• Airport and Payment Facial Recognition Systems Fooled by Masks and Photos, Raising Security Concerns

    Masks and simple photographs are enough to fool some facial recognition technology, highlighting a major shortcoming in what is billed as a more effective security tool. The test, by artificial intelligence company Kneron, involved visiting public locations and tricking facial recognition terminals into allowing payment or access. For example, in stores in Asia—where facial recognition technology is deployed widely—the Kneron team used high quality 3-D masks to deceive AliPay and WeChat (...)

    #Apple #Google #Qualcomm #MIT #CCTV #iPhone #smartphone #biométrie #facial #fraude #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #banque #empreintes #erreur #surveillance (...)


  • At least 10 police forces use face recognition in the EU, AlgorithmWatch reveals

    The majority of the police forces that answered questions by AlgorithmWatch said they use or plan to introduce face recognition. Use cases vary greatly across countries, but almost all have in common their lack of transparency. Police departments have long attempted to acquire, structure and store data on the populations they keep a watch on. Frenchman Alphonse Bertillon pioneered the use of anthropometrics by the police in the 1870s, creating a collection of tens of thousands of cards (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #empreintes #marcheur·euse #surveillance #vêtement #sport (...)


  • Unusual roundup of Eritrean refugees

    A serious and very unusual roundup of Eritrean refugees is underway in Khartoum this week. Security forces are targeting refugees and their establishments, in particular, refugees from Eritrea. Hungry security squads are hunting the helpless refugees from wherever they are: streets, workplaces, and even from their homes. Whoever caught by the security is asked to pay 50,000 or more to be released. Very unfortunately, Eritrean refugees are terrorized and in hiding to save their lives, including who have legal documents from the government and who are recognized by UNHCR.

    This unprecedented and well organized move against Eritrean refugees has no one anticipated. And no one has a clue about the motive behind it. It may have any link with the recent visits to Asmara by the Sudanese authorities. If that is the case, these refugees are in real or in an imminent danger that requires an immediate attention from the international community. The security officers are asking their nationality before they put them on trucks. It’s very worrisome situation for refugees who have no protection from the host country or from their own representative in the country. United Nations and other humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR have the obligation to intervene and save innocent lives. The situation is very alarming and heartbreaking that needs an urgent attention from whoever is engaged in humanitarian works.

    I want to stress that this information is a real that is happening now and continues to happen on innocent people who have no crime or misconduct, their only crime being that they are refugees who fled repression and asked protection in other country. As humans, they don’t deserve protection? They do, in fact, international community shouldn’t wait a second to act; it’s a matter of urgency. Have a look on the pictures below; refugees are under attack, horror, and terror from security and gangs.

    #rafles #réfugiés_érythréens #Soudan #Khartoum #asile #migrations #réfugiés #enlèvements #prisons #emprisonnement


    • The plight of Eritrean refugees in Sudan: an appeal to the UNHCR


      UNHCR Khartoum Office, the Sudan

      Sudan Commission for Refugees (COR)

      Higher Council for Community Development


      It is to be recalled that on 30 October 2019, a symposium was organized in Khartoum attended by representatives of the Sudanese Ministry of Labor as well as one representative from each of the caseloads of refugees in the Sudan from Eritrea, S. Sudan, Ethiopia, the Congo, Yemen and Syria.

      At the said symposium, the Sudanese authorities and the local UNHCR Office have reached the agreement that refugees in the Sudan can be allowed training and work opportunities like Sudanese citizens, except in security and military spheres. Sadly, this accord was not formally conveyed to the concerned refugees in a manner that they can understand nor did the concerned authorities initiate the pledged training opportunities. Instead, refugees are this month being rounded up from their homes, workplaces and from the streets and taken to prison. Their incarcerators claim that the refugees, including those who held residence permits as of 2000 from the Immigration Ministry, have no work permits. To add insult to injury, the Sudanese “law enforcers” are asking the detained refugees to buy their freedom by paying between 50,000 and 100,000 Sudanese pounds.

      We the undersigned Eritrean political and civic forces demand the most immediate action on the following:

      The Sudanese authorities to stop the unjust action taken and being taken against Eritrean and other refugees in the host country;
      To let the refugees taken from workplaces to safely return to their jobs;
      To release without pre-conditions all detained refugees and respect the right of those refugees already holding residence permits to stay in the Sudan as refugees;
      To provide training courses to refugees as pledged, and to pay back the money taken from refugees who were asked to pay up to 100,000 pounds for their release from prison.

      Likewise, we urge the UNHCR to follow up the implementation of the agreement reached with the Sudanese authorities and the COR at the symposium of 30 October 2019 and protect the rights of victimized Eritrean refugees.

      No one can ignore or forget the historic warm welcome and support of the Sudanese people to Eritrean refugees, and we still call with strong hope the Sudanese Government to pursue fraternal relations that can strengthen existing bonds between our peoples. There is no doubt that Eritreans still take the Sudan as their second home.

      Respectfully yours,

      Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change (ENCDC);
      Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP);
      United Eritreans for Justice (UEJ)
      Unity for Democratic change (UDC)
      Eritrean National Front (ENF)


    • Un ami érythréen, qui suit cela de près, vient de me dire que cela fait 3 semaines que les rafles continuent, que les érythréens (et que les Erythréens, pas les migrants d’autres nationalités présents au Soudan, comme les Ethiopiens ou les Somaliens ou les Syriens, qui, eux, ne sont pas enlevés).

      Il me conseille 2 chaînes youtube, qui donnent des news en tigrinya :

      #Mestyat_Betna (la chaîne à suivre selon lui) :
      –-> voir notamment cette #vidéo :

      Mestyat Betna habite en Allemagne.


      Fnan App Infotech (sport surtout et questions politiques) :

  • Amérique centrale : le corridor de la sécheresse

    « Nos deux journalistes ont parcouru en septembre le bien nommé « 
    couloir de la sécheresse » en Amérique centrale, du Guatemala au
    Honduras en passant par le Salvador. Parce qu’aux causes entendues et entremêlées de la migration centraméricaine vers le nord — violence, chômage, corruption — s’en greffe une autre, de plus en plus déterminante : la crise climatique, qui frappe de plein fouet le monde rural.


    Pour une grande partie de la population de ces trois pays — encore
    largement ruraux — qui forment le « triangle du Nord », le sentiment
    est prégnant qu’il y a peu ou pas d’espoir de s’en sortir en restant
    là. « Tout le monde veut partir », entendrons-nous dire partout, tout
    le temps. Et tout le monde semble connaître quelqu’un ou quelqu’une qui est parti.


    Insécurité et absence de perspectives d’emploi : maux connus et
    profonds. S’y superpose aujourd’hui une sécheresse qui dure depuis au moins cinq ans et dont peu doutent qu’elle soit aggravée par le
    dérèglement climatique. Aussi, cette météo dérangée est devenue une cause majeure de la migration en milieu rural, sinon de la migration tout court. De l’insécurité alimentaire à la migration, la corrélation est claire. »

    Source : Le Devoir, 13 décembre 2019.


  • Emotion Analytics Market to Rake in Around US $25 Billion by 2023 with 17% CAGR - Reuters

    The importance of next-gen technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and emotion analytics are being quickly realised by enterprises all over the world. Businesses are leveraging the capabilities of such technologies to bolster their customer relationship management (CRM). Emotion analytics with its futuristic characteristics has found the limelight in the business world. The technology is used to enhance data classification, data collection, data visualization and data analytics. A widening application base is partly driving the global market for emotion analytics. A recent study conducted by Market Research Future (MRFR), reveals that the global Emotion Analytics Market will capture a strong CAGR of 17% between 2017 and 2023.

    Emotion Analytics Market – Segmental Analysis
    Based on type, market has been segmented into video analytics, speech analytics, facial analytics and others. By technology, the market has been segmented into biometrics and neuroscience, pattern recognition, artificial intelligence, records management, 3D modelling and others. By solution, the market has been segmented into cloud, mobile and web application and others. On the basis of end-user, the market has been segmented into defense, commercial, enterprises, industrial, security agencies and others.

    #Emotions #Reconnaissance_faciale #Marché_émergent

  • Les gilets jaunes face à l’empire (2/2)

    Voir la première partie


    Deuxième point la question identitaire, au sens large. Immédiatement les gilets jaunes ont brandi des symboles nationaux – le drapeau, la Marseillaise, le bonnet phrygien – et tenus les propos les accompagnant. Il s’agissait moins d’un nationalisme idéologisé qu’un appel à revenir aux fondements républicains, qu’une réaction en face de l’effacement du cadre national, celui-ci étant vu comme un cadre collectif, issu d’une histoire commune, incarnant une identité partagée, lieu d’exercice de la souveraineté populaire et espace de déploiement d’un projet de société admis et revendiqué auquel sont conviés les nouveaux arrivants, enfants ou immigrés. On peut, ici aussi, être d’accord ou pas, mais inutile de préciser que c’est, là encore, contre toute la mécanique impériale, qui repose sur l’envers exact de tous ces points. (...)

    #Assemblée, #Conférence, #Empire, #Gauchisme, #Gilets jaunes_(2018-2019), #Libéralisme, #Lieux_Communs, #Multiculturalisme, #Politique, #Récupération

  • #Avis sur la légalité internationale des transferts d’armes vers l’#Arabie_saoudite, les #Émirats_arabes_unis et les membres de la coalition militairement impliqués au #Yémen

    Le présent avis traite de la #légalité, au regard du #droit_international, des transferts d’armes vers l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et les membres de la Coalition militairement impliqués au Yémen. L’avis n’évalue pas la légalité de tels transferts à la lumière du droit interne de chaque État fournisseur, pas plus qu’il n’examine en détail les obligations des groupes armés non étatiques ou des entreprises dans leurs rôles de fournisseurs et d’utilisateurs d’armes.

    L’accent est mis ici sur les #obligations_juridiques_internationales des parties au #conflit au Yémen et des États tiers qui leur fournissent leurs armes. Seront examinées ci-après les principales #normes_internationales applicables aux décisions de #transfert_d’armes qui visent à assurer la #protection_de_la_population_civile au Yémen et de l’#infrastructure_civile indispensable à sa survie.

    Les États qui transfèrent des armes à d’autres pays sont soumis aux normes du droit de la responsabilité internationale de l’État. Ils ont l’obligation de retenir ces transferts d’armes lorsqu’il est raisonnablement prévisible que les destinataires les utiliseront pour commettre des violations graves du droit international ou de les détourneront vers d’autres utilisateurs. Tel qu’expliqué ci-après, les États qui fournissent des armes aux parties au conflit au Yémen portent une énorme #responsabilité en regard du grand nombre de personnes civiles qui ont subi de graves blessures et des pertes, y compris à leur domicile, entraînant des déplacements internes et externes massifs de population. Les infrastructures civiles essentielles à la survie de la population ont été détruites ou gravement endommagées lors d’attaques armées, et l’accès à l’aide humanitaire reste entravé par les forces armées et les milices. Selon les Nations Unies, des millions de personnes souffrent de ce qui a été qualifié de la “pire crise humanitaire du monde”.

    #armes #armement #commerce_d'armes #Emirats_arabes_unis #protection_civile #guerre

    ping @reka

  • Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes

    How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
    In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.

    What do all these people have in common?

    All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.

    Since the summer of 2015,
    Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
    when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
    Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
    And much of this money is being spent in Africa.

    Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.

    However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.

    The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?

    At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.

    In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.

    If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.

    This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?

    This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.

    For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?

    While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
    in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.

    Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
    Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’

    It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.

    But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.

    It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.

    The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
    the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
    the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
    the French president, to Mark Rutte,

    the Dutch prime minister.

    Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
    ‘No data available’

    But let’s get back to those funding streams.

    The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.

    But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”

    Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
    but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
    or “no data available”.

    The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,

    the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.

    This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”

    At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
    Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti

    “There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”

    This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.

    Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.

    The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.

    Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.

    The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.

    Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.

    Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
    in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.

    In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
    the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.

    But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.

    Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.

    But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.

    The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
    The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.

    But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.

    To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”

    (DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

    Still with me?

    Because this was just the Netherlands.

    Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).

    Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.

    This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.

    Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.

    Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.

    Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.

    Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,

    which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.

    And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
    organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.

    This is the European migration spaghetti.
    How we managed to compile a list nonetheless

    By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?

    We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?


    We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).

    No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.

    In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
    This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
    was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.

    So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.

    More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.

    For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

    What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?

    Each country has its own way of categorising projects.

    There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.

    When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.

    While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
    1) Where is the money going?

    In Nigeria, we found

    If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
    50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.

    Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
    more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative

    to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.

    The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities

    in Nigeria: at least €92m.

    Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.

    We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
    Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
    Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.

    2) Where isn’t the money going?

    When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.

    “The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.

    See their website here.
    “Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”

    We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.

    Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.

    But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”

    Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.

    3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?

    We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?

    Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.

    One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”

    Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
    And we’ve only looked at one country ...

    That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.

    When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?

    Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?

    But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP

    called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.

    Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.

    But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.

    So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    Et ajouté à la métaliste développement/migrations :

    ping @isskein @isskein @pascaline @_kg_

  • Les gilets jaunes face à l’empire (1/2)

    Les idées exposées ici avaient été évoquées dans les conclusions des deux textes « L’horizon impérial » (mars 2018) et « Gilets jaunes et démocratie directe » (décembre 2018) auxquels on se référera. Elles ont également été présentées dans l’émission « Offensive Sonore : Gilets jaunes III » (février 2018) sur Radio Libertaire puis résumées lors de la [soirée-débat du 18 novembre 2019 à la librairie parisienne « La lucarne des écrivains ». On se reportera d’une manière générale à nos deux brochures « Le mouvement des Gilets Jaunes », décembre 2018 – juin 2019. (...)

    #Assemblée, #Conférence, #Empire, #Gauchisme, #Gilets jaunes (2018-2019), #Libéralisme, #Lieux Communs, #Multiculturalisme, #Politique, #Récupération

  • Educated Germans leave home to earn more money abroad, for a while

    The majority of German emigrants are well-educated young people who find better pay abroad, a new study shows. Many of them, however, choose to return.

    Germans living abroad earn on average €12,000 ($13,200) more than they do back home, according to a representative study published Wednesday.

    The Federal Institute for Population Research and the University of Duisburg in Essen interviewed 10,000 German-born people to find out why they emigrated and what effect leaving Germany had on them.

    “Over 60% of respondents reported that their net household income abroad was ’better’ or ’much better’ than their income the year prior,” said the Institute’s Andreas Ette. For women or people with lower levels of education, the contrast was even greater.

    Around 180,000 German citizens emigrate every year, while another 130,000 return. About 76% of emigrants have a university degree.

    Switzerland is the most popular destination for Germans, with one in five emigrants moving there, followed by Austria, the United States, and Great Britain.

    Read more: Where Germans like to emigrate

    Career is the number one reason for Germans to move abroad, followed by a desire for a different way of life. Some 37% said their partner’s career was the reason for their move. One in five moved to study.

    Brain drain? Not quite

    The interview subjects were between the ages of 20 and 70 and had either emigrated out of or returned to Germany between July 2017 and June 2018.

    Most German emigrants are young, between the ages of 20 and 40, with an average age falling between the ages of 36 and 37.

    Read more: Emigration more worrying than immigration for many Europeans, says ECFR study

    “There are certainly retired people that emigrate as well, but that is not the typical group. Instead, it’s normal that people will go abroad shortly after the end of their studies to begin their career and seek new experiences,” said Marcel Erlinghagen from the Institute for Sociology at the University of Duisburg in Essen. “It’s important to note, however, that we see a relative remigration. That means the highly qualified people are coming back. You can’t call it a long-term loss.”

    Rather than characterize this movement as a “brain drain”, or departure of well-educated people from the country, the study’s authors call it a “#brain_circulation.”

    The best come and go

    Despite the high departure rate among highly educated Germans, researchers said more than enough qualified people immigrate to Germany from other countries.

    “The best leave, but the best also come,” they write.

    Currently, 5% of Germans live abroad, putting Germany third in terms of emigration among OECD countries behind Poland and Great Britain. The annual number of German emigrants has risen gradually the 1980s.


    #Allemagne #émigration #migrations #statistiques #chiffres #fuite_de_cerveaux

  • #bruno_le_maire contre les méchants communistes

    Alors que la filière automobile française est, une fois de plus, en grande difficulté, le ministre de l’économie Bruno Le Maire a sorti, une fois de plus aussi, notre carnet Lire la suite...

    #Fin_de_l'automobile #argent #capitalisme #communisme #constructeurs #économie #emploi #industrie #peugeot #renault #subventions

  • Alexandra Allio De Corato sur Twitter :
    "Le Chargé d’Affaires des Émirats Arabes Unis à #Damas « Nous espérons que la sécurité prévaudra dans toute la République arabe syrienne sous la direction avisée du Dr Bashar Al-Assad » #SYRIE" / Twitter


    #emirats_arabes_unis #e.a.u

  • Vacances aux Bahamas, chômage mieux rémunéré que le travail : des agents Pôle #Emploi_répondent aux clichés

    Comme pour l’actuelle réforme des retraites, le gouvernement a tenté de justifier sa réforme de l’assurance chômage par une série d’idée reçues allègrement relayées par certains médias. Mais dans la réalité, la plupart des chômeurs galèrent. « Quand vous êtes salarié et que vous voyez certaines personnes qui partent en vacances aux Bahamas grâce à l’assurance chômage, il est légitime de se dire que ce système marche sur la tête ! », Damien Adam, député LREM de Seine-Maritime, novembre 2018. Voilà le genre de (...) #Décrypter

    / #Inégalités, #Fractures_sociales, A la une, Emploi , #Protections_sociales, Quel avenir pour nos protections sociales (...)

    #Quel_avenir_pour_nos_protections_sociales_ ?

  • Fingerprint Analysis Is High-Stakes Work — but It Doesn’t Take Much to Qualify as an Expert

    Brendan Max and two of his colleagues in the Cook County, Illinois, public defender’s office got some good news and some bad news in the spring of 2018. Actually, it was the same news : The three lawyers had nearly aced a proficiency test designed for fingerprint examiners. None of them had any training or real expertise in latent fingerprint analysis — the practice of trying to match a fingerprint collected from a crime scene to the known print of a suspect — aside from what they’d learned (...)

    #biométrie #criminalité #justice #reconnaissance #empreintes #erreur


  • C’est comment qu’on survit ?

    Ces dernières semaines j’ai travaillé sur une réforme dont les médias ont peu parlé, mais qui va impacter massivement les futurs chômeurs et chômeuses. Cette BD a été construite avec l’aide d’un conseiller de Pôle Emploi et est libre de droits pour toute utilisation militante. Source : Emma

  • Mise en perspective des impacts écologiques du numérique | Raphaël Lemaire

    La vidéo est de loin le sujet principal quand on parle de données.

    Mais là on est dans le pur numérique. Pour comparer avec d’autres choses du quotidien, j’ai ensuite pris une métrique pour laquelle on trouve des données facilement : les émissions de GES, mesurées en kg équivalent co2.

    Il faut aussi

    visualiser l’impact de la fabrication des appareils, là où se trouve vraiment le sujet des impacts écologiques du numérique

    Bien sur il y a plein d’autres choses à prendre en compte, notamment l’épuisement des métaux et autres matériaux rares pour la fabrication des appareils. Ces métriques montreraient également la domination de la fabrication par rapport à l’usage.

    Laissez vos emails tranquilles, la grosse bonne action en numérique est de faire durer le plus longtemps possible les appareils et d’éviter d’acheter des gadgets. Ensuite on peut réduire son usage de vidéo ou réduire la résolution.

    #empreinte_numérique #CO2 #émissions_gaz_effets_de_serre #transition_écologique

  • Transition énergétique et déclin des émissions de CO2 : constat extrêmement pessimiste et inquiétant de Vaclav Smil, un historien spécialiste des transitions énergétiques dans l’histoire
    https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/flip-tabloid/oil_44_EN/ABO_OilMagazine_44_EN.pdf p.10-14

    Determined efforts to reduce excesses in affluent countries, to adopt
    the most efficient energy solutions in nations rising from energy poverty, and to accelerate the diffusion of noncarbon alternatives could end the furtherrise of emissions and enable their steady subsequent decline. But it is highly unlikely that we could engineer
    an immediate plunge in CO2 emissions and eliminate them by 2050 in order to replicate the trend shown in the IPCC’s 1.5 °C report. Global energy (r)evolutions take time and to break that historic pattern would require either a collapse of modern civilization or a supremely coordinated and resolutely executed transformation on the global scale, beginning instantly and proceeding rapidly and at a cost, a major share of the global economic product, that has no precedent in history

    p.14 pour cette citation
    #énergie #émissions_CO2

  • Transition énergétique et déclin des émissions de CO2 : constat extrêmement pessimiste et inquiétant de Vaclav Smil, un historien spécialiste des transitions énergétiques dans l’histoire
    https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/flip-tabloid/oil_44_EN/ABO_OilMagazine_44_EN.pdf p.10-14

    Determined efforts to reduce excesses in affluent countries, to adopt
    the most efficient energy solutions in nations rising from energy poverty, and to accelerate the diffusion of noncarbon alternatives could end the furtherrise of emissions and enable their steady subsequent decline. But it is highly unlikely that we could engineer
    an immediate plunge in CO2 emissions and eliminate them by 2050 in order to replicate the trend shown in the IPCC’s 1.5 °C report. Global energy (r)evolutions take time and to break that historic pattern would require either a collapse of modern civilization or a supremely coordinated and resolutely executed transformation on the global scale, beginning instantly and proceeding rapidly and at a cost, a major share of the global economic product, that has no precedent in history

    p.14 pour cette citation
    #énergie #émissions_CO2

  • Le procès de la #mafia qui voulait régner sur la #Vallée_d’Aoste

    Avec la complicité d’élus valdôtains, une cellule mafieuse de la ’#Ndrangheta tissait son emprise sur la région alpine limitrophe de la Suisse. Les mafieux présumés et leurs affidés politiques vont comparaître devant la #justice.

    C’est un #procès retentissant, impliquant 14 membres présumés de la ’Ndrangheta et trois élus locaux, qui commencera le 12 décembre dans la Vallée d’Aoste. Les accusés doivent répondre du chef d’association mafieuse. Le 23 janvier, à l’issue d’une enquête lancée cinq ans plus tôt, les Valdôtains assistaient, médusés, à un coup de filet policier qui levait le voile sur la collusion entre la pègre calabraise et la politique locale. La plus petite région d’Italie se découvrait être une cible de choix pour la plus grande organisation criminelle du pays.

    Le but des mafieux était clair : prendre le contrôle du territoire. « Nous, les Calabrais, représentons un quart de la population valdôtaine », soit 32 000 habitants sur 125 000, se vantait le gérant d’une pizzeria d’Aoste mis sur écoute par le parquet qui le soupçonnait d’être un boss de la ’Ndrangheta. L’importante présence calabraise dans la Vallée d’Aoste avait une fonction de réservoir électoral, que la mafia a utilisé pour infiltrer la politique. Une tactique apprise après un précédent revers.

    Protéger leurs investissements

    En 2014 déjà, cinq mafieux avaient été condamnés pour extorsion, vol et tentative d’homicide. Des crimes en relation avec les affaires de la ’Ndrangheta dans l’immobilier, les jeux d’argent et la restauration. Pour protéger leurs investissements, les mafieux ont alors commencé à tisser leur toile autour de la politique valdôtaine. Les trois élus inculpés jeudi auraient bénéficié des bulletins de vote garantis par l’organisation. Deux d’entre eux étaient issus du premier parti de la région, l’Union valdôtaine, le puissant mouvement autonomiste érigé en défenseur du particularisme culturel et linguistique local.

    Les écoutes téléphoniques ont fait état d’échanges nourris entre les mafieux et les politiciens. Elue sans bannière politique, une conseillère municipale de Saint-Pierre, près d’Aoste, avait par exemple piloté l’attribution du service de transport scolaire à la société d’un homme proche de la ’Ndrangheta. En contrepartie, elle aurait obtenu que « les mafieux exercent des pressions sur les autres conseillers municipaux qui lui causaient des difficultés », explique la magistrate Silvia Salvadori, chargée de l’enquête judiciaire. Selon cette dernière, « les mafieux voulaient gouverner la Vallée d’Aoste ».

    La ’Ndrangheta entendait infiltrer tous les étages de la politique, législatifs et exécutifs, communaux et régionaux. Le maire de la ville d’Aoste, Fulvio Centoz, membre du Parti démocrate, a par exemple été approché, sans succès, par un boss mafieux. Cet épisode ainsi que l’arrestation d’un conseiller municipal pour ses liens présumés avec la pègre ont valu à la ville d’#Aoste un audit ministériel. La procédure, qui frappe aussi la commune de #Saint-Pierre, est susceptible d’aboutir à une mise sous tutelle du chef-lieu valdôtain pour #infiltration_mafieuse. Les enquêteurs ont aussi observé des contacts, apparemment infructueux, entre des mafieux présumés et l’ex-président de la région, #Augusto_Rollandin. Surnommé l’« #Empereur_Auguste », cet ex-homme fort de l’#Union_valdôtaine a influé, pendant plus d’un quart de siècle, sur la vie politique de la Vallée d’Aoste, avant de céder le pouvoir en 2017.

    « La fin du #déni »

    « Ce procès signe la fin du déni local à l’égard de la présence mafieuse », affirme Roberto Mancini, journaliste à Aoste et expert en criminalité mafieuse. Selon lui, l’élite politique et économique valdôtaine a trop longtemps refusé de regarder la réalité en face. « Comment la ’Ndrangheta a-t-elle réussi à percer aussi en profondeur dans le tissu social et politique ? Le procès devra répondre à cette question cruciale pour l’avenir de la région », espère Donatella Corti, présidente de la section valdôtaine de Libera, la plus importante ONG nationale antimafia. « Il devra aussi permettre de faire la lumière sur le réseau de complicités locales qui a permis aux clans de prospérer. » La Vallée d’Aoste pourra alors mesurer l’étendue de l’emprise mafieuse sur son territoire.

    « Une mise sous tutelle de la ville d’Aoste serait un tremblement de terre »

    Alors qu’il était en lice pour la mairie d’Aoste en 2015, Fulvio Centoz dîne avec des amis dans une pizzeria du quartier administratif de la ville. Le lieu est placé sur écoute par le parquet antimafia, qui tient le gérant calabrais de l’établissement dans son viseur. Ce dernier offre son « appui électoral », une proposition que le candidat décline instinctivement. Fulvio Centoz remportera plus tard la mairie. En janvier dernier, l’épisode fait l’objet d’une fuite dans la presse, au lendemain de l’arrestation d’un conseiller municipal d’Aoste pour ses accointances avec la ’Ndrangheta. Ces faits motivent un audit ministériel pour infiltration mafieuse. La Vallée d’Aoste est sous le choc : son chef-lieu risque d’être mis sous tutelle. Le ministre italien de l’Intérieur devrait rendre sa décision avant la fin de l’année.

    Si la ville d’Aoste devait être mise sous tutelle pour infiltration mafieuse, quelles en seraient les conséquences ?
    Fulvio Centoz : A mon sens, il n’y a pas d’éléments susceptibles d’aboutir à cette conclusion. Je suis confiant. Cela dit, une mise sous tutelle provoquerait un séisme dans toute la région, et au-delà. Elle aurait des répercussions politiques, favorisant la montée des extrêmes, mais aussi économiques, avec un impact négatif sur les investissements et le tourisme. La Vallée d’Aoste cesserait d’être ce paradis alpin, cette île de bonheur, qui a fait sa fortune. Ce dégât d’image serait probablement irréparable.

    Pourquoi n’avez-vous pas dénoncé l’épisode de la pizzeria aux autorités judiciaires ?

    Le gérant de l’établissement ne s’est jamais présenté comme étant un boss ou un émissaire de la ’Ndrangheta. Et rien ne me permettait à l’époque de le soupçonner, son nom n’ayant jamais fait son apparition dans la presse, ni dans les comptes rendus judiciaires connus du public. J’ai tiré la conclusion qu’il s’agissait d’un petit entrepreneur qui se vantait, comme tant d’autres, d’avoir une influence politique. Pour savoir si le gérant d’une pizzeria est un mafieux, il faudrait disposer du niveau d’information du parquet anti.

    Quelles leçons tirez-vous de cette mésaventure ?

    Le niveau d’alerte face à la menace d’infiltration mafieuse doit être relevé. L’an prochain auront lieu les élections communales en Vallée d’Aoste. Les candidats sont prévenus : la ’Ndrangheta cherchera à gagner leurs faveurs. Gare toutefois à ne pas céder aux amalgames. Tous les Calabrais ne sont pas mafieux ! J’ai toujours lancé cette mise en garde, on ne doit pas criminaliser toute une communauté.


  • La fabrique des « #indésirables », dans les sociétés européennes hier et aujourd’hui

    Le 80e anniversaire des décrets-lois Daladier a servi de prétexte au comité scientifique des Voix d’exils pour engager une réflexion collective sur la fabrique des « #étrangers_indésirables » hier et aujourd’hui, manière de s’interroger sur le processus de #criminalisation des personnes migrantes par les autorités des différents états européens.


    Pour télécharger le numéro de la revue en pdf :

    #catégorisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés

  • Les personnes en situation de handicap suspectées à leur tour d’être des « fraudeurs »

    La Cour des comptes s’attaque dans un rapport à l’allocation adulte handicapé. Elle réclame une « détection des demandes frauduleuses » et accuse même les médecins de produire des « certificats de complaisance ». Après les chômeurs, après les allocataires du RSA, les personnes en situation de handicap sont-elles la nouvelle catégorie de pauvres que le gouvernement va soumettre à des contrôles « renforcés » ? C’est ce que donne à penser un rapport de la Cour des comptes publié le 25 novembre. Celui-ci se (...) En bref

    / #Luttes_sociales, Quel avenir pour nos #Protections_sociales ?, #Inégalités, Protections sociales

    #Quel_avenir_pour_nos_protections_sociales_ ?

    • Au Royaume-Uni aussi, il y a une dizaine d’années, le gouvernement avait mis en œuvre des sanctions contre les personnes handicapées et en longue maladie, considérant que beaucoup n’étaient pas vraiment en incapacité de travailler. Puis ces sanctions avaient été étendues à l’ensemble des demandeurs d’emplois et des travailleurs pauvres qui perçoivent une allocation. Puis, toutes les allocations sociales (handicap, RSA, aide au logement…) ont été fusionnées dans un système dit de « crédit universel ». Macron a le même projet avec son « revenu social universel ». Une fois toutes les allocations fusionnées, tous les allocataires seront-ils de même soupçonnés de frauder ?

      C’est une très classique migration de population allocataire d’un droit au chômage de plus en plus restreint vers les prestations destinées aux handicapées qui est ainsi anticipée. Y compris en exploitant/renversant des exigences d’intégration sociale par l’emploi.
      Ce phénomène, massif et transitoire (on se charge d’y mettre bon ordre a postériori, ici c’est anticipé), a été observé aux Pays-Bas (avec 10 ans de reconnaissance de nombreux "handicapés sociaux pour lesquels on constatait le manque de revenu issu de l’emploi comme du droit au chômage) puis au R.U. où les prestations handicapées ont été utilisées comme refuge, dernier support social, lorsque le #droit_au_chômage a été raboté, avant de se voir elles aussi contingentées. Comme dans le cas des migrants sans papiers, y a pas de surnuméraires, juste une gestion de la population qui la stratifie et la balkanise.

      NB : divers articles connexes sont indiqués en pied de page de l’article cité de bastamag cité ici.
      #employabilité #AAH #MDPH #Caf

    • Ce matin je me rends compte que j’ai fini par oublier la phrase du psy qui m’a filé l’AAH et choisi de ne pas m’aiguiller vers des dispositifs d’insertion par l’emploi, décidant que ma vie serait une vie à part, aussi éclatante ou misérable que je le mériterais. Et plus de seize ans après, je suis en train de choisir de ne pas faire ma demande de renouvellement, genre ça passe ou je casse.

  • OpenMoji is an Open Source Emoji Set That Looks Awesome

    OpenMoji is an open source emoji library that’s free to use. The set has over 3000 glyphs, supports Unicode’s Emoji 12.0 spec, and is available as a font. This post, OpenMoji is an Open Source Emoji Set That Looks Awesome, was written by Joey Sneddon and first appeared on OMG! Ubuntu!.

    • https://openmoji.org

      #Emoji are indispensable for daily communication. They are practical (👍), funny (😆) and sometimes quite bizarre (💩🤪🙀🧟). For us, emoji are much more than colorful images decorating fun short messages. We think they are rather part of an important and exciting development: the return of pictorial symbols to written communication. For the first time in history, it is possible to communicate with a combination of letters and icons. Now it becomes feasible to say things and convey meanings that were previously impossible.

      Unfortunately, the creative variety of emoji has been rather limited so far, especially when compared to the incredible number of available fonts. At the moment, there is only a dozen emoji sets, most of them from big tech companies. These emoji are visually adapted to the respective appearance of their software platforms. In addition, the usage rights are often very restrictive (e.g. the terms of use of Apple’s emoji).

      That is why we have developed OpenMoji as the first open source and independent emoji system to date. When designing the OpenMoji system, we have developed visual guidelines that are not linked to a specific branding. In addition, our goal was to design emojis that integrate well in combination with text.

      OpenMoji is an open-source project of 50+ students and 2 professors of the HfG Schwäbisch Gmünd (Design University) and external contributers.