• Migrants: le règlement de Dublin va être supprimé

    La Commission européenne doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de sa politique migratoire, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée.

    Cinq ans après le début de la crise migratoire, l’Union européenne veut changer de stratégie. La Commission européenne veut “abolir” le règlement de Dublin qui fracture les Etats-membres et qui confie la responsabilité du traitement des demandes d’asile au pays de première entrée des migrants dans l’UE, a annoncé ce mercredi 16 septembre la cheffe de l’exécutif européen Ursula von der Leyen dans son discours sur l’Etat de l’Union.

    La Commission doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de la politique migratoire européenne, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée, alors que le débat sur le manque de solidarité entre pays Européens a été relancé par l’incendie du camp de Moria sur lîle grecque de Lesbos.

    “Au coeur (de la réforme) il y a un engagement pour un système plus européen”, a déclaré Ursula von der Leyen devant le Parlement européen. “Je peux annoncer que nous allons abolir le règlement de Dublin et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration”, a-t-elle poursuivi.
    Nouveau mécanisme de solidarité

    “Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité”, a-t-elle dit, alors que les pays qui sont en première ligne d’arrivée des migrants (Grèce, Malte, Italie notamment) se plaignent de devoir faire face à une charge disproportionnée.

    La proposition de réforme de la Commission devra encore être acceptée par les Etats. Ce qui n’est pas gagné d’avance. Cinq ans après la crise migratoire de 2015, la question de l’accueil des migrants est un sujet qui reste source de profondes divisions en Europe, certains pays de l’Est refusant d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile.

    Sous la pression, le système d’asile européen organisé par le règlement de Dublin a explosé après avoir pesé lourdement sur la Grèce ou l’Italie.

    Le nouveau plan pourrait notamment prévoir davantage de sélection des demandeurs d’asile aux frontières extérieures et un retour des déboutés dans leur pays assuré par Frontex. Egalement à l’étude pour les Etats volontaires : un mécanisme de relocalisation des migrants sauvés en Méditerranée, parfois contraints d’errer en mer pendant des semaines en attente d’un pays d’accueil.

    Ce plan ne résoudrait toutefois pas toutes les failles. Pour le patron de l’Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Didier Leschi, “il ne peut pas y avoir de politique européenne commune sans critères communs pour accepter les demandes d’asile.”

    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/migrants-le-reglement-de-dublin-tres-controverse-va-etre-supprime_fr_

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_dublin #fin #fin_de_Dublin #suppression #pacte #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration #new_pact #nouveau_pacte #pacte_sur_la_migration_et_l'asile

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    Documents officiels en lien avec le pacte:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/879881

    ping @reka @karine4 @_kg_ @isskein

    • Immigration : le règlement de Dublin, l’impossible #réforme ?

      En voulant abroger le règlement de Dublin, qui impose la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile au premier pays d’entrée dans l’Union européenne, Bruxelles reconnaît des dysfonctionnements dans l’accueil des migrants. Mais les Vingt-Sept, plus que jamais divisés sur cette question, sont-ils prêts à une refonte du texte ? Éléments de réponses.

      Ursula Von der Leyen en a fait une des priorités de son mandat : réformer le règlement de Dublin, qui impose au premier pays de l’UE dans lequel le migrant est arrivé de traiter sa demande d’asile. « Je peux annoncer que nous allons [l’]abolir et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration », a déclaré la présidente de la Commission européenne mercredi 16 septembre, devant le Parlement.

      Les États dotés de frontières extérieures comme la Grèce, l’Italie ou Malte se sont réjouis de cette annonce. Ils s’estiment lésés par ce règlement en raison de leur situation géographique qui les place en première ligne.

      La présidente de la Commission européenne doit présenter, le 23 septembre, une nouvelle version de la politique migratoire, jusqu’ici maintes fois repoussée. « Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a-t-elle poursuivi. Un terme fort à l’heure où l’incendie du camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, plus de 8 000 adultes et 4 000 enfants à la rue, a révélé le manque d’entraide entre pays européens.

      Pour mieux comprendre l’enjeu de cette nouvelle réforme européenne de la politique migratoire, France 24 décrypte le règlement de Dublin qui divise tant les Vingt-Sept, en particulier depuis la crise migratoire de 2015.

      Pourquoi le règlement de Dublin dysfonctionne ?

      Les failles ont toujours existé mais ont été révélées par la crise migratoire de 2015, estiment les experts de politique migratoire. Ce texte signé en 2013 et qu’on appelle « Dublin III » repose sur un accord entre les membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que la Suisse, l’Islande, la Norvège et le Liechtenstein. Il prévoit que l’examen de la demande d’asile d’un exilé incombe au premier pays d’entrée en Europe. Si un migrant passé par l’Italie arrive par exemple en France, les autorités françaises ne sont, en théorie, pas tenu d’enregistrer la demande du Dubliné.
      © Union européenne | Les pays signataires du règlement de Dublin.

      Face à l’afflux de réfugiés ces dernières années, les pays dotés de frontières extérieures, comme la Grèce et l’Italie, se sont estimés abandonnés par le reste de l’Europe. « La charge est trop importante pour ce bloc méditerranéen », estime Matthieu Tardis, chercheur au Centre migrations et citoyennetés de l’Ifri (Institut français des relations internationales). Le texte est pensé « comme un mécanisme de responsabilité des États et non de solidarité », estime-t-il.

      Sa mise en application est aussi difficile à mettre en place. La France et l’Allemagne, qui concentrent la majorité des demandes d’asile depuis le début des années 2000, peinent à renvoyer les Dublinés. Dans l’Hexagone, seulement 11,5 % ont été transférés dans le pays d’entrée. Outre-Rhin, le taux ne dépasse pas les 15 %. Conséquence : nombre d’entre eux restent « bloqués » dans les camps de migrants à Calais ou dans le nord de Paris.

      Le délai d’attente pour les demandeurs d’asile est aussi jugé trop long. Un réfugié passé par l’Italie, qui vient déposer une demande d’asile en France, peut attendre jusqu’à 18 mois avant d’avoir un retour. « Durant cette période, il se retrouve dans une situation d’incertitude très dommageable pour lui mais aussi pour l’Union européenne. C’est un système perdant-perdant », commente Matthieu Tardis.

      Ce règlement n’est pas adapté aux demandeurs d’asile, surenchérit-on à la Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués). Dans un rapport, l’organisation qualifie ce système de « machine infernale de l’asile européen ». « Il ne tient pas compte des liens familiaux ni des langues parlées par les réfugiés », précise le responsable asile de l’association, Gérard Sadik.

      Sept ans après avoir vu le jour, le règlement s’est vu porter le coup de grâce par le confinement lié aux conditions sanitaires pour lutter contre le Covid-19. « Durant cette période, aucun transfert n’a eu lieu », assure-t-on à la Cimade.

      Le mécanisme de solidarité peut-il le remplacer ?

      « Il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a promis Ursula von der Leyen, sans donné plus de précision. Sur ce point, on sait déjà que les positions divergent, voire s’opposent, entre les Vingt-Sept.

      Le bloc du nord-ouest (Allemagne, France, Autriche, Benelux) reste ancré sur le principe actuel de responsabilité, mais accepte de l’accompagner d’un mécanisme de solidarité. Sur quels critères se base la répartition du nombre de demandeurs d’asile ? Comment les sélectionner ? Aucune décision n’est encore actée. « Ils sont prêts à des compromis car ils veulent montrer que l’Union européenne peut avancer et agir sur la question migratoire », assure Matthieu Tardis.

      En revanche, le groupe dit de Visegrad (Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie), peu enclin à l’accueil, rejette catégoriquement tout principe de solidarité. « Ils se disent prêts à envoyer des moyens financiers, du personnel pour le contrôle aux frontières mais refusent de recevoir les demandeurs d’asile », détaille le chercheur de l’Ifri.

      Quant au bloc Méditerranée (Grèce, Italie, Malte , Chypre, Espagne), des questions subsistent sur la proposition du bloc nord-ouest : le mécanisme de solidarité sera-t-il activé de façon permanente ou exceptionnelle ? Quelles populations sont éligibles au droit d’asile ? Et qui est responsable du retour ? « Depuis le retrait de la Ligue du Nord de la coalition dans le gouvernement italien, le dialogue est à nouveau possible », avance Matthieu Tardis.

      Un accord semble toutefois indispensable pour montrer que l’Union européenne n’est pas totalement en faillite sur ce dossier. « Mais le bloc de Visegrad n’a pas forcément en tête cet enjeu », nuance-t-il. Seule la situation sanitaire liée au Covid-19, qui place les pays de l’Est dans une situation économique fragile, pourrait faire évoluer leur position, note le chercheur.

      Et le mécanisme par répartition ?

      Le mécanisme par répartition, dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, revient régulièrement sur la table des négociations. Son principe : la capacité d’accueil du pays dépend de ses poids démographique et économique. Elle serait de 30 % pour l’Allemagne, contre un tiers des demandes aujourd’hui, et 20 % pour la France, qui en recense 18 %. « Ce serait une option gagnante pour ces deux pays, mais pas pour le bloc du Visegrad qui s’y oppose », décrypte Gérard Sadik, le responsable asile de la Cimade.

      Cette doctrine reposerait sur un système informatisé, qui recenserait dans une seule base toutes les données des demandeurs d’asile. Mais l’usage de l’intelligence artificielle au profit de la procédure administrative ne présente pas que des avantages, aux yeux de la Cimade : « L’algorithme ne sera pas en mesure de tenir compte des liens familiaux des demandeurs d’asile », juge Gérard Sadik.

      Quelles chances pour une refonte ?

      L’Union européenne a déjà tenté plusieurs fois de réformer ce serpent de mer. Un texte dit « Dublin IV » était déjà dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, en proposant par exemple que la responsabilité du premier État d’accueil soit définitive, mais il a été enterré face aux dissensions internes.

      Reste à savoir quel est le contenu exact de la nouvelle version qui sera présentée le 23 septembre par Ursula Van der Leyen. À la Cimade, on craint un durcissement de la politique migratoire, et notamment un renforcement du contrôle aux frontières.

      Quoi qu’il en soit, les négociations s’annoncent « compliquées et difficiles » car « les intérêts des pays membres ne sont pas les mêmes », a rappelé le ministre grec adjoint des Migrations, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, jeudi 17 septembre. Et surtout, la nouvelle mouture devra obtenir l’accord du Parlement, mais aussi celui des États. La refonte est encore loin.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27376/immigration-le-reglement-de-dublin-l-impossible-reforme

      #gouvernance #Ursula_Von_der_Leyen #mécanisme_de_solidarité #responsabilité #groupe_de_Visegrad #solidarité #répartition #mécanisme_par_répartition #capacité_d'accueil #intelligence_artificielle #algorithme #Dublin_IV

    • Germany’s #Seehofer cautiously optimistic on EU asylum reform

      For the first time during the German Presidency, EU interior ministers exchanged views on reforms of the EU asylum system. German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) expressed “justified confidence” that a deal can be found. EURACTIV Germany reports.

      The focus of Tuesday’s (7 July) informal video conference of interior ministers was on the expansion of police cooperation and sea rescue, which, according to Seehofer, is one of the “Big Four” topics of the German Council Presidency, integrated into a reform of the #Common_European_Asylum_System (#CEAS).

      Following the meeting, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, spoke of an “excellent start to the Presidency,” and Seehofer also praised the “constructive discussions.” In the field of asylum policy, she said that it had become clear that all member states were “highly interested in positive solutions.”

      The interior ministers were unanimous in their desire to further strengthen police cooperation and expand both the mandates and the financial resources of Europol and Frontex.

      Regarding the question of the distribution of refugees, Seehofer said that he had “heard statements that [he] had not heard in years prior.” He said that almost all member states were “prepared to show solidarity in different ways.”

      While about a dozen member states would like to participate in the distribution of those rescued from distress at the EU’s external borders in the event of a “disproportionate burden” on the states, other states signalled that they wanted to make control vessels, financial means or personnel available to prevent smuggling activities and stem migration across the Mediterranean.

      Seehofer’s final act

      It will probably be Seehofer’s last attempt to initiate CEAS reform. He announced in May that he would withdraw completely from politics after the end of the legislative period in autumn 2021.

      Now it seems that he considers CEAS reform as his last great mission, Seehofer said that he intends to address the migration issue from late summer onwards “with all I have at my disposal.” adding that Tuesday’s (7 July) talks had “once again kindled a real fire” in him. To this end, he plans to leave the official business of the Interior Ministry “in day-to-day matters” largely to the State Secretaries.

      Seehofer’s shift of priorities to the European stage comes at a time when he is being sharply criticised in Germany.

      While his initial handling of a controversial newspaper column about the police published in Berlin’s tageszeitung prompted criticism, Seehofer now faces accusations of concealing structural racism in the police. Seehofer had announced over the weekend that, contrary to the recommendation of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), he would not commission a study on racial profiling in the police force after all.

      Seehofer: “One step is not enough”

      In recent months, Seehofer has made several attempts to set up a distribution mechanism for rescued persons in distress. On several occasions he accused the Commission of letting member states down by not solving the asylum question.

      “I have the ambition to make a great leap. One step would be too little in our presidency,” said Seehofer during Tuesday’s press conference. However, much depends on when the Commission will present its long-awaited migration pact, as its proposals are intended to serve as a basis for negotiations on CEAS reform.

      As Johansson said on Tuesday, this is planned for September. Seehofer thus only has just under four months to get the first Council conclusions through. “There will not be enough time for legislation,” he said.

      Until a permanent solution is found, ad hoc solutions will continue. A “sustainable solution” should include better cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, as the member states agreed on Tuesday.

      To this end, “agreements on the repatriation of refugees” are now to be reached with North African countries. A first step towards this will be taken next Monday (13 July), at a joint conference with North African leaders.

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/germany-eyes-breakthrough-in-eu-migration-dispute-this-year

      #Europol #Frontex

    • Relocation, solidarity mandatory for EU migration policy: #Johansson

      In an interview with ANSA and other European media outlets, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs #Ylva_Johansson explained the new migration and asylum pact due to be unveiled on September 23, stressing that nobody will find ideal solutions but rather a well-balanced compromise that will ’’improve the situation’’.

      European Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has explained in an interview with a group of European journalists, including ANSA, a new pact on asylum and migration to be presented on September 23. She touched on rules for countries of first entry, a new mechanism of mandatory solidarity, fast repatriations and refugee relocation.

      The Swedish commissioner said that no one will find ideal solutions in the European Commission’s new asylum and migration proposal but rather a good compromise that “will improve the situation”.

      She said the debate to change the asylum regulation known as Dublin needs to be played down in order to find an agreement. Johansson said an earlier 2016 reform plan would be withdrawn as it ’’caused the majority’’ of conflicts among countries.

      A new proposal that will replace the current one and amend the existing Dublin regulation will be presented, she explained.

      The current regulation will not be completely abolished but rules regarding frontline countries will change. Under the new proposal, migrants can still be sent back to the country responsible for their asylum request, explained the commissioner, adding that amendments will be made but the country of first entry will ’’remain important’’.

      ’’Voluntary solidarity is not enough," there has to be a “mandatory solidarity mechanism,” Johansson noted.

      Countries will need to help according to their size and possibilities. A member state needs to show solidarity ’’in accordance with the capacity and size’’ of its economy. There will be no easy way out with the possibility of ’’just sending some blankets’’ - efforts must be proportional to the size and capabilities of member states, she said.
      Relocations are a divisive theme

      Relocations will be made in a way that ’’can be possible to accept for all member states’’, the commissioner explained. The issue of mandatory quotas is extremely divisive, she went on to say. ’’The sentence of the European Court of Justice has established that they can be made’’.

      However, the theme is extremely divisive. Many of those who arrive in Europe are not eligible for international protection and must be repatriated, she said, wondering if it is a good idea to relocate those who need to be repatriated.

      “We are looking for a way to bring the necessary aid to countries under pressure.”

      “Relocation is an important part, but also” it must be done “in a way that can be possible to accept for all member states,” she noted.

      Moreover, Johansson said the system will not be too rigid as the union should prepare for different scenarios.
      Faster repatriations

      Repatriations will be a key part of the plan, with faster bureaucratic procedures, she said. The 2016 reform proposal was made following the 2015 migration crisis, when two million people, 90% of whom were refugees, reached the EU irregularly. For this reason, the plan focused on relocations, she explained.

      Now the situation is completely different: last year 2.4 million stay permits were issued, the majority for reasons connected to family, work or education. Just 140,000 people migrated irregularly and only one-third were refugees while two-thirds will need to be repatriated.

      For this reason, stressed the commissioner, the new plan will focus on repatriation. Faster procedures are necessary, she noted. When people stay in a country for years it is very hard to organize repatriations, especially voluntary ones. So the objective is for a negative asylum decision “to come together with a return decision.”

      Also, the permanence in hosting centers should be of short duration. Speaking about a fire at the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos where more than 12,000 asylum seekers have been stranded for years, the commissioner said the situation was the ’’result of lack of European policy on asylum and migration."

      “We shall have no more Morias’’, she noted, calling for well-managed hosting centers along with limits to permanence.

      A win-win collaboration will instead be planned with third countries, she said. ’’The external aspect is very important. We have to work on good partnerships with third countries, supporting them and finding win-win solutions for readmissions and for the fight against traffickers. We have to develop legal pathways to come to the EU, in particular with resettlements, a policy that needs to be strengthened.”

      The commissioner then rejected the idea of opening hosting centers in third countries, an idea for example proposed by Denmark.

      “It is not the direction I intend to take. We will not export the right to asylum.”

      The commissioner said she was very concerned by reports of refoulements. Her objective, she concluded, is to “include in the pact a monitoring mechanism. The right to asylum must be defended.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27447/relocation-solidarity-mandatory-for-eu-migration-policy-johansson

      #relocalisation #solidarité_obligatoire #solidarité_volontaire #pays_de_première_entrée #renvois #expulsions #réinstallations #voies_légales

    • Droit d’asile : Bruxelles rate son « #pacte »

      La Commission européenne, assurant vouloir « abolir » le règlement de Dublin et son principe du premier pays d’entrée, doit présenter ce mercredi un « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile ». Qui ne bouleverserait rien.

      C’est une belle victoire pour Viktor Orbán, le Premier ministre hongrois, et ses partenaires d’Europe centrale et orientale aussi peu enclins que lui à accueillir des étrangers sur leur sol. La Commission européenne renonce définitivement à leur imposer d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile en cas d’afflux dans un pays de la « ligne de front » (Grèce, Italie, Malte, Espagne). Certes, le volumineux paquet de textes qu’elle propose ce mercredi (10 projets de règlements et trois recommandations, soit plusieurs centaines de pages), pompeusement baptisé « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile », prévoit qu’ils devront, par « solidarité », assurer les refoulements vers les pays d’origine des déboutés du droit d’asile, mais cela ne devrait pas les gêner outre mesure. Car, sur le fond, la Commission prend acte de la volonté des Vingt-Sept de transformer l’Europe en forteresse.
      Sale boulot

      La crise de 2015 les a durablement traumatisés. A l’époque, la Turquie, par lassitude d’accueillir sur son sol plusieurs millions de réfugiés syriens et des centaines de milliers de migrants économiques dans l’indifférence de la communauté internationale, ouvre ses frontières. La Grèce est vite submergée et plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes traversent les Balkans afin de trouver refuge, notamment en Allemagne et en Suède, parmi les pays les plus généreux en matière d’asile.

      Passé les premiers moments de panique, les Européens réagissent de plusieurs manières. La Hongrie fait le sale boulot en fermant brutalement sa frontière. L’Allemagne, elle, accepte d’accueillir un million de demandeurs d’asile, mais négocie avec Ankara un accord pour qu’il referme ses frontières, accord ensuite endossé par l’UE qui lui verse en échange 6 milliards d’euros destinés aux camps de réfugiés. Enfin, l’Union adopte un règlement destiné à relocaliser sur une base obligatoire une partie des migrants dans les autres pays européens afin qu’ils instruisent les demandes d’asile, dans le but de soulager la Grèce et l’Italie, pays de premier accueil. Ce dernier volet est un échec, les pays d’Europe de l’Est, qui ont voté contre, refusent d’accueillir le moindre migrant, et leurs partenaires de l’Ouest ne font guère mieux : sur 160 000 personnes qui auraient dû être relocalisées, un objectif rapidement revu à 98 000, moins de 35 000 l’ont été à la fin 2017, date de la fin de ce dispositif.

      Depuis, l’Union a considérablement durci les contrôles, notamment en créant un corps de 10 000 gardes-frontières européens et en renforçant les moyens de Frontex, l’agence chargée de gérer ses frontières extérieures. En février-mars, la tentative d’Ankara de faire pression sur les Européens dans le conflit syrien en rouvrant partiellement ses frontières a fait long feu : la Grèce a employé les grands moyens, y compris violents, pour stopper ce flux sous les applaudissements de ses partenaires… Autant dire que l’ambiance n’est pas à l’ouverture des frontières et à l’accueil des persécutés.
      « Usine à gaz »

      Mais la crise migratoire de 2015 a laissé des « divisions nombreuses et profondes entre les Etats membres - certaines des cicatrices qu’elle a laissées sont toujours visibles aujourd’hui », comme l’a reconnu Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union du 16 septembre. Afin de tourner la page, la Commission propose donc de laisser tomber la réforme de 2016 (dite de Dublin IV) prévoyant de pérenniser la relocalisation autoritaire des migrants, désormais jugée par une haute fonctionnaire de l’exécutif « totalement irréaliste ».

      Mais la réforme qu’elle propose, une véritable « usine à gaz », n’est qu’un « rapiéçage » de l’existant, comme l’explique Yves Pascouau, spécialiste de l’immigration et responsable des programmes européens de l’association Res Publica. Ainsi, alors que Von der Leyen a annoncé sa volonté « d’abolir » le règlement de Dublin III, il n’en est rien : le pays responsable du traitement d’une demande d’asile reste, par principe, comme c’est le cas depuis 1990, le pays de première entrée.

      S’il y a une crise, la Commission pourra déclencher un « mécanisme de solidarité » afin de soulager un pays de la ligne de front : dans ce cas, les Vingt-Sept devront accueillir un certain nombre de migrants (en fonction de leur richesse et de leur population), sauf s’ils préfèrent « parrainer un retour ». En clair, prendre en charge le refoulement des déboutés de l’asile (avec l’aide financière et logistique de l’Union) en sachant que ces personnes resteront à leur charge jusqu’à ce qu’ils y parviennent. Ça, c’est pour faire simple, car il y a plusieurs niveaux de crise, des exceptions, des sanctions, des délais et l’on en passe…

      Autre nouveauté : les demandes d’asile devront être traitées par principe à la frontière, dans des camps de rétention, pour les nationalités dont le taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugié est inférieur à 20% dans l’Union, et ce, en moins de trois mois, avec refoulement à la clé en cas de refus. « Cette réforme pose un principe clair, explique un eurocrate. Personne ne sera obligé d’accueillir un étranger dont il ne veut pas. »

      Dans cet ensemble très sévère, une bonne nouvelle : les sauvetages en mer ne devraient plus être criminalisés. On peut craindre qu’une fois passés à la moulinette des Etats, qui doivent adopter ce paquet à la majorité qualifiée (55% des Etats représentant 65% de la population), il ne reste que les aspects les plus répressifs. On ne se refait pas.


      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/22/droit-d-asile-bruxelles-rate-son-pacte_1800264

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      Graphique ajouté au fil de discussion sur les statistiques de la #relocalisation :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/605713

    • Le pacte européen sur l’asile et les migrations ne tire aucune leçon de la « crise migratoire »

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la nouvelle Commission européenne a présenté les grandes lignes d’orientation de sa politique migratoire à venir. Alors que cinq ans plutôt, en 2015, se déroulait la mal nommée « crise migratoire » aux frontières européennes, le nouveau Pacte Asile et Migration de l’UE ne tire aucune leçon du passé. Le nouveau pacte de l’Union Européenne nous propose inlassablement les mêmes recettes alors que les preuves de leur inefficacité, leur coût et des violences qu’elles procurent sont nombreuses et irréfutables. Le CNCD-11.11.11, son homologue néerlandophone et les membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à un changement de cap.

      Le nouveau Pacte repose sur des propositions législatives et des recommandations non contraignantes. Ses priorités sont claires mais pas neuves. Freiner les arrivées, limiter l’accueil par le « tri » des personnes et augmenter les retours. Cette stratégie pourtant maintes fois décriée par les ONG et le milieu académique a certes réussi à diminuer les arrivées en Europe, mais n’a offert aucune solution durable pour les personnes migrantes. Depuis les années 2000, l’externalisation de la gestion des questions migratoires a montré son inefficacité (situation humanitaires dans les hotspots, plus de 20.000 décès en Méditerranée depuis 2014 et processus d’encampement aux frontières de l’UE) et son coût exponentiel (coût élevé du contrôle, de la détention-expulsion et de l’aide au développement détournée). Elle a augmenté le taux de violences sur les routes de l’exil et a enfreint le droit international en toute impunité (non accès au droit d’asile notamment via les refoulements).

      "ll est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée"

      La proposition de mettre en place un mécanisme solidaire européen contraignant est à saluer, mais celui-ci doit être au service de l’accueil et non couplé au retour. La possibilité pour les États européens de choisir à la carte soit la relocalisation, le « parrainage » du retour des déboutés ou autre contribution financière n’est pas équitable. La répartition solidaire de l’accueil doit être permanente et ne pas être actionnée uniquement en cas « d’afflux massif » aux frontières d’un État membre comme le recommande la Commission. Il est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée. Le changement annoncé du Règlement de Dublin l’est juste de nom, car les premiers pays d’entrée resteront responsables des nouveaux arrivés.

      Le focus doit être mis sur les alternatives à la détention et non sur l’usage systématique de l’enfermement aux frontières, comme le veut la Commission. Le droit de demander l’asile et d’avoir accès à une procédure de qualité doit être accessible à tous et toutes et rester un droit individuel. Or, la proposition de la Commission de détenir (12 semaines maximum) en vue de screener (5 jours de tests divers et de recoupement de données via EURODAC) puis trier les personnes migrantes à la frontière en fonction du taux de reconnaissance de protection accordé en moyenne à leur pays d’origine (en dessous de 20%) ou de leur niveau de vulnérabilité est contraire à la Convention de Genève.

      "La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix."

      La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix, comme le préconise la Commission.

      La meilleure façon de lutter contre les violences sur les routes de l’exil reste la mise en place de plus de voies légales et sûres de migration (réinstallation, visas de travail, d’études, le regroupement familial…). Les ONG regrettent que la Commission reporte à 2021 les propositions sur la migration légale. Le pacte s’intéresse à juste titre à la criminalisation des ONG de sauvetage et des citoyens qui fournissent une aide humanitaire aux migrants. Toutefois, les propositions visant à y mettre fin sont insuffisantes. Les ONG se réjouissent de l’annonce par la Commission d’un mécanisme de surveillance des droits humains aux frontières extérieures. Au cours de l’année écoulée, on a signalé de plus en plus souvent des retours violents par la Croatie, la Grèce, Malte et Chypre. Toutefois, il n’est pas encore suffisamment clair si les propositions de la Commission peuvent effectivement traiter et sanctionner les refoulements.

      Au lendemain de l’incendie du hotspot à Moria, symbole par excellence de l’échec des politiques migratoires européennes, l’UE s’enfonce dans un déni total, meurtrier, en vue de concilier les divergences entre ses États membres. Les futures discussions autour du Pacte au sein du parlement UE et du Conseil UE seront cruciales. Les ONG membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le Parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à promouvoir des ajustements fermes allant vers plus de justice migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Le-pacte-europeen-sur-l-asile-et

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Critical ‘First Look’ Analysis

      Where does it come from?

      The New Migration Pact was built on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme that the Commission tried to push in 2016. And the least that one can say, is that it shows! The whole migration plan has been decisively shaped by this initial failure. Though the Pact has some merits, the very fact that it takes as its starting point the radical demands made by the most nationalist governments in Europe leads to sacrificing migrants’ rights on the altar of a cohesive and integrated European migration policy.

      Back in 2016, the vigorous manoeuvring of the Commission to find a way out of the European asylum dead-end resulted in a bittersweet victory for the European institution. Though the Commission was able to find a qualified majority of member states willing to support a fair distribution of the asylum seekers among member states through a relocation scheme, this new regulation remained dead letter. Several eastern European states flatly refused to implement the plan, other member states seized this opportunity to defect on their obligations and the whole migration policy quickly unravelled. Since then, Europe is left with a dysfunctional Dublin agreement exacerbating the tensions between member states and 27 loosely connected national asylum regimes. On the latter point, at least, there is a consensus. Everyone agrees that the EU’s migration regime is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.

      Obviously, the Commission was not keen to go through a new round of political humiliation. Having been accused of “bureaucratic hubris” the first time around, the commissioners Schinas and Johansson decided not to repeat the same mistake. They toured the European capitals and listened to every side of the entrenched migration debate before drafting their Migration Pact. The intention is in the right place and it reflects the complexity of having to accommodate 27 distinct democratic debates in one single political space. Nevertheless, if one peers a bit more extensively through the content of the New Plan, it is complicated not to get the feelings that the Visegrad countries are currently the key players shaping the European migration and asylum policies. After all, their staunch opposition to a collective reception scheme sparked the political process and provided the starting point to the general discussion. As a result, it is no surprise that the New Pact tilts firmly towards an ever more restrictive approach to migration, beefs up the coercive powers of both member states and European agencies and raises many concerns with regards to the respect of the migrants’ fundamental rights.
      What is in this New Pact on Migration and Asylum?

      Does the Pact concede too much ground to the demands of the most xenophobic European governments? To answer that question, let us go back to the bizarre metaphor used by the commissioner Schinas. During his press conference, he insisted on comparing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum to a house built on solid foundations (i.e. the lengthy and inclusive consultation process) and made of 3 floors: first, some renewed partnerships with the sending and transit states, second, some more effective border procedures, and third, a revamped mandatory – but flexible ! – solidarity scheme. It is tempting to carry on with the metaphor and to say that this house may appear comfortable from the inside but that it remains tightly shut to anyone knocking on its door from the outside. For, a careful examination reveals that each of the three “floors” (policy packages, actually) lays the emphasis on a repressive approach to migration aimed at deterring would-be asylum seekers from attempting to reach the European shores.
      The “new partnerships” with sending and transit countries, a “change in paradigm”?

      Let us add that there is little that is actually “new” in this New Migration Pact. For instance, the first policy package, that is, the suggestion that the EU should renew its partnerships with sending and transit countries is, as a matter of fact, an old tune in the Brussels bubble. The Commission may boast that it marks a “change of paradigm”, one fails to see how this would be any different from the previous European diplomatic efforts. Since migration and asylum are increasingly considered as toxic topics (for, they would be the main factors behind the rise of nationalism and its corollary, Euroscepticism), the European Union is willing to externalize this issue, seemingly at all costs. The results, however, have been mixed in the past. To the Commission’s own admission, only a third of the migrants whose asylum claims have been rejected are effectively returned. Besides the facts that returns are costly, extremely coercive, and administratively complicated to organize, the main reason for this low rate of successful returns is that sending countries refuse to cooperate in the readmission procedures. Neighbouring countries have excellent reasons not to respond positively to the Union’s demands. For some, remittances sent by their diaspora are an economic lifeline. Others just do not want to appear complicit of repressive European practices on their domestic political scene. Furthermore, many African countries are growing discontent with the forceful way the European Union uses its asymmetrical relation of power in bilateral negotiations to dictate to those sovereign states the migration policies they should adopt, making for instance its development aid conditional on the implementation of stricter border controls. The Commission may rhetorically claim to foster “mutually beneficial” international relation with its neighbouring countries, the emphasis on the externalization of migration control in the EU’s diplomatic agenda nevertheless bears some of the hallmarks of neo-colonialism. As such, it is a source of deep resentment in sending and transit states. It would therefore be a grave mistake for the EU to overlook the fact that some short-term gains in terms of migration management may result in long-term losses with regards to Europe’s image across the world.

      Furthermore, considering the current political situation, one should not primarily be worried about the failed partnerships with neighbouring countries, it is rather the successful ones that ought to give us pause and raise concerns. For, based on the existing evidence, the EU will sign a deal with any state as long as it effectively restrains and contains migration flows towards the European shores. Being an authoritarian state with a documented history of human right violations (Turkey) or an embattled government fighting a civil war (Lybia) does not disqualify you as a partner of the European Union in its effort to manage migration flows. It is not only morally debatable for the EU to delegate its asylum responsibilities to unreliable third countries, it is also doubtful that an increase in diplomatic pressure on neighbouring countries will bring major political results. It will further damage the perception of the EU in neighbouring countries without bringing significant restriction to migration flows.
      Streamlining border procedures? Or eroding migrants’ rights?

      The second policy package is no more inviting. It tackles the issue of the migrants who, in spite of those partnerships and the hurdles thrown their way by sending and transit countries, would nevertheless reach Europe irregularly. On this issue, the Commission faced the daunting task of having to square a political circle, since it had to find some common ground in a debate bitterly divided between conflicting worldviews (roughly, between liberal and nationalist perspectives on the individual freedom of movement) and competing interests (between overburdened Mediterranean member states and Eastern member states adamant that asylum seekers would endanger their national cohesion). The Commission thus looked for the lowest common denominator in terms of migration management preferences amongst the distinct member states. The result is a two-tier border procedure aiming to fast-track and streamline the processing of asylum claims, allowing for more expeditious returns of irregular migrants. The goal is to prevent any bottleneck in the processing of the claims and to avoid the (currently near constant) overcrowding of reception facilities in the frontline states. Once again, there is little that is actually new in this proposal. It amounts to a generalization of the process currently in place in the infamous hotspots scattered on the Greek isles. According to the Pact, screening procedures would be carried out in reception centres created across Europe. A far cry from the slogan “no more Moria” since one may legitimately suspect that those reception centres will, at the first hiccup in the procedure, turn into tomorrow’s asylum camps.

      According to this procedure, newly arrived migrants would be submitted within 5 days to a pre-screening procedure and subsequently triaged into two categories. Migrants with a low chance of seeing their asylum claim recognized (because they would come from a country with a low recognition rate or a country belonging to the list of the safe third countries, for instance) would be redirected towards an accelerated procedure. The end goal would be to return them, if applicable, within twelve weeks. The other migrants would be subjected to the standard assessment of their asylum claim. It goes without saying that this proposal has been swiftly and unanimously condemned by all human rights organizations. It does not take a specialized lawyer to see that this two-tiered procedure could have devastating consequences for the “fast-tracked” asylum seekers left with no legal recourse against the initial decision to submit them to this sped up procedure (rather than the standard one) as well as reduced opportunities to defend their asylum claim or, if need be, to contest their return. No matter how often the Commission repeats that it will preserve all the legal safeguards required to protect migrants’ rights, it remains wildly unconvincing. Furthermore, the Pact may confuse speed and haste. The schedule is tight on paper (five days for the pre-screening, twelve weeks for the assessment of the asylum claim), it may well prove unrealistic to meet those deadlines in real-life conditions. The Commission also overlooks the fact that accelerated procedures tend to be sloppy, thus leading to juridical appeals and further legal wrangling and eventually amounting to processes far longer than expected.
      Integrating the returns, not the reception

      The Commission talked up the new Pact as being “balanced” and “humane”. Since the two first policy packages focus, first, on preventing would-be migrants from leaving their countries and, second, on facilitating and accelerating their returns, one would expect the third policy package to move away from the restriction of movement and to complement those measures with a reception plan tailored to the needs of refugees. And here comes the major disappointment with the New Pact and, perhaps, the clearest indication that the Pact is first and foremost designed to please the migration hardliners. It does include a solidarity scheme meant to alleviate the burden of frontline countries, to distribute more fairly the responsibilities amongst member states and to ensure that refugees are properly hosted. But this solidarity scheme is far from being robust enough to deliver on those promises. Let us unpack it briefly to understand why it is likely to fail. The solidarity scheme is mandatory. All member states will be under the obligation to take part. But there is a catch! Member states’ contribution to this collective effort can take many shapes and forms and it will be up to the member states to decide how they want to participate. They get to choose whether they want to relocate some refugees on their national soil, to provide some financial and/or logistical assistance, or to “sponsor” (it is the actual term used by the Commission) some returns.

      No one expected the Commission to reintroduce a compulsory relocation scheme in its Pact. Eastern European countries had drawn an obvious red line and it would have been either naïve or foolish to taunt them with that kind of policy proposal. But this so-called “flexible mandatory solidarity” relies on such a watered-down understanding of the solidarity principle that it results in a weak and misguided political instrument unsuited to solve the problem at hand. First, the flexible solidarity mechanism is too indeterminate to prove efficient. According to the current proposal, member states would have to shoulder a fair share of the reception burden (calculated on their respective population and GDP) but would be left to decide for themselves which form this contribution would take. The obvious flaw with the policy proposal is that, if all member states decline to relocate some refugees (which is a plausible scenario), Mediterranean states would still be left alone when it comes to dealing with the most immediate consequences of migration flows. They would receive much more financial, operational, and logistical support than it currently is the case – but they would be managing on their own the overcrowded reception centres. The Commission suggests that it would oversee the national pledges in terms of relocation and that it would impose some corrections if the collective pledges fall short of a predefined target. But it remains to be seen whether the Commission will have the political clout to impose some relocations to member states refusing them. One could not be blamed for being highly sceptical.

      Second, it is noteworthy that the Commission fails to integrate the reception of refugees since member states are de facto granted an opt-out on hosting refugees. What is integrated is rather the return policy, once more a repressive instrument. And it is the member states with the worst record in terms of migrants’ rights violations that are the most likely to be tasked with the delicate mission of returning them home. As a commentator was quipping on Twitter, it would be like asking a bully to walk his victim home (what could possibly go wrong?). The attempt to build an intra-European consensus is obviously pursued at the expense of the refugees. The incentive structure built into the flexible solidarity scheme offers an excellent illustration of this. If a member state declines to relocate any refugee and offers instead to ‘sponsor’ some returns, it has to honour that pledge within a limited period of time (the Pact suggests a six month timeframe). If it fails to do so, it becomes responsible for the relocation and the return of those migrants, leading to a situation in which some migrants may end up in a country where they do not want to be and that does not want them to be there. Hardly an optimal outcome…
      Conclusion

      The Pact represents a genuine attempt to design a multi-faceted and comprehensive migration policy, covering most aspects of a complex issue. The dysfunctions of the Schengen area and the question of the legal pathways to Europe have been relegated to a later discussion and one may wonder whether they should not have been included in the Pact to balance out its restrictive inclination. And, in all fairness, the Pact does throw a few bones to the more cosmopolitan-minded European citizens. For instance, it reminds the member states that maritime search and rescue operations are legal and should not be impeded, or it shortens (from five to three years) the waiting period for refugees to benefit from the freedom of movement. But those few welcome additions are vastly outweighed by the fact that migration hardliners dominated the agenda-setting in the early stage of the policy-making exercise and have thus been able to frame decisively the political discussion. The end result is a policy package leaning heavily towards some repressive instruments and particularly careless when it comes to safeguarding migrants’ rights.

      The New Pact was first drafted on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme. Back then, the Commission publicly made amends and revised its approach to the issue. Sadly, the New Pact was presented to the European public when the ashes of the Moria camp were still lukewarm. One can only hope that the member states will learn from that mistake too.

      https://blog.novamigra.eu/2020/09/24/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-a-critical-first-look-analysis

    • #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration : un “nouveau départ” pour violer les droits humains

      La Commission européenne a publié aujourd’hui son « Nouveau Pacte sur l’Asile et la Migration » qui propose un nouveau cadre règlementaire et législatif. Avec ce plan, l’UE devient de facto un « leader du voyage retour » pour les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s en Méditerranée. EuroMed Droits craint que ce pacte ne détériore encore davantage la situation actuelle pour au moins trois raisons.

      Le pacte se concentre de manière obsessionnelle sur la politique de retours à travers un système de « sponsoring » : des pays européens tels que l’Autriche, la Pologne, la Hongrie ou la République tchèque – qui refusent d’accueillir des réfugié.e.s – pourront « sponsoriser » et organiser la déportation vers les pays de départ de ces réfugié.e.s. Au lieu de favoriser l’intégration, le pacte adopte une politique de retour à tout prix, même lorsque les demandeurs.ses d’asile peuvent être victimes de discrimination, persécution ou torture dans leur pays de retour. A ce jour, il n’existe aucun mécanisme permettant de surveiller ce qui arrive aux migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s une fois déporté.e.s.

      Le pacte proposé renforce la sous-traitance de la gestion des frontières. En termes concrets, l’UE renforce la coopération avec les pays non-européens afin qu’ils ferment leurs frontières et empêchent les personnes de partir. Cette coopération est sujette à l’imposition de conditions par l’UE. Une telle décision européenne se traduit par une hausse du nombre de refoulements dans la région méditerranéenne et une coopération renforcée avec des pays qui ont un piètre bilan en matière de droits humains et qui ne possèdent pas de cadre efficace pour la protection des droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées.

      Le pacte vise enfin à étendre les mécanismes de tri des demandeurs.ses d’asile et des migrant.e.s dans les pays d’arrivée. Ce modèle de tri – similaire à celui utilisé dans les zones de transit aéroportuaires – accentue les difficultés de pays tels que l’Espagne, l’Italie, Malte, la Grèce ou Chypre qui accueillent déjà la majorité des migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s. Placer ces personnes dans des camps revient à mettre en place un système illégal d’incarcération automatique dès l’arrivée. Cela accroîtra la violence psychologique à laquelle les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s sont déjà soumis. Selon ce nouveau système, ces personnes seront identifié.e.s sous cinq jours et toute demande d’asile devra être traitée en douze semaines. Cette accélération de la procédure risque d’intensifier la détention et de diviser les arrivant.e.s entre demandeurs.ses d’asile et migrant.e.s économiques. Cela s’effectuerait de manière discriminatoire, sans analyse détaillée de chaque demande d’asile ni possibilité réelle de faire appel. Celles et ceux qui seront éligibles à la protection internationale seront relocalisé.e.s au sein des États membres qui acceptent de les recevoir. Les autres risqueront d’être déportés immédiatement.

      « En choisissant de sous-traiter davantage encore la gestion des frontières et d’accentuer la politique de retours, ce nouveau pacte conclut la transformation de la politique européenne en une approche pleinement sécuritaire. Pire encore, le pacte assimile la politique de “retour sponsorisé” à une forme de solidarité. Au-delà des déclarations officielles, cela démontre la volonté de l’Union européenne de criminaliser et de déshumaniser les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, Président d’EuroMed Droits.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-nouveau-depart-pour-violer-les-droits

    • Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

      This Policy Insight examines the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the principles and commitments enshrined in the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR) and the EU Treaties. It finds that from a legal viewpoint the ‘Pact’ is not really a Pact at all, if understood as an agreement concluded between relevant EU institutional parties. Rather, it is the European Commission’s policy guide for the duration of the current 9th legislature.

      The analysis shows that the Pact has intergovernmental aspects, in both name and fundamentals. It does not pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union. The Pact encourages an artificial need for consensus building or de facto unanimity among all EU member states’ governments in fields where the EU Treaties call for qualified majority voting (QMV) with the European Parliament as co-legislator. The Pact does not abolish the first irregular entry rule characterising the EU Dublin Regulation. It adopts a notion of interstate solidarity that leads to asymmetric responsibilities, where member states are given the flexibility to evade participating in the relocation of asylum seekers. The Pact also runs the risk of catapulting some contested member states practices’ and priorities about localisation, speed and de-territorialisation into EU policy.

      This Policy Insight argues that the Pact’s priority of setting up an independent monitoring mechanism of border procedures’ compliance with fundamental rights is a welcome step towards the better safeguarding of the rule of law. The EU inter-institutional negotiations on the Pact’s initiatives should be timely and robust in enforcing member states’ obligations under the current EU legal standards relating to asylum and borders, namely the prevention of detention and expedited expulsions, and the effective access by all individuals to dignified treatment and effective remedies. Trust and legitimacy of EU asylum and migration policy can only follow if international (human rights and refugee protection) commitments and EU Treaty principles are put first.

      https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/whose-pact

    • First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals

      This week the EU Commission published its new package of proposals on asylum and (non-EU) migration – consisting of proposals for legislation, some ‘soft law’, attempts to relaunch talks on stalled proposals and plans for future measures. The following is an explanation of the new proposals (not attempting to cover every detail) with some first thoughts. Overall, while it is possible that the new package will lead to agreement on revised asylum laws, this will come at the cost of risking reduced human rights standards.

      Background

      Since 1999, the EU has aimed to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’. A first phase of legislation was passed between 2003 and 2005, followed by a second phase between 2010 and 2013. Currently the legislation consists of: a) the Qualification Directive, which defines when people are entitled to refugee status (based on the UN Refugee Convention) or subsidiary protection status, and what rights they have; b) the Dublin III Regulation, which allocates responsibility for an asylum seeker between Member States; c) the Eurodac Regulation, which facilitates the Dublin system by setting up a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and people who cross the external border without authorisation; d) the Asylum Procedures Directive, which sets out the procedural rules governing asylum applications, such as personal interviews and appeals; e) the Reception Conditions Directive, which sets out standards on the living conditions of asylum-seekers, such as rules on housing and welfare; and f) the Asylum Agency Regulation, which set up an EU agency (EASO) to support Member States’ processing of asylum applications.

      The EU also has legislation on other aspects of migration: (short-term) visas, border controls, irregular migration, and legal migration – much of which has connections with the asylum legislation, and all of which is covered by this week’s package. For visas, the main legislation is the visa list Regulation (setting out which non-EU countries’ citizens are subject to a short-term visa requirement, or exempt from it) and the visa code (defining the criteria to obtain a short-term Schengen visa, allowing travel between all Schengen states). The visa code was amended last year, as discussed here.

      For border controls, the main legislation is the Schengen Borders Code, setting out the rules on crossing external borders and the circumstances in which Schengen states can reinstate controls on internal borders, along with the Frontex Regulation, setting up an EU border agency to assist Member States. On the most recent version of the Frontex Regulation, see discussion here and here.

      For irregular migration, the main legislation is the Return Directive. The Commission proposed to amend it in 2018 – on which, see analysis here and here.

      For legal migration, the main legislation on admission of non-EU workers is the single permit Directive (setting out a common process and rights for workers, but not regulating admission); the Blue Card Directive (on highly paid migrants, discussed here); the seasonal workers’ Directive (discussed here); and the Directive on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here). The EU also has legislation on: non-EU students, researchers and trainees (overview here); non-EU family reunion (see summary of the legislation and case law here) and on long-term resident non-EU citizens (overview – in the context of UK citizens after Brexit – here). In 2016, the Commission proposed to revise the Blue Card Directive (see discussion here).

      The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of most of these laws, except some asylum law applies to the UK and Ireland, and Denmark is covered by the Schengen and Dublin rules. So are the non-EU countries associated with Schengen and Dublin (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). There are also a number of further databases of non-EU citizens as well as Eurodac: the EU has never met a non-EU migrant who personal data it didn’t want to store and process.

      The Refugee ‘Crisis’

      The EU’s response to the perceived refugee ‘crisis’ was both short-term and long-term. In the short term, in 2015 the EU adopted temporary laws (discussed here) relocating some asylum seekers in principle from Italy and Greece to other Member States. A legal challenge to one of these laws failed (as discussed here), but in practice Member States accepted few relocations anyway. Earlier this year, the CJEU ruled that several Member States had breached their obligations under the laws (discussed here), but by then it was a moot point.

      Longer term, the Commission proposed overhauls of the law in 2016: a) a Qualification Regulation further harmonising the law on refugee and subsidiary protection status; b) a revised Dublin Regulation, which would have set up a system of relocation of asylum seekers for future crises; c) a revised Eurodac Regulation, to take much more data from asylum seekers and other migrants; d) an Asylum Procedures Regulation, further harmonising the procedural law on asylum applications; e) a revised Reception Conditions Directive; f) a revised Asylum Agency Regulation, giving the agency more powers; and g) a new Resettlement Regulation, setting out a framework of admitting refugees directly from non-EU countries. (See my comments on some of these proposals, from back in 2016)

      However, these proposals proved unsuccessful – which is the main reason for this week’s attempt to relaunch the process. In particular, an EU Council note from February 2019 summarises the diverse problems that befell each proposal. While the EU Council Presidency and the European Parliament reached agreement on the proposals on qualification, reception conditions and resettlement in June 2018, Member States refused to support the Presidency’s deal and the European Parliament refused to renegotiate (see, for instance, the Council documents on the proposals on qualification and resettlement; see also my comments on an earlier stage of the talks, when the Council had agreed its negotiation position on the qualification regulation).

      On the asylum agency, the EP and Council agreed on the revised law in 2017, but the Commission proposed an amendment in 2018 to give the agency more powers; the Council could not agree on this. On Eurodac, the EP and Council only partly agreed on a text. On the procedures Regulation, the Council largely agreed its position, except on border procedures; on Dublin there was never much prospect of agreement because of the controversy over relocating asylum seekers. (For either proposal, a difficult negotiation with the European Parliament lay ahead).

      In other areas too, the legislative process was difficult: the Council and EP gave up negotiating amendments to the Blue Card Directive (see the last attempt at a compromise here, and the Council negotiation mandate here), and the EP has not yet agreed a position on the Returns Directive (the Council has a negotiating position, but again it leaves out the difficult issue of border procedures; there is a draft EP position from February). Having said that, the EU has been able to agree legislation giving more powers to Frontex, as well as new laws on EU migration databases, in the last few years.

      The attempted relaunch

      The Commission’s new Pact on asylum and immigration (see also the roadmap on its implementation, the Q and As, and the staff working paper) does not restart the whole process from scratch. On qualification, reception conditions, resettlement, the asylum agency, the returns Directive and the Blue Card Directive, it invites the Council and Parliament to resume negotiations. But it tries to unblock the talks as a whole by tabling two amended legislative proposals and three new legislative proposals, focussing on the issues of border procedures and relocation of asylum seekers.

      Screening at the border

      This revised proposals start with a new proposal for screening asylum seekers at the border, which would apply to all non-EU citizens who cross an external border without authorisation, who apply for asylum while being checked at the border (without meeting the conditions for legal entry), or who are disembarked after a search and rescue operation. During the screening, these non-EU citizens are not allowed to enter the territory of a Member State, unless it becomes clear that they meet the criteria for entry. The screening at the border should take no longer than 5 days, with an extra 5 days in the event of a huge influx. (It would also be possible to apply the proposed law to those on the territory who evaded border checks; for them the deadline to complete the screening is 3 days).

      Screening has six elements, as further detailed in the proposal: a health check, an identity check, registration in a database, a security check, filling out a debriefing form, and deciding on what happens next. At the end of the screening, the migrant is channelled either into the expulsion process (if no asylum claim has been made, and if the migrant does not meet the conditions for entry) or, if an asylum claim is made, into the asylum process – with an indication of whether the claim should be fast-tracked or not. It’s also possible that an asylum seeker would be relocated to another Member State. The screening is carried out by national officials, possibly with support from EU agencies.

      To ensure human rights protection, there must be independent monitoring to address allegations of non-compliance with human rights. These allegations might concern breaches of EU or international law, national law on detention, access to the asylum procedure, or non-refoulement (the ban on sending people to an unsafe country). Migrants must be informed about the process and relevant EU immigration and data protection law. There is no provision for judicial review of the outcome of the screening process, although there would be review as part of the next step (asylum or return).

      Asylum procedures

      The revised proposal for an asylum procedures Regulation would leave in place most of the Commission’s 2016 proposal to amend the law, adding some specific further proposed amendments, which either link back to the screening proposal or aim to fast-track decisions and expulsions more generally.

      On the first point, the usual rules on informing asylum applicants and registering their application would not apply until after the end of the screening. A border procedure may apply following the screening process, but Member States must apply the border procedure in cases where an asylum seeker used false documents, is a perceived national security threat, or falls within the new ground for fast-tracking cases (on which, see below). The latter obligation is subject to exceptions where a Member State has reported that a non-EU country is not cooperating on readmission; the process for dealing with that issue set out under the 2019 amendments to the visa code will then apply. Also, the border process cannot apply to unaccompanied minors or children under 12, unless they are a supposed national security risk. Further exceptions apply where the asylum seeker is vulnerable or has medical needs, the application is not inadmissible or cannot be fast-tracked, or detention conditions cannot be guaranteed. A Member State might apply the Dublin process to determine which Member State is responsible for the asylum claim during the border process. The whole border process (including any appeal) must last no more than 12 weeks, and can only be used to declare applications inadmissible or apply the new ground for fast-tracking them.

      There would also be a new border expulsion procedure, where an asylum application covered by the border procedure was rejected. This is subject to its own 12-week deadline, starting from the point when the migrant is no longer allowed to remain. Much of the Return Directive would apply – but not the provisions on the time period for voluntary departure, remedies and the grounds for detention. Instead, the border expulsion procedure would have its own stricter rules on these issues.

      As regards general fast-tracking, in order to speed up the expulsion process for unsuccessful applications, a rejection of an asylum application would have to either incorporate an expulsion decision or entail a simultaneous separate expulsion decision. Appeals against expulsion decisions would then be subject to the same rules as appeals against asylum decisions. If the asylum seeker comes from a country with a refugee recognition rate below 20%, his or her application must be fast-tracked (this would even apply to unaccompanied minors) – unless circumstances in that country have changed, or the asylum seeker comes from a group for whom the low recognition rate is not representative (for instance, the recognition rate might be higher for LGBT asylum-seekers from that country). Many more appeals would be subject to a one-week time limit for the rejected asylum seeker to appeal, and there could be only one level of appeal against decisions taken within a border procedure.

      Eurodac

      The revised proposal for Eurodac would build upon the 2016 proposal, which was already far-reaching: extending Eurodac to include not only fingerprints, but also photos and other personal data; reducing the age of those covered by Eurodac from 14 to 6; removing the time limits and the limits on use of the fingerprints taken from persons who had crossed the border irregularly; and creating a new obligation to collect data of all irregular migrants over age 6 (currently fingerprint data for this group cannot be stored, but can simply be checked, as an option, against the data on asylum seekers and irregular border crossers). The 2020 proposal additionally provides for interoperability with other EU migration databases, taking of personal data during the screening process, including more data on the migration status of each person, and expressly applying the law to those disembarked after a search and rescue operation.

      Dublin rules on asylum responsibility

      A new proposal for asylum management would replace the Dublin regulation (meaning that the Commission has withdrawn its 2016 proposal to replace that Regulation). The 2016 proposal would have created a ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry, requiring that State to examine first whether many of the grounds for removing an asylum-seeker to a non-EU country apply before considering whether another Member State might be responsible for the application (because the asylum seeker’s family live there, for instance). It would also have imposed obligations directly on asylum-seekers to cooperate with the process, rather than only regulate relations between Member States. These obligations would have been enforced by punishing asylum seekers who disobeyed: removing their reception conditions (apart from emergency health care); fast-tracking their substantive asylum applications; refusing to consider new evidence from them; and continuing the asylum application process in their absence.

      It would no longer be possible for asylum seekers to provide additional evidence of family links, with a view to being in the same country as a family member. Overturning a CJEU judgment (see further discussion here), unaccompanied minors would no longer have been able to make applications in multiple Member States (in the absence of a family member in any of them). However, the definition of family members would have been widened, to include siblings and families formed in a transit country. Responsibility for an asylum seeker based on the first Member State of irregular entry (a commonly applied criterion) would have applied indefinitely, rather than expire one year after entry as it does under the current rules. The ‘Sangatte clause’ (responsibility after five months of living in a second Member State, if the ‘irregular entry’ criterion no longer applies) would be dropped. The ‘sovereignty clause’, which played a key part in the 2015-16 refugee ‘crisis’ (it lets a Member State take responsibility for any application even if the Dublin rules do not require it, cf Germany accepting responsibility for Syrian asylum seekers) would have been sharply curtailed. Time limits for detention during the transfer process would be reduced. Remedies for asylum seekers would have been curtailed: they would only have seven days to appeal against a transfer; courts would have fifteen days to decide (although they could have stayed on the territory throughout); and the grounds of review would have been curtailed.

      Finally, the 2016 proposal would have tackled the vexed issue of disproportionate allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers by setting up an automated system determining how many asylum seekers each Member State ‘should’ have based on their size and GDP. If a Member State were responsible for excessive numbers of applicants, Member States which were receiving fewer numbers would have to take more to help out. If they refused, they would have to pay €250,000 per applicant.

      The 2020 proposal drops some of the controversial proposals from 2016, including the ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry (the current rule, giving Member States an option to decide if a non-EU country is responsible for the application on narrower grounds than in the 2016 proposal, would still apply). Also, the sovereignty clause would now remain unchanged.

      However, the 2020 proposal also retains parts of the 2016 proposal: the redefinition of ‘family member’ (which could be more significant now that the bottleneck is removed, unless Member States choose to apply the relevant rules on non-EU countries’ responsibility during the border procedure already); obligations for asylum seekers (redrafted slightly); some of the punishments for non-compliant asylum-seekers (the cut-off for considering evidence would stay, as would the loss of benefits except for those necessary to ensure a basic standard of living: see the CJEU case law in CIMADE and Haqbin); dropping the provision on evidence of family links; changing the rules on responsibility for unaccompanied minors; retaining part of the changes to the irregular entry criterion (it would now cease to apply after three years; the Sangatte clause would still be dropped; it would apply after search and rescue but not apply in the event of relocation); curtailing judicial review (the grounds would still be limited; the time limit to appeal would be 14 days; courts would not have a strict deadline to decide; suspensive effect would not apply in all cases); and the reduced time limits for detention.

      The wholly new features of the 2020 proposal are: some vague provisions about crisis management; responsibility for an asylum application for the Member State which issued a visa or residence document which expired in the last three years (the current rule is responsibility if the visa expired less than six months ago, and the residence permit expired less than a year ago); responsibility for an asylum application for a Member State in which a non-EU citizen obtained a diploma; and the possibility for refugees or persons with subsidiary protection status to obtain EU long-term resident status after three years, rather than five.

      However, the most significant feature of the new proposal is likely to be its attempt to solve the underlying issue of disproportionate allocation of asylum seekers. Rather than a mechanical approach to reallocating responsibility, the 2020 proposal now provides for a menu of ‘solidarity contributions’: relocation of asylum seekers; relocation of refugees; ‘return sponsorship’; or support for ‘capacity building’ in the Member State (or a non-EU country) facing migratory pressure. There are separate rules for search and rescue disembarkations, on the one hand, and more general migratory pressures on the other. Once the Commission determines that the latter situation exists, other Member States have to choose from the menu to offer some assistance. Ultimately the Commission will adopt a decision deciding what the contributions will be. Note that ‘return sponsorship’ comes with a ticking clock: if the persons concerned are not expelled within eight months, the sponsoring Member State must accept them on its territory.

      Crisis management

      The issue of managing asylum issues in a crisis has been carved out of the Dublin proposal into a separate proposal, which would repeal an EU law from 2001 that set up a framework for offering ‘temporary protection’ in a crisis. Note that Member States have never used the 2001 law in practice.

      Compared to the 2001 law, the new proposal is integrated into the EU asylum legislation that has been adopted or proposed in the meantime. It similarly applies in the event of a ‘mass influx’ that prevents the effective functioning of the asylum system. It would apply the ‘solidarity’ process set out in the proposal to replace the Dublin rules (ie relocation of asylum seekers and other measures), with certain exceptions and shorter time limits to apply that process.

      The proposal focusses on providing for possible exceptions to the usual asylum rules. In particular, during a crisis, the Commission could authorise a Member State to apply temporary derogations from the rules on border asylum procedures (extending the time limit, using the procedure to fast-track more cases), border return procedures (again extending the time limit, more easily justifying detention), or the time limit to register asylum applicants. Member States could also determine that due to force majeure, it was not possible to observe the normal time limits for registering asylum applications, applying the Dublin process for responsibility for asylum applications, or offering ‘solidarity’ to other Member States.

      Finally, the new proposal, like the 2001 law, would create a potential for a form of separate ‘temporary protection’ status for the persons concerned. A Member State could suspend the consideration of asylum applications from people coming from the country facing a crisis for up to a year, in the meantime giving them status equivalent to ‘subsidiary protection’ status in the EU qualification law. After that point it would have to resume consideration of the applications. It would need the Commission’s approval, whereas the 2001 law left it to the Council to determine a situation of ‘mass influx’ and provided for the possible extension of the special rules for up to three years.

      Other measures

      The Commission has also adopted four soft law measures. These comprise: a Recommendation on asylum crisis management; a Recommendation on resettlement and humanitarian admission; a Recommendation on cooperation between Member States on private search and rescue operations; and guidance on the applicability of EU law on smuggling of migrants – notably concluding that it cannot apply where (as in the case of law of the sea) there is an obligation to rescue.

      On other issues, the Commission plan is to use current legislation – in particular the recent amendment to the visa code, which provides for sticks to make visas more difficult to get for citizens of countries which don’t cooperate on readmission of people, and carrots to make visas easier to get for citizens of countries which do cooperate on readmission. In some areas, such as the Schengen system, there will be further strategies and plans in the near future; it is not clear if this will lead to more proposed legislation.

      However, on legal migration, the plan is to go further than relaunching the amendment of the Blue Card Directive, as the Commission is also planning to propose amendments to the single permit and long-term residence laws referred to above – leading respectively to more harmonisation of the law on admission of non-EU workers and enhanced possibilities for long-term resident non-EU citizens to move between Member States (nb the latter plan is separate from this week’s proposal to amend this law as regards refugees and people with subsidiary protection already). Both these plans are relevant to British citizens moving to the EU after the post-Brexit transition period – and the latter is also relevant to British citizens covered by the withdrawal agreement.

      Comments

      This week’s plan is less a complete restart of EU law in this area than an attempt to relaunch discussions on a blocked set of amendments to that law, which moreover focusses on a limited set of issues. Will it ‘work’? There are two different ways to answer that question.

      First, will it unlock the institutional blockage? Here it should be kept in mind that the European Parliament and the Council had largely agreed on several of the 2016 proposals already; they would have been adopted in 2018 already had not the Council treated all the proposals as a package, and not gone back on agreements which the Council Presidency reached with the European Parliament. It is always open to the Council to get at least some of these proposals adopted quickly by reversing these approaches.

      On the blocked proposals, the Commission has targeted the key issues of border procedures and allocation of asylum-seekers. If the former leads to more quick removals of unsuccessful applicants, the latter issue is no longer so pressing. But it is not clear if the Member States will agree to anything on border procedures, or whether such an agreement will result in more expulsions anyway – because the latter depends on the willingness of non-EU countries, which the EU cannot legislate for (and does not even address in this most recent package). And because it is uncertain whether they will result in more expulsions, Member States will be wary of agreeing to anything which either results in more obligations to accept asylum-seekers on their territory, or leaves them with the same number as before.

      The idea of ‘return sponsorship’ – which reads like a grotesque parody of individuals sponsoring children in developing countries via charities – may not be appealing except to those countries like France, which have the capacity to twist arms in developing countries to accept returns. Member States might be able to agree on a replacement for the temporary protection Directive on the basis that they will never use that replacement either. And Commission threats to use infringement proceedings to enforce the law might not worry Member States who recall that the CJEU ruled on their failure to relocate asylum-seekers after the relocation law had already expired, and that the Court will soon rule on Hungary’s expulsion of the Central European University after it has already left.

      As to whether the proposals will ‘work’ in terms of managing asylum flows fairly and compatibly with human rights, it is striking how much they depend upon curtailing appeal rights, even though appeals are often successful. The proposed limitation of appeal rights will also be maintained in the Dublin system; and while the proposed ‘bottleneck’ of deciding on removals to non-EU countries before applying the Dublin system has been removed, a variation on this process may well apply in the border procedures process instead. There is no new review of the assessment of the safety of non-EU countries – which is questionable in light of the many reports of abuse in Libya. While the EU is not proposing, as the wildest headbangers would want, to turn people back or refuse applications without consideration, the question is whether the fast-track consideration of applications and then appeals will constitute merely a Potemkin village of procedural rights that mean nothing in practice.

      Increased detention is already a feature of the amendments proposed earlier: the reception conditions proposal would add a new ground for detention; the return Directive proposal would inevitably increase detention due to curtailing voluntary departure (as discussed here). Unfortunately the Commission’s claim in its new communication that its 2018 proposal is ‘promoting’ voluntary return is therefore simply false. Trump-style falsehoods have no place in the discussion of EU immigration or asylum law.

      The latest Eurodac proposal would not do much compared to the 2016 proposal – but then, the 2016 proposal would already constitute an enormous increase in the amount of data collected and shared by that system.

      Some elements of the package are more positive. The possibility for refugees and people with subsidiary protection to get EU long-term residence status earlier would be an important step toward making asylum ‘valid throughout the Union’, as referred to in the Treaties. The wider definition of family members, and the retention of the full sovereignty clause, may lead to some fairer results under the Dublin system. Future plans to improve the long-term residents’ Directive are long overdue. The Commission’s sound legal assessment that no one should be prosecuted for acting on their obligations to rescue people in distress at sea is welcome. The quasi-agreed text of the reception conditions Directive explicitly rules out Trump-style separate detention of children.

      No proposals from the EU can solve the underlying political issue: a chunk of public opinion is hostile to more migration, whether in frontline Member States, other Member States, or transit countries outside the EU. The politics is bound to affect what Member States and non-EU countries alike are willing to agree to. And for the same reason, even if a set of amendments to the system is ultimately agreed, there will likely be continuing issues of implementation, especially illegal pushbacks and refusals to accept relocation.

      https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/09/first-analysis-of-eus-new-asylum.html?spref=fb

    • Pacte européen sur les migrations et l’asile : Le rendez-vous manqué de l’UE

      Le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile présenté par la Commission ce 23 septembre, loin de tirer les leçons de l’échec et du coût humain intolérable des politiques menées depuis 30 ans, s’inscrit dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées, fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement et des expulsions et au détriment d’une politique d’accueil qui s’attache à garantir et à protéger la dignité et les droits fondamentaux.

      Des « nouveaux » camps européens aux frontières pour filtrer les personnes arrivées sur le territoire européen et expulser le plus grand nombre

      En réaction au drame des incendies qui ont ravagé le camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, affirmait le 17 septembre devant les députés européens qu’« il n’y aurait pas d’autres Moria » mais de « véritables centres d’accueil » aux frontières européennes.

      Si le nouveau pacte prévoie effectivement la création de « nouveaux » camps conjuguée à une « nouvelle » procédure accélérée aux frontières, ces derniers s’apparentent largement à l’approche hotspot mise en œuvre par l’Union européenne (UE) depuis 2015 afin d’organiser la sélection des personnes qu’elle souhaite accueillir et l’expulsion, depuis la frontière, de tous celles qu’elle considère « indésirables ».

      Le pacte prévoie ainsi la mise en place « d’un contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire pour toutes les personnes qui se présentent aux frontières extérieures ou après un débarquement, à la suite d’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage ». Il s’agira, pour les pays situés à la frontière extérieure de l’UE, de procéder – dans un délai de 5 jours et avec l’appui des agences européennes (l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes – Frontex et le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile – EASO) – à des contrôles d’identité (prise d’empreintes et enregistrement dans les bases de données européennes) doublés de contrôles sécuritaires et sanitaires afin de procéder à un tri préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire, permettant d’orienter ensuite les personne vers :

      Une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière pour celles possédant une nationalité pour laquelle le taux de reconnaissance d’une protection internationale, à l’échelle de l’UE, est inférieure à 20%
      Une procédure d’asile normale pour celles considérées comme éligibles à une protection.
      Une procédure d’expulsion immédiate, depuis la frontière, pour toute celles qui auront été rejetées par ce dispositif de tri, dans un délai de 12 semaines.

      Pendant cette procédure de filtrage à la frontière, les personnes seraient considérées comme n’étant pas encore entrées sur le territoire européen ce qui permettrait aux Etats de déroger aux conventions de droit international qui s’y appliquent.

      Un premier projet pilote est notamment prévu à Lesbos, conjointement avec les autorités grecques, pour installer un nouveau camp sur l’île avec l’appui d’une Task Force européenne, directement placée sous le contrôle de la direction générale des affaires intérieure de la Commission européenne (DG HOME).

      Difficile de voir où se trouve l’innovation dans la proposition présentée par la Commission. Si ce n’est que les États européens souhaitent pousser encore plus loin à la fois la logique de filtrage à ces frontières ainsi que la sous-traitance de leur contrôle. Depuis l’été 2018, l’Union européenne défend la création de « centres contrôlés au sein de l’UE » d’une part et de « plateformes de débarquement dans les pays tiers » d’autre part. L’UE, à travers ce nouveau mécanisme, vise à organiser l’expulsion rapide des migrants qui sont parvenus, souvent au péril de leur vie, à pénétrer sur son territoire. Pour ce faire, la coopération accrue avec les gardes-frontières des États non européens et l’appui opérationnel de l’agence Frontex sont encore et toujours privilégiés.
      Un « nouvel écosystème en matière de retour »

      L’obsession européenne pour l’amélioration du « taux de retour » se retrouve au cœur de ce nouveau pacte, en repoussant toujours plus les limites en matière de coopération extérieure et d’enfermement des personnes étrangères jugées indésirables et en augmentant de façon inédite ses moyens opérationnels.

      Selon l’expression de Margaritis Schinas, commissaire grec en charge de la « promotion du mode de vie européen », la nouvelle procédure accélérée aux frontières s’accompagnera d’« un nouvel écosystème européen en matière de retour ». Il sera piloté par un « nouveau coordinateur de l’UE chargé des retours » ainsi qu’un « réseau de haut niveau coordonnant les actions nationales » avec le soutien de l’agence Frontex, qui devrait devenir « le bras opérationnel de la politique de retour européenne ».

      Rappelons que Frontex a vu ses moyens décuplés ces dernières années, notamment en vue d’expulser plus de personnes migrantes. Celle-ci a encore vu ses moyens renforcés depuis l’entrée en vigueur de son nouveau règlement le 4 décembre 2019 dont la Commission souhaite accélérer la mise en œuvre effective. Au-delà d’une augmentation de ses effectifs et de la possibilité d’acquérir son propre matériel, l’agence bénéficie désormais de pouvoirs étendus pour identifier les personnes « expulsables » du territoire européen, obtenir les documents de voyage nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de leurs expulsions ainsi que pour coordonner des opérations d’expulsion au service des Etats membres.

      La Commission souhaite également faire aboutir, d’ici le second trimestre 2021, le projet de révision de la directive européenne « Retour », qui constitue un recul sans précédent du cadre de protection des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : L’expulsion au cœur des politiques migratoires européennes, 22 mai 2019
      Des « partenariats sur-mesure » avec les pays d’origine et de transit

      La Commission étend encore redoubler d’efforts afin d’inciter les Etats non européens à participer activement à empêcher les départs vers l’Europe ainsi qu’à collaborer davantage en matière de retour et de réadmission en utilisant l’ensemble des instruments politiques à sa disposition. Ces dernières années ont vu se multiplier les instruments européens de coopération formelle (à travers la signature, entre autres, d’accords de réadmission bilatéraux ou multilatéraux) et informelle (à l’instar de la tristement célèbre déclaration entre l’UE et la Turquie de mars 2016) à tel point qu’il est devenu impossible, pour les États ciblés, de coopérer avec l’UE dans un domaine spécifique sans que les objectifs européens en matière migratoire ne soient aussi imposés.

      L’exécutif européen a enfin souligné sa volonté de d’exploiter les possibilités offertes par le nouveau règlement sur les visas Schengen, entré en vigueur en février 2020. Celui-ci prévoie d’évaluer, chaque année, le degré de coopération des Etats non européens en matière de réadmission. Le résultat de cette évaluation permettra d’adopter une décision de facilitation de visa pour les « bon élèves » ou à l’inverse, d’imposer des mesures de restrictions de visas aux « mauvais élèves ». Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Expulsions contre visas : le droit à la mobilité marchandé, 2 février 2020.

      Conduite au seul prisme des intérêts européens, cette politique renforce le caractère historiquement déséquilibré des relations de « coopération » et entraîne en outre des conséquences désastreuses sur les droits des personnes migrantes, notamment celui de quitter tout pays, y compris le leur. Sous couvert d’aider ces pays à « se développer », les mesures « incitatives » européennes ne restent qu’un moyen de poursuivre ses objectifs et d’imposer sa vision des migrations. En coopérant davantage avec les pays d’origine et de transit, parmi lesquelles des dictatures et autres régimes autoritaires, l’UE renforce l’externalisation de ses politiques migratoires, sous-traitant la gestion des exilées aux Etats extérieurs à l’UE, tout en se déresponsabilisant des violations des droits perpétrées hors de ses frontières.
      Solidarité à la carte, entre relocalisation et expulsion

      Le constat d’échec du système Dublin – machine infernale de l’asile européen – conjugué à la volonté de parvenir à trouver un consensus suite aux profonds désaccords qui avaient mené les négociations sur Dublin IV dans l’impasse, la Commission souhaite remplacer l’actuel règlement de Dublin par un nouveau règlement sur la gestion de l’asile et de l’immigration, liant étroitement les procédures d’asile aux procédures d’expulsion.

      Les quotas de relocalisation contraignants utilisés par le passé, à l’instar du mécanisme de relocalisation mis en place entre 2015 et 2017 qui fut un échec tant du point de vue du nombre de relocalisations (seulement 25 000 relocalisations sur les 160 000 prévues) que du refus de plusieurs Etats d’y participer, semblent être abandonnés.

      Le nouveau pacte propose donc un nouveau mécanisme de solidarité, certes obligatoire mais flexible dans ses modalités. Ainsi les Etats membres devront choisir, selon une clé de répartition définie :

      Soit de participer à l’effort de relocalisation des personnes identifiées comme éligibles à la protection internationale depuis les frontières extérieures pour prendre en charge l’examen de leur demande d’asile.
      Soit de participer au nouveau concept de « parrainage des retours » inventé par la Commission européenne. Concrètement, il s’agit d’être « solidaire autrement », en s’engageant activement dans la politique de retour européenne par la mise en œuvre des expulsions des personnes que l’UE et ses Etats membres souhaitent éloigner du territoire, avec la possibilité de concentrer leurs efforts sur les nationalités pour lesquelles leurs perspectives de faire aboutir l’expulsion est la plus élevée.

      De nouvelles règles pour les « situations de crise et de force majeure »

      Le pacte prévoie d’abroger la directive européenne relative à des normes minimales pour l’octroi d’une protection temporaire en cas d’afflux massif de personnes déplacées, au profit d’un nouveau règlement européen relatif aux « situations de crise et de force majeure ». L’UE et ses Etats membres ont régulièrement essuyé les critiques des acteurs de la société civile pour n’avoir jamais activé la procédure prévue par la directive de 2001, notamment dans le cadre de situation exceptionnelle telle que la crise de l’accueil des personnes arrivées aux frontières sud de l’UE en 2015.

      Le nouveau règlement prévoie notamment qu’en cas de « situation de crise ou de force majeure » les Etats membres pourraient déroger aux règles qui s’appliquent en matière d’asile, en suspendant notamment l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant un durée d’un mois maximum. Cette mesure entérine des pratiques contraires au droit international et européen, à l’instar de ce qu’a fait la Grèce début mars 2020 afin de refouler toutes les personnes qui tenteraient de pénétrer le territoire européen depuis la Turquie voisine. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Frontière Grèce-Turquie : de l’approche hotspot au scandale de la guerre aux migrant·e ·s, 3 mars 2020

      Cette proposition représente un recul sans précédent du droit d’asile aux frontières et fait craindre de multiples violations du principe de non refoulement consacré par la Convention de Genève.

      Bien loin d’engager un changement de cap des politiques migratoires européennes, le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile ne semble n’être qu’un nouveau cadre de plus pour poursuivre une approche des mouvements migratoires qui, de longue date, s’est construite autour de la volonté d’empêcher les arrivées aux frontières et d’organiser un tri parmi les personnes qui auraient réussi à braver les obstacles pour atteindre le territoire européen, entre celles considérées éligibles à la demande d’asile et toutes les autres qui devraient être expulsées.

      De notre point de vue, cela signifie surtout que des milliers de personnes continueront à être privées de liberté et à subir les dispositifs répressifs des Etats membres de l’Union européenne. Les conséquences néfastes sur la dignité humaine et les droits fondamentaux de cette approche sont flagrantes, les personnes exilées et leurs soutiens y sont confrontées tous les jours.

      Encore une fois, des moyens très importants sont consacrés à financer l’érection de barrières physiques, juridiques et technologiques ainsi que la construction de camps sur les routes migratoires tandis qu’ils pourraient utilement être redéployés pour accueillir dignement et permettre un accès inconditionnel au territoire européen pour les personnes bloquées à ses frontières extérieures afin d’examiner avec attention et impartialité leurs situations et assurer le respect effectif des droits de tou∙te∙s.

      Nous appelons à un changement radical des politiques migratoires, pour une Europe qui encourage les solidarités, fondée sur la protection des droits humains et la dignité humaine afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non pas leur exclusion.

      https://www.lacimade.org/pacte-europeen-sur-les-migrations-et-lasile-le-rendez-vous-manque-de-lue

    • EU’s new migrant ‘pact’ is as squalid as its refugee camps

      Governments need to share responsibility for asylum seekers, beyond merely ejecting the unwanted

      One month after fires swept through Europe’s largest, most squalid refugee camp, the EU’s migration policies present a picture as desolate as the blackened ruins of Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos. The latest effort at overhauling these policies is a European Commission “pact on asylum and migration”, which is not a pact at all. Its proposals sharply divide the EU’s 27 governments.

      In an attempt to appease central and eastern European countries hostile to admitting asylum-seekers, the commission suggests, in an Orwellian turn of phrase, that they should operate “relocation and return sponsorships”, dispatching people refused entry to their places of origin. This sort of task is normally reserved for nightclub bouncers.

      The grim irony is that Hungary and Poland, two countries that would presumably be asked to take charge of such expulsions, are the subject of EU disciplinary proceedings due to alleged violations of the rule of law. It remains a mystery how, if the commission proposal moves forward, the EU will succeed in binding Hungary and Poland into a common asylum policy and bend them into accepting EU definitions of the rule of law.

      Perhaps the best thing to be said of the commission’s plan is that, unlike the UK government, EU policymakers are not toying with hare-brained schemes of sending asylum-seekers to Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. Such options are the imagined privilege of a former imperial power not divested of all its far-flung possessions.

      Yet the commission’s initiative still reeks of wishful thinking. It foresees a process in which authorities swiftly check the identities, security status and health of irregular migrants, before returning them home, placing them in the asylum system or putting them in temporary facilities. This will supposedly decongest EU border zones, as governments will agree how to relocate new arrivals. But it is precisely the lack of such agreement since 2015 that led to Moria’s disgraceful conditions.

      The commission should not be held responsible for governments failing to shoulder their responsibilities. It is also justified in emphasising the need for a strong EU frontier. This is a precondition for free movement inside the bloc, vital for a flourishing single market.

      True, the Schengen system of border-free internal travel is curtailed at present because of the pandemic, not to mention restrictions introduced in some countries after the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis. But no government wants to abandon Schengen. Where they fall out with each other is over the housing of refugees and migrants.

      Europe’s overcrowded, unhygienic refugee camps, and the paralysis that grips EU policies, are all the more shameful in that governments no longer face a border emergency. Some 60,800 irregular migrants crossed into the EU between January and August, 14 per cent less than the same period in 2019, according to the EU border agency.

      By contrast, there were 1.8m illegal border crossings in 2015, a different order of magnitude. Refugees from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria made desperate voyages across the Mediterranean, with thousands drowning in ramshackle boats. Some countries, led by Germany and Sweden, were extremely generous in opening their doors to refugees. Others were not.

      The roots of today’s problems lie in the measures devised to address that crisis, above all a 2016 accord with Turkey. Irregular migrants were kept on Moria and other Greek islands, designated “hotspots”, in the expectation that failed asylum applicants would be smoothly returned to Turkey, its coffers replenished by billions of euros in EU assistance. In practice, few went back to Turkey and the understaffed, underfunded “hotspots” became places of tension between refugees and locals.

      Unable to agree on a relocation scheme among themselves, EU governments lapsed into a de facto policy of deterrence of irregular migrants. The pandemic provided an excuse for Italy and Malta to close their ports to people rescued at sea. Visiting the Greek-Turkish border in March, Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president, declared: “I thank Greece for being our European aspida [shield].”

      The legitimacy of EU refugee policies depends on adherence to international law, as well the bloc’s own rules. Its practical success requires all governments to share a responsibility for asylum-seekers that goes beyond ejecting unwanted individuals. Otherwise the EU will fall into the familiar trap of cobbling together unsatisfactory half-measures that guarantee more trouble in the future.

      https://www.ft.com/content/c50c6b9c-75a8-40b1-900d-a228faa382dc?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754

    • The EU’s pact against migration, Part One

      The EU Commission’s proposal for a ‘New Pact for Migration and Asylum’ offers no prospect of ending the enduring mobility conflict, opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The ’New Pact for Migration and Asylum’, announced by the European Commission in July 2019, was finally presented on September 23, 2020. The Pact was eagerly anticipated as it was described as a “fresh start on migration in Europe”, acknowledging not only that Dublin had failed, but also that the negotiations between European member states as to what system might replace it had reached a standstill.

      The fire in Moria that left more than 13.000 people stranded in the streets of Lesvos island offered a glaring symbol of the failure of the current EU policy. The public outcry it caused and expressions of solidarity it crystallised across Europe pressured the Commission to respond through the publication of its Pact.

      Considering the trajectory of EU migration policies over the last decades, the particular position of the Commission within the European power structure and the current political conjuncture of strong anti-migration positions in Europe, we did not expect the Commission’s proposal to address the mobility conflict underlying its migration policy crisis in a constructive way. And indeed, the Pact’s main promise is to manage the diverging positions of member states through a new mechanism of “flexible solidarity” between member states in sharing the “burden” of migrants who have arrived on European territory. Perpetuating the trajectory of the last decades, it however remains premised on keeping most migrants from the global South out at all cost. The “New Pact” then is effectively a pact between European states against migrants. The Pact, which will be examined and possibly adopted by the European Parliament and Council in the coming months, confirms the impasse to which three decades of European migration and asylum policy have led, and an absence of any political imagination worthy of the name.
      The EU’s migration regime’s failed architecture

      The current architecture of the European border regime is based on two main and intertwined pillars: the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC, or Schengen II) and the Dublin Convention, both signed in 1990, and gradually enforced in the following years.[1]

      Created outside the EC/EU context, they became the central rationalities of the emerging European border and migration regime after their incorporation into EU law through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99). Schengen instituted the EU’s territory as an area of free movement for its citizens and, as a direct consequence, reinforced the exclusion of citizens of the global South and pushed control towards its external borders.

      However this profound transformation of European borders left unchanged the unbalanced systemic relations between Europe and the Global South, within which migrants’ movements are embedded. As a result, this policy shift did not stop migrants from reaching the EU but rather illegalised their mobility, forcing them to resort to precarious migration strategies and generating an easily exploitable labour force that has become a large-scale and permanent feature of EU economies.

      The more than 40,000 migrant deaths recorded at the EU’s borders by NGOs since the end of the 1980s are the lethal outcomes of this enduring mobility conflict opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The second pillar of the EU’s migration architecture, the Dublin Convention, addressed asylum seekers and their allocation between member-states. To prevent them from filing applications in several EU countries – derogatively referred to as “asylum shopping” – the 2003 Dublin regulation states that the asylum seekers’ first country of entry into the EU is responsible for processing their claims. Dublin thus created an uneven European geography of (ir)responsibility that allowed the member states not directly situated at the intersection of European borders and routes of migration to abnegate their responsibility to provide shelter and protection, and placed a heavier “burden” on the shoulders of states located at the EU’s external borders.

      This unbalanced architecture, around which the entire Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was constructed, would begin to wobble as soon as the number of people arriving on the EU’s shores rose, leading to crisis-driven policy responses to prevent the migration regime from collapsing under the pressure of migrants’ refusal to be assigned to a country that was not of their choosing, and conflicts between member states.

      As a result, the development of a European border, migration and asylum policy has been driven by crisis and is inherently reactive. This pattern particularly holds for the last decade, when the large-scale movements of migrants to Europe in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 put the EU migration regime into permanent crisis mode and prompted hasty reforms. As of 2011, Italy allowed Tunisians to move on, leading to the re-introduction of border controls by states such as France, while the same year the 2011 European Court of Human Rights’ judgement brought Dublin deportations to Greece to a halt because of the appalling reception and living conditions there. The increasing refusal by asylum seekers to surrender their fingerprints – the core means of implementing Dublin – as of 2013 further destabilized the migration regime.

      The instability only grew when in April 2015, more then 1,200 people died in two consecutive shipwrecks, forcing the Commission to publish its ‘European Agenda for Migration’ in May 2015. The 2015 agenda announced the creation of the hotspot system in the hope of re-stabilising the European migration regime through a targeted intervention of European agencies at Europe’s borders. Essentially, the hotspot approach offered a deal to EU member states: comprehensive registration in Europeanised structures (the hotspots) by so-called “front-line states” – thus re-imposing Dublin – in exchange for relocation of part of the registered migrants to other EU countries – thereby alleviating front-line states of part of their “burden”.

      This plan however collapsed before it could ever work, as it was immediately followed by the large-scale summer arrivals of 2015 as migrants trekked across Europe’s borders. It was simultaneously boycotted by several member states who refused relocations and continue to lead the charge in fomenting an explicit anti-migration agenda in the EU. While border controls were soon reintroduced, relocations never materialised in a meaningful manner in the years that followed.

      With the Dublin regime effectively paralysed and the EU unable to agree on a new mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers within Europe, the EU resorted to the decades-old policies that had shaped the European border and migration regime since its inception: keeping migrants out at all cost through border control implemented by member states, European agencies or outsourced to third countries.

      Considering the profound crisis the turbulent movements of migrants had plunged the EU into in the summer of 2015, no measure was deemed excessive in achieving this exclusionary end: neither the tacit acceptance of violent expulsions and push-backs by Spain and Greece, nor the outsourcing of border control to Libyan torturers, nor the shameless collaboration with dictatorial regimes such as Turkey.

      Under the guise of “tackling the root causes of migration”, development aid was diverted and used to impose border externalisation and deportation agreements. But the external dimension of the EU’s migration regime has proven just as unstable as its internal one – as the re-opening of borders by Turkey in March 2020 demonstrates. The movements of illegalised migrants towards the EU could never be entirely contained and those who reached the shores of Europe were increasingly relegated to infrastructures of detention. Even if keeping thousands of migrants stranded in the hell of Moria may not have been part of the initial hotspot plan, it certainly has been the outcome of the EU’s internal blockages and ultimately effective in shoring up the EU’s strategy of deterrence.

      The “New Pact” perpetuating the EU’s failed policy of closure

      Today the “New Pact”, promised for Spring 2020 and apparently forgotten at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, has been revived in a hurry to address the destruction of Moria hotspot. While detailed analysis of the regulations that it proposes are beyond the scope of this article,[2] the broad intentions of the Pact’s rationale are clear.

      Despite all its humane and humanitarian rhetoric and some language critically addressing the manifest absence of the rule of law at the border of Europe, the Commission’s pact is a pact against migration. Taking stock of the continued impasse in terms of internal distribution of migrants, it re-affirms the EU’s central objective of reducing, massively the number of asylum seekers to be admitted to Europe. It promises to do so by continuing to erect chains of externalised border control along migrants’ entire trajectories (what it refers to as the “whole-of-route approach”).

      Those who do arrive should be swiftly screened and sorted in an infrastructure of detention along the borders of Europe. The lucky few who will succeed in fitting their lives into the shrinking boxes of asylum law are to be relocated to other EU countries in function of a mechanism of distribution based on population size and wealth of member states.

      Whether this will indeed undo the imbalances of the Dublin regime remains an open question[3], nevertheless, this relocation key is one of the few positive steps offered by the Pact since it comes closer to migrants’ own “relocation key” but still falls short of granting asylum seekers the freedom to choose their country of protection and residence.[4] The majority of rejected asylum seekers – which may be determined on the basis of an extended understanding of the “safe third country” notion – is to be funnelled towards deportations operated by the EU states refusing relocation. The Commission hopes deportations will be made smoother after a newly appointed “EU Return Coordinator” will have bullied countries of origin into accepting their nationals using the carrot of development aid and the stick of visa sanctions. The Commission seems to believe that with fewer expected arrivals and fewer migrants ending up staying in Europe, and with its mechanism of “flexible solidarity” allowing for a selective participation in relocations or returns depending on the taste of its member states, it can both bridge the gap between member states’ interests and push for a deeper Europeanisation of the policy field in which its own role will become more central.

      Thus, the EU Commission’s attempt to square the circle of member states’ conflicting interests has resulted in a European pact against migration, which perpetuates the promises of the EU’s (anti-)migration policy over the last three decades: externalisation, enhanced borders, accelerated asylum procedures, detention and deportations to prevent and deter migrants from the global South. It seeks to strike yet another deal between European member states, without consulting – and at the expense of – migrants themselves. Because most of the policy means contained in the pact are not new, and have always failed to durably end illegalised migration – instead they have created a large precaritised population at the heart of Europe – we do not see how they would work today. Migrants will continue to arrive, and many will remain stranded in front-line states or other EU states as they await deportation. As such, the outcome of the pact (if it is agreed upon) is likely a perpetuation and generalisation of the hotspot system, the very system whose untenability – glaringly demonstrated by Moria’s fire – prompted the presentation of the New Pact in the first place. Even if the Commission’s “no more Morias” rhetoric would like to persuade us of the opposite,[5] the ruins of Moria point to the past as well as the potential future of the CEAS if the Commission has its way.

      We are dismayed at the loss of yet another opportunity for Europe to fundamentally re-orient its policy of closure, one which is profoundly at odds with the reality of large-scale displacement in an unequal and interconnected world. We are dismayed at the prospect of more suffering and more political crises that can only be the outcome of this continued policy failure. Clearly, an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with the movements of migration is called for. One which actually aims to de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict. One which starts from the reality of the movements of migrants and offers a frame for it to unfold rather than seeks to suppress and deny it.

      Notes and references

      [1] We have offered an extensive analysis of the following argument in previous articles. See in particular : Bernd Kasparek. 2016. “Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime”. In Migration Policy and Practice, edited by Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis, 59–78. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. 2016. “Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis”. Near Futures Online. No 1. Available here.

      [2] For first analyses see Steve Peers. 2020. “First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals”, EU Law Analysis, 25 September 2020; Sergio Carrera. 2020. “Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum”, CEPS, September 2020.

      [3] Carrera, ibid.

      [4] For a discussion of migration of migrants’ own relocation key, see Philipp Lutz, David Kaufmann and Anna Stütz. 2020. “Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees”, Journal of Common Market Studies 2020 Volume 58. Number 3. pp. 757–775. To compare the actual asylum applications across Europe over the last years with different relocations keys, see the tool developed by Etienne Piguet.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/the-eus-pact-against-migration-part-one

      #whole-of-route_approach #relocalisation #clé_de_relocalisation #relocation_key #pays-tiers_sûrs #EU_Return_Coordinator #solidarité_flexible #externalisation #new_pact

    • Towards a European pact with migrants, Part Two

      We call for a new Pact that addresses the reality of migrants’ movements, the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.

      In Part One, we analysed the EU’s new Pact against migration. Here, we call for an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with migration, one which offers a legal frame for migration to unfold, and addresses the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.Let us imagine for a moment that the EU Commission truly wanted, and was in a position, to reorient the EU’s migration policy in a direction that might actually de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict: what might its pact with migrants look like?

      The EU’s pact with migrants might start from three fundamental premises. First, it would recognize that any policy that is entirely at odds with social practices is bound to generate conflict, and ultimately fail. A migration policy must start from the social reality of migration and provide a frame for it to unfold. Second, the pact would acknowledge that no conflict can be brought to an end unilaterally. Any process of conflict transformation must bring together the conflicting parties, and seek to address their needs, interests and values so that they no longer clash with each other. In particular, migrants from the global South must be included in the definition of the policies that concern them. Third, it would recognise, as Tendayi Achiume has put it, that migrants from the global South are no strangers to Europe.[1] They have long been included in the expansive webs of empire. Migration and borders are embedded in these unequal relations, and no end to the mobility conflict can be achieved without fundamentally transforming them. Based on these premises, the EU’s pact with migrants might contain the following four core measures:
      Global justice and conflict prevention

      Instead of claiming to tackle the “root causes” of migration by diverting and instrumentalising development aid towards border control, the EU’s pact with migrants would end all European political and economic relations that contribute to the crises leading to mass displacement. The EU would end all support to dictatorial regimes, would ban all weapon exports, terminate all destabilising military interventions. It would cancel unfair trade agreements and the debts of countries of the global South. It would end its massive carbon emissions that contribute to the climate crisis. Through these means, the EU would not claim to end migration perceived as a “problem” for Europe, but it would contribute to allowing more people to live a dignified life wherever they are and decrease forced migration, which certainly is a problem for migrants. A true commitment to global justice and conflict prevention and resolution is necessary if Europe wishes to limit the factors that lead too many people onto the harsh paths of exile in their countries and regions, a small proportion of whom reach European shores.
      Tackling the “root causes” of European racism

      While the EU’s so-called “global approach” to migration has in fact been one-sided, focused exclusively on migration as “the problem” rather then the processes that drive the EU’s policies of exclusion, the EU’s pact with migrants would boldly tackle the “root causes” of racism and xenophobia in Europe. Bold policies designed to address the EU’s colonial past and present and the racial imaginaries it has unleashed would be proposed, a positive vision for living in common in diverse societies affirmed, and a more inclusive and fair economic system would be established in Europe to decrease the resentment of European populations which has been skilfully channelled against migrants and racialised people.
      Universal freedom of movement

      By tackling the causes of large-scale displacement and of exclusionary migration policies, the EU would be able to de-escalate the mobility conflict, and could thus propose a policy granting all migrants legal pathways to access and stay in Europe. As an immediate outcome of the institution of right to international mobility, migrants would no longer resort to smugglers and risk their lives crossing the sea – and thus no longer be in need of being rescued. Using safe and legal means of travel would also, in the time of Covid-19 pandemic, allow migrants to adopt all sanitary measures that are necessary to protect migrants and those they encounter. No longer policed through military means, migration could appear as a normal process that does not generate fear. Frontex, the European border agency, would be defunded, and concentrate its limited activities on detecting actual threats to the EU rather then constructing vulnerable populations as “risks”. In a world that would be less unequal and in which people would have the possibly to lead a dignified life wherever they are, universal freedom of movement would not lead to an “invasion” of Europe. Circulatory movement rather then permanent settlement would be frequent. Migrants’ legal status would no longer allow employers to push working conditions down. A European asylum system would continue to exist, to grant protection and support to those in need. The vestiges of the EU’s hotspots and detention centres might be turned into ministries of welcome, which would register and redirect people to the place of their choice. Registration would thus be a mere certification of having taken the first step towards European citizenship, transforming the latter into a truly post-national institution, a far horizon which current EU treaties only hint at.
      Democratizing borders

      Considering that all European migration policies to date have been fundamentally undemocratic – in that they were imposed on a group of people – migrants – who had no say in the legislative and political process defining the laws that govern their movement – the pact would instead be the outcome of considerable consultative process with migrants and the organisations that support them, as well the states of the global South. The pact, following from Étienne Balibar’s suggestion, would in turn propose to permanently democratise borders by instituting “a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations),” within “new representative institutions” that “are not merely ‘territorial’ and certainly not purely national.”[2] In such a pact, the original promise of Europe as a post-national project would finally be revived.

      Such a policy orientation may of course appear as nothing more then a fantasy. And yet it appears evident to us that the direction we suggest is the only realistic one. European citizens and policy makers alike must realise that the question is not whether migrants will exercise their freedom to cross borders, but at what human and political cost. As a result, it is far more realistic to address the processes within which the mobility conflict is embedded, than seeking to ban human mobility. As the Black Lives Matter’s slogan “No justice no peace!” resonating in the streets of the world over recent months reminds us, without mobility justice, [3] their can be no end to mobility conflict.
      The challenges ahead for migrant solidarity movements

      Our policy proposals are perfectly realistic in relation to migrants’ movements and the processes shaping them, yet we are well aware that they are not on the agenda of neoliberal and nationalist Europe. If the EU Commission has squandered yet another opportunity to reorient the EU’s migration policy, it is simply that this Europe, governed by these member states and politicians, has lost the capacity to offer bold visions of democracy, freedom and justice for itself and the world. As such, we have little hope for a fundamental reorientation of the EU’s policies. The bleak prospect is of the perpetuation of the mobility conflict, and the human suffering and political crises it generates.

      What are those who seek to support migrants to do in this context?

      We must start by a sobering note addressed to the movement we are part of: the fire of Moria is not only a symptom and symbol of the failures of the EU’s migration policies and member states, but also of our own strategies. After all, since the hotspots were proposed in 2015 we have tirelessly denounced them, and documented the horrendous living conditions they have created. NGOs have litigated against them, but efforts have been turned down by a European Court of Human Rights that appears increasingly reluctant to position itself on migration-related issues and is thereby contributing to the perpetuation of grave violations by states.

      And despite the extraordinary mobilisation of civil society in alliance with municipalities across Europe who have declared themselves ready to welcome migrants, relocations never materialised on any significant scale. After five years of tireless mobilization, the hotspots still stand, with thousands of asylum seekers trapped in them.

      While the conditions leading to the fire are still being clarified, it appears that the migrants held hostage in Moria took it into their own hands to try to get rid of the camp through the desperate act of burning it to the ground. As such, while we denounce the EU’s policies, our movements are urgently in need of re-evaluating their own modes of action, and re-imagining them more effectively.

      We have no lessons to give, as we share these shortcomings. But we believe that some of the directions we have suggested in our utopian Pact with migrants can guide migrant solidarity movements as well , as they may be implemented from the bottom-up in the present and help reopen our political imagination.

      The freedom to move is not, or not only, a distant utopia, that may be instituted by states in some distant future. It can also be seen as a right and freedom that illegalised migrants seize on a day-to-day basis as they cross borders without authorisation, and persist in living where they choose.

      Freedom of movement can serve as a useful compass to direct and evaluate our practices of contestation and support. Litigation remains an important tool to counter the multiple forms of violence and violations that migrants face along their trajectories, even as we acknowledge that national and international courts are far from immune to the anti-migrant atmosphere within states. Forging infrastructures of support for migrants in the course of their mobility (such as the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone and the civilian rescue fleet) – and their stay (such as the many citizen platforms for housing )– is and will continue to be essential.

      While states seek to implement what they call an “integrated border management” that seeks to manage migrants’ unruly mobilities before, at, and after borders, we can think of our own networks as forming a fragmented yet interconnected “integrated border solidarity” along the migrants’ entire trajectory. The criminalisation of our acts of solidarity by states is proof that we are effective in disrupting the violence of borders.

      Solidarity cities have formed important nodes in these chains, as municipalities do have the capacity to enable migrants to live in dignity in urban spaces, and limit the reach of their security forces for example. Their dissonant voices of welcome have been important in demonstrating that segments of the European population, which are far from negligible, refuse to be complicit with the EU’s policies of closure and are ready to embody an open relation of solidarity with migrants and beyond. However we must also acknowledge that the prerogative of granting access to European states remains in the hands of central administrations, not in those of municipalities, and thus the readiness to welcome migrants has not allowed the latter to actually seek sanctuary.

      While humanitarian and humanist calls for welcome are important, we too need to locate migration and borders in a broader political and economic context – that of the past and present of empire – so that they can be understood as questions of (in)justice. Echoing the words of the late Edouard Glissant, as activists focusing on illegalised migration we should never forget that “to have to force one’s way across borders as a result of one’s misery is as scandalous as what founds that misery”.[4] As a result of this framing, many more alliances can be forged today between migrant solidarity movements and the global justice and climate justice movements, as well as anti-racist, anti-fascist, feminist and decolonial movements. Through such alliances, we may be better equipped to support migrants throughout their entire trajectories, and transform the conditions that constrain them today.

      Ultimately, to navigate its way out of its own impasses, it seems to us that migrant solidarity movements must address four major questions.

      First, what migration policy do we want? The predictable limits of the EU’s pact against migration may be an opportunity to forge our own alternative agenda.

      Second, how can we not only oppose the implementation of restrictive policies but shape the policy process itself so as to transform the field on which we struggle? Opposing the EU’s anti-migrant pact over the coming months may allow us to conduct new experiments.

      Third, as long as policies that deny basic principles of equality, freedom, justice, and our very common humanity, are still in place, how can we lead actions that disrupt them effectively? For example, what are the forms of nongovernmental evacuations that might support migrants in accessing Europe, and moving across its internal borders?

      Fourth, how can struggles around migration and borders be part of the forging of a more equal, free, just and sustainable world for all?

      The next months during which the EU’s Pact against migration will be discussed in front of the European Parliament and Council will see an uphill battle for all those who still believe in the possibility of a Europe of openness and solidarity. While we have no illusions as to the policy outcome, this is an opportunity we must seize, not only to claim that another Europe and another world is possible, but to start building them from below.

      Notes and references

      [1] Tendayi Achiume. 2019, “The Postcolonial Case for Rethinking Borders.” Dissent 66.3: pp.27-32.

      [2] Etienne Balibar. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton: University Press, p. 108 and 117.

      [3] Mimi Sheller. 2018. Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. London: Verso.

      [4] Edouard Glissant. 2006. “Il n’est frontière qu’on n’outrepasse”. Le Monde diplomatique, October 2006.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/towards-pact-migrants-part-two

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : Afin de garantir un nouveau départ et d’éviter de reproduire les erreurs passées, certains éléments à risque doivent être reconsidérés et les aspects positifs étendus.

      L’engagement en faveur d’une approche plus humaine de la protection et l’accent mis sur les aspects positifs et bénéfiques de la migration avec lesquels la Commission européenne a lancé le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile sont les bienvenus. Cependant, les propositions formulées reflètent très peu cette rhétorique et ces ambitions. Au lieu de rompre avec les erreurs de la précédente approche de l’Union européenne (UE) et d’offrir un nouveau départ, le Pacte continue de se focaliser sur l’externalisation, la dissuasion, la rétention et le retour.

      Cette première analyse des propositions, réalisée par la société civile, a été guidée par les questions suivantes :

      Les propositions formulées sont-elles en mesure de garantir, en droit et en pratique, le respect des normes internationales et européennes ?
      Participeront-elles à un partage plus juste des responsabilités en matière d’asile au niveau de l’UE et de l’international ?
      Seront-elles susceptibles de fonctionner en pratique ?

      Au lieu d’un partage automatique des responsabilités, le Pacte introduit un système de Dublin, qui n’en porte pas le nom, plus complexe et un mécanisme de « parrainage au retour »

      Le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile a manqué l’occasion de réformer en profondeur le système de Dublin : le principe de responsabilité du premier pays d’arrivée pour examiner les demandes d’asile est, en pratique, maintenu. De plus, le Pacte propose un système complexe introduisant diverses formes de solidarité.

      Certains ajouts positifs dans les critères de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de la demande d’asile sont à relever, par exemple, l’élargissement de la définition des membres de famille afin d’inclure les frères et sœurs, ainsi qu’un large éventail de membres de famille dans le cas des mineurs non accompagnés et la délivrance d’un diplôme ou d’une autre qualification par un Etat membre. Cependant, au regard de la pratique actuelle des Etats membres, il sera difficile de s’éloigner du principe du premier pays d’entrée comme l’option de départ en faveur des nouvelles considérations prioritaires, notamment le regroupement familial.

      Dans le cas d’un nombre élevé de personnes arrivées sur le territoire (« pression migratoire ») ou débarquées suite à des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, la solidarité entre Etats membres est requise. Les processus qui en découlent comprennent une série d’évaluations, d’engagements et de rapports devant être rédigés par les États membres. Si la réponse collective est insuffisante, la Commission européenne peut prendre des mesures correctives. Au lieu de promouvoir un mécanisme de soutien pour un partage prévisible des responsabilités, ces dispositions tendent plutôt à créer des formes de négociations entre États membres qui nous sont toutes devenues trop familières. La complexité des propositions soulève des doutes quant à leur application réelle en pratique.

      Les États membres sont autorisés à choisir le « parrainage de retour » à la place de la relocalisation de personnes sur leur territoire, ce qui indique une attention égale portée au retour et à la protection. Au lieu d’apporter un soutien aux Etats membres en charge d’un plus grand nombre de demandes de protection, cette proposition soulève de nombreuses préoccupations juridiques et relatives au respect des droits de l’homme, en particulier si le transfert vers l’Etat dit « parrain » se fait après l’expiration du délai de 8 mois. Qui sera en charge de veiller au traitement des demandeurs d’asile déboutés à leur arrivée dans des Etats qui n’acceptent pas la relocalisation ?

      Le Pacte propose d’étendre l’utilisation de la procédure à la frontière, y compris un recours accru à la rétention

      A défaut de rééquilibrer la responsabilité entre les États membres de l’UE, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures communes exacerbe la pression sur les États situés aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et sur les pays des Balkans occidentaux. La Commission propose de rendre, dans certains cas, les procédures d’asile et de retour à la frontière obligatoires. Cela s’appliquerait notamment aux ressortissants de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 20%. Ces procédures seraient facultatives lorsque les Etats membres appliquent les concepts de pays tiers sûr ou pays d’origine sûr. Toutefois, la Commission a précédemment proposé que ceux-ci deviennent obligatoires pour l’ensemble des Etats membres. Les associations réitèrent leurs inquiétudes quant à l’utilisation de ces deux concepts qui ont été largement débattus entre 2016 et 2019. Leur application obligatoire ne doit plus être proposée.

      La proposition de procédure à la frontière repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – notamment sur le fait que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’est pas éligible à un statut de protection et que l’examen des demandes de protection peut être effectué facilement et rapidement. Ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont correctes. En effet, en prenant en considération à la fois les décisions de première et de seconde instance dans toute l’UE il apparaît que la plupart des demandeurs d’asile dans l’UE au cours des trois dernières années ont obtenu un statut de protection. En outre, le Pacte ne doit pas persévérer dans cette approche erronée selon laquelle les procédures d’asile peuvent être conduites rapidement à travers la réduction de garanties et l’introduction d’un système de tri. La durée moyenne de la procédure d’asile aux Pays-Bas, souvent qualifiée d’ « élève modèle » pour cette pratique, dépasse un an et peut atteindre deux années jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit prise.

      La proposition engendrerait deux niveaux de standards dans les procédures d’asile, largement déterminés par le pays d’origine de la personne concernée. Cela porte atteinte au droit individuel à l’asile et signifierait qu’un nombre accru de personnes seront soumises à une procédure de deuxième catégorie. Proposer aux Etats membres d’émettre une décision d’asile et d’éloignement de manière simultanée, sans introduire de garanties visant à ce que les principes de non-refoulement, d’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, et de protection de la vie privée et familiale ne soient examinés, porte atteinte aux obligations qui découlent du droit international. La proposition formulée par la Commission supprime également l’effet suspensif automatique du recours, c’est-à-dire le droit de rester sur le territoire dans l’attente d’une décision finale rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière.

      L’idée selon laquelle les personnes soumises à des procédures à la frontière sont considérées comme n’étant pas formellement entrées sur le territoire de l’État membre est trompeuse et contredit la récente jurisprudence de l’UE, sans pour autant modifier les droits de l’individu en vertu du droit européen et international.

      La proposition prive également les personnes de la possibilité d’accéder à des permis de séjour pour des motifs autres que l’asile et impliquera très probablement une privation de liberté pouvant atteindre jusqu’à 6 mois aux frontières de l’UE, c’est-à-dire un maximum de douze semaines dans le cadre de la procédure d’asile à la frontière et douze semaines supplémentaires en cas de procédure de retour à la frontière. En outre, les réformes suppriment le principe selon lequel la rétention ne doit être appliquée qu’en dernier recours dans le cadre des procédures aux frontières. En s’appuyant sur des restrictions plus systématiques des mouvements dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, la proposition restreindra l’accès de l’individu aux services de base fournis par des acteurs qui ne pourront peut-être pas opérer à la frontière, y compris pour l’assistance et la représentation juridiques. Avec cette approche, on peut s’attendre aux mêmes échecs rencontrés dans la mise en œuvre des « hotspot » sur les îles grecques.

      La reconnaissance de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant comme élément primordial dans toutes les procédures pour les États membres est positive. Cependant, la Commission diminue les garanties de protection des enfants en n’exemptant que les mineurs non accompagnés ou âgés de moins de douze ans des procédures aux frontières. Ceci est en contradiction avec la définition internationale de l’enfant qui concerne toutes les personnes jusqu’à l’âge de dix-huit ans, telle qu’inscrite dans la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant ratifiée par tous les États membres de l’UE.

      Dans les situations de crise, les États membres sont autorisés à déroger à d’importantes garanties qui soumettront davantage de personnes à des procédures d’asile de qualité inférieure

      La crainte d’iniquité procédurale est d’autant plus visible dans les situations où un État membre peut prétendre être confronté à une « situation exceptionnelle d’afflux massif » ou au risque d’une telle situation.

      Dans ces cas, le champ d’application de la procédure obligatoire aux frontières est considérablement étendu à toutes les personnes en provenance de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 75%. La procédure d’asile à la frontière et la procédure de retour à la frontière peuvent être prolongées de huit semaines supplémentaires, soit cinq mois chacune, ce qui porte à dix mois la durée maximale de privation de liberté. En outre, les États membres peuvent suspendre l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant quatre semaines et jusqu’à un maximum de trois mois. Par conséquent, si aucune demande n’est enregistrée pendant plusieurs semaines, les personnes sont susceptibles d’être exposées à un risque accru de rétention et de refoulement, et leurs droits relatifs à un accueil digne et à des services de base peuvent être gravement affectés.

      Cette mesure permet aux États membres de déroger à leur responsabilité de garantir un accès à l’asile et un examen efficace et équitable de l’ensemble des demandes d’asile, ce qui augmente ainsi le risque de refoulement. Dans certains cas extrêmes, notamment lorsque les États membres agissent en violation flagrante et persistante des obligations du droit de l’UE, le processus de demande d’autorisation à la Commission européenne pourrait être considéré comme une amélioration, étant donné qu’actuellement la loi est ignorée, sans consultation et ce malgré les critiques de la Commission européenne. Toutefois, cela ne peut être le point de départ de l’évaluation de cette proposition de la législation européenne. L’impact à grande échelle de cette dérogation offre la possibilité à ce qu’une grande majorité des personnes arrivant dans l’UE soient soumises à une procédure de second ordre.

      Pré-filtrage à la frontière : risques et opportunités

      La Commission propose un processus de « pré-filtrage à l’entrée » pour toutes les personnes qui arrivent de manière irrégulière aux frontières de l’UE, y compris à la suite d’un débarquement dans le cadre des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage. Le processus de pré-filtrage comprend des contrôles de sécurité, de santé et de vulnérabilité, ainsi que l’enregistrement des empreintes digitales, mais il conduit également à des décisions impactant l’accès à l’asile, notamment en déterminant si une personne doit être sujette à une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière, de relocalisation ou de retour. Ce processus peut durer jusqu’à 10 jours et doit être effectué au plus près possible de la frontière. Le lieu où les personnes seront placées et l’accès aux conditions matérielles d’accueil demeurent flous. Le filtrage peut également être appliqué aux personnes se trouvant sur le territoire d’un État membre, ce qui pourrait conduire à une augmentation de pratiques discriminatoires. Des questions se posent également concernant les droits des personnes soumises au filtrage, tels que l’accès à l’information, , l’accès à un avocat et au droit de contester la décision prise dans ce contexte ; les motifs de refus d’entrée ; la confidentialité et la protection des données collectées. Etant donné que les États membres peuvent facilement se décharger de leurs responsabilités en matière de dépistage médical et de vulnérabilité, il n’est pas certain que certains besoins seront effectivement détectés et pris en considération.

      Une initiative à saluer est la proposition d’instaurer un mécanisme indépendant des droits fondamentaux à la frontière. Afin qu’il garantisse une véritable responsabilité face aux violations des droits à la frontière, y compris contre les éloignements et les refoulements récurrents dans un grand nombre d’États membres, ce mécanisme doit être étendu au-delà de la procédure de pré-filtrage, être indépendant des autorités nationales et impliquer des organisations telles que les associations non gouvernementales.

      La proposition fait de la question du retour et de l’expulsion une priorité

      L’objectif principal du Pacte est clair : augmenter de façon significative le nombre de personnes renvoyées ou expulsées de l’UE. La création du poste de Coordinateur en charge des retours au sein de la Commission européenne et d’un directeur exécutif adjoint aux retours au sein de Frontex en sont la preuve, tandis qu’aucune nomination n’est prévue au sujet de la protection de garanties ou de la relocalisation. Le retour est considéré comme un élément admis dans la politique migratoire et le soutien pour des retours dignes, en privilégiant les retours volontaires, l’accès à une assistance au retour et l’aide à la réintégration, sont essentiels. Cependant, l’investissement dans le retour n’est pas une réponse adaptée au non-respect systématique des normes d’asile dans les États membres de l’UE.

      Rien de nouveau sur l’action extérieure : des propositions irréalistes qui risquent de continuer d’affaiblir les droits de l’homme

      La tension entre l’engagement rhétorique pour des partenariats mutuellement bénéfiques et la focalisation visant à placer la migration au cœur des relations entre l’UE et les pays tiers se poursuit. Les tentatives d’externaliser la responsabilité de l’asile et de détourner l’aide au développement, les mécanismes de visa et d’autres outils pour inciter les pays tiers à coopérer sur la gestion migratoire et les accords de réadmission sont maintenues. Cela ne représente pas seulement un risque allant à l’encontre de l’engagement de l’UE pour ses principes de développement, mais cela affaiblit également sa posture internationale en générant de la méfiance et de l’hostilité depuis et à l’encontre des pays tiers. De plus, l’usage d’accords informels et la coopération sécuritaire sur la gestion migratoire avec des pays tels que la Libye ou la Turquie risquent de favoriser les violations des droits de l’homme, d’encourager les gouvernements répressifs et de créer une plus grande instabilité.

      Un manque d’ambition pour des voies légales et sûres vers l’Europe

      L’opportunité pour l’UE d’indiquer qu’elle est prête à contribuer au partage des responsabilités pour la protection au niveau international dans un esprit de partenariat avec les pays qui accueillent la plus grande majorité des réfugiés est manquée. Au lieu de proposer un objectif ambitieux de réinstallation de réfugiés, la Commission européenne a seulement invité les Etats membres à faire plus et a converti les engagements de 2020 en un mécanisme biennal, ce qui résulte en la perte d’une année de réinstallation européenne.

      La reconnaissance du besoin de faciliter la migration de main-d’œuvre à travers différents niveaux de compétences est à saluer, mais l’importance de cette migration dans les économies et les sociétés européennes ne se reflète pas dans les ressources, les propositions et les actions allouées.

      Le soutien aux activités de recherche et de sauvetage et aux actions de solidarité doit être renforcé

      La tragédie humanitaire dans la mer Méditerranée nécessite encore une réponse y compris à travers un soutien financier et des capacités de recherches et de sauvetage. Cet enjeu ainsi que celui du débarquement sont pris en compte dans toutes les propositions, reconnaissant ainsi la crise humanitaire actuelle. Cependant, au lieu de répondre aux comportements et aux dispositions règlementaires des gouvernements qui obstruent les activités de secours et le travail des défendeurs des droits, la Commission européenne suggère que les standards de sécurité sur les navires et les niveaux de communication avec les acteurs privés doivent être surveillés. Les acteurs privés sont également requis d’adhérer non seulement aux régimes légaux, mais aussi aux politiques et pratiques relatives à « la gestion migratoire » qui peuvent potentiellement interférer avec les obligations de recherches et de sauvetage.

      Bien que la publication de lignes directrices pour prévenir la criminalisation de l’action humanitaire soit la bienvenue, celles-ci se limitent aux actes mandatés par la loi avec une attention spécifique aux opérations de sauvetage et de secours. Cette approche risque d’omettre les activités humanitaires telles que la distribution de nourriture, d’abris, ou d’information sur le territoire ou assurés par des organisations non mandatées par le cadre légal qui sont également sujettes à ladite criminalisation et à des restrictions.

      Des signes encourageants pour l’inclusion

      Les changements proposés pour permettre aux réfugiés d’accéder à une résidence de long-terme après trois ans et le renforcement du droit de se déplacer et de travailler dans d’autres Etats membres sont positifs. De plus, la révision du Plan d’action pour l’inclusion et l’intégration et la mise en place d’un groupe d’experts pour collecter l’avis des migrants afin de façonner la politique européenne sont les bienvenues.

      La voie à suivre

      La présentation des propositions de la Commission est le commencement de ce qui promet d’être une autre longue période conflictuelle de négociations sur les politiques européennes d’asile et de migration. Alors que ces négociations sont en cours, il est important de rappeler qu’il existe déjà un régime d’asile européen et que les Etats membres ont des obligations dans le cadre du droit européen et international.

      Cela requiert une action immédiate de la part des décideurs politiques européens, y compris de la part des Etats membres, de :

      Mettre en œuvre les standards existants en lien avec les conditions matérielles d’accueil et les procédures d’asile, d’enquêter sur leur non-respect et de prendre les mesures disciplinaires nécessaires ;
      Sauver des vies en mer, et de garantir des capacités de sauvetage et de secours, permettant un débarquement et une relocalisation rapide ;
      Continuer de s’accorder sur des arrangements ad-hoc de solidarité pour alléger la pression sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et encourager les Etats membres à avoir recours à la relocalisation.

      Concernant les prochaines négociations sur le Pacte, nous recommandons aux co-législateurs de :

      Rejeter l’application obligatoire de la procédure d’asile ou de retour à la frontière : ces procédures aux standards abaissés réduisent les garanties des demandeurs d’asile et augmentent le recours à la rétention. Elles exacerbent le manque de solidarité actuel sur l’asile dans l’UE en plaçant plus de responsabilité sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures. L’expérience des hotspots et d’autres initiatives similaires démontrent que l’ajout de procédures ou d’étapes dans l’asile peut créer des charges administratives et des coûts significatifs, et entraîner une plus grande inefficacité ;
      Se diriger vers la fin de la privation de liberté de migrants, et interdire la rétention de mineurs conformément à la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, et de dédier suffisamment de ressources pour des solutions non privatives de libertés appropriées pour les mineurs et leurs familles ;
      Réajuster les propositions de réforme afin de se concentrer sur le maintien et l’amélioration des standards des droits de l’homme et de l’asile en Europe, plutôt que sur le retour ;
      Œuvrer à ce que les propositions réforment fondamentalement la façon dont la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile en UE est organisée, en adressant les problèmes liés au principe de pays de première entrée, afin de créer un véritable mécanisme de solidarité ;
      Limiter les possibilités pour les Etats membres de déroger à leurs responsabilités d’enregistrer les demandes d’asile ou d’examiner les demandes, afin d’éviter de créer des incitations à opérer en mode gestion de crise et à diminuer les standards de l’asile ;
      Augmenter les garanties pendant la procédure de pré-filtrage pour assurer le droit à l’information, l’accès à une aide et une représentation juridique, la détection et la prise en charge des vulnérabilités et des besoins de santé, et une réponse aux préoccupations liées à l’enregistrement et à la protection des données ;
      Garantir que le mécanisme de suivi des droits fondamentaux aux frontières dispose d’une portée large afin de couvrir toutes les violations des droits fondamentaux à la frontière, qu’il soit véritablement indépendant des autorités nationales et dispose de ressources adéquates et qu’il contribue à la responsabilisation ;
      S’opposer aux tentatives d’utiliser l’aide au développement, au commerce, aux investissements, aux mécanismes de visas, à la coopération sécuritaire et autres politiques et financements pour faire pression sur les pays tiers dans leur coopération étroitement définie par des objectifs européens de contrôle migratoire ;
      Evaluer l’impact à long-terme des politiques migratoires d’externalisation sur la paix, le respect des droits et le développement durable et garantir que la politique extérieure migratoire ne contribue pas à la violation de droits de l’homme et prenne en compte les enjeux de conflits ;
      Développer significativement les voies légales et sûres vers l’UE en mettant en œuvre rapidement les engagements actuels de réinstallation, en proposant de nouveaux objectifs ambitieux et en augmentant les opportunités de voies d’accès à la protection ainsi qu’à la migration de main-d’œuvre et universitaire en UE ;
      Renforcer les exceptions à la criminalisation lorsqu’il s’agit d’actions humanitaires et autres activités indépendantes de la société civile et enlever les obstacles auxquels font face les acteurs de la société civile fournissant une assistance vitale et humanitaire sur terre et en mer ;
      Mettre en place une opération de recherche et de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée financée et coordonnée par l’UE ;
      S’appuyer sur les propositions prometteuses pour soutenir l’inclusion à travers l’accès à la résidence à long-terme et les droits associés et la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action sur l’intégration et l’inclusion au niveau européen, national et local.

      https://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/positions/europe/774-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-l-asile-afin-de-garantir-un-no

    • Nouveau Pacte européen  : les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s traité.e.s comme des « # colis à trier  »

      Le jour même de la Conférence des Ministres européens de l’Intérieur, EuroMed Droits présente son analyse détaillée du nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration, publié le 23 septembre dernier (https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analysis-of-Asylum-and-Migration-Pact_Final_Clickable.pdf).

      On peut résumer les plus de 500 pages de documents comme suit  : le nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration déshumanise les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, les traitant comme des «  #colis à trier  » et les empêchant de se déplacer en Europe. Ce Pacte soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de respect des droits humains, dont certaines sont à souligner en particulier  :

      L’UE détourne le concept de solidarité. Le Pacte vise clairement à «  rétablir la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres  », donnant ainsi la priorité à la #cohésion:interne de l’UE au détriment des droits des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s. La proposition laisse le choix aux États membres de contribuer – en les mettant sur un pied d’égalité – à la #réinstallation, au #rapatriement, au soutien à l’accueil ou à l’#externalisation des frontières. La #solidarité envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s et leurs droits fondamentaux sont totalement ignorés.

      Le pacte promeut une gestion «  sécuritaire  » de la migration. Selon la nouvelle proposition, les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s seront placé.e.s en #détention et privé.e.s de liberté à leur arrivée. La procédure envisagée pour accélérer la procédure de demande d’asile ne pourra se faire qu’au détriment des lois sur l’asile et des droits des demandeur.se.s. Il est fort probable que la #procédure se déroulera de manière arbitraire et discriminatoire, en fonction de la nationalité du/de la demandeur.se, de son taux de reconnaissance et du fait que le pays dont il/elle provient est «  sûr  », ce qui est un concept douteux.

      L’idée clé qui sous-tend cette vision est simple  : externaliser autant que possible la gestion des frontières en coopérant avec des pays tiers. L’objectif est de faciliter le retour et la réadmission des migrant.e.s dans le pays d’où ils/elles sont parti.es. Pour ce faire, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) verrait ses pouvoirs renforcés et un poste de coordinateur.trice européen.ne pour les retours serait créé. Le pacte risque de facto de fournir un cadre juridique aux pratiques illégales telles que les refoulements, les détentions arbitraires et les mesures visant à réduire davantage la capacité en matière d’asile. Des pratiques déjà en place dans certains États membres.

      Le Pacte présente quelques aspects «  positifs  », par exemple en matière de protection des enfants ou de regroupement familial, qui serait facilité. Mais ces bonnes intentions, qui doivent être mises en pratique, sont noyées dans un océan de mesures répressives et sécuritaires.

      EuroMed Droits appelle les Etats membres de l’UE à réfléchir en termes de mise en œuvre pratique (ou non) de ces mesures. Non seulement elles violent les droits humains, mais elles sont impraticables sur le terrain  : la responsabilité de l’évaluation des demandes d’asile reste au premier pays d’arrivée, sans vraiment remettre en cause le Règlement de Dublin. Cela signifie que des pays comme l’Italie, Malte, l’Espagne, la Grèce et Chypre continueront à subir une «  pression  » excessive, ce qui les encouragera à poursuivre leurs politiques de refoulement et d’expulsion. Enfin, le Pacte ne répond pas à la problématique urgente des «  hotspots  » et des camps de réfugié.e.s comme en Italie ou en Grèce et dans les zones de transit à l’instar de la Hongrie. Au contraire, cela renforce ce modèle dangereux en le présentant comme un exemple à exporter dans toute l’Europe, alors que des exemples récents ont démontré l’impossibilité de gérer ces camps de manière humaine.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/nouveau-pacte-europeen%e2%80%af-les-migrant-e-s-et-refugie-e-s-traite

      #paquets_de_la_poste #paquets #poste #tri #pays_sûrs

    • A “Fresh Start” or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact

      In ongoing discussions on the reform of the CEAS, solidarity is a key theme. It stands front and center in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum: after reassuring us of the “human and humane approach” taken, the opening quote stresses that Member States must be able to “rely on the solidarity of our whole European Union”.

      In describing the need for reform, the Commission does not mince its words: “[t]here is currently no effective solidarity mechanism in place, and no efficient rule on responsibility”. It’s a remarkable statement: barely one year ago, the Commission maintained that “[t]he EU [had] shown tangible and rapid support to Member States under most pressure” throughout the crisis. Be that as it may, we are promised a “fresh start”. Thus, President Von der Leyen has announced on the occasion of the 2020 State of the Union Address that “we will abolish the Dublin Regulation”, the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal (examined here) has been withdrawn, and the Pact proposes a “new solidarity mechanism” connected to “robust and fair management of the external borders” and capped by a new “governance framework”.

      Before you buy the shiny new package, you are advised to consult the fine print however. Yes, the Commission proposes to abolish the Dublin III Regulation and withdraws the Dublin IV Proposal. But the Proposal for an Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (hereafter “the Migration Management Proposal”) reproduces word-for-word the Dublin III Regulation, subject to amendments drawn … from the Dublin IV Proposal! As for the “governance framework” outlined in Articles 3-7 of the Migration Management Proposal, it’s a hodgepodge of purely declamatory provisions (e.g. Art. 3-4), of restatements of pre-existing obligations (Art. 5), of legal bases authorizing procedures that require none (Art. 7). The one new item is a yearly monitoring exercise centered on an “European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy” (Art. 6), which seems as likely to make a difference as the “Mechanism for Early Warning, Preparedness and Crisis Management”, introduced with much fanfare with the Dublin III Regulation and then left in the drawer before, during and after the 2015/16 crisis.

      Leaving the provisions just mentioned for future commentaries – fearless interpreters might still find legal substance in there – this contribution focuses on four points: the proposed amendments to Dublin, the interface between Dublin and procedures at the border, the new solidarity mechanism, and proposals concerning force majeure. Caveat emptor! It is a jungle of extremely detailed and sometimes obscure provisions. While this post is longer than usual – warm thanks to the lenient editors! – do not expect an exhaustive summary, nor firm conclusions on every point.
      Dublin, the Undying

      To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of the death of the Dublin system have been once more greatly exaggerated. As noted, Part III of the Migration Management Proposal (Articles 8-44) is for all intents and purposes an amended version of the Dublin III Regulation, and most of the amendments are lifted from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal.

      A first group of amendments concerns the responsibility criteria. Some expand the possibilities to allocate applicants based on their “meaningful links” with Member States: Article 2(g) expands the family definition to include siblings, opening new possibilities for reunification; Article 19(4) enlarges the criterion based on previous legal abode (i.e. expired residence documents); in a tip of the hat to the Wikstroem Report, commented here, Article 20 introduces a new criterion based on prior education in a Member State.

      These are welcome changes, but all that glitters is not gold. The Commission advertises “streamlined” evidentiary requirements to facilitate family reunification. These would be necessary indeed: evidentiary issues have long undermined the application of the family criteria. Unfortunately, the Commission is not proposing anything new: Article 30(6) of the Migration Management Proposal corresponds in essence to Article 22(5) of the Dublin III Regulation.

      Besides, while the Commission proposes to expand the general definition of family, the opposite is true of the specific definition of family applicable to “dependent persons”. Under Article 16 of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants who e.g. suffer from severe disabilities are to be kept or brought together with a care-giving parent, child or sibling residing in a Member State. Due to fears of sham marriages, spouses have been excluded and this is legally untenable and inhumane, but instead of tackling the problem the Commission proposes in Article 24 to worsen it by excluding siblings. The end result is paradoxical: persons needing family support the most will be deprived – for no apparent reason other than imaginary fears of “abuses” – of the benefits of enlarged reunification possibilities. “[H]uman and humane”, indeed.

      The fight against secondary movements inspires most of the other amendments to the criteria. In particular, Article 21 of the Proposal maintains and extends the much-contested criterion of irregular entry while clarifying that it applies also to persons disembarked after a search and rescue (SAR) operation. The Commission also proposes that unaccompanied children be transferred to the first Member State where they applied if no family criterion is applicable (Article 15(5)). This would overturn the MA judgment of the ECJ whereby in such cases the asylum claim must be examined in the State where the child last applied and is present. It’s not a technical fine point: while the case-law of the ECJ is calculated to spare children the trauma of a transfer, the proposed amendment would subject them again to the rigours of Dublin.

      Again to discourage secondary movements, the Commission proposes – as in 2016 – a second group of amendments: new obligations for the applicants (Articles 9-10). Applicants must in principle apply in the Member State of first entry, remain in that State for the duration of the Dublin procedure and, post-transfer, remain in the State responsible. Moving to the “wrong” State entails losing the benefits of the Reception Conditions Directive, subject to “the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with” the Charter. It is debatable whether this is a much lesser standard of reception. More importantly: as reception conditions in line with the Directive are seldom guaranteed in several frontline Member States, the prospect of being treated “in accordance with the Charter” elsewhere will hardly dissuade applicants from moving on.

      The 2016 Proposal foresaw, as further punishment, the mandatory application of accelerated procedures to “secondary movers”. This rule disappears from the Migration Management Proposal, but as Daniel Thym points out in his forthcoming contribution on secondary movements, it remains in Article 40(1)(g) of the 2016 Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission proposes deleting Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, i.e. the guarantee that persons transferred back to a State that has meanwhile discontinued or rejected their application will have their case reopened, or a remedy available. This is a dangerous invitation to Member States to reintroduce “discontinuation” practices that the Commission itself once condemned as incompatible with effective access to status determination.

      To facilitate responsibility-determination, the Proposal further obliges applicants to submit relevant information before or at the Dublin interview. Late submissions are not to be considered. Fairness would demand that justified delays be excused. Besides, it is also proposed to repeal Article 7(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, whereby authorities must take into account evidence of family ties even if produced late in the process. All in all, then, the Proposal would make proof of family ties harder, not easier as the Commission claims.

      A final group of amendments concern the details of the Dublin procedure, and might prove the most important in practice.

      Some “streamline” the process, e.g. with shorter deadlines (e.g. Article 29(1)) and a simplified take back procedure (Article 31). Controversially, the Commission proposes again to reduce the scope of appeals against transfers to issues of ill-treatment and misapplication of the family criteria (Article 33). This may perhaps prove acceptable to the ECJ in light of its old Abdullahi case-law. However, it contravenes Article 13 ECHR, which demands an effective remedy for the violation of any Convention right.
      Other procedural amendments aim to make it harder for applicants to evade transfers. At present, if a transferee absconds for 18 months, the transfer is cancelled and the transferring State becomes responsible. Article 35(2) of the Proposal allows the transferring State to “stop the clock” if the applicant absconds, and to resume the transfer as soon as he reappears.
      A number of amendments make responsibility more “stable” once assigned, although not as “permanent” as the 2016 Proposal would have made it. Under Article 27 of the Proposal, the responsibility of a State will only cease if the applicant has left the Dublin area in compliance with a return decision. More importantly, under Article 26 the responsible State will have to take back even persons to whom it has granted protection. This would be a significant extension of the scope of the Dublin system, and would “lock” applicants in the responsible State even more firmly and more durably. Perhaps by way of compensation, the Commission proposes that beneficiaries of international protection obtain “long-term status” – and thus mobility rights – after three years of residence instead of five. However, given that it is “very difficult in practice” to exercise such rights, the compensation seems more theoretical than effective and a far cry from a system of free movement capable of offsetting the rigidities of Dublin.

      These are, in short, the key amendments foreseen. While it’s easy enough to comment on each individually, it is more difficult to forecast their aggregate impact. Will they – to paraphrase the Commission – “improv[e] the chances of integration” and reduce “unauthorised movements” (recital 13), and help closing “the existing implementation gap”? Probably not, as none of them is a game-changer.

      Taken together, however, they might well aggravate current distributive imbalances. Dublin “locks in” the responsibilities of the States that receive most applications – traditional destinations such as Germany or border States such as Italy – leaving the other Member States undisturbed. Apart from possible distributive impacts of the revised criteria and of the now obligations imposed on applicants, first application States will certainly be disadvantaged combination by shortened deadlines, security screenings (see below), streamlined take backs, and “stable” responsibility extending to beneficiaries of protection. Under the “new Dublin rules” – sorry for the oxymoron! – effective solidarity will become more necessary than ever.
      Border procedures and Dublin

      Building on the current hotspot approach, the Proposals for a Screening Regulation and for an Asylum Procedures Regulation outline a new(ish) “pre-entry” phase. This will be examined in a forthcoming post by Lyra Jakuleviciene, but the interface with infra-EU allocation deserves mention here.

      In a nutshell, persons irregularly crossing the border will be screened for the purpose of identification, health and security checks, and registration in Eurodac. Protection applicants may then be channelled to “border procedures” in a broad range of situations. This will be mandatory if the applicant: (a) attempts to mislead the authorities; (b) can be considered, based on “serious reasons”, “a danger to the national security or public order of the Member States”; (c) comes from a State whose nationals have a low Union-wide recognition rate (Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal).

      The purpose of the border procedure is to assess applications “without authorising the applicant’s entry into the Member State’s territory” (here, p.4). Therefore, it might have seemed logical that applicants subjected to it be excluded from the Dublin system – as is the case, ordinarily, for relocations (see below). Not so: under Article 41(7) of the Proposal, Member States may apply Dublin in the context of border procedures. This weakens the idea of “seamless procedures at the border” somewhat but – from the standpoint of both applicants and border States – it is better than a watertight exclusion: applicants may still benefit from “meaningful link” criteria, and border States are not “stuck with the caseload”. I would normally have qualms about giving Member States discretion in choosing whether Dublin rules apply. But as it happens, Member States who receive an asylum application already enjoy that discretion under the so-called “sovereignty clause”. Nota bene: in exercising that discretion, Member States apply EU Law and must observe the Charter, and the same principle must certainly apply under the proposed Article 41(7).

      The only true exclusion from the Dublin system is set out in Article 8(4) of the Migration Management Proposal. Under this provision, Member States must carry out a security check of all applicants as part of the pre-entry screening and/or after the application is filed. If “there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order” of the determining State, the other criteria are bypassed and that State becomes responsible. Attentive readers will note that the wording of Article 8(4) differs from that of Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal (e.g. “serious grounds” vs “reasonable grounds”). It is therefore unclear whether the security grounds to “screen out” an applicant from Dublin are coextensive with the security grounds making a border procedure mandatory. Be that as it may, a broad application of Article 8(4) would be undesirable, as it would entail a large-scale exclusion from the guarantees that applicants derive from the Dublin system. The risk is moderate however: by applying Article 8(4) widely, Member States would be increasing their own share of responsibilities under the system. As twenty-five years of Dublin practice indicate, this is unlikely to happen.
      “Mandatory” and “flexible” solidarity under the new mechanism

      So far, the Migration Management Proposal does not look significantly different from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal, which did not itself fundamentally alter existing rules, and which went down in flames in inter- and intra-institutional negotiations. Any hopes of a “fresh start”, then, are left for the new solidarity mechanism.

      Unfortunately, solidarity is a difficult subject for the EU: financial support has hitherto been a mere fraction of Member State expenditure in the field; operational cooperation has proved useful but cannot tackle all the relevant aspects of the unequal distribution of responsibilities among Member States; relocations have proved extremely beneficial for thousands of applicants, but are intrinsically complex operations and have also proven politically divisive – an aspect which has severely undermined their application and further condemned them to be small scale affairs relative to the needs on the ground. The same goes a fortiori for ad hoc initiatives – such as those that followed SAR operations over the last two years– which furthermore lack the predictability that is necessary for sharing responsibilities effectively. To reiterate what the Commission stated, there is currently “no effective solidarity mechanism in place”.

      Perhaps most importantly, the EU has hitherto been incapable of accurately gauging the distributive asymmetries on the ground, to articulate a clear doctrine guiding the key determinations of “how much solidarity” and “what kind(s) of solidarity”, and to define commensurate redistributive targets on this basis (see here, p.34 and 116).

      Alas, the opportunity to elaborate a solidarity doctrine for the EU has been completely missed. Conceptually, the New Pact does not go much farther than platitudes such as “[s]olidarity implies that all Member States should contribute”. As Daniel Thym aptly observed, “pragmatism” is the driving force behind the Proposal: the Commission starts from a familiar basis – relocations – and tweaks it in ways designed to convince stakeholders that solidarity becomes both “compulsory” and “flexible”. It’s a complicated arrangement and I will only describe it in broad strokes, leaving the crucial dimensions of financial solidarity and operational cooperation to forthcoming posts by Iris Goldner Lang and Lilian Tsourdi.

      The mechanism operates according to three “modes”. In its basic mode, it is to replace ad hoc solidarity initiatives following SAR disembarkations (Articles 47-49 of the Migration Management Proposal):

      The Commission determines, in its yearly Migration Management Report, whether a State is faced with “recurring arrivals” following SAR operations and determines the needs in terms of relocations and other contributions (capacity building, operational support proper, cooperation with third States).
      The Member States are “invited” to notify the “contributions they intend to make”. If offers are sufficient, the Commission combines them and formally adopts a “solidarity pool”. If not, it adopts an implementing act summarizing relocation targets for each Member State and other contributions as offered by them. Member States may react by offering other contributions instead of relocations, provided that this is “proportional” – one wonders how the Commission will tally e.g. training programs for Libyan coastguards with relocation places.
      If the relocations offered fall 30% short of the target indicated by the Commission, a “critical mass correction mechanism” will apply: each Member States will be obliged to meet at least 50% of the quota of relocations indicated by the Commission. However, and this is the new idea offered by the Commission to bring relocation-skeptics onboard, Member States may discharge their duties by offering “return sponsorships” instead of relocations: the “sponsor” Member State commits to support the benefitting Member State to return a person and, if the return is not carried out within eight months, to accept her on its territory.

      If I understand correctly the fuzzy provision I have just summarized – Article 48(2) – it all boils down to “half-compulsory” solidarity: Member States are obliged to cover at least 50% of the relocation needs set by the Commission through relocations or sponsorships, and the rest with other contributions.

      After the “solidarity pool” is established and the benefitting Member State requests its activation, relocations can start:

      The eligible persons are those who applied for protection in the benefitting State, with the exclusion of those that are subject to border procedures (Article 45(1)(a)).Also excluded are those whom Dublin criteria based on “meaningful links” – family, abode, diplomas – assign to the benefitting State (Article 57(3)). These rules suggest that the benefitting State must carry out identification, screening for border procedures and a first (reduced?) Dublin procedure before it can declare an applicant eligible for relocation.
      Persons eligible for return sponsorship are “illegally staying third-country nationals” (Article 45(1)(b)).
      The eligible persons are identified, placed on a list, and matched to Member States based on “meaningful links”. The transfer can only be refused by the State of relocation on security grounds (Article 57(2)(6) and (7)), and otherwise follows the modalities of Dublin transfers in almost all respects (e.g. deadlines, notification, appeals). However, contrary to what happens under Dublin, missing the deadline for transfer does not entail that the relocation is cancelled it (see Article 57(10)).
      After the transfer, applicants will be directly admitted to the asylum procedure in the State of relocation only if it has been previously established that the benefitting State would have been responsible under criteria other than those based on “meaningful links” (Article 58(3)). In all the other cases, the State of relocation will run a Dublin procedure and, if necessary, transfer again the applicant to the State responsible (see Article 58(2)). As for persons subjected to return sponsorship, the State of relocation will pick up the application of the Return Directive where the benefitting State left off (or so I read Article 58(5)!).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is under “migratory pressure”, at the request of the concerned State or of its own motion (Article 50), the mechanism operates as described above except for one main point: beneficiaries of protection also become eligible for relocation (Article 51(3)). Thankfully, they must consent thereto and are automatically granted the same status in the relocation State (see Articles 57(3) and 58(4)).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is confronted to a “crisis”, rules change further (see Article 2 of the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation):

      Applicants subject to the border procedure and persons “having entered irregularly” also become eligible for relocation. These persons may then undergo a border procedure post-relocation (see Article 41(1) and (8) of the Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation).
      Persons subject to return sponsorship are transferred to the sponsor State if their removal does not occur within four – instead of eight – months.
      Other contributions are excluded from the palette of contributions available to the other Member States (Article 2(1)): it has to be relocation or return sponsorship.
      The procedure is faster, with shorter deadlines.

      It is an understatement to say that the mechanism is complex, and your faithful scribe still has much to digest. For the time being, I would make four general comments.

      First, it is not self-evident that this is a good “insurance scheme” for its intended beneficiaries. As noted, the system only guarantees that 50% of the relocation needs of a State will be met. Furthermore, there are hidden costs: in “SAR” and “pressure” modes, the benefitting State has to screen the applicant, register the application, and assess whether border procedures or (some) Dublin criteria apply before it can channel the applicant to relocation. It is unclear whether a 500 lump sum is enough to offset the costs (see Article 79 of the Migration Management Proposal). Besides, in a crisis situation, these preliminary steps might make relocation impractical – think of the Greek registration backlog in 2015/6. Perhaps, extending relocation to persons “having entered irregularly” when the mechanism is in “crisis mode” is meant precisely to take care of this. Similar observations apply to return sponsorship. Under Article 55(4) of the Migration Management Proposal, the support offered by the sponsor to the benefitting State can be rather low key (e.g. “counselling”) and there seems to be no guarantee that the benefitting State will be effectively relieved of the political, administrative and financial costs associated to return. Moving from costs to risks, it is clear that the benefitting State bears all the risks of non implementation – in other words, if the system grinds to a halt or breaks down, it will be Moria all over again. In light of past experience, one can only agree with Thomas Gammelthoft-Hansen that it’s a “big gamble”. Other aspects examined below – the vast margins of discretion left to the Commission, and the easy backdoor opened by the force majeure provisions – do not help either to create predictability.
      Second, as just noted the mechanism gives the Commission practically unlimited discretion at all critical junctures. The Commission will determine whether a Member States is confronted to “recurring arrivals”, “pressure” or a “crisis”. It will do so under definitions so open-textured, and criteria so numerous, that it will be basically the master of its determinations (Article 50 of the Migration Management Proposal). The Commission will determine unilaterally relocation and operational solidarity needs. Finally, the Commission will determine – we do not know how – if “other contributions” are proportional to relocation needs. Other than in the most clear-cut situations, there is no way that anyone can predict how the system will be applied.
      Third: the mechanism reflects a powerful fixation with and unshakable faith in heavy bureaucracy. Protection applicants may undergo up to three “responsibility determination” procedures and two transfers before finally landing in an asylum procedure: Dublin “screening” in the first State, matching, relocation, full Dublin procedure in the relocation State, then transfer. And this is a system that should not “compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications”(recital 34)! Decidedly, the idea that in order to improve the CEAS it is above all necessary to suppress unnecessary delays and coercion (see here, p.9) has not made a strong impression on the minds of the drafters. The same remark applies mutatis mutandis to return sponsorships: whatever the benefits in terms of solidarity, one wonders if it is very cost-effective or humane to drag a person from State to State so that they can each try their hand at expelling her.
      Lastly and relatedly, applicants and other persons otherwise concerned by the relocation system are given no voice. They can be “matched”, transferred, re-transferred, but subject to few exceptions their aspirations and intentions remain legally irrelevant. In this regard, the “New Pact” is as old school as it gets: it sticks strictly to the “no choice” taboo on which Dublin is built. What little recognition of applicants’ actorness had been made in the Wikstroem Report is gone. Objectifying migrants is not only incompatible with the claim that the approach taken is “human and humane”. It might prove fatal to the administrative efficiency so cherished by the Commission. Indeed, failure to engage applicants is arguably the key factor in the dismal performance of the Dublin system (here, p.112). Why should it be any different under this solidarity mechanism?

      Framing Force Majeure (or inviting defection?)

      In addition to addressing “crisis” situations, the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation includes separate provisions on force majeure.

      Thereunder, any Member State may unilaterally declare that it is faced with a situation making it “impossible” to comply with selected CEAS rules, and thus obtain the right – subject to a mere notification – to derogate from them. Member States may obtain in this way longer Dublin deadlines, or even be exempted from the obligation to accept transfers and be liberated from responsibilities if the suspension goes on more than a year (Article 8). Furthermore, States may obtain a six-months suspension of their duties under the solidarity mechanism (Article 9).

      The inclusion of this proposal in the Pact – possibly an attempt to further placate Member States averse to European solidarity? – beggars belief. Legally speaking, the whole idea is redundant: under the case-law of the ECJ, Member States may derogate from any rule of EU Law if confronted to force majeure. However, putting this black on white amounts to inviting (and legalizing) defection. The only conceivable object of rules of this kind would have been to subject force majeure derogations to prior authorization by the Commission – but there is nothing of the kind in the Proposal. The end result is paradoxical: while Member States are (in theory!) subject to Commission supervision when they conclude arrangements facilitating the implementation of Dublin rules, a mere notification will be enough to authorize them to unilaterally tear a hole in the fabric of “solidarity” and “responsibility” so painstakingly – if not felicitously – woven in the Pact.
      Concluding comments

      We should have taken Commissioner Ylva Johansson at her word when she said that there would be no “Hoorays” for the new proposals. Past the avalanche of adjectives, promises and fancy administrative monikers hurled at the reader – “faster, seamless migration processes”; “prevent the recurrence of events such as those seen in Moria”; “critical mass correction mechanism” – one cannot fail to see that the “fresh start” is essentially an exercise in repackaging.

      On responsibility-allocation and solidarity, the basic idea is one that the Commission incessantly returns to since 2007 (here, p. 10): keep Dublin and “correct” it through solidarity schemes. I do sympathize to an extent: realizing a fair balance of responsibilities by “sharing people” has always seemed to me impracticable and undesirable. Still, one would have expected that the abject failure of the Dublin system, the collapse of mutual trust in the CEAS, the meagre results obtained in the field of solidarity – per the Commission’s own appraisal – would have pushed it to bring something new to the table.

      Instead, what we have is a slightly milder version of the Dublin IV Proposal – the ultimate “clunker” in the history of Commission proposals – and an ultra-bureaucratic mechanism for relocation, with the dubious addition of return sponsorships and force majeure provisions. The basic tenets of infra-EU allocation remain the same – “no choice”, first entry – and none of the structural flaws that doomed current schemes to failure is fundamentally tackled (here, p.107): solidarity is beefed-up but appears too unreliable and fuzzy to generate trust; there are interesting steps on “genuine links”, but otherwise no sustained attempt to positively engage applicants; administrative complexity and coercive transfers reign on.

      Pragmatism, to quote again Daniel Thym’s excellent introductory post, is no sin. It is even expected of the Commission. This, however, is a study in path-dependency. By defending the status quo, wrapping it in shiny new paper, and making limited concessions to key policy actors, the Commission may perhaps carry its proposals through. However, without substantial corrections, the “new” Pact is unlikely to save the CEAS or even to prevent new Morias.

      http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-fresh-start-or-one-more-clunker-dublin-and-solidarity-in-the-ne

      #Francesco_Maiani

      #force_majeure

    • European Refugee Policy: What’s Gone Wrong and How to Make It Better

      In 2015 and 2016, more than 1 million refugees made their way to the European Union, the largest number of them originating from Syria. Since that time, refugee arrivals have continued, although at a much slower pace and involving people from a wider range of countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

      The EU’s response to these developments has had five main characteristics.

      First, a serious lack of preparedness and long-term planning. Despite the massive material and intelligence resources at its disposal, the EU was caught completely unaware by the mass influx of refugees five years ago and has been playing catch-up ever since. While the emergency is now well and truly over, EU member states continue to talk as if still in the grip of an unmanageable “refugee crisis.”

      Second, the EU’s refugee policy has become progressively based on a strategy known as “externalization,” whereby responsibility for migration control is shifted to unstable states outside Europe. This has been epitomized by the deals that the EU has done with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Turkey, all of which have agreed to halt the onward movement of refugees in exchange for aid and other rewards, including support to the security services.

      Third, asylum has become increasingly criminalized, as demonstrated by the growing number of EU citizens and civil society groups that have been prosecuted for their roles in aiding refugees. At the same time, some frontline member states have engaged in a systematic attempt to delegitimize the NGO search-and-rescue organizations operating in the Mediterranean and to obstruct their life-saving activities.

      The fourth characteristic of EU countries’ recent policies has been a readiness to inflict or be complicit in a range of abuses that challenge the principles of both human rights and international refugee law. This can be seen in the violence perpetrated against asylum seekers by the military and militia groups in Croatia and Hungary, the terrible conditions found in Greek refugee camps such as Moria on the island of Lesvos, and, most egregiously of all, EU support to the Libyan Coastguard that enables it to intercept refugees at sea and to return them to abusive detention centers on land.

      Fifth and finally, the past five years have witnessed a serious absence of solidarity within the EU. Frontline states such as Greece and Italy have been left to bear a disproportionate share of the responsibility for new refugee arrivals. Efforts to relocate asylum seekers and resettle refugees throughout the EU have had disappointing results. And countries in the eastern part of the EU have consistently fought against the European Commission in its efforts to forge a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the refugee issue.

      The most recent attempt to formulate such an approach is to be found in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which the Commission proposed in September 2020.

      It would be wrong to entirely dismiss the Pact, as it contains some positive elements. These include, for example, a commitment to establish legal pathways to asylum in Europe for people who are in need of protection, and EU support for member states that wish to establish community-sponsored refugee resettlement programs.

      In other respects, however, the Pact has a number of important, serious flaws. It has already been questioned by those countries that are least willing to admit refugees and continue to resist the role of Brussels in this policy domain. The Pact also makes hardly any reference to the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration—a strange omission given the enormous amount of time and effort that the UN has devoted to those initiatives, both of which were triggered by the European emergency of 2015-16.

      At an operational level, the Pact endorses and reinforces the EU’s externalization agenda and envisages a much more aggressive role for Frontex, the EU’s border control agency. At the same time, it empowers member states to refuse entry to asylum seekers on the basis of very vague criteria. As a result, individuals may be more vulnerable to human smugglers and traffickers. There is also a strong likelihood that new refugee camps will spring up on the fringes of Europe, with their residents living in substandard conditions.

      Finally, the Pact places enormous emphasis on the involuntary return of asylum seekers to their countries of origin. It even envisages that a hardline state such as Hungary could contribute to the implementation of the Pact by organizing and funding such deportations. This constitutes an extremely dangerous new twist on the notions of solidarity and responsibility sharing, which form the basis of the international refugee regime.

      If the proposed Pact is not fit for purpose, then what might a more constructive EU refugee policy look like?

      It would in the first instance focus on the restoration of both EU and NGO search-and-rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and establish more predictable disembarkation and refugee distribution mechanisms. It would also mean the withdrawal of EU support for the Libyan Coastguard, the closure of that country’s detention centers, and a substantial improvement of the living conditions experienced by refugees in Europe’s frontline states—changes that should take place with or without a Pact.

      Indeed, the EU should redeploy the massive amount of resources that it currently devotes to the externalization process, so as to strengthen the protection capacity of asylum and transit countries on the periphery of Europe. A progressive approach on the part of the EU would involve the establishment of not only faster but also fair asylum procedures, with appropriate long-term solutions being found for new arrivals, whether or not they qualify for refugee status.

      These changes would help to ensure that those searching for safety have timely and adequate opportunities to access their most basic rights.

      https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/11/5/european-refugee-policy-whats-gone-wrong-and-how-to-make-it-b

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Turning European Union Territory into a non-Territory

      Externalization policies in 2020: where is the European Union territory?

      In spite of the Commission’s rhetoric stressing the novel elements of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (hereinafter: the Pact – summarized and discussed in general here), there are good reasons to argue that the Pact develops and consolidates, among others, the existing trends on externalization policies of migration control (see Guild et al). Furthermore, it tries to create new avenues for a ‘smarter’ system of management of immigration, by additionally controlling access to the European Union territory for third country nationals (TCNs), and by creating different categories of migrants, which are then subject to different legal regimes which find application in the European Union territory.

      The consolidation of existing trends concerns the externalization of migration management practices, resort to technologies in developing migration control systems (further development of Eurodac, completion of the path toward full interoperability between IT systems), and also the strengthening of the role of the European Union executive level, via increased joint management involving European Union agencies: these are all policies that find in the Pact’s consolidation.

      This brief will focus on externalization (practices), a concept which is finding a new declination in the Pact: indeed, the Pact and several of the measures proposed, read together, are aiming at ‘disentangling’ the territory of the EU, from a set of rights which are related with the presence of the migrant or of the asylum seeker on the territory of a Member State of the EU, and from the relation between territory and access to a jurisdiction, which is necessary to enforce rights which otherwise remain on paper.

      Interestingly, this process of separation, of splitting between territory-law/rights-jurisdiction takes place not outside, but within the EU, and this is the new declination of externalization which one can find in the measures proposed in the Pact, namely with the proposal for a Screening Regulation and the amended proposal for a Procedure Regulation. It is no accident that other commentators have interpreted it as a consolidation of ‘fortress Europe’. In other words, this externalization process takes place within the EU and aims at making the external borders more effective also for the TCNs who are already in the territory of the EU.

      The proposal for a pre-entry screening regulation

      A first instrument which has a pivotal role in the consolidation of the externalization trend is the proposed Regulation for a screening of third country nationals (hereinafter: Proposal Screening Regulation), which will be applicable to migrants crossing the external borders without authorization. The aim of the screening, according to the Commission, is to ‘accelerate the process of determining the status of a person and what type of procedure should apply’. More precisely, the screening ‘should help ensure that the third country nationals concerned are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible’ and also to avoid absconding after entrance in the territory in order to reach a different state than the one of arrival (recital 8, preamble of proposal). The screening should contribute as well to curb secondary movements, which is a policy target highly relevant for many northern and central European Union states.

      In the new design, the screening procedure becomes the ‘standard’ for all TCNs who crossed the border in irregular manner, and also for persons who are disembarked following a search and rescue (SAR) operation, and for those who apply for international protection at the external border crossing points or in transit zones. With the screening Regulation, all these categories of persons shall not be allowed to enter the territory of the State during the screening (Arts 3 and 4 of the proposal).

      Consequently, different categories of migrants, including asylum seekers which are by definition vulnerable persons, are to be kept in locations situated at or in proximity to the external borders, for a time (up to 5 days, which can become 10 at maximum), defined in the Regulation, but which must be respected by national administrations. There is here an implicit equation between all these categories, and the common denominator of this operation is that all these persons have crossed the border in an unauthorized manner.

      It is yet unclear how the situation of migrants during the screening is to be organized in practical terms, transit zones, hotspot or others, and if this can qualify as detention, in legal terms. The Court of Justice has ruled recently on Hungarian transit zones (see analysis by Luisa Marin), by deciding that Röszke transit zone qualified as ‘detention’, and it can be argued that the parameters clarified in that decision could find application also to the case of migrants during the screening phase. If the situation of TCNs during the screening can be considered detention, which is then the legal basis? The Reception Conditions Directive or the Return Directive? If the national administrations struggle to meet the tight deadlines provided for the screening system, these questions will become more urgent, next to the very practical issue of the actual accommodation for this procedure, which in general does not allow for access to the territory.

      On the one side, Article 14(7) of the proposal provides a guarantee, indicating that the screening should end also if the checks are not completed within the deadlines; on the other side, the remaining question is: to which procedure is the applicant sent and how is the next phase then determined? The relevant procedure following the screening here seems to be determined in a very approximate way, and this begs the question on the extent to which rights can be protected in this context. Furthermore, the right to have access to a lawyer is not provided for in the screening phase. Given the relevance of this screening phase, also fundamental rights should be monitored, and the mechanism put in place at Article 7, leaves much to the discretion of the Member States, and the involvement of the Fundamental Rights Agency, with guidance and support upon request of the MS can be too little to ensure fundamental rights are not jeopardized by national administrations.

      This screening phase, which has the purpose to make sure, among other things, that states ‘do their job’ as to collecting information and consequently feeding the EU information systems, might therefore have important effects on the merits of the individual case, since border procedures are to be seen as fast-track, time is limited and procedural guarantees are also sacrificed in this context. In the case the screening ends with a refusal of entry, there is a substantive effect of the screening, which is conducted without legal assistance and without access to a legal remedy. And if this is not a decision in itself, but it ends up in a de-briefing form, this form might give substance to the next stage of the procedure, which, in the case of asylum, should be an individualized and accurate assessment of one’s individual circumstances.

      Overall, it should be stressed that the screening itself does not end up in a formal decision, it nevertheless represents an important phase since it defines what comes after, i.e., the type of procedure following the screening. It must be observed therefore, that the respect of some procedural rights is of paramount importance. At the same time, it is important that communication in a language TCNs can understand is effective, since the screening might end in a de-briefing form, where one or more nationalities are indicated. Considering that one of the options is the refusal of entry (Art. 14(1) screening proposal; confirmed by the recital 40 of the Proposal Procedure Regulation, as amended in 2020), and the others are either access to asylum or expulsion, one should require that the screening provides for procedural guarantees.

      Furthermore, the screening should point to any element which might be relevant to refer the TCNs into the accelerated examination procedure or the border procedure. In other words, the screening must indicate in the de-briefing form the options that protect asylum applicants less than others (Article 14(3) of the proposal). It does not operate in the other way: a TCN who has applied for asylum and comes from a country with a high recognition rate is not excluded from the screening (see blog post by Jakuleviciene).

      The legislation creates therefore avenues for disentangling, splitting the relation between physical presence of an asylum applicant on a territory and the set of laws and fundamental rights associated to it, namely a protective legal order, access to rights and to a jurisdiction enforcing those rights. It creates a sort of ‘lighter’ legal order, a lower density system, which facilitates the exit of the applicant from the territory of the EU, creating a sort of shift from a Europe of rights to the Europe of borders, confinement and expulsions.

      The proposal for new border procedures: an attempt to create a lower density territory?

      Another crucial piece in this process of establishing a stronger border fence and streamline procedures at the border, creating a ‘seamless link between asylum and return’, in the words of the Commission, is constituted by the reform of the border procedures, with an amendment of the 2016 proposal for the Regulation procedure (hereinafter: Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation).

      Though border procedures are already present in the current Regulation of 2013, they are now developed into a “border procedure for asylum and return”, and a more developed accelerated procedure, which, next to the normal asylum procedure, comes after the screening phase.

      The new border procedure becomes obligatory (according to Art. 41(3) of the Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation) for applicants who arrive irregularly at the external border or after disembarkation and another of these grounds apply:

      – they represent a risk to national security or public order;

      – the applicant has provided false information or documents or by withholding relevant information or document;

      – the applicant comes from a non-EU country for which the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions is below 20 percent.

      This last criterion is especially problematic, since it transcends the criterion of the safe third country and it undermines the principle that every asylum application requires a complex and individualized assessment of the particular personal circumstances of the applicant, by introducing presumptive elements in a procedure which gives fewer guarantees.

      During the border procedure, the TCN is not granted access to the EU. The expansion of the new border procedures poses also the problem of the organization of the facilities necessary for the new procedures, which must be a location at or close to the external borders, in other words, where migrants are apprehended or disembarked.

      Tellingly enough, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum describes as guarantees in the asylum border procedure all the situations in which the border procedure shall not be applied, for example, because the necessary support cannot be provided or for medical reasons, or where the ‘conditions for detention (…) cannot be met and the border procedure cannot be applied without detention’.

      Also here the question remains on how to qualify their stay during the procedure, because the Commission aims at limiting resort to detention. The situation could be considered de facto a detention, and its compatibility with the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Hungarian transit zones case is questionable.

      Another aspect which must be analyzed is the system of guarantees after the decision in a border procedure. If an application is rejected in an asylum border procedure, the “return procedure” applies immediately. Member States must limit to one instance the right to effective remedy against the decision, as posited in Article 53(9). The right to an effective remedy is therefore limited, according to Art. 53 of the Proposed Regulation, and the right to remain, a ‘light’ right to remain one could say, is also narrowly constructed, in the case of border procedures, to the first remedy against the negative decision (Art. 54(3) read together with Art. 54(4) and 54(5)). Furthermore, EU law allows Member States to limit the right to remain in case of subsequent applications and provides that there is no right to remain in the case of subsequent appeals (Art. 54(6) and (7)). More in general, this proposal extends the circumstances where the applicant does not have an automatic right to remain and this represents an aspect which affects significantly and in a factual manner the capacity to challenge a negative decision in a border procedure.

      Overall, it can be argued that the asylum border procedure is a procedure where guarantees are limited, because the access to the jurisdiction is taking place in fast-track procedures, access to legal remedies is also reduced to the very minimum. Access to the territory of the Member State is therefore deprived of its typical meaning, in the sense that it does not imply access to a system which is protecting rights with procedures which offer guarantees and are therefore also time-consuming. Here, efficiency should govern a process where the access to a jurisdiction is lighter, is ‘less dense’ than otherwise. To conclude, this externalization of migration control policies takes place ‘inside’ the European Union territory, and it aims at prolonging the effects of containment policies because they make access to the EU territory less meaningful, in legal terms: the presence of the person in the territory of the EU does not entail full access to the rights related to the presence on the territory.

      Solidarity in cooperating with third countries? The “return sponsorship” and its territorial puzzle

      Chapter 6 of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes, among other things, to create a conditionality between cooperation on readmission with third countries and the issuance of visas to their nationals. This conditionality was legally established in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code Regulation. The revision (discussed here) states that, given their “politically sensitive nature and their horizontal implications for the Member States and the Union”, such provisions will be triggered once implementing powers are conferred to the Council (following a proposal from the Commission).

      What do these measures entail? We know that they can be applied in bulk or separately. Firstly, EU consulates in third countries will not have the usual leeway to waive some documents required to apply for visas (Art. 14(6), visa code). Secondly, visa applicants from uncooperative third countries will pay higher visa fees (Art. 16(1) visa code). Thirdly, visa fees to diplomatic and service passports will not be waived (Art. 16(5)b visa code). Fourthly, time to take a decision on the visa application will be longer than 15 days (Art. 23(1) visa code). Fifthly, the issuance of multi-entry visas (MEVs) from 6 months to 5 years is suspended (Art. 24(2) visa code). In other words, these coercive measures are not aimed at suspending visas. They are designed to make the procedure for obtaining a visa more lengthy, more costly, and limited in terms of access to MEVs.

      Moreover, it is important to stress that the revision of the Visa Code Regulation mentions that the Union will strike a balance between “migration and security concerns, economic considerations and general external relations”. Consequently, measures (be they restrictive or not) will result from an assessment that goes well beyond migration management issues. The assessment will not be based exclusively on the so-called “return rate” that has been presented as a compass used to reward or blame third countries’ cooperation on readmission. Other indicators or criteria, based on data provided by the Member States, will be equally examined by the Commission. These other indicators pertain to “the overall relations” between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and a given third country, on the other. This broad category is not defined in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code, nor do we know what it precisely refers to.

      What do we know about this linkage? The idea of linking cooperation on readmission with visa policy is not new. It was first introduced at a bilateral level by some member states. For example, fifteen years ago, cooperation on redocumentation, including the swift delivery of laissez-passers by the consular authorities of countries of origin, was at the centre of bilateral talks between France and North African countries. In September 2005, the French Ministry of the Interior proposed to “sanction uncooperative countries [especially Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria] by limiting the number of short-term visas that France delivers to their nationals.” Sanctions turned out to be unsuccessful not only because of the diplomatic tensions they generated – they were met with strong criticisms and reaction on the part of North African countries – but also because the ratio between the number of laissez-passers requested by the French authorities and the number of laissez-passers delivered by North African countries’ authorities remained unchanged.

      At the EU level, the idea to link readmission with visa policy has been in the pipeline for many years. Let’s remember that, in October 2002, in its Community Return Policy, the European Commission reflected on the positive incentives that could be used in order to ensure third countries’ constant cooperation on readmission. The Commission observed in its communication that, actually, “there is little that can be offered in return. In particular visa concessions or the lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in exceptional cases only; in most cases it is not.” Therefore, the Commission set out to propose additional incentives (e.g. trade expansion, technical/financial assistance, additional development aid).

      In a similar vein, in September 2015, after years of negotiations and failed attempt to cooperate on readmission with Southern countries, the Commission remarked that the possibility to use Visa Facilitation Agreements as an incentive to cooperate on readmission is limited in the South “as the EU is unlikely to offer visa facilitation to certain third countries which generate many irregular migrants and thus pose a migratory risk. And even when the EU does offer the parallel negotiation of a visa facilitation agreement, this may not be sufficient if the facilitations offered are not sufficiently attractive.”

      More recently, in March 2018, in its Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for an amendment of the Common Visa Code, the Commission itself recognised that “better cooperation on readmission with reluctant third countries cannot be obtained through visa policy measures alone.” It also added that “there is no hard evidence on how visa leverage can translate into better cooperation of third countries on readmission.”

      Against this backdrop, why has so much emphasis been put on the link between cooperation on readmission and visa policy in the revised Visa Code Regulation and later in the New Pact? The Commission itself recognised that this conditionality might not constitute a sufficient incentive to ensure the cooperation on readmission.

      To reply to this question, we need first to question the oft-cited reference to third countries’ “reluctance”[n1] to cooperate on readmission in order to understand that, cooperation on readmission is inextricably based on unbalanced reciprocities. Moreover, migration, be it regular or irregular, continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on unemployment and poverty in countries of origin. Readmission has asymmetric costs and benefits having economic social and political implications for countries of origin. Apart from being unpopular in Southern countries, readmission is humiliating, stigmatizing, violent and traumatic for migrants,[n2] making their process of reintegration extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially when countries of origin have often no interest in promoting reintegration programmes addressed to their nationals expelled from Europe.

      Importantly, the conclusion of a bilateral agreement does not automatically lead to its full implementation in the field of readmission, for the latter is contingent on an array of factors that codify the bilateral interactions between two contracting parties. Today, more than 320 bilateral agreements linked to readmission have been concluded between the 27 EU Member States and third countries at a global level. Using an oxymoron, it is possible to argue that, over the past decades, various EU member states have learned that, if bilateral cooperation on readmission constitutes a central priority in their external relations (this is the official rhetoric), readmission remains peripheral to other strategic issue-areas which are detailed below. Finally, unlike some third countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, Southern third countries have no prospect of acceding to the EU bloc, let alone having a visa-free regime, at least in the foreseeable future. This basic difference makes any attempt to compare the responsiveness of the Balkan countries to cooperation on readmission with Southern non-EU countries’ impossible, if not spurious.

      Today, patterns of interdependence between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are very much consolidated. Over the last decades, Member States, especially Spain, France, Italy and Greece, have learned that bringing pressure to bear on uncooperative third countries needs to be evaluated cautiously lest other issues of high politics be jeopardized. Readmission cannot be isolated from a broader framework of interactions including other strategic, if not more crucial, issue-areas, such as police cooperation on the fight against international terrorism, border control, energy security and other diplomatic and geopolitical concerns. Nor can bilateral cooperation on readmission be viewed as an end in itself, for it has often been grafted onto a broader framework of interactions.

      This point leads to a final remark regarding “return sponsorship” which is detailed in Art. 55 of the proposal for a regulation on asylum and migration management. In a nutshell, the idea of the European Commission consists in a commitment from a “sponsoring Member State” to assist another Member State (the benefitting Member State) in the readmission of a third-country national. This mechanism foresees that each Member State is expected to indicate the nationalities for which they are willing to provide support in the field of readmission. The sponsoring Member State offers an assistance by mobilizing its network of bilateral cooperation on readmission, or by opening a dialogue with the authorities of a given third country where the third-country national will be deported. If, after eight months, attempts are unsuccessful, the third-country national is transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Note that, in application of Council Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, the sponsoring Member State may or may not recognize the expulsion decision of the benefitting Member State, just because Member States continue to interpret the Geneva Convention in different ways and also because they have different grounds for subsidiary protection.

      Viewed from a non-EU perspective, namely from the point of view of third countries, this mechanism might raise some questions of competence and relevance. Which consular authorities will undertake the identification process of the third country national with a view to eventually delivering a travel document? Are we talking about the third country’s consular authorities located in the territory of the benefitting Member State or in the sponsoring Member State’s? In a similar vein, why would a bilateral agreement linked to readmission – concluded with a given ‘sponsoring’ Member State – be applicable to a ‘benefitting’ Member State (with which no bilateral agreement or arrangement has been signed)? Such territorially bounded contingencies will invariably be problematic, at a certain stage, from the viewpoint of third countries. Additionally, in acting as a sponsoring Member State, one is entitled to wonder why an EU Member State might decide to expose itself to increased tensions with a given third country while putting at risk a broader framework of interactions.

      As the graph shows, not all the EU Member States are equally engaged in bilateral cooperation on readmission with third countries. Moreover, a geographical distribution of available data demonstrates that more than 70 per cent of the total number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission (be they formal or informal[n3]) concluded with African countries are covered by France, Italy and Spain. Over the last decades, these three Member States have developed their respective networks of cooperation on readmission with a number of countries in Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

      Given the existence of these consolidated networks, the extent to which the “return sponsorship” proposed in the Pact will add value to their current undertakings is objectively questionable. Rather, if the “return sponsorship” mechanism is adopted, these three Member States might be deemed to act as sponsoring Member States when it comes to the expulsion of irregular migrants (located in other EU Member States) to Africa and the MENA region. More concretely, the propensity of, for example, Austria to sponsor Italy in expelling from Italy a foreign national coming from the MENA region or from Africa is predictably low. Austria’s current networks of cooperation on readmission with MENA and African countries would never add value to Italy’s consolidated networks of cooperation on readmission with these third countries. Moreover, it is unlikely that Italy will be proactively “sponsoring” other Member States’ expulsion decisions, without jeopardising its bilateral relations with other strategic third countries located in the MENA region or in Africa, to use the same example. These considerations concretely demonstrate that the European Commission’s call for “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”, on which its “return sponsorship” mechanism is premised, is contingent on the existence of a federative Union able to act as a unitary supranational body in domestic and foreign affairs. This federation does not exist in political terms.

      Beyond these practical aspects, it is important to realise that the cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission has expanded as a result of tremendously complex bilateral dynamics that go well beyond the mere management of international migration. These remarks are crucial to understanding that we need to reflect properly on the conditionality pattern that has driven the external action of the EU, especially in a regional context where patterns of interdependence among state actors have gained so much relevance over the last two decades. Moreover, given the clear consensus on the weak correlation between cooperation on readmission and visa policy (the European Commission being no exception to this consensus), linking the two might not be the adequate response to ensure third countries’ cooperation on readmission, especially when the latter are in position to capitalize on their strategic position with regard to some EU Member States.

      Conclusions

      This brief reflection has highlighted a trend which is taking shape in the Pact and in some of the measures proposed by the Commission in its 2020 package of reforms. It has been shown that the proposals for a pre-entry screening and the 2020 amended proposal for enhanced border procedures are creating something we could label as a ‘lower density’ European Union territory, because the new procedures and arrangements have the purpose of restricting and limiting access to rights and to jurisdiction. This would happen on the territory of a Member State, but in a place at or close to the external borders, with a view to confining migration and third country nationals to an area where the territory of a state, and therefore, the European territory, is less … ‘territorial’ than it should be: legally speaking, it is a ‘lower density’ territory.

      The “seamless link between asylum and return” the Commission aims to create with the new border procedures can be described as sliding doors through which the third country national can enter or leave immediately, depending on how the established fast-track system qualifies her situation.

      However, the paradox highlighted with the “return sponsorship” mechanism shows that readmission agreements or arrangements are no panacea, for the vested interests of third countries must also be taken into consideration when it comes to cooperation on readmission. In this respect, it is telling that the Commission never consulted third states on the new return sponsorship mechanism, as if their territories were not concerned by this mechanism, which is far from being the case. For this reason, it is legitimate to imagine that the main rationale for the return sponsorship mechanism may be another one, and it may be merely domestic. In other words, the return sponsorship, which transforms itself into a form of relocation after eight months if the third country national is not expelled from the EU territory, subtly takes non-frontline European Union states out of their comfort-zone and engage them in cooperating on expulsions. If they fail to do so, namely if the third-country national is not expelled after eight months, non-frontline European Union states are as it were ‘forcibly’ engaged in a ‘solidarity practice’ that is conducive to relocation.

      Given the disappointing past experience of the 2015 relocations, it is impossible to predict whether this mechanism will work or not. However, once one enters sliding doors, the danger is to remain stuck in uncertainty, in a European Union ‘no man’s land’ which is nothing but another by-product of the fortress Europe machinery.

      http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum.html

    • Le nouveau Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne a présenté son très attendu nouveau Pacte sur la migration et l’asile.

      Alors que l’Union européenne (UE) traverse une crise politique majeure depuis 2015 et que les solutions apportées ont démontré leur insuffisance en matière de solidarité entre États membres, leur violence à l’égard des exilés et leur coût exorbitant, la Commission européenne ne semble pas tirer les leçons du passé.

      Au menu du Pacte : un renforcement toujours accru des contrôles aux frontières, des procédures expéditives aux frontières de l’UE avec, à la clé, la détention généralisée pour les nouveaux arrivants, la poursuite de l’externalisation et un focus sur les expulsions. Il n’y a donc pas de changement de stratégie.

      Le Règlement Dublin, injuste et inefficace, est loin d’être aboli. Le nouveau système mis en place changera certes de nom, mais reprendra le critère tant décrié du “premier pays d’entrée” dans l’UE pour déterminer le pays responsable du traitement de la demande d’asile. Quant à un mécanisme permanent de solidarité pour les États davantage confrontés à l’arrivée des exilés, à l’instar des quotas de relocalisations de 2015-2017 – relocalisations qui furent un échec complet -, la Commission propose une solidarité permanente et obligatoire mais… à la carte, où les États qui ne veulent pas accueillir de migrants peuvent choisir à la place de “parrainer” leur retour, ou de fournir un soutien opérationnel aux États en difficulté. La solidarité n’est donc cyniquement pas envisagée pour l’accueil, mais bien pour le renvoi des migrants.

      Pourtant, l’UE fait face à beaucoup moins d’arrivées de migrants sur son territoire qu’en 2015 (1,5 million d’arrivées en 2015, 140.00 en 2019)

      Fin 2019, l’UE accueillait 2,6 millions de réfugiés, soit l’équivalent de 0,6% de sa population. À défaut de voies légales et sûres, les personnes exilées continuent de fuir la guerre, la violence, ou de rechercher une vie meilleure et doivent emprunter des routes périlleuses pour rejoindre le territoire de l’UE : on dénombre plus de 20.000 décès depuis 2014. Une fois arrivées ici, elles peuvent encore être détenues et subir des mauvais traitements, comme c’était le cas dans le camp qui a brûlé à Moria. Lorsqu’elles poursuivent leur route migratoire au sein de l’UE, elles ne peuvent choisir le pays où elles demanderont l’asile et elles font face à la loterie de l’asile…

      Loin d’un “nouveau départ” avec ce nouveau Pacte, la Commission propose les mêmes recettes et rate une opportunité de mettre en œuvre une tout autre politique, qui soit réellement solidaire, équitable pour les États membres et respectueuse des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes, avec l’établissement de voies légales et sûres, des procédures d’asile harmonisées et un accueil de qualité, ou encore la recherche de solutions durables pour les personnes en situation irrégulière.

      Dans cette brève analyse, nous revenons sur certaines des mesures phares telles qu’elles ont été présentées par la Commission européenne et qui feront l’objet de discussions dans les prochains mois avec le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Nous expliquerons également en quoi ces mesures n’ont rien d’innovant, sont un échec de la politique migratoire européenne, et pourquoi elles sont dangereuses pour les personnes migrantes.

      https://www.cire.be/publication/le-nouveau-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-lasile

      Pour télécharger l’analyse :
      https://www.cire.be/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_

    • New pact on migration and asylum. Perspective on the ’other side’ of the EU border

      At the end of September 2020, and after camp Moria on Lesvos burned down leaving over 13,000 people in an even more precarious situation than they were before, the European Commission (EC) introduced a proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. So far, the proposal has not been met with enthusiasm by neither member states or human rights organisations.

      Based on first-hand field research interviews with civil society and other experts in the Balkan region, this report provides a unique perspective of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum from ‘the other side’ of the EU’s borders.

      #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #rapport #Refugee_rights #militarisation

    • Impakter | Un « nouveau » pacte sur l’asile et les migrations ?

      Le média en ligne Impakter propose un article d’analyse du Pacte sur l’asile et les migrations de l’Union européenne. Publié le 23 septembre 2020, le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions. L’article pointe l’aspect critique du projet, et notamment des concepts clés tels que : « processus de pré-selection », « le processus accélérée » et le « pacte de retour ». L’article donne la parole à plusieurs expertises et offre ainsi une meilleure compréhension de ce que concrètement ce pacte implique pour les personnes migrantes.

      L’article de #Charlie_Westbrook “A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?” a été publié le 11 février dans le magazine en ligne Impakter (sous licence Creative Commons). Nous vous en proposons un court résumé traduisant les lignes directrices de l’argumentaire, en français ci-dessous. Pour lire l’intégralité du texte en anglais, vous pouvez vous rendre sur le site de Impakter.

      –---

      Le “Nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile”, a été publié le 23 septembre, faisant suite à l’incendie du camp surpeuplé de Moria. Le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions sur lesquelles les États membres de l’UE devront maintenant se mettre d’accord – une entreprise qui a déjà connu des difficultés.

      Les universitaires, les militants et les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme de l’UE soulignent les préoccupations éthiques et pratiques que suscitent nombre des propositions suggérées par la Commission, ainsi que la rhétorique axée sur le retour qui les anime. Charlie Westbrook la journaliste, a contacté Kirsty Evans, coordinatrice de terrain et des campagnes pour Europe Must Act, qui m’a fait part de ses réactions au nouveau Pacte.

      Cet essai vise à présenter le plus clairement possible les problèmes liés à ce nouveau pacte, en mettant en évidence les principales préoccupations des experts et des ONG. Ces préoccupations concernent les problèmes potentiels liés au processus de présélection, au processus accéléré (ou “fast-track”) et au mécanisme de parrainage des retours.

      Le processus de présélection

      La nouvelle proposition est d’instaurer une procédure de contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire européen. L’ONG Human Rights Watch, dénonce la suggestion trompeuse du pacte selon laquelle les personnes soumises à la procédure frontalière ne sont pas considérées comme ayant formellement pénétré sur le territoire. Ce processus concerne toute personne extra-européenne qui franchirait la frontière de manière irrégulière. Ce manque de différenciation du type de besoin inquiète l’affirme l’avocate et professeur Lyra Jakulevičienė, car cela signifie que la politique d’externalisation sera plus forte que jamais. Ce nouveau règlement brouille la distinction entre les personnes demandant une protection internationale et les autres migrants “en plaçant les deux groupes de personnes sous le même régime juridique au lieu de les différencier clairement, car leurs chances de rester dans l’UE sont très différentes”. Ce processus d’externalisation, cependant, “se déroule “à l’intérieur” du territoire de l’Union européenne, et vise à prolonger les effets des politiques d’endiguement parce qu’elles rendent l’accès au territoire de l’UE moins significatif”, comme l’expliquent Jean-Pierre Cassarino, chercheur principal à la chaire de la politique européenne de voisinage du Collège d’Europe, et Luisa Marin, professeur adjoint de droit européen. En d’autres termes, les personnes en quête de protection n’auront pas pleinement accès aux droits européens en arrivant sur le territoire de l’UE. Il faudra d’abord déterminer ce qu’elles “sont”. En outre, les recherches universitaires montrent que les processus d’externalisation “entraînent le contournement des normes fondamentales, vont à l’encontre de la bonne gouvernance, créent l’immobilité et contribuent à la crise du régime mondial des réfugiés, qui ne parvient pas à assurer la protection”. Les principales inquiétudes de ces deux expert·es sont les suivantes : la rapidité de prise de décision (pas plus de 5 jours), l’absence d’assistance juridique, Etat membre est le seul garant du respect des droits fondamentaux et si cette période de pré-sélection sera mise en œuvre comme une détention.

      Selon Jakulevičienė, la proposition apporte “un grand potentiel” pour créer davantage de camps de style “Moria”. Il est difficile de voir en quoi cela profiterait à qui que ce soit.

      Procédure accélérée

      Si un demandeur est orienté vers le système accéléré, une décision sera prise dans un délai de 12 semaines – une durée qui fait craindre que le système accéléré n’aboutisse à un retour injuste des demandeurs. En 2010, Human Rights Watch a publié un rapport de fond détaillant comment les procédures d’asile accélérées étaient inadaptées aux demandes complexes et comment elles affectaient négativement les femmes demandeurs d’asile en particulier.
      Les personnes seront dirigées vers la procédure accélérée si : l’identité a été cachée ou que de faux documents ont été utilisés, si elle représente un danger pour la sécurité nationale, ou si elle est ressortissante d’un pays pour lesquels moins de 20% des demandes ont abouti à l’octroi d’une protection internationale.

      Comme l’exprime le rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW), “la procédure à la frontière proposée repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’ont pas besoin de protection et que l’évaluation des demandes d’asile peut être faite facilement et rapidement”.

      Essentiellement, comme l’écrivent Cassarino et Marin, “elle porte atteinte au principe selon lequel toute demande d’asile nécessite une évaluation complexe et individualisée de la situation personnelle particulière du demandeur”.

      Tout comme Jakulevičienė, Kirsty Evans s’inquiète de la manière dont le pacte va alimenter une rhétorique préjudiciable, en faisant valoir que “le langage de l’accélération fait appel à la “protection” de la rhétorique nationale évidente dans la politique et les médias en se concentrant sur le retour des personnes sur leur propre territoire”.

      Un pacte pour le retour

      Désormais, lorsqu’une demande d’asile est rejetée, la décision de retour sera rendue en même temps.

      Le raisonnement présenté par la Commission pour proposer des procédures plus rapides et plus intégrées est que des procédures inefficaces causent des difficultés excessives – y compris pour ceux qui ont obtenu le droit de rester.

      Les procédures restructurées peuvent en effet profiter à certains. Cependant, il existe un risque sérieux qu’elles aient un impact négatif sur le droit d’asile des personnes soumises à la procédure accélérée – sachant qu’en cas de rejet, il n’existe qu’un seul droit de recours.

      La proposition selon laquelle l’UE traitera désormais les retours dans leur ensemble, et non plus seulement dans un seul État membre, illustre bien l’importance que l’UE accorde aux retours. À cette fin, l’UE propose la création d’un nouveau poste de coordinateur européen des retours qui s’occupera des retours et des réadmissions.

      Décrite comme “la plus sinistre des nouvelles propositions”, et assimilée à “une grotesque parodie de personnes parrainant des enfants dans les pays en développement par l’intermédiaire d’organisations caritatives”, l’option du parrainage de retour est également un signe fort de l’approche par concession de la Commission.

      Pour M. Evans, le fait d’autoriser les pays à opter pour le “retour” comme moyen de “gérer la migration” semble être une validation du comportement illégal des États membres, comme les récentes expulsions massives en Grèce. Alors, qu’est-ce que le parrainage de retour ? Eh bien, selon les termes de l’UE, le parrainage du retour est une option de solidarité dans laquelle l’État membre “s’engage à renvoyer les migrants en situation irrégulière sans droit de séjour au nom d’un autre État membre, en le faisant directement à partir du territoire de l’État membre bénéficiaire”.

      Les États membres préciseront les nationalités qu’ils “parraineront” en fonction, vraisemblablement, des relations préexistantes de l’État membre de l’UE avec un État non membre de l’UE. Lorsque la demande d’un individu est rejetée, l’État membre qui en est responsable s’appuiera sur ses relations avec le pays tiers pour négocier le retour du demandeur.

      En outre, en supposant que les réadmissions soient réussies, le parrainage des retours fonctionne sur la base de l’hypothèse qu’il existe un pays tiers sûr. C’est sur cette base que les demandes sont rejetées. La manière dont cela affectera le principe de non-refoulement est la principale préoccupation des organisations des droits de l’homme et des experts politiques, et c’est une préoccupation qui découle d’expériences antérieures. Après tout, la coopération avec des pays tiers jusqu’à présent – à savoir l’accord Turquie-UE et l’accord Espagne-Maroc – a suscité de nombreuses critiques sur le coût des droits de l’homme.

      Mais en plus des préoccupations relatives aux droits de l’homme, des questions sont soulevées sur les implications ou même les aspects pratiques de l’”incitation” des pays tiers à se conformer, l’image de l’UE en tant que champion des droits de l’homme étant déjà corrodée aux yeux de la communauté internationale.

      Il s’agira notamment d’utiliser la délivrance du code des visas comme méthode d’incitation. Pour les pays qui ne coopèrent pas à la réadmission, les visas seront plus difficiles à obtenir. La proposition visant à pénaliser les pays qui appliquent des restrictions en matière de visas n’est pas nouvelle et n’a pas conduit à une amélioration des relations diplomatiques. Guild fait valoir que cette approche est injuste pour les demandeurs de visa des pays “non coopérants” et qu’elle risque également de susciter des sentiments d’injustice chez les voisins du pays tiers.

      L’analyse de Guild est que le nouveau pacte est diplomatiquement faible. Au-delà du financement, il offre “peu d’attention aux intérêts des pays tiers”. Il faut reconnaître, après tout, que la réadmission a des coûts et des avantages asymétriques pour les pays qui les acceptent, surtout si l’on considère que la migration, comme le soulignent Cassarino et Marin, “continue d’être considérée comme une soupape de sécurité pour soulager la pression sur le chômage et la pauvreté dans les pays d’origine”.

      https://asile.ch/2021/03/02/impakter-un-nouveau-pacte-sur-lasile-et-les-migrations

      L’article original :
      A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?
      https://impakter.com/a-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum

    • The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees. International Experiences on Containment and Mobility and their Impacts on Trust and Rights

      In September 2020, the European Commission published what it described as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (emphasis added) that lays down a multi-annual policy agenda on issues that have been central to debate about the future of European integration. This book critically examines the new Pact as part of a Forum organized by the Horizon 2020 project ASILE – Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role.

      ASILE studies interactions between emerging international protection systems and the United Nations Global Compact for Refugees (UN GCR), with particular focus on the European Union’s role and the UN GCR’s implementation dynamics. It brings together a new international network of scholars from 13 institutions examining the characteristics of international and country specific asylum governance instruments and arrangements applicable to people seeking international protection. It studies the compatibility of these governance instruments’ with international protection and human rights, and the UN GCR’s call for global solidarity and responsibility sharing.

      https://www.asileproject.eu/the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-in-light-of-the-united-nations-glob

  • Trapped in Dublin

    ECRE’s study (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/842813/EPRS_STU(2020)842813_EN.pdf) on the implementation of the Dublin Regulation III, has just been published by the Europpean Parliament Research Service which commissioned it.

    Drawing largely on statistics from the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) database, managed by ECRE and fed by national experts from across Europe, and on ongoing Dublin-related litigation, the study uses the European Commission’s own Better Regulation toolbox. The Better Regulation framework is designed to evaluate any piece of Regulation against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value.

    There are no surprises:

    Assessing the data shows that Dublin III is not effective legislation as it does not meet its own objectives of allowing rapid access to the procedure and ending multiple applications. The hierarchy of criteria it lays down is not fully respected. It appears inefficient – financial costs are significant and probably disproportionate. Notable are the large investments in transfers that do not happen and the inefficient sending of different people in different directions. The human costs of the system are considerable – people left in limbo, people forcibly transferred, the use of detention. The relevance and EU added value of the Regulation in its current form should be questioned. The coherence of the Dublin Regulation is weak in three ways: internal coherence is lacking due to the differing interpretations of key articles across the Member States+; coherence with the rest of the asylum acquis is not perfect; and coherence with fundamental rights is weak due to flaws in drafting and implementation.

    So far, so already well known.

    None of this is news: everybody knows that Dublin is flawed. Indeed, in this week’s hearing at the European Parliament, speaker after speaker stood up to condemn Dublin, including all the Member States present. Even the Member States that drove the Dublin system and whose interests it is supposed to serve (loosely known as the northern Member States), now condemn it openly: it is important to hear Germany argue in a public event that the responsibility sharing rules are unfair and that both trust among states and compliance across the Common European Asylum System is not possible without a fundamental reform of Dublin.

    More disturbing is the view from the persons subject to Dublin, with Shaza Alrihawi from the Global Refugee-led Network describing the depression and despair resulting from being left in limbo while EU countries use Dublin to divest themselves of responsibility. One of the main objectives of Dublin is to give rapid access to an asylum procedure but here was yet another case of someone ready to contribute and to move on with their life who was delayed by Dublin. It is no surprise that “to Dublin” has become a verb in many European languages – “dubliner” or “dublinare”, and a noun: “I Dublinati” – in all cases with a strong negative connotation, reflecting the fear that people understandably have of being “dublinated”.

    With this picture indicating an unsatisfactory situation, what happens now?

    Probably not much. While there is agreement that Dublin III is flawed there is profound disagreement on what should replace it. But the perpetual debate on alternatives to Dublin needs to continue. Dysfunctional legislation which fails the Commission’s own Better Regulation assessment on every score cannot be allowed to sit and fester.

    All jurisdictions have redundant and dysfunctional legislation on their statute books; within the EU legal order, Dublin III is not the only example. Nonetheless, the damage it does is profound so it requires attention. ECRE’s study concludes that the problems exist at the levels of design and implementation. As well as the unfair underlying principles, the design leaves too much room for policy choices on implementation – precisely the problem that regulations as legal instruments are supposed to avoid. Member States’ policy choices on implementation are currently (and perhaps forever) shaped by efforts to minimise responsibility. This means that a focus on implementation alone is not the answer; changes should cover design and implementation.

    The starting point for reform has to be a fundamental overhaul, tackling the responsibility allocation principles. While the original Dublin IV proposal did not do this, there are multiple alternatives, including the European Parliament’s response to Dublin IV and the Commission’s own alternatives developed but not launched in 2016 and before.

    Of course, Dublin IV also had the other flaws, including introducing inadmissibility procedures pre-Dublin and reduction of standards in other ways. Moving forward now means it is necessary to de-link procedural changes and the responsibility-sharing piece.

    Unfortunately, the negotiations, especially between the Member States, are currently stuck in a cul-de-sac that focuses on exactly this kind of unwelcome deal. The discussion can be over-simplified as follows: “WE will offer you some ‘solidarity’ – possibly even a reform of Dublin – but only if, in exchange, YOU agree to manage mandatory or expanded border procedures of some description”. These might be expanded use of current optional asylum procedures at the border; it might be other types of rapid procedures or processes to make decisions about people arriving at or transferred to borders. In any case, the effect on the access to asylum and people’s rights will be highly detrimental, as ECRE has described at length. But they also won’t be acceptable to the “you” in this scenario, the Member States at the external borders.

    There is no logical or legal reason to link the procedural piece and responsibility allocation so closely. And why link responsibility allocation and procedures and not responsibility allocation and reception, for instance? Or responsibility allocation and national/EU resources? This derives from the intrusion of a different agenda: the disproportionate focus on onward movement, also known as (the) “secondary” movement (obsession).

    If responsibility allocation is unfair, then it should be reformed in and of itself, not in exchange for something. The cry will then go out that it is not fair because the MS perceived to “benefit” from the reform will get something for nothing. Well no: any reform could – and should – be accompanied with strict insistence on compliance with the rest of the asylum acquis. The well-documented implementation gaps at the levels of reception, registration, decision-making and procedural guarantees should be priority.

    Recent remarks by Commissioner Schinas (https://euobserver.com/migration/147511) present nothing new and among many uncertainties concerning the fate of the 2016 reforms is whether or not a “package approach” will be maintained by either or both the co-legislators – and whether indeed that is desirable. One bad scenario is that everything is reformed except Dublin. There are provisional inter-institutional agreements on five files, with the Commission suggesting that they move forward. ECRE’s view is that the changes contained in the agreements on these files would reduce protection standards and not add value; other assessments are that protection standards have been improved. Either way, there are strong voices in both the EP and among the MS who don’t want to go ahead without an agreement on Dublin. Which is not wrong – allocation of responsibility is essential in a partially harmonised system: with common legal provisions but without centralised decision-making, responsibility allocation is the gateway to access rights and obligations flowing from the other pieces of legislation. Thus, to pass other reforms without tackling Dublin seems rather pointless.

    While certainly not the best option, the best bet (if one had to place money on something) would be that nothing changes for the core legislation of the CEAS. For that reason, ECRE’s study also lists extensive recommendations for rights-based compliance with Dublin III.

    For example, effectiveness would be improved through better respect for the hierarchy of responsibility criteria, the letter of the law: prioritise family unity through policy choices, better practice on evidential standards, and greater use of Articles 16 and 17. Minimise the focus on transfers based on take-back requests, especially when they are doomed to fail. To know from the start that a transfer is doomed to fail yet to persist with it is an example of a particularly inhumane political dysfunction. Effectiveness also requires better reporting to deal with the multiple information gaps identified, and clarity on key provisions, including through guidance from the Commission.

    Solidarity among Member States could be fostered through use of Article 33 in challenging situations, which allows for preventive actions by the Commission and by Member States, and along with the Temporary Protection Directive, provides better options than some of the new contingency plans under discussion. The use of Article 17, 1 and 2, provides a legal basis for the temporary responsibility-sharing mechanisms which are needed in the absence of deeper reform.

    In perhaps the most crucial area, fundamental rights compliance could be significantly improved: avoid coercive transfers; implement CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence on reasons for suspension of transfers – there is no need to show systemic deficiencies (CK, Jawo); make a policy decision to suspend transfers to the EU countries where conditions are not adequate and human rights violations are commonplace, rather than waiting for the courts to block the transfer. Resources and political attention could focus on the rights currently neglected: the right to family life, the best interests of the child, right to information, alternatives to detention. Evaluating implementation should be done against the Charter of Fundamental Rights and should always include the people directly affected.

    Even with flawed legislation, there are decisions on policy and resource allocation to be made that could make for better compliance and, in this case, compliance in a way that generates less suffering.

    https://www.ecre.org/weekly-editorial-trapped-in-dublin

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin #Dublin_III #Better_Regulation #efficacité #demandes_multiples (le fameux #shopping_de_l'asile) #accélération_des_procédures #coût #transferts_Dublin #renvois_Dublin #coûts_humains #rétention #limbe #détention_administrative #renvois_forcés #cohérence #droits_humains #dépression #désespoir #santé_mentale #responsabilité #Dublin_IV #procédure_d'asile #frontières #frontière #mouvements_secondaires #unité_familiale #inhumanité #solidarité #Temporary_Protection_Directive #protection_temporaire #droits #intérêt_supérieur_de_l'enfant

    –—

    Commentaire de Aldo Brina à qui je fais aveuglement confiance :

    Les éditos de #Catherine_Woollard, secrétaire générale de l’#ECRE, sont souvent bons… mais celui-ci, qui porte sur Dublin, gagne à être lu et largement diffusé

    ping @karine4 @isskein

    • #Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 décembre 2020 sur la mise en œuvre du règlement #Dublin_III (2019/2206(INI))

      Extrait :

      Les procédures de transfert ont fortement augmenté en 2016-2017 et génèrent des coûts humains, matériels et financiers considérables ; déplore toutefois que les transferts n’aient été effectués que dans 11 % des cas, ce qui aggrave encore la surcharge souvent importante des régimes d’asile et confirme le manque d’efficacité du règlement ; juge essentiels les efforts visant à garantir l’accès à l’information et des procédures rapides pour le regroupement familial et les transferts de demandeurs d’asile

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0361_FR.html

      #statistiques #chiffres

  • Francesco Maiani | Quelle réforme pour le système de Dublin ?

    La crise de 2015 n’y est pour rien. Dublin n’a jamais fonctionné correctement. La Commission le reconnaît elle-même : « Par sa conception ou sa mauvaise mise en œuvre » il « fait peser une responsabilité disproportionnée sur certains États membres et encourage des flux migratoires irréguliers et incontrôlés ». Avant 2015, « il existait déjà […] de graves défaillances dans [sa] mise en œuvre » [3].

    Un vaste déficit d’efficacité et d’effectivité. Entre 2008 et 2014, il y a eu 2’680’000 demandes d’asile, 402’800 requêtes Dublin, 275’000 transferts agréés et environ 94’000 transferts effectués. Un énorme gaspillage de ressources pour un résultat négligeable en termes de distribution effective. Cerise sur le gâteau : les « transferts nets » entre États membres ont été « proches de zéro » [4].

    À la lecture du projet Dublin IV, la priorité n° 1 semble être « empêcher que le fonctionnement du système ne soit perturbé par des mouvements secondaires de demandeurs d’asile […] vers l’État membre de leur choix »[6]. Le moyen choisi est la dissuasion : le demandeur ne demandant pas l’asile dans le premier Etat est soumis à une procédure accélérée ; le demandeur qui se déplace vers le « mauvais Etat » y est privé de tout support matériel ; le demandeur qui doit être « repris en charge » par l’Etat responsable est pénalisé au stade de la procédure d’asile. La procédure peut même être définitivement close en son absence. Pour durcir encore le système, la Commission propose de restreindre le champ d’application de la clause de souveraineté en la rendant applicable aux seuls motifs familiaux, et de limiter le droit de recours à deux seuls motifs : mauvaise application des critères fondés sur les liens familiaux et existence d’une « défaillance systémique » dans l’Etat responsable.

    Mais c’est le simplisme de l’approche de la Commission qui frappe. Trop de recours ralentissent Dublin ? Loin d’agir sur les causes, on coupe sur le droit de recours ! Les demandeurs ne coopèrent pas ? Il suffit de les menacer de sanctions draconiennes. Vingt ans d’expérience, culminés dans la boue du camp informel de Idomeni, en Grèce, n’a pas suffi à la Commission pour apprendre que les demandeurs sont prêts à payer le prix fort pour garder de facto leur liberté de choix. La tentative de les « dissuader » par un mix de sanctions – déjà expérimentées sans succès au niveau national – ne peut qu’approfondir le fossé entre demandeurs et système officiel d’accueil sans rien apporter en termes d’efficacité.

    Si on regarde les choses du point de vue des Etats, et notamment des Etats en première ligne, l’élimination du critère de l’entrée irrégulière représenterait aussi un pas en avant décisif vers plus de justice distributive. Elle éliminerait par ailleurs l’incitation, déjà évoquée, à ne pas identifier les arrivants.

    L’idée du #choix est en soi révolutionnaire dans le débat Dublin, mais on peut présumer que les options seront limitées à des alternatives peu attractives.

    Reste que tant la Proposition Dublin IV et le rapport Wikström partagent une même erreur de perspective. Celle de prétendre que la solidarité entre États membres pourra se faire en se « partageant » les demandeurs d’asile. Ceci impliquerait un nombre massif de transferts. Or, l’expérience démontre à souhait combien ceci est infaisable et indésirable. Un Système européen commun d’asile doit indéniablement reposer sur un meilleur partage des responsabilités et de l’accueil. Augmenter les coûts globaux et multiplier les occasions de coercition nous conduirait toutefois droit dans le mur.

    https://asile.ch/2018/06/14/francesco-maiani-quelle-reforme-pour-le-systeme-de-dublin

    #pays_sûr #Dublin #règlement_dublin #asile #migrations #réfugiés #UE #EU #Europe #Dublin_IV #Rapport_Wikström
    cc @isskein

    • L’asile politique et l’Union européenne. Propositions pour sortir de l’#impasse : Le volontariat avant la contrainte, et l’internationalisation si celle-ci est envisagée.

      Aujourd’hui la régulation de l’asile politique dans l’Union européenne parait gérée par deux mécanismes qui provoquent la colère des uns puis celle des autres. Le risque aujourd’hui existe que sur l’asile, l’une de ses valeurs les plus fondamentales l’Union européenne se divise, se « démoralise » et éclate. Comment sortir de l’impasse ? Les auteurs esquissent des pistes de sortie de la crise actuelle.

      https://journals.openedition.org/revdh/4657

  • Riformare Dublino? Campa cavallo

    Article de @stesummi

    Anche secondo Ferruccio Pastore, direttore del Forum internazionale ed europeo di ricerche sull’immigrazioneLink esterno (FIERILink esterno), con sede a Torino, una revisione sostanziale del regolamento di Dublino è altamente improbabile e Matteo Salvini ne è consapevole. «Per questo sta tentando di agire su un altro terreno, quello del mare, problematico sia da un punto di visto morale che giuridico. Non credo però che abbia un grande margine di manovra, perché l’Italia in questo momento è come un vaso di coccio tra i vasi di ferro. Il paradosso è che in Europa c’è un consenso sul fatto che l’Italia non debba essere lasciata sola, ma da queste parole non scaturiscono fatti».

    Inoltre, una riforma del regolamento di Dublino non risolverebbe la questione, precisa Ferruccio Pastore. «Negli ultimi quattro anni, l’Italia ha visto sbarcare oltre mezzo milione di migranti africani. Si tratta per lo più di giovani maschi, con un basso livello di formazione e senza titolo per ottenere lo statuto di rifugiati o la protezione sussidiaria. Queste persone esulano dunque da ogni possibile programma di ricollocamento all’interno dell’UE e pongono l’Italia in una situazione unica rispetto ad altri paesi europei».

    «Se è vero che Dublino va riformato, bisogna però anche rendersi conto che la gestione della migrazione va oltre la questione dell’asilo, che in assenza di vie legali è diventato l’unico strumento per ottenere un permesso per venire in Europa».

    L’Unione Europea sembra però incapace di trovare un consenso minimo su una nuova politica migratoria e il caso Aquarius ha reso ancora più evidente la frattura e l’incoerenza esistente in seno ai paesi membri. La Francia, che da tempo ha chiuso la frontiera con Ventimiglia, accusa l’Italia di cinismo; la Spagna dà prova di solidarietà, ma barrica le sue enclave di Ceuta e Melilla; Angela Merkel è costretta - forse - ad accettare di respingere i migranti alla frontiera per salvare il suo governo; e il presidente ungherese Viktor Orban non vuol sentire parlar d’altro che di un rimpatrio immediato di tutti i profughi.

    La strada da percorrere è questa, secondo il direttore del FIERI, ma «il problema è che malgrado le promesse, i paesi europei - in particolari quelli che dicono ’aiutiamoli a casa loro’ - non hanno versato alcun contributo per il fondo fiduciario europeo per l’Africa, il primo strumento operativo per creare delle alternative in loco». Ferruccio Pastore sottolinea inoltre il pericolo insito negli accordi che diversi paesi europei e la stessa Unione stanno facendo con l’Africa. «Si investono risorse importanti affinché i governi africani diventino gendarmi dei loro popoli, vietando loro ogni libertà, e questo a lungo andare può essere uno strumento avvelenato, generare insicurezza e perfino portare a una rivoluzione, come è stato il caso per la Primavera araba».


    https://www.tvsvizzera.it/tvs/vicenda-aquarius_riformare-dublino--campa-cavallo/44198368
    #Dublin #Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Dublin_IV #relocalisation #arrivées #statistiques #Méditerranée #chiffres #mer_Méditerranée #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement

  • Il y a déjà beaucoup de matériel sur seenthis concernant les #ONG en #Méditerranée (v. https://seenthis.net/messages/678296)

    Je me suis dite que cela valait la peine de commencer un nouveau fil, car il y aura encore beaucoup de choses à archiver depuis que le nouveau gouvernement en Italie a été formé...

    Ce fil complète plus particulièrement celui-ci : https://seenthis.net/messages/514535

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #mourir_en_mer #sauvetage

    cc @isskein

    • Ong, Saviano replica a #Salvini: «Il diritto del mare ha una regola sacra: non si lasciano annegare le persone»

      Lo scrittore e giornalista Roberto Saviano risponde attraverso un video alle parole pronunciate dal leader della Lega e neo ministro Matteo Salvini ("Le Ong? No ai vice scafisti che attraccano nei porti"): «La poca conoscenza che ha il ministro Salvini del diritto del mare lo porta a ignorare un elemento fondamentale: le Ong agiscono sempre coordinate dalla Guardia Costiera italiana, quindi sempre nel rispetto delle regole. Dando dei ’vice scafisti’ a persone che salvano vite in mare, sta dando anche colpa alla Guardia costiera italiana e di questo deve prendersene responsabilità». Infine dice: «Il diritto del mare ha una regola eterna: Non si lasciano persone a mare, non si lasciano annegare. E non sarà Salvini a interrompere questo diritto sacro»

      https://video.repubblica.it/politica/ong-saviano-replica-a-salvini-il-diritto-del-mare-ha-una-regola-sacra-non-si-lasciano-annegare-le-persone/306649/307279?refresh_ce

    • Migranti, Salvini a Malta: «La nave Aquarius non può attraccare in Italia». La replica: «Non spetta a noi»

      La decisione del ministro dell’Interno che ha intimato a Malta di accettare la nave con a bordo 629 migranti che sta entrando nelle acque di competenza de La Valletta. Gino Strada: «Sconcertato nel vedere ministri razzisti o sbirri alla guida del mio Paese»


      https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_giugno_11/migranti-salvini-la-aquarius-non-potra-approdare-un-porto-italiano-28e
      #Malte

    • #Aquarius, da Napoli a Palermo i sindaci contro Salvini: “I nostri porti sono aperti. È senza cuore e viola le norme”

      #Luigi_De_Magistris e #Leoluca_Orlando danno la loro disponibilità ad accogliere la nave Aquarius con a bordo gli oltre 600 migranti. Il sindaco di #Messina: «La nave è diretta qui, no a diktat: il porto è aperto». #Falcomatà (#Reggio_Calabria): «Disponibili come sempre». Pd: «Rischi umanitari, parli Conte». Boldrini: «Il ministro dell’Interno riporta il Paese ai tempi di sua nonna». Ma Forza Italia sta con il governo

      https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/06/10/aquarius-da-napoli-palermo-sindaci-contro-salvini-nostri-porti-sono-aperti-e-senza-cuore-e-viola-le-norme/4417316
      #Naples #Palerme #port

    • Migranti, Salvini a Malta: «Accolga la nave Aquarius, porti italiani chiusi». La replica: «Non è nostra competenza»

      Messaggio alle autorità maltesi: «Il porto più sicuro è il vostro». La risposta è negativa: «Il soccorso è stato coordinato da Roma». Il premier Conte: «Inviamo motovedette con medici». Alle 22.50 arrivano nuove istruzioni: fermarsi in mezzo al mare a 35 miglia dalla Sicilia


      http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2018/06/10/news/porti_salvini-198644488

    • De Magistris: «Il porto di Napoli pronto ad accogliere i migranti»

      Il sindaco del capoluogo campano risponde così alla decisione del ministro dell’Interno: «Metodo brutale, noi siamo per le vite umane». Con lui, i primi cittadini di Messina, Palermo, Reggio Calabria. Molte le critiche da sinistra. Grasso (Leu) commenta la foto di Salvini: «Olio di ricino su tela»

      http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2018/06/10/news/de_magistris_il_porto_di_napoli_pronto_ad_accogliere_i_migranti_-19866240

    • L’#Espagne va accueillir le navire avec 629 migrants en Méditerranée, le ministre italien Salvini crie victoire et prévient les autres navires

      L’Espagne a accepté d’accueillir le navire transportant les 629 migrants secourus au large de la Libye, dont le sort était l’enjeu d’un bras de fer entre Malte et l’Italie, a annoncé lundi le gouvernement de Pedro Sanchez. « Le président du gouvernement Pedro Sanchez a donné des instructions pour que l’Espagne honore les engagements internationaux en matière de crise humanitaire et a annoncé qu’elle accueillerait dans un port espagnol le navire Aquarius dans lequel se trouvent plus de 600 personnes abandonnées à leur sort en Méditerranée », indique un communiqué de la présidence du gouvernement.

      http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/l-espagne-va-accueillir-le-navire-avec-629-migrants-en-mediterranee-le-minis

    • Migrants rejetés par l’Italie : l’Espagne propose d’accueillir l’« Aquarius » dans le port de Valence

      Six cent vingt-neuf passagers, dont de nombreux enfants, sont depuis samedi à bord du navire de sauvetage qui ne trouve pas de port pour l’accueillir.

      Un espoir pour les 629 migrants de l’Aquarius ? Le chef du gouvernement espagnol, Pedro Sanchez, a annoncé lundi 11 juin que son pays accueillerait le navire de sauvetage affrété par l’ONG française SOS-Méditerranée qui s’est vu refuser depuis samedi l’accès aux ports italiens et maltais.

      « Il est de notre obligation d’aider à éviter une catastrophe humanitaire et d’offrir un “port sûr” à ces personnes », dit un communiqué de la présidence du gouvernement, précisant que le port de Valence a été choisi comme destination du navire.

      Le premier ministre maltais, qui a lui-même refusé d’accueillir le navire, a remercié sur Twitter son homologue espagnol et proposé de faire parvenir des provisions à l’Aquarius. « Nous devrons nous réunir pour éviter qu’une telle situation se reproduise », écrit-il, ajoutant : « Il s’agit d’un problème européen. »

      Rien n’est pourtant acté du côté de l’association SOS-Méditerranée : « Cette déclaration politique doit encore trouver une traduction opérationnelle, notamment auprès des autorités maritimes », a indiqué au Monde Fabienne Lassalle, directrice adjointe de l’ONG.

      Depuis dimanche, la situation n’a pas évolué au large de Malte, où se trouve l’Aquarius, à quelque 30 milles de la petite île méditerranéenne, malgré les appels en ce sens de l’ONU et de Bruxelles. Sept femmes enceintes, 11 enfants en bas âge et 123 mineurs isolés notamment se trouvent à bord.

      « Impératif humanitaire »

      « Nous demandons à toutes les parties concernées de contribuer à un règlement rapide afin que les personnes à bord du navire Aquarius puissent être débarquées en toute sécurité dès que possible », a déclaré devant la presse le porte-parole de la Commission européenne, Margaritis Schinas, évoquant un « impératif humanitaire ».

      Le même terme a été repris par le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR) de l’Organisation des Nations unies, qui a décrit la situation comme « un impératif humanitaire urgent ». « Les gens sont en détresse, ils sont à court de provisions et ont besoin d’aide rapidement », affirment les Nations unies. « Les questions plus larges de savoir qui a la responsabilité et comment ces responsabilités doivent être partagées entre Etats devraient être traitées plus tard », ajoute leur communiqué.

      En Europe, Berlin a fait part de sa préoccupation. « Le gouvernement allemand appelle toutes les parties impliquées à assumer leur responsabilité humanitaire », a déclaré le porte-parole du gouvernement allemand, Steffen Seibert.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/06/11/la-commission-europeenne-exhorte-malte-et-l-italie-a-trouver-une-solution-po
      #Valence

    • El Gobierno ofrece el puerto de Valencia para acoger a los 629 refugiados a la deriva en el Mediterráneo

      El Gobierno central acepta el ofrecimiento de Valencia como ciudad de acogida de los más de 600 inmigrantes que llevan días deambulando en un barco en el Mediterráneo. El alcalde de València, Joan Ribó, ha ofrecido este lunes la ciudad de para acoger a los refugiados del Aquarius, el barco de rescate de la ONG SOS Mediterráneo con 629 inmigrantes a bordo, entre ellos 123 menores, al que Italia ha cerrado sus puertos.

      https://www.eldiario.es/cv/Ribo-Valencia-refugiados-rescatados-Mediterraneo_0_781122098.html

    • Pedro Sánchez ofrece València como puerto para el ‘Aquarius’

      El Gobierno de España ha ofrecido a la ONU la ciudad de València como “puerto seguro” para el barco ‘Aquarius’, que navega con 629 inmigrantes y refugiados rescatados por MSF y Sos Mediterranée, cuya entrada a Italia ha sido impedida por el nuevo ministro del Interior, Matteo Salvini. La alcaldesa de Barcelona, Ada Colau, también había ofrecido su puerto.

      Pedro Sánchez ha dado instrucciones para que España “cumpla con los compromisos internacionales en materia de crisis humanitarias”, ha destacado el Ejecutivo en un comunicado. “Es nuestra obligación ayudar a evitar una catástrofe humanitaria y ofrecer ‘un puerto seguro’ a estas personas, cumpliendo de esta manera con las obligaciones del Derecho Internacional”, añade. El destino será València previa coordinación con la Generalitat valenciana.

      http://www.lavanguardia.com/r/GODO/LV/p5/WebSite/2018/06/11/Recortada/_20180611125507-kV2H-U4519741327t5H-992x558@LaVanguardia-Web.jpg
      http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/valencia/20180611/4519741327/valencia-se-ofrece-puerto-aquarius.html

    • Aquarius: Spagna troppo lontana, fa rotta verso l’Italia

      Sos e Msf decidono di non fare rotta verso la Spagna, troppo rischioso. Raggiungere Valencia significa sottoporre i migranti a ore estenuati di viaggio. A bordo c’è ancora cibo e acqua ma non sufficienti per i giorni necessari a raggiungere la Spagna: l’equipaggio ritiene che sia comunque rischioso.

      La nostra corrispondente, Anelise Borges, direttamente dalla nave, ha intervistato in esclusiva per Euronews il coordinatore della ong Sos Mediterranée Italia, Nicola Stalla:

      «Abbiamo informato Spagna e Italia e tutte le autorità marittime in comunicazione con l’Aquarius in queste ore, che le circostanze in cui ci troviamo e con la quantittà ingente di persone a bordo, non ci sarebbero le condizioni di sicurezza per la nave e per l’equipaggio e per tutte le persone che sono a bordo per affrontare quest’altro viaggio e arrivare in spagna»

      Avremmo potuto affrontare questo tipo di viaggio se avessimo avuto meno persone sulla nave in modo tale che potessero essere accomodati e protetti all’interno di uno spazio coperto e non esposti all’aperto sui pontili. Le condizioni atmosferiche peggioreranno nei prossimi giorni infatti"
      La Sos Mediterrannée che opera in parternariato con Medici senza frontiere, reputa insomma troppo lontana la Spagna e non puo accettare la proposta del neo premier Pedro Sànchez.

      http://it.euronews.com/2018/06/11/aquarius-spagna-troppo-lontana-fa-rotta-verso-l-italia

    • L’Aquarius non approderà in Spagna

      La ong SOS Mediterranée ha rifiutato l’offerta del governo spagnolo: il viaggio fino al porto di Valencia sarebbe stato insostenibile per i seicento migranti a bordo della nave

      Lunedì sera la ong SOS Mediterranée ha fatto sapere che la nave Aquarius in arrivo dalla Libia e con circa seicento migranti a bordo non approderà al porto di Valencia, nonostante l’offerta del nuovo governo spagnolo guidato dal socialista Pedro Sánchez. SOS Mediterranée – che si trova ancora tra Malta e Italia dopo che le era stato rifiutato l’approdo dal governo italiano – ha detto che il viaggio per Valencia sarebbe stato troppo lungo, dai tre ai cinque giorni, e avrebbe messo in pericolo la vita delle persone a bordo. La nave, infatti, ha già raggiunto la sua massima capienza e nei prossimi giorni è previsto un peggioramento del tempo. SOS Mediterranée ha ringraziato il governo spagnolo dell’offerta e ha sollecitato quello italiano a trovare una soluzione per le oltre seicento persone che si trovano sulla nave, molte delle quali minori e alcune in condizioni di salute precarie.

      Il governo spagnolo – che da pochi giorni è guidato dal leader socialista Pedro Sánchez – aveva fatto sapere di aver messo a disposizione il porto di Valencia «per evitare una crisi umanitaria». Valencia dista però più di 1.500 chilometri e fin da subito erano emersi dubbi sul fatto che l’equipaggio e le persone soccorse sarebbero state in grado di compiere un viaggio così lungo.

      https://www.ilpost.it/2018/06/11/aquarius-migranti-salvini

    • Commentaire de Sara Prestianni sur FB :

      Valencia è a 700 miglia da dove si trova ora L’Aquarius, a 3-4 giorni di traversata .... non certo il porto più sicuro.

      Inoltre con il far approdare la nave della Marina al porto di Catania, Salvini ribadisce che il suo obbiettivo sono, oltre ai migranti, le ong che praticano salvataggio in mare.

      https://www.facebook.com/prestianni.sara/posts/10216315178380129

      Et réponse d’Alessandro Fioroni :

      infatti mi pare che questo aspetto sia quasi espunto dal dibattito, tra l’altro 4 giorni per andare e 4 per tornare fanno 8, 8 giorni di assenza dalla zona calda. Spero proprio che non si verifichino tragedie

    • Pourquoi le navire humanitaire « Aquarius » n’accosterait pas en France ?

      A la différence de l’Espagne, la France n’a pour l’heure pas fait de proposition à l’ONG SOS Méditerranée pour accueillir son bateau, et rien ne l’y oblige.

      Bonjour,

      Le navire Aquarius, qui secoure les migrants en difficulté en Méditerranée au cours de la traversée vers l’Europe, s’est vu proposer, lundi 11 juin, un port espagnol pour accoster. Habitué des rades italiennes, le bateau affrété par SOS Méditerranée paye cher l’arrivée au pouvoir, de l’autre côté des Alpes, de la coalition Ligue du Nord (extrême droite) - mouvement Cinq Étoiles (anti système).

      Le ministre de l’Intérieur Matteo Salvini (Ligue du Nord) a en effet refusé, pendant le week-end, d’accueillir l’Aquarius, et les plus de 600 migrants rescapés à son bord. Dimanche, Salvini reprochait à Malte de ne pas prendre ses responsabilités, menaçant de ne plus laisser accoster aucun bateau humanitaire dans les ports italiens, si La Valette n’ouvrait pas ses rades à l’Aquarius. Mais les Maltais ont refusé.

      Le Premier ministre socialiste espagnol Pedro Sanchez est alors entré en jeu, proposant le port de Valence au navire. Salvini s’est alors félicité, lors d’une conférence de presse à Milan, ce lundi après-midi, que le bateau débarque « dans un autre port qu’un port italien ». « Victoire », a aussi écrit le droitiste ministre de l’Intérieur italien sur Twitter. Dans la foulée, le Premier ministre maltais annonçait que l’île allait envoyer des ravitaillements à l’Aquarius, pour lui permettre de rallier l’Espagne.
      Querelle de droits

      L’Aquarius est intervenu dans les eaux territoriales libyennes, et a réalisé, selon l’Agence France-Presse, six opérations dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche. Il compte aujourd’hui 629 migrants à son bord. Sur marinetraffic.com, on peut situer le navire, au sud de la Sicile, à l’est de Malte et observer le trajet du bateau jusqu’aux côtes de Libye et en sens inverse.

      « Selon la Convention internationale sur le sauvetage (Search and Rescue, SAR) de 1979, les Etats définissent une zone où ils sont habilités à effectuer des sauvetages », explique à CheckNews Kiara Neri, maître de conférences à Lyon III. Puisque la Libye n’a pas les moyens d’assurer cette mission, la « zone SAR » italienne s’étend jusqu’aux côtes de l’Etat africain. « C’est donc le commandement de Rome qui gère les bateaux humanitaires qui interviennent là-bas », résume la spécialiste du droit international et maritime.

      L’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), dans une résolution de 2004, rappelle qu’il faut, en vertu des conventions internationales, que « dans un temps raisonnable, un endroit sûr [place of safety] » soit assuré aux personnes assistées en mer. Et ensuite : « La responsabilité de mettre à disposition un endroit sûr, ou de s’assurer qu’un endroit sûr soit mis à disposition, incombe au gouvernement responsable de la zone SAR dans laquelle les survivants ont été sauvés. » En l’occurrence, l’Italie.

      Or, à 19 heures ce lundi, Rome n’a toujours pas donné de consignes à l’Aquarius. « Nous sommes toujours en stand by », se désole Antoine Laurent, responsable des opérations maritimes de SOS Méditerranée, auprès de CheckNews. « On attend d’avoir des nouvelles des Italiens, soit pour nous dire d’accoster quelque part, soit pour nous confirmer qu’on doit aller en Espagne. »

      Sur le papier, toutefois, plusieurs villes, comme Reggio de Calabre, ou Naples, ont offert l’hospitalité, via les réseaux sociaux, à l’Aquarius. « Mais ces propositions ne servent pas si le ministère de l’Intérieur s’y oppose », rappelle Kiara Neri.
      Et la France dans tout ça ?

      Théoriquement, le bateau a le droit de sortir de la zone SAR italienne. Le problème, c’est qu’il n’en a pas les moyens. L’Espagne est à près de trois jours de mer, et le bateau ne dispose de vivres que pour une journée, selon Sophie Beau. La directrice générale de SOS Méditerranée, interrogée par l’AFP, juge la proposition espagnole « encourageante » mais « concrètement, il faut qu’on puisse débarquer au plus vite. »

      Ce manque de nourriture constitue, selon l’ONG, un « impératif humanitaire urgent », qui pourrait contraindre Malte ou l’Italie à laisser accoster l’Aquarius.

      Le bâtiment appartenant à une ONG française, que peut et doit faire Paris ? « Légalement, rien n’oblige la France à proposer quoi que ce soit », observe Kiara Neri. Par ailleurs, « la France n’est pas beaucoup plus près que l’Espagne », remarque Antoine Laurent qui préférerait voir le bateau jeter l’ancre à Malte ou en Sicile.

      Toutefois, selon le responsable de SOS Méditerranée, l’ONG n’a reçu aucune proposition de la part des autorités françaises. Sollicités par CheckNews, les ministères de l’Intérieur et des Affaires étrangères, et la présidence de la République n’ont pas répondu.

      Interrogé à ce sujet par une journaliste de BFM, lors d’une conférence de presse en marge d’une rencontre bilatérale avec la Belgique sur la sécurité et la lutte contre le terrorisme, le Premier ministre Edouard Philippe a botté en touche, évoquant plus largement la politique migratoire française, estimant notamment qu’il faut « traiter avec les pays d’origine de ces migrations […] pour éviter les départs ».

      Cordialement

      http://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2018/06/11/pourquoi-le-navire-humanitaire-aquarius-n-accosterait-pas-en-france_16582

    • UN High Commissioner for Refugees welcomes Spain’s decision to allow Aquarius to dock
      Today’s decision of Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of Spain to exceptionally allow a rescue ship, Aquarius, to dock in his country is courageous and welcome. It ends what was becoming an increasingly difficult and untenable situation for the crew of the Aquarius and the more than 600 rescued people who were aboard.

      Irrespective of how European countries choose to manage their sea borders, the principle of rescue at sea is one that should never be in doubt. I would welcome opportunity to discuss with concerned governments arrangements for search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and to avoid any repetition of the situation in which the Aquarius found itself.

      My office stands ready, as always to work with countries of Europe and the Mediterranean to ensure that saving lives and maintaining asylum remains our shared priority.

      http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/6/5b1ea1824/un-high-commissioner-refugees-welcomes-spains-decision-allow-aquarius-dock.ht

    • Refugees in Orbit – again !

      Matteo Salvini, Italy’s new far-right home secretary, tweeted “Vittoria!” after news broke that the 629 persons stranded aboard the M.S. Aquarius would be forced to proceed to the Spanish city of Valencia rather than being allowed to disembark at much closer ports in Sicily. But for whom was it a “victory”?

      Surely not for those seeking asylum who had been stranded at sea for days on an overcrowded search and rescue ship. The ability of ship’s crew of 12 had been strained to the breaking point attempting to meet the medical and survival needs of those rescued on Saturday, including persons with serious chemical burns and others requiring urgent orthopaedic surgery, as Italy and Malta bickered like petulant children about which should step in to save lives.

      And surely not for international law. The longstanding principle that a shipmaster has a duty to rescue persons in distress without regard for their nationality, status, or circumstances is pragmatically viable only when states honour their duty to enable the speedy disembarkation of those rescued – a duty that Italy (and perhaps also Malta) breached in this case.

      But is it a victory for Italy, as the home secretary presumably meant to suggest? There is no doubt that Italy (and to a much greater extent, Greece) has shouldered more than its fair share of refugees arriving to seek protection in Europe. Nor can it be doubted that Europe and the rest of the world have acted too slowly and undependably to share-out what is in principle a common responsibility to protect refugees, thus fueling frustration and even anger. The EU’s absurd “Dublin Regulation” rule that allocates nearly all protection duties to the first country in which a refugee arrives is both unprincipled and cruel. So while nothing can justify Italy’s flagrant breach of the duty to facilitate speedy disembarkation of those rescued, its determination to force a redistribution of responsibility is perhaps more comprehensible.

      In truth, the real villain here is an outmoded system of implementing protection obligations under the UN’s Refugee Convention. Under the status quo, whatever country a refugee reaches is the one and only country that has protection obligations to that refugee. Accidents of geography, rather than any principled metric, determine which states are obliged to carry the burdens for implementing what is in theory a universal duty to protect refugees. That approach has led to some 60% of the world’s refugees being left in the hands of just 10, mostly very poor, countries – with the rest of us giving them only bits of charity and offering resettlement to only about 1% of the refugees they admit. There is therefore a perverse incentive built into the system to turn refugees away – as this week’s horrific events in the Mediterranean make clear.

      The UN’s “global compact” process was supposed to end this prisoner’s dilemma. Yet under the proposal now offered by UNHCR (the UN’s global refugee agency), little will change. The agency suggests only that states agree to attempt to hash out possible voluntary relief to frontline states on a case-by-case basis – leaving those states confronted with the arrival of refugees in the truly horrible bind of choosing between waiting and hoping for solidarity (that may or may not come) and turning refugees away. For the UN to have failed to put forward a plan for binding and immediate sharing of financial burdens and human responsibilities is ethically inexcusable.

      So if Italy is angry, it should turn its anger toward those responsible for its dilemma – the EU for failing to move beyond the manifestly wrong-headed “first country of arrival rule,” and the UN for failing to offer leadership on a serious system to share refugee burdens and responsibilities. But taking out its anger on sick and exhausted refugees as it did this week was not a victory for anyone.

      https://verfassungsblog.de/refugees-in-orbit-again

    • En 1939, l’Amérique ferma sa frontière à un paquebot de 908 réfugiés #juifs

      À l’heure où l’Europe ferme ses frontières aux réfugiés, il est bon de se rappeler cet épisode de 1939 où un bateau de plus de 900 réfugiés juifs fut prié de retourner en Europe, sous le régime nazi.

      Le 13 mai 1939, le #Saint-Louis, paquebot transatlantique allemand, quitte le port de Hambourg. À son bord, 937 passagers. La grande majorité d’entre eux sont des juifs allemands fuyant le Troisième Reich.

      Persécutés–quelques mois auparavant avait lieu la Nuit de Cristal, pogrom où une centaine de juifs furents assassinés–, ils ont réuni l’argent nécessaire pour un visa et un aller simple sur le Saint-Louis dans l’espoir de trouver refuge en Amérique.

      Mais, alors que leur paquebot appareille dans le port de la Havane, les autorités cubaines ne les autorisent pas à débarquer. Hostile envers les juifs, « le pays souffrait en plus d’une dépression économique et beaucoup de Cubains n’appréciaient pas du tout le nombre relativement grand de réfugiés [...], qui étaient perçus comme des concurrents pour les rares emplois », rapporte l’Encyclopédie multimédia de la Shoah. Seuls vingt-neuf d’entre eux sont autorisés à rester sur le sol cubain.

      Quotas de réfugiés

      Après Cuba, le Saint-Louis tente sa chance aux États-Unis. Le bateau navigue si près des côtes de la Floride que les passagers aperçoivent les lumières de Miami. Un câble est envoyé au président Franklin D. Roosevelt, lui demandant de leur accorder l’asile. Il ne reçut jamais de réponse.
      À l’époque, la presse américaine s’est largement fait l’écho de la situation critique des passagers du Saint-Louis. Mais l’Acte d’immigration de 1924, mis en place aux États-Unis, limitait le nombre de réfugiés pouvant être admis chaque année. À l’été 1939, le quota était déjà atteint.

      Les Américains, quoique compatissants vis-à-vis des réfugiés et indignés par la politique du régime nazi, soutiennent ces restrictions à l’immigration. La crise économique de 1929 venait de passer par là, laissant des millions d’Américains au chômage, et l’arrivée d’immigrés était vue comme une menace sur les derniers emplois disponibles.

      Souvenir honteux

      Le Saint-Louis a dû faire demi-tour pour l’Europe, alors sous la botte nazie. Beaucoup de ses passagers furent victimes des camps, comme les membres de cette famille, tous tués à Auschwitz, rapporte le site News :

      Le Saint-Louis a dû faire demi-tour pour l’Europe, alors sous la botte nazie. Beaucoup de ses passagers furent victimes des camps

      Le souvenir honteux du paquebot Saint-Louis, désormais immortalisé dans les musées de l’holocauste à travers le monde, n’est pas sans rappeler la situation critique de l’Europe.

      La Méditerranée est devenue un cimetière marin, avec plus de 30.000 migrants morts depuis 2000 lors du naufrage de leur embarcation, tandis qu’à Calais les réfugiés tentent de forcer l’entrée du tunnel sous la Manche au péril de leur vie. Pendant ce temps, les pays européens hésitent sur la marche à suivre pour gérer cet afflux de migrants et de réfugiés fuyant la guerre dans leur pays.

      Faut-il leur ouvrir toutes grandes les portes de l’Europe ? Faut-il se protéger avec encore plus de barbelés ? L’opinion oscille entre bonne volonté utopique et xénophobie voilée. Il n’existe aucune solution simple, mais conclut le site Project Syndicate, « se rappeler du sort des juifs d’Europe dans les années 1930 devrait au moins nous obliger à ne pas faire preuve d’indifférence envers le sort de ceux qui n’ont nulle part où aller ».


      http://www.slate.fr/story/106249/1939-amerique-refoulait-refugies-juifs
      #histoire #WWII #deuxième_guerre_mondiale #seconde_guerre_mondiale

    • Cronaca di una giornata sull’Aquarius

      Dalla sera del 10 giugno la nave Aquarius di Sos Méditerranée e Medici senza frontiere è ferma a 35 miglia dalle coste italiane, in attesa che le autorità decidano quale è il porto di destinazione, ma la situazione a bordo è sempre più critica. La nave trasporta 629 persone, salvate in diverse operazioni al largo della Libia nel corso del weekend: i viveri basteranno ancora soltanto per poche ore. Nel frattempo il nuovo governo spagnolo, guidato dal socialista Pedro Sánchez, ha dato la sua disponibilità allo sbarco dei migranti nel porto di Valencia, in Spagna, che dista però qualche giorno di navigazione dal punto in cui la nave umanitaria si trova in questo momento.

      L’annuncio è stato accolto con sorpresa da Medici senza frontiere che in un comunicato ha detto di non aver ricevuto ancora comunicazioni ufficiali. “Medici senza frontiere ha appreso dai mezzi d’informazione che il primo ministro spagnolo, Pedro Sánchez, ha offerto Valencia come porto di sbarco per la nave Aquarius. Non abbiamo ancora ricevuto alcuna comunicazione ufficiale in merito da parte dei centri di coordinamento dalla centrale operativa della guardia costiera di Italia o Spagna. La situazione a bordo per le 629 persone soccorse, con diverse di loro che hanno bisogno di assistenza medica, richiede una soluzione urgente”.

      “Le persone a bordo hanno cominciato a chiedere cosa sta succedendo”, racconta Alessandro Porro, uno dei volontari italiani di Sos Méditerranée. “Li abbiamo informati che stiamo aspettando istruzioni per l’indicazione di un porto di sbarco, ma li abbiamo rassicurati sul fatto che non li porteremo in Libia, questa è la loro maggiore preoccupazione”, racconta Porro. A bordo non ci sono casi medici che hanno bisogno di un immediato trasferimento: ci sono sette donne incinte che probabilmente saranno trasportate in Italia con delle motovedette italiane perché non possono sostenere il viaggio verso la Spagna. “Le persone a bordo hanno problemi di disidratazione, di ustioni da carburante e infine c’è un ragazzo che ha bisogno di un intervento chirurgico”, continua Porro. Le motovedette con i presidi medici, che erano state annunciate dal governo italiano, non sono mai arrivate.

      “Avere più di seicento persone a bordo implica che lo spazio a loro disposizione non sia molto, la nave è lunga settanta metri, non è un traghetto. Per ora non ci sono ancora state tensioni, ma la situazione non è facile, ci stiamo facendo aiutare dagli stessi migranti per le pulizie. Solo le donne possono stare sotto coperta, gli uomini e i ragazzi sono sul ponte, all’aperto”, continua Porro che spiega che di solito il tempo di permanenza in queste condizioni è di uno o due giorni. “Non c’è problema né per il carburante né per l’acqua, perché l’Aquarius ha al momento parecchia autonomia e ha un impianto di desalinizzazione dell’acqua marina, ma i viveri finiranno entro poche ore”, conclude Porro.

      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/06/11/cronaca-giornata-aquarius

    • Yesterday, Monday 11th June, at 9pm, more than a thousand of people gathered in front of the port of Palermo to protest against the decision of Salvini, Italian Minister of Internal Affairs, to close Italian ports to boats carrying migrants.

      Hier, lundi 11 juin, à 21h, plus de mille personnes se sont rassemblées devant le port de Palerme pour protester contre la décision de Salvini, Ministre de l’Intérieur italien, de fermer les ports aux bateaux transportant des migrant.e.s.

      Des associations, des civils, des officiels dont le maire, se sont rejoints devant le port, un peu avant 21h. Le cortège s’est ensuite rendu jusqu’à Piazza Massimo, coeur de la ville, en passant devant la Préfecture de Palerme.

      Quelques articles/ photos sur la situation en Italie / et la manifestation (en italien)
      http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/06/12/foto/palermo_in_migliaia_al_porto_per_solidarieta_all_aquarius-198792435/1/#4

      http://siciliainformazioni.com/cettina-vivirito/834435/palermo-reato-di-altruismo-siamo-tutti-colpevoli-al-presidio-ap

      http://www.radiondadurto.org/2018/06/11/nave-aquarius-lega-e-5-stelle-chiudono-i-porti-scoppia-il-caso-diplom

    • Les dirigeants nationalistes corses proposent d’accueillir l’«Aquarius», chassé d’Italie

      Le président du conseil exécutif de Corse Gilles Simeoni a proposé ce mardi d’accueillir sur l’île le navire affrété par l’ONG qui a secouru 629 migrants en Méditerranée, enjeu d’un bras de fer entre l’Italie et Malte, qui refusent de le laisser accoster. « Manque de vivres, mauvaises conditions météo, et port espagnol trop éloigné : face à l’urgence, le conseil exécutif de Corse propose à @SOSMedFrance d’accueillir l’#Aquarius dans un port #corse », a tweeté Gilles Simeoni. L’Espagne avait proposé lundi d’accueillir le navire mais les dirigeants de l’ONG SOS Méditerranée jugent que les conditions de sécurité ne sont pas réunies pour mener le bateau jusqu’à l’Espagne.

      http://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/les-dirigeants-nationalistes-corses-proposent-daccueillir-laquarius-chass

      #Corse

    • Marie-Christine Vergiat : « C’est l’Union européenne qui a créé cette situation »

      L’eurodéputée Marie-Christine Vergiat dénonce la responsabilité de l’Union européenne qui, depuis une demi-douzaine d’années, laisse l’Italie gérer seule l’accueil des migrants pour l’Europe. Avec les dégâts politiques que l’on sait.
      Qui porte la responsabilité du blocage de l’Aquarius depuis dimanche, aux portes de l’Europe ? Si Matteo Salvini, le ministre de l’intérieur italien d’extrême droite, fait du refus de l’accueil des migrants sa marque de fabrique électoraliste, c’est l’Union européenne qui est la principale coupable du drame qui se joue actuellement, estime Marie-Christine Vergiat, députée européenne Front de gauche, membre de la GUE au Parlement de Strasbourg.

      L’Aquarius bloqué pendant deux jours en pleine mer : à qui la faute ?

      Marie-Christine Vergiat : C’est l’Union européenne qui, par absence de solidarité vis-à-vis de l’Italie, a créé cette situation. Avant 2011, et pendant des années, Malte [sollicitée après le refus de l’Italie – ndlr] a dû gérer toute seule l’arrivée des migrants, c’est pourquoi cette fois elle a refusé de prendre en charge l’Aquarius.

      Depuis 2011, date à laquelle les mouvements de population ont commencé à devenir plus importants, on a ensuite laissé l’Italie en première ligne se débrouiller. Aujourd’hui, elle accueille chaque année entre 100 000 et 150 000 personnes sur son territoire. Avec la mise en avant de « Dublin 3 », l’Italie a pris en charge le poids du sauvetage en mer pour toute l’Europe, et elle l’a plutôt bien fait.

      Il faut voir que quand le gouvernement italien a lancé l’opération « Mare Nostrum » pour aller secourir les personnes, elle s’est retrouvée seule. Matteo Renzi a dû trouver 95 millions d’euros d’octobre 2013 à octobre 2014 pour financer l’opération et, quand il a demandé de l’aide, le Conseil européen lui a donné 5 millions d’euros. Quant à la Grèce, elle a été en première ligne en 2015 et 2016, et a accueilli un million de personnes, là encore, seule.

      Comment expliquez-vous qu’il n’y ait jamais eu de répartition concertée des migrants entre les États membres ?

      En 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, le président de la Commission européenne, a fait ce qu’il a pu : il a demandé à ce que 160 000 personnes soient « délocalisées » depuis l’Italie et la Grèce vers les autres pays européens sur deux ans. Même si cela était très insuffisant puisqu’il y avait 1,4 million de personnes arrivées en Italie et en Grèce sur la même période. Mais le premier réflexe des pays a été de refuser et de fermer leurs frontières. Heureusement qu’en 2015 et 2016, l’Allemagne d’Angela Merkel a accueilli 60 % des réfugiés (parmi eux, deux tiers de Syriens). Mais il faut rappeler que le nombre de réfugiés accueillis en Europe est une goutte d’eau par rapport à ce que vit le Moyen-Orient.

      Et pourtant, si l’on en croit les récentes élections en Italie notamment, le discours de l’extrême droite contre les migrants semble payant politiquement…

      Récemment, la Commission européenne a présenté une étude qui montre que les Européens restent solidaires des réfugiés dans tous les pays d’Europe, excepté en Italie. On peut pousser des cris d’orfraie, ce sentiment anti-immigré ne tombe pas du ciel. C’est facile de commenter alors qu’en France, on n’a jamais ouvert nos ports pour soulager l’Italie ou la Grèce. En réalité, la France a été très peu impactée par la crise migratoire. Le nombre de demandeurs d’asile n’a presque pas augmenté. Entre 2015 et 2016, il est passé de 85 000 à 95 000. Et encore, nous sommes un des pays où le taux d’acceptation des demandes d’asile est le plus bas – entre 35 et 40 % –, ce qui est en dessous de bien des pays européens. Quand on voit ce qui se passe à la frontière franco-italienne, c’est hallucinant : on fait du contrôle au faciès des migrants, au mépris des lois nationales, européennes et internationales… Il y a de quoi avoir honte de nos gouvernements ! En plus, ils se cachent derrière les accords de Dublin pour renvoyer les migrants dans le pays où ils ont accosté, donc très souvent en Italie, alors qu’il n’y a aucune obligation de « dublinage » : si le pays d’arrivée est obligé d’accepter le retour de la personne qui lui a été renvoyée, en revanche, l’autre pays européen n’est absolument pas obligé de la renvoyer là d’où elle vient.

      Où en êtes-vous de la réforme des accords de Dublin ?

      Il y a actuellement un bras de fer entre le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Au Parlement, six groupes sur huit, de la droite à la gauche européenne, sont d’accord pour proposer une clé de répartition. Le problème, c’est que le Conseil européen ne veut pas de cette solution et veut durcir Dublin en obligeant au renvoi dans le pays. Et contrairement à ce qu’on peut croire, il n’y a pas que les pays de l’Est qui bloquent. Les gouvernants, à l’exception des pays du Sud, affirment que mettre en place une répartition est trop compliqué pour les migrants et que c’est pour cela qu’ils refusent. Mais le problème, c’est qu’ils ne se donnent pas les moyens de l’accueil…

      Comment faire avancer les choses, puisqu’un blocage politique semble favoriser la flambée des extrêmes droites ?

      Le seul moyen de résister c’est, au lieu de courir derrière l’extrême droite, de faire tout le contraire : de montrer, d’une part, qu’il n’y a pas de « submersion » migratoire et, d’autre part, que si l’accueil est pensé et organisé, tout peut très bien se passer. Ce n’est de toute façon pas en construisant des murs qu’on va empêcher les migrants de venir.

      Cet épisode très médiatique de l’Aquarius bloqué en mer peut-il pousser le Conseil européen à revoir ses positions ?

      Il faut espérer que cette histoire permette de montrer ce qui se passe au Conseil européen. En tout cas, Pedro Sánchez, le nouveau président espagnol, a été courageux d’accepter que les 629 personnes bloquées sur le bateau débarquent en Espagne – même si cela s’explique par le fait que la question migratoire apparaît moins comme un enjeu du débat en Espagne… Aujourd’hui, il faut travailler dans deux directions pour l’opinion publique européenne : d’abord, expliquer que les migrations principales viennent non pas des pays du Sud, mais du Nord et d’Asie (Inde et Chine), et que les premiers migrants en Europe sont ukrainiens – ils arrivent en Pologne pour le travail. Ensuite, rappeler que la grande majorité des migrants arrivent de façon régulière (immigration de travail, pour faire des études, regroupement familial…) et que l’une des manières d’éviter les morts en Méditerranée et de ne pas faire le jeu des passeurs et des trafiquants, c’est d’ouvrir des voies de passage légales.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/110618/marie-christine-vergiat-c-est-l-union-europeenne-qui-cree-cette-situation?

    • Un plan de acogida vetado por Rajoy en 2015, clave para la llegada a Valencia de los refugiados del Aquarius

      La Conselleria de Igualdad y Políticas Inclusivas de la Generalitat Valenciana, dirigida por Mónica Oltra, ha desempolvado un plan elaborado hace tres años para acoger a refugiados sirios llegados a las islas griegas que el Gobierno Central nunca autorizó. El martes por la tarde habrá una reunión entre Generalitat, Ayuntamiento de Valencia y ONG para organizar la llegada de los 629 migrantes y refugiados a los que Italia ha negado sus puertos.

      http://www.publico.es/sociedad/plan-acogida-vetado-rajoy-2015-clave-llegada-valencia-refugiados-del-aquariu

    • Message de Sara Prestianni, via la mailing-list Migeurop (12.06.2018):

      Le Gouvernement Italien confirme sa volonté (folle) de ramener les migrants à Valencia bien que à plusieurs reprises Sos Med et autres ont signalé le risque que cela représentait pour les 629 migrants à bord de l’Aquarius de faire autres 3/4 jours de navigation avec la meteo qui semble empirer.
      Les migrants seront obligés à l’énième “trasbordo” - transfert - vers des bateaux de la Marine Militaire Italienne qui devraient les ramener à Valencia.

      La volonté du Gouvernement est clairement celle de criminaliser l’accès aux ports pour les ong qui sauvent vies humaines en mer.
      Hier, sans aucune déclaration officielle du Gouvernement, les 900 migrants interceptés en mer après les 629 qui se trouvent à bord de l’Aquarius,qui se trouvaient à bord de la Marine Militaire Italienne ont été autorisé à entrer dans le port de Catane. Le message de Salvini est claire : plus aucun bateau qui a un pavillon étranger pourra rentrer dans les ports italiennes avec à bord des migrants.
      Par ailleurs Salvini a annoncé une visite rapide en Libye et dans la réunion d’urgence sur le cas “Aquarius” il semblerait que la question de l’externalisation était à l’ordre du jour.

    • Lettera aperta di Gabriele Del Grande al Ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini

      Confesso che su una cosa sono d’accordo con Salvini: la rotta libica va chiusa. Basta tragedie in mare, basta dare soldi alle mafie libiche del contrabbando. Sogno anch’io un Mediterraneo a sbarchi zero. Il problema però è capire come ci si arriva. E su questo, avendo alle spalle dieci anni di inchieste sul tema, mi permetto di dare un consiglio al ministro perché mi pare che stia ripetendo gli stessi errori dei suoi predecessori.

      Blocco navale, respingimenti in mare, centri di detenzione in Libia. La ricetta è la stessa da almeno quindici anni. Pisanu, Amato, Maroni, Cancellieri, Alfano, Minniti. Ci hanno provato tutti. E ogni volta è stato un fallimento: miliardi di euro persi e migliaia di morti in mare.
      https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2105161009497488&id=100000108285082

      Voici, hélas, ce qui est en train de se décider au niveau européen: un nouveau fonds pour la protection des frontières....
      https://seenthis.net/messages/701648

      Questa volta non sarà diverso. Per il semplice fatto che alla base di tutto ci sono due leggi di mercato che invece continuano ad essere ignorate. La prima è che la domanda genera l’offerta. La seconda è che il proibizionismo sostiene le mafie.

      In altre parole, finché qualcuno sarà disposto a pagare per viaggiare dall’Africa all’Europa, qualcuno gli offrirà la possibilità di farlo. E se non saranno le compagnie aeree a farlo, lo farà il contrabbando.

      Viviamo in un mondo globalizzato, dove i lavoratori si spostano da un paese all’altro in cerca di un salario migliore. L’Europa, che da decenni importa manodopera a basso costo in grande quantità, in questi anni ha firmato accordi di libera circolazione con decine di paesi extraeuropei. Che poi sono i paesi da dove provengono la maggior parte dei nostri lavoratori emigrati: Romania, Albania, Ucraina, Polonia, i Balcani, tutto il Sud America. La stessa Europa però, continua a proibire ai lavoratori africani la possibilità di emigrare legalmente sul suo territorio. In altre parole, le ambasciate europee in Africa hanno smesso di rilasciare visti o hanno reso quasi impossibile ottenerne uno.

      Siamo arrivati al punto che l’ultima e unica via praticabile per l’emigrazione dall’Africa all’Europa è quella del contrabbando libico. Le mafie libiche hanno ormai il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord del Mediterraneo centrale. Riescono a spostare fino a centomila passeggeri ogni anno con un fatturato di centinaia di milioni di dollari ma anche con migliaia di morti.

      Eppure non è sempre stato così. Davvero ci siamo dimenticati che gli sbarchi non esistevano prima degli anni Novanta? Vi siete mai chiesti perché? E vi siete mai chiesti perché nel 2018 anziché comprarsi un biglietto aereo una famiglia debba pagare il prezzo della propria morte su una barca sfasciata in mezzo al mare? Il motivo è molto semplice: fino agli anni Novanta era relativamente semplice ottenere un visto nelle ambasciate europee in Africa. In seguito, man mano che l’Europa ha smesso di rilasciare visti, le mafie del contrabbando hanno preso il sopravvento.

      Allora, se davvero Salvini vuole porre fine, come dice, al business delle mafie libiche del contrabbando, riformi i regolamenti dei visti anziché percorrere la strada del suo predecessore. Non invii i nostri servizi segreti in Libia con le valigette di contante per pagare le mafie del contrabbando affinché cambino mestiere e ci facciano da cane da guardia. Non costruisca altre prigioni oltremare con i soldi dei contribuenti italiani. Perché sono i nostri soldi e non vogliamo darli né alle mafie né alle polizie di paesi come la Libia o la Turchia.

      Noi quelle tasse le abbiamo pagate per veder finanziato il welfare! Per aprire gli asili nido che non ci sono. Per costruire le case popolari che non ci sono. Per finanziare la scuola e la sanità che stanno smantellando. Per creare lavoro. E allora sì smetteremo di farci la guerra fra poveri. E allora sì avremo un obiettivo comune per il quale lottare. Perché anche quella è una balla. Che non ci sono soldi per i servizi. I soldi ci sono, ma come vengono spesi? Quanti miliardi abbiamo pagato sottobanco alle milizie libiche colluse con le mafie del contrabbando negli anni passati? Quanti asili nido ci potevamo aprire con quegli stessi denari?

      Salvini non perda tempo. Faccia sbarcare i seicento naufraghi della Acquarius e anziché prendersela con le ONG, chiami la Farnesina e riscrivano insieme i regolamenti per il rilascio dei visti nei paesi africani. Introduca il visto per ricerca di lavoro, il meccanismo dello sponsor, il ricongiungimento familiare. E con l’occasione vada a negoziare in Europa affinché siano visti validi per circolare in tutta la zona UE e cercarsi un lavoro in tutta la UE anziché pesare su un sistema d’accoglienza che fa acqua da tutte le parti.

      Perché io continuo a non capire come mai un ventenne di Lagos o Bamako, debba spendere cinquemila euro per passare il deserto e il mare, essere arrestato in Libia, torturato, venduto, vedere morire i compagni di viaggio e arrivare in Italia magari dopo un anno, traumatizzato e senza più un soldo, quando con un visto sul passaporto avrebbe potuto comprarsi un biglietto aereo da cinquecento euro e spendere il resto dei propri soldi per affittarsi una stanza e cercarsi un lavoro. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di lavoratori immigrati in Italia, che guardate bene non sono passati per gli sbarchi e tantomeno per l’accoglienza. Sono arrivati dalla Romania, dall’Albania, dalla Cina, dal Marocco e si sono rimboccati le maniche. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di italiani, me compreso, emigrati all’estero in questi decenni. Esattamente come vorrebbero fare i centomila parcheggiati nel limbo dell’accoglienza.

      Centomila persone costrette ad anni di attesa per avere un permesso di soggiorno che già sappiamo non arriverà in almeno un caso su due. Perché almeno in un caso su due abbiamo davanti dei lavoratori e non dei profughi di guerra. Per loro non è previsto l’asilo politico. Ma non è previsto nemmeno il rimpatrio, perché sono troppo numerosi e perché non c’è la collaborazione dei loro paesi di origine. Significa che di qui a un anno almeno cinquantamila persone andranno ad allungare le file dei senza documenti e del mercato nero del lavoro.

      Salvini dia a tutti loro un permesso di soggiorno per motivi umanitari e un titolo di viaggio con cui possano uscire dal limbo dell’accoglienza e andare a firmare un contratto di lavoro, che sia in Italia o in Germania. E dare così un senso ai progetti che hanno seguito finora. Perché l’integrazione la fa il lavoro. E se il lavoro è in Germania, in Danimarca o in Norvegia, non ha senso costringere le persone dentro una mappa per motivi burocratici. Altro che riforma Dublino, noi dobbiamo chiedere la libera circolazione dentro l’Europa dei lavoratori immigrati. Perché non possiamo permetterci di avere cittadini di serie a e di serie b. E guardate che lo dobbiamo soprattutto a noi stessi.

      Perché chiunque di noi abbia dei bambini, sa che cresceranno in una società cosmopolita. Già adesso i loro migliori amici all’asilo sono arabi, cinesi, africani. Sdoganare un discorso razzista è una bomba a orologeria per la società del domani. Perché forse non ce ne siamo accorti, ma siamo già un noi. Il noi e loro è un discorso antiquato. Un discorso che forse suona ancora logico alle orecchie di qualche vecchio nazionalista. Ma che i miei figli non capirebbero mai. Perché io non riuscirei mai a spiegare ai miei bambini che ci sono dei bimbi come loro ripescati in mare dalla nave di una ONG e da due giorni sono bloccati al largo perché nessuno li vuole sbarcare a terra.

      Chissà, forse dovremmo ripartire da lì. Da quel noi e da quelle battaglie comuni. Dopotutto, siamo o non siamo una generazione a cui il mercato ha rubato il futuro e la dignità? Siamo o non siamo una generazione che ha ripreso a emigrare? E allora basta con le guerre tra poveri. Basta con le politiche forti coi deboli e deboli coi forti.

      Legalizzate l’emigrazione Africa –Europa, rilasciate visti validi per la ricerca di lavoro in tutta l’Europa, togliete alle mafie libiche il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord e facciamo tornare il Mediterraneo ad essere un mare di pace anziché una fossa comune. O forse trentamila morti non sono abbastanza?

    • By rejecting a migrant ship, Italian populists are simply following the EU’s lead

      The standoff over a boatload of men, women and children rescued in the Mediterranean encapsulates the morass of Europe’s migration policy so neatly that it is almost redundant to call it a metaphor.

      Some 629 migrants were left adrift in international waters while European Union member states competed to sound more resolute in their refusal of a safe port. It was left to Spain to intervene as supplies began to run out aboard the rescue ship, the Aquarius, one of the handful of charity boats still operating despite their routine harassment by the EU-backed Libyan coastguard. Meanwhile, Italy and Malta sniped at each other on social media, as policy was made in the form of hashtags such as “we’re shutting our ports”. Germany was too busy to comment as its leaders sound off over tougher asylum laws in response to the grisly murder of a teenage girl.

      Watching from the sidelines, the UN refugee agency asked meekly if Europe’s politicians could disembark the people in need aboard the Aquarius first and sort out their differences later.
      The starting point in understanding this mess should be to ask why Italy’s new interior minister, Matteo Salvini, has picked a fight over the Aquarius now.

      Migration policy watchers will be tempted to think that this is a public play to strengthen Italy’s position ahead of an end-of-June deadline to reform parts of the EU’s maddeningly complex asylum system. In this reading, Salvini is seeking an overhaul of the so-called Dublin regulations to ease the burden on frontline states such as Italy and Greece and remove the obligation for new arrivals to seek asylum in their country of first arrival.

      This interpretation would be both reassuring and completely wrong. This is not about the incremental advance of national interests.

      Where European observers had expected Italy to pick a fight with the EU over the single currency, its interior minister has gone straight for migration. Salvini understands, just as Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Sebastian Kurz in Austria do, that the EU has no response. Italy has been left alone to deal with sea arrivals from north Africa and talks over new Dublin regulations will not change this. There is no solidarity on asylum and migration.

      Salvini has blocked the Aquarius because this is the terrain on which he wins regardless of the outcome. As the leader of the far-right Northern League, he has built a campaign around promises of mass deportations of migrants. The fact that his proposals were and are impracticable and illegal did not prevent the League from gaining a 17% share of the vote.

      Salvini’s bombastic claims that African migrants are turning Italy into a giant refugee camp ignore the fact that sea arrivals so far this year have dropped to one-fifth of the level during the same period last year.

      No matter – rhetorical battles over migration allow him to pose as the senior coalition partner and defender of Italy.

      EU migration policy, particularly since the record inflows of 2015, has been built on the idea that controlling sea arrivals would shore up Europe’s political centre. Human rights and international law could be subordinated to the need for control even if this meant co-opting Libyan militias, paying smugglers to act as coastguards or redirecting development aid to corrupt African regimes in return for trapping Africans on the move.

      European voters, the reasoning went, would forgive rights abuses in faraway places in return for harder borders. In its simplest formulation, EU policy-makers framed the choice as one between allowing moderates to talk like Salvini or getting Salvini himself.

      Critics of this policy consensus were dismissed as naive.

      Its arch practitioner was Italy’s previous interior minister Marco Minniti, who delivered a huge reduction in sea arrivals through a series of shady deals in Libya that turned smugglers and traffickers into Europe’s paid gatekeepers.

      Before the votes were counted in Italy the “Minniti plan” had many admirers in Europe’s capitals and on the European commission, the bloc’s executive body. Since the man himself and his party were swept out of power it has become painfully apparent that there is no electoral dividend for centrists who endorse anti-migration populism.

      Over the weekend Minniti and his former government colleagues hit out at Salvini’s refusal of a safe port to the Aquarius and boasted of the balance they had struck between “security” and “reception” – in other words between the deterrence of migration and the humane treatment of those who somehow slipped through. They are still missing the point.

      By treating migration policy as an arena of crisis where human rights and international law could be discarded in the rush to respond to a perceived panic, Minniti and his supporters in Brussels and Berlin were the midwives of Salvinism.

      It has been left to the mayors of southern Italy to defy their own government and publicly offer the Aquarius a safe port. Often the strongest rebuttal to the populists comes not from the tainted centre but from Europeans in the areas most affected by the actual movement of people.

      https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/italy-migrant-rescue-ship-standoff-aquarius

    • ASGI : Gravi responsabilità dell’Italia nella vicenda Aquarius

      Il comportamento del governo italiano nella vicenda Aquarius è gravissimo e l’intervento della Spagna non solleva l’Italia dalle sue responsabilità. ASGI lancia l’allarme sul possibile imminente ripetersi di episodi analoghi.

      Mentre scriviamo ancora non è definitivamente conclusa la vicenda della nave Aquarius, che ci auguriamo possa trovare felice esito anche grazie all’intervento delle autorità spagnole e, comunque, oltre la gestione che ha avuto da parte del Governo italiano.

      La scelta di solidarietà fatta dal Governo spagnolo di fornire assistenza materiale e giuridica ai naufraghi salvati dalla nave Aquarius, infatti, non deve oscurare la gravi responsabilità del governo italiano nella conduzione complessiva di tutte le operazioni.

      Va infatti ricordato che le operazioni di soccorso sono partite su impulso di un SOS diramato dall’MRCC (Comando generale del Corpo della Capitanerie di Porto) di Roma e che pertanto, in base al diritto internazionale – l’Italia è sempre stato il Paese giuridicamente responsabile del coordinamento dei soccorsi.

      Solo in questo senso possono essere lette le principali Convenzioni internazionali pertinenti in materia e, tra esse:

      – la Convenzione sulla salvaguardia della vita umana in mare (Convenzione SOLAS, firmata a Londra nel 1974 e ratificata dall’Italia con L. 313/1980);
      – la Convenzione internazionale sulla ricerca ed il soccorso in mare (Convenzione SAR, firmata ad Amburgo nel 1979 e ratificata dall’Italia con L. 147/1989, da cui il Regolamento di attuazione D.P.R. 662/1994;
      – la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del mare (Convenzione CNUDM o UNCLOS, adottata a Montegobay nel 1982 e ratificata dall’Italia con L. 689/1994)

      Fino al momento nel quale la Spagna non ha annunciato il suo intervento per ragioni umanitarie il centro di coordinamento dei soccorso italiano, competente e responsabile degli stessi, ha continuato a non indicare alcuna destinazione alla barca Aquarius, rendendosi completamente inadempiente verso precisi obblighi indicati dal diritto internazionale ed interno e ponendo a rischio la vita di centinaia di persone.

      La situazione di pericolo e di estrema difficoltà, in cui si trovavano e si trovano tutt’ora i migranti, oltre ai membri dell’equipaggio, integra senza dubbio una situazione di pericolo che non fa ritenere legittima alcuna limitazione all’approdo in un porto italiano. Nel caso di specie doveva, infatti, immediatamente trovare applicazione l’art. 18, par. 2 della Convenzione UNCLOS, la quale prevede che lo Stato costiero non può invocare una violazione del diritto di passaggio inoffensivo né obbligare la nave straniera a riprendere il largo. Conseguentemente, lo Stato costiero, nel cui mare territoriale, o nelle vicinanze del quale, si trovi una nave in una situazione di pericolo è, infatti, il titolare primario dell’obbligo di portare soccorso ed è responsabile della conclusione del salvataggio. La nave che si trova quindi in una situazione di pericolo implicante una minaccia per la vita delle persone a bordo, qualsiasi sia lo status di questi passeggeri, gode di un “diritto” di accesso al porto.

      Il diniego di accesso ai porti italiani a imbarcazioni che abbiano effettuato il soccorso in mare comporta la violazione degli articoli 2 e 3 della Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, applicabile poiché l’Italia, nel coordinare l’azione SAR, esercita funzioni esecutive al di fuori del proprio territorio «conformemente al diritto internazionale» (v. mutatis mutandis, Al-Skeini c. Regno Unito e Jaloud c. Paesi Bassi). Le persone soccorse vertevano infatti in evidente necessità di cure mediche urgenti, nonché di generi di prima necessità (acqua, cibo, medicinali), e tali bisogni non potevano esser soddisfatti in alto mare. Le condizioni alle quali gli stessi sono stati sottoposti determinano l’esposizione di uomini, donne e bambini ad un reale trattamento disumano e degradante ( in violazione dell’art. 3 cedu) e ad un serio rischio per la loro vita (in violazione dell’ art. 2 cedu).

      Sulla nave Aquarius vi erano richiedenti asilo e rifugiati, pertanto la scelta del governo italiano di negare un porto sicuro a queste persone, anche poiché le operazioni di soccorso erano state gestite dalle autorità italiane, avrebbe potuto comportare per lo Stato Italiano la violazione del principio di non refoulment ai sensi dell’art 33 della Convenzione di Ginevra sullo Status dei Rifugiati del 1951 se non si fosse trovato un porto sicuro. Il principio di non refoulment è un principio di diritto internazionale generale, vincolante per tutti gli Stati anche indipendentemente dalla ratifica della Convenzione del 1951; esso stabilisce il divieto di respingimento verso qualsiasi luogo in cui una persona potrebbe trovarsi esposta al rischio di persecuzione e/o di condizione ascrivibile a trattamento disumano e degradante, trattamento nel quale si sono trovati a vivere coloro che erano da giorni in alto mare in assenza di approdo in porto sicuro.
      Sotto il profilo del diritto penale, l’obbligo di prestare soccorso configura una precisa prescrizione giuridica, la quale non può essere disattesa. Si ritiene che la condotta tenuta dall’MRCC di Roma sia stata suscettibile da integrare almeno la fattispecie dell’omissione di soccorso ai sensi dell’art. 593 c.p. A ciò si aggiunga che se dal ritardo dell’ingresso fossero derivate (o dovessero derivare) morte o lesioni in capo alle persone a bordo, ciò integrerebbe fattispecie penali autonome, quali omicidio o lesioni, che sarebbero imputabili a tutta la catena di comando italiana in ragione dell’evidente dovere giuridico di salvaguardia della vita che incombe sul paese che coordina i soccorsi

      Il “braccio di ferro” diplomatico attuato parte del Governo italiano con le Autorità di Malta e con la UE ha messo a rischio la vita di centinaia di persone ed il rispetto di basilari diritti della persona e ciò costituisce un precedente gravissimo nella storia europea.

      Il governo italiano aveva tutti gli strumenti legali e politici per far valere nella fase di discussione e votazione del Regolamento Dublino IV le argomentazioni che ha portato invece sul piano mediatico e dell’uso della forza contro persone in stato di necessità dimostrando l’esplicita volontà di non proporre politiche costruttive rinunciando ad un ruolo centrale nel dibattito europeo. Il governo italiano, invece, ha voluto imporre il solo uso della forza. Sarebbe stato possibile per il Ministro degli Interni in carica recarsi a Bruxelles e discutere della necessità di ripartizione equa dei rifugiati fra gli stati europei facendo valere in modo democratico e legale presso tale sede le priorità individuate dall’esecutivo italiano, senza incorrere nelle violazioni dei diritti umani fondamentali e delle norme cogenti.

      ASGI, nell’auspicare che la specifica vicenda abbia esito rapido e positivo, ha tuttavia il fondato timore che situazioni analoghe possano ripetersi già dalle prossime ore fa appello a tutte le istituzioni e al Parlamento, nonché a tutte le forze democratiche del Paese, affinché l’Italia non si renda più responsabile degli indecorosi eventi che si sono consumati negli ultimi giorni e che il diritto internazionale e quello interno in materia di soccorsi in mare venga scrupolosamente rispettato.

      https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/aquarius-violazione-diritto-internazionale

    • Migranti, Toninelli: «Non è detto che il posto in cui debbano sbarcare sia un porto. Può essere una nave»

      "Non c’è scritto da nessuna parte che il «place of safety», cioè il luogo in cui devono essere sbarcati e messi in sicurezza i migranti, debba essere un porto. Può essere anche una nave, battente bandiera straniera. Di conseguenza noi chiederemo un’assunzione di responsabilità a quei paesi di cui le navi della Ong battono bandiera". Così il ministro delle Infrastrutture Danilo Toninelli, al termine del vertice sull’immigrazione a Palazzo Chigi. Di fronte a chi gli fa notare che però questo significherebbe, nel caso della nave Aquarius che batte bandiera britannica, circumnavigare l’Oceano per arrivare in Inghilterra (contravvenendo dunque al principio del porto sicuro più vicino), Toninelli fa dietrofront: «Noi chiediamo un’assunzione di responsabilità e condivisione delle spese».

      https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/immigrati-2015/migranti-toninelli-non-e-detto-che-il-posto-in-cui-debbano-sbarcare-sia-un-porto-puo-essere-una-nave/307625/308254

    • Aquarius : l’Union européenne et les Etats membres doivent cesser de traiter les migrants comme « des patates chaudes »

      Bruxelles, 13 juin 2018 – Stupéfaits et inquiets de ce moderne Exodus, on voit se profiler à l’horizon le cabotage infini de ce bateau qui passe du statut de sauveteur à celui de fardeau. Le nouveau gouvernement italien, en large partie acquis aux idées xénophobes et racistes de Matéo Salvini, montre ses muscles et refuse de laisser mouiller l’Aquarius dans ses ports. Dont acte, l’AEDH savait ne rien devoir attendre d’un gouvernement dont les partenaires avaient annoncé pendant la campagne électorale qu’il ne respecterait pas les droits de l’Homme.

      Aujourd’hui, le nouveau gouvernement espagnol a annoncé que son pays est prêt à accueillir les « naufragés des droits » dans le port de Valence. L’AEDH salue cet acte et souhaite qu’il fasse exemple pour tous les États membres. Elle recommande que cet accueil se révèle inconditionnel et qu’ayant fait le principal, sauver des vies, le gouvernement de Pedro Sanchez s’illustre en offrant de dignes conditions de séjour. On souhaiterait également que ce nouveau gouvernement mette fin aux opérations de push-back des migrants se présentant aux enceintes de Ceuta et Melilla.

      Et les autres pays concernés par « les affaires de Méditerranée », que font-ils ? Malte refuse d’accueillir mais se donne bonne conscience en envoyant des vivres, la France de Macron se réfugie derrière une interprétation hasardeuse du droit de la mer contre le droit humanitaire pour ne rien faire et attend piteusement 48 h qu’un autre pays se dévoue…

      L’AEDH est au regret de constater que l’Union européenne est à la remorque des Etats membres. Notre association souhaite que le Conseil européen joue enfin son rôle d’orientation de la politique européenne et condamne l’attitude indigne des États membres qui, dominés par la peur, alignent leurs politiques migratoires sur celles prônées par les forces d’extrême droite.

      L’AEDH condamne avec force le refus d’accueillir du gouvernement italien. Mais depuis longtemps elle s’oppose aussi aux refus de la Pologne, de la Hongrie, de la Slovaquie, de la République tchèque d’accueillir des réfugiés. Elle ne peut non plus accepter les faux semblants de bien d’autres gouvernements, qui tout en proclamant qu’ils vont accueillir, imposent des règles tellement restrictives qu’ils organisent de fait la chasse aux migrants et les expulsent. C’est en particulier le cas de la France où l’on retrouve des migrants morts à la fonte des neiges, de la Belgique où la police peut tirer sur des migrants.

      L’AEDH affirme que le refus des Etats membres et de la Commission de procéder à l’abrogation du règlement Dublin est non seulement un manquement grave aux droits des personnes mais une stupidité qui enferme les États-membres situés aux frontières extérieures de l’U.E. dans un dilemme impossible : accueillir des milliers de migrants ou les repousser. C’est à cause du règlement Dublin, que le système d’accueil est devenu purement et simplement un moyen d’externaliser les migrants vers les pays de leur première entrée, en particulier l’Italie et la Grèce. Et si la Méditerranée a tant d’importance, c’est que la route par la Turquie a été bloquée par l’ignoble accord conclu avec ce pays, en fermant pudiquement les yeux sur la politique d’Erdogan qui piétine les droits fondamentaux de tant de citoyens en Turquie.

      L’AEDH considère que l’ensemble des Etats membres sont collectivement responsables du désastre italien. Elle demande à toutes ses associations membres, à tous les citoyens et à toutes les citoyennes de l’UE d’agir pour que l’on change de politique.

      C’est le but de l’ICE lancée depuis quelques semaines : « Nous sommes une Europe accueillante : laissez-nous agir ! ». Signez, faites signer, transmettez, montrez votre appui envers ces enfants, ces femmes, ces hommes qui croyaient avoir enfin pu prendre le bateau de l’espoir, cet Aquarius qui symbolise notre solidarité.

      http://www.aedh.eu/aquarius-lunion-europeenne-et-les-etats-membres-doivent-cesser-de-traiter-les-m

    • Migranti nel Mediterraneo, ong non può fare trasbordo: “Nessun porto assegnato, si rischia nuovo caso Aquarius”

      Una nave della Marina Usa ha salvato 41 persone e recuperato 12 corpi senza vita nel Mediterraneo. Ma l’imbarcazione di Sea Watch, che l’ha raggiunta e a bordo ha cibo e coperte, non può assistere i sopravvissuti. Perché da Roma non sono arrivate istruzioni

      https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/06/13/migranti-salvati-su-nave-militare-usa-ma-la-ong-sea-watch-non-puo-fare-trasbordo-nessun-porto-assegnato-si-rischia-nuovo-caso-aquarius/4426052

    • Aquarius procede a fatica contro il mare in burrasca, ancora a ridosso della Sicilia, a sud di Marsala. La velocita con la quale avanza verso nord-ovest d’ di appena 5 nodi e mezzo. A questa velocità impiegherà almeno 6 giorni per arrivare a Valencia. Salvini sta imponendo un trattamento disumano ai migranti dopo quello che si può definire un respingimento illecito. I migranti erano stati soccorsi da mezzi della Guardia costiera ed erano già entrati in territorio italiano.

      LA AQUARIUS DEVE ENTRARE NEL PORTO DI TRAPANI CHE SI TROVA SULLA SUA ROTTA. ASSIEME ALLA DATTILO CHE LA SCORTA CON ALTRI MIGRANTI A BORDO.
      VALENCIA NON E’ RAGGIUNGIBILE . IL PIANO DI SALVINI E’ DISUMANO.

      VI PREGO DI FARE GIRARE AL MASSIMO QUESTA NOTIZIA. LE AGENZIE DI INFORMAZIONI DANNO SOLO NOTIZIE RASSICURANTI CHE NON CORRISPONDONO ALLA SITUAZIONE REALE DEL MARE.


      https://www.facebook.com/isabelle.saintsaens/posts/10215493114986035?comment_id=10215493417153589&notif_id=1528933312392754&n

    • Autre ONG bloquée dans ses opérations de sauvetage en mer, cette fois-ci c’est #Sea-Watch. Voici leur communiqué du 13 juin 2018 :
      Shipwreck survivors and bodies stuck on US warship due to italian port closure – Sea-Watch 3 last rescue vessel left in Mediterranean.

      41 survivors and 12 deceased in a shipwreck off the Libyan Coast yesterday morning are still stuck on a US warship as Italy closed its ports to rescue vessels. Sea-Watch strongly denounces the fact that once again people in distress at sea are being held in diplomatic limbo. The dispute on migration must not be carried out at the expense of people in need. A surveillance aircraft of the civil rescue fleet is currently operating in the SAR zone to search for further distress cases and bodies of yesterday’s shipwreck. The Sea-Watch 3 is also patrolling the SAR zone in close proximity to the US warship. Meanwhile, we still await instructions as no state has taken responsibility so far. The Sea-Watch 3 is currently the only dedicated rescue asset in the Mediterranean Sea.

      At 12.36 local time, the Sea-Watch office received a request by a US Navy warship to take over 41 survivors and 12 deceased in a shipwreck 20 nautical miles off the Libyan coast. Our vessel Sea-Watch 3 proceeded towards the given position as the only civil rescue asset left in the mediterranean sea at that moment. “It is unacceptable that people who have literally been picked out of the water, who have seen their friends drowning, still do not get a place of safety, this is a damning indictment of the European Union’s policy on immigration. A dispute about the distribution of asylum seekers must not be carried out at the expense of people in maritime distress” says Johannes Bayer, Sea-Watch chairman and head of the current mission of the Sea-Watch 3. “We urge the European governments to find a quick solution for this humiliating tragedy”.

      Meanwhile, Italian Coast Guard asset CP941 is disembarking 932 people and 2 dead bodies in the Sicilian port of Catania today, which shows a double standard upheld by the Italian government.
      NGO vessels have consistently taken responsibility for search and rescue activities in the world’s most dangerous migration route, yet they have become the scapegoat of the Italian government, as it attempts to pressure the rest of the EU to share in the responsibility towards people in distress and in wider migration policy reforms, including that of the Dublin III regulation. Sea-Watch therefore urges the European states to make way for a political solution for this charade; after safe arrival to Italy, there are also many roads that lead from Rome.

      Furthermore, yesterday’s shipwreck shows a deadly lack of rescue capacity at sea, and it is evident that in the absence of safe and legal passage to Europe, such shipwrecks will only continue to occur. “If the Aquarius wasn’t stuck on the way to Valencia, maybe those people could have been rescued” Bayer says. Still there is no knowledge about the real number of drownings as it is likely not all bodies could be retrieved. “We urge the European states to take responsibility and to stop gambling with lives at sea,” Bayer says.

      https://sea-watch.org/en/shipwreck-survivors-and-bodies-stuck-on-us-warship-due-to-italian-port-cl

    • « Aquarius » 2018, « Saint-Louis » 1939 : l’histoire bégaie

      Alors que l’Aquarius a été refoulé par l’Italie, il y a quatre-vingts ans des réfugiés fuyaient le nazisme en embarquant sur un paquebot transatlantique, le « Saint-Louis ».

      Le refus de l’Italie de laisser accoster l’Aquarius n’est que l’expression paroxystique de la politique des Etats européens qui, depuis des années, mettent toute leur énergie à tenir à distance migrants et exilés. Mais cette image d’un vaisseau fantôme nous renvoie aussi quatre-vingts ans en arrière, quand les réfugiés fuyant le nazisme se voyaient systématiquement refuser l’accès à une terre d’asile.

      Entre hier et aujourd’hui, les analogies sont frappantes : la fermeture de plus en plus hermétique des frontières à mesure que la persécution s’aggrave et que les flux d’exilés augmentent ; des réfugiés contraints d’embarquer clandestinement sur des bateaux de fortune avec l’espoir, souvent déçu, qu’on les laissera débarquer quelque part ; en guise de justification, la situation économique et le chômage, d’un côté, l’état de l’opinion dont il ne faut pas attiser les tendances xénophobes et antisémites, de l’autre ; le fantasme, hier, de la troisième colonne – agitateurs communistes, espions nazis –, aujourd’hui de la menace terroriste ; et finalement une diplomatie qui n’hésite pas à pactiser avec les pires dictatures, hier pour tenter de sauver la paix (on sait ce qu’il en est advenu), aujourd’hui pour tenter d’endiguer les flux de réfugiés.
      Réfugiés interdits de débarquer à Cuba

      Visas refusés, frontières closes : les réfugiés sont acculés, en désespoir de cause, à prendre la mer, le plus souvent clandestinement. A la veille de la guerre, des dizaines, des centaines de bateaux, parfois des paquebots de ligne, souvent des bâtiments de fortune ou de contrebande qui ont pris leurs passagers en charge frauduleusement, naviguent sur les océans à la recherche d’un port où ils seront autorisés à débarquer : le Cairo part le 22 avril 1939 de Hambourg pour Alexandrie ; l’Usaramo pour Shanghai ; l’Orbita pour le Panama en juin 1939 ; l’Orinoco, vers Cuba… (1). D’autres restent bloqués pendant des semaines ou des mois dans les ports roumains de la mer Noire ou sur le Danube.

      Même ceux qui ont des papiers d’immigration en règle ne sont pas assurés d’être admis, comme le montre l’histoire cruelle du Saint-Louis. Ce paquebot transatlantique quitte Hambourg le 13 mai 1939 en direction de La Havane. Ses 937 passagers, presque tous des juifs fuyant le Troisième Reich, sont en possession de certificats de débarquement émis par le directeur général de l’Immigration de Cuba. Mais, dans l’intervalle, le président cubain a invalidé ces certificats. On interdit donc aux passagers de débarquer. Le bateau repart, et lorsqu’il passe le long des côtes de Floride une demande est adressée au président des Etats-Unis afin qu’il leur accorde l’asile – elle ne reçoit pas de réponse. Le 6 juin 1939, le Saint-Louis reprend sa route vers l’Europe. In extremis, avant que le bateau ne soit contraint de revenir en Allemagne, le Jewish Joint Commitee réussit à négocier avec les gouvernements européens une répartition des passagers entre la Grande-Bretagne, la France, la Belgique et les Pays-Bas qui n’acceptèrent de les accueillir qu’à condition qu’il ne s’agisse que d’un transit dans l’attente d’une émigration définitive vers une autre destination. Temporairement sauvés, une majorité d’entre eux connaîtra le sort réservé aux juifs dans les pays occupés par l’Allemagne.
      Un gigantesque marché noir

      Les embarquements clandestins se poursuivent une fois la guerre déclenchée, les réfugiés prenant des risques croissants pour tenter de rejoindre clandestinement la Palestine depuis les ports de la mer Noire, à travers le Bosphore, les Dardanelles et la mer Egée. Un gigantesque marché noir s’organise, avec la bénédiction des nazis qui, avant la programmation de la « solution finale », y voient une façon de débarrasser l’Europe de ses juifs. Beaucoup de ces « bateaux cercueils », comme on les a appelés, font naufrage, d’autres sont victimes des mines ou des sous-marins allemands, et les épidémies déciment ceux qui ont réussi à survivre. Décidément, on a l’impression que l’histoire bégaie.

      http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/06/13/aquarius-2018-saint-louis-1939-l-histoire-begaie_1658569

    • #Marie-Christine_Vergiat : « C’est l’Union européenne qui a créé cette situation »

      L’eurodéputée Marie-Christine Vergiat dénonce la responsabilité de l’Union européenne qui, depuis une demi-douzaine d’années, laisse l’Italie gérer seule l’accueil des migrants pour l’Europe. Avec les dégâts politiques que l’on sait.

      Qui porte la responsabilité du blocage de l’Aquarius depuis dimanche, aux portes de l’Europe ? Si Matteo Salvini, le ministre de l’intérieur italien d’extrême droite, fait du refus de l’accueil des migrants sa marque de fabrique électoraliste, c’est l’Union européenne qui est la principale coupable du drame qui se joue actuellement, estime Marie-Christine Vergiat, députée européenne Front de gauche, membre de la GUE au Parlement de Strasbourg.

      L’Aquarius bloqué pendant deux jours en pleine mer : à qui la faute ?

      Marie-Christine Vergiat : C’est l’Union européenne qui, par absence de solidarité vis-à-vis de l’Italie, a créé cette situation. Avant 2011, et pendant des années, Malte [sollicitée après le refus de l’Italie – ndlr] a dû gérer toute seule l’arrivée des migrants, c’est pourquoi cette fois elle a refusé de prendre en charge l’Aquarius.

      Depuis 2011, date à laquelle les mouvements de population ont commencé à devenir plus importants, on a ensuite laissé l’Italie en première ligne se débrouiller. Aujourd’hui, elle accueille chaque année entre 100 000 et 150 000 personnes sur son territoire. Avec la mise en avant de « Dublin 3 », l’Italie a pris en charge le poids du sauvetage en mer pour toute l’Europe, et elle l’a plutôt bien fait.

      Il faut voir que quand le gouvernement italien a lancé l’opération « Mare Nostrum » pour aller secourir les personnes, elle s’est retrouvée seule. Matteo Renzi a dû trouver 95 millions d’euros d’octobre 2013 à octobre 2014 pour financer l’opération et, quand il a demandé de l’aide, le Conseil européen lui a donné 5 millions d’euros. Quant à la Grèce, elle a été en première ligne en 2015 et 2016, et a accueilli un million de personnes, là encore, seule.

      Comment expliquez-vous qu’il n’y ait jamais eu de répartition concertée des migrants entre les États membres ?

      En 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, le président de la Commission européenne, a fait ce qu’il a pu : il a demandé à ce que 160 000 personnes soient « délocalisées » depuis l’Italie et la Grèce vers les autres pays européens sur deux ans. Même si cela était très insuffisant puisqu’il y avait 1,4 million de personnes arrivées en Italie et en Grèce sur la même période. Mais le premier réflexe des pays a été de refuser et de fermer leurs frontières. Heureusement qu’en 2015 et 2016, l’Allemagne d’Angela Merkel a accueilli 60 % des réfugiés (parmi eux, deux tiers de Syriens). Mais il faut rappeler que le nombre de réfugiés accueillis en Europe est une goutte d’eau par rapport à ce que vit le Moyen-Orient.

      Et pourtant, si l’on en croit les récentes élections en Italie notamment, le discours de l’extrême droite contre les migrants semble payant politiquement…

      Récemment, la Commission européenne a présenté une étude qui montre que les Européens restent solidaires des réfugiés dans tous les pays d’Europe, excepté en Italie. On peut pousser des cris d’orfraie, ce sentiment anti-immigré ne tombe pas du ciel. C’est facile de commenter alors qu’en France, on n’a jamais ouvert nos ports pour soulager l’Italie ou la Grèce. En réalité, la France a été très peu impactée par la crise migratoire. Le nombre de demandeurs d’asile n’a presque pas augmenté. Entre 2015 et 2016, il est passé de 85 000 à 95 000. Et encore, nous sommes un des pays où le taux d’acceptation des demandes d’asile est le plus bas – entre 35 et 40 % –, ce qui est en dessous de bien des pays européens. Quand on voit ce qui se passe à la frontière franco-italienne, c’est hallucinant : on fait du contrôle au faciès des migrants, au mépris des lois nationales, européennes et internationales… Il y a de quoi avoir honte de nos gouvernements ! En plus, ils se cachent derrière les accords de Dublin pour renvoyer les migrants dans le pays où ils ont accosté, donc très souvent en Italie, alors qu’il n’y a aucune obligation de « dublinage » : si le pays d’arrivée est obligé d’accepter le retour de la personne qui lui a été renvoyée, en revanche, l’autre pays européen n’est absolument pas obligé de la renvoyer là d’où elle vient.

      Où en êtes-vous de la réforme des accords de Dublin ?

      Il y a actuellement un bras de fer entre le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Au Parlement, six groupes sur huit, de la droite à la gauche européenne, sont d’accord pour proposer une clé de répartition. Le problème, c’est que le Conseil européen ne veut pas de cette solution et veut durcir Dublin en obligeant au renvoi dans le pays. Et contrairement à ce qu’on peut croire, il n’y a pas que les pays de l’Est qui bloquent. Les gouvernants, à l’exception des pays du Sud, affirment que mettre en place une répartition est trop compliqué pour les migrants et que c’est pour cela qu’ils refusent. Mais le problème, c’est qu’ils ne se donnent pas les moyens de l’accueil…

      Comment faire avancer les choses, puisqu’un blocage politique semble favoriser la flambée des extrêmes droites ?

      Le seul moyen de résister c’est, au lieu de courir derrière l’extrême droite, de faire tout le contraire : de montrer, d’une part, qu’il n’y a pas de « submersion » migratoire et, d’autre part, que si l’accueil est pensé et organisé, tout peut très bien se passer. Ce n’est de toute façon pas en construisant des murs qu’on va empêcher les migrants de venir.

      Cet épisode très médiatique de l’Aquarius bloqué en mer peut-il pousser le Conseil européen à revoir ses positions ?

      Il faut espérer que cette histoire permette de montrer ce qui se passe au Conseil européen. En tout cas, Pedro Sánchez, le nouveau président espagnol, a été courageux d’accepter que les 629 personnes bloquées sur le bateau débarquent en Espagne – même si cela s’explique par le fait que la question migratoire apparaît moins comme un enjeu du débat en Espagne… Aujourd’hui, il faut travailler dans deux directions pour l’opinion publique européenne : d’abord, expliquer que les migrations principales viennent non pas des pays du Sud, mais du Nord et d’Asie (Inde et Chine), et que les premiers migrants en Europe sont ukrainiens – ils arrivent en Pologne pour le travail. Ensuite, rappeler que la grande majorité des migrants arrivent de façon régulière (immigration de travail, pour faire des études, regroupement familial…) et que l’une des manières d’éviter les morts en Méditerranée et de ne pas faire le jeu des passeurs et des trafiquants, c’est d’ouvrir des voies de passage légales.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/110618/marie-christine-vergiat-c-est-l-union-europeenne-qui-cree-cette-situation

    • La nave Usa che ha lasciato i corpi in mare vicina al porto di Augusta

      La Trenton della Us Navy, con a bordo i 40 superstiti del naufragio di martedì, ha abbandonato i cadaveri alla deriva perché non ha celle frigorifere. Ora incrocia al largo del porto siciliano, ma all’Italia non è arrivata nessuna richiesta formale.

      La nave Trenton della sesta flotta della Us Navy, con a bordo i 40 superstiti del naufragio di un gommone avvenuto martedì mattina, è ricomparsa al largo del porto di Augusta. Appare evidente l’intenzione di sbarcare nel porto siciliano i superstiti che ha a bordo ormai da tre giorni, nell’attesa che qualcuno dia indicazioni sul porto più vicino disposto a farli scendere. Tuttavia non risulta alcuna richiesta formale da parte degli Stati Uniti all’Italia che, peraltro, non ha mai assunto alcun coordinamento del soccorso, avvenuto a sole venti miglia dalle coste libiche.

      Perché dunque la nave americana, che ha lasciato andare alla deriva i corpi delle 12 vittime del naufragio, ha fatto rotta verso l’Italia invece di chiedere l’approdo in un altro Paese? Un altro caso spinoso per il governo italiano, che si trova adesso a dover decidere se autorizzare l’ingresso della nave della Us Navy nel porto di Augusta.

      Da tre giorni, ormai, dopo aver invano chiesto di poter trasbordare il suo carico sulla nave della Ong tedesca Sea Watch, la nave vagava in attesa di sapere dove poter sbarcare i vivi. I morti, quelli, vista la complessità della situazione, hanno deciso di abbandonarli in acqua. "Non ci sono salme a bordo della Trenton - ha confermato a «Repubblica» l’ufficio pubbliche relazioni della Us Navy - l’equipaggio continua a prendersi cura delle 40 persone soccorse. Ci stiamo coordinando con i nostri partner internazionali per decidere la destinazione delle persone a bordo".

      Dalla Us Navy spiegano così l’abbandono dei 12 cadaveri le cui operazioni di recupero erano state comunicate via radio dalla Trenton martedi mattina contestualmente alla richiesta di aiuto avanzata alla vicina nave della ong tedesca Sea Watch prima e all’IMRCC di Roma poi. < Abbiamo visto in un primo momento 12 corpi apparentemente senza vita. I soccorritori hanno dato priorità al recupero di coloro che avevano bisogno di aiuto immediato. La barca di salvataggio è poi tornata sul posto per cercare quei corpi, ma non li ha trovati". «Se necessario - si legge in una nota - le navi della US Navy sono in grado di conservare i corpi in depositi refrigerati».
      Un orrore destinato a scatenare un nuovo caso visto che, a impedire un rapido trasferimento dei superstiti e delle salme a terra, è l’impasse provocato dall’ostracismo annunciato dal ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini alle navi delle Ong. Martedi, subito dopo il soccorso, dopo aver chiamato le guardie costiere libica e italiana, la nave americana si è rivolta alla Sea watch, comunicando di avere in corso il recupero dei 12 corpi, e ha chiesto la disponibilità al trasbordo. «Corpi non possiamo prenderne, non abbiamo le celle. E i superstiti li prendiamo solo se ci assegnano contestualmente un porto sicuro che non sia più lontano di 36 ore di navigazione».

      Dopo il caso Aquarius, il rischio è che poi, con i migranti a bordo, non venga concesso un porto in Italia e la nave, che non è grande, non potrebbe affrontare una lunga navigazione come quella cui è stata costretta la Aquarius. La richiesta viene reiterata dagli americani alla sala operativa di Roma, ma la risposta è che il soccorso non è stato coordinato da Roma e dunque non spetta a loro indicare il porto. In realtà il soccorso non è stato coordinato da nessuno.

      http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/06/14/news/la_nave_usa_senza_celle_frigoriferi_alla_deriva_12_corpi-198956762/?ref=RHPPLF-BH-I0-C8-P2-S1.8-T1

    • Aquarius, la nave di migranti cambia rotta e si dirige verso la Sardegna

      La decisione dovuta al maltempo. Sos Mediterranee spiega: «Le persone a bordo sono esauste, scioccate e con il mal di mare». Il ministro Salvini ribatte: «Problemi loro. A giorni ci saranno novità sul ruolo delle ong»

      «Dattilo, la nave della Guardia Costiera italiana che guida il nostro convoglio, ha deciso di cambiare rotta», twitta Sos Mediterranee, sottolineando che si tratta di una scelta dovuta al maltempo. «Aquarius proseguirà lungo la costa orientale della Sardegna — aggiunge la ong francese — per ripararsi dal maltempo altrimenti insopportabile per le persone a bordo, esauste, scioccate e con il mal di mare». Il ministro degli Interni Matteo Salvini, però, non cede: non ci sarà nessun attracco sulle coste sarde, Aquarius «arriverà in Spagna». Se le persone a bordo hanno problemi, «sono solo loro — afferma —. La nave prende a bordo sistematicamente 500 persone a tratta: ora ne hanno 100, un quinto di quelle che imbarcano di solito. Non è che adesso possano anche decidere dove cominciare e dove finire la crociera». «A giorni ci saranno novità sul ruolo delle ong», aggiunge. «Verranno messi i puntini sulle i, su chi fa cosa e su chi rispetta la legge e chi non la rispetta», ha aggiunto.

      La situazione sull’Aquarius

      Sull’Aquarius ci sono al momento 52 donne, 10 bambini e 45 uomini, tra cui alcuni trattati per sindrome da annegamento o con gravi ustioni da carburante e acqua salata; gli altri 523 profughi sono stati trasbordati sulle due unità navali italiane che la stanno scortando. Tutti i 629 migranti sono stati trasferiti per sicurezza all’interno delle tre imbarcazioni del convoglio: diversi di loro hanno accusato malori durante la notte per il «vento a 35 nodi e le onde alte 4 metri — comunicano i soccorritori —, abbiamo messo dei corrimano perché è difficile stare in piedi».

      Lo «schermo» alle onde

      Il percorso iniziale per il porto di Valencia prevedeva un passaggio a sud della Sardegna ma, considerato che l’apice della perturbazione è previsto sul lato occidentale, si vogliono utilizzare l’isola come «barriera» al maltempo; e tagliare le Bocche di Bonifacio, sotto la Corsica, per raggiungere quindi la Spagna. L’operazione è destinata ad allungare ulteriormente il viaggio verso la terra ferma della «nave della discordia», che ha innescato una crisi diplomatica tra Italia e Francia e un durissimo scambio di accuse con Malta, oltre all’accorato appello di Papa Francesco. L’approdo, meteo permettendo, potrebbe avvenire a questo punto domenica sera. «Abbiamo distribuito arance, barrette di cereali, cornetti e thè freddo forniti ieri dalla Guardia Costiera Italiana» rende noto il personale di Medici senza frontiere, che gestisce l’emergenza con Sos Mediterranee. Nel frattempo la zona di ricerca e soccorso resta sempre più scoperta e 12 cadaveri sono rimasti in mare». «L’identificazione del porto di sbarco è una decisione nazionale su cui l’Ue non ha competenza - afferma intanto la ministra degli Esteri europea, Federica Mogherini -, però viste le notizie sulle condizioni del mare» nella legge «c’è una chiara indicazione» affinché venga fatto «ogni sforzo per limitare al minimo il tempo di permanenza sulla nave» degli immigrati; da ormai 5 giorni consecutivi in balìa del mare e delle polemiche politiche.

      Madrid prepara l’accoglienza

      Le autorità spagnole, dal canto loro, fanno sapere che esamineranno «caso per caso» la situazione dei 629 richiedenti asilo per decidere, con «colloqui individuali», quali trasferire nei centri di aiuto umanitario e quali nelle strutture di detenzione per stranieri; esattamente come avviene per gli extracomunitari che arrivano attraverso i barconi o le enclavi marocchine di Ceuta e Melilla. Il governo iberico sostiene di essersi comportato semplicemente «come obbliga la Costituzione rispetto ai trattati internazionali e europei». Lo sbarco dei migranti avverrà comunque in maniera scaglionata e lontano dagli occhi dei media.

      https://www.corriere.it/cronache/18_giugno_14/odissea-aquarius-nave-cambia-rotta-la-sardegna-24e4bd94-6fb4-11e8-b9b6-434f

    • Francia prenderà parte migranti Aquarius

      La vicepremier spagnola Carmen Calvo ha annunciato che la Francia collaborerà all’accoglienza dei migranti dell’Aquarius. Lo riporta La Vanguardia. Calvo, responsabile del coordinamento per l’accoglienza, ha accettato la proposta presentata dal governo francese, dopo una conversazione con l’ambasciatore francese in Spagna. Il presidente Pedro Sanchez, riferisce il quotidiano, ha ringraziato il presidente francese Emmanuel Macron, sottolineando che questa è la cooperazione «con cui l’Europa deve rispondere».

      http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/europa/2018/06/16/francia-prendera-parte-migranti-aquarius_53ace0c1-88b9-4511-b1ab-6ab072e084aa.h
      #France

    • Migranti, dirottare le Ong nei porti di bandiera farebbe solo danni

      L’esperto di diritto del mare e di asilo Paleologo a L43: «La proposta di Salvini? Così si rallenta l’obbligo di salvataggio». Il ministro può ridiscutere Dublino, ma «non sulla pelle dei naufraghi».

      Il rallentamento, in alcuni casi fino al blocco, della catena di salvataggio in acque maltesi e libiche, di norma attraverso il coordinamento del comando della guardia costiera italiana, per effetto della chiusura dei nostri porti alle navi delle Ong straniere nel Mediterrano ha contribuito a provocare 12 morti e altre decine di feriti al largo della Libia, in seguito all’’altolà del neo ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini alla See Watch 3, «pronta dopo la Aquarius a raccogliere il suo carico umano davanti a Tripoli». Altre decine, centinaia di morti si temono nelle settimane a venire.

      CAMBIARE DUBLINO. Con i respingimenti delle navi straniere, il leader della Lega si aspetta un cambio della prassi e in prospettiva del regolamento di Dublino sui richiedenti asilo: far attraccare le imbarcazioni di Ong battenti bandiera straniera nei luoghi d’origine e non più in Italia, come i mezzi delle Marine di altri Paesi. Peccato che la legge internazionale non possa dargli ragione, né ora né mai: «Guardando alle bandiere», spiega a L43 l’avvocato in prima linea nei soccorsi in mare, componente della Clinica legale per i diritti umani dell’Università di Palermo e consulente del team legale di Open Arms, Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo, «verrebbe meno il salvataggio internazionale, ossia la stessa legge del mare».

      DOMANDA. Salvini ha chiuso i porti alle navi delle Ong straniere che caricano a bordo migranti naufraghi e sottolinea che debbano attraccare nei porti dei loro Paesi e non in Italia. Giuridicamente ha un fondamento la sua rivendicazione?
      RISPOSTA. No, intanto un ministro non può stabilire regole che valgono esclusivamente per le navi delle Ong. Quando richiamano i luoghi di sbarco – da indicare dalle competenti autorità nazionali e nel nostro caso dal comando della guardia costiera di Roma – le convenzioni di diritto del mare non distinguono tra navi umanitarie, navi commerciali o militari.

      D. La See Watch 3, additata da Salvini e bloccata nelle operazione come la Aquarius, è una Ong tedesca ma batte bandiera olandese: dopo i salvataggi potrebbe per esempio rientrare nei porti anche in Olanda, in Germania, o per legge deve attraccare per forza in Italia?
      R. Il criterio dello Stato di bandiera è arbitrario e non garantisce una sollecita conclusione delle operazioni di soccorso in un porto sicuro, che non è necessariamente quello più vicino ma deve trovarsi nello Stato della centrale operativa della guardia costiera che coordina i soccorsi.

      D. Nel caso del trasbordo dei 629 migranti nelle acque tra Malta e l’Italia dell’Aquarius, il coordinamento era della guardia costiera italiana. E inoltre la Aquarius è una nave umanitaria di Sos Mediterranee e Medici senza frontiere: Ong transeuropee o addirittura internazionali.
      R. Non a caso il criterio dello Stato di bandiera non è mai stato applicato in anni di soccorsi nel Mediterraneo perché è sussidiario. Non garantisce lo svolgimento rapido delle procedure di soccorso imposto dalle convenzioni internazionali. Seguirlo, come dice Salvini, segnerebbe la fine dell’obbligo di soccorso internazionale.

      D. La fine della legge universale del mare. Sempre legalmente, con i regolamenti europei e le norme internazionali attuali, si può chiedere alle navi per esempio della Marina francesi, inglesi e tedesche che salvano migranti nel Mediterraneo di dirigersi poi nei propri porti nazionali?
      R. Tutte le navi straniere delle operazioni Ue Frontex ed Eunavfor Med, ossia l’operazione militare Sofia, sono coordinate dalla centrale operativa della guardia costiera italiana, anche quando soccorrono nella zona di ricerca e salvataggio libica Sar, che in realtà esiste solo sulla carta. Di conseguenza devono sbarcare, come sbarcano, solo in porti italiani.

      D. Sulle responsabilità da redistribuire nelle acque territoriali dei Paesi membri dell’Ue, «e non solo all’Italia» ricorda sempre Salvini, la Francia se ne può lavare completamente le mani? La Spagna può fare di più? E Malta può essere pressata almeno dall’Ue a sottoscrivere le normative internazionali vigenti, per sgravare l’Italia anche dagli impegni nelle sue acque?
      R. A meno di una modifica sostanziale del regolamento Dublino, nessun Paese europeo può essere costretto a prendere a suo carico naufraghi soccorsi nelle zone di ricerca e salvataggio libiche o italiane. E il nuovo ministro dell’Interno non può imporre le modifiche con un ricatto sulla pelle di uomini, donne e bambini già duramente provati dalla sofferenza e dagli abusi subiti in Libia.

      D. La visione di Salvini può essere portata avanti politicamente al tavolo per cambiare il regolamento Dublino? È concepibile cioè un’Unione europea dove ogni mezzo di forze militari o Ong di Paesi membri impegnati nel Mediterraneo faccia riferimento, anziché all’Italia, al proprio Stato Ue specifico? Prendendosi a questo punto in carico anche la prima registrazione dei richiedenti asilo?
      R. L’odissea dell’Aquarius sta dimostrando che una redistribuzione dei naufraghi soccorsi in acque internazionali è possibile e lecita solo dopo il loro sbarco in un porto italiano, indicato dal comando centrale della guardia costiera. La scelta di sbarrare dei porti non aiuterà a cambiare il regolamento Dublino, specie se l’Italia farà fronte comune con l’Ungheria di Viktor Orban e l’Austria di Sebastian Kurz. Si avranno soltanto centinaia di morti in più, come conseguenza della cacciata delle Ong.

      https://www.lettera43.it/it/articoli/interviste/2018/06/17/migranti-soccorso-ong-straniere-salvini/221051

    • The Italian interior minister Matteo Salvini (Lega) has announced after negotiations with minister of infrastructure Danilo Toninelli (5 Stars), and the minister of defence Elisabetta Trenta (5 Stars) the retreat of the Italian rescue forces from the international waters of the central Mediterranean Sea. Instead, France, Spain, Greece, Malta, Libya, Tunisia, the EU with the Frontex-Themis operation and the NATO should take on the job. It is important to stress the following: this concerns the ‘death zone’ near the Libyan-Italian off-shore oil station in the central Mediterranean, where in the past three decades the most boat-people have drowned. Salvini’s plans are directed against the “radical crowd that wants to turn Italy into a refugee camp”. All the more important will it be to connect the activities of non-governmental rescuers in the Central Mediterranean with strategies of admit boat-people in Germany, France, and other EU member states.

      Salvini kündigt Abzug der Küstenwache aus internationalen Gewässern an
      Der italienische Innenminister Matteo Salvini (Lega) kündigt

      nach Beratung mit dem Infrastruktur-Minister Danilo Toninelli (5Stelle), und der Verteidigungsministerin Elisabetta Trenta (5Stelle) den Rückzug der italienischen Seenotrettung aus den internationalen Gewässern des zentralen Mittelmeers an. Stattdessen sollten Frankreich, Spanien, Griechenland, Malta, Libyen, Tunesien, die EU mit Frontex-Themis und die Nato diese Arbeit übernehmen.

      Hinzuweisen ist auf folgenden Hintergrund: Es geht um die Todeszone in der Nähe der libysch-italienischen Off-Shore-Petro-Förderanlagen im zentralen Mittelmeer, wo in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten die meisten Boat-people ertrunken sind. Salvini richtet dieses Abzugs-Vorhaben gegen die „radikale linke Schickeria, die Italien in ein Flüchtlingslager verwandeln will“.

      Um so dringlicher wird es, die Aktivität der NGO-Seenotrettung im zentralen Mittelmeer mit Strategien der Aufnahme von Bootsflüchtlingen in Deutschland, Frankreich und anderen EU-Ländern zu verbinden.

      http://ffm-online.org/2018/06/18/salvini-kuendigt-abzug-der-kuestenwache-aus-internationalen-gewaessern-a

    • Du « Saint-Louis » à l’« Aquarius » : 80 ans d’abomination envers les réfugiés

      Retour sur la pérégrination tragique du paquebot Saint-Louis, chargé de réfugiés juifs fuyant l’Allemagne nazie au printemps 1939, qui fut partout refoulé. Or voici que récidivent, sous nos yeux, la méprise et le mépris envers ceux qui migrent.

      Si cette histoire vous amuse,
      Nous allons la, la, la recommencer,
      Ohé ! Ohé !

      Ainsi s’achève – sans donc jamais se terminer – une comptine atroce (il y est question d’un mousse tiré à la courte paille échappant de peu à l’anthropophagie), qui semble saturer l’univers politique des adultes après avoir bercé leur enfance : Il était un petit navire. Le da capo suit son cours inexorable ; jusqu’à mimer le bégaiement de l’Histoire, maintenant et toujours.

      Navigation rime avec immigration et les Suisses opposèrent au flot des réfugiés de la Seconde Guerre mondiale une image impitoyable, dont le cinéaste helvète Markus Imhoof a fait un film : La barque est pleine (Das Boot ist voll). Le mot d’ordre apparaît plus que jamais d’actualité en cette fin de printemps 2018.

      Sous nos yeux se déroule l’errance d’un paquebot, dont le nom signifie en latin « qui se rapporte à l’eau » : Aquarius. Le sort réservé à ces migrants par une Europe absorbée dans sa graisse et dans ses ténèbres, rappelle la condition faite aux réfugiés du Saint-Louis par un monde sans lumières, opiniâtre et petit en tout à l’excès. C’était en 1939 : c’était hier et pourtant aujourd’hui.

      Nazifier les personnes et les événements relève certes du lieu commun, dénote une paresse de la pensée, tient du réflexe rhétorique pavlovien. Mais la concordance des temps s’avère parfois indéniable. À preuve, cet épisode du transatlantique allemand qui, le 13 mai 1939 – six mois après la Nuit de cristal –, laisse derrière lui le port de Hambourg dans un mugissement libérateur et des fumées de bon augure, avec à son bord quelque 900 juifs persuadés d’avoir échappé à la souricière hitlérienne.

      Le Saint-Louis fait route vers Cuba. Les voyageurs ont acheté à prix d’or des permis de débarquement : 500 dollars par passager (ce qui ferait aujourd’hui près de 9 000 dollars). Mais le président Federico Laredo Brú a signé entretemps son décret 937, qui invalide tous les engagements précédents de son pays. Ainsi prétend-il mettre fin à un trafic de visas ayant pris des proportions scandaleuses dans une île en crise.

      Le 27 mai, lorsque le paquebot entre dans le port de La Havane, interdiction lui est signifiée de s’approcher du quai, puis ordre lui est donné de regagner les eaux internationales. Surchauffée par l’extrême droite et ses journaux ayant soutenu la croisade de Francisco Franco en Espagne contre les rouges, la population cubaine manifeste (40 000 personnes dans les rues). Ne surtout pas laisser débarquer ces vecteurs du communisme – le messianisme juif étant lié à la révolution et donc à la dissolution de la société occidentale, selon un poncif politico-religieux de l’époque…

      Le navire se dirige alors vers la Floride, jette l’ancre au large de Miami. Attente angoissante. Rien n’y fait : l’Amérique isolationniste et le Département d’État antisémite auquel se fie encore le président Roosevelt, au pouvoir depuis plus de sept ans à Washington, se montrent inflexibles. Le souvenir et les effets de la Grande Dépression sont patents : 83 % des Américains s’opposent à l’allègement des quotas et restrictions de la loi sur l’immigration, selon un sondage du magazine Fortune.

      Les républicains ont réussi une percée lors des élections de mi-mandat, en novembre 1938. Pas question de céder à l’émotion, de créer un appel d’air en passant pour faible : l’Amérique renvoie l’encombrant vaisseau vers l’Europe. Les câbles adressés au président démocrate par certains passagers du Saint-Louis restent sans réponse.

      Gustav Schröder, capitaine au grand cœur du transatlantique, pour ne pas réexpédier ses passagers vers une mort certaine en Allemagne, a bien l’intention de mettre le feu à son navire au large des côtes britanniques, histoire de forcer le gouvernement de Londres à recueillir les passagers. Mais il apprend en mer que Morris Troper, directeur pour l’Europe du « Joint » (American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), a obtenu – moyennant une caution de 500 000 dollars (près de 9 millions de dollars actuels) – que certaines nations démocratiques européennes, Pays-Bas, France, Grande-Bretagne et Belgique, accueillent la plupart des passagers.

      Après 40 jours et 40 nuits océaniques, le Saint-Louis débarque à Anvers sa cargaison humaine. Les rescapés rejoignent leur pays d’accueil. La guerre puis l’occupation nazie rattraperont certains d’entre eux. Des 288 personnes arrivées en Grande-Bretagne, toutes survécurent, sauf une qui fut tuée lors d’une attaque aérienne en 1940. Des 620 passagers sur le continent, 87 (14 %) purent émigrer avant l’invasion allemande de mai-juin 1940. 532 subirent la conquête nazie. 278 survécurent. 254 périrent, victimes de la Shoah (84 raflés en Belgique, 84 aux Pays-Bas et 86 en France).

      Les survivants se liguèrent après la guerre, pour venir en aide à l’ancien capitaine du Saint-Louis, Gustav Schröder, qui vivait dans la précarité en RFA. Le 11 mars 1993, Yad Vashem devait honorer la mémoire de ce marin allemand antinazi en lui accordant le titre de Juste parmi les nations.
      Scélérats d’État

      Quand montent les périls, des individus clairvoyants et volontaires se posent en vigies des libertés. Les Sentinelles, tel est le titre d’un beau roman tragique de Bruno Tessarech (Grasset, 2009), qui relate comment, à la fin des années 1930, les pseudo démocraties pactisent avec les dictateurs. Elles se vautrent, humainement, moralement et politiquement, face aux tyrans de rencontre : « Nous [les] supplions de résoudre le problème qu’ils ont eux-mêmes créé, manière de leur répéter, au cas où ils ne l’auraient pas encore compris, que nous leur laissons les mains libres », se désole un jeune diplomate français, héros imaginaire et pourtant si incarné de ce récit d’une marche à la guerre durant laquelle les supposés décideurs agissent en somnambules.

      Le livre s’ouvre sur la conférence internationale d’Évian en 1938, qui explique les tribulations tragiques du Saint-Louis l’année suivante. Les trente-deux pays réunis (le Reich nazi n’est pas invité, l’Urss de Staline ne s’y fait pas représenter) s’entendent pour fermer leurs portes et leurs ports aux juifs d’Allemagne. La Suisse estime en avoir assez fait depuis l’Anschluss et ses afflux de juifs autrichiens : Berne va jusqu’à réclamer à Berlin d’apposer la lettre « J », en rouge sur les passeports de ses ressortissants israélites, afin de les mieux repérer !

      Comble de cette époque désespérante : la République dominicaine du dictateur Trujillo s’avère le seul pays à souhaiter recevoir des réfugiés juifs allemands, afin de « blanchir » sa population ! Les victimes du racisme nazi refuseront la proposition raciste du despote des Antilles. Et la presse hitlérienne exulte à la suite de ce lâche fiasco d’Évian, au mois de juillet 1938 : « Juifs à vendre : même à bas prix, personne n’en veut ! » Le Führer se paie le luxe de faire la leçon à ses donneurs de leçon : « Une honte de voir les démocraties dégouliner de pitié pour le peuple juif et rester de marbre quand il s’agit de vraiment venir en aide aux Juifs ! »

      Tous les clignotants de la mémoire et de l’histoire sont au rouge, en 2018, quatre-vingts ans après la conférence d’Évian. Refuser les réfugiés tient lieu de politique commune aux États froids et veules, qui se satisfont des pertes humaines en temps de paix comme dans la guerre. Et tant de citoyens en âge de voter, perdus pour la raison, se fichent aujourd’hui du destin des musulmans comme ils se fichaient jadis du sort des juifs. Fortifiés par de telles masses électorales, les soi-disant responsables des prétendues démocraties se font scélérats d’État. Emmanuel Macron invite à ne « jamais céder à l’émotion ». Angela Merkel, qui passait pour l’ultime digue contre « l’orbanisation » de l’Europe, rend les armes face au premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orbán : « La Hongrie fait le travail pour nous », a-t-elle glissé dimanche 10 juin sur la chaîne de télévision publique allemande ARD.

      Comme à contre-courant, Justin Trudeau, le premier ministre du Canada, s’est repenti, le mois dernier, au sujet du refus de son pays d’accepter de recevoir les passagers errants du Saint-Louis en 1939 : « Ces excuses ne pourront pas ramener ceux dont la vie a été volée ni réparer les vies brisées par cette tragédie. Cependant, nous avons la responsabilité commune de reconnaître cette réalité difficile, d’en tirer des leçons, et de continuer à nous dresser contre l’antisémitisme tous les jours. C’est ainsi que nous donnerons un sens au vœu solennel : “Plus jamais.” »

      Faudra-t-il attendre 2098 pour que des regrets officiels se manifestent à Paris, Rome, Budapest, Londres ou Berlin, au sujet de la disgrâce européenne imposée en 2018 aux réfugiés de l’Aquarius ? Faudra-t-il qu’entretemps une calamité géopolitique – dont cet épisode aura été annonciateur – ait à nouveau ravagé les peuples et les consciences, pour que l’aveuglement laisse place à la solidarité ?

      Une chanson pour finir. Et pour comprendre à quel point nous avons régressé depuis une cinquantaine d’années. En 1967-1968, alors que l’Occident prônait l’ouverture, l’accueil, le brassage, la rencontre et l’hybridation dans le sillage de l’après-guerre et de la décolonisation, triomphait une comédie musicale : Hair. C’est désormais notre Atlantide. Aquarius était son titre phare. Aquarius, en anglais, signifie « verseau », la constellation du porteur d’eau, dont l’ère tant attendue devait advenir : « La paix guidera les planètes/ Et l’amour conduira les étoiles (Then peace will guide the planets/ And love will steer the stars). »

      Regardez, ci-dessous, dans le film de Miloš Forman (Hair, 1979), comment la diversité engendrait alors la richesse, au lieu de provoquer la suspicion. Écoutez ces paroles, aujourd’hui incroyables, annonçant « Harmonie et compréhension (Harmony and understanding), illumination séraphique (Angelic illumination) », avec cet hymne propre à un monde englouti : « Guidé par les forces cosmiques, prends soin de nous, ô verseau (Guided by the cosmic forces/ O care for us/ Aquarius). » C’était hier ; c’était il y a mille ans, hélas !…


      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/150618/du-saint-louis-l-aquarius-80-ans-d-abomination-envers-les-refugies?onglet=

    • EU inaction over Mediterranean migrants is criminal

      Frederic Penard of SOS Mediterranee urges EU member states to adopt immediately an adequate and common response plan to the ongoing crisis in the Med

      The extraordinary support we have received from European civil society since we were first refused a port of safety for the 630 people who were stranded on the Aquarius shows that citizens are wiser than their leaders (Report, 13 June). By showing their attachment to human life and dignity first, they contrast with the European heads of state and governments for whom this intolerable journey should be a wake-up call. To those EU leaders who would like us gone, we repeat that, as a maritime and humanitarian organisation, our only aim is to save and preserve life according to the law of the sea; and to bear witness on behalf of civil society to the ongoing tragedy in the Mediterranean.

      To those who’ve been supportive, we are sincerely thankful. Nevertheless, we have to remind them that as EU member states, they are co-responsible for the situation in the Mediterranean. By contributing to the training and financing of the Libyan coastguard, they are consciously participating in interceptions of boats in distress, which not only result in people being sent back to the Libyan hell, but also gravely jeopardises safe, efficient and professional search and rescue activities in international waters. To those of them who have been indifferent to our repeated calls for more coordinated search and rescue capacity in the central Mediterranean and for a European response to the drama on our common shores, we say that time has come to wake up. We urge all EU states to adopt immediately an adequate and common response plan to this tragedy: a European rescue fleet must be deployed and a EU-shared policy must be found for the safe disembarkation of the rescued people in the nearest port of safety.

      Indifference has resulted in too many deaths; inaction is criminal. As long as there will be people risking their lives at sea, SOS Méditerranée will pursue its mission in the international waters at the doorstep of Europe to search, rescue and testify.
      Frédéric Penard
      Director of operations, SOS Méditerranée


      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/17/eu-inaction-over-mediterranean-migrants-is-criminal?CMP=share_btn_tw

    • L’Italie ferme ses port(e)s

      Cette semaine, en effet, ça se passe beaucoup à Rome ! Nous avons tous entendu parler de l’interdiction faite au navire Aquarius de débarquer en Italie les près de 700 migrants secourus par son affréteur l’ONG SOS Méditerranée. Cette décision du gouvernement italien a été inspirée et incarnée par son ministre de l’Intérieur, le très télégénique chef du parti d’extrême-droite : la Ligue. Pas plus tard qu’hier, ce même Matteo Salvini en a rajouté une couche : aucun navire d’ONG n’accostera plus en Italie. Mais c’est fou ça !

      Pourquoi ? Car, qu’il y ait des ONG humanitaires ou qu’il n’y en ait pas, les personnes qui sont déterminées à traverser la Méditerranée pour rejoindre l’Europe le font. De plus, les navires des ONG sont équipés pour faire de l’humanitaire : sur l’Aquarius, il y a des vivres, des équipements médicaux, du personnel médical. Les cargos, les tankers, les chalutiers, lorsqu’ils se déroutent pour sauver les passagers d’une embarcation en détresse, eux, ne sont pas tout armés pour recueillir des personnes migrantes en train de couler.

      Mardi dernier, quelque-part au milieu de la mer Méditerranée. Un navire de la sixième flotte de la marine américaine, l’USS Trenton, se porte au secours de 40 naufragés. Malheureusement, précise le communiqué du 14 juin, concentré sur ce sauvetage, l’équipage n’a pu repêcher les douze cadavres qui flottaient au milieu des vivants. Ben oui : les navires militaires, jusqu’à preuve du contraire, ne sont équipés ni d’hôpital ambulant, ni de cellule de soutien, et encore moins de chambre froide. C’est important, pourtant, de donner au corps une sépulture, et d’identifier les morts.

      Salvini et le gouvernement populiste italien s’en prennent aux ONG. Vont-ils aussi interdire l’accostage dans leurs ports des navires militaires de l’Otan ? De leur propres gardes-côtes ? Vont-ils tomber sur la tête au point de se soustraire aux obligations du droit de la mer qui les oblige, en tant qu’Etat, à porter secours ?

      Avec Salvini, tout est possible... Ce gouvernement, au pouvoir depuis moins d’un mois, a mis dans son programme qu’il expulserait d’Italie les centaines de milliers de ressortissants étrangers déboutés du droit d’asile ou sans permis de séjour. En attendant, ce gouvernement, dont le président, Giuseppe Conte, était reçu par Emmanuel Macron à Paris vendredi, s’en prend aux ONG. Et, contrairement à une autre partie très importante de la société italienne qui se mobilise pour accueillir les personnes migrantes, les électeurs qui ont voté pour les deux partis au pouvoir, la Ligue et le Mouvement Cinq Etoiles, applaudissent des deux mains. S’ils apprécient la dureté et le peu d’humanité de leur gouvernement, c’est non seulement car ils sont souvent en phase avec le caractère xénophobe du programme de ces deux partis, mais c’est aussi car ils en ont marre que, depuis plusieurs années, les autres pays de l’Union européenne, notamment la France qui cadenasse sa frontière avec l’Italie, les laissent seuls face à ces arrivées de personnes migrantes, qui plus est dans ces conditions tragiques.
      Un « axe » qui fait tourner les têtes

      Car il n’y a pas que les Romains, en fait : ils sont nombreux, les dirigeants Européens à être tombés sur la tête cette semaine ! Les ministres de l’intérieur de trois pays, Salvini pour l’Italie, Kickl pour l’Autriche, Seehofer pour l’Allemagne, ont ainsi appelé à la constitution d’un « axe de la volonté ». De la volonté de quoi ? De renvoyer manu militari à la frontière toute personne entrée sans papier sur leur territoire. Les renvoyer où alors ? Dans le pays frontalier qu’elles auraient traversé précédemment ? A la mer ? Le gouvernement autrichien, que dirige Sebastian Kurz chef de l’ÖVP de droite, en coalition avec le FPÖ d’extrême droite, a déjà proposé, la semaine précédente, avec Lars Lokke Rasmussen, son homologue danois, d’ouvrir des centres d’examens des demandes d’asile à l’extérieur de l’UE, pourquoi pas dans les Balkans occidentaux, et d’y amener les demandeurs d’asile. De cette façon, ceux qui seraient déboutés ne seraient déjà plus dans l’UE.

      Il y a donc une ligne de front le long de laquelle s’affrontent deux conceptions du territoire européen : l’hospitalité et la xénophobie. La seconde est maintenant au gouvernement en Italie, en Autriche, au Danemark, en Hongrie, en République tchèque, en Slovaquie, et en Pologne. En France et en Belgique, les politiques publiques mises en œuvre glissent petit à petit de l’hospitalité vers le rejet et la fermeture. Cette semaine, le gouvernement français n’a pas voulu accueillir l’Aquarius, soit disant pour ne pas céder au chantage de Matteo Salvini. Résultat, c’est l’Espagne du tout nouveau gouvernement socialiste de Pedro Sanchez, pourtant bien plus éloignée de la Sicile, qui a proposé un de ses havres à l’Aquarius. En Allemagne, le ministre de l’intérieur, issu du parti qui dirige la Bavière, s’oppose, comme on vient de le voir, à la politique d’hospitalité et d’intégration voulue par sa cheffe de gouvernement.

      Les Européens sont donc divisés entre eux, et cette division passe au sein de chaque état-membre de l’UE. Les chefs d’État et de gouvernement vont se réunir les 28 et 29 juin prochains : ils sont censés se mettre d’accord sur une politique de migration et d’asile européenne. Une de ces deux lignes l’emportera-t-elle ? Un compromis ou une synthèse est-elle possible ? L’UE va-t-elle se briser sur la politique migratoire ? Jusqu’à quel point marchons-nous, nous les Européens, sur la tête ?

      Défié par son propre ministre de l’Intérieur qui prône cet axe des pays européens volontaires pour refouler les migrants, la chancelière d’Allemagne, Angela Merkel et la Commission européenne se battent pour un « dispatching » équilibré des migrants dans tous les pays de l’UE au delà du pays par lequel ces personnes arrivent en Europe. Elles proposent de mettre en place une procédure européenne d’instruction des demandes d’asile, de façon à éviter que l’étude des dossiers incombent uniquement aux pays d’entrée. Au passage, gardons bien en tête le nombre de personnes concernées. Selon Eurostat, citée par Euractiv.fr, le nombre de demandes d’asile est passé en UE de 563 000 en 2014 à environ 1,2 million en 2015 et 2016, au plus fort de la crise. En 2017, 650 000 demandes enregistrées. Si l’Allemagne, qui a suspendu l’application du règlement de Dublin au plus fort de la crise, récupère toujours la majorité des demandes (31% de l’ensemble des demandes en UE), l’Italie (20%) et la Grèce (9%) sont respectivement à la deuxième et quatrième place en raison de leurs situations aux portes de la Méditerranée.
      Ce qui est en cause, c’est donc ce qu’on appelle la convention de Dublin sur l’asile dans l’UE. Les 26 états-membres de l’espace Schengen de libre circulation (dans cet espace, les individus passent d’un pays à l’autre avec une simple carte d’identité et sans obligation de la montrer à la frontière) ont décidé que toute demande d’asile devait forcément être instruite par le pays d’entrée. Deux façons de réformer cette procédure qui n’est plus adaptée se font face : soit, au mépris de l’État de droit et des conventions internationales, on refoule les entrants et on examine leur demande dans des camps extra-territoriaux. C’est ce qui correspond aux propositions des gouvernements où l’extrême-droite est maintenant au pouvoir.

      Cela prolongerait et amplifierait ce que l’UE appelle ses hotspots : des centres installés dans plusieurs pays voisins qui sont sur les routes qui mènent des pays en guerre ou en crise que fuient les migrants vers l’UE, centres vers lesquels ils sont dirigés et retenus par les gouvernement locaux, pour que les fonctionnaires européens y examinent les demandes d’asile. Cette politique consiste, de plus en plus, en une diplomatie du carnet de chèque de moins en moins soucieuse du droit d’asile et des conventions de Genève réputées protéger les personnes en danger. Depuis 2015, la Turquie a ainsi coupé la route à des centaines de milliers de syriens fuyant la guerre civile ; elle les héberge dans des camps humanitaires financés par l’UE. L’Italie et l’UE ont passé des accords de même type avec la Libye pour les personnes fuyant la guerre au Soudan ou en Somalie, notamment. Mais, en Libye, ces personnes vivent un véritable enfer... pour partie financé par les accords avec l’UE.
      Vers un « axe de l’hospitalité » ?

      Les institutions de l’UE prévoient ce qui s’appelle des coopérations renforcées : un groupe de pays membre de l’UE peut mettre en œuvre une politique publique européenne si les autres ne s’y opposent pas. On pourrait imaginer que les pays hospitaliers refusent les propositions des pays actuellement gouvernés par l’extrême-droite de renvoi et d’externalisation ; et qu’ils obtiennent que les gouvernements xénophobes de ces pays ne s’opposent pas aux propositions de mutualisation de l’asile par les gouvernements des pays hospitaliers.

      Ceci ne serait pourtant que du court terme. À long terme, il s’agit de changer de discours et de regard sur la réalité migratoire. Il s’agit d’arrêter de marcher sur la tête, et de retomber sur nos pieds. Et là, cette semaine, ça se passe à Bilbao. Dans la capitale du pays basque espagnol qui est aussi une des plus belles villes d’Espagne, un allemand, Rainer Haas, s’est levé et a dit : « L’Union européenne doit adopter une législation unique sur les migrations ». Mais qui est Rainer Haas ? Il n’est que co-président du Conseil des communes et régions d’Europe (CCRE) et président du Comté de Ludwigsbourg (Allemagne). C’était mercredi dernier, en clôture de la conférence « Égalité, Diversité et Inclusion » organisée par le CCRE.

      Ce conseil regroupe toutes les collectivités locales d’Europe. Il n’a certes pas de pouvoir ni de souveraineté. Mais enfin, sur le terrain, c’est dans les collectivités territoriales que ça se passe. Rainer Haas a souligné l’impact positif de l’intégration des réfugiés et des demandeurs d’asile sur l’économie locale et régionale. « Actuellement, rapporte Euractiv.fr, notre taux de chômage dans la région oscille autour de 3 %, ce qui signifie le plein emploi. C’est le taux de chômage le plus bas depuis de très nombreuses années. ». Sa ville de Ludwigsbourg a intégré 11 000 réfugiés, soit l’équivalent de 2 % de la population locale.

      C’est la fermeture des voies d’accès légales à la migration vers l’Europe qui est à l’origine des trafics de passeurs et des morts en Méditerranée, ce n’est pas le projet migratoire lui même ! Au contraire, ces tragédies et ces crispations prouvent par l’absurde et de façon inhumaine et bien peu urbaine, que rien, même le risque de mourir, n’entame la détermination du petit nombre de personnes qui sont résolues à venir en Europe. Alors que les économistes, les démographes et les employeurs expliquent que l’Europe a rationnellement besoin de la venue de personnes migrantes, on pourrait peut-être mobiliser nos intelligences collectives et les formidables ressources de nos administrations si développées et si ingénieuses pour valoriser ces énergies, cette motivation, ces qualifications... avec lesquels ces candidats à des papiers européens font corps : le leur ! On pourrait peut-être trouver d’autre mode de sélection que la traversée de la Méditerranée au péril de sa vie, non ? Seuls les survivants auraient droit, et encore, à un permis de séjour ?

      Si donner des permis de séjour fait si peur à certains, on pourrait inventer des permis de circuler entre plusieurs pays. La France empêche les demandeurs d’asile de travailler, dans l’espoir de paraître une terre inhospitalière. L’Allemagne au contraire autorise les demandeurs d’asile à travailler peu de temps après le dépôt de la demande, de façon à ce que les gens se sentent bien et utiles le plus vite possible, et mènent une vie normale.... Il n’est pas surprenant qu’elle soit devenue une destination souhaitée par beaucoup.

      A Bilbao, Bart Sommers, maire de Malines en Belgique, a souligné l’impact positif de l’intégration des migrants. « Nous avons 138 nationalités différentes et nous avons plus de musulmans dans notre ville que la Hongrie et la Slovaquie réunies. » "Peut-être que Monsieur Orbán, [premier ministre hongrois depuis 2010 dont l’idéologie illibérale est très anti migrants], pourrait nous rendre visite", a-t-il ajouté.

      Mais ils sont fous ces Européens !


      https://www.explicite.info/articles/1003-leuroscope-de-la-semaine

      #aquarelle #dessins

    • La Spagna accoglie l’Aquarius, ma l’azione delle ong si restringe

      Il sole è già alto nel cielo e l’aria è ferma, il rumore dell’elicottero della polizia spagnola a bassa quota non dà tregua. Dopo otto giorni in mare e 1.300 chilometri percorsi in condizioni non sempre favorevoli per la navigazione, alle 10.25 del 17 giugno la nave umanitaria Aquarius appare all’orizzonte ed entra nel porto di Valencia, scortata da un’imbarcazione della guardia civil, da una della guardia costiera e dalle lance dell’ong Proactiva Open Arms.

      Aquarius sfila con il suo scafo arancione davanti alle televisioni di tutto il mondo schierate sul molo, mentre dal ponte i naufraghi intonano un canto. Sulla banchina gli operatori che aspettavano l’attracco dalle prime luci dell’alba si lasciano andare a un applauso. I medici e gli operatori sanitari spagnoli sono i primi a salire a bordo della nave diventata il simbolo della chiusura verso i migranti del nuovo governo italiano e della crisi politica che rischia di mandare in pezzi l’intera Unione europea.

      Circa un’ora dopo, le 106 persone soccorse al largo della Libia scendono dalla scaletta, tra loro undici bambini e sette donne incinte. L’ultimo a lasciare la nave è Reward, un ragazzo nigeriano, che scherza con i soccorritori. Per salutarlo uno degli operatori prende un’armonica e si mette a suonare. Dopo lunghi giorni di tensione, esplode la gioia. Un agente della guardia civil spagnola schierata allo sbarco non riesce a trattenere il sorriso. “Il momento più difficile è stato quando abbiamo dovuto spiegare ai migranti quello che stava succedendo”, ricorda Alessandro Porro, soccorritore di Sos Méditerranée e operatore della Croce rossa, originario di Asti, in Piemonte. “I migranti temevano di essere rimandati in Libia”.

      La rotta spagnola
      Alle 13.30 attracca la nave Orione della marina militare italiana, nave Dattilo della guardia costiera era sbarcata all’alba. Tutti i 630 migranti respinti il 10 giugno dall’Italia sono finalmente arrivati in un porto sicuro. Più di cento sono portati in ospedale, ma solo sei sono ricoverati. Le operazioni di sbarco vanno avanti per tutto il giorno e si concludono verso le 19.30, quando le autorità spagnole definiscono Valencia “capitale europea della solidarietà” e si dichiarano soddisfatte della buona riuscita del piano di emergenza che hanno chiamato “speranza nel Mediterraneo”.

      “Siamo contenti che questa inutile Odissea sia finita”, commenta la portavoce di Sos Méditerranée Mathilde Auvillain subito dopo lo sbarco dell’Aquarius. “L’accoglienza da parte degli spagnoli è stata molto umana, sono stati condotti prima i controlli medici e poi le identificazioni da parte della polizia”, continua. Il comune di Valencia ha preparato un’accoglienza imponente con la partecipazione di più di 2.300 operatori e funzionari, tra cui 800 volontari della Croce rossa. “Un aspetto che mi sembra molto positivo è il fatto che siano stati coinvolti circa 400 mediatori culturali e questo permetterà ai profughi di essere seguiti con attenzione durante le procedure di registrazione e di identificazione, fondamentali per la richiesta di asilo”, conclude. I migranti riceveranno un permesso umanitario valido per 45 giorni poi dovranno accedere alla procedure di richiesta di asilo ordinaria.

      Ma non tutti condividono la speranza che le sofferenze e gli ostacoli per queste persone siano terminati. Una parte dei migranti appena arrivati sarà trasferita in Francia, perché il governo di Emmanuel Macron ha comunicato la sua disponibilità, ma non vengono diffusi troppi dettagli su questa opzione. Mentre in particolare i migranti di origine algerina e marocchina rischiano di essere rimpatriati. Durante lo sbarco nel porto di Valencia, un gruppo di attivisti protesta davanti alla sala stampa.

      “Nessuno è illegale”, gridano. Denunciano le politiche di respingimento della Spagna nei confronti dei migranti nelle enclave di Ceuta e Melilla in Nordafrica e chiedono la chiusura dei centri di detenzione per il rimpatrio nella penisola iberica. “Molti dei migranti appena arrivati sono algerini e marocchini e dopo questo lungo calvario durato giorni in mare, ora rischiano di finire in un centro di detenzione per 60 giorni”, afferma Iñigo, un attivista della Campagna per la chiusura dei Centri di detenzione (Cie) mentre arrotola lo striscione con la scritta “No Cie” per tornarsene a casa dopo il sit in.

      La Spagna è il paese europeo con più immigrati in relazione alla popolazione (il 10 per cento) e il secondo paese dopo la Germania in termini assoluti con 6 milioni di immigrati. Ma è anche uno dei primi stati europei ad aver investito sulla militarizzazione della frontiera, tanto che le recinzioni di Ceuta e Melilla, costruite negli anni novanta, sono diventate il simbolo della cosiddetta Fortezza Europa.

      Negli ultimi due anni però la Spagna ha registrato a un nuovo aumento degli arrivi via mare in particolare dall’Algeria e dal Marocco. Secondo l’Alto commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati (Unhcr) nei primi sei mesi del 2018, in Spagna sono arrivati più di 14mila migranti, il 50 per cento in più di quelli arrivati nello stesso periodo del 2017, ma più o meno in linea con il numero di persone arrivate in Italia nei primi sei mesi del 2018 attraverso la rotta del Mediterraneo centrale. Solo nel finesettimana appena trascorso, la guardia costiera spagnola ha soccorso 1.290 persone nello stretto di Gibilterra e al largo delle isole Canarie. Nelle operazioni sono stati recuperati quattro cadaveri e 43 persone risultano disperse. I numeri della rotta spagnola sono destinati ad aumentare, secondo Frontex, ma nonostante questo, anche la Spagna è stata accusata dal governo italiano di non “fare la sua parte” sull’immigrazione.

      Un punto di non ritorno?
      Qualche ora dopo l’arrivo a Valencia, il coordinatore delle operazioni della nave Aquarius di Sos Méditerranée Nicola Stalla confessa tutto il suo sconcerto per l’esperienza appena vissuta. Originario di Alassio, in Liguria, e con una lunga esperienza alle spalle da coordinatore della missione, Stalla non avrebbe mai pensato che la Centrale operativa della guardia costiera di Roma avrebbe potuto ordinare alla nave Aquarius di attraccare a Malta, dopo aver coordinato i drammatici soccorsi di sabato notte.

      “Domenica sera ci siamo resi conto che quella decisione da parte di Roma ci avrebbe messo in una condizione di stallo pericolosa”, afferma. “Il nostro timore era quello di esaurire i viveri nel giro di poche ore, mentre Italia e Malta si rimpallavano le responsabilità”, racconta. Per Stalla la lunga traversata dell’Aquarius è la dimostrazione che i porti spagnoli e francesi non possano essere considerati un’alternativa valida a quelli italiani per i migranti soccorsi al largo della Libia.

      Il coordinatore della missione definisce “inumano e irrealistico” pensare che i migranti debbano essere sbarcati in Spagna o in Francia. “I giornalisti che erano a bordo hanno documentato cosa significhi sottoporre queste persone così vulnerabili a un viaggio lungo attraverso il Mediterraneo, un mare tutt’altro che facile per una nave sovraccarica in certe condizioni del meteo”.

      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/06/17/aquarius-valencia-ong

    • @stesummi fait, dans cet article, un lien entre ce qui se passe en Méditerranée, la fermeture des ports, et les discussions sur la réforme du #règlement_Dublin...

      Riformare Dublino ? Campa cavallo

      Nonostante la portata simbolica, giuridica e umana della chiusura dei porti a diverse navi di ONG, Matteo Salvini riuscirà difficilmente ad imporre ai paesi europei una maggior solidarietà nei confronti dell’Italia, ritengono diversi esperti. Il caso Aquarius ha reso ancor più evidente la frattura in seno all’Unione e l’incapacità dei paesi membri di trovare una risposta comune alla sfida del secolo.

      https://www.tvsvizzera.it/tvs/vicenda-aquarius_riformare-dublino--campa-cavallo/44198368
      #Dublin_IV #Dublin

    • Aquarius, una nave ostaggio della politica

      Concesso: l’Italia non può essere lasciata sola dall’Unione Europea a gestire il flusso di immigranti che attraversano il Mediterraneo partendo dall’Africa. Così come non può essere lasciata sola la Grecia, che ospita centinaia di migliaia di persone che la raggiunsero dalla Turchia due anni fa. Su questa sfida si misura la statura morale e politica dell’idea di comunità europea. Che per ora appare bassa. Ma la decisione del ministro degli interni italiano Matteo Salvini di chiudere i porti italiani alla nave Aquarius della ong italo-franco-tedesca Sos Mediterranée con 629 persone a bordo (dando così prova di essere il vero capo del governo, visto che la competenza spettava in realtà ad un altro ministero) è una brutta notizia per chi ha a cuore il diritto e l’impegno umanitario.

      La decisione del governo italiano è un atto illegale, contravviene alla Convenzione internazionale sulla ricerca e il salvataggio marittimo (ratificata dall’Italia nel 1989), la quale impone non solo il salvataggio in mare ma anche il trasferimento in luogo sicuro. Ed essendo stata la Aquarius incaricata dalla guardia costiera di Roma di portare in salvo le 629 persone, raccolte in diverse operazioni al largo della Libia, la chiusura dei porti ordinata da Salvini risulta ancora più assurda, tanto più che i porti restano aperti alle navi militari italiane, una delle quali ha portato oltre 900 migranti a Catania.

      Evidentemente il ministro degli interni e capo della Lega voleva mandare un segnale «forte» anche alle ong che in questi anni si sono prodigate per salvare più vite possibile sul Mediterraneo (essendo le forze messe in piedi dall’Unione europea insufficienti), da lui accusate di favorire l’immigrazione clandestina e di fare affari con i passatori. Ma il messaggio più forte è rivolto all’Unione Europea, che non riesce a riformare l’accordo di Dublino sul primo asilo e mettere d’accordo i suoi Stati membri sulla redistribuzione dei profughi, di cui si fa attualmente carico soprattutto l’Europa meridionale. Una redistribuzione cui si oppongono in particolare gli Stati del Gruppo di Visegrad (Ungheria, Polonia, Cechia e Slovacchia), con l’appoggio dell’Austria, con cui Salvini si sente maggiormente in sintonia.

      Ma è questa la strada per far crescere la solidarietà all’interno dell’Ue? O non è piuttosto un tentativo di minarla dall’interno, scatenando una litigiosità su un tema altamente delicato? Se il presidente francese Macron non è la persona più indicata per dare del «cinico» a Salvini (visto che il suo paese ha più volte chiuso le frontiere ai migranti che volevano raggiungerla dall’Italia), quale altro titolo può essere assegnato ad un ministro che gioca sulla pelle di centinaia di persone per raggiungere i suoi scopi politici ed elettorali?

      http://www.azione.ch/editoriale/dettaglio/articolo/aquarius-una-nave-ostaggio-della-politica.html

    • [L’intervista] #De_Falco, il comandante dei Cinque Stelle: “Salvini si rassegni: i naufraghi in mare vanno salvati”

      Parla l’ufficiale di Marina #Gregorio_De_Falco che la notte del 13 gennaio 2012 ordinò al capitano Schettino della Cosa Concordia di “tornare subito a bordo”. Il senatore 5 Stelle ricorda al ministro dell’Interno che il governo è “un organo collegiale”. Ma riconosce al segretario della Lega di aver ragione su Malta: “Non può continuare a sottrarsi”. Da sue ricerche la nave della Ong Lifeline è olandese. Insensato parlare di “blocco navale”. E assurdo ipotizzare di arretrare le navi rispetto alla zona dei salvataggi. “Le Capitanerie non lo faranno…

      http://notizie.tiscali.it/politica/articoli/intervista-de-falco-fusani

      v. anche:
      L’ex M5s De Falco: «Salverò i migranti. La legge del mare è superiore a quella di Salvini» - L’intervista
      https://www.open.online/primo-piano/2019/04/06/news/de_falco_intervista-187159

    • Corsica offers to take migrant boat

      The speaker of Corsica’s regional parliament, Jean-Guy Talamoni, said Monday that the French island was ready to open its port to the Lifeline, the boat of German NGO Mission Lifeline with some 230 migrants on board. Italy and Malta have refused to let the boat dock on their territory, as has Spain, which accepted the Aquarius, another boat, earlier this month.

      https://euobserver.com/tickers/142192
      #Corse

    • Publié par Fulvio Vassallo sur FB, le 27.06.2018:

      La Lifeline sta attraccando a Malta. Tra poco Muscat -su ordine di Salvini- la sequestrera’.

      I servizi giornalistici confermano che si contesta al comandante, che verrà arrestato, il grave fatto di non avere obbedito agli ordini provenienti dalla Centrale Operativa della Guardia costiera italiana di consegnare i naufraghi alle motovedette libiche, se non portarli direttamente in un porto libico.

      Sotto processo chi ha rispettato le regole delle Convenzioni internazionali, legittimati gli ordini illegittimi di riconsegna ai libici. Ai libici dai quali fuggono persone vittime di abusi e violenze che Salvini definisce soltanto come «retorica». Ma per la Direzione Distrettuale antimafia e per il Tribunale di Ragusa la Libia non offre «porti sicuri di sbarco».

      Questa e’ la fine del diritto internazionale. Ma anche dello stato di diritto in Italia.

      https://www.facebook.com/fulvio.vassallo.3/posts/10156549963911926

    • Pubblicato da Fulvio Vassallo, il 27.06.2018, su FB:

      Provata la prassi adottata dalla Centrale operativa della Guardia Costiera italiana (IMrcc) di Roma che ha ordinato al comandante della Lifeline, prima di riconsegnare i migranti alle motovedette libiche e poi di dirigere direttamente su Tripoli, per una «rendition» dei naufraghi agli agenti delle unità antimmigrazione del governo Serraj. Si tratta di ordini illegittimi, mai impartiti prima, frutto delle direttive informali impartite da Salvini e Toninelli. Più mettono sotto accusa le Ong, piu’ aprono processi contro gli operatori umanitari, piu vengono fuori le magagne della Guardia costiera ( e della Marina) italiana. Siamo solo all’inizio. Verranno fuori tracciati, notam, mappe, registrazioni e testimonianze . Vedremo alla fine chi ha rispettato la legge e le convenzioni internazionali e chi le ha violate. Se da qualche parte esistono ancora giudici indipendenti, come i giudici di Palermo e di Ragusa che hanno scritto nelle loro sentenze che in Libia non esistono «porti sicuri di sbarco».

      https://www.facebook.com/fulvio.vassallo.3/videos/10156550134361926

    • Una zona SAR per la “Libia” che non esiste. Si perfeziona la politica dell’annientamento.

      Sull’onda dei successi delle manovre di criminalizzazione delle ONG avviate lo scorso anno durante il governo Gentiloni-Minniti, dopo le operazioni di “soccorso” in acque internazionali delegate ai guardiacoste di Tripoli, giunge la notizia che l’IMO (Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite per la navigazione matrittima internazionale) avrebbe inserito nei suoi data base una zona SAR “libica” con la indicazione di una Centrale operativa di coordinamento.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/06/28/una-zona-sar-per-la-libia-che-non-esiste-si-perfeziona-la-politica-dellannien

    • La Libia ha dichiarato la sua zona SAR: lo conferma l’IMO

      Tripoli definisce una propria area di ricerca e soccorso riconosciuta dall’Organizzazione Marittima Internazionale. Una svolta che complica ulteriormente la situazione, rendendo ancora più incerto il futuro di chi è intrappolato in Libia e il ruolo delle navi umanitarie. Diverse le domande, prima tra tutte: come si può affidare la responsabilità del soccorso a un Paese che non può essere considerato “Place of Safety”?

      http://www.vita.it/it/article/2018/06/28/la-libia-ha-dichiarato-la-sua-zona-sar-lo-conferma-limo/147392
      #SAR #Libye #it_has_begun #sauvetage #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #zone_SAR

    • Colau ofrece Barcelona como “puerto seguro” para acoger migrantes a la deriva

      La alcaldesa de la capital catalana apela directamente al presidente Pedro Sánchez y la vicepresidenta Carmen Calvo para ayudar a la oenegé Open Arms “a salvar vidas”

      http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20180624/45375909848/ada-colau-barcelona-puerto-seguro-migrantes-deriva.html
      #Barcelone

      #Berlin aussi a déclaré vouloir accueillir des demandeurs d’asile de la #Lifeline...
      Berlin will Flüchtlinge aufnehmen
      http://www.taz.de/!5516521

      –-> je vais mettre les infos concernant les villes qui se sont déclarées prêtes à accueil des migrants sur ce fil autour des #villes-refuge : https://seenthis.net/messages/656848

    • Les ONG ne sont pas les complices des passeurs

      Non seulement les opérations de secours en mer sauvent des personnes de la noyade, mais elles œuvrent à leur évacuation en situation de danger immédiat dans leur pays, rappelle MSF.

      La Méditerranée est devenue depuis trois semaines l’arène au sein de laquelle les Etats européens s’adonnent à des jeux politiques sordides aux dépens de la vie de milliers de personnes et mettent en scène la fermeture de leur territoire. Dernier épisode en date, le 26 juin, commentant l’opération de sauvetage du Lifeline, un navire d’une organisation non gouvernementale et son débarquement accordé in extremis par Malte, le président Emmanuel Macron l’accuse d’être « intervenue en contravention de toutes les règles et des garde-côtes libyens » et ainsi d’avoir « fait le jeu des passeurs ». Poursuivant, il regrette qu’« au nom de l’humanitaire », il puisse n’y avoir « plus aucun contrôle ».

      Ainsi, c’est l’ensemble des organisations humanitaires de secours en mer qui se retrouvent qualifiées de complice des trafiquants. Une accusation aussi absurde qu’inacceptable. Les ONG n’agissent en mer que sur instruction du centre de coordination des secours maritimes italien. Emmanuel Macron oublie également, à l’instar de ses homologues européens, que les opérations non-gouvernementales ne secourent qu’une minorité de celles et ceux qui sont sauvés en mer, la plupart l’étant par les garde-côtes italiens et des navires marchands. Plutôt qu’encourager les migrants à prendre la mer dans des conditions périlleuses, nous disent les responsables européens, il s’agit de confier la responsabilité du sauvetage aux garde-côtes libyens, ainsi que celui de la surveillance des côtes pour empêcher les départs. Comme s’en félicite le porte-parole du gouvernement Benjamin Griveaux, « grâce à un investissement que la France et l’Union européenne auprès des autorités libyennes », le rythme des traversées a considérablement ralenti.

      Ce résultat a été obtenu au prix de mesures révoltantes. Car les Européens dans leur ensemble, et la France et l’Italie au premier chef, encouragent l’interception en mer, le refoulement et le maintien en Libye de milliers de personnes qui y ont enduré des mois, et même pour certains des années, de privations, d’extorsion, de torture et d’esclavage. Personne n’ignore plus en effet ces sévices depuis la publication de nombreux rapports, dont ceux issus de notre travail dans le pays, en Libye ainsi que la diffusion CNN de la vidéo d’un marché aux esclaves en octobre dernier. Le président Macron n’hésitait pas lui-même à qualifier de « crimes contre l’Humanité » les faits d’esclavage en Libye en novembre dernier.

      Depuis le début de l’année 2018, ils sont déjà plus de 10 000 à avoir été interceptés et refoulés par les « garde-côtes libyens », bannière regroupant des groupes disparates de militaires et milices en armes. Des garde-côtes que l’Union européenne finance et forme, malgré la porosité de certains de ces groupes avec les trafiquants d’êtres humains comme cela a été largement démontré. Pour rappel, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a sanctionné le 7 juin dernier six personnes, dont quatre Libyens, à la tête de réseaux de trafiquants : parmi eux, un des chefs des garde-côtes de la ville de Zawiya. Pourtant, par un tour de passe-passe tragique, la France se satisfait aujourd’hui, à l’instar de l’Italie, de sa coopération – de sa complicité ? – avec ces autorités aux contours flous et dont on sait qu’elles maltraitent les migrants et organisent elles-mêmes parfois leur passage.

      Une fois reconduites dans les centres de détention, les personnes interceptées seront pour la plupart soumises à un chantage de fait : rester enfermées dans ces cages fétides des mois encore ou bien se résoudre à intégrer le programme de « retours volontaires » dans leur pays d’origine organisé par l’Organisation internationale des migrations. Bien que certains d’entre eux accueillent ces propositions avec soulagement, d’autres ne s’y soumettent que pour échapper au pire. Quelques-uns finiront par bénéficier de la protection du Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés, seront envoyés au Niger en attente d’une hypothétique relocalisation dans un pays européen. Mais leur nombre est terriblement faible – un peu moins de deux cents depuis la fin de l’année 2017 – au regard des dizaines de milliers de personnes reconnues demandeuses d’asile en Libye.

      A ce regard, rien ne fonctionne : il n’existe aucun système d’enregistrement digne de ce nom et les activités du HCR dans le pays sont extrêmement contraintes. Enfin, une partie des personnes interceptées se retrouve à nouveau plongée dans des réseaux de criminalité et enfermée dans des prisons sauvages, où elles sont torturées pour obtenir une rançon de leurs proches. Les migrants détenus en Libye aujourd’hui se trouvent d’ailleurs majoritairement dans ces lieux de captivité clandestins, soumis aux pratiques les plus barbares et parfois tués. MSF sait, pour jouer les fournisseurs de sacs à cadavre à une association locale au nord de la Libye, que ce sont des centaines de personnes qui disparaissent ainsi chaque mois.

      Dès lors, la fuite est pour ses personnes une nécessité bien plus qu’un choix. En ce sens, les opérations de secours en mer des ONG répondent autant à sauver les gens d’une noyade certaine que d’œuvrer à l’évacuation de personnes en situation de danger immédiat.

      L’alternative au secours en mer n’est pas, comme feignent de le croire Emmanuel Macron et Matteo Salvini, sa disparition, mais bien plutôt une capacité accrue pour faire sortir les migrants qui le souhaitent de cette situation où ils connaissent l’enfer, et cela sans que le recours aux passeurs soit leur unique possibilité : sortir d’une logique de détention, accorder toute sa place à la demande d’asile en prenant conscience que certains d’entre eux ne pourront être rapatriés, accélérer les processus de relocalisation dans les pays tiers, y compris en Europe. Que penserait Paul Ricoeur, dont se réclame notre président, d’un de ses disciples faisant de l’ambulancier le complice de l’agresseur ?

      http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/06/29/les-ong-ne-sont-pas-les-complices-des-passeurs_1662820

    • Migranti: Toninelli, divieto di attracco per la nave ong #Astral

      «In ragione della nota formale che mi giunge dal Ministero dell’Interno e che adduce motivi di ordine pubblico, dispongo il divieto di attracco nei porti italiani per la nave Ong Astral, in piena ottemperanza dell’articolo 83 del Codice della Navigazione». Lo dice in una nota il Ministro delle Infrastrutture e dei trasporti, Danilo Toninelli.

      http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2018/06/29/migranti-toninelli-divieto-di-attracco-per-la-nave-ong-astral-_d1b9ba19-7f42-44

      Commentaire de Marta Esperti sur FB:

      Decisione puramente politica, l’Astral non ha nessun migrante a bordo tra l’altro. Inoltre Astral è il nome della nave e non della ONG (#Proactiva_Open_Arms). Un’altra decisione meschina ed irregolare.

    • Updated (3): Another battle between Malta, Italy brewing on yet another ship with migrants

      Another battle of words is brewing between Malta and Italy on yet another group of migrants that has been rescued by a ship belonging to a non-governmental organisation.

      Italian Home Minister Matteo Salvini, on Twitter, wrote that Italy will not be accepting the ship with the migrants which, according to him, is closer to Malta.

      But, in a reply, Home Affairs Minister Michael Farrugia said that Lampedusa, which is Italian territory, is closer to the area where the SAR operation took place. The map shows that Lampedusa is 124.99 nautical miles away from the site, while Malta is 141.02 nautical miles away.


      http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-06-30/local-news/Another-battle-between-Malta-Italy-brewing-on-yet-another-migrant-sh

    • "Avete fatto annegare 100 migranti". Open Arms accusa l’Italia

      La ong #Open_Arms accusa la Guardia costiera italiana e quella libica della morte dei migranti annegati in un naufragio al largo della Libia. «Ieri 100 persone sono morte nel naufragio di una barca di fronte alle coste della Libia», afferma la ong, che ha in queste ore nel Mediterraneo la nave Astral, a bordo della quale si trovano 59 migranti soccorsi oggi.

      Open Arms - prosegue il tweet dell’europarlamentare socialista spagnolo Javi Lopez, che si trova a bordo e che in un filmato si sofferma in un colloquio con Oscar Camps, fondatore della ong spagnola - «avrebbe potuto salvarle ma il suo appello è stato ignorato dalla Guardia costiera italiana e da quella libica».Il gommone naufragato tra ieri e giovedì scorso aveva a bordo almeno 120 migranti. Al naufragio sono sopravvissuti in 16. Tra i morti ci sono almeno tre bambini. «L’evento Sar avvenuto nella giornata di ieri e per il quale risultano dispersi circa 100 migranti è accaduto in acque territoriali libiche e non ha visto in alcun modo il coinvolgimento della Centrale operativa della Guardia costiera di Roma». E’ quanto precisa la stessa Guardia costiera in riferimento alla ricostruzione di Open Arms che ha accusato l’Italia.

      https://www.huffingtonpost.it/2018/06/30/avete-fatto-annegare-100-migranti-open-arms-accusa-litalia_a_23471711

    • Migrants rescue boat allowed to dock in Barcelona

      A Spanish rescue boat which plucked 60 migrants from a patched-up rubber dinghy in the Mediterranean Sea near Libya has been given permission to sail to Barcelona, following another political row between Italy and Malta over where the vessel should dock.

      The boat, Open Arms, run by Spanish aid group Proactiva Open Arms, said it rescued the migrants – including five women, a nine-year-old child and three teenagers – after it spotted a rubber boat patched with duct tape floating in the sea. All the migrants appeared in good health.

      Italy’s right-wing interior minister Matteo Salvini quickly declared that the rescue boat “can forget about arriving in an Italian port”, and claimed it should instead go to Malta, the nearest port.

      Malta swiftly pushed back, with its interior minister contending that the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily, was closer to the boat.

      http://www.itv.com/news/2018-06-30/migrants-rescue-boat-allowed-to-dock-in-barcelona

    • Dopo l’allontanamento delle ONG è strage quotidiana sulla rotta del Mediterraneo centrale

      Nel giorno in cui il ministro dell’interno e vice-presidente del Consiglio rilancia da Pontida l’ennesimo attacco contro le ONG, che vedranno “solo in cartolina” i porti italiani, e mentre tre navi umanitarie sono bloccate nel porto de La Valletta, per decisione del governo maltese, nelle acque del Mediterraneo Centrale si continua a morire. Si continua a morire nell’indifferenza della maggior parte della popolazione italiana, schierata con chi ha promesso che, chiudendo i porti, e le vie di fuga, ai migranti da soccorrere in mare, le condizioni di vita degli italiani colpiti dalla crisi potranno migliorare. Una tragica illusione. Il vero pericolo per tutti oggi non viene dal mare, ma dalla costituzione di un fronte sovranista ed identitario europeo, che potrebbe cancellare lo stato di diritto e la democrazia rappresentativa. E allora non ci sarà più spazio nè per i diritti umani nè per i diritti sociali. i più forti imporranno le loro leggi ai più deboli.

      Questa volta nessuno potrà accusare le navi umanitarie, come hanno fatto fino a oggi direttori di giornali in Italia ed esponenti della sedicente Guardia costiera libica. Adesso i libici, in assenza delle navi umanitarie, sono costretti ad avvalersi delle navi commerciali in navigazione nelle loro acque, per operazioni di soccorso che da soli non sono in grado di garantire, salvo poi attaccare le ONG. Per le persone “soccorse” in mare da questi mezzi il destino è segnato, lo sbarco avviene a Tripoli, porto più vicino ma non “place of safety“, e dopo poche ore, per coloro che sono trasferiti dal centro di prima accoglienza al porto, ai vari centri di detenzione gestiti dalle milizie, il destino è segnato.

      Si ripetono intanto attacchi scomposti contro gli operatori umanitari, che rilanciano la macchina del fango che da oltre un anno si rivolge contro le ONG, accusate di tutti i possibili reati, per il solo fatto di salvare vite umane in mare. Si vogliono eliminare tutti i testimoni dell’Olocausto nel Mediterraneo. Senza un voto del Parlamento si è cercato di introdurre in via surrettizia il reato di solidarietà, in spregio al principio di legalità, affermato dalla Costituzione italiana.

      Questa striscia di morte, che si allunga giorno dopo giorno, con una cadenza mai vista prima, deriva direttamente dalla eliminazione delle navi umanitarie e dall’arretramento degli assetti militari italiani ed europei che in passato, anche se si verificavano gravi stragi, riuscivano tuttavia a garantire più solleciti interventi di soccorso. Il blocco di tre navi umanitarie a Malta, come il sequestro della Juventa lo scorso anno, potrebbero essere stati causa di una forte riduzione della capacità di soccorso in acque internazionali, tra la Libia e ‘Europa, una capacità di soccorso che gli stati non hanno voluto mantenere negli standards imposti dalle Convenzioni internazionali a ciascun paese responsabile di una zona SAR ( ricerca e soccorso). La presenza delle navi umanitarie è stata bollata come un fattore di attrazione delle partenze, se non come vera e propria complicità con i trafficanti, come ha ripetuto in più occasioni Salvini. Ne vediamo oggi le conseguenze mortali.

      Anche l’UNHCR ha espresso la sua preoccupazione per la diminuzione degli assetti navali in grado di operare interventi di soccorso nelle acque del Mediterraneo centrale. Secondo l’OIM negli ultimi tre giorni sono annegate oltre 200 persone, una serie di stragi ignorate dall’oipinione pubblica italiana e nascoste dai politici concentrati nel rinnovato attacco contro le ONG. La “banalità” della strage quotidiana in mare costituisce la cifra morale del governo Salvini-Di Maio. Con il sommarsi delle vittime, e l’allontanamento dei testimoni, si vuole produrre una totale assuefazione nella popolazione italiana. Per alimentare altro odio ed altra insicurezza, utili per le prossime scadenze elettorali.

      Nelle prime settimane di insediamento del nuovo governo, ed in vista del Consiglio europeo di Bruxelles del 28-29 giugno scorso, il ministero dell’interno ha disposto in modo informale la chiusura dei porti ed il divieto di ingresso nelle acque territoriali, per alcune imbarcazioni delle Organizzazioni non governative che avevano effettuato soccorsi nelle acque internazionali antistanti le coste libiche. Sono state anche ritardate le operazioni di sbarco di centinaia di persone, soccorse da unità militari ( come la nave americana Trenton), o commerciali ( come il cargo Alexander Maersk), che, solo dopo lunghi giorni di attesa, hanno potuto trasbordare i naufraghi che avevamo a bordo e proseguire per la loro rotta. In molti casi si sono trasferite le responsabilità di coordinamento dei soccorsi alle autorità libiche, con i risultati che sono sotto gli occhi di tutti.

      Le ultime vicende delle navi umanitarie Acquarius , Lifeline e Open Arms, dopo il sequestro, lo scorso anno, della nave Juventa, ancora bloccata a Trapani, hanno aperto una nuova fase di tensioni anche a livello internazionale, in particolare con il governo maltese e con le autorità spagnole. Il governo italiano ha chiuso i porti alle poche navi umanitarie ancora impegnate nelle attività di ricerca e salvataggio (SAR) sulla rotta del Mediterraneo centrale, mentre si è rilanciata la criminalizzazione delle Ong, e più in generale di chiunque rispetti il dovere di salvare vite umane in mare, malgrado importanti decisioni della magistratura (di Ragusa e di Palermo) riconoscessero come lecite, anzi doverose, le attività di soccorso umanitario delle stesse Ong sotto inchiesta.

      Da ultimo si è appreso che ci sarebbero motivi “di ordine pubblico” alla base della decisione del ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini di vietare l’accesso ai porti italiani alla Open Arms.
Questi motivi, stando a informazioni che non sono state formalizzate in un provvedimento notificato agli interessati, sarebbero costituiti dalle “vicende giudiziarie” in cui è stata coinvolta la nave delle Ong spagnola, dissequestrata con una sentenza del Gip poi confermata dal tribunale di Ragusa, e dalle “manifestazioni”(rischio proteste) che si sono verificate in occasione del sequestro preventivo alla quale era stata sottoposta nel porto di Pozzallo.

      Si configura così come problema di “ordine pubblico” il doveroso espletamento di una operazione SAR che si è svolta nel pieno rispetto della legge e del diritto internazionale, per legittimare un provvedimento, ancora segretato, forse una circolare probabilmente da redigere, del ministro Toninelli, che vieta l’ingresso alle navi delle Ong nelle acque territoriali e nei porti italiani .

      L’allontanamento delle ONG per effetto delle “chiusure” informali dei porti, e la istituzione unilaterale di una zona SAR libica, oltre al blocco imposto alle navi umanitarie dalle autorità maltesi, riducono la presenza dei mezzi di soccorso nel Mediterraneo centrale e hanno già comportato un aumento esponenziale delle vittime.

      La realizzazione del progetto italiano di istituire una zona SAR , completata con una forte pressione sull’IMO a Londra, sta producendo tutti i suoi effetti mortali, considerando che la Guardia costiera “libica” non può coprire tutte le azioni di soccorso che è chiamata ad operare (spesso da assetti italiani), avendo a disposizione soltanto sei motovedette. Si tratta di mezzi ceduti dai precedenti governi italiani, oggi abbastanza logorati malgrado siano stati curati nella manutenzione dai marinai delle unità italiane, di stanza nel porto di Tripoli, nell’ambito della missione NAURAS. Non si sa come e quando arriveranno in Libia le 12 motovedette promesse alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli da Salvini, che doveva fare approvare la sua proposta in Consiglio dei ministri, approvazione che ancora non c’e’ stata. Una iniziativa che potrebbe infuocare ancora di più lo scontro tra le milizie libiche per il controllo dei porti, e del traffico di gas e petrolio.
      La creazione fittizia di una zona SAR libica, che sembra sia stata notificata anche all’IMO, sta legittimando gli interventi più frequenti della Guardia costiera di Tripoli, che arrivano a minacciare anche gli operatori umanitari mentre sono impegnati negli interventi di soccorso in acque internazionali. Interventi di soccorso che sono sempre monitorati dalle autorità militari italiane ed europee, che però non intervengono con la stessa tempestività che permetteva in passato il salvataggio di migliaia di vite.

      Il cerchio si chiude. Adesso arriva anche il supporto europeo alla chiusura contro le ONG, anche se non si traduce in alcun atto dotato di forza normativa vinclante. Tutte le politiche europee sull’immigrazione, anche i respingimenti, avverranno “su base volontaria”. Ma le navi di Frontex ( e di Eunavfor Med) rimangono vincolate agli obblighi di soccorso previsti dai Regolamenti europei n.656 del 2014 e 1624 del 2016. Atti normativi, vincolanti anche per i ministri,che subordinano le azioni contro i trafficanti alla salvaguardia della vita delle vittime, non esternazioni di leader sull’orlo di una crisi di nervi alla fine di un Consiglio europeo estenuante ed inconcludente.

      L’illegalità di scelte politiche e militari che vanno contro il diritto internazionale viene giustificata con lo spauracchio di manifestazioni democratiche di protesta. Non e’ a rischio soltanto la libertà di manifestazione o il diritto a svolgere attività di assistenza e di soccorso umanitario. Il messaggio lanciato dal governo italiano, e ripreso dal governo maltese, è chiaro, riguarda tutti, non solo i migranti. E’ la strategia mortale della dissuasione, rivolta ai migranti ed agli operatori umanitari. Altro che “pacchia”. Per chi si trova costretto a fuggire dalla Libia, senza alternative sicure per salvare la vita, il rischio del naufragio si fa sempre più concreto. Anche se gli “sbarchi” sono drasticamente calati, rispetto allo scorso anno, è in forte aumento il numero delle vittime, morti e dispersi, abbandonati nelle acque del Mediterraneo.

      In questa situazione la magistratura italiana è chiamata a fare rispettare le regole dello stato di diritto e gli impegni assunti dall’Italia con la firma e la ratifica delle Convenzioni internazionali di diritto del mare. Ma è anche importante il contributo della società civile organizzata, delle associazioni, di tutto quel mondo del volontariato che in questi ultimi mesi è stato messo sotto accusa con lo slogan della “lotta al business dell’immigrazione”. Quando erano state proprio le Organizzazioni non governative a denunciare chi faceva affari sulla pelle dei migranti e chi ometteva i controlli, denunce fatte in Parlamento e nel lavoro quotidiano di tanti cittadini solidali. L’attacco contro il sistema di accoglienza è stato utilizzato per delegittimare e bloccare chi portava soccorso in mare, mentre gli stati venivano meno ai loro obblighi di salvataggio. Verranno dalla società civile europea e dagli operatori umanitari le denunce che inchioderanno i responsabili delle stragi per omissione.

      Rispetto alle richieste di soccorso, e persino rispetto alle istanze che si stanno proponendo per avere chiarite le basi normative e i contenuti dei provvedimenti amministrativi, sulla base dei quali si sta interdicendo l’ingresso nelle acque territoriali e nei porti italiani alle navi delle ONG, impegnate in attività SAR nelle acque internazionali a nord delle coste libiche, silenzi e ritardi. Si può riscontrare silenzio e ritardo nell’attività delle pubbliche amministrazioni riconducibili al Ministero delle infrastrutture ( quanto al divieto di ingresso) e dell’interno (quanto alle note di rilevazione ed alla dichiarazione di una situazione di pericolo per l’ordine pubblico). Le decisioni dei ministri, su materie così importanti che incidono sulla vita ( e sulla morte) delle persone, non possono essere comunicate sui social, con messaggi Twitter o attraverso Facebook.

      Se gli avvistamenti iniziali ed il coordinamento “di fatto” (come rilevato dalla magistratura) della Guardia costiera “libica” sono effettuati da parte di autorità militari italiane, in sinergia con gli assetti aero-navali europei delle missioni Themis di Frontex ed Eunavfor MED, le autorità italiane non possono dismettere la loro responsabilità di soccorso.

      In questi casi il ministero dell’interno italiano ha l’obbligo di indicare un porto sicuro (place of safety) di sbarco in Italia, dal momento che la Libia non offre porti sicuri, e che Malta ha negato in diverse occasioni l’attracco a navi commerciali o umanitarie, che avevano operato soccorsi nelle acque del Mediterraneo centrale.

      Contro la scelta di chiudere i porti e di interdire l’ingresso delle navi delle ONG nelle acque territoriali, tanto per sbarcare naufraghi soccorsi in alto mare, quanto per effettuare rifornimenti e cambi di equipaggio, occorre rilanciare una forte iniziativa sul piano sociale, politico e legale. Per affermare il diritto alla vita, un diritto incondizionato, che non può essere piegato a finalità politiche o giudiziarie. Per battere quell’ondata di disinformazione e di rancore sociale che sta disintegrando il tessuto umano della nostra Repubblica, e la stessa Unione Europea, indicando nei migranti e in chi li assiste la ragione di tutti i mali che affliggono i cittadini italiani. Come se si trattasse di nemici interni da eliminare. Di fronte a tutto questo, la resistenza è un dovere.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/01/dopo-lallontanamento-delle-ong-e-strage-quotidiana-sulla-rotta-del-mediterran

    • Migrants : pour les armateurs, secourir les naufragés est « un devoir absolu »

      Le devoir des navires est de porter assistance aux personnes en situation de détresse en mer, quelles que soient les circonstances, souligne le délégué général d’Armateurs de France Hervé Thomas, alors que l’Italie a bloqué pendant trois jours un cargo danois qui avait secouru des migrants.

      http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/migrants-pour-les-armateurs-secourir-les-naufrages-est-un-devoir-absolu/article-normal-860223.html
      #droit_de_la_mer

    • #Sea-Watch hindered from leaving port while people drown at sea

      +++ Current surge in death toll linked to crack down on sea rescue +++ Sea-Watch fully entitled with Dutch flag, investigations are political campaign against civil rescue fleet +++

      Sea-Watch learned today that its vessel is detained in Malta, without any legal grounds provided by authorities. Since the Sea-Watch 3 is not registered in the sportboat register, as is the case for LIFELINE and SEEFUCHS, but is listed in the royal shipping register as a Dutch seagoing vessel, fully entitled to fly the Dutch flag, the lack of permission to sail from Malta turns out not to be a registration issue, but a political campaign to stop civil rescue at sea.

      While rescue assets are blocked in port, recent days have become the deadliest this year. Yesterday, the UNHCR reported another 63 people missing, while on Friday more than 100 people had drowned, among them babies and children. At the moment there is no suitable rescue asset left in the area of operation, despite the fact that the Sea-Watch 3 is well equipped and ready to sail. Sea-Watch strongly urges the Maltese government to stop hindering rescue workers, as human lives are at acute risk.

      https://sea-watch.org/en/321

    • Terzo naufragio in quattro giorni. I governi uccidono ed i giudici processano la solidarietà.

      Oggi vogliamo soltanto fissare la sequenza dei fatti, le vicende di questa ultima strage, che rischia di essere cancellata dall’indifferenza generale, per restituire una lacrima ed un ricordo a quelli che potrebero essere nostri padri, madri, fratelli, sorelle, figli, nipoti. Che oggi, dopo questo ennesimo naufragio, saranno dispersi in qualche parte del Mediterraneo, senza che le loro famiglie possano avere almeno restituiti i cadaveri. Altre 114 vite cancellate dalle politiche di “lotta ai trafficanti” e di “difesa dei confini” che in Europa ed alle sue frontiere esterne stanno prevalendo persino sul diritto alla vita.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/02/terzo-naufragio-in-quattro-giorni-i-governi-uccidono-ed-i-giudici-processano-

      v. aussi:
      http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2018/07/02/news/migranti_unhcr_nuovo_naufragio_in_libia_114_dispersi_in_mare-200669661
      https://www.corriere.it/cronache/18_luglio_02/migranti-altro-naufragio-l-agenzia-onu-ci-sono-114-dispersi-850cef22-7e26-1
      http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/topnews/2018/07/02/nuovo-naufragio-in-libia-114-dispersi_79f8cc8a-ea4b-42a9-8be5-19b6c31b0545.html

    • 16/06: Alarm Phone alerted to two boats in the Western Mediterranean – one person died during rescue operation

      Watch The Med Alarm Phone Investigations – 16th of June 2018
      Case name: 2018_06_16-WM264
      Situation: Alarm Phone alerted to two distress cases between Morocco and Spain, one traveller died during the rescue operation.
      Status of WTM Investigation: Concluded
      Place of Incident: Western Mediterranean Sea

      Summary of the Case: On Saturday the 16th of June, the Alarm Phone shift team was alerted to two boats in distress in the Western Mediterranean. Both boats were rescued by the Moroccan navy. However, one traveller drowned during the rescue operation of the second boat.

      At 12.48pm, the Alarm Phone shift team was alerted by a contact person to a boat in distress carrying 51 travellers, amongst them seven women. The boat had left the day before in the early evening from Nador. The contact person had not been able to reach the travellers since the previous evening, and we did also not manage to establish direct contact. At 1.13pm the contact person informed us that the travellers had been intercepted by the Moroccan navy.

      At 09.10pm, the Alarm Phone shift team was alerted by a contact person to a group of 11 travellers, who had left from a beach just south of Tangier two hours earlier. Via the contact person we received the position of the travellers, but from 10.25pm it was not possible for neither us nor the contact person to reach the travellers. At 10.45pm we called the Spanish search and rescue organisation Salvamento Maritimo (SM) and passed on our information. At 11.41 we managed to reach the travellers. They had been rescued by the Moroccan navy and were back in Morocco, but they informed us that one person had drowned. We learned via the contact person that the person had drowned during the rescue operation, and that the Moroccan navy had been unwilling to resuscitate him.
      Four days later we received a testimony from the group of travellers, explaining the events on the night that their friend lost his life. They explained that the Moroccan navy had come towards them, just as a Spanish helicopter had spotted them from above. The navy had approached them quickly, creating big waves which caused the boat to capsize. Most of the travellers managed to cling on to their rubber boat, which had flipped over. They explained how their friend was not able to grab hold of the boat, and how the navy made no effort to help him, but simply watched him drown. Afterwards they allowed the remaining distressed people onto their vessel, and brought them back to Morocco. We send all our condolences to the family and friends of the traveller who passed away, and want to once again point out that the Moroccan navy is not a rescue organisation, but first and foremost a military unit with border management as their main aim.

      http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/reports/view/923

    • Malta blocks migrant search plane from operating in Mediterranean as EU toughens stance on refugee rescues

      Malta has blocked an aircraft used to search for migrant boats in the Mediterranean from operating out of the country, according to a migrant rescue group.

      Sea Watch, which runs the #Moonbird aircraft, condemned the move, accusing authorities of grounding the plane during the “deadliest days” in the Mediterranean since records began.

      The German NGO said the plane had been involved in the rescue of some 20,000 people since it began operating.


      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/malta-blocks-moonbird-plane-mediterranean-refugee-crisis-ngo-sea-watc

    • Libya’s Authorities Rescue 41 Migrants after Shipwreck

      The Libyan Coast Guard rescued 41 migrants after the shipwreck of a pneumatic boat in which 63 other people, declared missing, were also traveling, today reported the government.

      The boat, which sank off the coast of Garabolli, 50 kilometers east of this capital, was carrying 104 people, a figure that can be deduced from the possible victims still to be found, according to the Navy spokesman, Colonel Major Ayoub Gassem.

      The 41 migrants who traveled as passengers survived because of their life vests, which allowed them to resist until they were rescued.

      Gassem lamented the limited resources of the Coast Guard, including only three operational vessels, often immobilized in the port due to lack of fuel, breakdowns and life jackets, in a country through which thousands of Africans try to reach Europe.

      That body of operations rescued only last June more than 4,000 migrants, a thousand of them in a single day.

      http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=30585&SEO=libyas-authorities-rescue-41-migrants-after-s

    • Aquarius : les étudiantes rousseauistes de l’ULB livrent leur analyse

      En mai dernier, nous avons eu la chance de participer au Concours de procès simulé en droit international Charles-Rousseau, lequel abordait cette année la problématique des migrants interceptés en mer. Le cas pratique mettait en scène deux États mettant en cause la responsabilité d’un troisième État, le Takaramé, devant le Tribunal international du droit de la mer. Il lui était reproché d’avoir manqué à ses obligations en matière de droit de la mer, de droits de l’Homme et de droit des réfugiés. En effet, cet État, dont le port était le plus proche du navire, avait refusé l’accès à ce même port à un navire en situation de détresse à la suite du secours qu’il avait apporté à une centaine de migrants fuyant les persécutions subies dans leur pays d’origine. Ce cas fictif n’est évidemment pas sans rappeler les récents évènements en méditerranée. Pendant plusieurs jours, l’Italie et Malte se sont en effet renvoyées la responsabilité d’accueillir l’Aquarius, un navire ayant recueilli à son bord plusieurs centaines de migrants. Le 10 juin 2018, ce navire de l’ONG SOS Méditerranée avait secouru 629 migrants, parmi lesquels se trouvaient 123 mineurs isolés, 11 enfants en bas âge, et 7 femmes enceintes. L’Italie ayant refusé de les accueillir, le navire s’était retrouvé bloqué à 35 milles marins de l’Italie, et à 27 milles marins de Malte. L’ONG avait pourtant comme pratique, en raison d’un accord passé avec les autorités italiennes, d’accoster et de débarquer les personnes secourues dans les ports italiens. Il semblait donc logique que le navire débarque, comme à son habitude, ces personnes en Italie. Mais logique ne fait pas forcément droit. Il convient donc de s’interroger sur ce que dit le droit international quant au débarquement des migrants secourus en mer. Les conclusions qui suivent s’appuient sur les recherches que nous avons pu effectuer dans le cadre du Concours Charles-Rousseau.

      Dans la suite de la présente analyse, nous démontrerons d’abord que les Etats ne manquent pas de profiter des zones grises du droit de la mer pour oublier leurs obligations envers l’Aquarius. Ensuite, nous insisterons sur l’importance de l’obligation de respecter les droits de l’Homme en mer, qui apparaissait s’imposer tout particulièrement à l’Italie, mais également aux autre États, dans le cas présent.

      1. Les États côtiers de la méditerranée ont vite fait d’oublier les obligations que leur impose la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer

      L’obligation pour les Etats de secourir les personnes en détresse en mer est une des plus anciennes règles coutumières en droit de la mer, et est désormais codifiée à l’article 98 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. Si ce dernier requiert des Etats qu’ils exigent des navires battant leur pavillon de se porter aussi vite que possible au secours des personnes en détresse en mer, il exige tout autant des États côtiers qu’ils facilitent la création et le fonctionnement d’un service permanent de recherche et de sauvetage adéquat et efficace pour assurer la sécurité maritime. Il nous semble dès lors important d’insister sur un premier point. Si les Conventions SAR et SOLAS précisent et mettent en œuvre cette obligation de coopération par la création de Régions de recherches et de sauvetage, elles ne font pas disparaitre l’obligation principale de coopération qui pèse sur tous les États côtiers. Nous nous étonnons dès lors d’entendre le président français, dont les côtes s’étendent sur plus de 1500km en méditerranée, dénoncer « l’irresponsabilité de l’Italie ». Les États ont beau jeu de se cacher derrière les obligations de l’Italie pour faire oublier les leurs.

      Quoi qu’il en soit, qu’en est-il plus précisément des obligations spécifiques de l’Italie et de Malte, États responsables de la Région de recherche et de sauvetage dans laquelle se trouvait l’Aquarius ? Si la Convention SAR a principalement pour objet de régler le déroulement des opérations de sauvetage et la coopération entre Etats, sa version initiale ne donne aucune indication sur l’endroit dans lequel les navires secourus devraient pouvoir débarquer. Les amendements de 2004 ont tenté, suite à l’affaire du Tampa en Australie, de combler cette lacune en imposant aux Etats de remettre les personnes en « lieu sûr ». Néanmoins, l’on se heurte à un premier problème en ce qui concerne Malte : elle n’a pas ratifié ces amendements, et ce, afin précisément de ne pas être soumise à l’obligation d’accueillir des navires en détresse tels que l’Aquarius. La République maltaise n’est dès lors tenue qu’à l’obligation de coopération en vue du sauvetage du navire et des personnes à son bord.

      Ensuite, en ce qui concerne l’obligation de remettre les personnes secourues en lieu sûr, inscrite à la Règle 33 (1-1) de la Convention SOLAS, ainsi qu’au paragraphe 3.1.9. de la Convention SAR dans sa version amendée, elle n’implique aucune obligation de débarquement sur le territoire de l’État responsable de la Région de recherche et de sauvetage. L’Organisation Maritime Internationale (ci-après l’OMI) définit un lieu sûr comme étant « un endroit où la vie des personnes secourues n’est plus menacée et où leurs besoins fondamentaux (tels que la nourriture, le logement et les besoins médicaux) peuvent être satisfaits ». Le navire ayant prêté assistance peut ainsi être considéré comme un lieu sûr. Néanmoins, un tel navire ne peut être qu’un lieu sûr temporaire, les besoins fondamentaux des quelques 600 personnes secourues ne pouvant être indéfiniment contentés à son bord.

      S’il n’est pas requis de l’Etat côtier qu’il accueille les personnes secourues sur son territoire, les Principes relatifs aux procédures administratives pour le débarquement des personnes secourues en mer de l’OMI précisent que l’État responsable de la Région de recherche et de sauvetage a l’obligation résiduelle d’autoriser le débarquement sur son propre territoire, lorsqu’il n’est pas possible ailleurs. Toutefois, ces principes sont dénués de force juridique, et n’engagent donc les États à aucune obligation véritablement contraignante.

      En l’espèce, l’Italie et Malte n’ont pas coopéré pour trouver un lieu sûr pour ces personnes, mais se sont contentés de refuser qu’elles débarquent sur leurs territoires. Si l’Espagne n’avait pas proposé d’accueillir ce navire, l’Aquarius serait toujours en haute mer sans solution. L’Italie n’était certes pas dans l’obligation d’accepter les personnes sur son territoire, mais elle ne pouvait se contenter de refuser ce navire sans tenter de coopérer avec les autres Etats côtiers. En espèce, c’est l’Espagne qui s’est proposée, palliant de fait les violations de l’Italie.

      On constate donc ici une volonté de l’Italie et de Malte de profiter des zones grises du droit de la mer, en jouant de l’ambiguïté de la notion de « lieu sûr » dans le cas de l’Italie, ou en limitant autant que faire se peut l’étendue de son obligation de secours et sauvetage dans le cas de Malte. Si l’Italie est à blâmer pour avoir totalement nié sa responsabilité envers l’Aquarius, il nous semble qu’elle n’est pas la seule à devoir l’être, l’Europe entière étant concernée par la situation en méditerranée. En faisant la sourde oreille à celle-ci, les États européens oublient toutefois leur obligation de coopération en matière de secours et sauvetage. Ils oublient également les obligations qui leurs incombent en vertu des instruments de protection des droits de la personne, comme nous allons maintenant l’évoquer.

      2. Les considérations élémentaires d’humanité imposaient aux États côtier de se proposer afin d’accueillir les migrants

      Les obligations relatives au droit de la mer ne sont pas les seules à entrer en jeu. Les Etats doivent en effet également respecter les considérations élémentaires d’humanité. Par cette expression, on entend l’ensemble des principes juridiques visant à la protection du respect de la dignité des personnes. La Cour internationale de justice s’est prononcé à plusieurs reprises quant à celles-ci, insistant sur l’importance de leur respect (Détroit de Corfou, Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, Immunités juridictionnelles de l’État). Le Tribunal international du droit de la mer a également rappelé que ces principes s’appliquent dans le droit de la mer (Affaires du Navire Saïga No. 2, Incident de l’Enrica Lexie, Navire Louisa, Juno Trader). Plus spécifiquement, ces considérations élémentaires d’humanité sont reflétées dans les instruments conventionnels de protection des droits fondamentaux, qu’il s’agisse de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme (ci-après la CEDH) ou du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques (ci-après le PIDCP).

      Afin de déterminer si ces instruments sont applicables au cas d’espèce, il convient toutefois d’abord de déterminer si les États en cause exerçaient bien leur juridiction. En principe, une personne se trouvant sur le territoire d’un État est présumée se trouver sous sa juridiction. Toutefois, l’Aquarius ne se trouvant pas dans la mer territoriale de l’Italie ou de Malte, mais bien en Haute Mer, cette présomption ne joue pas en l’espèce. Toutefois, dans certaines circonstances exceptionnelles, un État peut exercer sa juridiction de manière extraterritoriale. Tel est le cas notamment, comme l’a rappelé la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme dans l’affaire Al-Skeini contre Royaume-Uni, quand des agents étatiques exercent un contrôle effectif sur les personnes victimes de violations de droits de l’Homme. Bien qu’aucun agent de l’État italien ne soit monté à bord de l’Aquarius, le simple fait d’empêcher un navire de se diriger vers son territoire permet d’indiquer que l’Italie exerçait bien juridiction sur le navire et les personnes à son bord. Par ailleurs, l’article 92 de la Convention de Montego Bay précise bien que « les navires naviguent sous le pavillon d’un seul État et sont soumis (…) à sa juridiction exclusive en haute mer ». Ainsi, l’Aquarius battant pavillon anglais, le Royaume-Uni pourrait potentiellement être tenu responsable des violations des droits de l’Homme commises à bord du navire. Le silence et la passivité de cet État dans cette affaire est dès lors interpellant…

      En l’espèce, il existait plusieurs risques de violations des droits fondamentaux. Tout d’abord, les migrants et les membres de l’équipage de l’Aquarius ont été contraint à vivre durant quatre jours à bord du navire dans des conditions déplorables, et à retraverser la mer méditerranéenne en direction de l’Espagne (dont le port le plus proche se situait à 1500 km du navire au moment des faits). Se pose alors la question de savoir si l’Italie, Malte et les autres États européens n’ont pas soumis ces personnes à des traitements inhumains et dégradants. De tels traitements sont prohibés par l’article 3 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme, ainsi que par l’article 7 §1 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques. Selon le Comité des droits de l’Homme, le fait qu’un acte relève ou non du champ d’application de l’article 7 du Pacte précité « dépend de toutes les circonstances, par exemple la durée et les modalités du traitement considéré, ses conséquences physiques et mentales ainsi que le sexe, l’âge et l’état de santé de la victime » (affaire Vuolanne contre Finlande). Au vu de la vulnérabilité accrue et de la situation personnelle des personnes se trouvant à bord du navire, et compte tenu de l’état de détresse du navire, le fait de les forcer à vivre ainsi à bord de l’Aquarius durant plusieurs jours, est constitutif de traitements inhumains et dégradants.

      Ensuite, bien qu’au regard du droit de la mer, aucun État n’ait formellement l’obligation de permettre le débarquement de migrants secourus en mer sur son territoire, il se peut qu’au final permettre un tel débarquement soit la seule façon pour un État d’agir conformément à ses obligations prévues en matière de droits de l’Homme. En effet, l’article 33 §1 de la Convention de Genève relative au statut des réfugiés interdit à tout État de refouler des personnes vers un territoire où leur vie ou leur liberté serait menacée. Dans le même sens, l’article 3 de la CEDH interdit aux États membres du Conseil de l’Europe de renvoyer une personne vers un territoire où elle risque d’être soumise à de la torture ou à d’autres mauvais traitements. A contrario, le renvoi de migrants vers un « pays sûr » est autorisé. A ce sujet, nous avons été assez surprises d’apprendre que l’Italie avait indiqué à l’Aquarius de se rendre en Libye, sachant que l’État italien a été condamné en 2012 par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme pour avoir violé l’article 3 de la CEDH en ayant refoulé des ressortissants somaliens et érythréens en Libye, lors de l’affaire Hirsi Jamaa.

      Conclusion

      En conclusion, l’actualité européenne concernant le navire Aquarius met en exergue l’intention des États d’exploiter les vides juridiques existants en matière de prise en charge des personnes secourues en mer et témoigne également de l’urgente nécessité que les États membres de l’Union européenne s’accordent afin d’apporter une réponse globale à la migration. Reste que, comme on l’a vu, les États sont liés par leurs obligations découlant des droits de la personne. Ici aussi cependant, les États en procédant à des refoulements en mer, cherchent à contourner celles-ci. Il est en effet plus que difficile pour un migrant refoulé vers la Lybie de pouvoir attraire l’Italie devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme.

      Justine Braun
      Marianne Chagnon
      Caroline Delava
      France Laurent

      http://cdi.ulb.ac.be/aquarius-etudiantes-rousseauistes-de-lulb-livrent-analyse/#more-4589

    • "Porti chiusi anche alle navi militari europee", ma Salvini irrita la Difesa: “Non ha nessuna competenza”

      L’affondo del vicepremier dopo lo sbarco a Messina di 106 migranti da una nave irlandese: «Stortura da modificare, porterò la questione al vertice dei ministri dell’Interno Ue». Ma arriva lo stop: «Questa missione europea è gestita da Esteri e Difesa»

      http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2018/07/08/news/nave_militare_irlandese_sbarca_a_messina_con_106_migranti-201198516

    • Les #gardes-côtes_libyens interceptent de plus en plus de migrants en Méditerranée

      Est-ce la conséquence d’une raréfaction des secours en Méditerranée ? Pendant le week-end du 14 juillet, un bateau de pêche en bois, avec à son bord 450 personnes, a été secouru dans les eaux internationales, non loin de l’île italienne de Lampedusa. Un mois après la crise de l’Aquarius, le navire que l’Italie – sous la pression de son ministre de l’intérieur d’extrême droite Matteo Salvini – a refusé d’accueillir avec 630 migrants à son bord, les ONG ne peuvent presque plus opérer au large des côtes libyennes, poussant les migrants à tenter des voies toujours plus dangereuses.
      « Ce n’est pas la première fois que ce type d’embarcations tente la traversée depuis la Libye, même si l’on voit plus souvent des petits bateaux pneumatiques, réagit Nicola Stalla, coordinateur des opérations de recherche et sauvetage à bord du navire humanitaire “Aquarius”. En revanche, le fait qu’ils soient parvenus aussi loin est clairement une conséquence du manque de moyens de sauvetage en mer. »

      L’Aquarius est à quai à Marseille, tandis que le Lifeline et le Sea-Watch sont empêchés de repartir de Malte. Seul l’Open-Arms, le bateau affrété par l’ONG catalane Proactiva, navigue actuellement en Méditerranée centrale, de retour de Barcelone où il avait accosté le 4 juillet, avec à son bord soixante migrants que l’Italie avait refusé d’accueillir.

      Le navire secouru ce week-end rappelle le naufrage d’un chalutier aux abords de Lampedusa en 2013, au cours duquel près de 400 personnes s’étaient noyées. La catastrophe avait déclenché l’opération militaire et humanitaire européenne « Mare Nostrum ». « Ces bateaux sont particulièrement dangereux, car le risque de chavirage est très important, ajoute M. Stalla. En fonction de la quantité de carburant et d’eau à bord, le centre de gravité est modifié. Il y a aussi un risque d’asphyxie dans la cale, souvent surchargée. »

      Ping-pong diplomatique

      Transbordées à bord de bateaux italien et britannique, les personnes secourues ce week-end ont accosté lundi en Sicile après un nouveau ping-pong diplomatique entre Rome et La Valette, les deux capitales se renvoyant la responsabilité de leur accueil. La situation s’est débloquée après que cinq pays européens, dont la France, ont accepté de recevoir plus de la moitié de ces migrants, à la demande du gouvernement italien. « On voit se mettre en place un mécanisme de solidarité entre certains pays européens, c’est un début mais c’est très fragile », commente Vincent Cochetel, envoyé spécial du Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) pour la situation en Méditerranée centrale.

      Conséquence directe du retrait des ONG, la proportion de morts en mer parmi les personnes tentant la traversée entre la Libye et l’Italie a doublé, passant de 1 % à 2,1 % entre les premiers semestres de 2017 et 2018, d’après des chiffres du HCR. Sur l’ensemble de la zone de Méditerranée centrale, 564 personnes ont disparu en juin. Un chiffre légèrement supérieur à celui de juin 2017, alors même que les flux d’arrivées sont sept fois moins importants. « Les noyades se multiplient pendant que les gouvernements européens bloquent les secours humanitaires », ont alerté la semaine dernière SOS-Méditerranée et Médecins sans frontières, les deux ONG qui affrètent l’Aquarius.

      « Ceux qui criminalisent les ONG sont responsables des morts, parce qu’ils omettent délibérément de porter assistance aux personnes », a réagi Axel Steier, cofondateur de Lifeline, dont le bateau a débarqué 234 migrants à Malte, le 27 juin, après que l’Italie lui a également refusé l’accès à ses ports. Depuis, le navire a été saisi, et son capitaine est convoqué devant la justice maltaise le 30 juillet, accusé de ne pas avoir enregistré correctement l’immatriculation de son bateau. Egalement empêché de repartir, le navire de l’ONG allemande Sea Watch est amarré à La Valette. La capitaine, Pia Klemp, explique : « Quand on a décidé de partir le 2 juillet après une opération de maintenance, on a requis une autorisation aux autorités portuaires. Elle nous a été refusée. C’est la première fois ».

      « Le droit maritime est complètement foulé au pied »

      Enfin, le Moonbird, l’avion de reconnaissance géré par Sea Watch et l’ONG suisse Humanitarian Pilots Initiative, est bloqué au sol. « Malte nous interdit d’entrer ou de quitter la région d’information de vol libyenne, donc ça nous empêche de faire nos opérations », constate Tamino Böhm, chef de mission. « Depuis deux mois, il y a moins de capacités de recherche et de sauvetage, résume Vincent Cochetel, du HCR. Or, toutes les bonnes volontés sont nécessaires pour sauver des vies. Les ONG représentaient 40 % des efforts en mer. »

      Dans le même temps, les interceptions d’embarcations par les gardes-côtes libyens ont augmenté de plus de 28 %. Depuis le début de l’année, ce sont 10 466 personnes tentant la traversée qui ont été ramenées en Libye. Dans cet objectif, Rome apporte une aide importante à Tripoli, notamment en fournissant des vedettes aux gardes-côtes. « Si les Libyens réalisent des interceptions dans leurs eaux territoriales, ce n’est pas problématique en soi. Mais dans les eaux internationales, à notre avis, les Libyens peuvent coordonner les sauvetages dans leur zone de secours, mais pas débarquer les personnes chez eux tant qu’ils n’ont pas de lieu sûr. En tout cas, les centres de détention ne correspondent pas à un port sûr », prévient Vincent Cochetel, en référence au droit maritime international, qui considère que les migrants secourus doivent être débarqués dans le port sûr le plus proche. Plusieurs ONG font toutefois état d’opérations menées par les Libyens dans les eaux internationales. En outre, elles témoignent d’un transfert de responsabilité entre Rome et Tripoli en matière de coordination des sauvetages dans les eaux internationales. « Le droit maritime est complètement foulé au pied, s’alarme Sophie Beau. On ne peut pas construire un modèle autour de la Libye, c’est le chaos le plus total. »

      https://abonnes.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2018/07/17/les-gardes-cotes-libyens-interceptent-de-plus-en-plus-de-migrants-en

    • Libyan coastguard left refugees to die in Mediterranean : NGO

      A woman and a child were found dead hours after they were left in their damaged boat by the Libyan coastguard.

      Proactiva Open Arms, which has been rescuing refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Europe, says the Libyan coastguard has left at least two refugees to die after abandoning them at sea.

      The Spanish NGO, which carries out search and rescue operations in Mediterranean, posted a video and pictures on Twitter showing how their boat took aboard three people; two women and a child.

      By the time the three were found by Proactiva, one woman and the child had already died.

      According to tweets by Oscar Camps, founder and director of Proactiva, the boat was damaged and abandoned by the Libyan coastguard.

      “Today we’ve found the bodies of a woman and a small child, as well as a woman who was still alive among the wreck of a ship,” Camps said in a video.

      “I want to condemn the lack of assistance in international waters and the merchant ship Triades which abandoned a boat in danger in the middle of the night,” he added.

      “They don’t know how to manage an emergency situation they arrived two days late and abandoned two women and a child in the wreckage of a ship that they themselves destroyed,” Camps said.

      The boat carrying the two bodies and one survivor were found about 120km off the Libyan coast.


      https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/libyan-coastguard-left-refugees-die-mediterranean-ngo-180717195213059.htm

      #gardes-côtes_libyens

    • Press Release: Migrants rescued in Distress in Maltese Search and Rescue Zone illegally transferred to Tunisian territorial waters

      Over the past four days, the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone has collected information that strongly suggest that a boat carrying 40 migrants from several African countries seeking protection in Europe was illegally transferred into Tunisian territorial waters after having already reached international waters and the Maltese Search and Rescue (SAR) zone. Among the group are eight women, two of whom are pregnant. The wooden boat had left from Libya and was rescued on Friday the 13th of July north of the oil platform Astrat in international waters and in the Maltese SAR zone by the supply vessel Sarost 5. MRCC Tunis as well as the crew of the supply vessel confirmed the position of the migrant boat in the Maltese SAR zone. Both Malta and Italy denied the supply vessel their permission to disembark the migrants in Maltese and Italian harbours.

      The migrants are still in limbo. After rescue, they were provided with some food and brought to the oil platform. Later, the supply vessel took course on Sfax/Tunisia to disembark the people there. The authorities of Sfax, however, refused to allow them to disembark. They were then told to disembark in Zarzis/Tunisia. But since Monday the 16th of July, at 1am, they are also blocked from entering the port there.

      We demand that the people are safely and immediately brought to a safe harbour in Europe. We demand that European coastguards take responsibility for coordinating Search and Rescue operations of boats in situations of distress in their Search and Rescue zones, as legally mandated. We demand a long-term solution that allows those in distress at sea to be swiftly disembarked in European harbours, rather than the case-by-case evaluations that we see currently, which unnecessarily prolong the suffering of those rescued. We also declare our solidarity with the crews of non-governmental and commercial vessels that carry out vital search and rescue operations despite the obstacles that European governments create.


      https://alarmphone.org/en/2018/07/18/press-release-migrants-rescued-in-distress-in-maltese-search-and-rescue-zone-illegally-transferred-to-tunisian-territorial-waters/?post_type_release_type=post

    • #Marc_Gasol, il campione Nba da 20 milioni di dollari all’anno che salva i migranti come volontario

      Il giocatore dei Memphis Grizzlies - fratello dell’ex Laker, Pau, e nazionale spagnolo come lui - era a bordo della nave della Ong catalana che martedì ha denunciato l’inefficienza della Guardia Costiera libica accusandola di aver abbandonato Josephine e una mamma con il figlio piccolo, poi morti, al largo delle coste di Tripoli. Il cestista al El Pais: «Scioccato dalla foto del piccolo Aylan circolata nel 2015. Da allora ho deciso di fare la mia parte»


      https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/07/18/marc-gasol-il-campione-nba-da-20-milioni-di-dollari-allanno-che-salva-i-migranti-come-volontario/4500446

    • #Josephine, l’unica sopravvissuta al naufragio libico: è rimasta 48 ore in acqua attaccata a un pezzo di legno

      Lo sguardo traumatizzato, quasi vitreo, di chi ancora non distingue la vita dalla morte. Così appare l’unica donna sopravvissuta all’ultimo naufragio libico, in cui sono morti una madre e un bambino. Questa donna miracolata si chiama Josephine, viene dal Camerun ed è rimasta due giorni in mare, attaccata ad un pezzo di legno, prima che i volontari della Ong spagnola Open Arms la recuperassero al largo della Libia. A raccontare la sua storia è Annalisa Camilli, una giornalista di ’Internazionale’ che si trova a bordo della nave e ha assistito al salvataggio. A soccorrere la donna è stato Javier Figuera, uno volontario spagnolo di 25 anni: «Quando le ho preso le spalle per girarla - dice - ho sperato con tutto il mio cuore che fosse ancora viva. Dopo avermi preso il braccio non smetteva di toccarmi, di aggrapparsi a me». A quel punto, prosegue Camilli, sono arrivati altri soccorritori e l’hanno trasportata sulla nave, dove ora si trova con sintomi di ipotermia. Accanto a lei gli uomini di Open Arms hanno trovato anche un’altra donna e un bambino di circa 5 anni, che però erano già morti. I loro corpi sono a bordo della nave della Ong. Secondo il medico di bordo - scrive ancora Camilli - «la donna era morta da diverse ore mentre il bimbo era deceduto da poco». Per la Ong quanto avvenuto è «un’omissione di soccorso» da parte della guardia costiera libica - dice il fondatore di Open Arms Oscar Camps - che non è in grado di gestire una situazione d’emergenza e ha abbandonato due donne e un bambino"


      http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2018/07/17/foto/naufragio_libia_open_arms_mamma_bimbo-202013383/1/?ref=fbpr#1

    • “Abbiamo lasciato in mare solo due morti”. I libici raccontano l’ultimo naufragio – La Stampa

      Parla l’equipaggio della Guardia costiera di Tripoli intervenuto lunedì per soccorrere il barcone alla deriva e fotografato da Open Arms. Resta il mistero sul dramma di Josefa, l’unica sopravvissuta: “Non c’era, non avremmo abbandonato nessuno vivo in acqua”

      Lunedì 16 luglio all’ora di pranzo abbiamo ricevuto una chiamata dal mercantile spagnolo Triades che ci segnalava un’imbarcazione di migranti in difficoltà tra Khoms e Tripoli e ci siamo mossi per intervenire, ne abbiamo tirati a bordo 165, maschi e femmine, tutti. Abbiamo lasciato in mare solo i due corpi senza vita di una donna e un bambino dopo aver provato invano a rianimarli: erano morti e portarli a terra non aveva alcun senso, ma oltre loro non c’era nessun altro in acqua». A raccontare la versione libica dell’ultimo scontro tra Roma, Tripoli e l’Ong Open Arms, quello che da due giorni si consuma intorno alle tragiche immagini del salvataggio della superstite Josefa, è Tofag Scare, colonnello della Guardia Costiera di Misurata che lavora in coordinamento con i colleghi della capitale.

      “L’Italia fa fare a noi il lavoro sporco solo perché non vuole accogliere gli africani”

      Mentre parla con «La Stampa» il suo comando operativo riceve un Sos dalla zona SaR al largo di Khoms, l’ennesimo, ci dice: «Nonostante il nostro equipaggiamento obsoleto, dal 2011 a oggi abbiamo salvato oltre 80 mila persone alla deriva nel Mediterraneo».

      Le ricostruzioni di quanto avvenuto nella notte tra lunedì e martedì coincidono fino a un certo punto, poi divergono lasciando aperte molte domande. Secondo la Open Arms le motovedette di Tripoli avrebbero distrutto il barcone dei migranti e abbandonato in mare quelli riluttanti a salire a bordo, di loro sarebbe sopravvissuta solo Josefa che, ancora sotto choc, dice alla giornalista di «Internazionale» di non ricordare il momento del naufragio ma di essere stata picchiata dai libici al pari dei suoi compagni di cui non sa più nulla. Tripoli, al contrario, afferma di non aver fatto altro che recuperare 165 disperati: la novità è che parla anche di due corpi in mare, cadaveri che, si apprende, «secondo la legge libica vanno identificati prima di essere sepolti o rimandati a casa e dunque in questi casi vengono lasciati al mare».

      “Contro di noi solo accuse infamanti: abbiamo salvato più di 80 mila persone”

      Il colonnello Scare telefona a più riprese ai colleghi in servizio il 16 luglio e raccoglie i tasselli del suo puzzle: «La motovedetta Ras al Jade è andata a soccorrere 165 persone in condizioni penose, affamate, bruciate dal sole, c’era un cattivo odore spaventoso. Dopo averci chiamato, il mercantile Triades è rimasto lì ad attenderci, ma nel frattempo non ha neppure dato da mangiare e da bere a quella gente, ha detto che non era il suo lavoro e che non poteva fare nulla».

      Scare fornisce il verbale della conversazione tra la Guardia Costiera e la Triades con la posizione dell’intervento fatto (37.74147°/ 13.84367°) che, grossomodo, coincide con quella indicata dalla Open Arms. Anche la motovedetta Ras al Jade pare essere la stessa (quella che già in passato aveva incrociato le spade con la Open Arms): possibile che quella notte ci sia stato più di un salvataggio? Che i cadaveri di cui si parla siano diversi? Le fotografie diffuse dalla Open Arms – che domani arriverà a Maiorca – mostrano chiaramente che i due corpi senza vita si trovano sullo stesso relitto su cui è rimasta a galla Josefa. E dai centri dove i migranti soccorsi vengono condotti non escono numeri sugli arrivi di martedì.

      La risposta dal banco degli imputati è decisa e va oltre la testimonianza della giornalista tedesca Nadja Kriewwald, che quella notte era a bordo con i libici e ha raccontato di non aver visto altro che i superstiti accolti sul ponte: «Non avremmo avuto alcuna ragione di abbandonare in acqua delle persone vive: anche se si fossero rifiutate di salire a bordo le avremmo tirare su a forza, lo abbiamo fatto con gli uomini e lo avremmo fatto facilmente con le donne. È una bugia, è propaganda contro di noi. Non c’era nessuno oltre i due morti che, per altro, al nostro arrivo erano già morti. Quello di cui ci accusano è privo di senso».

      Il fastidio che si respira a Misurata e a Tripoli è forte, ma non tanto per l’attacco della Open Arms quanto per la stanchezza di «gestire una grana altrui» e prendere colpi. Lo esprime un membro della Guardia Costiera che però chiede di non pubblicare il suo nome: «L’Italia ci fa fare il lavoro sporco perché non vuole gli africani, ma anche noi non siamo contenti di prenderli qui, le nostre città sono piene fino a scoppiare, i centri per loro non bastano più e sono diventati bombe a orologeria. Certe volte con le motovedette ci spingiamo fin dentro le acque internazionali, dove sarebbe illegale, e io dico che sbagliamo. Lo facciamo perché abbiamo un accordo e l’Italia ci ha promesso delle cose, ma se non arriva nulla ci stiamo solo caricando di problemi e di cattiva reputazione. Quando bruciamo i barconi degli scafisti lo facciamo per metterli fuori uso, non per sadismo. E comunque siete voi a chiederci di bloccare gli africani che vogliono venire in Europa, loro di certo non sognano la Libia».

      La notte di lunedì resta un capitolo aperto che ne ha aperti altri. Un terzo marinaio di Misurata racconta che il numero dei migranti è cresciuto talmente tanto negli ultimi mesi, in concomitanza con il rinnovato impegno di pattugliamento della Guardia Costiera, da aver modificato la situazione sul terreno: «Non c’è neppure più lavoro per loro. Noi li prendiamo in mare ma dopo nessuno li vuole. I siriani adesso hanno cominciato ad andare in aereo in Sudan, dove non hanno bisogno del visto, e poi con 1500 dollari si fanno portare a Tripoli e da qui ad Algeri per avere maggiori chance».

      https://www.nuovaresistenza.org/2018/07/abbiamo-lasciato-in-mare-solo-due-morti-i-libici-raccontano-lultimo

    • L’ammiraglio. Pettorino: prestare aiuto a chiunque rischi di perdere la vita in mare

      Il comandante della Guardia Costiera: c’è un principio non scritto che risiede nell’animo di ogni marinaio: quello di prestare aiuto a chiunque rischi di perdere la propria vita in mare.

      C’è un «principio non scritto che risiede nell’animo di ogni marinaio: quello di prestare aiuto a chiunque rischi di perdere la propria vita in mare». A dirlo non è un esponente delle “magliette rosse”, ma l’ammiraglio Giovanni Pettorino, comandante della Guardia Costiera italiana. Davanti al ministro Danilo Toninelli e al presidente della Camera Roberto Fico l’ufficiale ha scandito il caposaldo di chi va per mare. Parole espresse per ribadire quale sia la spinta interiore che sentono i suoi uomini ogni volta che arriva un Sos.

      Nel tono e nel lessico di Pettorino non ci sono accenti polemici. Ma quelle affermazioni pesano. E quando il comandante le pronuncia, viene calorosamente interrotto dagli applausi prolungati delle centinaia di divise bianche che lo ascoltano in occasione della cerimonia con cui mercoledì è stata ricordata la fondazione, 153 anni fa, della Guardia costiera. Un atto di fierezza che avrebbe dovuto chiudersi lì. Ma un servitore dello Stato lo riconosci anche quando sa celebrare i signornò. E succede quando l’ammiraglio si sfila le lenti da lettura e con piglio da comandante ricorda un episodio lontano.

      Un fuori programma con cui l’ammiraglio decide di chiudere il saluto alle autorità civili. Che il numero uno della Guardia Costiera stia per dire qualcosa che lascerà il segno lo intuisce chiunque lo conosca. Una citazione inizialmente non contenuta nel testo originario.

      È la rievocazione del leggendario comandante siciliano Salvatore Todaro, che durante la Seconda guerra mondiale affondò una nave militare belga per poi salvarne l’equipaggio. Todaro, come ha ricordato Pettorino, venne «violentemente apostrofato» dall’ammiraglio alleato tedesco Karl Donitz, che irrise l’ufficiale italiano definendolo «don Chisciotte del mare» e minacciando gravi conseguenze per avere tratto in salvo i nemici, mettendo a rischio il suo stesso equipaggio. Il perché di quella disobbedienza lo spiega Pettorino, guardando negli occhi gli esponenti politici sulla tribuna e facendo propria la risposta di Todaro: «Noi siamo marinai, marinai italiani, abbiamo duemila anni di civiltà, e noi queste cose le facciamo».

      Poi l’eroe di guerra «si avviò al congedo restando per sempre nella leggenda e nei cuori di tutti i marinai». A tanti uomini della Guardia Costiera queste parole sono suonate come un incoraggiamento. «In questi ultimi anni, ad invarianza di risorse umane disponibili, il corpo delle capitanerie di porto aveva ricordato prima Pettorino – è stato chiamato a far fronte ad uno sforzo inedito, quello del soccorso prestato, in mare, a migliaia di persone in pericolo di perdersi, operando su un’area ampia oltre la metà della superficie del mar Mediterraneo».

      Un impegno gravoso, «che abbiamo assolto nella piena consapevolezza di ben onorare il giuramento prestato, da ciascuno di noi, di osservare la Costituzione e le leggi». Dimostrando, una volta di più, quali siano quella vocazione e quell’abnegazione che non si può barattare: «Uomini e donne che ogni giorno si impegnano per far sì che altri possano continuare a vivere».


      https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/pettorino-prestare-aiuto-a-chiunque-rischi-di-perdere-la-vita-in-mare

    • EU-Rettungsmission im Mittelmeer vorerst gestoppt

      Italien weigert sich, aus dem Mittelmeer gerettete Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen - auch nicht im Zuge der EU-Mission „Sophia“.
      Die EU ist ratlos, der Kommandeur hat nach SPIEGEL-Informationen alle Schiffe in den Hafen beordert.

      Die EU-Mission „Sophia“ zur Rettung von Flüchtlingen auf dem Mittelmeer wird vorerst eingestellt. Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen beorderte der Kommandeur der Mission, der italienische Admiral Enrico Credendino, jetzt alle beteiligten Kriegsschiffe zurück in die Häfen.

      Mit der Order ist die Mission faktisch gestoppt, vorerst jedenfalls. Betroffen ist auch ein deutsches Versorgungsschiff. Nach SPIEGEL-Informationen befand sich der Tender „Mosel“ bereits vor dem Befehl von Credendino routinehalber in einem Mittelmeerhafen. Dort sollen das Schiff und die deutschen Soldaten nun erstmal bleiben, heißt es in Berlin.

      Hintergrund für den spontanen Stopp der Mission ist die Weigerung Italiens, von den EU-Militärschiffen gerettete Menschen weiter aufzunehmen. Italien hatte seine Blockadehaltung diese Woche in einem Brief an die EU angekündigt. Kurzfristig anberaumte Beratungen der EU-Partner brachten zunächst keine Lösung.

      Die Operation „Sophia“ ist nach dem Baby einer geretteten Somalierin benannt, das auf einer deutschen Fregatte geboren wurde. Seit 2015 ist die Mission mit einer kleinen Flotte von Kriegsschiffen auf dem Mittelmeer aktiv. So sollen die dort agierenden Schleusernetzwerke aufgeklärt und an ihrem lukrativen Geschäft gehindert werden.

      Seit dem Beginn der Mission konnten die EU-Soldaten, derzeit auf sechs Kriegsschiffen aus Spanien, Italien, Frankreich, Irland, Kroatien und Deutschland unterwegs, 148 mutmaßliche Schleuser festnehmen und mehr als 200 der benutzten Schiffe und Boote zerstören. Die EU sieht die Mission deswegen als Erfolg an.

      Rom verbietet privaten Rettern gerettete Flüchtlinge nach Italien zu bringen

      Regelmäßig werden die EU-Soldaten auf den Schiffen auch zu Seenotrettern. Fast 50.000 Flüchtlinge hat die Mission gerettet, fast die Hälfte davon wurde von deutschen Soldaten aus meist seeuntüchtigen Schiffen und Barkassen auf dem Mittelmeer gezogen. Anschließend wurden die Menschen nach Italien gebracht.

      Genau gegen diesen Automatismus geht Italien jetzt vor, die neue Regierung in Rom fährt einen radikalen Kurs gegen Flüchtlinge und will nicht länger akzeptieren, dass Italien die Hauptlast der ankommenden Menschen trägt. Folglich verbietet Rom privaten Rettern schon länger, gerettete Flüchtlinge nach Italien zu bringen.

      Als Reaktion auf den Brief aus Rom trafen sich die mit der Sicherheitspolitik betrauten EU-Botschafter umgehend zu einer Krisensitzung - eine Einigung konnte nicht erzielt werden. Folglich beorderte der Kommandeur der Mission die Schiffe in die Häfen.

      Auch am Freitag setzten sich die Botschafter erneut zusammen. Dem Vernehmen nach wollte man Italien anbieten, einen Schlüssel zu erstellen, wie die von der EU-Mission geretteten Menschen in ganz Europa verteilt werden können. Bis zum späten Nachmittag war nicht bekannt, ob sich Rom auf den Kompromiss einlässt.

      Ähnliche Angebote der anderen EU-Nationen hatten zumindest die quälenden Odysseen privater Rettungsschiffe in den jüngsten Tagen beendet, die von Italien an der Einfahrt in seine Häfen gehindert worden waren. Auch Deutschland hatte sich zur Aufnahme von kleineren Kontingenten der Geretteten bereit erklärt.

      Kommissionschef Jean-Claude Juncker ließ am Freitag mitteilen, dass er kommende Woche Vorschläge machen will, um die Flüchtlingskrise in Italien zu lindern. Details wurden zunächst nicht bekannt.

      Denkbar ist, dass es um Vorschläge geht, Flüchtlinge, die in Italien an Land gehen, rasch auf Länder zu verteilen, die sich dazu bereit erklären. Zudem soll die Kooperation mit Drittstaaten außerhalb der EU Thema sein.

      In der Debatte der EU-Sicherheitsbotschafter am Mittwoch versuchten die anderen Mitgliedsländer Italien davon zu überzeugen, sich weiter an das gemeinsam beschlossene Mandat zu halten. Italien trüge damit die Hauptlast der Operation „Sophia“, das Mandat läuft noch bis Ende des Jahres.

      Über die künftige Ausgestaltung des Mandats sollte im September ohnehin diskutiert werden. Denkbar ist, dass dies nun vorgezogen wird.

      In einem Schreiben an Italiens Premier Conte betonte Juncker, dass die Mission „Sophia“ eine wesentliche Rolle im Rahmen der europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik spiele. Conte hatte sich am Donnerstag für eine EU-Kriseneinheit zur Verteilung von aus Seenot geretteten Flüchtlingen ausgesprochen.

      Am Freitagabend endete in Brüssel das Krisentreffen der Botschafter zunächst ohne konkrete Lösung. Einigen konnte man sich nur, den sogenannten Operationsplan für die Mission „Sophia“ in wenigen Wochen neu zu fassen. Darin soll dann auf italienischen Wunsch auch festgelegt werden, wie bei der Mission gerettete Flüchtlinge künftig verteilt werden, nachdem sie an Land gebracht wurden. Diplomaten sagten, Italien habe dies durch seine Blockade-Ankündigung erzwungen. Um den Verteilungsschlüssel dürfte bald heftig gestritten werden.

      http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/mittelmeer-kommandeur-stoppt-eu-rettungsoperation-sophia-a-1219476.html

    • Ora le ong schierano i droni per salvare sempre più migranti

      La mossa dell’Aquarius: «Non ci arrivano più informazioni sui naufragi in atto, dobbiamo aggiustare la nostra strategia». Ed essere sempre più autonome
      Le navi delle ong tornano in mare e questa volta schierano anche i droni, per continuare nella propria ricerca delle imbarcazioni di migranti e salvare sempre più persone.

      Ad annunciare la novità un volontario imbarcato sulla nave Aquarius, che già nelle scorse settimane era stata protagonista della prima grande offensiva politica di Matteo Salvini dopo l’insediamento come ministro dell’Interno. Al momento a Marsiglia, la nave di Sos Mediterranée si attrezza per fronteggiare le mutate condizioni del quadro politico internazionale: «Ci stiamo preparando a diversi scenari, sicuramente avremo più cibo e autonomia di navigazione, perché dovremo stare più a lungo in mare. E avremo anche un drone per la ricerca dei migranti da soccorrere», spiega all’Ansa uno dei volontari.

      Dalla nave denunciano che nel mar Mediterraneo «alle navi di soccorso non arrivano più informazioni sui soccorsi in atto e non sappiamo perché». Per questo la variegata flottiglia delle molte associazioni non governative impiegate in queste missioni umanitarie si sta attrezzando per estendere il raggio d’azione e adeguarsi alla nuova situazione che impone loro di essere sempre più autonome. Il volontario Alessandro Porro ha svelato anche che ci sarebbero stati alcuni incontri fra le diverse organizzazioni proprio per coordinare al meglio gli sforzi.

      «Nell’attuale situazione ci sono naufragi di cui non si sa niente - spiega- Attualmente la mortalità è aumentata al 10%, quindi su 100 migranti che partono, 10 muoiono nel viaggio nel tratto di mare che oggi è il più pericoloso al mondo. Siamo arrabbiati ma ci sosteniamo a vicenda e ognuno di noi fa proposte per migliorare le operazioni di soccorso».

      http://m.ilgiornale.it/news/2018/07/20/ora-le-ong-schierano-i-droni-per-salvare-sempre-piu-migranti/1555943
      #drones

    • Omissione di soccorso come prassi di deterrenza ?

      Dopo l’arrivo delle due imbarcazioni di Open Arms a Palma di Maiorca è stata depositata presso la locale procura una denuncia sui fatti verificati in occasione del ritrovamento in acque internazionali, avvenuto il 17 luglio a circa 80 miglia dalle coste di Homs, di una donna e di due cadaveri sopra il relitto di un gommone alla deriva. Nella conferenza stampa che si è svolta oggi a Palma di Maiorca,sono stati esposti i fatti, secondo la documentazione in possesso dellla Organizzazione consegnata all’autorità giudiziaria spagnola. Le imbarcazioni di Open Arms hanno dovuto fare rotta verso la Spagna per le dichiarazioni del ministro dell’interno che esponevano la superstite al rischio di pressioni dopo lo sbarco a Catania, porto indicato dallo stesso Salvini.

      Il ministro, che su questo naufragio, e sulle conseguenti responsabilità, aveva annunciato prove inconfutabili attraverso “una teste indipendente”, una giornalista della televisione tedesca RTL, piuttosto che rispondere sulla vicenda, esibendo la documentazione in suo possesso, rilancia adesso pesanti accuse sulle fonti di finanziamento della Open Arms e minaccia a sua volta altre denunce su chi ha soltanto rappresentato quanto accaduto. Per il ministro Toninelli l’Italia non sarebbe neppure in grado di documentare i movimenti delle motovedette libiche.

      Alla fine, ancora una volta, tutte le colpe vengono riversate sulla ONG Open Arms che per la Meloni sarebbe addirittura responsabile di tratta e di causata strage. Un rovesciamento completo della narrazione dei fatti che si vuole imporre agli italiani in preda alla paura per la insicurezza che subiscono, una insicurezza che ha cause e responsabili molto diversi da quelli indicati dai politici di governo. Che attaccando le ONG devono solo nascondere i propri fallimenti, sia sul piano interno, che in Europa e nei rapporti con i paesi terzi, a partire dalla clamorosa bocciatura da parte dei libici di tutti i piani proposti da Salvini e Moavero.

      Le versioni inzialmente fornite dalla sedicente Guardia costiera di Tripoli, e quindi dalla giornalista che si trovava a bordo della motovedetta libica, venivano rapidamente modificate, fino all’ammissione che davvero i libici avevano avvistato il gommone poi soccorso da Open Arms, e dopo avere presumibilmente recuperato i vivi, avevano lasciato a bordo del relitto due cadaveri, come sarebbe prassi, per loro stessa ammissione. Saranno le indagini ad accertare se le persone, poi rinvenute cadavere sulle tavole del relitto, siano state abbandonate ancora in vita a seguito di un rifiuto a salire sulla motovedetta. Episodi nei quali la Guardia costiera libica aveva allontanato o minacciato imbarcazioni delle ONG intervenute in soccorso in acque internazionali, spesso sotto il coordinamento iniziale della guardia costiera italiana, si sono ripetute da tempo.

      Viene confermata anche dai libici la presenza, a 80 miglia a nord di Homs, dunque nell’area nella quale poi gli spagnoli hanno trovato il relitto semiaffondato del gommone, con Josepha e due cadaveri, di una nave commerciale, la TRIADES, che dopo lo scambio di vari messaggi radio, si sarebbe allontanata, o sarebbe stata allontanata, dal luogo dell’evento SAR, proseguendo la sua rotta verso il porto di Misurata. Open Arms ha presentato la sua denuncia alla magistratura spagnola contro il comandante della Triades, contro il comandante della motovedetta libica che sarebbe intervenuta sul gommone poi ritrovato distrutto ed alla deriva, e contro eventuali ignoti che dovessero emergere dalle indagini come responsabili del coordinamento dei soccorsi.

      Quanto poi affermato da un esponente daila Guardia costiera di Misurata, negli ultimi comunicati, conferma buona parte della ricostruzione iniziale fornita da Open Arms, e subito smentita da Salvini. Sarà la magistratura spagnola ad accertare le responsabilità relative all’abbandono in mare di due cadaveri, ammesso che il bambino fosse già morto al momento dell’intervento della Guardia costiera libica, e dell’unica sopravvissuta, che quando potrà raccontare la sua versione dei fatti, sarà sentita dalla Procura di Palma di Maiorca. L’obbligio di accertare fatti tanto gravi, se l’abbandono in mare si collega anche ad un rifiuto di salire sulla motovedetta, incombe ai magistrati, chi ha sollevato il velo della censura su queste stragi non ha paura. Anche se altri avrebbero preferito il silenzio.

      Come riferisce la stampa,“Dal Viminale fanno trapelare che l’intenzione non è quella di stare a guardare. Secondo l’agenzia AGI – Roma, 21 lug. – “Non meritano risposta le Ong che insinuano, scappano, minacciano denunce ma non svelano con trasparenza finanziatori e attivita””. E” quanto fanno trapelare fonti del Viminale dopo le denunce di Open Arms a Libia e Italia per omicidio colposo. “La denuncia di Josefa? Qualcuno strumentalizza una vittima per fini politici – proseguono le stesse fonti -. Noi denunceremo chi, con bugie e falsita”, mette in dubbio l”immensa opera di salvataggio e accoglienza svolta dall”Italia”. (AGI)

      Rimane la certezza di una grave anomalia democratica in Italia. Da una parte si ritiene di potere diffamare e calunniare le ONG, ed anche chi li difende, senza dovere mai pagare il conto di accuse che non trovano ancora conferme certe da parte della magistratura, che ha pure archiviato indagini sulle quali si è giocata una ignobile speculazione mediatica. Sembrerebbe ormai scontata la violazione delle regole internazionali di soccorso, anche quando questo inizialmente è gestito dalla Guardia costiera italiana, come è avvenuto a giugno nel caso della nave Aquarius. Un caso che ha occupato per giorni le prime pagine di giornali. Ma tutto questo oggi non sembra interessare più nessuno. Si deve rimanere in silenzio anche su queste vicende ?

      A causa di questa campagna mediatica, già scatenata lo scorso anno, ed adesso rilanciata con toni ancora più minacciosi, si sono ritirate, o sono state bloccate, la maggior parte delle navi umanitarie. A Malta sono ancora sotto sequestro, per “effetto domino” rispetto alle scelte italiane,due navi delle ONG, la Sea Watch e la Lifeline Le accuse di costituire un fattore di attrazione (pull factor) si sono poi estese alle attività di ricerca e salvataggio (SAR) della Guardia costiera italiana, ed addirittura alle attività di contrasto dei trafficanti e dei terroristi della missione Eunavfor Med. Dal 28 giugno si è inventata una zona SAR libica nella quale le autorità italiane declinano la loro competenza ad intervenire, ritendola trasferita sulle autorità di Tripoli che dispongono di sole 4 motovedette d’altura, e di una dozzina di mezzi veloci inadatti a caricare naufraghi a bordo.

      Le sentenze dei tribunali siciliani hanno confermato che la Libia non offre porti sicuri di sbarco e il ruolo di coordinamento nella cosiddetta “SAR libica” affidato nei mesi scorsi alla Marina italiana. Cosa è cambiato, se è cambiato qualcosa, dopo il 28 giugno, quando si è affidata soltanto ai libici una immensa zona SAR che evdentemente non sono in grado di gestire garantendo la salvaguardia della vita umana in mare ?

      Risultato di queste politiche di progressivo ritiro e delle prassi aggressive nei confronti di chiunque soccorre migranti in alto mare, sulla rotta del Mediterraneo centrale, un aumento delle vittime,oltre quattrocento nelle ultime settimane, e probabilmente di tante altre non se ne sa nulla. Come non si sarebbe saputo nulla di Josepha e delle due vittime con le quali era rimasta aggrappata ad una tavola in alto mare, se Open Arms non avesso continuato le sue missioni, pur restando in acque internazionali, ad una distanza assai elevata dalla costa libica, oltre 140 chilometri ( 80 miglia marine). Adesso si profila una guerra totale alle ONG, dopo avere portato a compimento la criminalizzazione della solidarietà. Sembra che la parola ONG sia tra quelle più “odiate” dagli italiani. Le campagne di stampa, agite in maniera scientifica sui social, hanno prodotto più effetti delle sentenze della magistratura. Adesso fa notizia che una ONG abbia denunciato una omissione di soccorso, senza essere invece inquisita per agevolazione di ingresso clandestino.

      Una cappa di silenzio è invece calata sulla vicenda dei 40 migranti bloccati da sei giorni a bordo di un rimorchiatore, il SAROST, fermo davanti alla città tunisina di Zarzis perchè nessuno vuole offrire un porto sicuro di sbarco. Nè la Tunisia, che pure risulta stato di bandiera, nè l’Italia o Malta, che in passato soccorrevano e indicavano un luogo di sbarco sicuro, generalmente in Italia, per le persone soccorse nella zona SAR maltese, la stessa nella quale sono stati soccorsi gli sfortunati naufraghi presi a bordo dal SAROST, rimorchiatore di servizio di una piattaforma petrolifera offshore.

      Il comandante della SAROST ha chiesto lo sbarco in Tunisia, ma nessuno gli ha risposto. Nessuno ha raccolto gli appelli delle ONG perchè si procedesse allo sbarco. Adesso in peroicolo ci sono vite di esseri umani, dopo che l’equipaggio della nave ha ceduto tutto quello che poteva per garantire la sopravvivevanza. Chiediamo che a questo punto almeno la Tunisia garantisca un porto di sbarco e soccorsi per i feriti. Chiediamo che la Croce Rossa, che ha comnciato a fornire qualche aiuto alla SAROST, si impegni attivamente per risolvere questo ennesimo caso, frutto delle politiche di abbandono attuate da parte di Malta e dell’Italia. E tanti altri simili ne verranno nei prossimi mesi, fino alla prossima strage, e poi ancora un’altra. No. Non è possibile alcuna assuefazione, che vorrebbero imporci. Sul rimorchiatore fermo davanti Zarzis, di fatto trasformato in prigione galleggiante, 40 persone rischiano ormai la vita per effetto dell’abbandono imposto da Italia e Malta, e per la mancata disponibilità da parte della Tunisia, ad accettare almeno uno sbarco provvisorio.

      A bordo della SAROST sono ancora in attesa di sbarco in un porto sicuro, che nessuno ha indicato, due donne incinta e un ferito, che sono in acqua da 10 giorni. Persone che lo scorso anno, in una occasione simile, sarebbero state già soccorse da una nave umanitaria, in assenza di mezzi statali, e sbarcati in Italia in un porto sicuro. Ma ormai è l’Italia che non offre più porti sicuri, a fronte delle dichiarazioni del ministro dell’interno e delle prassi imposte alla Guardia costiera, alla Marina, alle autorità di frontiera e richieste persino alla magistratura, come nel caso della richiesta di arresti per i “facinorosi” soccorsi dal rimorchiatore Vos Thalassa e poi sbarcati a Trapani da una nave militare.

      A chi governa è concesso ogni giorno spacciare notizie false, come l’esistenza a Tripoli, di un centro di accoglienza sicuro, o, dopo la visita di Salvini in Libia, come la possibilità di creare campi di raccolta in quel paese, o addirittura in Niger, che sarebbero considerati come ubicati in un “paese terzo sicuro”, dunque nel quale si potrebbero creare vere e proprie “piattaforme di sbarco”, per impedire ai migranti qualsiasi possibilità di fuga verso l’Europa. Ma l’Unione Europea ha già fatto conoscere la sua ferma opposizione a questo progetto dietro il quale si camuffano i respinginenti collettivi vietati dalle Connvezioni internazionali, come dovrebbe sapere il leghista Salvini dopo che la Corte Europea dei diritti dell’Uomo ha condannato l’Italia sul caso Hirsi nel 2012 per i respingimenti collettivi ordinati tre anni prima dal suo predecessore al Viminale, il leghista Roberto Maroni. Le torture e le estorsioni nei centri di detenzione libici sono ormai provate ed ancora attuali, secondo le testimonianze raccolte allo sbarco.

      Si spaccia per contrasto dell’immigrazione, che si definisce “illegale” la pratica degli accordi con le milizie libiche, o con i sindaci delle città che ne sono espressione, apparentemente per rilanciare iniziative civili, di fatto per incentivare l’arresto e la detenzione del maggior numero di persone al fine di impedire la prosecuzione della loro fuga verso il Mediterraneo. Il numero degli immigrati presenti in questi mesi nei centri di detenzione libici è raddoppiato, lo conferma l’ONU. Si richiamano protocolli operativi e Trattati di amicizia stipulati con una Libia che oggi non esiste più’. Sullo sfondo altri accordi con le milizie. Tutto questo senza la minima base legale di un voto parlamentare.Sembra proprio la fine del diritto internazionale, piegato dalla politica della forza muscolare esibita sui social e del fatto compiuto.

      Quando invece giornalisti indipendenti o rappresentanti delle ONG raccontano fatti documentati e facilmente verifiicabili, quando gli avvocati esercitano in pieno il loro ruolo di difensori dei diritti umani, si scatenano le minacce e le ritorsioni, che collegano pezzi di istituzioni, servizi e gruppi delle destre identitarie europee, ben oltre quanto consentirebbero i ruoli istituzionali dei soggetti da cui provengono. Insinuazioni calunniose si rivolgono anche a chi difende gli operatori umanitari ed i migranti.

      Nessuno però riferisce della corruzione diffusa in Libia e della stretta commistione tra il traffico di esseri umani ed il contrabbando di petrolio che dalla Libia raggiunge Malta ed altri paesi europei. Quando i processi contro le ONG si arrestano, o le indagini vengono archiviate, solo uno spazio a fondo pagina, la sentenza di condanna gli italiani la hanno già emessa nei giorni della tempesta mediatica. La fine della presunzione di innocenza e del diritto ad un giusto processo.

      Sono tempi in cui una menzogna ripetuta cento volte sembra valere più della verità, lo sappiamo, e vediamo la marea nera di consenso che si sta aggregando attorno alle posizioni più estreme sul tema immigrazione, che giocano sulla vita delle persone per raccattare consensi elettorali o per aumentare il potere contrattuale con gli altri paesi europei. Si spaccia una emergenza che non esiste, la vera emergenza è l’attacco alla democrazia ed alle garanzie dello stato di diritto, che si gioca proprio sulle questioni del soccorso in mare e della protezione internazionale ( con il ricatto sul Regolamento Dublino). Evidente la saldatura nei fatti tra le estreme destre identitarie e nazionaliste europee e la poltica di Salvini, che aspira ad un asse con Orban in Ungheria e Kurtz in Austria. Due “alleati” sul piano ideologico, ma che in nome del loro nazionalismo hanno già respinto tutte le richieste avanzate dal governo italiano, a partire dai trasferimenti Dublino. Alla fine in Europa i diversi nazionalismi si scontreranno tra loro, ma dalle macerie ne usciremo tutti impoveriti e con una grave lesione dei principi democratici.

      Tutto questo preoccupa ma non spaventa, restiamo al nostro posto, testimoni di un tempo terribile in cui la vita delle persone vale meno della difesa di un confine sull’acqua, un confine che nell’ordine naturale non può esistere. Nell’immaginario collettivo però i confini si stanno moltiplicando proprio per effetto della politica, e non conta se chi si presenta come difensore dell’identità nazionale e del territorio italiano, ricorre poi alla menzogna ed all’odio per costruire altri muri, questa volta all’interno della nostra società. per alimentare un livello di conflittualità sempre più elevato, dal quale ricava evidenti vantaggi in vista delle prossime scadenze elettorali. Ma le ferite inferte oggi ai rapporti internazionali, alla coesione sociale, alla possibilità di convivenza pacifica con gli immigrati tutti, resteranno aperte per anni. E per costruire una finta sicurezza costruiranno sempre più muri, fino a quando saremo tutti reclusi.

      Non arretriamo.Saremo ancora attivi nella difesa degli operatori umanitari e di tutti coloro che saranno accusati di crimine per avere soccorso o prestato assistenza alle persone migranti. Perchè prima che di migranti si tratta di persone, che devono avere riconosciuti gli stessi diritti fondamentali che spettano a qualunque persona, a partire dal diritto alla vita. Perchè i loro diritti sono i nostri diritti.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/21/omissione-di-soccorso-come-prassi-di-deterrenza

    • Italian coastguards express unease as government closes ports to migrants

      The decision by Italy’s new populist government to close the country’s ports to migrants saved at sea is causing unease within the heart of the Italian coastguard, some staff say, who until recently played a key role in rescue missions.

      Over the last decade the coastguard has coordinated the rescue of hundreds of thousands of migrants off the coast of Libya, in many cases pulling them from the water themselves in treacherous conditions.

      But as of June, they have been ordered to transfer calls for help and reports of boats in distress to the Libyan capital Tripoli.

      Now — despite a culture of traditionally not criticising government policy — a handful of coastguard staff have spoken out.

      In an interview with Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore last week, a coastguard admiral criticised the government and in particular far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini’s new hardline stance.

      Speaking on condition of anonymity, the admiral recalled that the Italian justice system had deemed Libya was not a “safe place” for rescued people to returned to.

      Many migrants trying to reach Europe are desperate not to go back to Libya as they potentially face abuse and rape in detention centres.

      The admiral also denounced the absence of an official decree or act regarding the decision to close the country’s ports to vessels carrying migrants.

      In recent weeks the policy has left the coastguard powerless as several ships with rescued migrants aboard spent days stranded in the Mediterranean unable to dock in Italy.

      On Wednesday, at an event marking the 153rd anniversary of the Italian Coastguard, admiral Giovanni Pettorino, coastguard commander, evoked the memory of Salvatore Todaro, a submariner who during WW2 took serious risks to rescue the survivors of a ship he had just sunk.

      “In times of war, these things are not done,” a German admiral is said to have told Todaro at the time.

      The coastguard commander concluded his speech given before Italy’s new political authorities, by recalling Todaro’s response: “We are Italian sailors. We have 2000 years of civility behind us and we do these things.”

      – ’Feeling of helplessness’ -

      Speaking anonymously to Catholic daily Avvenire and Radio Radicale, some coastguard officers said the priority to rescue those in danger was demonstrated earlier this month.

      On 13 July the coastguard was sent to keep watch on 450 migrants crammed into a fishing boat, but took part in a later rescue mission even though Rome had told them to let Malta take charge, the officers said.

      Recalling the decision to intervene, the officers spoke of their “feeling of helplessness” which had built up in the weeks prior, as migrants attempted the perilous sea crossing.

      The vast majority of Italy’s around 13,000 coastguard officers work along the country’s 8,000 km of coastline, but the institution says that more than 2,000 of them have had first-hand experience on vessels operating off Libya — where a large number of the migrant tragedies occur.

      “At the moment, the atmosphere among the coastguard corps is not the best,” says Sergio Scandura, a journalist with Radio Radicale.

      The month of June was the deadliest in the Mediterranean in recent years with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reporting some 564 deaths or disappearances, despite the fact that overall departures have dropped sharply since the summer of 2017.

      Salvini’s hardline immigration stance appears to, however, be very popular among Italians: according to about half a dozen separate polls, some two-thirds of citizens approve his decision to close ports to rescued migrants.

      His far-right League party — which governs the country as part of a coalition — has also experienced a boom in the polls: the League garnered 17 percent of the vote at the March general election, but opinion polls now suggest support of around 30 percent.

      The new policy has come under fire from the country’s opposition politicians, however, and some of Italy’s prominent Catholic figures have also spoken out.

      After two bodies were discovered in a deflated dinghy off Libya, along with one survivor suffering from shock and hypothermia on Tuesday, the Episcopal Conference of Italy released a statement denouncing a “tragedy which we cannot manage to get used to”.

      “We warn unequivocally that to save our humanity from vulgarity and barbarism, we must protect life. Every life. From the most exposed, humiliated and trampled,” the bishops wrote.

      http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/italian-coastguards-express-unease-as-government-closes-ports-to-migrants/article/527517

    • Quale futuro per le operazioni di soccorso in mare svolte dalle ONG ?

      1.Quanto successo nell’ultimo mese, a partire dal blocco dell’attracco della Aquarius in un porto italiano, e poi, a ridosso del Consiglio Europeo del 28 giugno con la istituzione, sulla carta, di una zona SAR libica, e quindi con il seguito di naufragi in acque internazionali, deve indurre ad una riflessione sulle operazioni di ricerca e salvataggio (SAR) svolte dalle Organizzazioni non governative. Operazioni sempre di più spesso oggetto attacchi calunniosi e nel mirino di iniziative giudiziarie, in Italia ed a Malta. Anche se le prime inchieste contro alcune ONG sono state già archiviate.

      Giorno dopo giorno, abbiamo assistito ad una continua escalation del governo italiano contro le ONG, alle quali si è negata ogni possibilità di attracco e di sbarco, con Salvini che si è reso anche protagonista dei tentativi di inasprimento delle prassi adottate dalle missioni europee Frontex ed Eunavfor Med, giungendo a negare, anche dopo stragi gravissime, l’indicazione di un porto sicuro di sbarco a navi militari, persino americane, ed a mezzi della missione europea EUNAVFOR MED ( Sophia). Un tentativo che l’Unione Europea ha respinto, ribadendo gli impegni operativi ed i doveri di soccorso sanciti dalle Convenzioni internazionali e dai Regolamenti europei, che nessun paese membro può violare unilateralmente.

      Analoga risposta negativa è giunta alla proposta di Salvini che intendeva lanciare un piano Marshall per la Libia, allo scopo evidente di rinforzare la cd. Guardia costiera “libica” e di finanziare grandi centri di trattenimento dei migranti in modo da impedire che questi potessero imbarcarsi verso l’Europa. Un progetto già avviato da anni da precedenti governi, al quale si voleva dare adesso maggiore concretezza con un ulteriore fornitura di motovedette al governo Serraj. Ma le promesse italiane si sono rivelate farlocche, le motovedette da regalare ai libici sono pochissime, e sembra che il loro arrivo a Tripoli sia previsto per il mese di ottobre. Sempre che ad ottobre a Tripoli ci sia ancora il governo Serraj. Tutta la politica italiana in questi ultimi due mesi ha nascosto come non si possa parlare più di un processo di riconciliazione in Libia, e dunque di una unica Libia, la vera fake-news che continua ad essere distribuita agli italiani per tranqullizzari sui “successi” conseguiti dai loro governanti.

      Adesso anche la sedicente “Guardia costiera libica” ammette di non avere i mezzi per garantire le attività di ricerca e soccorso in “alto mare”, fino a 85 miglia dalla costa, che sarebbero imposte dalle Convenzioni internazionali, e che si sarebbero dovute verificare prima di concedere l’inserimento della SAR Zone libica nei registri ufficiali dell’Organizzazione marittima della Nazioni Unite (IMO). Chi ha spinto per quella zona SAR libica che ancora oggi non esiste, porta sulla coscienza le centinaia di vittime che i ritardi degli interventi dei libici, e le modalità di ingaggio violento adottate dalle motovedette di Tripoli, hanno prodotto in questo ultimo mese. Una responsabilità che non sarà facile accertare nei tribunali, ma che peserà come una pietra sul destino politico dei protagonisti di queste scelte.

      Di fronte ad un fallimento di così vaste dimensioni, ed alle prime denunce che stanno arrivando, non solo in cartolina, i governanti italiani hanno scelto la linea del totale capovolgimento dei fatti e delle responsabilità, inasprendo i blocchi e lo sbarramento dei porti, ed imposto a Malta un analogo inasprimento, che si sta traducendo anche nel sequestro arbitrario a La Valletta di due navi delle ONG ( Lifeline e Seawatch). Salvini lo aveva promesso, e i maltesi hanno eseguito.

      Le ONG ritornano dunque nel mirino, in nome di un emergenza che non esiste e di una lotta contro ai trafficanti che nessuno però garantisce perchè in Libia non si riesce ad affermare una giurisdizione indipendente dalle milizie che controllano i diversi territori, e gestiscono direttamente rapporti con i trafficanti di persone ( e di petrolio). Dal momento che queste scelte politiche, alle quali corrispondono prassi operative prive di fondamento legale, come la “chiusura dei porti” imposta da Salvini e Toninelli, o gli ordini di “stand by“,già impartiti lo scorso anno, producono e produrranno ancora in futuro centinaia di morti. Perchè cambieranno soltanto le rotte, ma sempre i migranti saranno messi in mare dalla Libia verso l’Europa, occorre chiedersi che ruolo possono giocare ancora le ONG. Per tentare almeno di ridurre il numero delle vittime, e per continuare a denunciare i casi sempre più frequenti di omissione di soccorso in acque internazionali. In attesa che i tribunali internazionali o l’Unione Europea impongano agli stati il pieno rispetto delle Convenzioni internazionali e dei Regolamenti europei che privilegiano la salvaguardia della vita umana in mare ed il diritto di chiedere protezione, rispetto alla difesa dei confini marittimi.

      2.Occorre innanzitutto prendere atto che, come si è evidenziato in queste ultime settimane, sempre più spesso le decisioni amministrative o le direttive emanate dal governo potranno creare i presupposti per l’avvio di azioni penali da parte della magistratura nei confronti di quegli operatori umanitari e di quelle ONG che si atterranno al rispetto delle Convenzioni internazionali e dei Regolamenti europei, nello svolgimento di attività di ricerca e soccorso nelle acque del Mediterraneo Centrale.

      Si verificherà poi, in occasioni sempre più frequenti, che la manipolazione dei dati e la successiva diffusione di fake-news capovolga il senso della narrazione degli eventi di soccorso in mare, fino a fare assumere ai veri responsabili la veste di accusatori ed ai soccorritori la posizione di inquisiti, in modo da eliderne del tutto le possiblità di intervento, sia in mare che nel dibattito pubblico, minandone la credibilità.

      Per contrastare tutto questo e permettere la prosecuzione delle attività di ricerca e salvataggio delle ONG in acque internazionali occorre rafforzare i team legali di esperti che verifichino il rispetto delle regole di Diritto internazionale, e del diritto dei rifugiati, da parte di tutti gli attori chiamati ad intervenire, o che si trovano nelle posizioni più vicine alle aree nelle quali si verificano gli eventi SAR.

      Appare fondamentale in questa prospettiva denunciare la istituzione di una zona SAR libica da parte dell’IMO,su impulso ed avallo delle autorità italiane. Va denuinciata altresì la inefficacia delle attività di ricerca e salvataggio svolta da Malta nella vastissima zona SAR che per ragioni economiche il governo di La Valletta continua ad attribuirsi. Occorre dunque una forte iniziativa a livello di Nazioni Unite e quindi dell’IMO per stabilire con certezza vere zone SAR, individuando le autorità che effettivamente sono in grado di intervenire con effettive capacità di coordinamento e di raccordo con altre autorità SAR. La vita umana in mare non può essere data in appalto per ragioni elettorali o di convenienza politica. Gli accordi bilaterali tra stati in questo campo possono assumere rilievo solo nell’ambito di un riconoscimento internazionale effettivo della capacità di coordinamento dei soccorsi attraverso una Centrale operativa nazionale (MRCC).

      Al fine di garantire la massima trasparenza, contro il rischio di altre e più gravi ricostruzioni farlocche degli interventi SAR da parte dei ministri, e di altre autorità, occorre realizzare sistemi di trasmissione video in tempo reale, accessibili in rete, di tutte le attività di ricerca e soccorso che saranno svolte dalle navi delle ONG, utilizzando anche le rilevazioni radar, quelle satellitari, e la via del monitoraggio aereo con l’uso di droni, per documentare i casi di intervento della Guardia costiera “libica”, che libica non è più, ed eventuali casi di abbandono in mare. Si corre altrimenti il rischio concreto che alla prossima strage, se soltanto una nave delle ONG si trovi nelle vicinanze dell’evento di soccorso, tutte le responsabilità posano essere adossate sugli operatori umanitari. Una certa parte dell’opinione pubblica, ormai incline all’odio senza verificare i fatti, non aspetta altro.

      In un momento in cui le spinte nazionaliste dei governi sovranisti e populisti europei hanno messo tutti contro tutti, occorre negoziare accordi con i singoli stati, anche della sponda sud, come la Tunisia, per garantire possibilità di rifornimento alle singole navi delle ONG che saranno ancora impegnate in attività di ricerca e salvataggio sulla rotta del Mediterraneo Centrale. Vanno inoltre utilizzate le navi più grandi che le ONG saranno in grado di inviare in questa zona come stazione galleggiante di rifornimento e assistenza anche sanitaria, per i casi più urgenti. Ornai è evidente che l’Italia e Malta non garantiscono più “porti sicuri di sbarco” (POS), e le offerte più recenti di attracco altro non sono che un passaggio strumentale al sequestro delle imbarcazioni ed all’incriminazione degli equipaggi.

      Si è visto lo scorso anno come i provvedimenti amministrativi di controllo o di fermo tecnico siano finalizzati alla successiva adozione di inziative penali, con il caso della Juventa, attratta con un ordine della Guardia costiera per il trasbordo di tre migranti a Lampedusa, e poi sequestrata. Un processo ancora in corso, nel quale si dovrà chiarire anche il ruolo degli agenti di sicurezza infiltrati a bordo della nave Vos Hestia di Save The Children, poi finita pure nell’inchiesta. Si è ripetuto ancora quest’anno, in Italia, a Pozzallo, con il sequestro della Open Arms, ed a Malta con il sequestro illegale ( perchè in assenza di provvedimenti giudiziari che lo legittimassero) della nave Sea Watch e della Lifeline, bloccate da settimane per problemi burocratici. Tutti casi nei quali le scelte degli esecutivi e gli ordini di natura amministrativa delle autorità marittime hanno contribuito alla costruzione di una fattispecie penale. E quindi ad una gigantesca operazione mediatica che ha condannato le ONG e tutti i cittadini solidali prima ancora che i processi offrissero almeno qualche effettiva possibilità di difesa e di ribaltamento della narrazione tossica diffusa a reti unificate. Ma la Libia non offre “porti sicuri di sbarco”, dopo i giudici siciliani adesso lo dice anche l’Unione Europea.

      Quanto alla individuazione di porti sicuri di sbarco (POS), che sono garantiti dalle Convenzoni internazionali, prima di ciascuna missione le imbarcazioni delle ONG va garantita la possibilità di rientro in un paese ed in un porto nel quale le persone soccorse possano essere sbarcate in sicurezza, e nel quale gli operatori umanitari non rischino l’apertura di procedimenti penali o il sequestro della nave. Queste attività repressive che si riconducono generalmente al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, come pure il ritardo immotivato nella indicazione di un porto sicuro di sbarco, si ripercuotono direttamente sulla salute psico-fisica dei naufraghi, e possono ridurre notevolmente la capacità operativa delle imbarcazioni delle ONG, mettemndo a rischio anche il diritto alla vita.

      3. Le attività di ricerca e salvataggio ancora svolte da Organizzazioni non governative non si possono collocare al di fuori di una cornice di coordinamento che va comunque garantita con le Autorità SAR nazionali competenti, come previsto dal diritto internazionale del mare. Non si può però continuare a ricorrere ad una negoziazione caso per caso, dopo o addirittura durante l’espletamento delle operazioni di soccorso.

      Retweeted Paolo Biondi (@PaoloBiondi82):

      Oggi Malta ha coordinato il salvataggio di 19 migranti in difficoltà all’interno della Regione di ricerca e soccorso maltese (DDR) circa 50 miglia a sud dell’isola. Rcc Malta è stata informata di questa barca da parte di Mrcc Roma e della guardia costiera libica quando era ancora nella SAR Libica.

      Malta coordinated the rescue of 19 migrants in distress within the Maltese Search and Rescue Region (SRR) some 50NM south of the island. RCC Malta was informed of this boat by MRCC Rome and the Libyan Coast Guard when it was still in Libya SRR

      Bisogna dunque attivare canali di comunicazioni costanti con quelle autorità SAR che possono garantire lo sbarco in un porto sicuro, che come prevedono le Convenzioni internazionali di diritto del mare, non è necessariamente il “porto più vicino”, come qualcuno ha ritenuto in Italia, ma è quel porto nel quale la persona sbarcata ( e potremmo aggiungere adesso, anche i soccorritori) abbiano la piena garanzia che i diritti fondamentali della persona siano rispettati. Occorre che le ONG si raccordino tra loro e stilino loro una “Carta dei soccorsi nel mare Mediterraneo”, sulla quale aggregare consenso in modo da garantire modalità di intervento generalmente condivise. Un documento con prasse operative concordate da verificare con la Guardia costiera italiana che ha una tradizione di soccorso in mare che non può essere smentita da atti di indirizzo politico.

      Ricordiamo bene come l’attacco alle ONG sia patrtito dalle destre identitarie europee e, subito dopo, da Frontex, all’inizio dello scorso anno. Ma il confronto ed il coordinamento sulle operazioni SAR nel Mediterraneo centrale non potrà prescindere dal tentativo di coinvolgimento dell’Agenzia per il controllo delle frontiere esterne (FRONTEX), oggi ridefinita come “Guardia costiera e di frontiera europea” ( in base al Regolamento UE 1624 del 2016) . Sarò anche importante verificare la disponibilità a partecipare ad attività SAR della missione EUNAVFOR MED ( Operazione Sophia), un obbligo ineludibile da garantire nel rigoroso rispetto del proprio mandato operativo, deciso nell’ambito della politica estera comune dell’Unione Europea (PESC). Non sarà un confronto facile, ma nessuno può pensare che ritirando le navi militari, limitandone le attività in operazioni SAR, o costringendo le ONG al ritiro totale, si possa garantire un miglior risultato delle politiche migratorie europee e nazionali, anche a costo di passare sopra le migliaia di morti e dispersi che queste politiche hanno fin qui prodotto.

      Il soccorso in mare è condizionato anche da quello che succede nei paesi della sponda sud del Mediterraneo. Senza una soluzione politica del conflitto in Libia e senza la garanzia di un qualsiasi stato di diritto che sia almeno in parte esente dalla corruzione diffusa che caratterizza quel paese, qualsiasi accordo con le milizie e con le forze che controllano le diverse Guardie costiere, rischia di tradursi ancora una volta con un ulteriore rafforzamento delle organizzazioni criminali. Le minacce, reiterate anche di recente, rivolte dalla Guardia costiera di Tripoli alle Organizzazioni non governative comprendono ormai il rischio di attacchi armati e di sequesto di persona.

      Le navi delle ONG ben dificilmente potranno avventurarsi a meno di 70 miglia (120 chilometri) dalla costa libica. La minaccia di sequestro da parte della Guardia costiera di Tripoli diventa ogni giorno più grave. Un motivo in più che dovrebbe spingere la comunità internazionale, o singoli paesi, questa volta davvero “volenterosi”, ad organizzare missioni internazionali di ricerca e soccorso nel Mediterraneo centrale. In acque internazionali che ormai, dopo la creazione di una zona SAR “libica”, sono rimaste nella esclusiva disponibilità di un gruppo di milizie che non garantisce il rispetto dei diritti e dei corpi delle persone, nè durante le azioni di soccorso, nè durante le successive fasi dello sbarco a terra e dell’internamento nei centri di detenzione. Adesso sono ache alcuni esponenti della Guardia costiera di Tripoli, di cui Salvini si fida tanto, che ammettono di non avere i mezzi necessari per salvaguardare la vita umana in mare.

      In questa direzione la società civile organizzata deve andare oltre l’impegno qui profuso, occorre davvero che “si imbarchi” con tutte le proprie capacità organizzative sulle navi delle ONG, che significa garantire un impegno continuo a livello più ampio. Non certo con la presenza fisica, ma con una attività ben documentata di diffusione delle notizie, di accertamento delle fake news, di iniziativa politica e di sostegno economico e legale, che permetta di difendere i valori del soccorso e della solidarietà contro tutti i tentativi di depistaggio e di diffusione di messaggi di odio, di negazione della dignità umana e di subordinazione del diritto alla vita alle esigenze della difesa delle frontiere, se non alla mera propaganda elettorale.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/07/22/quale-futuro-per-le-operazioni-di-soccorso-in-mare-svolte-dalle-ong

    • JOSEFA : «SONO ARRIVATI I LIBICI E CI HANNO PICCHIATO»

      Sicuri da morire. L’accusa dell’unica superstite al naufragio. Da Open Arms denuncia per omicidio colposo

      «Denunceremo chi, con bugie e falsità, mette in dubbio l’opera di salvataggio e accoglienza svolta dall’Italia»: il Viminale ieri ha attaccato ancora l’Ong catalana Proactiva open arms, arrivata ieri mattina a Palma di Maiorca con il cadavere della donna e del bambino ritrovati martedì con l’unica superstite, Josefa, aggrappata alle assi del fondo del gommone distrutto a 80 miglia dalla cosa libica, 90 da Lampedusa. La donna camerunese, ricoverata in forte stato di choc e con i postumi dell’ipotermia, dopo essere rimasta due giorni a galleggiare in acqua, ha raccontato: «Sono arrivati i libici, ci hanno picchiato e ci hanno lasciato in mare». Il Viminale insiste: «Qualcuno strumentalizza una vittima per fini politici. Se la Ong ha preferito rifiutare l’approdo per scappare altrove è un problema suo. I porti siciliani erano aperti». Alla Proactiva era stato offerto lo scalo di Catania ma il coordinatore della missione, Riccardo Gatti, aveva chiarito: «Rifiutiamo il porto di sbarco italiano dopo le dichiarazioni del governo (che aveva definito la denuncia dei volontari catalani una fake news ndr) e perché non crediamo che in Italia ci sia un porto sicuro». La scelta di Catania, poi, era risultata sospetta visto che la procura locale sta processando l’Ong tedesca Jugend Rettet per favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina.

      I membri della Proactiva open arms, insieme al campione dell’Nba Marc Gasol, si sono recati ieri al tribunale di Palma per presentare una denuncia per omissione di soccorso e omicidio colposo contro il capitano della Triades, il mercantile che per primo ha individuato i migranti e avvertito Tripoli senza però soccorrerli. «Lo faremo anche contro il capitano del pattugliatore della Guardia costiera libica» che avrebbe volontariamente affondato il gommone mentre a bordo c’erano ancora due donne e un bambino ha spiegato Oscar Camps, fondatore dell’Ong catalana, confermando anche l’intenzione di presentare una denuncia contro la Guardie costiera italiana e Malta perché potrebbero aver commesso il reato di omissione del dovere di assistenza.

      Alla stampa Camps ha poi spiegato che l’Europa lascia alla Libia («un paese senza stato») le operazioni in mare nonostante i sospetti di connivenza della sua Guardia costiera con i trafficanti: «Siamo etichettati come criminali, l’Italia ci accusa di mentire, diffamare e insultare, vuole rimandare in Libia le persone che salviamo. Siamo gli unici testimoni e adesso nessun’altra Ong è attiva nell’area. Siamo stati testimoni della barbarie disumana che vive il Mediterraneo». L’ultima stoccata è per il ministro dell’Interno, Matteo Salvini, che da mesi ripete «le Ong vedranno i nostri porti in cartolina». Camps ne ha mandata una virtuale via twitter al leader leghista con la dedica «Un abbraccio da Maiorca. Oscar e Josefa». A Palma c’era anche il deputato di Leu, Erasmo Palazzotto, che ha partecipato alla missione: «Chiederò al governo italiano che renda pubblici i dati su ciò che è accaduto nel luogo in cui è stata trovata morta la madre con il bambino per vedere se c’è responsabilità del governo e della guardia costiera nell’omicidio».

      La Marina italiana ieri ha respinto ogni addebito: «Non siamo mai stati coinvolti nel soccorso. Dopo il ritrovamento, all’Ong è stata data piena disponibilità a trasferire la donna, ancora in vita, in Italia, per ricevere assistenza sanitaria, è stata data anche la possibilità di raggiungere direttamente il porto di Catania». Anche il ministro dei Trasporti, Danilo Toninelli, difende l’operato del governo: «Open Arms sbaglia obiettivo. L’Italia è un esempio per umanità ed efficienza nei soccorsi».

      Nessuno però sa spiegare la presenza di una donna viva e due cadaveri tra i relitti del gommone distrutto. Non sa spiegarlo soprattutto la Libia, che martedì aveva negato di averli lasciati in mare, chiamando in causa una troupe di giornalisti tedeschi presenti durante le operazioni. Poi è stata costretta a precisare che i salvataggi lunedì sera erano stati due e quindi venerdì ha parzialmente ammesso di aver provato a rianimare i corpi senza vita ma di non saper spiegare la presenza di Josefa. Una spiegazione arriva però dall’Italia. Il fatto quotidiano, riportando notizie apprese dai nostri militari, spiega: «I migranti non vogliono essere riportati in Libia, per convincerli ad accettare il soccorso è ormai prassi che i libici inizino le operazioni per affondare la barca». È la spiegazione che aveva dato Camps martedì, bollata da Salvini come «fake news».

      https://ilmanifesto.it/josefa-sono-arrivati-i-libici-e-ci-hanno-picchiato

    • Open Arms, a una settimana dalla tragedia Salvini incalzato non dà spiegazioni e loda i libici

      Era il 17 luglio quando la ong spagnola Proactiva Open Arms annunciava di aver recuperato nel Mediterraneo tre corpi - un bambino e una donna morta e un’altra invece ancora in vita - accanto a un relitto abbandonato dalla Guardia Costiera libica dopo un’operazione di recupero di migranti. Il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini aveva negato che i libici avessero abbandonato delle persone in mare, tantomeno affondando il barcone nel quale viaggiavano, e aveva promesso le prove a sostegno della sua tesi. Poco dopo, dal Viminale si segnalava la presenza di una giornalista tedesca a bordo delle motovedette dei libici che avrebbero compiuto il salvataggio oggetto della qu