• Respingimenti e ostacoli all’asilo. Ritorno sulla frontiera Italia-Svizzera

    Da gennaio ad aprile 2023 a Como-Ponte Chiasso oltre 1.300 persone migranti sono state “riammesse” indietro dalle autorità elvetiche. È il confine terrestre italiano con i dati più alti. Quattro su 10 sono afghani: la protezione è un miraggio

    Ahmed, diciassettenne afghano, è partito da Kabul nell’autunno del 2021 per non finire tra le fila dell’esercito talebano. A un anno e mezzo dalla partenza, dopo aver percorso una delle diramazioni della rotta balcanica, passa per la stazione di Milano, dove non si ferma neanche una notte: la prossima tappa da raggiungere è Zurigo, l’obiettivo ultimo la Germania. Che cosa lo aspetta al confine italo-svizzero? Seppur poco raccontato, secondo i dati del ministero dell’Interno, su questa frontiera nei primi quattro mesi del 2023 sono state registrate 1.341 riammissioni passive, ovvero le pratiche di polizia a danno di persone straniere considerate irregolari che, a un passo dall’arrivo sul territorio elvetico, vengono costrette a ritornare in Italia.

    A far da contraltare all’approccio di frontiera finalizzato al respingimento, una parte della società civile su entrambi i lati del confine testimonia ormai da anni un’accoglienza possibile ma sempre più difficile nei confronti dei transitanti. La collaborazione tra i due Paesi si rifà all’accordo italo-svizzero del 1998 “sulla riammissione delle persone in situazione irregolare”, mai ratificato dal Parlamento italiano. Il 31 maggio scorso quell’impegno bilaterale è stato ribadito nell’incontro tra il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi e la sua omologa svizzera, Elisabeth Baume-Schneider, per contrastare, parole del Viminale, la “criminalità organizzata”, il “terrorismo internazionale” e monitorare i “foreign fighters di rientro dai teatri di guerra”. Il tutto, ha assicurato la consigliera elvetica, garantendo “sempre il rispetto dei diritti umani dei migranti”. Retorica politica che propone un concetto di sicurezza e promette di proteggere tutti, ma poi nella pratica minaccia le stesse persone in cerca di una maggior sicurezza.

    Già nel 2016 l’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’Immigrazione (Asgi) aveva evidenziato l’illegittimità delle riammissioni previste dall’accordo bilaterale per diversi motivi: ostacolano la domanda di asilo, implicano controlli sistemici e discriminatori lungo una frontiera Schengen e sono considerabili espulsioni collettive; infine, essendo procedure informali, non permettono di presentare un eventuale ricorso.

    Nonostante le rassicurazioni sul “rispetto dei diritti umani” di Baume-Schneider, le riammissioni, con le annesse criticità sottolineate nel 2016, continuano anche oggi. I dati relativi ai primi mesi dell’anno, comunicati dal Viminale dopo un’istanza di accesso civico di Altreconomia, sono eloquenti. Per quanto riguarda il settore terrestre di Como-Ponte Chiasso, da gennaio ad aprile 2023 sono state registrate 1.341 riammissioni verso l’Italia (numeri alti, basti pensare che per il più conosciuto accordo bilaterale tra Italia e Slovenia erano state 1.240 le persone riammesse nel 2020, anno di picco).

    Quello con la Svizzera si conferma quindi il confine terrestre italiano dove vengono registrate più riammissioni passive (si veda, a questo proposito, l’articolo sui respingimenti ai confini italiani nel numero di febbraio di Altreconomia). Dal gennaio 2022, infatti, in media, 330 persone ogni mese sono costrette dalla polizia svizzera a ritornare sui propri passi. Quattro su dieci sono afghani, proprio come Ahmed. Seguono siriani, turchi, marocchini e poi bengalesi e tunisini.

    Entrare nel merito di ciascun episodio è impossibile, ma si può ipotizzare che in molti casi la riammissione abbia ostacolato l’accesso alla domanda di protezione internazionale per persone provenienti da zone di conflitto. Ciò che permette un così alto numero di riammissioni è l’esteso sistema di controllo elvetico. “Il Ticino ha il più alto numero di poliziotti pro-capite di tutta la Svizzera”, spiega Donato Di Blasi di Casa Astra, centro di prima accoglienza per persone in emergenza abitativa nella Svizzera italiana. Nel territorio, infatti, si conta un agente ogni 305 abitanti, a fronte della media nazionale di uno ogni 466 secondo i dati della Radiotelevisione svizzera. “I pattugliamenti della polizia svizzera si estendono sui treni fino a Lugano, a 30 chilometri dalla stazione di confine di Ponte Chiasso”, continua Di Blasi.

    Spesso i controlli avverrebbero sistematicamente nei confronti di persone con caratteristiche somatiche apparentemente non di origine europea, in violazione delle normative che vietano la profilazione etnica (racial profiling). Un ragazzo egiziano di 16 anni che vive attualmente a Como racconta: “Una volta rientrando da Milano mi sono addormentato sul treno, superando per sbaglio la fermata di Como. Alla stazione di Chiasso mi hanno svegliato i poliziotti, mi hanno perquisito fino a lasciarmi in mutande, poi mi hanno riportato in Italia. Ero l’unico sul treno a cui è successo così”. Il monitoraggio frontaliero delle forze dell’ordine si inoltra anche nelle zone di transito percorribili in auto o a piedi. Per sorvegliare al meglio queste aree, l’ufficio federale dell’armamento (Armasuisse) aveva annunciato già nel 2015 l’acquisto di sei droni di fabbricazione israeliana che entreranno a pieno regime entro la fine del 2024.

    Nonostante la fitta rete di controlli e i numeri delle riammissioni, le realtà comasche che supportano le persone transitanti concordano nel dire che la situazione per le strade di Como non è minimamente paragonabile a quella dell’estate del 2016, quando fino a 500 persone dormivano nei pressi della stazione di San Giovanni in attesa di superare il confine. “Sono sporadici i casi di persone riammesse dalla Svizzera presenti sulle strade di Como”, racconta Anna Merlo di Porta Aperta, sportello di Caritas per i senza dimora. “Dato l’alto numero delle riammissioni, ci chiediamo: dove vanno le persone una volta riportate in Italia?”, si domanda don Giusto Della Valle, parroco di Rebbio, realtà solidale con le persone transitanti e attualmente luogo di accoglienza per decine di minori stranieri non accompagnati in attesa di una sistemazione definitiva. L’impressione è che chi viene riammesso non si fermi in città, provando a continuare il viaggio in altre zone di frontiera, vicine e lontane.

    Ahmed ha avuto fortuna, è riuscito a superare l’ennesimo confine, ma questo non significa la fine degli ostacoli. Infatti, dalle informazioni raccolte, è frequente che le persone transitanti, intercettate dalle forze dell’ordine sul territorio svizzero, dopo aver provato a fare domanda di asilo vengano riportate in Italia alla centrale di polizia di Ponte Chiasso. “Per essere certi che la domanda di asilo venga presa in carico e le persone non vengano respinte, l’unico modo è accompagnarle fisicamente alla questura di Chiasso per contestare un’eventuale riammissione; lo abbiamo fatto più volte in passato -spiega Gabriela Giuria Tasville di Azione posti liberi, fondazione che segue dal punto di vista legale i richiedenti asilo in Ticino-. A peggiorare il quadro, inoltre, è impossibile, per le persone in transito, soggiornare anche temporaneamente in Svizzera, perché dal 2008 è entrata in vigore una legge federale che vieta qualsiasi forma di accoglienza e penalizza chiunque aiuti le persone transitanti in situazione di irregolarità”. Questa legge infatti punisce “con una pena detentiva sino a un anno o con una pena pecuniaria chiunque […] facilita o aiuta a preparare l’entrata, la partenza o il soggiorno illegali di uno straniero” (articolo 116, 1.a). Le autorità, da una parte, non permettono alle persone transitanti di regolarizzare la loro posizione sul territorio e quindi di accedere alle strutture di accoglienza; dall’altra, puniscono chiunque aiuti il soggiorno di una persona che è in una situazione di irregolarità a causa del mancato accesso alla procedura di asilo.

    Questa legge, ormai arrivata al suo quindicesimo anno d’età, ha fatto sì che realtà come Casa Astra, che già nel 2004 accoglieva sans papier provenienti dall’Ecuador, non possano più supportare persone in situazione di emergenza abitativa senza documenti. Ancora più eclatante è il caso del centro sociale autogestito il Molino a Lugano, unica realtà che fino al 2021 accoglieva apertamente le persone transitanti. Nel maggio di due anni fa è stato raso al suolo su provvedimento della polizia cantonale. Al contrario della solida collaborazione tra le autorità di frontiera dei due Paesi, costruire e mantenere una rete solidale a livello locale e transfrontaliero di supporto alle persone in transito, in questo contesto, sembra quasi impossibile.

    https://altreconomia.it/respingimenti-e-ostacoli-allasilo-ritorno-sulla-frontiera-italia-svizze

    #Italie #Suisse #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #réadmissions #réadmissions_passives #foreign_fighters #terrorisme #statistiques #chiffres #2023 #2022 #profilage_racial #drones #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité

  • „‚Wenn die Kugeln knapp am Kopf vorbeizischen ...“ : Deutscher Legionär schildert Schrecken des Ukraine-Kriegs
    https://www.merkur.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-legionaer-deutschland-erlebnis-schilderung-verwundet-butscha-ru

    La guerre en Ukraine est différent de la guerre en Aghanistan. En Ukraine c’est comme dans À l’Ouest, rien de nouveau avec drones. Témoignage d’un légionnaire allemand.

    26.4.2023, Interview: Klaus Rimpel - Der Ex-Bundeswehr-Soldat kämpfte in Butscha und Irpin für die Ukraine. Nun gibt er im Merkur-Interview Einblick in die Realität des Krieges.

    München/Kiew – Er konnte dem Unrecht in der Ukraine nicht tatenlos zusehen: Der 25-jährige Ex-Bundeswehrsoldat Jonas Kratzenberg kämpfte als Legionär in Irpin, Butscha und im Donbas gegen Russland – bis er bei einem Drohnenangriff von Granatsplittern im ganzen Körper schwer verletzt wurde. Im Gespräch mit dem Münchner Merkur und in dem Buch „Schützenhilfe“ (Yes Publishing, 22 Euro) beschreibt der Aachener, was er in der Internationalen Legion im Ukraine-Krieg erlebte.

    Münchner Merkur: Sie wurden in der Bundeswehr zum Panzergrenadier ausgebildet. Warum sind Sie als deutscher Soldat zum Kämpfen in die Ukraine gegangen?

    Jonas Kratzenberg: Schon Wochen vor Kriegsausbruch war mir klar, dass Russland die Ukraine überfallen würde. Ich war angewidert von der Inaktivität der Bundesregierung, von der Inaktivität der Nato und litt darunter, dass die Ukraine zumindest in der Anfangsphase in diesem Krieg völlig alleingelassen wurde. Und mir hat der Kampfgeist der Ukrainer imponiert. Als der Krieg ausgebrochen ist, war ich gerade aus der Bundeswehr ausgeschieden. Ich hatte keinen Job, hatte keine Freundin, keine Verpflichtungen – so schien es mir die perfekte Gelegenheit, etwas für den Frieden in Europa zu tun und das, was ich fünf Jahre lang bei der Bundeswehr gelernt hatte, auf dem Schlachtfeld einzusetzen.

    Sind Sie einfach an die ukrainische Grenze gefahren und haben gesagt, Sie würden gerne gegen die Russen kämpfen?

    Mehr oder weniger. Man kann sich im Konsulat anmelden, danach muss man nur zum ausgemachten Treffpunkt in der Ukraine gehen, wo man genommen oder abgelehnt wird. Die Internationale Legion ist grob in drei Gruppen aufgeteilt: Die Russischsprachigen, da kommen die meisten aus Georgien. Dann gibt es sehr viele Spanischsprachige aus Lateinamerika. Der Rest wurde in den Topf englischsprachige Ausländer gesteckt, wo auch Deutsche oder Franzosen drin sind, die gar kein Englisch können. Aber irgendwie haben wir uns immer verständigt.
    Ukraine-Krieg: „Die Details sind es, die man nicht los wird“

    Und dann ging es gleich aufs Schlachtfeld?

    Ende März wurden wir ohne formales Training nach Irpin und Butscha geschickt. Schon während ich es erlebte, war mir klar, dass das, was ich dort sah, mich nie mehr loslassen würde. In Irpin standen wir an einem Observationspunkt, direkt am letzten Abschnitt vor der russischen Front, quasi im Niemandsland zwischen Russen und Ukrainern. Auch wenn man die Bilder des Krieges aus den Medien kennt – man kann es sich nicht vorstellen, wie schlimm es wirklich war. Die Details sind es, die man nicht los wird.

    Können Sie diese Details beschreiben?

    (stockt, lange Pause) Die Leichen. Die Leichen …

    Haben Sie auch Kameraden in diesen Kämpfen verloren?

    Ja …

    Wie geht man damit um?

    Man lebt weiter.

    Erfahrungen aus dem Ukraine-Krieg: „Panik begleitete uns jederzeit“

    Gibt es psychologische Hilfe?

    Ich habe das Glück, dass ich als ehemaliger Bundeswehr-Angehöriger Zugriff auf den Sozialdienst der Bundeswehr habe. Wenn ich nicht bei der Bundeswehr gewesen wäre, würde ich nicht wissen, an wen ich mich wenden könnte – außer vielleicht an den Dorfpfarrer. Es gibt Dinge, die kann man alleine nicht verarbeiten. Artillerie-Beschuss oder im Kampf zu stehen: Darauf bereitet einen nichts vor, egal, ob man im Kampf gehärteter Soldat oder Zivilist im friedlichen Deutschland ist. Da kommt man nicht ungeschoren raus. Egal wie mutig oder sogar verrückt man ist: Wenn die Kugeln knapp am Kopf vorbeizischen, wenn man das Pfeifen der Artillerie hört, dann scheißt sich jeder ein. Panik begleitete uns jederzeit. Die Hauptsache ist, diese Angst zu unterdrücken und trotzdem weiterzumachen.

    Die Ukraine ist von Kopf bis Fuß ein korruptes Land, und das trifft auch auf das Militär zu.

    Wie erlebten Sie Ihre ukrainischen Vorgesetzten?

    Die Ukraine ist von Kopf bis Fuß ein korruptes Land, und das trifft auch auf das Militär zu. Ausländische Kämpfer, die kein Ukrainisch sprechen und die sich juristisch nicht wehren können, sind der Willkür der Kommandeure ausgeliefert. Jede Art von Beschwerde stößt im besten Fall auf taube Ohren.

    Haben Sie nicht gedacht: Wenn ihr mich hier so behandelt, dann gehe ich zurück nach Deutschland!

    Am Gehen wird man grundsätzlich nicht gehindert. Aber meine Kameraden und ich waren nicht bereit, den Kampf aufzugeben, vor allem nicht nach dem, was wir in Irpin und Butscha erlebt hatten.
    Ukraine-Krieg: „Es ist ‚Im Westen nichts Neues‘ mit Kampfdrohnen“

    Es heißt oft, dass der Krieg in der Ukraine mit seinen Schützengräben an den Ersten Weltkrieg erinnert. Stimmt das?

    Ja, es ist „Im Westen nichts Neues“ mit Kampfdrohnen. Artillerie vorbereiten, Infanteriewellen mit gepanzerter Unterstützung – alles wie im Ersten Weltkrieg. Wir hatten das Glück, Teil einer Spezialeinheit zu sein, und hatten so dynamischere, gefährlichere Missionen. Aber dafür blieb es uns erspart, dauernd im Schützengraben zu sitzen.

    Es heißt, russische Soldaten würden wie Kanonenfutter verheizt.

    Ja, aber beide Seiten haben sich da nicht viel genommen. Nur: Die Russen haben mehr Menschen zum Verheizen.

    Wir waren auf dem Weg zurück in die Basis. Auf den letzten Metern kam eine Drohne, ich hab mich auf den Boden geworfen, wie es mir beigebracht wurde. Die Drohne hat sich mich ausgesucht, dann hat’s gerummst.

    Werden in der Ukraine auch die Internationalen Legionen verheizt?

    Tatsächlich nicht. Es wurden falsche Entscheidungen getroffen, weil es an erfahrenen Offizieren fehlt. Dadurch wurden Leben unnötig weggeworfen. Aber zumindest der vom Geheimdienst geführte Legions-Teil, bei dem ich war, wurde grundsätzlich nicht als Kanonenfutter missbraucht.

    Wie war es, als sich die Russen aus Irpin und Butscha zurückzogen?

    Wir haben gejubelt. Der Punkt, wo das Leiden sich ausgezahlt hat, wo man einfach abschalten kann, ist ein pures Glücksgefühl. Wenn der Sieg der Ukraine irgendwann kommt, wird die Nachricht für mich in Deutschland weit weniger bedeuten, als wenn ich sie kämpfend in der Ukraine hätte erleben können.

    Sie haben deshalb nicht bis zum Ende des Krieges kämpfen können, weil Sie im November 2022 in der Nähe des südukrainischen Mikolajew schwer verletzt wurden …

    Es war eine meiner heftigsten Missionen, wir hatten Verluste, Verwundete, aber wir hatten es nach einem schweren Feuergefecht rausgeschafft. Wir waren auf dem Weg zurück in die Basis. Auf den letzten Metern kam eine Drohne, ich hab mich auf den Boden geworfen, wie es mir beigebracht wurde. Die Drohne hat sich mich ausgesucht, dann hat’s gerummst.

    Jonas Kratzenberg nach seiner Verwundung im Ukraine-Krieg.
    Jonas Kratzenberg nach seiner Verwundung im Ukraine-Krieg. © fkn
    Gruppe Wagner „deutlich kompetenter und gefährlicher als die russische Armee“

    Wie war die medizinische Versorgung?

    Ich wurde von meinen Kameraden stabilisiert und in ein Krankenhaus nach Odessa gebracht, wo ich alle Hilfe der Welt hatte. Die medizinische Versorgung auch an der Front ist sehr gut. Aber es war trotzdem sehr schwierig in einem Krankenhaus, wo man die Sprache nicht richtig spricht, wo man nicht weiß, was mit einem passiert, wo man sich völlig hilflos fühlt.

    Haben Sie da nicht bereut, als Kämpfer in die Ukraine gegangen zu sein?

    Nein! Keine Sekunde! Ich werde es auch niemals bereuen.

    Haben Sie auch gegen Söldner der Gruppe Wagner gekämpft?

    Gott sei dank nicht. Aber meine Kameraden sind, nachdem ich verwundet wurde, in den Donbass gezogen und haben dort gegen Wagner gekämpft. Sie erzählen, dass Wagner deutlich kompetenter und gefährlicher ist als die russische Armee.
    Deutscher Legionär schildert Eindrücke aus dem Ukraine-Krieg: Nicht mit Afghanistan-Mission vergleichbar

    Ist es illegal, in einem fremden Land zu kämpfen?

    Grundsätzlich darf ein Zivilist mehr oder weniger machen, was er will. Wer aber für den deutschen Staat bei einer Sicherheitsbehörde oder der Bundeswehr arbeitet, macht sich strafbar, wenn er für ein anderes Land kämpft. Deshalb musste ich bis Ende Februar warten, ehe ich in die Ukraine konnte.

    Sie waren als Bundeswehr-Soldat auch in Afghanistan. War das vergleichbar mit dem, was Sie in der Ukraine erlebten?

    Nicht im Mindesten. Klar, in Afghanistan war Krieg, aber was wir dort unten gemacht haben, war kein Krieg. Es war eine Stabilisierungsmission. Das Highlight meines Einsatzes war, dass eine Rakete in unser Lager einschlug und einen Generator zerstörte. Geholfen hat mir aber in der Ukraine, dass ich vor dem Afghanistan-Einsatz eine gute infantristische Ausbildung bekam. Und in Afghanistan habe ich Dinge gelernt, an die man beim Soldatsein nicht unmittelbar denkt: Im Gefecht ist es ungemein wichtig, den Alltagsstress möglichst gering zu halten. Wann immer es möglich war, habe ich in den Kampfpausen in der Ukraine gelesen. Und in einem Dorf gab es WLAN. Wenn wir nicht im Schützengraben saßen, gingen wir dorthin, um mit unseren Angehörigen daheim zu sprechen.

    Wie fanden es Ihre Eltern, dass Sie in den Krieg gezogen sind?

    (Lange Pause) Irgendwie haben sie es verkraftet. Es war schrecklich, vor allem für meine Mutter. Sie hat mit niemandem darüber geredet, wo ich bin, nicht einmal mit ihren Schwestern. Sie wusste, wenn das Thema zur Sprache kommt, dann kann sie nicht mehr aufhören zu weinen.
    Sieg gegen Russland? „Es steht besser um die Ukraine als viele glauben“

    Haben die Ukrainer eine Chance, gegen das mächtige Russland zu gewinnen?

    Es steht besser um die Ukraine, als viele bei uns glauben. Solange der Westen in seiner Unterstützung nicht nachlässt, ist das machbar. Die Frage ist, wie viele Menschenleben das noch kosten wird. Wenn die Ukraine das komplette Kriegsziel mit der Befreiung der Krim erreichen will, wird das noch lange dauern. Das Einzige, worauf man für einen schnellen Sieg hoffen kann, ist, dass es einen Putsch in Russland gibt.

    Gehen Sie nach Ihrer Genesung wieder zurück in den Kampf in der Ukraine?

    Ich verspüre schon noch den Drang, zurückzukehren und wieder zu kämpfen. Aber mein Platz ist hier bei meiner Freundin, die ich in der Ukraine kennengelernt habe, und bei meiner Familie, und da muss ich anfangen, mir eine Zukunft ohne den Krieg aufzubauen.

    #guerre #Ukranr #Afghanistan #drones #wagner #armée #infanterie #légionnaires

  • À Lyon, des manifs contre la réforme des retraites s’en étaient pris au quartier huppé du 6e arrondissement et nombreuses furent les mobilisations be water dont la multiplicité (simultanée) et l’imprévisibilité avaient obéré l’aptitude policière à nasser et arrêter. Depuis le Premier mai, entre collaboration de la CGT, utilisation de l’ADN et de drones, la justice et la police travaillent...

    Caisse de So - Lyon @CaissedesoLyon
    https://twitter.com/CaissedesoLyon/status/1663257265921458200

    🚨Durant la manifestation/carnaval du 26 mai, un jeune homme a été interpellé à la Croix-Rousse. Les policiers auraient retrouvé son #ADN dans la quinquallerie Foussier qui a été pillé pendant la #Manifestation1erMai

    Déjà « connu des services » pour avoir incendié un véhicule de police pendant les #giletsjaunes et participé au saccage du local du PS en 2016, il a été placé en détention avant sa comparution immédiate demain à partir de 14h au tribunal.

    Plusieurs choses à retenir :
    ➡️ des enquêtes sont encore en cours pour les manfestations de mars, avril et mai. Par ex, un homme (arrêté et condamné pour une manif) s’est fait prequisitionner à la mi-mai et aura un procès l’année prochaine pour le 1er mai.
    Un autre manifestant a été arrêté le 16 mai, toujours pour la manifestation du 1er mai. Il a été écroué et est passé en comparuton immédiate le 19 mai.
    ➡️ si les policiers ne dispersent pas instantanément les rassemblements/manifs non-déclarées, c’est très certainement parce qu’ils passent au crible les participant-e-s pour essayer de mettre le grappin sur les gens qu’ils recherchent toujours🕵️‍♀️.
    ➡️ en cas de garde-à-vue pour le 1er mai ou autre, on a toujours rien à déclarer ! Et en cas de perquiz, c’est toujours bien si les enquêteurs ne trouvent pas 🧥🧣🧢👜 qui nous incriminent. À bon entendeur !
    Rdv le 6 juin dans la rue !

    Que s’est-il passé ce 1er mai à Lyon ?
    https://groupeantifascistelyonenvirons.com/2021/05/04/communique-suite-a-la-manif-du-1er-mai

    Le bloc avance lentement pour rester compact et ne pas se détacher du reste de la manif. Au bout de 300 mètres, Jackie, leader de l’UD #CGT de Lyon vient à l’avant de notre bloc et nous demande d’aller plus vite car ils n’arrivent pas à avancer. Le bloc accélère donc le pas mais nous réalisons que la CGT n’avance pas pour autant. Une personne vient nous voir et nous informe qu’elle aurait entendu un flic en civil, dire à un responsable de la CGT, qu’ils allaient procéder à des arrestations dans le bloc. Le bloc s’arrête pour attendre le reste de la manif, mais trop tard. La manœuvre entre CGT et police était déjà en place, un cordon de plusieurs dizaines de CRS encercle le bloc dans son dos. Le bloc comprend qu’il est en train d’être nassé, les banderoles se retournent pour faire face à cette ligne de police mais nous sommes entouré-es.

    Immédiatement une première charge fonce dans le Pink bloc et leur arrache les banderoles. Le bloc explose suite aux percées de flics par devant, à l’arrière et sur les cotés en simultanée. Les flics se replient aussitôt et le bloc se reforme pour se sécuriser. Il ressort les banderoles mais dans la foulée, une deuxième charge beaucoup plus violente est opérée. La CGT, qui n’a toujours pas bougé de sa ligne, regarde le spectacle, cacahuètes à la main.

    Lyon : deux individus interpellés « grâce à l’utilisation d’un drone » lors de la manifestation du 1er Mai
    https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/manifestations-du-1er-mai-deux-individus-interpelles-a-lyon-grace-a-l-utili

    Les drones de surveillance en appui aux forces de l’ordre font déjà leur effet à Lyon. Moins de deux heures après le départ de la manifestation du 1er Mai, les policiers ont interpellé deux individus repérés par un drone alors qu’ils allaient s’en prendre à la mairie du 7e arrondissement, a annoncé la préfecture.

    #police #drones #manifestation #arrestation #répression

  • Des drônes de surveillance policière vont survoler #Toulouse et les villes alentour.
    https://actu.fr/occitanie/toulouse_31555/pourquoi-des-drones-vont-survoler-toulouse-et-les-villes-alentour-des-ce-jeudi_

    À partir du 18 mai et jusqu’au 18 juillet 2023, des drones vont survoler Toulouse et les villes alentour pour lutter contre les rodéos urbains.

    Suit la liste des quartiers qui seront mis sous surveillance par drônes.

    #argent_public #drones #surveillance #police #industrie_de_l'armement

  • Un recours devant le Conseil d’État pour stopper l’envol des drones | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/160523/un-recours-devant-le-conseil-d-etat-pour-stopper-l-envol-des-drones

    Le 19 avril était publié le décret autorisant les forces de l’ordre à déployer des drones équipés de caméras. Depuis, ceux-ci sont utilisés pour surveiller des manifestations, des rodéos urbains, l’arrivée de migrants à la frontière franco-italienne ou les délinquants d’un quartier de Nice. Le Conseil d’État examine un référé demandant sa suspension. [...]

    Dans le bilan de la surveillance de la manifestation parisienne du 1er Mai, la direction de l’ordre public et de la circulation de la préfecture de police va plus loin et avance « des perspectives d’amélioration intéressantes », envisageant d’équiper les drones « d’un haut-parleur », « d’un diffuseur de produit marquant codé » ou encore « d’une lampe à forte puissance ». [...]

    Le gouvernement avait tenté de régulariser sa situation lors du vote de la loi « sécurité globale » du 25 mai 2021. Mais les articles relatifs aux drones avaient dans la foulée été censurés par le Conseil constitutionnel, et ce dû aux trop faibles garanties apportées au regard des libertés individuelles mises en jeu.

    Le gouvernement avait très vite revu sa copie et intégré un nouveau cadre légal de l’utilisation des drones à la loi « responsabilité pénale et sécurité intérieure » adoptée le 18 novembre 2021. Le Conseil constitutionnel avait cette fois validé le dispositif mais celui-ci nécessitait encore la prise d’un décret fixant ses conditions d’application concrètes. [...]

    Ils ont ainsi été déployés durant plusieurs manifestations du 1er Mai, notamment à Paris où trois appareils ont surveillé le cortège. Dans le bilan joint à la procédure par le ministère de l’intérieur, la préfecture de police se félicite par ailleurs de l’efficacité de cette surveillance aérienne qui a permis, selon elle, de mieux repérer les mouvements de foule, et ainsi de répartir idéalement les forces de l’ordre sur le terrain. [...]

    Outre la surveillance des manifestations un peu partout en France, les drones ont également été mobilisés pour d’autres occasions, notamment dans les Alpes-Maritimes. Le 9 mai, la préfecture a ainsi autorisé le déploiement pour une durée de trois mois d’un drone dans le quartier des Moulins à Nice « au titre de la prévention des atteintes à la sécurité des personnes et des biens ».

    Le lendemain, le préfet des Alpes-Maritimes prenait un nouvel arrêté autorisant, toujours pour trois mois, l’usage de deux drones pour surveiller les sentiers pédestres situés sur une partie de la frontière franco-italienne « au titre de la surveillance des frontières ». [...]

    « Les drones ont une capacité de visualisation sur un rayon de 600 mètres. La taille des cartes mémoires embarquées est de 200 Go, soit environ 50 DVD, ajoute l’un des mémoires des requérants. Il est donc fondamental que l’usage des drones soit encadré par les textes de la manière la plus pointilleuse possible, de façon prévisible pour les administrés, ne laissant quasiment aucune marge de manœuvre opérationnelle aux préfets, comme l’exige le droit de l’Union européenne. » [...]

    https://jpst.it/3dACP

    #drones #contrôle_social #vidéosurveillance #innovation_technologique #État_policier #fichage

  • UK to fund France detention site as leaders agree migration deal

    The UK will help fund a detention centre in France as part of a financial package to tackle irregular migration.
    France and the United Kingdom have agreed on a multiyear financial package to stop migration across the Channel, days after the UK government drew criticism for a bill barring unauthorised arrivals.

    As part of the deal announced on Friday, the UK will help fund a detention centre in France while French authorities will deploy a new dedicated permanent policing unit and enhanced technology to patrol the country’s beaches, including drones and aircraft.

    The agreement also involves doubling the number of personnel deployed to northern France to tackle small-boat crossings, half of whom will be in place by the end of 2023.

    It will see a new 24-hour zonal coordination centre with permanent British liaison officers that will bring all relevant French authorities together to coordinate the response.

    Officers from both countries will also look to work with countries along the routes favoured by people traffickers.

    The UK said it would contribute roughly $581m in funding over the next three years to help pay for the new measures, adding that it expected France to contribute “significantly more funding”. France did not provide any cost estimates.

    British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and French President Emmanuel Macron said at a news conference after meeting in Paris that the two sides had agreed to work more closely together.

    “It is time for a new start,” Macron said.

    Sunak, who took office in October 2022, said the two countries shared “the same beliefs” and had “taken cooperation to an unprecedented level”.

    “Criminal gangs should not get to decide who comes to our country. Within weeks of my coming into office, we agreed our largest ever small boats deal and today we’ve taken our cooperation to an unprecedented level to tackle this shared challenge,” he said.

    The two leaders also discussed further cooperation on defence, as well as the joint training of Ukrainian troops.

    Sunak has made stopping boat arrivals one of his five priorities after the number of people arriving on the south coast of England increased to more than 45,000 last year.

    Camille Le Coz, an analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, told Al Jazeera that in terms of policy, “what we are seeing is more of the same.”

    UK-French cooperation over controls at their shared borders has been formalised in the past through a series of bilateral agreements.

    “What the UK really wants is to be able to return people to France, and this is something that has not been agreed and won’t be agreed by France,” Le Coz said.

    Al Jazeera’s Natacha Butler, reporting from Paris, said ties between the two countries have been rocky since the UK voted to leave the European Union in 2016, but have been fortified by the countries’ support for Ukraine since Russia’s invasion last year.

    Friday’s summit was the first in five years, Butler said, and the realignment was partly due to “a common sense of purpose” forged by the ongoing conflict.
    UK plan to stop Channel crossings

    The new deal came on the heels of criticism in the UK of new draft legislation – dubbed the “Illegal Migration Bill” – barring the entry of asylum seekers arriving by unauthorised means, such as in small boats across the Channel.

    The legislation would enable the detention of people without bail or judicial review for the first 28 days after arrival.

    It would also disqualify people from using modern slavery laws to challenge government decisions to remove them in the courts.

    Sunak said the government would “take back control of our borders, once and for all”.

    Diane Abbott, a member of Parliament with the main opposition Labour Party, said the bill was “mistreating migrants and their rights” and would not work “in the real world”.

    Ylva Johansson, the European Union’s commissioner for home affairs, said she believed the plans breached international law.

    Opposition parties and rights organisations have questioned the morality and practicality of the government’s longstanding migration policies, including deporting some asylum seekers to Rwanda.

    UK home secretary Suella Braverman admitted on Tuesday that the government had “pushed the boundaries of international law”.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/10/uk-to-fund-france-detention-centre-as-leaders-agree-migration-deal

    #UK #Angleterre #France #Channel #migrations #asile #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #drones #rétention #détention_administrative #externalisation #accord

  • Il muro della Bulgaria. Un altro ostacolo europeo ai diritti dei migranti

    La Commissione europea ha messo a disposizione 600 milioni di euro per sostenere gli Stati membri nelle attività di contrasto ai flussi delle persone. Sofia, tra i primi destinatari dei finanziamenti, punta a rafforzare la barriera di 130 chilometri con la Turchia. Mentre Ong e volontari internazionali denunciano gravi violazioni e abusi

    Il 3 aprile di quest’anno i cittadini bulgari sono stati chiamati alle urne. Ad avere la maggioranza (risicata) è stato il partito Gerb guidato da Bojko Borisov. Il gruppo conservatore non ha stravinto e si preannuncia dunque un difficile periodo di transizione alla ricerca di alleanze per poter formare un nuovo governo. Borisov è già stato per tre volte a capo dell’esecutivo e durante i suoi mandati si è distinto per una linea molto dura in tema di immigrazione.

    Una linea mantenuta anche dall’attuale presidente, Rumen Radev, eletto per la prima volta nel 2017 grazie al sostegno del Partito socialista. A febbraio di quest’anno Radev ha chiesto all’Unione europea fondi per finanziare il rafforzamento della barriera lunga 130 chilometri che divide il Paese dalla Turchia. La richiesta per il “muro” è pervenuta nonostante la presidente della Commissione europea, Ursula von der Leyen, già a ottobre avesse affermato, non senza ipocrisie, che l’Ue non avrebbe mai finanziato la costruzione di muri e di filo spinato per impedire l’attraversamento dei migranti.

    Pochi mesi dopo però, in apertura dell’ultimo Consiglio europeo, è stata diramata una lettera (diffusa da Statewatch: https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/march/von-der-leyen-letter-key-border-between-bulgaria-and-turkiye-is-first-ta) nella quale è stato annunciato lo stanziamento di 600 milioni di euro per supportare “in modo sostanziale gli Stati membri nel controllo delle frontiere”, con particolare riferimento a quelle “esterne” della Turchia e quelle “interne” della Bulgaria, che riceveranno per prime tali fondi. Il budget sarà speso per finanziare sistemi di sorveglianza quali telecamere termiche, droni e radar grazie ai quali la polizia di frontiera potrà sorvegliare ogni movimento sospetto ai confini.

    Questa decisione, presa per rafforzare il controllo delle frontiere, interviene nonostante le criticità espresse da Ong e operatori locali nei confronti della gestione dell’immigrazione da parte delle autorità bulgare. A ottobre dello scorso anno un ragazzo siriano è stato raggiunto da colpi di arma da fuoco sparati dalla polizia di frontiera bulgara mentre tentava di attraversare il confine dalla Turchia. L’uomo è sopravvissuto nonostante i proiettili lo abbiano raggiunto al petto e alla mano, lasciandogli quest’ultima semi-paralizzata. E non era la prima volta che accadeva: sulla stessa frontiera nel 2015 un cittadino afghano è morto dopo gli spari esplosi da una guardia bulgara.

    Episodi del genere vengono confermati ripetutamente dalle testimonianze che i migranti rilasciano alle organizzazioni internazionali come Medici senza frontiere che in suo recente report ha raccolto le voci di chi è transitato in Bulgaria. C’è chi è stato picchiato ripetutamente con tubi di gomma da parte delle autorità, donne che hanno subito dalle stesse violenze sessuali, persone private di ogni bene e costrette a tornare in Turchia senza vestiti, sulla neve. Un uso della violenza spropositato, in barba a qualsiasi norma sui diritti umani, che viene denunciato anche da No name kitchen (Nnk), Ong spagnola e internazionale che opera sulle rotte balcaniche.

    Una delle testimonianze raccolte da Nnk recita: “La polizia bulgara ci ha attaccati con un cane che ha morso un mio amico alle gambe, alle mani e alla testa. Dopo ci hanno tolto tutti i vestiti, anche alle donne che erano con noi, e ci hanno spediti indietro in Turchia. I colpi che ci hanno inferto hanno rotto gambe e braccia ad alcune persone che poi non sono riuscite a proseguire il cammino per mesi e mesi”.

    Barbara Bécares, responsabile stampa della stessa Ong, spiega come tra 2018 e 2019 moltissimi migranti abbiano preferito passare per la Grecia a causa della nota violenza e dei trattamenti disumani perpetrati dalla polizia bulgara. Una polizia europea. Ma questa rotta è tornata in auge proprio dal 2020, quando anche in Grecia le autorità si sono macchiate di simili comportamenti rendendo il passaggio per il Paese altrettanto difficile e pericoloso. Le testimonianze che giungono sono da considerarsi come una piccola parte rispetto al totale di coloro che subiscono gli stessi trattamenti e che magari preferiscono non parlare per paura di ritorsioni. In Bulgaria la criminalizzazione delle organizzazioni non governative impedisce ai migranti di poter chiedere aiuto e denunciare gli abusi che subiscono. Chi riesce a varcare il confine dalla Turchia senza essere stanato, tenta di mantenere un profilo basso in attesa di oltrepassare la frontiera per la Serbia. Molti sanno che se vengono intercettati dalle autorità rischiano di essere respinti in Turchia o di finire all’interno di campi di detenzione. Un’inchiesta realizzata dal collettivo Lighthouse Reports denuncia l’esistenza di centri di detenzione illegali: vere e proprie gabbie nei pressi della stazione di polizia di Sredets (città a 40 chilometri dal confine turco) dove i migranti vengono rinchiusi anche per giorni. “La struttura assomiglia a una cuccia per cani in disuso, con sbarre su un lato -si legge nell’inchiesta-. I richiedenti asilo l’hanno descritta come una ‘gabbia’”.

    Gli abusi che vengono perpetrati quotidianamente a richiedenti asilo e migranti nel Paese sono ormai più che noti. A ciò si somma una sistematica negligenza nell’esame delle richieste d’asilo: molti richiedenti hanno denunciato di attendere una risposta alla propria domanda da anni.

    Tra questi c’è anche Khalid, un uomo eritreo che raggiunto telefonicamente ci ha raccontato la sua storia. È scappato dall’Eritrea nel lontano 2012. Arrivato in Turchia ha tentato di raggiungere la Grecia attraversando il confine dal fiume Evros ma per tre volte è stato respinto dalla polizia ellenica. Ha deciso dunque di cambiare frontiera e a marzo 2013 è riuscito ad arrivare in Bulgaria e da qui è cominciato quello che lui stesso definisce “un incubo”, non ancora finito. Dapprima è stato rinchiuso per tre mesi in un centro di detenzione a Lyubimets, una piccola cittadina non lontana dal confine turco. Le condizioni all’interno del centro sono descritte come degradanti: “Era un edificio di tre piani nelle quali venivano stipate migliaia di persone. Al piano inferiore c’erano le donne e le famiglie con bambini e a quello superiori gli uomini. Era sovraffollato e non veniva rispettata nessuna regola da parte delle autorità”.

    Poi è stato trasferito in un campo profughi vicino la capitale bulgara dove gli sono state prese le impronte digitali e dove ha richiesto la protezione internazionale. Non avendo ricevuto alcuna risposta, dopo sette mesi ha dunque deciso di scappare e di andare in Grecia, dove è stato rinchiuso all’interno di un altro centro. Qui ha trascorso altri sette mesi e dopo il suo rilascio ha iniziato un lungo viaggio che lo avrebbe poi portato fino in Svezia. Siamo nel 2016. Nel Paese scandinavo ha tentato di chiedere nuovamente asilo ma la sua domanda è stata respinta in base al Regolamento di Dublino ed è stato quindi trasferito in maniera coatta proprio in Bulgaria, dove è rimasto per altri tre anni. Dopo un anno e mezzo gli è stata notificata la prima risposta alla richiesta d’asilo: negativa. Ad aprile 2018 Khalid ha fatto appello alla Corte suprema bulgara. Ma tutto si è rivelato un buco nell’acqua. Senza alcun riscontro ed esasperato per l’attesa, ha deciso di ripercorrere l’intera rotta balcanica fino alla Slovenia, dove è giunto nel 2019 e dove ha ripresentato la domanda d’asilo. Dopo un anno gli è stato notificato l’ennesimo esito negativo e a quel punto, pur di non essere deportato nuovamente, ha deciso di andare in Francia, passando per l’Italia.

    Ed è proprio da un centro per richiedenti asilo di Parigi che ora racconta la sua storia. A metà aprile avrà il suo primo colloquio negli uffici per l’immigrazione ma è già stato avvisato che, tra le opzioni possibili, c’è anche quella di essere riportato in Slovenia e da lì in Bulgaria. Quando gli si chiede che cosa pensa di fare, dice che probabilmente non andrà all’appuntamento. “Preferisco rimettermi in viaggio per il Belgio o tenterò di attraversare il canale della Manica per raggiungere l’Inghilterra”. Nel 2012, quando fuggì dalla sua Asmara, aveva 33 anni.

    https://altreconomia.it/il-muro-della-bulgaria-un-altro-ostacolo-europeo-ai-diritti-dei-migrant
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Bulgarie #Turquie #drones #radar #caméras_thermiques #budget #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #violence #route_des_Balkans #Lyubimets

  • Un robot ailé capable de se poser tel un oiseau - EPFL
    https://actu.epfl.ch/news/un-robot-aile-capable-de-se-poser-tel-un-oiseau

    Des scientifiques de l’EPFL ont mis au point une méthode qui permet à un robot ailé de se poser de manière autonome sur un perchoir horizontal à l’aide d’un mécanisme à griffe. Cette innovation pourrait considérablement élargir l’étendue des tâches assistées par des robots.

    #drones

  • Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

    « Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

    « Le patrouilleur Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens.

    La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de surveillance aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

    Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données ADS-B, un signal émis par les avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

    Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

    Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

    Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

    Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri.

    L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

    De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

    Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

    Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « centre régional de coordination des sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

    Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

    Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l
    #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Méditerranée #Libye #mer_Méditerranée #pull-backs #pull-back #push-backs

    • Airborne Complicity – Frontex Aerial Surveillance Enables Abuse

      Over the last year, we have partnered with Human Rights Watch to investigate the use by the EU’s border agency, Frontex, of aerial surveillance in the central Mediterranean. The aircraft, several planes and a drone operated by private companies, transmit video feeds and other information to a situation centre in Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, where operational decisions are taken about when and whom to alert about migrants’ boats. Frontex aerial surveillance is key in enabling the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept migrant boatsand return their passengers to Libya, knowing full well that they will face systematic and widespread abuse when forcibly returned there.

      To circumvent Frontex’s lack of transparency on these issues (in processing 27 of 30 freedom of information requests we submitted – the others are pending – Frontex identified thousands of relevant documents but released only 86 of them, most of which were heavily redacted) we cross-referenced official and open-source data, including drone and plane flight tracks, together with information collected by Sea-Watch (through its various search and rescue ships and planes operating in the area), the Alarm Phone, as well as the testimony of survivors who courageously shared their stories with us. 

      Overall, contrary to Frontex claim that its aerial surveillance saves lives, the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Border Forensics demonstrates it is in service of interceptions by Libyan forces, rather than rescue. While the presence of Frontex aircraft has not had a meaningful impact on the death rate at sea, we found a moderate and statistically significant correlation between its aerial assets flights and the number of interceptions performed by the Libyan Coast Guard. On days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels.

      Our reconstruction of the events of July 30, 2021, when several boats carrying migrants were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the area where the drone was patrolling, is a good demonstration of this. The evidence we collected strongly suggests that the droneplayed a key role in facilitating the interception of potentially hundreds of people. 

      The analysis of available data supports the conclusion that the Frontex aerial surveillance forms a central plank of the EU’s strategy to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching Europe by boat and to knowingly return them to unspeakable abuse in Libya. It should be understood in continuity with the progressive withdrawal of EU ships from the central Mediterranean, the handover of responsibility to Libyan forces, and the obstruction of nongovernmental rescue groups which we have been investigating in the frame of the Forensic Oceanography project since several years. 

      The retreat of rescue vessels from the central Mediterranean and the simultaneous increase of surveillance aircraft in the sky is yet another attempt by the EU to further remove itself spatially, physically, and legally from its responsibilities: it allows the EU to maintain a distance from boats in distress, while keeping a close eye from the sky that enables Libyan forces to carry out what we have previously referred to as “refoulement by proxy”. Our investigation seeks to re-establish the connection between Frontex aerial surveillance and the violence captured migrants face at sea and in Libya thereafter.
      Reconstructing 30 July 2021 

      Since the beginning of our research, we have been looking into a number of specific cases of interceptions that involved European aerial assets. Thanks to the relentless effort of documentation by civil society organisations active in the central Mediterranean, in particular the Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, we were able to put together an extensive list of such cases. 

      We eventually decided to focus on the events of July 30, 2021 as a case study. In order to reconstruct what happened on that day, we have combined witness testimonies, data and footage collected by Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, tracks of aerial and naval assets, open-source information and data about disembarkation in Libya as well as two separate databases of interceptions (Frontex’ own JORA database and information from two European Union External Action Service classified documents). 

      Frontex drone’s tracks that day indicate it most likely detected at least two boats later intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard. The rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 witnessed by chance the interception of one of them that took place within the Maltese Search and Rescue Area. The Sea-Watch 3 had not received any distress alert via Frontex despite being in the immediate vicinity of the boat and ready to assist its passengers. 

      Frontex’ own database admits that its aerial surveillance program detected a total of 5 boats on that day. While only further disclosure by Frontex would allow to ultimately assess its impact on each specific interception that took place on that day, the precise geographical coordinates for the five interceptions reported in the classified EEAS documents seem to match at least three peculiar flight patterns of the Frontex drone.
      Analysing Frontex aerial surveillance
      Flight tracking

      In parallel to case reconstructions, we have been tracking the overall activities of Frontex aircraft in the central Mediterranean. Since these planes and drone are chartered from private companies such as DEA Aviation and ADAS, a subsidiary of Airbus, there is no publicly available official list of such assets. The first task was to understand which were the aerial assets patrolling the central Mediterranean on behalf of Frontex. Cross-referencing various identification information (hexcodes, callsigns, etc.) of these planes with those that had been already identified by Sea Watch airborne team and various journalists allowed us to establish a dependable list of Frontex aerial assets operating in the area. 

      Once that was established, we acquired from ADS-B Exchange (the only flight tracking platform that does not block any aircraft for which data is received by their feeders) a large dataset of flight tracking data covering a period of several months (May 2020 to September 2022) for all these aircraft. While the low number of data feeders near our area of interest means that coverage of the recorded data is at times inconsistent, ADS-B flight tracking data (which include latitude, longitude, altitude, and several other parameters) provide an exceptional insight into aerial activities performed by these assets and became a key element in our investigation.

      Thanks to these data, we were able to visualize the extend of each assets operational area over time. Each of these aircraft monitors a specific area of the central Mediterranean. What emerged were also a series of clearly identifiable and consistent search patters that Frontex aircraft are flying off the coast of Libya. More generally, these visualisations have allowed to grasp the extensive, yet tightly knit web of surveillance that results from aerial operations. 

      Pattern analysis

      When observed closely, flight tracks can provide further precious insights into Frontex surveillance activities. Several loops, U-turns, perfect circles, and sharp corners starts to emerge against the strict geometry of standard search patterns. These deviations indicate an aircraft is taking a closer look at something, thus testifying to potential sightings of migrant boats. Inspired by similar projects by John Wiseman, Emmanuel Freundenthal and others, we then started to isolate and taxonomise such search patterns and then wrote code to automatically identify similar patterns across the whole flight tracking dataset we had acquired. While this aspect of the research is still ongoing, it was already very useful in reconstructing the events of July 30, 2021, as detailed in the following section.

      Statistical analysis

      In order to assess the overall impact of aerial surveillance, we also conducted statistical analysis exploring the relation between interceptions carried out by Libyan forces and the presence of Frontex’s aerial assets in the 2021-2022 timeframe. 

      We first compiled several statistical data sources (data from the IOM, the UNHCR, the Maltese government as well as Frontex’ JORA database and a classified report by the European External Action Service) which, despite inconsistencies, have allowed us to measure migrant crossings and deaths, Libyan Coast Guard interceptions, and Frontex aerial presence. 

      The data gathered shows that Frontex aerial surveillance activities have intensified over time, and that they have been increasingly related to interception events. Our analysis reveals that almost one third of the 32,400 people Libyan forces captured at sea and forced back to Libya in 2021 were intercepted thanks to intelligence gathered by Frontex through aerial surveillance. Frontex incident database also shows that while Frontex’s role is very significant in enabling interception to Libya, it has very little impact on detecting boats whose passengers are eventually disembarked in Italy and Malta. 

      We then tested the correlation between Frontex aerial presence and Libyan Coast Guard interceptions over time and in space. The results show a moderate-to-strong and statistically significant correlation between the number of interceptions and the hours of flight flown by Frontex aerial assets. Said otherwise, on days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels. A spatial approach showed that interceptions and flight tracks are autocorrelated in space. At the same time, contrary to Frontex claims that aerial surveillance saves lives at sea, the analysis shows that there is no correlation between death rate and the flight time.

      Read the full statistical analysis here
      Conclusion

      Ultimately these different methods have allowed us to demonstrate how Frontex aerial surveillance (and in particular, because of its wider operational range, its drone) has become a key cog in the “pushback machine” that forces thousands of people back to abuse in Libya. 

      The publication of our findings with Human Rights Watch is the first stage of our ongoing investigation into the impact of European aerial surveillance on the lives and rights of migrants. We plan to continue deepening this investigation over the coming months.

       

      https://www.borderforensics.org/investigations/airborne-complicity
      #surveillance_aérienne #drones

  • #Route_des_Balkans : avec #Frontex, l’UE met les grands moyens pour enrayer les migrations

    La route des Balkans des réfugiés s’impose comme une priorité pour l’UE, qui accorde une enveloppe supplémentaire de 39,2 millions d’euros. Frontex va se déployer en #Albanie, en #Bosnie-Herzégovine, au #Monténégro et en #Serbie. La mission européenne vient aussi de signer un accord avec la #Macédoine_du_Nord.

    La #Commission_européenne a donné son #accord à une présence renforcée de Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, dans quatre pays des Balkans occidentaux. Cette autorisation porte sur les frontières entre l’UE, l’Albanie, la Serbie, le Monténégro et la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Bruxelles a aussi adopté un nouveau plan d’aides à hauteur de 39,2 millions d’euros, dans le cadre de l’#Instrument_d’aide_de_préadhésion (#IAP) pour le renforcement de la gestion des frontières dans ces pays candidats à l’intégration.

    Selon les accords actuellement en vigueur entre Frontex et l’Albanie, la Serbie et le Monténégro, des effectifs permanents de l’Agence européenne ne peuvent être déployées que sur les frontières de ces pays avec l’UE, sans exercer de compétences exécutives. Désormais, des #effectifs_permanents de Frontex pourront également être déployés sur les frontières de ces pays avec des États tiers. Cela veut dire, par exemple que des agents Frontex pourront patrouiller sur la frontière entre l’Albanie et le Monténégro ou entre la Serbie et la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

    Le plan d’aides financières annoncé servira surtout à financer du #matériel spécialisé (systèmes de #surveillance mobiles, #drones ou appareils biométriques). Ce plan financera aussi de la #formation et une aide à la mise en place et au fonctionnement de #centres_de_coordination_nationaux, dont des #centres_d’accueil et de #rétention des migrants. Ces 39,2 millions d’euros viennent renforcer les dispositifs sécuritaires pour un meilleur contrôle des frontières, dotés jusque là de 171,7 millions d’euros.

    “Nous nous concentrons sur le renforcement de la protection des frontières, la lutte contre les réseaux de trafiquants et l’intensification des #retours depuis la région.”

    La Commissaire aux Affaires intérieures #Ylva_Johansson a souligné que l’UE était très impliquée dans le soutien aux Balkans occidentaux au renforcement de la #coopération pour la gestion des migrations sur le terrain. « Voilà pourquoi nous proposons de négocier des accords de statut conformes au nouveau cadre juridique, qui permettront le déploiement de Frontex dans nos quatre pays partenaires avec la pleine force de son mandat, afin d’assurer que leurs frontières soient respectées et protégées conformément aux meilleures pratiques et normes européennes. »

    De son côté, le Commissaire européen à l’Élargissement #Oliver_Varhelyi estime que ce paquet arrive à point nommé, car les migrations restent, selon lui, un domaine dans lequel la collaboration avec les partenaires des Balkans occidentaux doit être renforcée. « Étant donné la pression migratoire accrue dans la région, nous nous concentrons sur le renforcement de la #protection_des_frontières, la lutte contre les réseaux de trafiquants et l’intensification des retours depuis la région. C’est dans ce but que nous renforçons notre soutien politique et financier. »

    Oliver Varhelyi a annoncé que la Commission avait l’intention d’augmenter ses financements en la matière d’ici 2024 pour les pays candidats des Balkans occidentaux, soit une enveloppe totale d’au moins 350 millions d’euros. Cette somme doit permettre à ces pays candidats de développer un système efficace de gestion des migrations dans tous les domaines, y compris l’asile, l’accueil, la sécurité aux frontières et les procédures de retour.

    https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/Route-des-Balkans-avec-Frontex-l-Union-europeenne-veut-mettre-les
    #Balkans #migrations #réfugiés #asile #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #aide_financière #biométrie #militarisation_des_frontières #renvois #expulsions

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • Tracking the Pact: EU seeks to seal off Balkan Route with expanded Frontex deployments

      The European Commission wants to launch negotiations with Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Albania so that EU border agency Frontex can extend its zone of operations. Currently, Frontex operations in those states can only take place at the borders they share with EU member states, in accordance with the 2016 Frontex Regulation. Upgrading the EU’s agreements with the Balkan states to take into account the powers granted to Frontex by the 2019 Regulation will make it possible to deploy EU border guards at non-EU borders - for example, between Bosnia and Serbia, or between Serbia and Montenegro. An agreement with North Macedonia has already been signed. The aim is to halt the irregular movement of people through the Balkans towards “core” EU member states.

      In order to launch negotiations the Commission needs the approval of the Council of the EU, and has thus sent to the Council four recommendations that, once they are signed off, will allow it to enter into negotiations with each of the four states:

      - Albania (COM(2022) 690 final, in Council doc. 14060/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Bosnia and Herzegovina (COM(2022) 691 final, in Council doc. 14061/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Montenegro (COM(2022) 692 final, in Council doc. 14062/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)
      – Serbia (COM(2022) 693 final, in Council doc. 14063/22, LIMITE, 26 October 2022, pdf)

      An upgraded agreement with North Macedonia based on the 2019 Frontex Regulation has already been approved.

      Each of the documents contains an explanatory memorandum before coming to the draft text of the proposed Council Recommendations.

      For example, the proposal on Albania notes:

      “Albania lies on the Western Balkans migration route, which sees significant irregular migration towards the core of the European Union, both via land and across the Adriatic Sea...

      Given that Albania is a neighbouring third country that remains an important country of transit for irregular migration to the European Union, the value of cooperation between the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the relevant authorities of Albania remains high. Albania has been a model for the successful deployment of Frontex joint operations to third countries, and it therefore represents an ideal candidate for the expansion of such cooperation.”

      Amongst other things, the memoranda note bilateral agreements signed by each of the states - for example, Bosnia has signed “readmission agreements with all the Western Balkan countries, Türkiye, Russia, Moldova and Pakistan whose practical implementation started in August 2022.” The intention is that Balkan states will not just prevent people from arriving in “core” EU territory - they will also deport them.

      There is no mention in any of the documents of the controversy the agency is mired in for its failure to uphold fundamental rights standards within the EU, in particular at the Greek-Turkish border, as confirmed by the recently-published report of the European Anti-Fraud Office.

      An annex to each of the above documents contains the negotiating directives for the Commission to follow, subject to possible amendment and then approval by the Council.

      - Albania (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Bosnia and Herzegovina (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Montenegro (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)
      - Serbia (as above, ANNEX/ADD 1, pdf)

      Although marked ’SENSITIVE’ (as are the proposals for recommendations), the annexes merely state that the agreement with each country should meet the standards set out in the model status agreement adopted by the European Commission in December last year.

      The final terms of the agreements are of course subject to negotiations with each state, with the texts then sent to the Council and Parliament for approval (or not).

      This is likely to lead to certain discrepancies. For example, the current status agreements with Balkan states contain differences on the privileges and immunities of officials deployed on Frontex operations:

      “While the agreements with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia include the provision that the executive director’s decision [on whether to waive criminal immunity or not] will be binding upon the authorities of the host state, no such article is found in the agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.”

      Negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex operations in Senegal and Mauritania are also ongoing. When approved, Frontex operations in those two countries will be the first ones outside the European continent.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/october/tracking-the-pact-eu-seeks-to-seal-off-balkan-route-with-expanded-fronte

    • Communiqué de presse du Conseil de l’UE du 24 février 2023 au sujet du nouvel accord conclu entre Frontex et la Macédoine du Nord (signé en octobre 2022, déploiement opérationnel à partir du 1er avril 2023: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr).

      Le communiqué refait le point sur les accords entre Frontex et les Etats non UE :

      - Border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules.
      - In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
      - In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.
      - An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.
      - The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

      –---

      Border management: EU concludes agreement with North Macedonia on Frontex cooperation

      The Council gave today its final green light to an agreement with North Macedonia on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The agreement will allow joint operations to be organised and Frontex border management teams to be deployed in North Macedonia, subject to the country’s agreement.

      As of 1st April, Frontex will be able to assist North Macedonia in its efforts to manage migratory flows, counter illegal immigration, and tackle cross-border crime. Reinforcing controls along North Macedonia’s borders will contribute to further enhancing security at the EU’s external borders.

      In line with the European border and coast guard regulation, the agreement also includes provisions for compliance monitoring and for the protection of fundamental rights.

      Background

      In 2019 a new Frontex regulation was adopted, broadening the agency’s mandate on several areas, including cooperation with third countries. The new mandate allows the agency to assist those countries with a status agreement throughout their territory and not only in the regions bordering the EU, as was the case with the previous mandate. It also allows Frontex staff to exercise executive powers, such as border checks and registration of persons. Status agreements allowing for joint operations can now be concluded with a wider range of countries and are no longer limited to neighbouring countries.

      Frontex had border management cooperation agreements in place with Albania (2019), Montenegro (2020) and Serbia (2020) under the previous rules. In November 2022, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations with these countries to broaden these agreements. It also agreed to open negotiations for an agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

      In July 2022, the Council also authorised the opening of negotiations for agreements with Mauritania and Senegal.

      An agreement with Moldova, already under the new rules, entered into force on 1 November 2022.

      The agreement with North Macedonia was signed on 26 October 2022. North Macedonia has reported its conclusion of the agreement, meaning it will enter into force on 1 April 2023 following today’s decision by the Council.

      https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/24/border-management-eu-concludes-agreement-with-north-macedonia-on-fr

  • EU mulls more police powers for west Africa missions

    The EU wants to further prop up anti-terror efforts at its overseas civilian missions in places like #Niger.

    Although such missions already seek to counter terrorism, the latest proposal (framed as a “mini-concept” by the EU’s foreign policy branch, the #European_External_Action_Service, #EEAS), entails giving them so-called “semi-executive functions.”

    Such functions includes direct support to the authorities by helping them carry out investigations, as well as aiding dedicated units to prosecute and detain suspected terrorist offenders.

    The concept paper, drafted over the summer, points towards a European Union that is willing to work hand-in-glove with corrupt and rights-abusing governments when it comes to issues dealing security and migration.

    This includes getting EU missions to seal cooperation deals between EU member state intelligence and security services with the host governments.

    And although the paper highlights the importances of human rights and gender equality, the terms are couched in policy language that clearly aims to boost policing in the countries.

    From helping them develop systems to collect biometric data to preserving and sharing “evidence derived from the battlefield”, the 14-page paper specifically cites the EU missions in Niger, Mali, Somalia, Libya, Iraq and Kosovo as prime examples.

    In Niger, the EU recently handed its mission a €72m budget and extended its mandate until September 2024.

    That budget includes training staff to drive armoured vehicles and piloting drones.

    Another EU internal document on Niger, also from over the summer, describes its mission there as “the main actor in the coordination of international support to Niger in the field of security.”

    It says Niger’s capacity to fight terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration has improved as a direct result of the mission’s intervention.

    The country was given €380m in EU funding spread over 2014 to 2020.

    In Mali, the EU mission there already supports the country’s dedicated units to intervene and investigate terror-related cases.

    But it had also temporarily suspended in April the operational training of formed units of the Malian armed forces and National Guard.
    Clash with Wagner in Mali

    The suspension followed reports that EU security trained forces in Mali were being co-opted by the Kremlin-linked Russian mercenary group Wagner, which was also operating in the Central African Republic.

    Mali has since withdrawn from the G5 Sahel, an anti-jihad grouping of countries in the region currently composed of Niger, Burkina, Mauritania, and Chad.

    And an internal EU paper from May posed the question of whether Malian authorities even want to cooperate with the EU mission.

    The EU’s mission there was also recently extended until 2024 with a €133.7m purse.

    The EU’s mini-concept paper on fighting terrorism, follows another idea on using specialised teams at the missions to also tackle migration.

    Part of those plans also aims to give the missions “semi-executive functions”, enabling them to provide direct support to police and carry out joint investigations on migration related issues.

    https://euobserver.com/world/156143

    #sécurité #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #Union_européenne #externalisation #anti-terrorisme (toujours la même rhétorique) #Mali #mini-concept #semi-executive_functions #services_secrets #coopération #biométrie #données #collecte_de_données #Somalie #Libye #Kosovo #Irak #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #G5_Sahel #budget #coût #police #collaboration

    ping @rhoumour @isskein @_kg_

  • Financement régional de drones policiers : l’Île-de-France dans l’embarras
    https://www.laquadrature.net/2022/09/05/financement-regional-de-drones-policiers-lile-de-france-dans-lembarras

    En début d’année, La Quadrature du Net s’associait aux élu·es de la région Île-de-France mobilisé·es contre le subventionnement illégal de drones municipaux par la région. Mise sous pression, la majorité régionale, embarrassée, commence à admettre…

    #général #Surveillance

  • Analizzare la deforestazione tramite l’utilizzo di droni

    La foresta Mau, situata nella parte occidentale del Kenya, ha subito processi di deforestazione già in epoca coloniale, inizialmente per soddisfare la richiesta di legname da usare come combustibile per lo sviluppo della ferrovia dell’Uganda. Ma è soprattutto durante la fase di transizione verso la democrazia, tra gli anni Ottanta e primi anni Duemila, che si assiste a una maggiore perdita di superficie forestale, in quanto in questo momento sono state illecitamente attribuite terre tramite programmi di insediamento rurale come mezzo per ottenere consenso politico.

    Missione in Kenya

    In agosto 2019, con la supervisione del professor Valerio Bini e il supporto dell’associazione italiana Mani Tese e dell’organizzazione svizzera #Drone_Adventures, mi sono recato in Kenya per mappare una parte della foresta #Ndoinet tramite l’ausilio di droni ad ali fisse, con l’intento di quantificare e localizzare la presenza di pascoli di bovini e ovini e analizzare la tipologia di foresta.

    Durante la missione, con 22 voli, è stata coperta una superficie forestale di 6’000 ettari. In seguito Drone Adventures ha realizzato una ortofoto di tutta l’area mappata, utile per avere un’idea generale ma non per raggiungere gli obiettivi preposti.

    Analisi delle immagini

    Si è quindi deciso di suddividere le fotografie dei singoli voli, circa 300-400 immagini per cartella, tra più studenti. Nella mia ricerca ho quindi incluso un capitolo dedicato specificatamente allo scopo di fornire linee guida ad altri studenti su come gestire ed elaborare le fotografie in modo uniforme e ottimale. Nell’ultimo capitolo ho invece analizzato le fotografie di uno specifico volo, confermando ad esempio che l’area analizzata è composta perlopiù da foresta di transizione e spazio aperto contro una minima parte di foresta densa.

    Il dato più rilevante emerso da questa analisi è rappresentato dalla distribuzione degli animali che si trovano tuttora nelle zone di insediamento abbandonate nei decenni scorsi. Ciò può influenzare in modo diretto la ricrescita o meno della foresta in quelle zone.

    Attraverso le fotografie ho potuto riscontrare la presenza indiretta dell’uomo, grazie all’osservazione di alberi caduti, ciò che fa pensare, vista la vicinanza a strade o insediamenti abbandonati, all’abbattimento volontario antropico e non a cause naturali.

    Lo stesso si può dire anche per le possibili tracce di incendio che sono raggruppate in una specifica area “corridoio” tra le due strade. In un caso si è anche potuto osservare la presenza di fuoco vivo.

    Conclusioni

    L’utilizzo dei droni in questo contesto si è dimostrato molto utile in quanto permette, in un tempo ristretto, di avere una panoramica su un determinato settore di foresta. Questo facilita l’ottenimento di informazioni vitali per proteggere la foresta, come l’individuazione di fuoco vivo, che può indicare un principio di incendio o produzione illegale di carbone, senza la necessità di ricorrere all’uso di elicotteri, molto più costosi e inquinanti.

    L’analisi della deforestazione tramite droni si è rivelata efficace e conferma che questi nuovi strumenti possono essere utilizzati anche per foreste in altre aree, così come per analizzare altre situazioni in cui è difficile accedere in altri modi.

    https://www.geograficamente.ch/analizzare-la-deforestazione-tramite-lutilizzo-di-droni

    #drones #déforestation #cartographie #forêt #Mau #Kenya

  • EU’s Drone Is Another Threat to Migrants and Refugees

    Frontex Aerial Surveillance Facilitates Return to Abuse in Libya

    “We didn’t know it was the Libyans until the boat got close enough and we could see the flag. At that point we started to scream and cry. One man tried to jump into the sea and we had to stop him. We fought off as much as we could to not be taken back, but we couldn’t do anything about it,” Dawit told us. It was July 30, 2021, and Dawit, from Eritrea, his wife, and young daughter were trying to seek refuge in Europe.

    Instead, they were among the more than 32,450 people intercepted by Libyan forces last year and hauled back to arbitrary detention and abuse in Libya.

    Despite overwhelming evidence of torture and exploitation of migrants and refugees in Libya – crimes against humanity, according to the United Nations – over the last few years the European Union has propped up Libyan forces’ efforts to intercept the boats. It has withdrawn its own vessels and installed a network of aerial assets run by private companies. Since May 2021, the EU border agency Frontex has deployed a drone out of Malta, and its flight patterns show the crucial role it plays in detecting boats close to Libyan coasts. Frontex gives the information from the drone to coastal authorities, including Libya.

    Frontex claims the surveillance is to aid rescue, but the information facilitates interceptions and returns to Libya. The day Dawit and his family were caught at sea, Libyan forces intercepted at least two other boats and took at least 228 people back to Libya. One of those boats was intercepted in international waters, inside the Maltese search-and-rescue area. The drone’s flight path suggests it was monitoring the boat’s trajectory, but Frontex never informed the nearby nongovernmental Sea-Watch rescue vessel.

    Human Rights Watch and Border Forensics, a nonprofit that uses innovative visual and spatial analysis to investigate border violence, are examining how the shift from sea to air surveillance contributes to the cycle of extreme abuse in Libya. Frontex’s lack of transparency – they have rejected ours and Sea-Watch’s requests for information about their activities on July 30, 2021 – leaves many questions about their role unanswered.

    Dawit and others panicked when they saw the Libyan boat because they knew what awaited upon return. He and his family ended up in prison for almost two months, released only after paying US$1,800. They are still in Libya, hoping for a chance to reach safety in a country that respects their rights and dignity.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/01/eus-drone-another-threat-migrants-and-refugees
    #Frontex #surveillance_aérienne #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #push-backs #pull-backs #refoulements #Libye #interception

    • Libia: il drone anti-migranti di Frontex

      Frontex, la controversa agenzia di sorveglianza delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea, pur avendo smesso la vigilanza marittima delle coste, attraverso l’utilizzo di un drone, sta aiutando la guardia costiera libica a intercettare i barconi dei migranti e rifugiati che tentano di raggiungere le coste italiane. I migranti, perlopiù provenienti dall’Africa subsahariana, sono così ricondotti in Libia dove sono sfruttati e sottoposti a gravi abusi.

      Lo denuncia l’organizzazione internazionale Human Rights Watch. È dal maggio del 2021 che Frontex ha dislocato un drone a Malta: secondo l’ong i piani di volo dimostrerebbero che il velivolo ha un ruolo cruciale nell’individuazione dei battelli in prossimità delle coste libiche; Frontex trasmette infatti i dati raccolti dal drone alle autorità libiche.

      L’agenzia europea sostiene che l’utilizzo del drone ha lo scopo di aiutare il salvataggio dei barconi in difficoltà, ma Human Rights Watch ribatte che questa attività manca di «trasparenza». Il rapporto vuole sottolineare che all’Europa non può bastare che i migranti non arrivino sulle sue coste. E non può nemmeno fingere di non sapere qual è la situazione in Libia.

      L’instabilità politica che caratterizza la Libia dalla caduta di Gheddafi nel 2011 ha fatto del paese nordafricano una via privilegiata per decine di migliaia di migranti che cercano di raggiungere l’Europa attraverso le coste italiane che distano circa 300 km da quelle libiche. Non pochi di questi migranti sono bloccati in Libia, vivono in condizioni deprecabili e in balia di trafficanti di esseri umani.

      https://www.nigrizia.it/notizia/libia-il-drone-anti-migranti-di-frontex

  • À #Calais, une #surveillance du ciel au tunnel

    #Drones, #reconnaissance_faciale, #capteurs_de_CO2 et de battements cardiaques : face à l’afflux de réfugiés, la frontière franco-britannique est surveillée à grands coups d’#intelligence_artificielle. Premier volet de notre série sur la #cybersurveillance des frontières.

    Pablo lève les yeux au ciel et réfléchit. Brusquement, il fixe son ordinateur. Le chargé de communication et plaidoyer chez Human Rights Observers (HRO) fouille dans ses dossiers, ouvre un document d’une quinzaine de pages. « Tu vois, ce jour-là, ils ont utilisé un drone », indique-t-il en pointant l’écran du doigt. Le 9 juin, l’association pour laquelle il travaille assiste à une expulsion de réfugié·es à #Grande-Synthe. Dans son compte-rendu, elle mentionne la présence d’un drone. Des vols d’aéronefs, hélicoptères ou avions, devenus routiniers.

    En cette matinée de fin juin, Pablo a donné rendez-vous sur son lieu de travail, « l’entrepôt », comme il l’appelle. Ce vaste bâtiment désaffecté d’une zone industrielle à l’est de Calais héberge plusieurs associations locales. Les bureaux de HRO sont spartiates : un simple préfabriqué blanc planté dans la cour.

    C’est ici que ses membres se réunissent pour documenter les #violences d’État perpétrées contre les personnes en situation d’exil à la frontière franco-britannique, plus spécifiquement à Calais et à Grande-Synthe. Depuis plus de 20 ans, la ville est érigée en symbole de la crise migratoire. L’évacuation et la destruction de la jungle en octobre 2016 n’ont rien changé. Désormais réparties dans de multiples camps précaires, des centaines de migrants et migrantes tentent le passage vers l’Angleterre au péril de leur vie. Selon le ministère de l’intérieur, ils et elles étaient 52 000 en 2021, un record, contre « seulement » 10 000 en 2020.

    Sous l’impulsion des pouvoirs publics, Calais se barricade. Plus que les maisons de briques rouges, ce sont les #clôtures géantes, les rangées de #barbelés et les #marécages_artificiels qui attirent la vue. Tout semble construit pour décourager les exilé·es de rejoindre la Grande-Bretagne. « Avant, il n’y avait pas tout ça. C’est devenu assez oppressant », regrette Alexandra. Arrivée il y a sept ans dans le Pas-de-Calais, elle travaille pour l’Auberge des migrants, association qui coordonne le projet HRO.

    Quatre #caméras empilées sur un pylône à l’entrée du port rappellent que cette frontière n’est pas que physique. #Vidéosurveillance, #drones, #avions, #détecteurs_de_CO2… Le littoral nord incarne le parfait exemple de la « #smart_border ». Une frontière invisible, connectée. Un eldorado pour certaines entreprises du secteur de l’intelligence artificielle, mais un cauchemar pour les exilé·es désormais à la merci des #algorithmes.

    Si des dizaines de #caméras lorgnent déjà sur le port et le centre-ville, la tendance n’est pas près de s’inverser. La maire LR, #Natacha_Bouchart, qui n’a pas donné suite à notre demande d’interview, prévoit d’investir 558 000 euros supplémentaires en #vidéosurveillance en 2022.

    « C’est la nouvelle étape d’une politique en place depuis plusieurs décennies », analyse Pierre Bonnevalle, politologue, auteur d’un long rapport sur le sujet. À Calais, la #bunkérisation remonte, selon le chercheur, au milieu des années 1990. « À cette époque commencent les premières occupations des espaces portuaires par des personnes venues des pays de l’Est qui souhaitaient rejoindre la Grande-Bretagne. Cela entraîne les premières expulsions, puis un arrêté pris par la préfecture pour interdire l’accès au port. »

    Les années suivantes, c’est à #Sangatte que se dessinent les pratiques policières d’aujourd’hui. Dans cette commune limitrophe de Calais, un hangar préfigure ce que sera la « #jungle » et héberge jusqu’à 2 000 exilé·es. « La police cible alors tous ceux qui errent dans la ville, tentent d’ouvrir des squats, de dormir dans un espace boisé. » Une manière de « contenir le problème », de « gagner du temps ».

    En parallèle, la ville s’équipe en vidéosurveillance et en barbelés. En 2016, l’expulsion de la jungle fait émerger la politique gouvernementale actuelle : l’#expulsion par les forces de l’ordre, toutes les 24 ou 48 heures, des camps où vivent les personnes exilées.

    #Surveillance_aérienne

    Calme et grisâtre en ce jour de visite, le ciel calaisien n’est pas épargné. Depuis septembre 2020, l’armée britannique fait voler un drone #Watchkeeper, produit par l’industriel français #Thales, pour surveiller la mer. « Nous restons pleinement déterminés à soutenir le ministère de l’intérieur britannique alors qu’il s’attaque au nombre croissant de petits bateaux traversant la Manche », se félicite l’armée britannique dans un communiqué.

    Selon des données de vol consultées par Mediapart, un drone de l’#Agence_européenne_pour_la_sécurité_maritime (#AESM) survole également régulièrement les eaux, officiellement pour analyser les niveaux de pollution des navires qui transitent dans le détroit du Pas-de-Calais. Est-il parfois chargé de missions de surveillance ? L’AESM n’a pas répondu à nos questions.

    Au sein du milieu associatif calaisien, la présence de ces volatiles numériques n’étonne personne. « On en voit souvent, comme des hélicoptères équipés de caméras thermiques », confie Marguerite, salariée de l’Auberge des migrants. Chargée de mission au Secours catholique, Juliette Delaplace constate que cette présence complexifie leur travail. « On ne sait pas si ce sont des drones militaires, ou des forces de l’ordre, mais lorsque l’on intervient et que les exilés voient qu’un drone nous survole, c’est très compliqué de gagner leur confiance. »

    En décembre 2021, à la suite d’une demande expresse du ministre de l’intérieur, Gérald Darmanin, l’agence européenne #Frontex a dépêché un #avion pour surveiller la côte pendant plusieurs semaines. « Une mission toujours en cours pour patrouiller aux frontières française et belge », précise Frontex.

    « On sent une évolution des #contrôles depuis l’intervention de cet avion, qui a œuvré principalement la nuit, confie le maire d’une ville du Nord. Beaucoup de gens tentaient de monter dans des camions, mais cela a diminué depuis que les contrôles se sont durcis. »

    Il faut dire que la société #Eurotunnel, qui gère le tunnel sous la Manche, ne lésine pas sur les moyens. En 2019, elle a dépensé 15 millions d’euros pour installer des sas « #Parafe » utilisant la reconnaissance faciale du même nom, mise au point par Thales. Lors du passage de la frontière, certains camions sont examinés par des capteurs de CO2 ou de fréquence cardiaque, ainsi que par de l’#imagerie par #ondes_millimétriques, afin de détecter les personnes qui pourraient s’être cachées dans le chargement.

    « C’est un dispositif qui existe depuis 2004, lorsque Nicolas Sarkozy a fait évacuer le camp de Sangatte, informe un porte-parole d’Eurotunnel. Depuis 2015, il y a tellement de demandes de la part des routiers pour passer par ce terminal, car ils peuvent recevoir des amendes si un migrant est trouvé dans leur camion, que nous avons agrandi sa capacité d’accueil et qu’il fait partie intégrante du trajet. »

    Des outils de plus en plus perfectionnés qui coïncident avec l’évolution des modes de passage des personnes exilées, analyse le politologue Pierre Bonnevalle. « Pendant longtemps, il s’agissait de surveiller les poids lourds. Le #port et le #tunnel sont aujourd’hui tellement bunkérisés que les exilés traversent en bateau. »

    Les technologies employées suivent : en novembre 2021, le ministère de l’intérieur annonçait la mise à disposition de 4 x 4, de lunettes de vision nocturne ou de #caméras_thermiques pour équiper les gendarmes et policiers chargés de lutter contre l’immigration clandestine sur les côtes de la Manche.

    « Ces technologies ne servent à rien, à part militariser l’espace public. J’ai encore rencontré des associatifs la semaine dernière qui me disaient que cela n’a aucun impact sur le nombre de passages et les risques pris par ces gens », tempête l’eurodéputé et ancien maire de Grande-Synthe Damien Carême.

    Elles ont malgré tout un #coût : 1,28 milliard d’euros depuis 1998, selon Pierre Bonnevalle, dont 425 millions pour la seule période 2017-2021. « C’est une estimation a minima, pointe-t-il. Cela ne prend pas en compte, par exemple, le coût des forces de l’ordre. »

    Publié en novembre 2021, un rapport de la commission d’enquête parlementaire sur les migrations détaille les dépenses pour la seule année 2020 : l’État a investi 24,5 millions dans des dispositifs humanitaires d’hébergement, contre 86,4 pour la mobilisation des forces de l’ordre. Des sommes qui désespèrent Pablo, le militant de Human Rights Observers. « Cela aurait permit de bâtir de nombreux centres d’accueil pour que les exilés vivent dans des conditions dignes. » L’État semble avoir d’autres priorités.

    #technologie #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #réfugiés #surveillance_des_frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #IA #AI #complexe_militaro-industriel #Manche #La_Manche #France #UK #Angleterre
    –-

    via @olaf #merci :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/968794

  • Slovenia e flussi migratori: via il filo spinato, arrivano i droni
    https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Slovenia/Slovenia-e-flussi-migratori-via-il-filo-spinato-arrivano-i-droni-219

    Il nuovo governo sloveno ha promesso, entro fine hanno, la rimozione delle famigerate barriere di filo spinato anti-migranti al confine con la Croazia. Non sarà un “liberi tutti”, ma solo la sostituzione di un rozzo meccanismo di controllo con altri più sofisticati

    • La Slovénie, la frontière et les réfugiés : des drones à la place des barbelés

      Le 15 juillet, le nouveau gouvernement slovène de gauche a entrepris la destruction du « mur » de barbelés érigé sur les frontières du pays avec la Croatie. Cela ne veut pas dire que celles-ci seront moins surveillées, bien au contraire : après les barbelés, place aux drones !

      Les premiers rouleaux de fil de fer barbelé à la frontière avec la Croatie avaient été posés en novembre 2015 près de Rigonce, dans le sud de la Styrie, un village qui était devenu l’une des principales voies d’accès à la Slovénie le long de la route des Balkans. Ensuite, les barrières se sont étendues sur toute la frontière, au grand étonnement de la population locale, qui a vu les soldats du génie militaire arriver pour placer des « barrières techniques » parfois jusque dans les jardins ou les cours des maisons. Cela n’avait pas manqué de soulever de vives protestations en Croatie et quelques manifestations symboliques ont été organisées ces dernières années le long de la frontière. La dernière a eu lieu au début de ce mois en Carniole Blanche (Bela Krajina), où des organisations non gouvernementales, l’office local du tourisme et des institutions culturelles ont descendu un tronçon de la rivière Kolpa avec une trentaine de bateaux, pour appeler le gouvernement à ôter sans attendre les barrières et à changer de politique de contrôle aux frontières.
      Durant la campagne électorale, le centre-gauche avait promis qu’en cas de victoire, il retirerait très rapidement les barbelés. Au lendemain de la victoire, certains se disaient même prêts, non sans enthousiasme, à former des équipes de volontaires pour aller détruire les barrières. Le gouvernement de Robert Golob s’est néanmoins empressé de dire aux citoyens de ne pas se ruer à l’assaut de ces clôtures honnies…

      Les 200 km de barbelés et les panneaux anti-migrants entre la Slovénie et la Croatie seront entièrement supprimés d’ici la fin de l’année, a confirmé le gouvernement. Le 15 juillet, les premiers mètres de la barrière ont été symboliquement retirés près du poste frontière de Krmačina, dans le sud-est du pays, en présence des représentants du ministère de l’Intérieur et de la police slovène. Peu avant, la ministre de l’Intérieur, Tatjana Bobnar, avait déclaré devant le Parlement que ces barrières seraient supprimées, afin que « plus personne ne meure en essayant de traverser la frontière ». La dernière victime en date est une jeune fille kurde qui s’est noyée en décembre dernier dans la Dragonja, le petit fleuve côtier qui sépare la Slovénie de la Croatie en Istrie. En tout, 23 personnes au moins sont mortes sur le sol slovène en tentant de remonter la route des Balkans. Selon les organisations qui s’occupent de l’aide aux migrants, les obstacles ont rendu la traversée des rivières plus difficile, augmentant les risques de noyade, surtout en hiver ou quand le niveau des eaux est élevé.

      “Il n’est nullement question d’ouvrir la frontière mais seulement de remplacer un mécanisme de contrôle rudimentaire par d’autres moyens plus sophistiqués.”

      Pour les ONG, cependant, le problème ne tient pas seulement aux barrières, mais surtout à l’attitude hostile contre les réfugiés adoptée par les institutions et la police, qui agissent de manière arbitraire en faisant obstacle aux demandes d’asile et en procédant à des refoulements forcés. Une stratégie qui n’a jamais été ouvertement assumée, mais qui a été mise en place dès le début de la crise, en 2015, par le gouvernement centriste de Miro Cerar. À l’époque, la Slovénie, qui redoutait de devenir un cul-de-sac pour les réfugiés syriens fuyant la guerre, avait lancé toute une série de mesures pour protéger l’ordre public, dont l’attribution à l’armée de tâches de contrôle des frontières ou même des manifestations. L’achat de canons à eau très modernes pour la police n’avait alors même pas fait débat. Ces gadgets ont été largement utilisés par l’ancien gouvernement conservateur pour réprimer les manifestations antigouvernementales et les protestations contre les restrictions imposées pendant l’épidémie de Covid-19.

      La suppression des barrières ne va certainement pas marquer un tournant décisif dans l’attitude des Slovènes envers les réfugiés. En résumé, il n’est nullement question d’ouvrir la frontière mais seulement de remplacer un mécanisme de contrôle rudimentaire par d’autres moyens plus sophistiqués. L’accord de coalition prévoit en effet le remplacement des barbelés par le renforcement de dispositifs de contrôle alternatifs, comme des systèmes de vidéosurveillance et des drones.

      Ljubljana ne veut pas du tout donner l’impression d’avoir lâché prise, mais la Slovénie tient au contraire à montrer qu’elle veut continuer à s’engager dans la lutte contre les migrations clandestines. Cela ne semble pourtant pas trop convaincre les Autrichiens, qui ont suspendu de facto le régime Schengen avec la Slovénie et ont « provisoirement » rétabli les contrôles aux frontières, depuis 2015. Les protestations de Ljubljana demandant le retour de l’ouverture de la frontière n’ont pas eu d’effets, et se sont heurtées aux réponses plutôt méprisantes de Vienne, où l’on ne cesse de répéter que le flux de migrants en provenance de Slovénie augmente.

      Schengen pour améliorer les relations de voisinage
      La situation devrait toutefois s’améliorer, au moins entre la Slovénie et la Croatie, mais pas à cause de la suppression des barrières. La frontière, établie il y a plus de trente ans, lors de la proclamation d’indépendance des deux pays, était initialement présentée comme une ligne de démarcation provisoire, mais elle est rapidement devenue une véritable frontière d’État. Les contrôles devraient être suspendus entre les deux pays l’année prochaine, quand la Croatie rejoindra à son tour l’espace Schengen. Une véritable libération pour les frontaliers qui, surtout en été et pendant les vacances, sont obligés de passer des heures et des heures dans les files d’attente pour pouvoir aller travailler ou rentrer chez eux. En trente ans, les deux pays n’ont pratiquement rien fait pour améliorer ce transit. L’adhésion de la Croatie à l’espace Schengen sera aussi un moyen de rétablir le dense réseau de relations qui existe au sein des populations locales, des deux côtés de la frontière. Les contacts n’ont jamais été complètement interrompus, mais s’étaient beaucoup compliqués, dans une zone qui par le passé n’avait jamais été divisée par une frontière.

      https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/La-Slovenie-la-frontiere-et-les-refugies-des-drones-a-la-place-de

    • Droni di pattugliamento al confine italo sloveno

      Droni di pattugliamento al confine italo sloveno, questa la recente notizia. I pattugliamenti dovrebbero iniziare entro un mese.

      L’idea ancora allo studio prevede l’inizio di un pattugliamento congiunto fra Italia e Slovenia per il controllo dell’immigrazione in continua crescita sulla rotta balcanica, questo è quanto emerso da una serie di incontri fra il nostro Ministro dell’Interno Luciana Lamorgese, e l’omologo ministro sloveno Aleš Hojs.

      L’iniziativa è stata promossa dal nostro Paese, che ha chiesto una collaborazione al governo sloveno per contrastare un flusso sempre crescente di immigrati clandestini che giungono in Italia senza i regolari permessi. Il nostro governo ha dichiarato di voler utilizzare visori notturni e droni di pattugliamento per migliorare e rendere più efficace le operatività delle forze dell’ordine che spesso si svolgono in zone impervi del confine italo-sloveno.

      Il ministro Lamorgese ha dichiarato che le zone di pattugliamento via terra e con droni riguarderanno principalmente le aree di Trieste e Udine dove si hanno maggiori riscontri di immigrazione clandestina. “Ci aspettiamo che le pattuglie congiunte diano risultati concreti” ha detto il ministro solveno Hojs che conferma l’impegno della Polizia slovena a svolgere controlli più serrati e precisi di tutta l’area di loro competenza. Il territorio sloveno è infatti un’are adi particolare transito di immigrati verso l’Italia e l’Europa in generale.

      Tra i primi a commentare l’incontro di Brdo è stata Tatjana Rojc, componente della commissione Esteri al Senato italiano, la quale ha dichiarato: “La ripresa delle pattuglie miste sul confine italo-sloveno conferma la volontà di collaborazione concreta che c’è tra i due Paesi – afferma la senatrice, e aggiunge “Credo sia da condividere anche l’accelerazione dell’ingresso della Croazia nell’area Schengen, come indicato dalla Commissione europea nella nuova strategia Ue che prevede misure per proteggere la libertà di movimento e la sicurezza dei confini allo stesso tempo“.

      https://www.droneblog.news/droni-di-pattugliamento-al-confine-italo-sloveno
      #drones

  • Par les temps qui courent, c’est pas tous les jours qu’un Etat décide de démanteler un mur...
    Slovenia to dismantle border fence with Croatia

    Slovenia has announced that it will be taking down its border fence on the Croatian border by the end of the year. The Interior Ministry confirmed the plan to the news agency STA.

    Slovenia’s new government has vowed to remove the controversial fence that separates it from neighbouring Croatia. Construction on the fence started in late 2015 during the height of the what is often referred to as the ’European refugee crisis,’ when hundreds of thousands of people fled to EU countries from war-torn Syria.

    The fence was designed to curb irregular migration into Slovenia through the Balkans. It was extended several times since 2015, and is currently about 200 kilometers long.

    Many people have been insured trying to scale the structure, suffering considerable cuts on the barbed wire that was placed on top of the fence.
    New government wants to change direction

    Slovenia shares a 670 kilometer-long border with Croatia, meaning that roughly a third of their shared border has been fortified with a fence.

    Both countries are members of the European Union, but only Slovenia is also part of the Schengen Area — a group of European countries that have abolished border controls at their shared borders. In part because of this, Slovenia has seen a lot of people trying to cross its borders to get to other Schengen countries, like Germany, Austria or Italy.

    Both Croatia and Slovenia have repeatedly come under fire for their treatment of migrants and refugees; Croatia in particular has faced repeated accusations of conducting illegal pushbacks into neighboring Bosnia.

    The Slovanian new government, which was sworn in last week, wants to change the country’s border policies. The left-liberal government under Prime Minister Robert Golob committed itself to demolishing the border fence in its coalition agreement, and they have announced plans to instead monitor the border with drones and cameras.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/41109/slovenia-to-dismantle-border-fence-with-croatia
    #murs #barrières_frontalières #Croatie #Slovénie #frontière_sud-alpine #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Balkans #route_des_Balkans

    Mais bon... au lieu des murs... des #drones #caméras_de_vidéosurveillance... c’est pas vraiment un changement de cap... voir :
    Slovenia e flussi migratori : via il filo spinato, arrivano i droni
    https://seenthis.net/messages/966571

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Slovenija objavila koliko će trajati rezanje ograde na granici s Hrvatskom, mijenjaju politiku prema migrantima: Učit će ih jezik i integrirati u društvo

      Slovenska vojska ovih dana počinje s uklanjanjem 200 kilometara ograde na granici prema Hrvatskoj. Kako je najavila Tatjana Bobnar, ministrica unutrašnjih poslova u vladi Roberta Goloba, vojnici dnevno mogu ukloniti 200 metara žice, što znači da će posao biti gotov za 150 radnih dana, tj. potkraj veljače naredne godine. Ministrica Bobnar najavila je i značajne promjene u migracijskoj politici zemlje

      Bobnar uvjerava da će policija nakon uklanjanja žice temeljito obavljati nadzor granice te tako nastaviti osiguravati primjerenu razinu sigurnosti pograničnom stanovništvu.

      ’Vlada i MUP zalažu se za sigurne rute migranata i siguran prelazak granice za građane, stanovnike i migrante. Zbog toga smo osnovali novo savjetodavno tijelo koje se već sastalo s predstavnicima državnih tijela, organizacijama i predstavnicima civilnog društva koji rade na području migracija te će pripremiti cjelovitu migracijsku strategiju. Oni će se usredotočiti na osiguravanje sigurnijih putova migracija, učinkovitije procedure azila i dobivanje boravišnih dozvola kako bi se olakšali uvjeti za međunarodnu zaštitu i sustavnu integraciju u društvo. Azilante je potrebno sustavno integrirati u društvo i tržište rada te im omogućiti učenje jezika, a spriječiti iskorištavanje radnika’, smatra ministrica Bobnar.
      Slovenska ministrica vanjskih poslova Tatjana Bobnar

      Dakako, desna oporba smatra da je u pitanju zabrinjavajući zaokret. Oporbena Nova Slovenija (NSi) predviđa pogoršanje sigurnosne situacije jer se zbog nedostatka pšenice očekuju veće migracije iz sjeverne Afrike, a ojačat će i balkanska krijumčarska ruta, smatraju. Policijska kontrola, kako predviđa vlada, neće biti dovoljna.

      ’Nije realno to da dodatna tehnička sredstva, poput dronova koje ministrica često spominje, mogu pružati istu razinu sigurnosti kao tehničke barijere’, komentirao je odluku zastupnik Nove Slovenije Janez Žakelj. NSi stoga predlaže selektivno uklanjanje ograde, ne svugdje.

      Podsjetimo, Slovenija je izgradila 194 kilometra ograde tijekom migrantskog vala 2015., u razdoblju u kojem je kroz državu prolazilo pola milijuna ljudi, na vrhuncu čak 14.000 dnevno. ’Tada je ta krajnja mjera bila nužna, meni je bilo krajnje neugodno, nisu se dobro osjećali ni drugi u vladi’, prisjetio se za Televiziju Slovenije tadašnji premijer Miro Cerar.

      Po njegovu mišljenju, to je bio jedini način da se kontrolira gomila ljudi i da se o pravilno brine o njima. Inače, prijetilo je zatvaranje austrijske i talijanske granice, a ni južni susjed, kako kaže, nije se ponio baš susjedski.

      ’Hrvatska tada nije bila kooperativna, znamo da se i sama ilegalno organizirala i slala izbjeglice preko zelene granice, noću, preko rijeka’, podsjetio je Cerar.

      Ogradu je privremeno postavila tadašnja vlada i najavila da će biti uklonjena u najkraćem mogućem roku.

      https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/slovenija-objavila-koliko-ce-trajati-rezanje-ograde-na-granici-s-hrvatskom-m

    • Slovenia’s interior minister faces no-confidence vote

      Opposition SDS Democrats tabled a motion of no-confidence on Tuesday against Interior Minister #Tatjana_Bobnar, alleging that he should be removed from office for his government’s decision to remove the long border fence erected to fight irregular migration between 2015 and 2016.

      The motion against Bobnar alleges misconduct and dereliction of duty and notes that his government’s decision to dismantle the fence built to stop the flow of irregular migrants has led to a surge in irregular migration.

      The government’s decision has had “security and political consequences,” said SDS lawmaker Branko Grims. Between January and August, Slovenia saw a 13% increase in irregular border crossings compared to the whole of last year, police data shows.

      Grims also pointed to the high increase in expressions of intent to apply for international protection. “Slovenia is becoming a destination country for illegal migrants,” he said.

      SDS has claimed for weeks that Bobnar has been knowingly opening borders to irregular migrants and putting citizens at risk.

      “If you work honestly and lawfully, you can face anyone in good conscience and defend your decisions at any time with reasonable arguments,” said Bobnar before the motion’s announcement, noting that she did not fear a motion that accused her of “solidarity and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

      In Slovenia, the opposition frequently uses no-confidence votes against ministers without actually being able to oust them. Instead, this allows the opposition to mount targeted attacks on the government and get significant airtime.

      The coalition parties said they firmly support Bobnar.

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/slovenias-interior-minister-faces-no-confidence-vote

  • #Suisse : Faute de rentabilité, la Poste renonce aux transports par drones autonomes ats/jop
    https://www.rts.ch/info/sciences-tech/technologies/13140560-faute-de-rentabilite-la-poste-renonce-aux-transports-par-drones-autonom

    La Poste va abandonner à la fin de l’année son projet de drones autonomes de transport. Faute de rentabilité en raison du cadre réglementaire suisse, ce mode de transport lancé en 2017 sera transféré au développeur californien Matternet.

    La Poste a examiné ces derniers mois la rentabilité de ses projets. Elle est arrivée à la conclusion que celui concernant les drones pour le transport d’échantillons d’analyses entre hôpitaux et laboratoires n’était pas rentable, a indiqué l’entreprise mercredi. Elle confie le projet à Matternet, qui effectuait jusqu’à présent les vols pour le compte de la Poste.


    Faute de rentabilité, la Poste renonce aux transports par drones autonomes / Le Journal horaire / 19 sec. / mercredi à 15:02

    « Les drones autonomes suscitent certes de l’intérêt dans le monde entier, mais dans l’environnement réglementaire actuel pour les véhicules aériens sans pilote, ils ne peuvent pas être utilisés à une échelle suffisamment large et ne sont pas rentables pour la Poste en Suisse », argue le communiqué.

    Les clients existants, comme l’hôpital universitaire de Zurich, pourront continuer à l’avenir d’acheter des transports par drones auprès de Matternet.

    « Travail de pionnier »
    Malgré l’interruption de l’exercice, la Poste tire un bilan positif d’un essai pionnier. Jusqu’à présent, personne en Suisse n’avait utilisé des drones autonomes à des fins commerciales. « Nous avons dû tout élaborer à partir de zéro », a expliqué leur porte-parole, évoquant par exemple, les procédures d’autorisation auprès de l’Office fédéral de l’aviation civile (OFAC).

    Le projet a également montré que les drones sans caméra et au service de la santé publique sont très bien acceptés par la population.

    Ainsi, même si l’activité des drones de transport n’est pour l’instant pas rentable, la Poste continuera à garder un œil dessus. « De tels projets montrent qu’il existe des moyens de transport qui offrent une plus-value », estime la porte-parole.

    #Poste #Livraison #Colis #drone #drones #aérien #transports #idée_à_la_con aux frais des #contribuables #Matternet

  • [UKRAINE / RUSSIE] Progressions russes V/S montée en puissance ukrainienne : ANALYSE

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JvSTRv1OI0

    Tous les 15 jours environs Xavier   #Tytelman publie une vidéo bilan assez détaillée sur la guerre en #Ukraine, l’état des forces en jeu, des avancées / reculs, du matériel, des pertes, etc.

    Ces images sont déjà terribles en elles-même ; il y a cette impression que les humains jouent à un jeu vidéo du style Words of Tanks grandeur nature… On y comprend comment sont utilisés les #drones d’observation pour guider les artilleries, ou découvre que l’armée Russe ressort du placard des très vieilles bombes et missiles (pour certaines déclassées), peu précises (probablement parce qu’ils ont utilisé déjà toutes celles qu’ils avaient de récent)…

    Une bonne partie de ce travail provient de l’#OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) qui vise à analyser les photos, vidéos, ou toute donnée devenue publique sur les réseaux sociaux, en les vérifiant, recoupant, datant, etc...

    Note : Je vous conseille d’arrêter la vidéo à 32 minutes (avant le dernier chapitre « Crimes contre l’humanité et tortures russes ») car bien qu’il ne montre pas de vidéo, le contenu est profondément *fortement choquant*.

    Je suis complètement perturbé et interloqué par comment les humains peuvent se détruire les uns les autres jusqu’à commettre de tels actes barbares sur leurs congénères. Ça parait tellement invraisemblable. Ou comment en prétextant d’éliminer le nazisme, on commet des actes tout autant dégueulasses. Comment ces soldats peuvent se permettre autant d’atrocités ? C’est affreusement dingue.

    #humanité #guerre #barbarie #torture #crimes_de_guerre #russie

  • Drone Terror from Turkey. Arms buildup and crimes under international law - with German participation

    In Kurdistan, Libya or Azerbaijan, Turkish “#Bayraktar_TB2” have already violated international law. Currently, the civilian population in Ethiopia is being bombed with combat drones. Support comes from Germany, among others.

    For almost two decades, companies from the USA and Israel were the undisputed market leaders for armed drones; today, China and Turkey can claim more and more exports for themselves. Turkey is best known for its “Bayraktar TB2,” which the military has been using since 2016 in the Turkish, Syrian and now also Iraqi parts of Kurdistan in violation of international law. In the four-month #Operation_Olive_Branch in Kurdish #Rojava alone, the “TB2” is said to have scored 449 direct hits four years ago and enabled fighter jets or helicopters to make such hits in 680 cases. It has a payload of 65 kilograms and can remain in the air for over 24 hours.

    The Turkish military also flies the “#Anka”, which is also capable of carrying weapons and is manufactured by #Turkish_Aerospace_Industries (#TAI). In a new version, it can be controlled via satellites and thus achieves a greater range than the “#TB2”. The “Anka” carries up to 200 kilograms, four times the payload of its competitors. The newest version of both drones can now stay in the air for longer than 24 hours.

    Drone industry is dependent on imports

    The “Anka” is also being exported, but the “TB2” is currently most widely used. The drone is manufactured by #Baykar, whose founder and namesake is #Selçuk_Bayraktar, a son-in-law of the Turkish president. The “TB2” also flew attacks on Armenian troops off #Nagorno-Karabakh, for the Tripoli government in Libya and for Azerbaijan; there it might have even - together with unmanned aerial vehicles of Israeli production - been decisive for the war, according to some observers.

    The aggressive operations prompted further orders; after Qatar, Ukraine, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkmenistan, Baykar is the first NATO country to sell the drone to Poland. About a dozen countries are said to have already received deliveries, and about as many are said to be considering procurement. Interest is reportedly coming from as far away as Lithuania and even the United Kingdom.

    The comparatively young Turkish drone industry is able to produce many of the components for its unmanned aerial vehicles itself or buy them from domestic suppliers, but manufacturers are still dependent on imports for key components. This applies to engines, for example, which are also produced in Turkey but are less powerful than competing products. For this reason, the “TB2” flew with Rotax engines from Austria, among others. Following Turkey’s support for the Azerbaijani war of aggression, the company stopped supplying Baykar.

    Canada imposes export ban

    According to the Kurdish news agency ANF, Baykar has also made purchases from Continental Motors, a U.S. corporation partly based in Germany that took over Thielert Aircraft Engines GmbH eight years ago. A cruise control system made by the Bavarian company MT-Propeller was found in a crashed “TB2”. According to the Armenian National Committee of America, a radar altimeter manufactured by SMS Smart Microwave Sensors GmbH and a fuel filter made by Hengst were also installed in the drone.

    However, exports of these products are not subject to licensing, and sales may also have been made through intermediaries. Hengst, for example, also sells its products through automotive wholesalers; the company says it does not know how the filter came into Baykar’s possession.

    Originally, the “TB2” was also equipped with a sensor module from the Canadian manufacturer Wescam. This is effectively the eye of the drone, mounted in a hemispherical container on the fuselage. This so-called gimbal can be swiveled 360° and contains, among other things, optical and infrared-based cameras as well as various laser technologies. Wescam also finally ended its cooperation with Baykar after the government in Ottawa issued an export ban on the occasion of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. The country had already imposed a temporary halt to deliveries following Turkish operations in the Kurdish region of Rojava in North Syria.

    “Eye” of the drone from Hensoldt

    Selçuk Bayraktar commented on the decision made by the Canadian Foreign Minister, saying that the required sensor technology could now also be produced in Turkey. In the meantime, the Turkish company Aselsan has also reported in newspapers close to the government that the sensor technology can now be produced completely domestically. Presumably, however, these devices are heavier than the imported products, so that the payload of small combat drones would be reduced.

    Hensoldt, a German company specializing in sensor technology, has been one of the suppliers. This was initially indicated by footage of a parade in the capital of Turkmenistan, where a freshly purchased “TB2” was also displayed to mark the 30th anniversary of the attainment of independence in Aşgabat last year. In this case, the drone was equipped with a gimbal from Hensoldt. It contains the ARGOS-II module, which, according to the product description, has a laser illuminator and a laser marker. This can be used, for example, to guide a missile into the target.

    Hensoldt was formed after a spinoff of several divisions of defense contractor Airbus, including its radar, optronics, avionics and electronic device jamming businesses. As a company of outstanding security importance, the German government has secured a blocking minority. The Italian defense group Leonardo is also a shareholder.

    Rocket technology from Germany

    The ARGOS module is manufactured by Hensoldt’s offshoot Optronics Pty in Pretoria, South Africa. When asked, a company spokesman confirmed the cooperation with Baykar. According to the company, the devices were delivered from South Africa to Turkey in an undisclosed quantity “as part of an order”. In the process, “all applicable national and international laws and export control regulations” were allegedly complied with.

    The arming of the “TB2” with laser-guided missiles was also carried out with German assistance. This is confirmed by answers to questions in the German Bundestag reported by the magazine “Monitor”. According to these reports, the German Foreign Ministry has issued several export licenses for warheads of an anti-tank missile since 2010. They originate from the company TDW Wirksysteme GmbH from the Bavarian town of Schrobenhausen, an offshoot of the European missile manufacturer MBDA.

    According to the report, the sales were presumably made to the state-owned Turkish company Roketsan. Equipment or parts for the production of the missiles are also said to have been exported to Turkey. The TDW guided missiles were of the “LRAT” and “MRAT” types, which are produced in Turkey under a different name. Based on the German exports, Roketsan is said to have developed the “MAM” missiles for drones; they are now part of the standard equipment of the “TB2”. These so-called micro-precision munitions are light warheads that can be used to destroy armored targets.

    Export licenses without end-use statement

    Roketsan sells the MAM guided missiles in three different versions, including a so-called vacuum bomb. Their development may have been carried out with the cooperation of the Bavarian company Numerics Software GmbH, according to ANF Deutsch. Numerics specializes in calculating the optimal explosive effect of armor-piercing weapons. According to the German Foreign Ministry, however, the company’s products, for which licenses have been issued for delivery to Turkey, are not suitable for the warheads in question.

    When the German government issues export licenses for military equipment, it can insist on a so-called end-use declaration. In the case of Turkey, the government would commit to obtaining German permission before reselling to a third country. The Foreign Ministry would not say whether such exchanges on missiles, sensors or other German technology have taken place. In total, export licenses for goods “for use or installation in military drones” with a total value of almost 13 million euros have been issued to Turkey, according to a response from last year.

    Deployment in Ethiopia

    As one of the current “hot spots”, the “Bayraktar TB2” is currently being deployed by Ethiopia in the civil war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As recently as December, the Tigrinese rebels were on the verge of entering the capital Addis Ababa, but the tide has since turned. Many observers attribute this to the air force. The Ethiopian military has 22 Russian MiG-23 and Sukhoi-27 fighter jets, as well as several attack helicopters.

    But the decisive factor is said to have been armed drones, whose armament allows far more precise attacks. “There were suddenly ten drones in the sky”, the rebel general Tsadokan Gebretensae confirmed to the New York Times in an interview. In a swarm, these had attacked soldiers and convoys. The Reuters news agency quotes a foreign military who claims to have “clear indications” of a total of 20 drones in use. However, these also come from China and Iran.

    Evidence, meanwhile, shows that the Turkish combat drones are used as before in Kurdistan and other countries for crimes under international law. On several occasions, they have also flown attacks on civilians, including in convoys with refugees. Hundreds of people are reported to have died under Turkish-made bombs and missiles.

    After the “TB2” comes the significantly larger “Akıncı”

    In the future, the Turkish military could deploy a significantly larger drone with two engines, which Baykar has developed under the name “Akıncı”. This drone will be controlled via satellites, which will significantly increase its range compared to the “TB2”. Its payload is said to be nearly 1.5 tons, of which 900 kilograms can be carried under the wings as armament. According to Baykar, the “Akıncı” can also be used in aerial combat. Unarmed, it can be equipped with optical sensors, radar systems or electronic warfare technology.

    Baykar’s competitor TAI is also developing a long-range drone with two engines. The “#Aksungur” is said to have capabilities comparable to the “#Akıncı” and was first flown for tests in 2019.

    http://kurdistan-report.de/index.php/english/1282-drone-terror-from-turkey-arms-buildup-and-crimes-under-interna
    #Turquie #Kurdistan #Kurdistan_turque #drones #armes #Allemagne #drones_de_combat #drones_armés #industrie_militaire #Rotax #Continental_Motors #SMS_Smart_Microwave_Sensors #Hengst #Wescam #Aselsan #technologie #ARGOS-II #Airbus #Optronics_Pty

  • #Robo_Dogs and Refugees: The Future of the Global Border Industrial Complex

    The future is here, and it’s a nightmare for migrants. Robo-dogs are joining the global arsenal of border enforcement technologies. The consequences will be deadly.

    A painting of an eye shedding a single tear adorns the concrete rampart of the rusty wall bisecting the city of Nogales at the U.S.-Mexico border. Elsewhere, other kinds of eyes scan the Sonoran Desert—drones, artificial intelligence (AI) surveillance towers, and now military-grade “robo-dogs,” which, according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in a February 1 article, might soon be deployed in this vast area of the Arizona-Mexico borderlands, a frequent crossing point for refugees and people on the move from Latin America, the Caribbean, and beyond.

    The robo-dogs, built by Ghost Robotics, are the latest border tech experiment. Originally designed for combat and tactical training operations, these quadruped autonomous machines are strong, fast, and sometimes armed. They can break down doors and right themselves when kicked over. Police departments are already using them, such as in Honolulu and New York (although the latter city cut short its use of them after a public outcry). On the border, DHS first tested what they call “programmable pooches” in El Paso, but officials didn’t give a clear indication of when nor where the machines would eventually be deployed.

    While these mechanical dogs may be a surprising addition to U.S. border enforcement, they join a technological infrastructure on the U.S.-Mexico border that has been developing for decades, often constructed by private companies and now championed by the Biden administration. The idea of mechanized Border Patrol agents is not exactly new either; in 2015, for example, the GuardBot company proposed that rolling, rubber spheres full of surveillance cameras (first designed for exploring Mars) “swarm” the borderlands in packs of 20 or 30. While that contract was never issued, it was a preamble to the robo-dogs. Here, now, is a glimpse into the future: an aggressive techno border fueled by a global industrial complex.

    The robo-dogs form part of a long process of border robotization on the U.S. Mexico border—from autonomous and integrated fixed towers (built by Anduril and Elbit Systems, respectively) to Predator B and medium-size drones (General Atomics), to university experiments to create miniature drones the size of locusts (as was done at the University of Arizona via a grant it received from the Department of Homeland Security for R&D).

    Petra, who was at the Arizona-Mexico border when DHS announced the robo-dogs, has been studying surveillance technologies and their effects on people crossing borders for years in Europe and globally, focusing on the real harms of automation, surveillance, and border tech experiments in spaces that have become testing grounds for innovation. The very real impacts these technologies will have is all the more stark, given the sheer number of people dying in the desert. In 2021, deaths at the U.S.-Mexico border were the highest ever recorded. Thus, although it is difficult to write about surveillance technologies—since they are hidden by design—the real-world impacts of “technosolutionism” are clear enough.

    On the rumbling roads of the West Arizona desert, Petra and colleagues traced the routes that people take after crossing the border, and this led them to various gravesites, like the modest orange cross that marks the arroyo where Elías Alvarado, a young husband and father, perished in 2020. His son was never able to see him again, only leaving a scratchy voice recording saying “I love you, papa,” which was played at Alvarado’s ceremony by a group called Battalion Search and Rescue, whose volunteers comb the desert for survivors and remains. It’s terrifying to imagine a not-so-distant future in which people like Alvarado will be pursued by high-speed, military-grade technology designed to kill. The future is not just more technology, it is more death.

    Virtual Fortress Europe

    The U.S.-Mexico frontier is by no means the only place where experimental border technology is being tested. For example, the European Union has been focusing on various surveillance and high-tech experiments in migration and border enforcement, including maritime and land drone surveillance; long-range acoustic devices (LRADs), or sound cannons; and AI-type technologies in newly built camps in Greece. The violence in many of these technologies is obvious: the sound cannons that were rolled out at the land border between Greece and Turkey emit a high-pitched sound that can hurt people’s eardrums in an attempt to deter them from getting close to the EU’s border, while AI “threat detection” surveillance monitors refugees in Greece’s new prisonlike refugee camps on the Aegean Islands. AI-driven surveillance using unpiloted drones and other types of technologies is also increasingly used along Europe’s maritime borders by actors such as Frontex, the EU’s border enforcement agency. As in the U.S.-Mexico desert, border surveillance makes the crossing more dangerous, since it forces them to take riskier routes to avoid detection.

    The increasing reliance on automation in border enforcement also brings with it a host of concerns, from privacy infringements when data is shared with repressive governments to discrimination and bias, particularly against groups that have historically borne the brunt of violent state action. For example, facial recognition has proved time and again to be biased against Brown and Black faces, as well as female faces, and yet it is increasingly used for migration control in the U.S., Canada, and soon various EU countries. These issues around discrimination and bias are not merely theoretical; they have had palpable impacts on people on the move such as Addisu, a young man from East Africa in his early 30s. He was living in an occupied building in Brussels when he told Petra, “We are Black, and border guards hate us. Their computers hate us too.”

    Tech pilot projects have also introduced AI-type lie detection into border enforcement, relying on emotion recognition and micro-expressions to apparently determine whether someone is telling the truth at the border. Yet what about differences in cross-cultural communication? Or the impact of trauma on memory, or the overreliance on Western norms of plausibility and lie detection grounded in biased and discriminatory determinations? Immigration and refugee decision-making by border enforcement officers is already replete with discretionary, opaque, and often biased reasoning that is difficult to challenge.

    Through the phenomenon of “border externalization,” the EU is also pushing its geographic borders further and further afield through biometric data collection and migration surveillance into North and sub-Saharan Africa. The United States is extending its border as well into southern Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, among other places. As these sorts of technological systems extend all over the world, so does the global border industrial complex, which is worth billions of dollars. Each new place becomes a testing ground for the next one.

    A Regulatory Free-for-All: Border Tech Unchecked

    Border technologies are political; they are developed and deployed in an ecosystem of private and public partnerships that are largely unregulated and unchecked. Big Tech interests are given free rein to develop and deploy technologies at the border and set the agenda of what counts as innovation and whose perspectives really matter when conversations around borders happen in national, regional, and international policy circles.

    There is big money to be made in the sharpening of borders with draconian technologies. According to the market forecast company Market and Markets, the global homeland security market will grow more than 6 percent by 2026, reaching $904.6 billion. As border and immigration budgets only continue to rise in Europe, the United States, and places beyond, there will only be more armed “robo-dogs,” drones with tasers, and border AI-lie detectors filling border zones. This coincides with forecasts for more and more people on the move in the coming decades—for various reasons, including catastrophic climate change. The collision of aggressive tech borders with human mobility has the makings of a monumental human rights disaster.

    Participation in discussions around technologies at the border is still limited to a select few, often in the suffocating constraints of the public-private nexus. The viewpoints of those most affected are routinely excluded from the discussion, particularly regarding no-go zones and ethically fraught uses of technology. Much of the discussion, such as it is, lacks contextual analysis or consideration of the ethical, social, political, and personal harm that these new technologies will have. While border and immigrant rights groups such as Mijente, Just Futures Law, the Immigrant Defense Project and others have been fighting the use of high-risk surveillance along the U.S.-Mexico border, the lucrative political climate of exclusion and border enforcement at all costs is what animates the move toward a surveillance dragnet. This dragnet will only increase the suffering and death along the frontier. “It’s a slow-motion genocide,” James Holeman, founder of Battalion Search Rescue, recently told Petra Molnar in the Arizona desert.

    Borders are the perfect testing ground for technologies: unregulated, increasingly politicized, and impacting groups already struggling with adequate resources. Ultimately, Big Tech and quick fixes do not address the systemic causes of marginalization and migration—historical and present-day decisions that perpetuate vast inequalities in the world and that benefit the fortressed West while disenfranchising and displacing the rest. Whether it be armed agents, imposed walls, or robo-dogs, border militarization ensures that rich countries can keep looting, exploiting, and polluting the rest of the world.

    https://www.theborderchronicle.com/p/robo-dogs-and-refugees-the-future
    #robots_dogs #complexe_militaro-industriel #robots #robots_chiens #frontières #surveillance #technologie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #robo-dog #Ghost_Robotics #Nogales #Mexique #USA #Etats-Unis #désert_du_Sonora #DHS #El_Paso #programmable_pooches #GuardBot #Anduril #Elbit_Systems #Predator_B #general_atomics #drones #robo_dog

  • Status agreement with Senegal : #Frontex might operate in Africa for the first time

    The border agency in Warsaw could deploy drones, vessels and personnel. It would be the first mission in a country that does not directly border the EU. Mauretania might be next.

    As a „priority third state“ in West Africa, Senegal has long been a partner for migration-related security cooperation with the EU. The government in Dakar is one of the addressees of the „#North_Africa_Operational_Partnership“; it also receives technical equipment and advice for border police upgrading from EU development aid funds. Now Brussels is pushing for a Frontex mission in Senegal. To this end, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled personally to the capital Dakar last week. She was accompanied by the Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, who said that a contract with Senegal might be finalised until summer. For the matter, Johansson met with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister.

    For operations outside the EU, Frontex needs a so-called status agreement with the country concerned. It regulates, for example, the use of coercive police measures, the deployment of weapons or immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. The Commission will be entrusted with the negotiations for such an agreement with Senegal after the Council has given the mandate. The basis would be a „model status agreement“ drafted by the Commission on the basis of Frontex missions in the Western Balkans. Frontex launched its first mission in a third country in 2019 in Albania, followed by Montenegro in 2020 and Serbia in 2021.

    New EU Steering Group on migration issues

    The deployment to Senegal would be the first time the Border Agency would be stationed outside Europe with operational competences. Johansson also offered „#surveillance equipment such as #drones and vessels“. This would take the already established cooperation to a new level.

    Frontex is already active in the country, but without uniformed and armed police personnel. Of the only four liaison officers Frontex has seconded to third countries, one is based at the premises of the EU delegation in #Dakar. His tasks include communicating with the authorities responsible for border management and assisting with deportations from EU member states. Since 2019, Senegal has been a member of Frontex’s so-called AFIC network. In this „Risk Analysis Cell“, the agency joins forces with African police forces and secret services for exchanges on imminent migration movements. For this purpose, Frontex has negotiated a working agreement with the Senegalese police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    The new talks with Senegal are coordinated in the recently created „Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration“ (MOCADEM). It is an initiative of EU member states to better manage their politics in countries of particular interest. These include Niger or Iraq, whose government recently organised return flights for its own nationals from Minsk after Belarus‘ „instrumentalisation of refugees“ at the EU’s insistence. If the countries continue to help with EU migration control, they will receive concessions for visa issuance or for labour migration.

    Senegal also demands something in return for allowing a Frontex mission. The government wants financial support for the weakened economy after the COVID pandemic. Possibilities for legal migration to the EU were also on the agenda at the meetings with the Commission. Negotiations are also likely to take place on a deportation agreement; the Senegalese authorities are to „take back“ not only their own nationals but also those of other countries if they can prove that they have travelled through the country to the EU and have received an exit order there.

    Deployment in territorial waters

    Senegal is surrounded by more than 2,600 kilometres of external border; like the neighbouring countries of Mali, Gambia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, the government has joined the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Similar to the Schengen area, the agreement also regulates the free movement of people and goods in a total of 15 countries. Only at the border with Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2001, are border security measures being stepped up.

    It is therefore possible that a Frontex operation in Senegal will not focus on securing the land borders as in the Western Balkans, but on monitoring the maritime border. After the „Canary Islands crisis“ in 2006 with an increase in the number of refugee crossings, Frontex coordinated the Joint Operation „Hera“ off the islands in the Atlantic; it was the first border surveillance mission after Frontex was founded. Departures towards the Canary Islands are mostly from the coast north of Senegal’s capital Dakar, and many of the people in the boats come from neighbouring countries.

    The host country of „Hera“ has always been Spain, which itself has bilateral migration control agreements with Senegal. Authorities there participate in the communication network „Seahorse Atlantic“, with which the Spanish gendarmerie wants to improve surveillance in the Atlantic. Within the framework of „Seahorse“, the Guardia Civil is also allowed to conduct joint patrols in the territorial waters of Senegal, Mauritania and Cape Verde. The units in „Hera“ were also the only Frontex mission allowed to navigate the countries‘ twelve-mile zone with their vessels. Within the framework of „Hera“, however, it was not possible for Frontex ships to dock on the coasts of Senegal or to disembark intercepted refugees there.

    Spain wants to lead Frontex mission

    Two years ago, the government in Madrid terminated the joint maritime mission in the Atlantic. According to the daily newspaper „El Pais“, relations between Spain and Frontex were at a low point after the border agency demanded more control over the resources deployed in „Hera“. Spain was also said to be unhappy with Frontex’s role in the Canary Islands. The agency had seconded two dozen officers to the Canary Islands to fingerprint and check identity documents after a sharp increase in crossings from Senegal and Mauritania in 2020. According to the International Organization for Migration, at least 1,200 people died or went missing when the crossing in 2021. The news agency AFP quotes the Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras which puts this number at over 4,400 people. Also the Commissioner Johansson said that 1,200 were likely underestimated.

    The new situation on the Canary Islands is said to have prompted Frontex and the government in Madrid to advocate the envisaged launch of the joint operation in Senegal. With a status agreement, Frontex would be able to hand over refugees taken on board to Senegalese authorities or bring them back to the country itself by ship. The Guardia Civil wants to take over the leadership of such an operation, writes El Pais with reference to Spanish government circles. The government in Dakar is also said to have already informed the EU of its readiness for such an effort.

    The idea for an operational Frontex deployment in Senegal is at least three years old. Every year, Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri assesses in a report on the implementation of the EU’s External Maritime Borders Regulation whether refugees rescued in its missions could disembark in the respective eligible third countries. In the annual report for 2018, Leggeri attested to the government in Senegal’s compliance with basic fundamental and human rights. While Frontex did not even consider disembarking refugees in Libya, Tunisia or Morocco, the director believes this would be possible with Senegal – as well as Turkey.

    Currently, the EU and its agencies have no concrete plans to conclude status agreements with other African countries, but Mauritania is also under discussion. Frontex is furthermore planning working (not status) arrangements with other governments in North and East Africa. Libya is of particular interest; after such a contract, Frontex could also complete Libya’s long-planned connection to the surveillance network EUROSUR. With a working agreement, the border agency would be able to regularly pass on information from its aerial reconnaissance in the Mediterranean to the Libyan coast guard, even outside of measures to counter distress situations at sea.

    https://digit.site36.net/2022/02/11/status-agreement-with-senegal-frontex-wants-to-operate-in-africa-for-t

    #Sénégal #asile #migrations #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Afrique #Mauritanie #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #renvois #expulsions #AFIC #Risk_Analysis_Cell #services_secrets #police #coopération #accord #MOCADEM #Operational_Coordination_Mechanism_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration #accords_de_réadmission #accord_de_réadmission #frontières_maritimes #Atlantique #Seahorse_Atlantic #Hera

    –-
    ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    et plus précisément ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765327

    ping @isskein @reka @karine4

    • L’Union européenne veut déployer Frontex au large des côtes sénégalaises

      À l’occasion de la visite au Sénégal de cinq commissaires européennes, l’UE propose au gouvernement le déploiement de Frontex, l’agence européenne de garde-côtes et de gardes-frontières. La Commission européenne envisagerait un déploiement d’ici à l’été en cas d’accord avec les autorités sénégalaises.

      C’est pour l’instant une proposition faite par Ylva Johansson. La commissaire chargée des Affaires intérieures a évoqué la question avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères, des forces armées et de l’Intérieur ce vendredi à Dakar.

      Pour l’Union européenne, l’intérêt immédiat est de contrôler le trafic d’êtres humains avec les embarcations qui partent des côtes sénégalaises vers l’archipel espagnol des Canaries. Mais le principe serait aussi de surveiller les mouvements migratoires vers l’Europe via la Mauritanie ou bien la route plus longue via l’Algérie et la Libye.

      L’idée est une collaboration opérationnelle des garde-côtes et gardes-frontières de l’agence Frontex avec la gendarmerie nationale sénégalaise et sous sa direction. L’UE envisage le déploiement de navires, de personnel et de matériel. La commissaire européenne aux Affaires intérieures a évoqué par exemple des drones.

      L’agence Frontex de surveillance des frontières extérieures de l’Union est en train de monter en puissance : son effectif devrait s’élever à 10 000 gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières dans quatre ans, soit dix fois plus qu’en 2018. Elle n’a jamais été déployée hors d’Europe et cette proposition faite au Sénégal illustre à l’avance la priorité que va mettre l’Europe sur les questions migratoires lors du sommet avec l’Union africaine dans une semaine.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220211-l-union-europ%C3%A9enne-veut-d%C3%A9ployer-frontex-au-large-des-c%C3%B4

    • EU seeks to deploy border agency to Senegal

      European Commissioner Ylva Johansson on Friday offered to deploy the EU’s border agency to Senegal to help combat migrant smuggling, following a surge in perilous crossings to Spain’s Canary Islands.

      At a news conference in the Senegalese capital Dakar, Johansson said the arrangement would mark the first time that the EU border agency Frontex would operate outside Europe.

      Should the Senegalese government agree, the commissioner added, the EU could send surveillance equipment such as drones and vessels, as well as Frontex personnel.

      Deployed alongside local forces, the agents would “work together to fight the smugglers,” she said.

      “This is my offer and I hope that Senegal’s government is interested in this unique opportunity,” said Johansson, the EU’s home affairs commissioner.

      The announcement comes amid a sharp jump in attempts to reach the Canary Islands — a gateway to the EU — as authorities have clamped down on crossings to Europe from Libya.

      The Spanish archipelago lies just over 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the coast of Africa at its closest point.

      But the conditions in the open Atlantic are often dangerous, and would-be migrants often brave the trip in rickety wooden canoes known as pirogues.

      About 1,200 people died or went missing attempting the crossing in 2021, according to the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM).

      Spanish NGO Caminando Fronteras last month put the figure at over 4,400 people.

      Johansson also said on Friday that the 1,200-person figure was likely an underestimate.

      She added that she had discussed her Frontex proposal with Senegal’s armed-forces minister and foreign minister, and was due to continue talks with the interior minister on Friday.

      An agreement that would see Frontex agents deployed in Senegal could be finalised by the summer, she said.

      EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was also at the news conference, said a Frontex mission in Senegal could also help tackle illegal fishing.

      Several top European Commission officials, including President Ursula von der Leyen, arrived in Senegal this week to prepare for a summit between the EU and the African Union on February 17-18.

      https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220211-eu-seeks-to-deploy-border-agency-to-senegal

    • EU: Tracking the Pact: Plan for Frontex to deploy “vessels, surveillance equipment, and carry out operational tasks” in Senegal and Mauritania

      The EU’s border agency is also due to open a “risk analysis cell” in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in autumn this year, according to documents obtained by Statewatch and published here. The two “action files” put heavy emphasis on the “prevention of irregular departures” towards the Canary Islands and increased cooperation on border management and anti-smuggling activities. Earlier this month, the Council authorised the opening of negotiations on status agreements that would allow Frontex to operate in both countries.

      Senegal: Fiche Action - Sénégal - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7990/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf)

      Action 1: Jointly pursue contacts with the Senegalese authorities - and in particular the Ministry of the Interior, as well as other relevant authorities - at political and diplomatic level to achieve progress on the commitments made during the visit of President von der Leyen and Commissioners on 9-11 February 2022, in particular with regard to the fight against irregular immigration, and Frontex cooperation, as part of a comprehensive EU-Senegal partnership on migration and mobility. Take stock of Senegal’s political context (i.a. Casamance) and suggestions in order to agree on next steps and a calendar.

      Action 2: Taking up the elements of the previous negotiations with the relevant Senegalese authorities, and in the framework of the new working arrangement model, propose a working arrangement with Frontex in the short term, depending on the will and the interest of the Senegalese authorities to conclude such an arrangement.

      Action 3: Depending on the response from the Senegalese authorities, initiate steps towards the negotiation and, in the medium term, the conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex to Senegal, particularly in terms of prevention of crime and irregular migration, including in the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings.

      Action 4 Give substance to the messages expressed by the Senegalese authorities in the framework of policy exchanges and work on joint programming (Joint Strategy Paper - JSP). Identify support and cooperation measures of major interest to the Senegalese authorities (e.g. explore with Senegal the interest in concluding a Talent Partnership with voluntary Member States, if progress is made in other aspects of migration cooperation; propose an anti-smuggling operational partnership and explore possibilities to strengthen cooperation and exchange of information with Europol). Make use of the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to frame cooperation projects on migration issues. Promote cooperation with Frontex on border management also in the broader framework of cooperation and exchanges with the Senegalese authorities.

      –-

      Mauretania: Fiche Action - Mauritanie - Renforcement de la coopération avec l’agence Frontex (WK 7989/2022 INIT, LIMITE, 7 June 2022, pdf):

      Action 1: On the basis of the exchanges initiated and the cooperation undertaken with the Mauritanian authorities, identify the main priorities of the migration relationship. Determine the support and cooperation measures of major interest (e.g. support for the implementation of the National Migration Management Strategy, continuation of maritime strategy actions, protection of refugees and asylum seekers, support for reintegration, fight against smuggling networks, deployment of an additional surveillance and intervention unit of the “GAR-SI” type, creation of jobs for young people, involvement of the diaspora in the development of the country, etc.). Use the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic route to coordinate cooperation projects on migration issues, including on root causes.

      Action 2: Propose to the Mauritanian authorities the holding of an informal migration dialogue between the EU and Mauritania, focusing notably on the fight against migrant smuggling and border management, in order to best determine their needs in this area and identify the possibilities for Frontex support.

      Action 3: On the basis of the exchanges that took place between Frontex and the Mauritanian authorities in the first semester of 2022, finalise the exchanges on a working arrangement with Frontex, depending on their interest to conclude it.

      Action 4: Depending on the interest shown by the Mauritanian authorities, initiate diplomatic steps to propose the negotiation and conclusion of a status agreement allowing direct operational support from Frontex at Mauritania’s borders, in particular in the area of prevention of irregular departures, but also in the fight against migrant smuggling and other areas of interest to Mauritania, in the framework of the Frontex mandate.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2022/july/eu-tracking-the-pact-plan-for-frontex-to-deploy-vessels-surveillance-equ
      #Mauritanie #surveillance

  • France: New surveillance cameras to stop migrant smuggling

    Dozens of new surveillance cameras are to be installed along the coast of northern France. The aim is to prevent migrant smuggling across the English Channel.

    Surveillance equipment will be installed in more than 20 locations on France’s northern coast to detect migrant smugglers, the broadcaster BFMTV reported on Thursday. The cameras will be installed on roads near the coast with the aim of filming smugglers’ vehicles and recording their license plates.

    Dubbed ’Terminus’, the operation is financed by the UK. The total cost is not yet known, according to the news agency dpa.

    About 50 cameras are to be installed between Montreuil and Calais by the middle of this year, the newspaper La Voix du Nord reported. The prefecture of Pas-de-Calais said more than 20 municipalities wished to register for the surveillance devices, according to the AFP news agency.

    Laurence Prouvot, the mayor of #Wissant, told AFP that the cameras will be more advanced than those already existing in the town. Wissant, about 20 km from Calais, will need 14 of the cameras, he said.

    British will not have access

    Local government authorities in France as well as French police will have access to the images, but they will not be shared with their British counterparts, dpa reports.

    Meanwhile some local authorities were critical of the surveillance project. The mayor of Merlimont, Mary Bonvoisin Alves Dos Santos, told BFMTV that the money would have been better spent on supporting those who rescue migrants in distress trying to cross the Channel.

    “I have the impression that we are the armed guard of British migration policy,” she said. At the same time, nothing is being done to provide the children, women and men with a decent place to live, she added.

    Record number of Channel crossings in 2021

    The UK and France have been discussing the issue of Channel crossings for years. In 2021 relations between the two countries became strained as the number of arrivals in the UK, compared to the previous year, tripled to around 28,000, and 27 people died in a shipwreck in November.

    A large amount of surveillance equipment has already been installed in an effort to prevent crossings. In November the French Interior Minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced the deployment of ultra-modern equipment.
    In December, Frontex, the European Border and Coastguard Agency, provided a plane to support border control in the Channel and the North Sea coast region which it said was “equipped with modern sensors and radars.” A surviellance drone was also deployed in January in #Pointe_aux_Oies, #Wimereux, according to the local prefecture.

    Migrants have continued to cross the Channel this year despite the increased surveillance measures. In January, more than 1,300 people reached the United Kingdom, five times as many as at the same time last year.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/38473/france-new-surveillance-cameras-to-stop-migrant-smuggling

    #surveillance #caméras_de_surveillance #migrations #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #réfugiés #Calais #Manche #France #UK #Angleterre #drones

  • Les drones policiers autorisés par le Conseil constitutionnel
    21 janvier 2022 – La Quadrature du Net
    https://www.laquadrature.net/2022/01/21/les-drones-policiers-autorises-par-le-conseil-constitutionnel

    Le Conseil constitutionnel vient de rendre sa décision sur la loi « responsabilité pénale et sécurité intérieure ». Ce texte, adopté le 18 novembre 2021 par le Parlement, prévoyait notamment de ré-autoriser les drones policiers. Si les drones avaient été interdits à quatre reprises depuis 2020 (deux fois par le Conseil d’État, une fois par la CNIL et une fois par le Conseil constitutionnel), l’entêtement du gouvernement a porté ses fruits. Après deux années d’illégalité, les drones vont ré-occuper le ciel et restaurer la surveillance de masse.

    Cette mauvaise nouvelle ne vient pas seule : le Conseil constitutionnel valide aussi les caméras embarquées sur les véhicules de police (hélicoptères, voitures…) ainsi que la vidéosurveillance des cellules de garde-à-vue. À côté, le Conseil ne prend même pas la peine d’examiner les nombreuses autres dispositions de cette loi qui s’en prennent à d’autres libertés fondamentales (amendes forfaitaires, prise d’empreintes forcée, répression des mineurs isolés, modification du régime d’irresponsabilité pénale – voir notre analyse commune avec le SAF, le SM et la LDH). (...)