• La nouvelle #définition du « #terrorisme » de la #Suisse crée un dangereux précédent dans le monde, ont prévenu des experts de l’ONU en matière de droits de l’homme

    Le projet de #loi_antiterroriste de la Suisse contrevient aux #normes_internationales en matière de droits de l’homme en élargissant la définition du terrorisme et pourrait créer un dangereux précédent pour la #répression de la #dissidence_politique dans le monde, ont averti aujourd’hui les experts* de l’ONU en matière de droits de l’homme.

    Ils ont exprimé leur regret quant au refus des autorités suisses de modifier les sections controversées du projet de loi, actuellement devant le Parlement, mais ont plaidé pour un changement de dernière minute.

    « Aucune de nos recommandations n’a été mise en œuvre », ont-ils dit, faisant référence à une lettre officielle de 16 pages adressée au gouvernement, envoyée à la fin du mois de mai. « Aucune réponse satisfaisante n’a été donnée à nos principales préoccupations concernant l’incompatibilité du projet de loi avec les droits de l’homme et les meilleures pratiques internationales en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme. »

    Les experts ont été particulièrement préoccupés par le fait que, selon le projet de loi, la nouvelle définition de l’« #activité_terroriste » n’exige plus du tout la perspective d’un #crime. Au contraire, la définition pourrait même inclure des actes licites visant à influencer ou à modifier l’ordre étatique, tels que les activités légitimes des #journalistes, de la société civile et des #militants politiques.

    Selon les normes internationales, y compris le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, le terrorisme comprend toujours l’intimidation ou la coercition d’une population ou d’un gouvernement par la menace ou la perpétration d’actes de violences causant la mort, des blessures graves ou la prise d’otages.

    « L’élargissement de la définition du terrorisme à toute campagne non violente impliquant la propagation de la peur va bien au-delà de l’actuel droit national suisse et contrevient aux normes internationales », ont-ils déclaré. « Cette définition excessivement large crée un dangereux précédent et risque de servir de modèle aux gouvernements autoritaires qui cherchent à réprimer la dissidence politique, notamment par la torture et d’autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. »

    Les experts ont également mis en garde contre certains articles du projet de loi qui donneraient à la #police_fédérale un pouvoir étendu pour désigner des « #terroristes_potentiels » et décider de #mesures_préventives à leur encontre sans #contrôle_judiciaire significatif.

    « Tout en reconnaissant les graves risques sécuritaires posés par le terrorisme, nous regrettons vivement que les autorités suisses aient décliné l’opportunité de bénéficier de notre assistance technique et de notre expertise sur la manière de combiner des mesures préventives efficaces et le respect des droits de l’homme », ont dit les experts.

    Les experts ont appelé les parlementaires à garder à l’esprit l’engagement traditionnellement fort de la Suisse en faveur des droits humains et à rejeter une loi qui « est appelée à devenir une tache sérieuse dans l’héritage par ailleurs fort de la Suisse en matière de droits de l’homme ».

    Les experts se sont en outre déclarés préoccupés par les modifications complémentaires proposées du #code_pénal envisageant l’incrimination du soutien aux organisations terroristes, qui, selon eux, risquait de mettre en danger la longue et remarquable tradition humanitaire de la Suisse. Ils ont donc exhorté le Conseil national à valider une récente proposition du Conseil des Etats d’exempter expressément l’action humanitaire impartiale de la criminalisation.

    « La protection des droits humains et les mesures efficaces de lutte contre le terrorisme ne sont pas des objectifs antagoniques, mais devraient être considérés comme des intérêts complémentaires et se renforçant mutuellement dans toute société démocratique », ont-ils conclu.

    https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26224&LangID=F
    #droits_humains

    ping @cede

  • Peine de mort : une majorité de Français favorable à son rétablissement - Le Parisien
    https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/peine-de-mort-une-majorite-de-francais-favorable-a-son-retablissement-14-

    Mais le sujet reste « très clivant politiquement », selon l’étude, puisque seuls les sympathisants RN (85 %) et LR (71 %, + 23 points) adhèrent majoritairement à cette affirmation, approuvée par une minorité (39 %) dans les autres partis. Le sondage note également une très forte progression (+ 31 points sur un an) des partisans de la peine de mort chez LFI et le PCF.

    Après le séparatisme et l’ensauvagement, la peine de mort.

  • Refugee protection at risk

    Two of the words that we should try to avoid when writing about refugees are “unprecedented” and “crisis.” They are used far too often and with far too little thought by many people working in the humanitarian sector. Even so, and without using those words, there is evidence to suggest that the risks confronting refugees are perhaps greater today than at any other time in the past three decades.

    First, as the UN Secretary-General has pointed out on many occasions, we are currently witnessing a failure of global governance. When Antonio Guterres took office in 2017, he promised to launch what he called “a surge in diplomacy for peace.” But over the past three years, the UN Security Council has become increasingly dysfunctional and deadlocked, and as a result is unable to play its intended role of preventing the armed conflicts that force people to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Nor can the Security Council bring such conflicts to an end, thereby allowing refugees to return to their country of origin.

    It is alarming to note, for example, that four of the five Permanent Members of that body, which has a mandate to uphold international peace and security, have been militarily involved in the Syrian armed conflict, a war that has displaced more people than any other in recent years. Similarly, and largely as a result of the blocking tactics employed by Russia and the US, the Secretary-General struggled to get Security Council backing for a global ceasefire that would support the international community’s efforts to fight the Coronavirus pandemic

    Second, the humanitarian principles that are supposed to regulate the behavior of states and other parties to armed conflicts, thereby minimizing the harm done to civilian populations, are under attack from a variety of different actors. In countries such as Burkina Faso, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia, those principles have been flouted by extremist groups who make deliberate use of death and destruction to displace populations and extend the areas under their control.

    In states such as Myanmar and Syria, the armed forces have acted without any kind of constraint, persecuting and expelling anyone who is deemed to be insufficiently loyal to the regime or who come from an unwanted part of society. And in Central America, violent gangs and ruthless cartels are acting with growing impunity, making life so hazardous for other citizens that they feel obliged to move and look for safety elsewhere.

    Third, there is mounting evidence to suggest that governments are prepared to disregard international refugee law and have a respect a declining commitment to the principle of asylum. It is now common practice for states to refuse entry to refugees, whether by building new walls, deploying military and militia forces, or intercepting and returning asylum seekers who are travelling by sea.

    In the Global North, the refugee policies of the industrialized increasingly take the form of ‘externalization’, whereby the task of obstructing the movement of refugees is outsourced to transit states in the Global South. The EU has been especially active in the use of this strategy, forging dodgy deals with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan and Turkey. Similarly, the US has increasingly sought to contain northward-bound refugees in Mexico, and to return asylum seekers there should they succeed in reaching America’s southern border.

    In developing countries themselves, where some 85 per cent of the world’s refugees are to be found, governments are increasingly prepared to flout the principle that refugee repatriation should only take place in a voluntary manner. While they rarely use overt force to induce premature returns, they have many other tools at their disposal: confining refugees to inhospitable camps, limiting the food that they receive, denying them access to the internet, and placing restrictions on humanitarian organizations that are trying to meet their needs.

    Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic of the past nine months constitutes a very direct threat to the lives of refugees, and at the same time seems certain to divert scarce resources from other humanitarian programmes, including those that support displaced people. The Coronavirus has also provided a very convenient alibi for governments that wish to close their borders to people who are seeking safety on their territory.

    Responding to this problem, UNHCR has provided governments with recommendations as to how they might uphold the principle of asylum while managing their borders effectively and minimizing any health risks associated with the cross-border movement of people. But it does not seem likely that states will be ready to adopt such an approach, and will prefer instead to introduce more restrictive refugee and migration policies.

    Even if the virus is brought under some kind of control, it may prove difficult to convince states to remove the restrictions that they have introduced during the COVD-19 emergency. And the likelihood of that outcome is reinforced by the fear that the climate crisis will in the years to come prompt very large numbers of people to look for a future beyond the borders of their own state.

    Fifth, the state-based international refugee regime does not appear well placed to resist these negative trends. At the broadest level, the very notions of multilateralism, international cooperation and the rule of law are being challenged by a variety of powerful states in different parts of the world: Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and the USA, to name just five. Such countries also share a common disdain for human rights and the protection of minorities – indigenous people, Uyghur Muslims, members of the LGBT community, the Kurds and African-Americans respectively.

    The USA, which has traditionally acted as a mainstay of the international refugee regime, has in recent years set a particularly negative example to the rest of the world by slashing its refugee resettlement quota, by making it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to claim refugee status on American territory, by entirely defunding the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency and by refusing to endorse the Global Compact on Refugees. Indeed, while many commentators predicted that the election of President Trump would not be good news for refugees, the speed at which he has dismantled America’s commitment to the refugee regime has taken many by surprise.

    In this toxic international environment, UNHCR appears to have become an increasingly self-protective organization, as indicated by the enormous amount of effort it devotes to marketing, branding and celebrity endorsement. For reasons that remain somewhat unclear, rather than stressing its internationally recognized mandate for refugee protection and solutions, UNHCR increasingly presents itself as an all-purpose humanitarian agency, delivering emergency assistance to many different groups of needy people, both outside and within their own country. Perhaps this relief-oriented approach is thought to win the favour of the organization’s key donors, an impression reinforced by the cautious tone of the advocacy that UNHCR undertakes in relation to the restrictive asylum policies of the EU and USA.

    UNHCR has, to its credit, made a concerted effort to revitalize the international refugee regime, most notably through the Global Compact on Refugees, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and the Global Refugee Forum. But will these initiatives really have the ‘game-changing’ impact that UNHCR has prematurely attributed to them?

    The Global Compact on Refugees, for example, has a number of important limitations. It is non-binding and does not impose any specific obligations on the countries that have endorsed it, especially in the domain of responsibility-sharing. The Compact makes numerous references to the need for long-term and developmental approaches to the refugee problem that also bring benefits to host states and communities. But it is much more reticent on fundamental protection principles such as the right to seek asylum and the notion of non-refoulement. The Compact also makes hardly any reference to the issue of internal displacement, despite the fact that there are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees under UNHCR’s mandate.

    So far, the picture painted by this article has been unremittingly bleak. But just as one can identify five very negative trends in relation to refugee protection, a similar number of positive developments also warrant recognition.

    First, the refugee policies pursued by states are not uniformly bad. Countries such as Canada, Germany and Uganda, for example, have all contributed, in their own way, to the task of providing refugees with the security that they need and the rights to which they are entitled. In their initial stages at least, the countries of South America and the Middle East responded very generously to the massive movements of refugees out of Venezuela and Syria.

    And while some analysts, including the current author, have felt that there was a very real risk of large-scale refugee expulsions from countries such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Lebanon, those fears have so far proved to be unfounded. While there is certainly a need for abusive states to be named and shamed, recognition should also be given to those that seek to uphold the principles of refugee protection.

    Second, the humanitarian response to refugee situations has become steadily more effective and equitable. Twenty years ago, it was the norm for refugees to be confined to camps, dependent on the distribution of food and other emergency relief items and unable to establish their own livelihoods. Today, it is far more common for refugees to be found in cities, towns or informal settlements, earning their own living and/or receiving support in the more useful, dignified and efficient form of cash transfers. Much greater attention is now given to the issues of age, gender and diversity in refugee contexts, and there is a growing recognition of the role that locally-based and refugee-led organizations can play in humanitarian programmes.

    Third, after decades of discussion, recent years have witnessed a much greater engagement with refugee and displacement issues by development and financial actors, especially the World Bank. While there are certainly some risks associated with this engagement (namely a lack of attention to protection issues and an excessive focus on market-led solutions) a more developmental approach promises to allow better long-term planning for refugee populations, while also addressing more systematically the needs of host populations.

    Fourth, there has been a surge of civil society interest in the refugee issue, compensating to some extent for the failings of states and the large international humanitarian agencies. Volunteer groups, for example, have played a critical role in responding to the refugee situation in the Mediterranean. The Refugees Welcome movement, a largely spontaneous and unstructured phenomenon, has captured the attention and allegiance of many people, especially but not exclusively the younger generation.

    And as has been seen in the UK this year, when governments attempt to demonize refugees, question their need for protection and violate their rights, there are many concerned citizens, community associations, solidarity groups and faith-based organizations that are ready to make their voice heard. Indeed, while the national asylum policies pursued by the UK and other countries have been deeply disappointing, local activism on behalf of refugees has never been stronger.

    Finally, recent events in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe have raised the question as to whether refugees could be spared the trauma and hardship of making dangerous journeys from one country and continent to another by providing them with safe and legal routes. These might include initiatives such as Canada’s community-sponsored refugee resettlement programme, the ‘humanitarian corridors’ programme established by the Italian churches, family reunion projects of the type championed in the UK and France by Lord Alf Dubs, and the notion of labour mobility programmes for skilled refugee such as that promoted by the NGO Talent Beyond Boundaries.

    Such initiatives do not provide a panacea to the refugee issue, and in their early stages at least, might not provide a solution for large numbers of displaced people. But in a world where refugee protection is at such serious risk, they deserve our full support.

    http://www.against-inhumanity.org/2020/09/08/refugee-protection-at-risk

    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #protection #Jeff_Crisp #crise #crise_migratoire #crise_des_réfugiés #gouvernance #gouvernance_globale #paix #Nations_unies #ONU #conflits #guerres #conseil_de_sécurité #principes_humanitaires #géopolitique #externalisation #sanctuarisation #rapatriement #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #droits_humains #Global_Compact_on_Refugees #Comprehensive_Refugee_Response_Framework #Global_Refugee_Forum #camps_de_réfugiés #urban_refugees #réfugiés_urbains #banque_mondiale #société_civile #refugees_welcome #solidarité #voies_légales #corridors_humanitaires #Talent_Beyond_Boundaries #Alf_Dubs

    via @isskein
    ping @karine4 @thomas_lacroix @_kg_ @rhoumour

    –—
    Ajouté à la métaliste sur le global compact :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/739556

  • Réfugiés : #violences et #chaos dans le nord-ouest de la Bosnie-Herzégovine
    Traduit et adapté par Manon Rumiz (Article original : https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Bosnia-Erzegovina/Migranti-caos-Bosnia-204594)

    Squats démantelés, familles déportées et laissées sans aide au bord de la route, violentes manifestations anti-migrants.... Dans le canton d’Una-Sana (nord-ouest de la Bosnie-Herzégovine), la situation des réfugiés devient toujours plus dramatique.

    « C’est le chaos. » Voilà comment Silvia Maraone, qui coordonne les activités de l’ONG italienne Ipsia (https://www.facebook.com/IPSIA.BIH) à #Bihać, résume la situation actuelle dans le canton d’#Una_Sana, explosive depuis le milieu de l’été. « Les conditions imposées par le gouvernement local n’offrent plus de répit à personne. Même les familles, les femmes et les enfants n’ont plus accès aux #camps officiels. Quant aux transports en commun, ils sont désormais interdits aux réfugiés, ce qui permet aux trafiquants de faire des affaires encore plus lucratives. »

    Dans le même temps, la police expulse les #squats et tous les #camps_informels, renvoyant les réfugiés hors des frontières du canton. La population locale, de son côté, manifeste ouvertement son hostilité face à la présence massive de candidats à l’exil. Les agressions verbales et physiques se multiplient, ainsi que les attaques contre les volontaires.

    “Le canton d’Una Sana est plus que jamais le #cul-de-sac de la route des Balkans.”

    Du fait de la #pandémie et de la proclamation de l’#état_d’urgence, la situation s’est encore détériorée depuis le printemps. Les camps officiels, déjà pleins, n’accueillent plus de nouveaux entrants alors mêmes que les arrivées ont repris depuis la réouverture des frontières au mois de juin. Le canton d’Una Sana est plus que jamais le cul-de-sac de la route des Balkans, d’autant qu’à l’ouest, le jeu de domino entre les polices italienne, slovène et croate se poursuit, aboutissant au #refoulement des migrants interceptés dans cette zone frontalière de l’Union européenne.

    La seule réponse apportée par les autorités locales a été l’ouverture, en avril, d’un « #camp_d’urgence » à Lipa, entre Bihać et #Bosanski_Petrovac, dont le millier places a vite été rempli. Les squats se sont donc multipliés dans les #friches_industrielles et dans les bois. De toute façon, les migrants ne souhaitent pas rester ici et le « #game » continue : chaque jour, ils sont des centaines à tenter de déjouer la surveillance de la frontière croate avec l’espoir de ne pas être arrêté avant d’avoir atteint l’Italie.

    Le début du « chaos » qu’évoque Silvia Maraone remonte à la mi-juillet, avec l’expulsion du camp de fortune qui s’était créé à l’entrée de #Velika_Kladuša, près du camp officiel de #Miral, le long de la rivière #Kladušnica. Officiellement, l’opération a été déclenchée à cause des plaintes répétées des riverains. Début août, la police est revenue pour chasser les migrants qui avaient reconstitué un nouveau camp.

    « #Milices_citoyennes »

    Quelques jours plus tard, le maire de Bihać, #Šuhret_Fazlić, déclarait que la situation était aussi devenue insoutenable dans sa commune. « Cela n’a jamais été pire qu’aujourd’hui. Chaque jour, nous assistons à l’arrivée d’un flux incontrôlé de migrants. Il y en a déjà des milliers qui campent un peu partout. Une fois de plus, on nous laisse seuls », avant de conclure, menaçant : « Nous sommes prêts à prendre des mesures radicales ». Ce n’est pas la première fois que le maire de Bihać tire la sonnette d’alarme. Début 2018, au tout début de la crise, l’édile déplorait déjà le manque de soutien des autorités de la Fédération, l’entité croato-bosniaque dont dépend le canton, et nationales. À l’automne 2019, Silvia Maraone s’inquiétait aussi : « La situation ne fera qu’empirer dans les mois qui viennent si de nouveaux camps officiels ne sont pas ouverts d’urgence ».

    Selon les chiffres officiels, plus de 80% des réfugiés présents sur le sol bosnien se concentreraient dans le seul canton d’Una Sana. « Il sont plus de 5000, dont à peine la moitié hébergés dans des centres d’accueil officiels. Les autres dorment dans des bâtiments détruits ou dans les bois en attendant de tenter le game », poursuit Silvia Maraone. Ces dernières semaines, la population de Velika Kladuša a organisé des manifestations hebdomadaires contre la présence de migrants. Organisées sur les réseaux sociaux, ces rassemblements réunissent des habitants venus de tout le canton.

    Pire, des #milices citoyennes ont commencé à se mettre en place pour refouler les migrants. « Dans certains groupes Facebook, des membres signalent les plaques des véhicules qui transportent des migrants », observe Silvia Maraone. « Des routes ont même été bloquées, des pierres et des bâtons jetés sur les véhicules. » Ce n’est pas tout. « Des citoyens ont attaqué des migrants en pleine rue, tandis que les volontaires leur venant en aide se sont faits dénoncer à la police. » Le 17 août, les forces de l’ordre ont dû intervenir à Velika Kladuša où des dizaines de riverains s’étaient massés et avaient attaqué un bus où se trouvaient des migrants.

    Pour justifier de telles actions coup de poing, on trouve la rhétorique habituelle de l’extrême-droite complotiste : la prétendue violence de ces migrants et la menace qu’ils feraient peser pour la sécurité de la population locale. Des arguments balayés par les statistiques officielles, mais qui font mouche auprès de Bosniens fatigués par des décennies de divisions, de corruption et de misère.

    Deux jours après la violente manifestation du 17 août à Velika Kladuša, la cellule de crise du canton d’Una-Sana a décrété des mesures très dures : l’évacuation de tous les migrants vivant hors des structures d’accueil officielles, perquisition dans tous les lieux privés offrants des services aux migrants, interdiction de quitter les camps officiels, d’utiliser les transports en commun et d’entrer dans le canton pour tous les migrants. Des postes de contrôle ont aussi été mis en place sur les routes d’accès au canton.

    “Ils ont tout brûlé, vêtements, téléphones portables, sacs à dos. Ils nous ont frappés avec des matraques.”

    « Les personnes expulsées des squats n’ont pas toutes pu être accueillies au camp de #Lipa et ont été refoulées en #Republika_Srpska (l’autre entité de Bosnie-Herzégovine) », dénonce Silvia Maraone. « Même les familles avec enfants sont abandonnées sans aucune aide. » Ces restrictions à la #liberté_de_mouvement violent les #droits_humains fondamentaux, comme l’a dénoncé Amnesty International dans un communiqué, le 25 août. Le réseau Transbalkanska Solidarnost (https://transbalkanskasolidarnost.home.blog) demande aux autorités locales et aux organisations internationales de « mettre fin à la politique du silence », de condamner publiquement ces pratiques illégales, de poursuivre les responsables et d’assurer un accueil digne et sûr aux migrants.

    Transbalkanska Solidarnost a recueilli plusieurs #témoignages sur ces expulsions, dont celles de l’ONG No Name Kitchen à Bosanska Otoka. « Nous dormions dans une ancienne usine abandonnée près de Bihać quand la police est arrivée. Il devait y avoir 20 ou 25 policiers. Ils ont tout brûlé, vêtements, téléphones portables, sacs à dos. Ils nous ont frappés avec des matraques, puis nous ont expulsés ici où nous sommes sans nourriture, sans rien. Je me suis échappé d’Afghanistan pour me sauver et là je retrouve cette violence... Pourquoi ?! », se désole A., 16 ans. Selon les chiffres des associations, plus de 500 réfugiés se sont retrouvés bloqués sur la ligne de démarcation entre les deux entités bosniennes, personne ne voulant les prendre en charge.

    Malgré les menaces qui se font toujours plus fortes, les réseaux de #volontaires continuent de venir en aide aux migrants : distribution de produits de première nécessité, de vêtements et signalement des violences et des violations des droits. « Ce n’est pas facile », reconnaît Silvia Maraone. « Tout le monde vous regarde mal et ceux que vous aidez sont détestés… Nous restons prudents. » Son ONG, Ipsia ; intervient toujours dans le camp de Bira, géré par l’#Organisation_internationale_pour_les_migrations (#OIM) où elle gère le Café social et prépare un projet plus vaste, soutenu par des fonds européens, pour développer des activités, hors des camps, visant à améliorer les relations entre migrants et population locale. Il y a urgence. « Jamais le bras-de-fer avec le reste de la Bosnie n’a été aussi tendu. »

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/refugies-chaos-dans-le-nord-ouest-de-la-bosnie-herzegovine

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #camps_de_réfugiés #campements #IOM #extrême_droite #solidarité

    –-> « Quant aux transports en commun, ils sont désormais interdits aux réfugiés, ce qui permet aux trafiquants de faire des affaires encore plus lucratives »
    #ségrégation #transports_publics #transports_en_commun #apartheid

    –-> « l’#Organisation_internationale_pour_les_migrations (#OIM) gère le Café social et prépare un projet plus vaste, soutenu par des fonds européens, pour développer des activités, hors des camps, visant à améliorer les relations entre migrants et population locale. Il y a urgence. »
    En fait, ce qu’il faudrait faire c’est ouvrir les frontières et laisser ces personnes bloquées en Bosnie, où elles n’ont aucune intention de rester, de partir...

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Impact of the use of private military and security services in immigration and border management on the protection of the rights of all migrants

    The present report covers the activities of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination since its previous report to the Council (A/HRC/42/42). It also highlights the impact on the protection of the human rights of all migrants of the increased use of private military and security services in immigration and border management.

    In the report, the Working Group outlines the overall context in which these services are provided and the relevant normative framework. It examines four main categories of services: provision of research and technical expertise; border security technologies and monitoring services; immigration detention, returns and removals; and the implementation of “externalization” policies. It shines a light on the impact of these services on the human rights of all migrants. It then looks at the lack of transparency, oversight and accountability of companies operating in this sector, and the impact on effective remedies for victims of violations and abuses by these companies.

    It concludes that, at times, companies are directly responsible for human rights abuses of migrants, notably in situations of deprivation of liberty; while in other instances, they are complicit in widespread human rights violations and abuse caused by other actors, such as immigration and border authorities.

    The Working Group ends its report with recommendations addressed primarily to States and private military and security companies, aimed at triggering a fundamental evaluation of the role that companies play in reinforcing security over humanitarian approaches to immigration and border management, as well as the specific security services they provide in this sector.

    https://undocs.org/A/HRC/45/9
    #rapport #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #mercenaires #militarisation_des_frontières #droits_humains #armée #armée_privée #privatisation #technologie #rétention #détention #renvois #expulsions

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Guide des droits - Chômeurs CGT
    https://chomeurs-precaires-cgt.fr/guide-des-droits

    Convocations et radiations illégales, offres déraisonnables, « prestations » ou formations bidons, pression voire harcèlement, manque d’information, refus de donner un RDV, refus de laisser un salarié privé d’emploi être accompagné, blocage des allocations, trop-perçus et indus abusifs… Vis-à-vis des relations parfois tendues avec Pôle Emploi, nous rappelons la nécessité impérieuse pour les privés d’emploi de connaître leurs droits et de s’organiser dans la lutte contre le chômage, de former des comités CGT de privés d’emploi et de précaires et de rejoindre le combat pour une vie digne.

    Ce guide se compose de deux parties : « le parcours à Pôle-Emploi » et « l’indemnisation ».

    Encore et toujours ce terme stal-dingue de « privé d’emploi ». C’était fondamentalement pas tenable. Maintenant, les « chômeurs en activité réduite » constituent la majorité (relative) des chômeurs indemnisés. Et on continue.

    #chômeurs #droits_sociaux #Pôle_emploi

  • « Les jeunes représentent un angle mort de l’Etat-providence français », Tom Chevalier
    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/09/05/les-jeunes-representent-un-angle-mort-de-l-etat-providence-francais_6051065_

    Le chercheur Tom Chevalier s’étonne, dans une tribune au « Monde », de l’absence d’accès des 18-25 ans aux minimas sociaux, pourtant recommandé par tous les rapports et les études, alors que la crise actuelle touche principalement les jeunes

    Tribune. Les jeunes âgés de 18 à 29 ans présentent un taux de pauvreté monétaire (revenu inférieur au seuil de 50 % du revenu médian) quatre fois supérieur à celui des personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans : environ 13 % contre 3 % en 2017 d’après l’Insee. Il s’agit également de la tranche d’âge dont le taux de pauvreté a le plus progressé ces dernières années, avec une hausse de près de 50 % depuis 2002.

    La crise économique de 2007, puis celle engendrée par la situation sanitaire due au Covid-19, ont progressivement dégradé les conditions de vie des jeunes. Ceux-ci représentent donc la partie de la population la plus touchée par la pauvreté. Pourtant, ils sont exclus du dispositif principal de lutte contre la pauvreté, à savoir le revenu de solidarité active (RSA). Paradoxe.

    Le RSA n’est en effet pas ouvert aux jeunes de moins de 25 ans. C’est une spécificité française puisque, dans la quasi-totalité des pays européens, les jeunes peuvent bénéficier du revenu minimum dès 18 ans, et que les jeunes adultes français de moins de 25 ans sont presque les seuls en Europe (avec les Espagnols et les Luxembourgeois) à être toujours considérés comme des enfants par l’Etat social. Même l’Italie, un pays à forte tradition familialiste, a récemment mis en place un revenu minimum (reddito di cittadinanza), sans condition d’âge.

    La tradition familialiste française

    Dans la plupart des pays, quand on devient adulte civilement (majorité civile) et politiquement (droit de vote), on le devient aussi socialement. Pas en France. Plusieurs raisons peuvent rendre compte de cette exception. Tout d’abord, la tradition familialiste française : on considère que c’est d’abord à la famille de prendre en charge ses « grands enfants », et c’est la raison pour laquelle les jeunes représentent un angle mort de l’Etat-providence français.

    Ce qui reporte la charge des difficultés sociales des jeunes sur les familles – renforçant d’autant l’importance des origines sociales et par conséquent les inégalités entre jeunes – et laisse à l’abandon ceux qui sont sans famille ou dont la famille n’a pas les ressources suffisantes pour les aider (« Les transferts familiaux vers les jeunes adultes en temps de crise : le charme discret de l’injustice distributive », Adrien Papuchon, Revue française des affaires sociales n°1-2, 2014).

    Ensuite, la critique d’un éventuel « assistanat » est récurrente dans le débat public : s’ils recevaient le RSA, les jeunes se reposeraient sur ce revenu, sans chercher d’emploi. C’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle l’allocation d’insertion en faveur des jeunes primo entrants sur le marché du travail fut supprimée en 1992, et que le « RSA jeunes », créé en 2009, établit des conditions trop restrictives et déconnectées des conditions de travail des jeunes en en limitant l’accès à ceux qui ont travaillé deux ans sur les trois dernières années.

    La critique d’assistanat envers les plus pauvres n’est pas fondée

    De fait, le RSA n’a finalement touché qu’environ 9 000 jeunes. Or, l’accès au revenu minimum n’affecte pas la recherche d’emploi des jeunes (« Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans », Olivier Bargain et Augustin Vicard, Economie et Statistique n° 467-468, 2014). Les travaux d’Esther Duflo sur la pauvreté ont notamment montré que cette critique d’assistanat envers les plus pauvres n’était pas fondée empiriquement.

    Surtout, il est possible d’articuler plus étroitement le bénéfice du revenu minimum aux dispositifs d’accompagnement vers l’emploi ou la formation, comme c’est le cas dans les pays nordiques dans le cadre des « garanties jeunesse ». S’il existe également en France une Garantie Jeunes, elle ne permet pas de couvrir la totalité des jeunes en situation de pauvreté : pour cela, il faudrait l’articuler à l’ouverture du RSA aux moins de 25 ans, ou changer de dimension en la transformant en un véritable droit social équivalent (« Arrêtons de les mettre dans des cases ! Pour un choc de simplification en faveur de la jeunesse », Célia Verot et Antoine Dulin, Rapport au premier ministre, mars 2017).

    Enfin, le coût budgétaire de la mesure demeure le sous-texte nécessaire à la compréhension d’une telle absence de décision. L’Inspection générale des affaires sociales, reprenant une étude de la Drees de 2012, a par exemple estimé le coût de l’ouverture du RSA aux 18-25 ans (non-étudiants) entre 1,5 et 3 milliards d’euros (« La protection sociale des jeunes de 16 à 29 ans », Rapport 2015 de l’Inspection générale des affaires sociales).

    Le « revenu universel d’activité » pour les moins de 25 ans

    A titre de comparaison, le crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi (CICE) a coûté 21 milliards en 2018, et le « plan jeunes » présenté le 23 juillet 6,5 milliards. C’est donc une réforme qui dépend en fin de compte d’une volonté politique forte en faveur des jeunes précaires, alors que ses effets seraient considérables en termes de réduction de la pauvreté (« Repenser les minima sociaux - Vers une couverture socle commune », Chistophe Sirugue, Rapport au premier ministre, avril 2016).

    Lors du débat sur la mise en place d’un éventuel « revenu universel d’activité » remplaçant l’ensemble des minima sociaux, la question de l’âge a été posée : faut-il ouvrir ce nouveau dispositif aux moins de 25 ans ? Si l’on a pu penser un temps que ce soit le cas, répondant ainsi à l’exemple de la quasi-totalité des pays d’Europe, au souhait des organisations jeunesse et aux nombreux rapports administratifs l’ayant appelé de leurs vœux (Concertation citoyenne sur le revenu universel d’activité - Synthèse des ateliers citoyens, octobre-décembre 2019), il semble que ce ne soit plus le cas puisque Gabriel Attal, alors secrétaire d’Etat à la jeunesse, s’est exprimé contre cette ouverture dans une interview le 26 mai 2020.

    Or, le contexte actuel rend d’autant plus nécessaire cette entrée des jeunes dans le droit commun des minima sociaux : si la crise sanitaire actuelle a principalement touché les plus âgés, la crise économique et sociale qui s’ensuit va concerner les jeunes en premier lieu, avec, entre autres, une montée du chômage et de la pauvreté. Cette situation, qui se retrouve dans tous les pays selon l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) comme selon l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), va également accroître les problèmes de santé mentale ainsi que la défiance politique des jeunes.

    La reconnaissance du statut de citoyen social

    Certes, le « plan jeunes » propose une palette de dispositifs pour aider les jeunes dans ce nouveau contexte. Il ne peut toutefois ni répondre à toutes les futures situations de pauvreté qui surviendront (accentuées par la future réforme de l’assurance chômage repoussée à 2021, qui augmentera la durée de cotisation de quatre à six mois), ni endiguer la crise de confiance des jeunes à l’égard des institutions, sans leur faire confiance en retour en reconnaissant leur statut d’adulte dans le cadre de la protection sociale.

    Si, comme l’a déclaré le 22 août à la presse la nouvelle secrétaire d’Etat à la jeunesse, Sarah el Haïry, être jeune en France « c’est être au cœur du système de solidarité », alors la première étape est de leur ouvrir ce qui constitue le premier pilier de cette solidarité : la reconnaissance du statut de citoyen social et son corollaire, l’accès au revenu minimum.

    Tom Chevalier travaille sur les politiques publiques en direction des jeunes en Europe. Il est notamment l’auteur de La jeunesse dans tous ses Etats (PUF, 2018).

    #Revenu #droits_sociaux #jeunes #RSA #RUA

  • #Marlène_Schiappa, le #fémonationalisme et nous

    Juillet 2020. Dans le cadre d’« opérations de reconquête républicaine », Marlène Schiappa en appelle au « bon sens », entendre : « Si la maison de votre voisin s’effondre, vous l’accueillez. Mais s’il se met à tabasser votre sœur, vous le virez ! » C’est en ces termes qu’elle se félicite de la mise en place, par ses soins, de la #double_peine pour les étrangers coupables de violences sexistes et sexuelles. Accusée de promouvoir le fémonationalisme — c’est-à-dire un féminisme qui instrumentalise les #droits_des_femmes à des fins nationalistes et identitaires —, la porte-voix du gouvernement Macron a répondu n’avoir « aucune leçon de féminisme à recevoir de qui que ce soit ». Plus qu’une participation à la présente polémique, la sociologue et écrivaine Kaoutar Harchi entend ici, en guise de prolongement, rappeler la nécessité de déployer, face aux menées libérales et xénophobes, « un féminisme antiraciste et anticapitaliste ».

    À peine nommée ministre déléguée auprès du ministre de l’Intérieur, en charge de la Citoyenneté, Marlène Schiappa, ancienne secrétaire d’État chargée de l’Égalité entre les hommes et les femmes et de la Lutte contre les discriminations, a revêtu les habits neufs — au vrai, pas tant que cela — de la nouvelle fonction politique qui lui incombe. Ces nouvelles attributions ne vont pas sans rappeler d’anciennes prises de position. Se voulant féministes, celles-ci plaidaient, en 2017, tant pour l’instauration d’un congé maternité non indexé au statut professionnel des mères que pour la verbalisation des insultes sexistes proférées au sein de l’espace public. L’alliance, hier comme aujourd’hui, d’un déploiement de dispositifs sécuritaires visant au contrôle des conduites masculines, d’une part, et d’une rhétorique de la protection des femmes contre les violences sexistes et sexuelles, d’autre part, est loin d’être une disposition circonstancielle. Elle peut même relever d’un projet féministe de type carcéro-punitif : déployé au cœur de l’État, il en a pris le pli au point de confier aux institutions de la force — policière et pénitentiaire — le monopole de la gestion protectrice des femmes.

    Ne voir là qu’une passion pour le châtiment et l’enfermement est à la fois nécessaire et insuffisant : l’analyse des alliances réalisées ne peut se faire indépendamment d’une analyse des significations politiques symboliquement induites, ni évacuer les effets empiriques produits sur les vies des hommes et des femmes. Car, au final, de quels hommes et de quelles femmes parle Marlène Schiappa lorsqu’elle défend la mise en place de mesures de lutte contre « le séparatisme » — que le président de la République évoquait déjà, le 18 février 2020, lors de son discours à Mulhouse ? Rien de plus simple, il suffit d’écouter Schiappa s’exprimer : « Lorsqu’un étranger commet des violences sexistes ou sexuelles, il doit cesser d’être accueilli en France. » Ou : « Si vous avez quelqu’un qui se présente comme étant un imam et qui, dans une salle de réunion, ou sur YouTube, ou sur les réseaux sociaux, appelle à la lapidation des femmes parce qu’elles se parfument, il ne faut pas rester sans agir, il faut déposer plainte. Tous les voies et recours doivent pouvoir être étudiés et nous devons pouvoir étudier des manières de renforcer la législation pour réaffirmer les grands principes de la République et notre lutte contre le séparatisme. »

    Ou bien encore : « L’idée, c’est de contrer les groupes organisés de manière hostile et violente vis-à-vis de la République. Il y a des choses qui existent déjà dans la loi : on a fait fermer près de 300 lieux problématiques, débits de boissons ou écoles hors contrat, qui prêchent cet islam politique, cet islamisme et ce séparatisme. […] Et c’est une manière de protéger les musulmans qui nous alertent et nous disent que leur mosquée est prise à partie sur ces questions-là par des groupes qui s’organisent pour parler au nom de l’islam. Il faut être prudent sur les mots et les termes, et c’est pour cela qu’on finalise cette loi et qu’on la présentera à la rentrée. » Et de préciser, enfin : « Je veux être prudente dans les comparaisons qu’on fait et je ne peux pas comparer [les exemples cités plus hauts avec] le diacre qui considère que l’évêché doit être réservé aux hommes. Je ne suis pas d’accord avec lui mais il ne met pas en péril la République. Ce n’est pas la même chose de dire "nos traditions veulent cela" que de dire "j’impose mes lois et je souhaite lapider des femmes", il y a une différence de degré. »

    Bien que nous ignorions encore selon quels dispositifs précis Marlène Schiappa entend mener ce « combat culturel », sa seule manière d’en assurer la performance médiatique nous permet d’identifier sans mal la forme de coalition qui le fonde : coalition d’un argumentaire centré sur la condition sociale inégalitaire à laquelle les femmes sont contraintes, et d’un discours qui se veut à la fois explicatif et prescriptif. Un discours qui fait de la condition des femmes un phénomène imputable, non pas au régime patriarcal tel qu’il se (re)configure au gré des périodes et des espaces, mais à un segment particulier de ce régime. En amalgamant les figures incommensurablement altérisées de l’étranger, du réfugié, du migrant, du musulman, de l’Arabe, du Noir ou encore du jeune de banlieue, ce segment devient le seul qui vaudrait la peine d’être combattu. Ce phénomène rhétorique où féminisme et racisme se rencontrent, se saluent, et s’incarnent en politiques gouvernementales, en programmes éducatifs, en campagnes de prévention ou encore en répertoire d’intégration, a été qualifié de « fémonationaliste » et s’arrime à la famille étendue des nationalismes sexuels.

    Un féminisme au service de la nation

    Forgé par Sara R. Farris à travers l’ouvrage In the name of Women’s Rights — The Rise of Femonationalism, le concept de fémonationalisme décrit, selon l’autrice, « les tentatives des partis européens de droite (entre autres) d’intégrer les idéaux féministes dans des campagnes anti-immigrés et anti-Islam ». Si la critique des convergences de la rhétorique des droits des femmes et celle du chauvinisme-nationalisme a mis en évidence, et avec insistance, les processus de culturalisation des violences faites à celles-ci, Sara R. Farris a œuvré, en tant que féministe marxiste, à déplacer l’analyse vers le terrain fécond du complexe politico-économique. Ainsi a‑t-elle cherché à comprendre les motivations profondes qui tendent, sous l’effet de la surqualification sexiste des hommes non-blancs1, à opposer les intérêts de ces derniers aux femmes non-blanches et, plus encore, à les représenter publiquement comme des figures antinomiques. Et la théoricienne de s’interroger : « De nos jours, particulièrement dans le Sud de l’Europe, les migrants sont fréquemment perçus comme une réserve de main‑d’œuvre bon marché dont la présence menace les emplois et les salaires des travailleurs nationaux. Pourtant, les travailleuses migrantes et les musulmanes en particulier ne sont ni présentées ni perçues de la même manière. Pourquoi ? »

    Pour répondre à cette question, plus redoutable qu’elle n’y paraît, Sara R. Farris a porté son attention sur les secteurs économiques d’intégration des migrant·es. De là, il est apparu que les travailleuses migrantes sont principalement employées par le secteur domestique tandis que les travailleurs migrants sont distribués selon une logique bien plus diversifiée. La féminisation des mondes du travail, l’ouverture du domaine des soins au marché ainsi que la facilitation transactionnelle, organisée par l’État, de recourir à une assistance extérieure — relative, notamment, à la garde d’enfants, à l’aide aux personnes âgées ou aux personnes handicapées — ont grandement et durablement favorisé la constitution des femmes du Sud, non comme « armée de réserve » menaçante mais comme « armée régulière » entretenue permettant aux collectivités blanches de bien vivre.

    Selon l’autrice, l’une des grilles de compréhension de l’appareil justificatoire fémonationaliste tirerait sa force de cette matérialité de l’aide féminine apportée. La lutte pour la conservation de cette aide conduirait alors à représenter et à traiter les femmes non-blanches issues des migrations postcoloniales comme victimes à extirper et à sauver des mains dangereuses de leur époux, père, frère, oncle, cousin, et plus généralement de tout homme de leur groupe ethno-racial supposé ou réel. La logique néolibérale, dont on perçoit bien, ici, l’intimité structurelle qu’elle entretient avec la sexualisation/racialisation de la force de travail, viendrait dès lors infléchir les traitements — mais pas les violences — que des gouvernements de droite et de gauche porteraient sur les femmes migrantes. Inflexions d’autant plus probables et soutenues qu’elles viennent confirmer, si ce n’est créer, un effet de coïncidence avec la définition majoritaire de la figure féminine — a fortiori migrante — émancipée et légitime à vivre sur les territoires nationaux européens : soit une femme libérée de l’emprise familiale et librement présente sur le marché du travail.

    Une séquence fémonationaliste historique

    Dans le contexte spécifique des politiques et législations françaises, il s’agirait alors de comprendre la manière dont la pensée de Sara R. Farris éclaire l’une des séquences contemporaines les plus fondamentales de la longue histoire fémonationaliste française, à savoir celle de l’interdiction du port du voile dans les écoles publiques, en 2004, au nom de la laïcité et de l’égalité filles-garçons. Comme le note la sociologue Christine Delphy, les arguments des féministes en faveur de l’interdiction du foulard, « formulés dès 1989 par Élisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut, Élisabeth de Fontenay, Catherine Kintzler2 », ont affirmé l’exceptionnalité de la violence sexiste exercée par les hommes non-blancs, en la rejetant au-delà du cadre de la violence sexiste ordinaire. Nombre de débats publics se sont alors orientés vers le « pourquoi » de cette violence supposée plus violente que toute autre, et ont fait d’elle, lorsqu’elle est observée sur le territoire national, une violence accidentelle — c’est-à-dire importée d’un ailleurs lointain, conséquence de l’immigration d’hommes de confession musulmane, réelle ou supposée — et portant atteinte à l’intégrité de la « démocratie sexuelle ».

    L’association Ni Putes ni Soumises, par exemple, grandement centrée sur l’accompagnement de la population féminine « des quartiers », a incarné le combat contre la « barbarie » patriarcale supposée de la fraction masculine, musulmane et populaire de la société française. Un combat, mené par quelques actrices féminines racisées proches des structures du pouvoir, se voulant représentatives du pendant féminin de ladite fraction, et qui a symbolisé, à lui-seul, l’arrachement des femmes bonnes d’une religion et d’une culture mauvaises. Cela au point que la nécessité d’aider les jeunes filles en question à quitter leur « culture » en quittant leur famille, et plus encore à rompre tout lien avec elles, a progressivement été défendue par les membres de l’association et par nombre d’acteurs et d’actrices institutionnels prohibitionnistes.

    Articulant ces éléments, qui mêlent processus de racialisation (lesquels assurent la pérennité de l’ordre patriarcal) et mécanismes de sexualisation (lesquels confèrent toute sa force à l’organisation racisée), Sara R. Farris y adjoint alors ce que la sociologue Dina Bader a nommé « la dimension du gain3 » : cet intérêt structurel qui mène les gouvernements de droite et de gauche, dans une perspective conservatrice et nationaliste, à s’accaparer le discours féministe, avec la collaboration volontariste de féministes en poste, « car ils ont quelque chose à gagner ». En filigrane de cette manière d’appréhender le phénomène d’un féminisme raciste, nous retrouvons l’hypothèse développée par le philosophe marxiste Alain Badiou selon laquelle « la loi sur le foulard [serait] une loi capitaliste pure [qui] ordonnerait que la féminité soit exposée. Autrement dit, que la circulation sous paradigme marchand du corps féminin [serait] obligatoire et interdi[rait] en la matière — et chez les adolescentes, plaque sensible de l’univers subjectif entier — toute réserve ». Ainsi la logique marchande d’une transparence de la féminité occidentale s’articule aux résidus fondamentaux de la logique (néo)coloniale du dévoilement articulée.

    Dans un paradigme où les femmes racisées, en tant que telles, sont perçues comme ayant toujours quelque chose d’elles à vendre quand, au contraire, les hommes racisés sont appréhendés comme ne disposant pas de ressources pour acheter, aux premières l’accueil sous conditions — celle de ne pas porter le voile, notamment —, aux seconds le rejet inconditionnel.

    Enjeux collectifs

    La rhétorique fémonationaliste à laquelle Marlène Schiappa s’adonne allègrement depuis le ministère de l’Intérieur4 se déploie entre les soupçons d’agressions sexuelles qui pèsent sur Gérald Darmanin : mise en scène révoltante d’un pouvoir qui survisibilise la violence sexiste de certains hommes pour mieux invisibiliser celle d’autres. Cette rhétorique appelle une réponse forte, collectivement organisée. Non parce que nos hommes subiraient le racisme et qu’il faudrait, en tant que leurs femmes, les en sauver — tandis que d’autres hommes chercheraient à nous sauver de ceux-là mêmes —, mais bien parce qu’en tant que femmes de personne, nous jugeons que la lutte antiraciste et la lutte antisexiste ne sauraient être pleinement réalisées que dans cette conscience aiguë que les personnes opprimées par le racisme ne sont pas toutes des hommes non-blancs et que l’oppression patriarcale ne soumet pas uniquement des femmes blanches. Dans cette perspective, et Delphy le remarque justement, les femmes racisées sont contraintes de construire avec et sans les hommes du groupe racisé, avec et sans les femmes du groupe blanc. Ce qui pose la question cruciale des conditions de possibilité liées à la construction d’un espace politique des femmes racisées.

    Que signifie cet « avec » et ce « sans » ? Une infinité de pièges qui parsème les chemins difficiles de l’émancipation politique des membres objectivement solidaires du groupe racisé et des membres objectivement solidaires du groupe féminin — solidarité que la rhétorique fémonationaliste cherche tout bonnement à rompre définitivement en isolant femmes et hommes, en livrant les unes à la dévoration domestique et les autres à la noyade en haute mer ou à l’asphyxie. Cela ne peut ni ne doit durer car personne ne peut être dépossédé de son existence et vivre en se sachant, ainsi, destiné à la mort. Dénoncer et lutter contre la racialisation des questions sexuelles et la sexualisation de la question raciale — auxquelles Schiappa et Darmanin, comme d’autres avant eux, vont en promettant un grand avenir — implique d’affronter une question centrale : si les femmes racisées sont aptes — car construites ainsi par un ensemble de rapports sociaux — à se voir, à se reconnaître et à éprouver une forme d’empathie envers l’homme non-blanc que le racisme violente et envers la femme blanche que le patriarcat oppresse, qui des membres de ces groupes dominés se reconnaissent en elles ?

    Il importe de nous acharner à pointer du doigt la moindre injustice de genre, de classe et de race, produite non seulement par l’instrumentalisation des idées féministes, mais aussi et surtout par le caractère instrumentalisable et donc antiféministe de ces mêmes idées. Cela, de nombreuses personnes qui militent l’ont dit bien des fois. Mais en matière de politique des luttes, se répéter est une manière de dialoguer avec ceux et celles qui entendraient parler de tout cela pour la première fois, comme une manière de ne pas laisser aller à l’apathie ceux et celles qui n’en ont que trop entendu parler. Il importe, aussi, de rompre avec l’idée selon laquelle les hommes racisés seraient substantiellement plus violents que les autres hommes et que les cultures des Suds seraient plus marquées par l’idéologie patriarcale que celles du Nord. Car, dans un cas comme dans un autre, nous sommes entraîné·es à répondre au « pourquoi » moralisant de cette prétendue spécificité, et non au « comment » politique de cette spécification. Cette rupture est absolument fondamentale. Elle conditionne la possibilité d’orienter la lutte, non pas contre les formes les plus monstrueuses du patriarcat — ce qui ne peut que nous conduire à entériner les formes souriantes et galantes de ce dernier — mais bien contre le patriarcat dans tous ses états5. Enfin, il importe de prendre la mesure des concurrences féroces qui ont lieu au sein des espaces du féminisme majoritaire blanc pour la conservation et/ou la conquête du monopole féministe.

    Demeurons vigilant·es quant aux potentielles formes de récupérations de la critique fémonationaliste, non pas dans une perspective révolutionnaire qui profiterait à toutes les membres de la classe des femmes, mais dans une logique de pure distinction stratégique des groupes dominants entre eux. Puisque l’oppression accable sur plusieurs fronts à la fois, nous ne pouvons que réfléchir ensemble et solidairement vers la construction d’espaces étendus. Espaces où les réflexions théoriques et les actions concrètes des femmes qui prônent un féminisme antiraciste et anticapitaliste pourront se déployer plus encore, dans la plénitude de leurs croisements.

    https://www.revue-ballast.fr/marlene-schiappa-le-femonationalisme-et-nous

    #nationalisme #violences_sexistes #violences_sexuelles #protection #châtiment #enfermement #séparatisme #étrangers #combat_culturel #altérisation #islam #musulmans #racisme #nationalismes_sexuels #nationalisme_sexuel #intersectionnalité #islamophobie #anti-réfugiés #culturalisation

    ping @cede

    –—

    Déjà signalé sur seenthis ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/870811
    Mais je mets ici le texte complet et ajoute des tags

    • In the Name of Women′s Rights. The Rise of Femonationalism

      Sara R. Farris examines the demands for women’s rights from an unlikely collection of right-wing nationalist political parties, neoliberals, and some feminist theorists and policy makers. Focusing on contemporary France, Italy, and the Netherlands, Farris labels this exploitation and co-optation of feminist themes by anti-Islam and xenophobic campaigns as “femonationalism.” She shows that by characterizing Muslim males as dangerous to western societies and as oppressors of women, and by emphasizing the need to rescue Muslim and migrant women, these groups use gender equality to justify their racist rhetoric and policies. This practice also serves an economic function. Farris analyzes how neoliberal civic integration policies and feminist groups funnel Muslim and non-western migrant women into the segregating domestic and caregiving industries, all the while claiming to promote their emancipation. In the Name of Women’s Rights documents the links between racism, feminism, and the ways in which non-western women are instrumentalized for a variety of political and economic purposes.

      https://www.dukeupress.edu/in-the-name-of-womens-rights
      #livre #Sara_Farris

  • Quand les tribunaux nourrissent les #trolls
    https://framablog.org/2020/08/28/quand-les-tribunaux-nourrissent-les-trolls

    Les #patent_trolls ou « chasseurs de #Brevets » sont des sociétés parasites qui tirent profit d’un portefeuille de brevets dont elles ont fait le plus souvent des dépôts abusifs. Elles sont particulièrement néfastes aux USA où elles multiplient les menaces de … Lire la suite­­

    #Droits_numériques #Internet_et_société #Non_classé #Censure #MyCroft #pression #VoiceTech

  • Deportation Union: Rights, accountability and the EU’s push to increase forced removals

    Deportation Union provides a critical examination of recently-introduced and forthcoming EU measures designed to increase the number of deportations carried out by national authorities and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex. It focuses on three key areas: attempts to reduce or eliminate rights and protections in the law governing deportations; the expansion and interconnection of EU databases and information systems; and the increased budget, powers and personnel awarded to Frontex.

    There has long-been coordinated policy, legal and operational action on migration at EU level, and efforts to increase deportations have always been a part of this. However, since the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015 there has been a rapid increase in new initiatives, the overall aim of which is to limit legal protections afforded to ‘deportable’ individuals at the same time as expanding the ability of national and EU authorities to track, detain and remove people with increasing efficiency.

    The measures and initiatives being introduced by the EU to scale up deportations will require massive public expenditure on technology, infrastructure and personnel; the strengthening and expansion of state and supranational agencies already-lacking in transparency and democratic accountability; and are likely to further undermine claims that the EU occupies the moral high ground in its treatment of migrants. Anyone wishing to question and challenge these developments will first need to understand them. This report attempts to go some way towards assisting with that task.


    https://www.statewatch.org/deportation-union-rights-accountability-and-the-eu-s-push-to-increase-fo
    #machine_à_expulser #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #UE #EU #rapport #union_européenne #renvois_forcés #rapport #Statewatch #Frontex #database #base_de_données #données_biométriques #Directive_Retour #return-opticon #Joint_return_operations (#JROs) #Collecting_return_operations #National_return_operations #Afghanistan #réfugiés_afghans #European_Centre_for_Returns #statistiques #chiffres #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains

    ping @isskein @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @etraces

  • (ಠ益ಠ ╬) reshare from (/posts/47d60790c5d30138c67a3a51e514374b) @jau...
    https://diasp.eu/p/11526220

    (ಠ益ಠ ╬)

    reshare from @[jaune_lola@diaspora-fr.org](/people/fa535f508c930137c7b309e21e57fdab)

    L #UE s’apprête à lancer un marché de #données à caractère personnel au sein duquel les citoyens seront payés pour partager

    L’inscription à un service offert par un des GAFAM n’est pas obligatoire ; à contrario, la participation au marché de données à caractère personnel pourrait bien être obligatoire pour les citoyens de l’Union européenne.

    #privacy #vieprivee #bigdata #SOS #alerteRouge #actu #politique #liberalisme #europe #confidentialite #surveillance #flicage #democrature #profilage #droitsHumains #bigbrother #1984 #pistage #informatique #numerique (...)

  • HCDH | Renewed violence and delayed implementation of the peace agreement severely threaten peace and stability in South Sudan, UN experts note
    https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26167&LangID=E

    The violence has also led to heightened levels of severe acute malnutrition among infants and children in the affected population. This at a time when the vast majority of civilians, particularly the 1.6 million internally displaced persons, continue to remain at risk because of COVID-19, and have limited access to basic services. These callous and brutal attacks have the potential to completely unravel the peace agreement," she added.

    #Covid_19#migrant#migration#soudandusud#deplaceinterne#violence#droitsfondamentaux

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • Opinion | John Lewis: Together, You Can Redeem the Soul of Our Nation - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/opinion/john-lewis-civil-rights-america.html

    By John Lewis

    Mr. Lewis, the civil rights leader who died on July 17, wrote this essay shortly before his death, to be published upon the day of his funeral.

    July 30, 2020

    While my time here has now come to an end, I want you to know that in the last days and hours of my life you inspired me. You filled me with hope about the next chapter of the great American story when you used your power to make a difference in our society. Millions of people motivated simply by human compassion laid down the burdens of division. Around the country and the world you set aside race, class, age, language and nationality to demand respect for human dignity.

    That is why I had to visit Black Lives Matter Plaza in Washington, though I was admitted to the hospital the following day. I just had to see and feel it for myself that, after many years of silent witness, the truth is still marching on.

    Emmett Till was my George Floyd. He was my Rayshard Brooks, Sandra Bland and Breonna Taylor. He was 14 when he was killed, and I was only 15 years old at the time. I will never ever forget the moment when it became so clear that he could easily have been me. In those days, fear constrained us like an imaginary prison, and troubling thoughts of potential brutality committed for no understandable reason were the bars.

    Though I was surrounded by two loving parents, plenty of brothers, sisters and cousins, their love could not protect me from the unholy oppression waiting just outside that family circle. Unchecked, unrestrained violence and government-sanctioned terror had the power to turn a simple stroll to the store for some Skittles or an innocent morning jog down a lonesome country road into a nightmare. If we are to survive as one unified nation, we must discover what so readily takes root in our hearts that could rob Mother Emanuel Church in South Carolina of her brightest and best, shoot unwitting concertgoers in Las Vegas and choke to death the hopes and dreams of a gifted violinist like Elijah McClain.

    Like so many young people today, I was searching for a way out, or some might say a way in, and then I heard the voice of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on an old radio. He was talking about the philosophy and discipline of nonviolence. He said we are all complicit when we tolerate injustice. He said it is not enough to say it will get better by and by. He said each of us has a moral obligation to stand up, speak up and speak out. When you see something that is not right, you must say something. You must do something. Democracy is not a state. It is an act, and each generation must do its part to help build what we called the Beloved Community, a nation and world society at peace with itself.

    Ordinary people with extraordinary vision can redeem the soul of America by getting in what I call good trouble, necessary trouble. Voting and participating in the democratic process are key. The vote is the most powerful nonviolent change agent you have in a democratic society. You must use it because it is not guaranteed. You can lose it.

    You must also study and learn the lessons of history because humanity has been involved in this soul-wrenching, existential struggle for a very long time. People on every continent have stood in your shoes, through decades and centuries before you. The truth does not change, and that is why the answers worked out long ago can help you find solutions to the challenges of our time. Continue to build union between movements stretching across the globe because we must put away our willingness to profit from the exploitation of others.

    Though I may not be here with you, I urge you to answer the highest calling of your heart and stand up for what you truly believe. In my life I have done all I can to demonstrate that the way of peace, the way of love and nonviolence is the more excellent way. Now it is your turn to let freedom ring.

    When historians pick up their pens to write the story of the 21st century, let them say that it was your generation who laid down the heavy burdens of hate at last and that peace finally triumphed over violence, aggression and war. So I say to you, walk with the wind, brothers and sisters, and let the spirit of peace and the power of everlasting love be your guide.

    #John_Lewis #Black_lives_matter #Droits_civiques #Démocratie

  • PHYLLIS CHESLER : "(...) Certains juges peuvent être achetés ; beaucoup d’autres, absolument pas. Je sais qu’il y a des juges équitables et de bonnes professionnel.le.s en santé mentale. Ils et elles sont peut-être une minorité et ils peuvent aussi être forcés à « donner à l’homme violent ce qu’il veut pour simplement faire avancer le dossier ». Autre problème : quand une mère protectrice battue continue d’insister pour la réouverture d’un dossier, elle sera perçue comme étant le problème et sera punie d’avoir osé déranger un.e juge très occupé.e.
    Certain.e.s avocat.e.s, hommes et femmes, ne font pas confiance aux femmes et ne les aiment pas. Je sais que de bon.ne.s avocat.e.s existent – mais les bon.ne.s avocat.e.s ne peuvent pas se permettre de représenter à titre gratuit des mères battues, plus ou moins pauvres, qui les occuperont pour des périodes pouvant aller de quatre à quinze ans. Les coûts pour l’avocat.e qui agit ainsi sont astronomiques et peuvent ruiner sa carrière et son équilibre mental. Et, quand un.e avocat.e fait du zèle pour représenter l’intérêt supérieur d’une mère battue et d’un.e enfant sexuellement agressé.e, elle ou il risque d’être accusé.e d’outrage à magistrat et de se voir radié.e du barreau."
    Sur le blogue scènes de l’avis quotidien | 30 juillet 2020
    https://scenesdelavisquotidien.com/2020/07/30/comment-les-meres-sont-detruites-quand-elles-essaient-de-pro
    Traduction : TRADFEM
    #Antiféminisme, #Justice, #Masculinistes, #Violences, #DroitsdesMères

  • #Handicap : le #contrat_social invalide #Datagueule_97
    https://peertube.datagueule.tv/videos/watch/1c3ec9fc-d0f8-41bb-a70f-8ebb80e03c18

    En 2018, en France : 2,8 millions d’handicapés reconnus + 2,3 millions non reconnus ; 400 millions de pénalités versées à l’#agefiph
    19 % de #chômage
    #aah : 900 €/ mois c/ 1026 €/mois pour le seuil de #pauvreté
    MDPH : délai moyen de 16 moisx
    80 % des #femmes en situation de handicap sont victimes de violences.

    Entretien avec Mme Anne-Sarah Kerdudo, directrice de l’association Droits pluriels.

    #invalidité #handicap_invisible #espaces_de_travail #espace_public #accessibilité #logement_accessible #loi_élan #ségrégation #inclusion #éducation_inclusive #établissements_médico-sociaux #discrimination #égalité des #droits

  • Pologne : le ministre de la justice veut que le pays se retire du traité européen sur les violences faites aux femmes
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/07/25/la-pologne-veut-se-retirer-du-traite-europeen-sur-les-violences-faites-aux-f

    La Pologne doit sortir du traité européen sur les violences faites aux femmes, a affirmé samedi 25 juillet le ministre polonais de la justice, Zbigniew Ziobro.

    Lors d’une conférence de presse, il a fait savoir que son administration demanderait lundi au ministère des familles d’entamer une procédure de retrait de ce traité, connu sous le nom de Convention d’Istanbul. « Il contient des éléments de nature idéologique, que nous considérons comme nuisibles », a déclaré le ministre.

    M. Ziobro estime notamment que ce traité va à l’encontre des droits des parents en demandant aux écoles d’enseigner l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

    #Pologne #droits_des_femmes #violences_sexistes

  • Comprendre la répression des Ouïghours par la Chine en quatre points clés
    https://www.franceculture.fr/geopolitique/comprendre-la-repression-des-ouighours-par-la-chine-en-quatre-points-c

    Les nouvelles du Xinjiang sont toujours plus inquiétantes à mesure que les rares informations de cette région parviennent à l’extérieur du pays : stérilisations forcées, viols, déportations, emprisonnements… Éclairage en 4 points majeurs de ce que l’on sait sur la répression des Ouïghours en Chine.

    #chine #ouïghours #géopolitique #droits_humains

  • HCDH | Bachelet sounds alarm over Lebanon economic crisis, calls for urgent and unified response
    https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26072&LangID=E

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet today warned of the crippling impact of the socio-economic crisis on Lebanon’s population, and urged the Government, political parties and the financial sector to work together to ensure the protection of the poorest and most vulnerable.
    Vulnerable Lebanese, in addition to other vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrant workers, are increasingly unable to meet their basic needs, she said. “This situation is fast spiralling out of control, with many already destitute and facing starvation as a direct result of this crisis,” Bachelet said.
    "The growing economic shocks, coupled with the outbreak of COVID-19, have touched all sections of society. Many have lost jobs, seen their life-savings evaporate before their eyes and lost their homes.

    #Covid19#migrant#migration#liban#onu#droitsfondamentaux#pauvrete#vulnerabilite

  • https://tradfem.wordpress.com/2020/07/21/changer-le-monde-pour-contrer-les-peres-assassins
    PAMELA CROSS, juriste militante canadienne : "À mon avis, si le meurtre d’un enfant par son père était vraiment « dévastateur » et « incompréhensible », les réformes que les mères et les défenderesses des droits des femmes réclament depuis des décennies auraient déjà été apportées."
    #droitsd'accès, #Loisurledivorce, #meurtresd'enfants, #NorahetRomyCarpentier, #PamelaCross, #pèresassassins, #violencefamiliale

  • « Regarde elle a les yeux grand ouverts » : le #MLAC

    Le documentaire retrace le parcours de quelques femmes du MLAC (Mouvement pour la liberté de l’avortement et de la contraception) d’ #Aix-en-Provence jugées en 1977 pour « pratiques illégales de la médecine et tentative d’avortement sur mineure ». Autour du #procès, le film nous fait découvrir le quotidien de ce collectif qui proposait aux femmes de s’approprier les savoirs médicaux liés au contrôle de la contraception, à la pratique des avortements, mais aussi aux #accouchements_à_domicile.

    https://paris-luttes.info/regarde-elle-a-les-yeux-grand
    #femmes #IVG #luttes #résistance #avortement #droits_des_femmes #histoire #film #film_documentaire #documentaire #Yann_Le_Masson #contracpetion

  • Les femmes vont-elles une nouvelle fois payer la crise ? – CONTRETEMPS
    https://www.contretemps.eu/crise-covid19-economie-inegalites-genre-feminisme

    Dans l’histoire, les moments de #crise économique sont particulièrement néfastes pour les #droits des #femmes. Dans les années 1930, le #chômage est utilisé comme justification au retour des femmes mariées au foyer ; durant les années 1970, ces discours réapparaissent sporadiquement : le $travail salarié des femmes est considéré comme second, après celui du mari, la rémunération des femmes constituant un $salaire d’appoint, un supplément pour le ménage.

    Menée du 1er au 5 mai auprès d’un échantillon de 2003 personnes représentatif de la population française, l’enquête Coconel montre que les disparités selon le sexe se sont accentuées alors que depuis une cinquantaine d’années, elles tendaient à se réduire. Aujourd’hui, tandis que des licenciements et un accroissement de la #précarité s’annoncent — l’enquête Coconel souligne que « parmi celles qui étaient en emploi au 1er mars 2020, deux sur trois seulement continuent de travailler deux mois plus tard, contre trois hommes sur quatre » — et que les femmes continuent d’occuper majoritairement les temps partiels, les bas salaires et les métiers déqualifiés, vont-elles une nouvelle fois payer la crise ?

  • Budget européen pour la migration : plus de contrôles aux frontières, moins de respect pour les droits humains

    Le 17 juillet 2020, le Conseil européen examinera le #cadre_financier_pluriannuel (#CFP) pour la période #2021-2027. À cette occasion, les dirigeants de l’UE discuteront des aspects tant internes qu’externes du budget alloué aux migrations et à l’#asile.

    En l’état actuel, la #Commission_européenne propose une #enveloppe_budgétaire totale de 40,62 milliards d’euros pour les programmes portant sur la migration et l’asile, répartis comme suit : 31,12 milliards d’euros pour la dimension interne et environ 10 milliards d’euros pour la dimension externe. Il s’agit d’une augmentation de 441% en valeur monétaire par rapport à la proposition faite en 2014 pour le budget 2014-2020 et d’une augmentation de 78% par rapport à la révision budgétaire de 2015 pour ce même budget.

    Une réalité déguisée

    Est-ce une bonne nouvelle qui permettra d’assurer dignement le bien-être de milliers de migrant.e.s et de réfugié.e.s actuellement abandonné.e.s à la rue ou bloqué.e.s dans des centres d’accueil surpeuplés de certains pays européens ? En réalité, cette augmentation est principalement destinée à renforcer l’#approche_sécuritaire : dans la proposition actuelle, environ 75% du budget de l’UE consacré à la migration et à l’asile serait alloué aux #retours, à la #gestion_des_frontières et à l’#externalisation des contrôles. Ceci s’effectue au détriment des programmes d’asile et d’#intégration dans les États membres ; programmes qui se voient attribuer 25% du budget global.

    Le budget 2014 ne comprenait pas de dimension extérieure. Cette variable n’a été introduite qu’en 2015 avec la création du #Fonds_fiduciaire_de_l’UE_pour_l’Afrique (4,7 milliards d’euros) et une enveloppe financière destinée à soutenir la mise en œuvre de la #déclaration_UE-Turquie de mars 2016 (6 milliards d’euros), qui a été tant décriée. Ces deux lignes budgétaires s’inscrivent dans la dangereuse logique de #conditionnalité entre migration et #développement : l’#aide_au_développement est liée à l’acceptation, par les pays tiers concernés, de #contrôles_migratoires ou d’autres tâches liées aux migrations. En outre, au moins 10% du budget prévu pour l’Instrument de voisinage, de développement et de coopération internationale (#NDICI) est réservé pour des projets de gestion des migrations dans les pays d’origine et de transit. Ces projets ont rarement un rapport avec les activités de développement.

    Au-delà des chiffres, des violations des #droits_humains

    L’augmentation inquiétante de la dimension sécuritaire du budget de l’UE correspond, sur le terrain, à une hausse des violations des #droits_fondamentaux. Par exemple, plus les fonds alloués aux « #gardes-côtes_libyens » sont importants, plus on observe de #refoulements sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale. Depuis 2014, le nombre de refoulements vers la #Libye s’élève à 62 474 personnes, soit plus de 60 000 personnes qui ont tenté d’échapper à des violences bien documentées en Libye et qui ont mis leur vie en danger mais ont été ramenées dans des centres de détention indignes, indirectement financés par l’UE.

    En #Turquie, autre partenaire à long terme de l’UE en matière d’externalisation des contrôles, les autorités n’hésitent pas à jouer avec la vie des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s, en ouvrant et en fermant les frontières, pour négocier le versement de fonds, comme en témoigne l’exemple récent à la frontière gréco-turque.

    Un budget opaque

    « EuroMed Droits s’inquiète de l’#opacité des allocations de fonds dans le budget courant et demande à l’Union européenne de garantir des mécanismes de responsabilité et de transparence sur l’utilisation des fonds, en particulier lorsqu’il s’agit de pays où la corruption est endémique et qui violent régulièrement les droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées, mais aussi les droits de leurs propres citoyen.ne.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, président d’EuroMed Droits.

    « Alors que les dirigeants européens se réunissent à Bruxelles pour discuter du prochain cadre financier pluriannuel, EuroMed Droits demande qu’une approche plus humaine et basée sur les droits soit adoptée envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, afin que les appels à l’empathie et à l’action résolue de la Présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen ne restent pas lettre morte ».

    https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/budget-europeen-pour-la-migration-plus-de-controles-aux-frontieres-mo


    https://twitter.com/EuroMedRights/status/1283759540740096001

    #budget #migrations #EU #UE #Union_européenne #frontières #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l’Afrique #Fonds_fiduciaire #sécurité #réfugiés #accord_UE-Turquie #chiffres #infographie #renvois #expulsions #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la #conditionnalité_de_l'aide_au_développement :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

    Et à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765319

    ping @karine4 @rhoumour @reka @_kg_

  • Une décision sans précédent en #Tunisie : le #Tribunal_administratif suspend la détention de 22 migrants détenus arbitrairement au #centre_d’accueil_et_d’orientation #El_Ouardia

    Une décision sans précédent en Tunisie : le Tribunal administratif suspend la détention de 22 migrants détenus arbitrairement au centre d’accueil et d’orientation El Ouardia

    Tunis, le 16 juillet 2020 – Saisi le 5 juin dernier de 22 requêtes en référé et en annulation concernant des migrants détenus arbitrairement au centre d’accueil et d’orientation El Ouardia, le tribunal administratif vient de rendre des décisions sans précédent. Il a en effet ordonné la suspension de leur détention au motif que leur privation de liberté est contraire au droit tunisien, mais aussi aux engagements internationaux de la Tunisie, notamment le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et la Convention contre la torture.

    Rappelant le principe fondamental de #légalité qui doit encadrer toute #restriction_de_liberté, le tribunal a notamment estimé que la #privation_de_liberté des 22 migrants ne respectait pas les conditions essentielles que sont l’existence d’une base légale et l’intervention d’une autorité juridictionnelle. Le tribunal a ainsi apporté une première réponse positive aux nombreux arguments soulevés par les avocats des détenus pour demander l’annulation immédiate du placement en détention de leurs clients. En vertu de ces décisions rendues en référé, les 22 migrants doivent être immédiatement libérés en attendant que le tribunal administratif statue sur les recours en annulation des mesures de détention.

    En vertu de ces décisions, le Ministère de l’Intérieur, responsable du centre de Ouardia, doit agir immédiatement afin de libérer les 22 migrants en attendant que le tribunal administratif statue sur les recours en annulation des mesures de détention. Une procédure qui pourrait durer des années et qui sera l’occasion pour le tribunal d’examiner en détails tous les arguments soulevés par les avocats des requérants.

    Dans leurs requêtes, les avocats avaient notamment dénoncé le fait que les migrants étaient détenus en dehors de toute procédure légale et de tout #contrôle_juridictionnel, sans accès à un avocat, sans notification écrite du fondement de leur placement en détention dans un centre qui n’est d’ailleurs même pas officiellement enregistré comme un lieu privatif de liberté. Autant de motifs qui concourent à qualifier ces détentions d’#arbitraires, en violation flagrante du droit international des droits de l’homme et de la Constitution tunisienne.

    Afin d’éviter que ces violations graves puissent encore être perpétrées, les autorités tunisiennes, et en particulier le Ministère de l’Intérieur, doivent clarifier le statut juridique du centre d’El Ouardia pour qu’il ne soit ne soit plus utilisé en tant que lieu de privation de liberté.

    https://ftdes.net/une-decision-sans-precedent-en-tunisie-le-tribunal-administratif-suspend-la-d

    #migrations #réfugiés #détention #rétention_administrative #justice #suspension #droits_humains

    ping @_kg_

  • Organizing amidst Covid-19


    Organizing amidst Covid-19: sharing stories of struggles
    Overviews of movement struggles in specific places

    Miguel Martinez
    Mutating mobilisations during the pandemic crisis in Spain (movement report, pp. 15 – 21)

    Laurence Cox
    Forms of social movement in the crisis: a view from Ireland (movement report, pp. 22 – 33)

    Lesley Wood
    We’re not all in this together (movement report, pp. 34 – 38)

    Angela Chukunzira
    Organising under curfew: perspectives from Kenya (movement report, pp. 39 – 42)

    Federico Venturini
    Social movements’ powerlessness at the time of covid-19: a personal account (movement report, pp. 43 – 46)

    Sobhi Mohanty
    From communal violence to lockdown hunger: emergency responses by civil society networks in Delhi, India (movement report, pp. 47 – 52)
    Feminist and LGBTQ+ activism

    Hongwei Bao
    “Anti-domestic violence little vaccine”: a Wuhan-based feminist activist campaign during COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 53 – 63)

    Ayaz Ahmed Siddiqui
    Aurat march, a threat to mainstream tribalism in Pakistan (movement report, pp. 64 – 71)

    Lynn Ng Yu Ling
    What does the COVID-19 pandemic mean for PinkDot Singapore? (movement report, pp. 72 – 81)

    María José Ventura Alfaro
    Feminist solidarity networks have multiplied since the COVID-19 outbreak in Mexico (movement report, pp. 82 – 87)

    Ben Trott
    Queer Berlin and the Covid-19 crisis: a politics of contact and ethics of care (movement report, pp. 88 – 108)
    Reproductive struggles

    Non Una Di Meno Roma
    Life beyond the pandemic (movement report, pp. 109 – 114)
    Labour organising

    Ben Duke
    The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the gig economy and zero hour contracts (movement report, pp. 115 – 120)

    Louisa Acciari
    Domestic workers’ struggles in times of pandemic crisis (movement report, pp. 121 – 127)

    Arianna Tassinari, Riccardo Emilia Chesta and Lorenzo Cini
    Labour conflicts over health and safety in the Italian Covid19 crisis (movement report, pp. 128 – 138)

    T Sharkawi and N Ali
    Acts of whistleblowing: the case of collective claim making by healthcare workers in Egypt (movement report, pp. 139 – 163)

    Mallige Sirimane and Nisha Thapliyal
    Migrant labourers, Covid19 and working-class struggle in the time of pandemic: a report from Karnataka, India (movement report, pp. 164 – 181)
    Migrant and refugee struggles

    Johanna May Black, Sutapa Chattopadhyay and Riley Chisholm
    Solidarity in times of social distancing: migrants, mutual aid, and COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 182 – 193)

    Anitta Kynsilehto
    Doing migrant solidarity at the time of Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 194 – 198)

    Susan Thieme and Eda Elif Tibet
    New political upheavals and women alliances in solidarity beyond “lock down” in Switzerland at times of a global pandemic (movement report, pp. 199 – 207)

    Chiara Milan
    Refugee solidarity along the Western Balkans route: new challenges and a change of strategy in times of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 208 – 212)

    Marco Perolini
    Abolish all camps in times of corona: the struggle against shared accommodation for refugees* in Berlin (movement report, pp. 213 – 224)
    Ecological activism

    Clara Thompson
    #FightEveryCrisis: Re-framing the climate movement in times of a pandemic (movement report, pp. 225 – 231)

    Susan Paulson
    Degrowth and feminisms ally to forge care-full paths beyond pandemic (movement report, pp. 232 – 246)

    Peterson Derolus [FR]
    Coronavirus, mouvements sociaux populaires anti-exploitation minier en Haïti (movement report, pp. 247 – 249)

    Silpa Satheesh
    The pandemic does not stop the pollution in River Periyar (movement report, pp. 250 – 257)

    Ashish Kothari
    Corona can’t save the planet, but we can, if we listen to ordinary people (movement report, pp. 258 – 265)
    Food sovereignty organising

    Dagmar Diesner
    Self-governance food system before and during the Covid-crisis on the example of CampiAperti, Bologna (movement report, pp. 266 – 273)

    URGENCI
    Community Supported Agriculture is a safe and resilient alternative to industrial agriculture in the time of Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 274 – 279)

    Jenny Gkougki
    Corona-crisis affects small Greek farmers who counterstrike with a nationwide social media campaign to unite producers and consumers on local level! (movement report, pp. 280 – 283)

    John Foran
    Eco Vista in the quintuple crisis (movement report, pp. 284 – 291)
    Solidarity and mutual aid

    Michael Zeller
    Karlsruhe’s “giving fences”: mobilisation for the needy in times of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 292 – 303)

    Sergio Ruiz Cayuela
    Organising a solidarity kitchen: reflections from Cooperation Birmingham (movement report, pp. 304 – 309)

    Clinton Nichols
    On lockdown and locked out of the prison classroom: the prospects of post-secondary education for incarcerated persons during pandemic (movement report, pp. 310 – 316)

    Micha Fiedlschuster and Leon Rosa Reichle
    Solidarity forever? Performing mutual aid in Leipzig, Germany (movement report, pp. 317 – 325)
    Artistic and digital resistance

    Kerman Calvo and Ester Bejarano
    Music, solidarities and balconies in Spain (movement report, pp. 326 – 332)

    Neto Holanda and Valesca Lima [PT]
    Movimentos e ações político-culturais do Brasil em tempos de pandemia do Covid-19 (movement report, pp. 333 – 338)

    Margherita Massarenti
    How Covid-19 led to a #Rentstrike and what it can teach us about online organizing (movement report, pp. 339 – 346)

    Dounya
    Knowledge is power: virtual forms of everyday resistance and grassroots broadcasting in Iran (movement report, pp. 347 – 354)
    Imagining a new world

    Donatella della Porta
    How progressive social movements can save democracy in pandemic times (movement report, pp. 355 – 358)

    Jackie Smith
    Responding to coronavirus pandemic: human rights movement-building to transform global capitalism (movement report, pp. 359 – 366)

    Yariv Mohar
    Human rights amid Covid-19: from struggle to orchestration of tradeoffs (movement report, pp. 367 – 370)

    Julien Landry, Ann Marie Smith, Patience Agwenjang, Patricia Blankson Akakpo, Jagat Basnet, Bhumiraj Chapagain, Aklilu Gebremichael, Barbara Maigari and Namadi Saka,
    Social justice snapshots: governance adaptations, innovations and practitioner learning in a time of COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 371 – 382)

    Roger Spear, Gulcin Erdi, Marla A. Parker and Maria Anastasia
    Innovations in citizen response to crises: volunteerism and social mobilization during COVID-19 (movement report, pp. 383 – 391)

    Breno Bringel
    Covid-19 and the new global chaos (movement report, pp. 392 – 399)

    https://www.interfacejournal.net/interface-volume-12-issue-1

    #mouvements_sociaux #résistance #covid-19 #confinement #revue #aide_mutuelle #Espagne #résistance #Irlande #Kenya #impuissance #sentiment_d'impuissance #faim #violence #Delhi #Inde #féminisme #Wuhan #Pakistan #PinkDot #LGBT #Singapour #solidarité_féministe #solidarité #Mexique #care #Berlin #Allemagne #queer #gig_economy #travail #travail_domestique #travailleurs_domestiques #Italie #Egypte #travailleurs_étrangers #Karnataka #distanciation_sociale #migrations #Suisse #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #réfugiés #camps_de_réfugiés #FightEveryCrisis #climat #changement_climatique #décroissance #Haïti #extractivisme #pollution #River_Periyar #Periyar #souveraineté_alimentaire #nourriture #alimentation #CampiAperti #Bologne #agriculture #Grèce #Karlsruhe #Cooperation_Birmingham #UK #Angleterre #Leipzig #musique #Brésil #Rentstrike #Iran #droits_humains #justice_sociale #innovation #innovation_sociale

    ping @isskein @karine4