it comes to the increasing control of the handful of oligarch publishers over the circulation of global public knowledge.

    #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots #Global_South #sud_global #sud_globaux #développement #pays_en_développement #pouvoir #marginalisation #capitalisme

    ping @reka

    • #Anne_Garland_Mahler : Global South

      The Global South as a critical concept has three primary definitions. First, it has traditionally been used within intergovernmental development organizations—primarily those that originated in the Non-Aligned Movement—to refer to economically disadvantaged nation-states and as a post–Cold War alternative to “Third World.” However, within a variety of fields, and often within literary and cultural studies, the Global South has been employed in a postnational sense to address spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization. In this second definition, the Global South captures a deterritorialized geography of capitalism’s externalities and means to account for subjugated peoples within the borders of wealthier countries, such that there are Souths in the geographic North and Norths in the geographic South. While this usage relies on a longer tradition of analysis of the North’s geographic Souths—wherein the South represents an internal periphery and subaltern relational position—the epithet “global” is used to unhinge the South from a one-to-one relation to geography. It is through this deterritorial conceptualization that a third meaning is attributed to the Global South, in which it refers to the resistant imaginary of a transnational political subject that results from a shared experience of subjugation under contemporary global capitalism. This subject is forged when the world’s Souths mutually recognize one another and view their conditions as shared. The use of the Global South to refer to a transnational political subjectivity under contemporary capitalist globalization draws from the rhetoric of the so-called Third World Project, or the non-aligned and radical internationalist discourses of the Cold War. In this sense, the Global South may productively be considered a direct response to the category of postcoloniality in that it captures both a political subjectivity and ideological formulation that arises from lateral solidarities among the world’s multiple “Souths” and that moves beyond the analysis of colonial difference within postcolonial theory. Critical scholarship that falls under the rubric Global South is invested in the analysis of the formation of a Global South subjectivity, the study of power and racialization within global capitalism in ways that transcend the nation-state as the unit of comparative analysis, and in tracing contemporary South-South relations—or relations among subaltern groups across national, linguistic, racial, and ethnic lines—as well as the histories of those relations in prior forms of South-South exchange.


  • Illich et la guerre contre la subsistance,
    hier et aujourd’hui

    Jean Robert


    Durant l’automne de 2013, l’essayiste public que je prétends être a dû faire face à deux tâches hétérogènes entre lesquelles j’ai eu l’intuition de convergences à explorer, mais aussi la certitude immédiate d’incompatibilités. Ce furent, d’une part, la rédaction d’un essai et la traduction française de textes d’un collègue mexicain sur la « petite école » zapatiste qui eut lieu en août, et, d’autre part l’élaboration de l’article que le lecteur a sous les yeux.

    La première de ces tâches consistait à mettre au net, d’abord en espagnol et puis en français, les souvenirs des jours passés au Chiapas à étudier, sous la conduite de paysans et paysannes indigènes, l’expérience zapatiste, depuis 2003, de construction d’un monde de liberté et de justice concrètes, c’est-à-dire proportionnées aux communautés qui les pratiquent. La seconde : la rédaction du présent article sur un homme — un penseur, un historien, un philosophe et un théologien qui se défendait de l’être — qui m’honora de son amitié du début des années 1970 à sa mort, en 2002 : Ivan Illich. Quel rapport y a-t-il entre ce qui en 2002 était encore un mouvement insurgé indigène et ce penseur « radical au vrai sens du mot » ? (...)

    #Ivan_Illich #zapatistes #EZLN #Mexique #Guillermo_Bonfil #Ernst_Bloch #État-nation #Marché #subsistance #guerre #travail #autonomie #modernité #développement #aliénation #Karl_Polanyi #Marx #transports #villes #conquête #invasion #faim #misère #Bentham #Mumford

  • Sur le plancher des vaches (IV/I)
    Symboles (et plus si affinités)



    Paris, le 7 octobre 2019

    « Le plancher des vaches » inaugural jouait avec quelques pseudo-vérités concernant ce que l’on a nommé la « technontologie ». La principale question posée était celle-ci : Notre genre d’humain n’aurait-il pas une certaine propension à recycler sans fin le divin Un ? Si tel était le cas, Dieu ne serait pas mort, mais où s’cache t’El crénom ?

    Le champ d’investigation proposé pour tenter de répondre à cette question est celui du monde du travail. « Le plancher des vaches II » a brossé à grand traits quelques dispositifs structurants mis en place à l’échelon mondial depuis les années 1980, dispositifs dont on a affirmé, dans « le plancher des vaches III », qu’ils dessinent un mouvement progressif de chosification du vivant.

    Ce mouvement n’est pas récent, mais on fait ici l’hypothèse qu’après la prise de corps opérée par la division scientifique du travail, puis le remplacement de bien des corps par des machines, l’époque actuelle est à la prise de tête. Nous avons réduit celle-ci au seul vocable de normalisation — nom proposé pour les tables de la loi —, soit un état de normalité, ce qui pourrait sembler à d’aucuns rassurant. Mais dans ce terme, au-delà de la norme, il y a un caractère de procédé, une proactivité et, sous-jacentes à celle-ci, des nécessités de vérifier ladite normalité. (...)

    #Dieu #normalisation #loi #Florence_Parly #intelligence_artificielle #symbole #cercle #Terre #religion #flèches #projet #développement_durable #trinité #génome #borroméen #plan #parousie #entreprise #objectif #stratégie #Hannah_Arendt

  • DotSPIP. Conversion de fichiers divers (docx, odt) au format #SPIP

    Une application drag-drop pour macOS, qui convertit des textes de divers formats vers les {{raccourcis SPIP}}.

    Ce petit utilitaire bien pratique n’avait pas été mis à jour depuis 2012… la version 2 est désormais compatible 64 bits, ce qui lui assure un avenir radieux pour les prochains millénaires. le #développement est sur passé sur github plutôt que dans un recoin de mon disque dur, ce qui n’est pas plus mal. (On utilise toujours #Platypus.)

    L’ancienne documentation est sur http://zzz.rezo.net/DotSPIP.html ; n’hésitez pas à jouer de la pull-request.


    (ah et pour la compatibilité Linux il y a une possibilité cachée ici https://github.com/Fil/DotSPIP/blob/master/src/linux-gnome.txt — si quelqu’un·e arrive à le faire marcher, ce serait super)

  • Jancovici : CO2 ou PIB, il faut choisir - Sciences Po - 29/08/2019
    Conférence intéressante car elle donne des repères historiques et des ordres de grandeurs.
    Très alarmiste, Jean-Marc Jancovici plaide, avec des arguments, pour une décroissance maitrisée et planifiée (et en France amortie par l’investissement dans le nucléaire parce que notre milieu naturel, n’est selon lui, pas très favorable au développement des énergies renouvelables).


    #transition-énergétique #développement-durable #décroissance #Jean-Marc-Jancovici

  • #Transport_aérien : des sénateurs veulent conforter les lignes d’#aménagement_du_territoire

    Dans son rapport présenté ce 3 octobre, la mission sénatoriale d’information sur les transports aériens et l’aménagement des territoires défend le rôle de l’avion qu’elle juge « vital » pour désenclaver les territoires isolés et répondre aux besoins de leurs habitants, en métropole et en outre-mer. Malgré le dénigrement dont il fait l’objet, le transport aérien peut être inscrit dans une trajectoire durable, selon elle. La mission formule 30 propositions concrètes dont plusieurs concernent directement le rôle des régions et des départements.

    […] Dans son septième axe de préconisations, la mission met en avant plusieurs propositions visant à concilier le #désenclavement aérien des territoires avec le #développement_durable. Tout d’abord, à propos de l’#écocontribution sur les billets d’avion mise en place dans le projet de loi de finances 2020, la mission va proposer via un amendement d’instaurer un abattement prenant en compte le degré de substituabilité entre l’aérien et le train. « Par exemple, un vol Paris-Lyon (52 minutes de différence entre le train et l’avion) ne bénéficierait pas d’abattement et serait pleinement imposé. En revanche, pour un vol Paris-Nice (4 heures 20 d’écart entre le train et l’avion), un abattement de 100 % sur la taxe carbone serait appliqué », illustre Josiane Costes.

    Le rapport : http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2018/r18-734-notice.html

    • Toulouse -> Caen la place en covoiturage 77€ pour 75€ en avion … en train, 125€ pour le meilleur prix.
      (Tiens tiens, voyages-scnf.com a été squatté, les brêles)

  • Dictators as 
Gatekeepers for Europe : 
Outsourcing EU border 
controls to Africa

    The USA is divided around the wall President Trump wants to build along the Mexican border. Europe has long answered this question at its own southern border: put up that wall but don’t make it look like one.

    Today the EU is trying to close as many deals as it can with African states, making it harder and harder for refugees to find protection and more dangerous for labour migrants to reach places where they can earn an income. But this is not the only effect: the more Europe tries to control migration from Africa, the harder it becomes for many Africans to move freely through their own continent, even within their own countries.

    Increasingly, the billions Europe pays for migration control are described as official development assistance (ODA), more widely known as development aid, supposedly for poverty relief and humanitarian assistance. The EU is spending billions buying African leaders as gatekeepers, including dictators and suspected war criminals. And the real beneficiaries are the military and technology corporations involved in the implementation.

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #dictature #dictatures #Afrique #contrôles_frontaliers #fermeture_des_frontières #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #développement #livre

    Ajouté à la métaliste autour de l’externalisation des frontières :

    Et celle-ci sur le lien migrations et développement :

    ping @karine4 @isskein @pascaline

    • Op-ed: The Birth Defect of EU Migration Diplomacy

      Prevention of migration to Europe, especially from Africa, was a priority of the previous Commission and, as it looks, likely to remain as such for the new Commission.

      This makes it increasingly difficult for refugees to find protection. And it is becoming increasingly dangerous for migrant workers to reach places where they can seek income. But that is not the only consequence. The more Europe tries to control migration, the more difficult it becomes for many Africans to move freely within their own continent, even within their own country.

      The EU investment is substantial. From the beginning of the millennium until 2015, the figure was around two billion euros. By 2020, at least another 15 billion euros will have been added. The EU will pay for the costs incurred by controlling migration itself: supplying detained refugees, jeeps or ships for the border police, deportations, reception camps. But it gives even more, in a sense as a premium: an extra portion of development aid for the coalition of the willing in matters of border protection.

      Some African states, such as Tunisia, therefore make it a punishable offence to leave for Europe without papers. Some save themselves such a law and imprison migrants just like that – for example Libya. Some set up border posts where there haven’t been any so far – Sudan, for example. Some introduce biometric passports that many of their citizens cannot afford – such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, which charges 185 dollars for one of the new so-called e-passports produced by a Belgian-Arab consortium. Some take back deportees from Europe, even if they are not their own citizens – for example Morocco. Some states block migration routes with soldiers – Egypt, for example. Some allow Frontex and European Police-Officers to come and help with this – Niger, for example. And some close the borders: not only for transit migrants, but also for their own citizens if they want to enter Europe irregularly – Algeria, for example.

      More and more often, the money paid in return for controlling migration is booked as Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is a misappropriation of funds that are there to alleviate poverty and hardship. It also contradicts the sense of development aid because labour migration is a blessing for poor countries. It brings money into the coffers of small traders and farmers. This mixture of development aid and migration control will increase. “Combating the root causes” is the new paradigm of development policy.

      Günter Nooke, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Africa Commissioner, had an idea on what Africa’s future could look like. In October 2018 he proposed that African states should give up parts of their territory against payment so that the EU could settle refugees there: “Perhaps one or the other African head of government is prepared to give up a piece of territorial sovereignty in exchange for a lease and allow free development there for 50 years. Migrants could be settled there in special economic zones, supported by the World Bank or the EU or individual states.” Such statements are hardly beneficial neither in the formal relationship between Europe and Africa nor in broader segments of the public on the African continent.

      But the cordon sanitaire that the EU is trying to weave against undesirable migration is full of holes. The blueprint agreement with Turkey is crumbling. The number of arrivals in the Aegean islands is currently higher than at any other time since the EU-Turkey deal came into force. Boats from Libya keep leaving, arrivals in Morocco increases.

      The massive political pressure that had been built up for the African states to recognise for example the EU „Laissez Passers“ – passport replacement papers that the deportation country can simply issue itself – or otherwise contribute to increasing the deportations of those obliged to leave has had only a limited effect. And last February, the African Union made it clear that it will not accept transit EU asylum camps on African soil.

      Neither the transit regions nor the regions of origin will let themselves be used in the long term as reception camps or assistant EU border guards. The consequence of this is that the EU cannot solve its migration problem outside its own territory on the long run. The old Commission had consistently refused to accept this insight. The new Commission would now have the opportunity not to repeat this mistake.


  • Chacun sa part « Monde qui bouge

    Ces différents exemples mettent en évidence que l’individualisme et le volontarisme participent à une certaine représentation du monde où le bienêtre, la réussite, le succès et autres dépendent essentiellement d’une attitude individuelle positive.

    Cela peut figer la lecture que l’on peut avoir de certains phénomènes sociaux complexes comme le chômage, les déséquilibres dans la production et la redistribution de richesses ou encore le bonheur d’une population, en négligeant entre autres des paramètres comme le hasard, la reproduction des privilèges sociaux, etc.

    C’est en cela qu’il s’agit bien d’une idéologie. Une idéologie correspond à un ensemble plus ou moins cohérent des idées, des croyances et des doctrines philosophiques, religieuses, politiques, économiques, sociales, propre à une époque, une société, une classe et qui oriente l’action. Nous ajoutons avec Paul Ricœur (4) qu’une idéologie comporte une dimension de dissimulation d’elle-même : elle est le processus par lequel un individu ou une classe témoigne de sa condition tout en ignorant qu’il en rend compte. Autrement dit, le propre d’une idéologie, c’est de formater notre vision du monde sans que nous ayons conscience de ce formatage. Une idéologie cesse dès lors d’être opérante lorsque nous prenons conscience des processus qui la sous-tendent.

    Le volontarisme est la tendance à croire (notamment en politique) que la volonté humaine est capable d’imposer le changement ; thèse, tendance selon laquelle la volonté humaine l’emporte sur toutes les autres facultés, sur le réel, sur les évènements, dans l’État et la société.

    L’individualisme correspond, en politique, à un idéal qui accorde le maximum d’importance à l’individu, à l’initiative privée et réduit le rôle de l’État au minimum ou même à rien. Elle se traduit notamment par une tendance à l’affirmation personnelle ou à l’expression originale.
    Volontarisme et individualisme dans l’enseignement

    Cette manière de surestimer le poids des caractéristiques individuelles (la volonté, le courage, les efforts…) au détriment des facteurs sociaux a été baptisée erreur fondamentale d’attribution. Dans l’enseignement, les sciences humaines et sociales ont montré combien les dynamiques d’étiquetage individuel pouvaient contribuer à reproduire les inégalités.

    Concrètement : si un enseignant considère qu’un élève en difficulté est un cancre, un bon à rien qui n’y met simplement pas du sien pour réussir, ce même enseignant accompagnera peut-être moins cet enfant vers la réussite, et l’enfant finira lui-même peut-être par se conformer à l’étiquette qui lui est imposée. Il s’agit notamment de ce que l’on appelle l’effet Pygmalion (ou effet Rosenthal-Jacobson).

    Quid de la maitrise des codes sociaux qui favorisent la compréhension des implicites partagés par les enseignants ? Quid de partis pris pédagogiques qui permettent à un type d’élèves de mieux s’en sortir que d’autres ? Que penser des phénomènes de ghettoïsation et de stigmatisation interclasses (bonnes classes versus mauvaises classes), interécoles (bonnes écoles versus mauvaises écoles) et interfilières dont sont encore empreintes les écoles ?

    Malgré ces constats sur la réussite des individus, les idéologies volontaristes et individualistes demeurent fortement ancrées dans le monde de l’enseignement, tant dans les contenus d’apprentissage dans des situations de sensibilisation (il faut amener les jeunes à être des adultes responsables) que dans l’accompagnement pédagogique (il faut individualiser les parcours. La réussite et les échecs des élèves sont de leur ressort).

    #individualisme #libéralisme #école #bien-être #développement_personnel

  • Agnès Crepet, développeuse Java (et fondatrice de l’association d’informaticiennes #Duchess, et de la conférence #Mix-IT) travaille chez #Fairphone et, dans ce podcast, explique (très bien) en français cet #ordiphone qui essaie d’être plus éthique et plus écologique que les autres.


    #développement_durable #extraction_minière #obsolescence_programmée #Android