• Khrys’presso du lundi 9 septembre 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/09/09/khryspresso-du-lundi-9-septembre-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World Chine : les Ouïghours enfermés dès l’école (liberation.fr) – voir aussi : Les Ouïghours en Chine, du rêve … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 2 septembre 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/09/02/khryspresso-du-lundi-2-septembre-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World Certains équipements de #Surveillance russe ont laissé fuiter des données pendant plus de deux ans (zdnet.com … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #veille #webrevue

  • Jeffrey Epstein, un espion ? Si oui, pour qui ? | JDQ
    https://www.journaldequebec.com/2019/07/12/jeffrey-epstein-un-espion-si-oui-pour-qui

    Long Before Epstein : Sex Traffickers & Spy Agencies – Consortiumnews
    https://consortiumnews.com/2019/08/23/long-before-epstein-sex-traffickers-spy-agencies

    Some cases include the 1950s -1970s Kincora scandal and the 1981 Peter Hayman affair, both in the U.K.; and the Finders’ cult and the Franklin scandal in the U.S. in the late 1980s. Just as these cases did not end in convictions, the pedophile and accused child-trafficker Jeffrey Epstein remained at arms’ length for years.

    #espionnage #pédophilie

  • Espionage: The Myers case 10 years later – Cuba Money Project
    http://cubamoneyproject.com/2019/06/18/myers
    Les vieux espions

    Convicted of spying for Cuba, Gwendolyn Myers soon adapted to life behind bars, telling a friend, “Did you know you can floss your teeth with the elastic in underpants?”
    Her husband, Kendall Myers, also wound up in prison. He once held a TOP SECRET security clearance at the State Department and earned $131,996 per year. In 2009, two years after his retirement, he admitted to an undercover FBI source that he had spied for Cuba for 30 years.
    Ten years later, Myers is serving a life term at a federal prison in Florence, Colorado.


    Walter Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn Myers.

    Relatives asked the court for mercy before the couple’s sentencing in 2010. Kendall Myers’ daughter, Amanda Myers Klein, described her father as “a very gentle and thoughtful man.” She wrote:

    He taught me never to yell, nor accept being yelled at. He taught me to think for myself, challenge conventional wisdom and always remain open minded and hearted. My father and Gwen have never displayed hatred or greed. They are motivated and guided by love and compassion for humankind.

    Klein said her father, now 82, had been teaching English as a second language to fellow inmates. She wrote:

    I am not in the least bit surprised by his energy and passion for helping others to learn. It is in his nature to teach and he does it so well.

    U.S. prosecutors considered Kendall Myers, also known as Agent 202, to be a national security threat. They wrote:

    Unlike many defendants who appear for sentencing before this Court, Kendall Myers was born into this world with every conceivable advantage. The great-grandson of Alexander Graham Bell and grandson of Gilbert Grosvenor, his was a life of wealth and privilege. He attended the finest schools, including a private boarding secondary school in Pennsylvania and Brown University for college. He also earned a Ph.D from Johns Hopkins University. Kendall Myers could have been anything he wanted to be. He chose to be a Cuban spy.
    He chose to use his substantial intellect and education to prey on the most sensitive secrets of the United States. He took a federal oath of office “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic” that he never had any intention of honoring. He then sought and obtained jobs within the Department of State solely because they would give him the widest possible access to classified information that he could steal for CuIS. He also developed friendships with other unwitting intelligence analysts just so he could exploit them for the benefit of Fidel Castro.

    Brett Kramarsic, a former electrical engineer, is the FBI special agent who investigated Myers. In 2009, he was assigned to a squad responsible for investigating counterespionage and unauthorized disclosure of classified information. According to Kramarsic’s sworn statement:
    Kendall Myers was born in Washington, D.C., in 1937. In June 1972, Myers earned a doctor’s degree from the School of Advanced International Studies, or SAIS, at Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C., and later taught at the school.
    In December 1978, Myers traveled to Cuba for “unofficial personal travel for academic purposes.”
    In a journal about his trip, he later wrote:

    Cuba is so exciting! I have become so bitter these past few months. Watching the evening news is a radicalizing experience. The abuses of our system, the lack of decent medical system, the oil companies and their undisguised indifference to public needs, the complacency about the poor, the utter inability of those who are oppressed to recognize their own condition…Have the Cubans given up their personal freedom to get material security? Nothing I have seen yet suggests that…I can see nothing of value that has been lost by the revolution…
    Everything one hears about Fidel suggests that he is a brilliant and charismatic leader. He exudes the sense of seriousness and purposefulness that gives the Cuban socialist system its unique character. The revolution is moral without being moralistic. Fidel has lifted the Cuban people out of the degrading and oppressive conditions which characterized pre-revolutionary Cuba. He has helped the Cubans to save their own souls. He is certainly one of the great political leaders of our time.

    Myers wrote that a visit to Havana’s Museum of the Revolution impressed him:

    Facing step by step the historic interventions of the U.S. in to Cuban affairs, including the systematic and regular murdering of revolutionary leaders left me with a lump in my throat… They don’t need to try very hard to make the point that we have been the exploiters. Batista was only one of the long list of murderous figures that we thrust upon them in the name of stability and freedom.
    There may have been some abuses under the present regime, life may be more complicated by rationing, etc., but no one can make me believe that Cuba would have been better off if we have defeated the revolution. The idea is obscene.

    Walter Kendall Myers and Gwendolyn Myers. Photo: New York Times

    Prosecutors say Myers agreed to serve as a clandestine agent for Cuba in 1979, but didn’t start work until 1981.
    On April 15, 1985, the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia, offered Myers a job as training instructor, a position that required a TOP SECRET security clearance.
    Later, in October 1999, Myers began working full time at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. His security clearance was bumped from TOP SECRET to TOP SECRET/SCI. SCI stands for sensitive compartmented information. Release of TOP SECRET information can result in “exceptionally grave” damage to national security.
    Gwen Myers was born in 1938 and married her husband on May 8, 1982. She did not work for U.S. government and had no security clearance, but she supported her husband’s activities, prosecutors say. A court document states:

    It was Kendall Myers who was initially contacted by the Cuban intelligence service to be a covert agent, and it was Kendall Myers who, in turn, recruited Gwendolyn.
    Gwendolyn Myers, on the other hand, while she was fully supportive of, and engaged in, their espionage, never had access to classified information. Her role was primarily related to communicating with their Cuban handlers and assisting in the transmission of the information Kendall Myers had gathered.

    Kendall Myers retired from the State Department in October 2007.
    The FBI began investigating the couple on April 15, 2009. The agency sent an undercover source to talk to them and claimed that one of their Cuban handlers – a Cuban intelligence agent – “sent me to contact you.”
    The undercover source said the handler wanted “to get some information from Kendall Myers” about changes in Cuba and the new administration of Barack Obama.
    The source – evidently a Cuban government official – met with the couple at a hotel lounge and reported that Myers stated, “We have been very cautious, careful with our moves and, uh, trying to be alert to any surveillance if there was any.”
    Gwen Myers admitted that the couple still had a short-wave radio they had once used to communicate with Cuban intelligence. She was quoted as saying, “You gave us the money to buy” the radio “a hundred years ago and it still works beautifully…although I haven’t listened to it in a while.”
    The couple agreed to meet with the undercover source again on April 30. At this meeting, they were trained how to use a device to encrypt future emails with the undercover source.
    Kendall Myers asked the undercover source to deliver a message to his Cuban handler. The message said he and his wife were “delighted to have contact again. We really have missed you. And you, speaking collectively, have been a really important part of our lives and we have felt incomplete. I mean, we really love your country…and the people and the team are just important in our lives. So we don’t want to fall out of contact again.”
    He acknowledged working with Cuban intelligence for 30 years, but said he and his wife did not want to continue that work. He said, “We’re a little burned out…We lived with the fear and the anxiety for a long time…and still do.”
    Kendall Myers said he and his wife “would like to be a reserve army…ready when we’re needed.”
    Kendall Myers admitted to the undercover source that Cuban intelligence had asked him decades earlier to seek employment either the State Department or the CIA.
    He applied for a CIA job on Sept. 1, 1981, but wound up at the State Department. A CIA job probably would not have worked out, his wife said, because he is “not a very good liar” and would have likely failed agency polygraph tests.
    While at the State Department, investigators found, Kendall Myers viewed more than 200 sensitive or classified intelligence reports related to Cuba from Aug. 22, 2006, until his retirement on Oct. 31, 2007. Most of the reports were marked SECRET or TOP SECRET.
    Gwen Myers told the undercover source that her preferred method for passing information to the Cubans was to switch shopping carts with them in a grocery store. That was “easy to do,” she said, although she “wouldn’t do it now. Now they have cameras, but they didn’t then.”
    Kendall Myers confessed a “great admiration” for Ana Belén Montes, a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst now serving a 25-year term for spying for Cuba. But he said the FBI caught her because “she was not paranoid enough.”
    He and his wife said they were honored to meet with Fidel Castro around New Year’s Day in 1995.
    “Oh, that was wonderful,” he said. “Fidel is wonderful, just wonderful.”
    Gwen Myers called Castro “the most incredible statesman in a hundred years for goodness sakes.”
    Prosecutors filed charges against the Myers in June 2009. They pled guilty and agreed to a “comprehensive debriefing by the intelligence community concerning their espionage activities.”
    Prosecutors weren’t entirely satisfied with the debriefings.

    …In certain areas the defendants provided information of significant value to the Government. In others, they did not. Further, the FBI memorandum identifies material areas in which the debriefings were marred by both of the defendants’ lack of recollection or inconsistencies and contradictions. There were times when the FBI assessed that Kendall Myers, in particular, gave inconsistent or uncooperative responses or was intentionally withholding information.

    Before sentencing in 2010, friends and relatives flooded the court with letters asking for leniency.
    One letter came from Kendall Myers’ brother, Martin, a doctor in Texas. He said Gwen Myers and her husband “care deeply about people born into poverty and hopelessness. They have spoken often about their concerns that society has left so many behind and their deep feelings about their plight. They have been frustrated by society’s apparent indifference to these people.”
    Gwen’s daughter, Jill Liebler, said her mother was “tirelessly kind, caring and generous.” She wrote:
    “She taught us by example that everyone, regardless of wealth, background, age, education, or employment position is to be treated with equal respect, consideration and kindness.”
    Beverly A. Pierce in Baltimore, Maryland, wrote that Gwen Myers had the “unassuming, unpretentious honesty that’s completely typical of the upper Midwest. (Garrison Keillor is not making that up).”
    She and Myers were friends.

    For years, Gwen and I got together regularly over beer or a glass of win and talked about work and men. She was always supportive and always had sound advice, which she wrapped up with irreverent humor.
    One thing that comes across clearly with Gwen is how deeply and thoroughly she loves Kendall. She can tell hysterically funny stories about him, and she admires and is utterly devoted to him. The depth and liveliness of their relationship is inspiring. We don’t see nearly enough of that in this world.

    Pierce said her friend had dealt with her imprisonment “with a quantity of courage, discipline, humor and resourcefulness,” telling her at one point, “Did you know you can floss your teeth with the elastic in underpants?”
    Pierce said Myers cared about fellow inmates and complained about the shackling of women prisoners who were pregnant.
    She said she hoped Myers could be forgiven for any misdeeds, writing:

    What she did, she did out of widespread love. I understand that Kendall will be in prison for life, sadly but justifiably. But perhaps Gwen can be released soon, for the benefit of her children and grandchildren who have suffered so with this. She brought it on herself, I do understand, but she is harmless at this point and does not threaten national security.

    Prosecutors were not swayed, writing:

    For nearly 30 years, Kendall and Gwendolyn Myers committed one of the worst crimes a citizen can perpetrate against his or her own country – espionage on behalf of a long-standing foreign adversary. They spied on behalf of the Republic of Cuba, an authoritarian Communist regime that undoubtedly used the secrets they provided, and the power those secrets conveyed, to prop itself up and act against the interests of the United States.
    And the defendants are actually proud of that legacy. They feel no remorse for what they did, nor for the harm that their espionage caused the United States. They betrayed the United States by choice. They became spies not because they were pressured by blackmail or the need for money, but allegedly because of a shared Communist ideology and an adoration of the Cuban revolution.
    Any attempt now by them to assert that they acted out of conscience and ideology when they betrayed the United States of America should be rejected by this Court as self-serving and woefully insufficient to mitigate their espionage. Make no mistake, the defendants intended to and did harm the United States.

    Kendall Myers’ ending salary at the State Department was $131,996 per year. He pled guilty and agreed to forfeit past earnings of $1,735,054. Prosecutors said he didn’t deserve the money because he had been spying for Cuba.
    Gwen Myers, also known as Agent 123 and Agent E-634, could have gotten a 10-year prison sentence. Prosecutors agreed to less time – 81 months – because they wanted to be debriefed and hoped to avoid a contested trial that they feared “risked further significant harm to the national security.”
    She was released on April 22, 2015, records show.
    Gwen Myers, who had heart trouble even before going to prison, later died. Court records don’t give a date.
    Her case was closed on Jan. 4, 2016.

    About – Cuba Money Project
    http://cubamoneyproject.com/about

    About
    Tracey Eaton

    Cuba Money Project is a journalism initiative aimed at reporting stories about U.S. government programs and projects related to Cuba.
    Among the project’s goals:

    To shed light on U.S. efforts to bring about a democratic transition 60 years after Fidel Castro took power.
    To learn the fate of hundreds of millions of U.S. tax dollars spent on Cuba programs (see an academic paper I wrote on the subject in 2016).

    Democracy in Cuba: America’s Relentless Quest
    https://docs.google.com/document/d/1caEs6CtxBCJ1EMkg9M-tnke6nqgXTOWDisHItJazKPA/edit

    This paper will examine U.S. democracy programs that have attempted to dislodge the Castro brothers. The State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Broadcasting Board of Governors have spent more than $1 billion on Cuba programs since Radio Martí was launched in 1980s (Eaton, Cuba spending hovers around $1 billion, 2015).

    Funding for democracy programs peaked at $44.4 million in 2008 under George W. Bush (Gootnick, 2013).
    The projects are barely noticeable in the U.S. government’s multitrillion-dollar budget, but they ignite passionate feelings in Cuba, where Fidel Castro and his followers fought American government interference for decades. Scholars and historians have long been drawn to Cuba because the island has had an outsized role in U.S. history. Key events with a Cuba connection include the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the Cold War. I would like to explore U.S. democracy programs to help shed light on the American policy as Cuba moves toward the post-Castro era.
    I will focus mostly on USAID and State Department programs carried out over the past decade. Among the questions I will pursue:
    How transparent are the programs? How much information about them is publicly available?
    How much democracy money reaches dissidents in Cuba? How are the programs seen on the island?
    How have the programs evolved?
    I will show that the programs are a controversial yet important element in the fight for democracy in Cuba. They help raise the international profile of Cuban activists. They highlight persistent human rights abuses. However, much about the programs remains unknown. U.S. officials refuse to disclose many details about the democracy projects. USAID and the State Department have improved internal controls and management, but the programs remain largely unaccountable to American taxpayers.

    #USA #Cuba #espionnage #justice #prpoagande #terrorisme #attentat

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 26 août 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/08/26/khryspresso-du-lundi-26-aout-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World Pékin a utilisé Twitter et #Facebook contre les manifestants de Hongkong (liberation.fr) – voir aussi : HongKong : … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 19 août 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/08/19/khryspresso-du-lundi-19-aout-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World « Nous sommes encore là » : des milliers de militants prodémocratie mobilisés à Hongkong (lemonde.fr) Comprendre la crise … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Facebook a espionné et retranscrit des conversations audio de ses usagers - Technologies - RFI
    http://www.rfi.fr/technologies/20190814-facebook-espionne-audio-conversations-usagers

    Faire du micro d’un téléphone un espion pour enregistrer les conversations et mieux cibler les #publicités avait été qualifié de théorie complotiste par Mark Zuckerberg lors de son audition devant le Congrès en avril 2018. « Nous ne faisons pas ça » avait répondu le fondateur du réseau social aux sénateurs américains après le scandale Cambridge Analytica sur la fuite des données personnelles de millions d’abonnés.

    Un an plus tard, c’est en fait une réalité : #Facebook le reconnait ce mardi après les révélations de l’agence Bloomberg. Selon ses informations ce sont des conversations audio passées sur l’application Messenger qui ont été enregistrées et même transcrites par des centaines de sous-traitants. Facebook promet avoir mis fin à cette pratique et l’avoir fait avec l’accord des utilisateurs qui l’auraient permis en cochant certaines règles d’utilisation.

    Il faudrait faire une liste des #complotismes qui n’en étaient pas

    #espionnage

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 12 août 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/08/12/khryspresso-du-lundi-12-aout-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World La Russie ferme « secrètement » l’Internet mobile pour frustrer les manifestants moscovites, selon un rapport (developpez.com) La … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue
    https://mamot.fr/system/media_attachments/files/005/529/906/original/9ef45e6de2714200.mp4?1564703189

  • China : Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad

    New 12-Point Code of Conduct to Help Educational Institutions Respond.

    Institutions of higher learning around the world should resist the Chinese government’s efforts to undermine academic freedom abroad, Human Rights Watch said today. On March 21, 2019, Human Rights Watch published a 12-point Code of Conduct for colleges and universities to adopt to respond to Chinese government threats to the academic freedom of students, scholars, and educational institutions.

    Many colleges and universities around the world with ties to the Chinese government, or with large student populations from China, are unprepared to address threats to academic freedom in a systematic way, Human Rights Watch said. Few have moved to protect academic freedom against longstanding problems, such as visa bans on scholars working on China or surveillance and self-censorship on their campuses.

    “Colleges and universities that stand together are better equipped to resist Chinese government harassment and surveillance on campuses, visa denials, and pressures to censor or self-censor,” said Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch. “Most important, they will be better prepared to ensure academic freedom on their campuses for all students and scholars, particularly those from China.”

    The proposed Code of Conduct is based on more than 100 interviews between 2015 and 2018 in Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with academics, graduate and undergraduate students, and administrators, some of them from China. The people interviewed came from a range of institutions, including globally known universities, large public institutions, and small, private colleges. Almost all were from or study China, or have operated academic programs on behalf of their institutions in China.

    Human Rights Watch found various threats to academic freedom resulting from Chinese government pressure. Chinese authorities have long monitored and conducted surveillance on students and academics from China and those studying China on campuses around the world. Chinese diplomats have also complained to university officials about hosting speakers – such as the Dalai Lama – whom the Chinese government considers “sensitive.”

    Academics told Human Rights Watch that students from China have described threats to their families in China in response to what those students had said in the classroom. Scholars from China detailed being directly threatened outside the country by Chinese officials to refrain from criticizing the Chinese government in classroom lectures or other talks. Others described students from China remaining silent in their classrooms, fearful that their speech was being monitored and reported to Chinese authorities by other students from China. One student from China at a university in the United States summed up his concerns about classroom surveillance, noting: “This isn’t a free space.”

    Many of the academics interviewed identified censorship and self-censorship as serious concerns. One said a senior administrator has asked them “as a personal favor” to decline media requests during a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping, fearing that it could have ramifications for their university.

    At two US universities, senior administrators cancelled appearances by speakers they believed the Chinese government would deem “sensitive,” and in one of those cases, the dean explained to a faculty member that the school did not want to lose its growing number of students from China. In another case, colleagues discouraged a scholar at a university with a large population of students from China from assigning his classes potentially “sensitive” titles. Two described academics participating in hiring panels in which the candidates were questioned during job interviews about their views on Confucius Institutes, which are effectively international outposts of China’s Ministry of Education that offer classes in Chinese language and culture.

    Many of those interviewed said they modified their remarks inside and outside classrooms because of fears of being denied access to China or to funding sources, of causing problems for students or scholars from China or their family members, or of offending or irking students or scholars from China.

    Many expressed discomfort with the presence of Confucius Institutes on their campuses. They said the presence of such institutions fundamentally compromised their institution’s commitment to academic freedom, especially when Confucius Institutes had been invited to their campuses without broad faculty consultation. In 2019, Victoria University cancelled the screening of a documentary critical of Confucius Institutes after the university’s Confucius Institute complained.

    A number of US institutions, including the University of Chicago, North Carolina State University, and the University of Massachusetts Boston have closed or announced they will close the Confucius Institutes on their campuses because of concerns about academic freedom, among other reasons.

    Few of those interviewed believed that their institutions offered any guidance or practical protections to enable them to speak freely.

    “Universities can’t continue to rely solely on honor codes or other statements of principle designed to address issues like cheating, plagiarism, or tenure to address pressure from the Chinese government on academic freedom abroad,” Richardson said. “Those don’t envision – let alone set out remedies for – the kinds of threats to academic freedom now widely reported.”

    As concerns about the Chinese government undermining human rights around the world have grown, students and scholars from China told Human Rights Watch they increasingly feel they are regarded with suspicion within their educational institutions.

    A recent Wilson Center study of Chinese political influence in higher education in the US found it important that “countermeasures neither vilify PRC [mainland] students as a group, nor lose sight of the fact that these students, along with faculty members of Chinese descent, are often the victims of influence and interference activities perpetrated by PRC diplomats and nationalistic peers.” Academic institutions should ensure that students and scholars from China feel welcomed, integrated, and protected, Human Rights Watch said.

    “President Xi’s moves to strangle academic freedom inside China makes it all the more urgent to ensure that students and scholars of and from China can enjoy academic freedom abroad,” Richardson said. “Institutions can demonstrate their commitment to peaceful, critical expression by adopting smart, robust protections, and keeping their gates open to all who seek academic freedom.”

    –-

    Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad
    A Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide

    Large numbers of students, scholars, scientists, and professors from China now study or work at colleges and universities abroad. In recent years, Chinese government authorities have grown bolder in trying to shape global perceptions of China on campuses and in academic institutions outside China. These authorities have sought to influence academic discussions, monitor overseas students from China, censor scholarly inquiry, or otherwise interfere with academic freedom.

    Human Rights Watch investigations found that the Chinese government attempts to restrict academic freedom beyond its borders. To counter such pressures, ensure the integrity of academic institutions, and protect the academic freedom and free expression rights of students, scholars, and administrators, particularly those who work on China or are from China, Human Rights Watch proposes the following Code of Conduct. While the impetus for and focus of the provisions that follow is pressure emanating from China, academic institutions should apply the same principles to interactions with all governments that threaten academic freedom on their campuses.

    All institutions of higher education should:

    Speak out for academic freedom. Publicly commit to supporting academic freedom and freedom of expression through public statements at the highest institutional levels, institutional policies, and internal guidelines. Explicitly recognize threats posed to academic freedom and freedom of expression by the Chinese government seeking to shape discussions, teaching, and scholarship on campus. Reaffirm a commitment to freedom of inquiry, enabling scholars and students to freely conduct research, and make clear that opposing direct and indirect censorship pressures or retaliation by third parties, including national and foreign governments, is integral to academic freedom.
    Strengthen academic freedom on campus. Emphasize the commitments and policies in support of academic freedom in student orientation, faculty hiring, handbooks and honor codes, and public gatherings. To avoid self-censorship or retaliation for stating opinions, academic institutions should publicize a policy that classroom discussions are meant to stay on campus, and never to be reported to foreign missions.
    Counter threats to academic freedom. Encourage students and faculty members to recognize that direct and indirect censorship pressures, threats, or acts of retaliation by Chinese government authorities or their agents against students or scholars for what they write or say threaten academic freedom. Develop and implement effective mechanisms, such as an ombudsperson, to whom such pressures, threats, or acts of retaliation can be privately or anonymously reported.
    Record incidents of Chinese government infringement of academic freedom. Actively track instances of direct or indirect Chinese government harassment, surveillance, or threats on campuses. Where warranted, they should be reported to law enforcement. Report annually the number and nature of these kinds of incidents.
    Join with other academic institutions to promote research in China. Academic institutions should work in concert, including by making public statements and complaints where appropriate, in the event of unwarranted visa denials or prolonged delays for research in China. Academic institutions should consider joint actions against Chinese government entities in response to visa denials or other obstacles to academic research.
    Offer flexibility for scholars and students working on China. Ensure that a scholar’s career advancement or a student’s progress will not be compromised if their research has to change direction due to Chinese government restrictions on research or access to source material in China. Institutions should consider steps, such as granting the scholar or student extra time to finish their research, supporting alternative research strategies, or publishing using pseudonyms, in the face of Chinese government obstacles, harassment, or reprisals. Academic institutions should be open to alternative research strategies when funding or receiving funds for academic work that has been rejected by a Chinese entity. Funders and review boards should provide comparable flexibility.
    Reject Confucius Institutes. Refrain from having Confucius Institutes on campuses, as they are fundamentally incompatible with a robust commitment to academic freedom. Confucius Institutes are extensions of the Chinese government that censor certain topics and perspectives in course materials on political grounds, and use hiring practices that take political loyalty into consideration.
    Monitor Chinese government-linked organizations. Require that all campus organizations, including the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA), that receive funding or support from Chinese diplomatic missions and other Chinese government-linked entities, report such information.
    Promote academic freedom of students and scholars from China. Inform students and scholars from China that they are not required to join any organizations, and help mentor and support them to ensure they can enjoy full academic freedom.
    Disclose all Chinese government funding. Publicly disclose, on an annual basis, all sources and amounts of funding that come directly or indirectly from the Chinese government. Publish lists of all projects and exchanges with Chinese government counterparts.
    Ensure academic freedom in exchange programs and on satellite campuses. Exchange programs and satellite campuses in China should only be undertaken after the completion of a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese counterpart that has been transparently discussed by relevant faculty members and ensures the protection of academic freedom, including control over hiring and firing, and the curriculum.
    Monitor impact of Chinese government interference in academic freedom. Work with academic institutions, professional associations, and funders to systematically study and regularly publicly report on: a) areas of research that have received less attention because of fears about access; b) decline of on-campus discussions of topics deemed sensitive by the Chinese government, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre; c) efforts by academic institutions to curtail Chinese government threats to academic freedom; and 4) strategies collectively pursued by institutions to defend and promote academic freedom.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-government-threats-academic-freedom-abroad
    #Chine #liberté_académique #surveillance #espions #étranger #censure #auto-censure

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur la censure et le monde académique :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/784716

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 5 août 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/08/05/khryspresso-du-lundi-5-aout-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World À Hongkong, « jour après jour, nous perdons nos libertés » (liberation.fr) « Nous sommes face à une absence … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue
    https://mamot.fr/system/media_attachments/files/005/529/906/original/9ef45e6de2714200.mp4?1564703189

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 5 août 2019
    https://framablog.org/?p=17749

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World À Hongkong, « jour après jour, nous perdons nos libertés » (liberation.fr) « Nous sommes face à une absence … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 15 juillet 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/07/15/khryspresso-du-lundi-15-juillet-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World La Corée du Nord lance un logiciel à la gloire du parti unique (usbeketrica.com) Après la … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 22 juillet 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/07/22/khryspresso-du-lundi-22-juillet-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World Les policiers expatriés de Hong Kong ciblés par la colère des manifestants (lepoint.fr) Aujourd’hui, manifestants comme … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Khrys’presso du lundi 29 juillet 2019
    https://framablog.org/2019/07/29/khryspresso-du-lundi-29-juillet-2019

    Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Brave New World Le mariage homosexuel reconnu au Japon grâce à la préfecture d’Ibaraki (japanization.org) Les fermes à clics, … Lire la suite­­

    #Claviers_invités #Internet_et_société #Libr'en_Vrac #Libre_Veille #DRM #espionnage #Facebook #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

  • Un micro caché dans Monsieur Cuisine Connect, le robot cuiseur connecté vendu par Lidl
    https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2019/06/13/un-micro-cache-dans-le-monsieur-cuisine-connect-de-lidl_5475859_4408996.html

    Le Monsieur Cuisine Connect, que les consommateurs s’arrachent, est équipé d’un micro. Sans que les acheteurs en soient informés.

    A aucun moment l’acheteur n’est prévenu. Et pourtant, l’appareil Monsieur Cuisine Connect, commercialisé en France par l’enseigne LidL depuis le 3 juin, est équipé d’un micro. Cet appareil de cuisine connecté, robot de cuisine à bas coût fabriqué en Chine, a connu un énorme succès à son lancement, avec des scènes de cohue à l’ouverture des magasins. Le site spécialisé Numerama a révélé jeudi 13 juin, en s’appuyant sur le décorticage de deux Français, Alexis Viguié et Adrien Albisetti, l’existence d’un micro dans ce robot cuiseur.

    Une information qu’a confirmée Michel Biero, directeur des achats de Lidl France, à BFM-TV. « Lorsque les développeurs ont lancé Monsieur Cuisine, il était prévu que l’appareil soit pilotable par la voix et éventuellement par Alexa », le système d’intelligence artificielle d’Amazon. A ce stade, cette fonctionnalité n’est pas proposée par le robot. Le micro est « totalement inactif » et il est impossible pour Lidl de l’activer à distance, a expliqué M. Biero.

    Ce dernier n’a cependant pas exclu l’apparition de cette fonctionnalité, en précisant que si la marque décidait d’implémenter la commande vocale, les utilisateurs devraient donner leur accord préalable. D’autant que l’appareil semble avoir été conçu avec cette fonctionnalité en tête : le micro est parfaitement fonctionnel et placé contre un petit trou percé à la surface de la coque en plastique de l’appareil.
    Un appareil mal protégé contre le piratage

    Par ailleurs, comme le dévoile Numerama, le fonctionnement de l’appareil repose sur une tablette équipée d’une ancienne version du système d’exploitation Android, dont la dernière mise à jour de sécurité date d’octobre 2017, ce que confirme Lidl. Or, tout appareil connecté doit être mis à jour régulièrement : chacun de ces « patchs » de sécurité le protège contre de potentiels piratages.

    Le micro a donc beau être désactivé, la sécurité de la tablette n’est, quant à elle, pas assurée. Des pirates pourraient par exemple exploiter ses failles pour activer le micro, et écouter les conversations des propriétaires de l’appareil.

    « Les risques de piratage existent mais comme sur n’importe quel appareil tablette ou téléphone », minimise Michel Biero. En réalité, une tablette équipée de la dernière mise à jour d’Android est bien plus protégée que celle présente dans les Monsieur Cuisine Connect. Même si tous les spécialistes de la sécurité informatique s’accordent à le dire : aucun système n’est inviolable.

    Au début de 2019, Google avait été critiqué pour un problème similaire : son système d’alarme Nest Secure, commercialisé depuis 2017, était en fait équipé d’un micro, sans que les utilisateurs en soient informés. Ils l’avaient découvert en février, quand Google avait annoncé une mise à jour permettant de commander le système par la voix.

  • Target – Zielscheibe
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uARTIKU-VM

    Il y des scènes interessantes qui montrent #Paris, #Hambourg et #Berlin en 1984/1985, on nous popose une bonne copie d’un point de passage entre Berlin-Ouest et Berlin-Est qui possède une qualité quasi documentaire.

    Autrement le montage consiste dans un mélange incroyable de lieux qui n’ont aucun rapport en réalité, un pont qui mène à la « Speicherstadt » à Hambourg figure comme pont berlinois et pour les scènes de la fin on « quitte Berlin » alors que c’était strictement impossible à l’époque. Les villages de la « banlieue berlinoise » consistent en maisons fabriqués avec des pierres qu’on ne trouve pas dans la région où tout est construit en briques, en bois et en boue seche

    J’aime bien la trame style b-picture , le jeu des acteurs est O.K.

    A l’époque le monde hetero ne se rendait pas encore compte de l’existence du #SIDA alors le jeune Matt Dillon avait droit à quelques scènes de baise d’une qualité acceptable. C’est un film américain alors on ne va pas très loin dans ce qu’on nous montre et Gene Hackman reste fidèle à sa femme alors que sa copine espionne est très amoureuse de lui. Il y a un vieux #stasi dans une chaise roulante, de la trahison etc.

    Target (1985 film) - Wikipedia
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Target_(1985_film)

    Target is a 1985 American mystery thriller film directed by Arthur Penn and starring Matt Dillon and Gene Hackman.
    ...
    Cast

    Gene Hackman - Walter Lloyd/Duncan (Duke) Potter
    Matt Dillon - Chris Lloyd/Derek Potter
    Gayle Hunnicutt - Donna Lloyd
    Josef Sommer - Barney Taber
    Guy Boyd - Clay
    Viktoriya Fyodorova - Lise
    Herbert Berghof - Schroeder
    Ilona Grübel - Carla
    James Selby - Ross
    Ray Fry - Mason
    Tomas Hnevsa - Henke
    Jean-Pol Dubois - Glasses/Assassin
    Robert Ground - Marine Sergeant
    Véronique Guillaud - Secretary American Consulate
    Charlotte Bailey - Receptionist
    Randy Moore - Tour Director
    Jacques Mignot - Madison Hotel Clerk
    Robert Liensol - Cafe Vendor

    #film #cinéma #guerre_froide #espionnage #USA #anticommunisme #DDR

    • @aude_v #SPOILER

      Je ne sais pas si le film est qualifié pour entrer dans la liste des flicks « culte », mais il a quelques éléments remarquables comme le vieux stasi qui se révèle finalement comme la seule personne à qui Gene Hackman peut faire confiance et qui ne le trahit pas. Il y a une histoire sous-jacente entre pères ennemis à cause de la guerre dans laquelle ils sont engagés. C’est ce destin d’homme qui les unit et permet un dénouement heureux de l’intrigue. L’essentiel se joue entre hommes adultes.

      Les personnages du fils Matt Dillon (Chris/Derek) et de l’épouse Gayle Hunnicutt sont neutres en ce qui concerne le traitement du sujet de la confiance. Gene Hackman a abandonné une vie d’aventures pour eux. La famille est sacrée donc il n’y a pas de trahison.

      Le fils est un boulet en pleine révolte pubertaire, et Gene ne peut pas vraiment compter sur lui. En ce qui concerne les femmes c’est tout aussi incertain : Son fils tombe amoureux d’une femme fatale allemande bien blonde Ilona Grübel (Carla) qui essaie de le tuer, la femme de Gene reste kidnappée jusqu’au dénouement, alors on ne sait rien sur elle, et sa copine Victoria Fyodorova (Lise) reste énigmatique.

      On ne sait jamais si on peut faire confiance aux femmes ...

      C’est pourquoi le dénouement se passe sous forme d’une belle déclinaison du sujet demoiselle en détresse avec son repartition de rôles hyper-classiques.

      Un moment drôle arrive quand papa Gene révèle à fiston Matt que toute la famille a changé de nom pour échapper aux persécution des espions est-allemands. Le petit est choqué et fait une scène digne de La Cage aux folles de Molinaro.

      Vu sous cet angle le film a certaines qualités de deuxième degré à cause du contraste entre d’un côté le personnage principal ultra-masculin joué par Gene Hackman et les femmes blondes très dures, et de l’autres côté les hommes CIA lâches aux allures homos efféminés, enfin rien n’est comme il semble .Voilà ce qui se doit dans un thriller avec des espions et des nenettes sexy .

      Bon, l’histoire est assez tirés par les cheveux, mais enfin ...

      https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilona_Gr%C3%BCbel
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gayle_Hunnicutt
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_Fyodorova

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damsel_in_distress

  • Ruffin a bien été espionné par LVMH pendant le tournage de « Merci Patron ! »
    https://www.nouvelobs.com/justice/20190521.OBS13231/ruffin-a-bien-ete-espionne-par-lvmh-pendant-le-tournage-de-merci-patron.h

    Un espionnage méthodique. Pendant environ un an entre 2015 et 2016, François Ruffin – élu député LFI en 2017 – a fait l’objet de surveillances commandées par le groupe LVMH, écrit Mediapart ce mardi 21 mai. A cette époque, le patron du journal satirique « Fakir » était alors en plein tournage de « Merci Patron ! », récompensé ensuite du César du meilleur documentaire, un film qui donne à voir comment un couple d’ouvriers au chômage obtient de l’argent du groupe de luxe au terme d’épisodes rocambolesques.

    (Étonnant, non ?)

    #vie_privée #protection_des_sources #espionnage #barbouzeries #LVMH

  • Comment François Ruffin et le journal « Fakir » ont été espionnés par LVMH
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/210519/comment-francois-ruffin-et-le-journal-fakir-ont-ete-espionnes-par-lvmh

    Le futur député François Ruffin et son journal "Fakir "ont fait l’objet, entre 2015 et 2016, d’un espionnage méthodique à la demande de la multinationale LVMH, selon les rapports d’un cabinet privé obtenus par Mediapart. Certains évoquent des informations relevant de la vie privée. « Je n’ai aucune information à ce sujet », a déclaré Bernard Arnault, le patron de LVMH, à la police.

    #Enquête #espionnage,I2F,_Hervé_Seveno,_Merci_Patron !,_Bernard_Squarcini,_François_Ruffin,_Klur,_LVMH,_Bernard_Arnault

  • Last Suspect Freed in Kim Jong-un’s Brother’s Murder Case | News | teleSUR English
    https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Last-Suspect-Freed-in-Kim-Jong-uns-Brothers-Murder-Case-20190504-000

    There are no other suspects held in custody now that Huong has been released, and it is expected that the case will not reach a conviction.

    Doan Thi Huong, the Vietnamese woman accused of assassinating North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un’s brother, Kim Jong Nam, has been released from a Malaysian prison after being held for over two years.

    Huong was accused of murdering Kim Jong Nam using the highly toxic VH nerve agent. After being released, Huong was taken into immigration custody until her scheduled flight to Hanoi. The formerly jailed woman stated that she wishes to pursue a career in acting and singing once she returns home.

    There are no other suspects held in custody now that Huong has been released, and it is expected that the case will not reach a conviction, considering Malaysia and Vietnam are attempting to normalize tense bilateral ties.

    Critics believe that the release of Huong will prevent Malaysia from raising further questions.

    On April 1, Vietnam successfully convinced Malaysian prosecutors to drop the murder charge against Huong. Vietnam increase lobbying efforts after the Indonesian government successfully negotiated with Vietnam to release the other suspect, Siti Aisyah, involved in the case.

    Aisyah was released and returned to Indonesia on March 11.

    Both governments used either good or improving intergovernmental relations to convince Malaysia to release the accused women, who maintain that they were tricked by North Korean agents into thinking their act was a harmless prank for a hidden camera TV show.

    The remaining suspects, four Korean nationals who boarded flights out of Kuala Lumpur International Airport, were also allowed to leave Malaysia in order to maintain relations with North Korea.

    “The best the two suspects could have pleaded guilty for is involuntary manslaughter. Instead, they both walk off free,” Sung-Yoon Lee, the assistant professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, stated and added that someone should have been held culpable for the death of Kim Jong Nam.

    #Corée #Vietnam #Malaisie #assassinat #espionnage

  • MfS Schulungsfilm für Führungsoffiziere Wer ist Wer 1987
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NkGfFesZ04U


    C’est une histoire tragique qui montre bien pourquoi il ne faut jamais permettre aux membres des services secrètes de trop s’approcher. Les techniques enseignées dans cette vidéo aux agents de l’Est ressemblent beaucoup aux pratiques de leurs collègues de l’Ouest.

    Avec sous-titres allemands et des traductions automatiques

    #espionnage #services_secrètes #trahison #DDR #histoire #Stasi

  • Indonesia: Polish Tourist Sentenced to 5 Years for Treason | News | teleSUR English
    https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Indonesia-Polish-Tourist-Sentenced-to-5-Years-for-Treason-20190503-0

    Published 3 May 2019 Authorities accused Skrzypski of collaborating with members of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), a separatist organization which advocates for a non-violent approach to gain independence.

    Polish tourist Jakub Skrzypski maintains his innocence as the first foreigner in Indonesia to be found guilty of treason and receive a sentence of five years in prison.

    Skrzypski was arrested in Papua, which is located on the far east of Indonesia, in August of last year. The 39-year-old plans to appeal the sentence, saying he was a victim of a politically motivated “show trial. I didn’t have the opportunity to speak in my defense or to present any favorable evidence. I reject the trial as well as the verdict,” he told reporters.

    Authorities accused Skrzypski of collaborating with members of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), a separatist organization which advocates for a non-violent approach to gain independence. According to his lawyer, Latifah Anum Siregar, “he was a tourist and he was just visiting friends that he met over the internet and other people who he had been recommended to meet who turned out to be activists.”

    Along with Skrzypski, student Simon Magal, the nephew of a prominent West Papua activist Yosepha Alomang was also held. Magal had been jailed previously for a campaign against the Freeport McMoran goldmine in the province.

    While the organization is not outlawed in the country, public demonstrations in support of the movement are. It is also illegal to fly the Papua independence flag.

    Siregar pointed out at the trial that the grounds for accusing her client of treason are unfounded because the KNPB was not registered or classified as banned. The KNBP is one of four separatist campaigns in the region.

    Indonesian authorities also claim that Skrzypski attempted to arrange an arms deal for the group, but this accusation was not mentioned at the trial. According to Papua police spokesperson Suryadi Diaz, “he (Skrzypski) has been involved in buying ammunition for them.”

    Skrzypski denies all accusations, saying that he does not “even know [the conflict in Papua] very well” and reiterated that the “trip wasn’t a clandestine one. I was visiting friends.”

    The Indonesian military and police are documented as being suspicious of foreigners who communicate with Papuans. “The Skrzypski-Magal case is another example that the Indonesian government keeps blocking media access and deters independent reporting about Papua,” Indonesia’s representative for Human Rights Watch, Andreas Harsono, stated.

    Despite the country promising to allow access to the media, the territory has remained restricted to international journalists.

    #Indonésie #Pologne #tourisme #espionnage #trahison

  • Spionage: Türkei will gezielt Spitzel im Verfassungsschutz platzieren - WELT
    https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article166732068/Tuerkei-will-gezielt-Spitzel-im-Verfassungsschutz-platzieren.html

    Die Türkei hat laut Sicherheitskreisen versucht, Informanten in das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz einzuschleusen.

    Bei Überprüfungen waren zuletzt mehrere Bewerber aufgefallen, die im engen Kontakt zum türkischen Geheimdienst standen.
    Die Kölner Behörde wollte sich nicht zu Details äußern. Eine Anfrage an die Botschaft der Türkei blieb unbeantwortet.

    Das Verhältnis zwischen deutschen und türkischen Geheimdiensten ist traditionell schwierig. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert operieren die von der Staatsmacht in Ankara hierher entsandten Agenten so, als ob es sich bei der Bundesrepublik um ihr Land handeln würde. Nach dem Putschversuch vor einem Jahr sind jetzt die ohnehin angespannten Beziehungen auf einem neuen Tiefpunkt angelangt.

    Nach Informationen der WELT versucht der türkische Geheimdienst MIT offenbar, gezielt Spitzel im Verfassungsschutz zu platzieren, um den Inlandsnachrichtendienst zu unterwandern. Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) teilte der WELT dazu mit: „Das BfV ist wie jeder andere Nachrichtendienst Ziel von strategischen Einschleusungsversuchen ausländischer Geheimdienste. Deshalb müssen wir als Sicherheitsbehörde besonders wachsam in Bezug auf Bewerber sein.“ Zu Details des heiklen Sachverhalts äußert sich die Kölner Behörde nicht.
    „Ganz neue Qualität“ der Infiltrationsversuche

    Sicherheitskreisen zufolge sollen die mutmaßlichen Spitzel des MIT bei den routinemäßigen Überprüfungen der Bewerber aufgefallen sein. Das BfV stockt derzeit sein Personal massiv auf, der Bundestag hat Hunderte von zusätzlichen Stellen bewilligt. Entsprechend viele Bewerbungen gehen derzeit beim Verfassungsschutz ein. „Die mehreren verdächtigen Kandidaten hatten sich sowohl auf Stellen für türkischsprachige Mitarbeiter als auch auf Jobs in anderen Bereichen des Verfassungsschutzes beworben“, sagte ein Nachrichtendienstler. Sie sollen in Kontakt mit dem türkischen Geheimdienst gestanden haben.

    Stephan Mayer (CSU), innenpolitischer Sprecher der Unionsfraktion, erklärte: „Generell ist es nicht hinnehmbar, wenn fremde Geheimdienste unsere Nachrichtendienste zu unterwandern versuchen. Dies gilt vor allem für das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, dessen Aufgabe gerade die Spionageabwehr ist. Dabei kommt es auch nicht darauf an, welches Land diesen Versuch unternimmt. Sollte ein Nato-Partner dies tun, wäre es natürlich besonders verwerflich.“ Er gehe davon aus, dass das Thema auch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium beschäftigen wird.

    Der Geheimdienstexperte Erich Schmidt-Eenboom bewertete die Versuche, den Verfassungsschutz zu infiltrieren, „als eine ganz neue Qualität“. In der Vergangenheit hätte sich der MIT darauf beschränkt, von den bundesdeutschen Diensten genutzte Dolmetscher als Zuträger zu rekrutieren. Doch ihm sei kein Fall bekannt, dass der türkische Geheimdienst versucht habe, seine Spitzel direkt im Verfassungsschutz unterzubringen.

    Eenboom fordert, nun zu prüfen, ob gegen enttarnte Bewerber wegen des Verdachts der „Geheimdienstlichen Agententätigkeit“ nach Paragraf 99 des Strafgesetzbuches ermittelt werden müsse. „Auch der Versuch ist strafbar“, sagt er. Wenn man da zu lasch reagiere, sei die „Abschreckungswirkung für den MIT gleich Null“. Ohnehin stellt sich die Frage, ob es der Türkei nicht längst gelungen ist, Spione einzuschleusen.

    Bereits lange vor der Ägide von Staatspräsident Recep Tayyip Erdogan brüskierte der MIT mit dreisten Aktionen die Deutschen. In dem Standardwerk „Lexikon der Geheimdienste im 20. Jahrhundert“, das 2003 erschien, wird dazu ausgeführt: „Mehr als ärgerlich ist es für Deutschland, dass seit dem Beginn der Zuwanderung türkischer Arbeitnehmer auch der türkische Geheimdienst MIT ziemlich ungeniert, gestützt auf diplomatische Einrichtungen der Türkei, in Deutschland sein Unwesen treibt.“

    Erst mit dem Putschversuch gegen Erdogan jagen die Spione aber vor allem seine Kritiker. „Früher ging es hauptsächlich um türkische Terrororganisationen, unter anderem die linksextremistische DHKP-C, die auch bei uns verboten ist. Seinerzeit kooperierten wir sogar mit dem MIT, indem wir Informanten aus diesem Bereich gemeinsam nutzten“, sagte August Hanning, ehemaliger Staatssektretär im Innenministerium und früherer BND-Präsident der WELT.

    Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz hat auf die zunehmenden Spionageaktivitäten der Türkei in Deutschland reagiert. Im Bereich der Spionageabwehr gibt es eine spezielle Einheit, die sich mit den MIT-Operationen hierzulande befasst. Unter Nato-Partnern ist so etwas höchst ungewöhnlich.

    #Allemagne #Turquie #espionnage

  • « L’#espion_du_président », protecteur de #Benalla et toujours à l’Elysée
    https://www.marianne.net/politique/l-espion-du-president-protecteur-de-benalla-et-toujours-l-elysee

    Il a échappé à la vigilance des sénateurs, personne n’a même prononcé son nom lors des auditions au Palais du Luxembourg. Mais dans son livre consacré aux réseaux d’Emmanuel Macron, notre ancien collaborateur Marc Endeweld, aujourd’hui journaliste freelance, accorde une place importante à celui qu’il appelle même « l’espion du président ». #Ludovic_Chaker, 38 ans est un autre « #chargé_de_mission à l’#Elysée ». Pendant la campagne, il a été le premier salarié d’En Marche, introduit par le conseiller Ismaël Emelien qu’il a rencontré lors d’un déplacement au Caire. Et c’est lui qui propose à toute la bande d’utiliser l’application cryptée Telegram alors peu connue et qui est toujours le moyen de communication préféré de la macronie. C’est également lui qui conseille l’embauche comme garde du corps d’un certain

  • China Spying: The Internet’s Underwater Cables Are Next - Bloomberg
    https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-09/china-spying-the-internet-s-underwater-cables-are-next


    Underwater eyes on China.
    Photographer: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Adam K. Thomas/U.S. Navy via Getty Images

    As the West considers the threat posed by China’s naval ambitions, there is a natural tendency to place overarching attention on the South China Sea. This is understandable: Consolidating it would provide Beijing with a huge windfall of oil and natural gas, and a potential chokehold over up to 40 percent of the world’s shipping.

    But this is only the most obvious manifestation of Chinese maritime strategy. Another key element, one that’s far harder to discern, is Beijing’s increasing influence in constructing and repairing the undersea cables that move virtually all the information on the internet. To understand the totality of China’s “Great Game” at sea, you have to look down to the ocean floor.
    […]
    But now the Chinese conglomerate #Huawei Technologies, the leading firm working to deliver 5G telephony networks globally, has gone to sea. Under its Huawei Marine Networks component, it is constructing or improving nearly 100 submarine cables around the world. Last year it completed a cable stretching nearly 4,000 miles from Brazil to Cameroon. (The cable is partly owned by China Unicom, a state-controlled telecom operator.) Rivals claim that Chinese firms are able to lowball the bidding because they receive subsidies from Beijing.
    […]
    A similar dynamic [as in 5G equipment] is playing out underwater. How can the U.S. address the security of undersea cables? There is no way to stop Huawei from building them, or to keep private owners from contracting with Chinese firms on modernizing them, based purely on suspicions. Rather, the U.S. must use its cyber- and intelligence-gathering capability to gather hard evidence of back doors and other security risks. This will be challenging — the Chinese firms are technologically sophisticated and entwined with a virtual police state.

    And back doors aren’t the only problem: Press reports indicate that U.S. and Chinese (and Russian) submarines may have the ability to “tap” the cables externally. (The U.S. government keeps such information tightly under wraps.) And the thousand or so ground-based landing stations will be spying targets as well.

    #cables_sous-marins #internet #espionnage