• The Frontier Within: The European Border Regime in the Balkans

    In the summer of 2015, the migratory route across the Balkans »entered into the European spotlight, and indeed onto the screen of the global public« (Kasparek 2016: 2), triggering different interpretations and responses. Contrary to the widespread framing of the mass movement of people seeking refuge in Europe as ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹ of unseen proportions, we opt for the perspective of »the long Summer of Migration« (Kasparek/Speer 2015) and an interpretation that regards it as »a historic and monumental year of migration for Europe precisely because disobedient mass mobilities have disrupted the European regime of border control« (Stierl/Heller/de Genova 2016: 23). In reaction to the disobedient mass mobilities of people, a state-tolerated and even state-organized transit of people, a »formalized corridor« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016), was gradually established. To avoid the concentration of unwanted migrants on their territory, countries along the route—sometimes in consultation with their neighboring countries and EU member states, sometimes simply by creating facts—strived to regain control over the movements by channeling and isolating them by means of the corridor (see e.g. Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Speer 2017; Tošić 2017). »Migrants didn’t travel the route any more: they were hurriedly channeled along, no longer having the power to either determine their own movement or their own speed« (Kasparek 2016). The corridor, at the same time, facilitated and tamed the movement of people. In comparison to the situation in Serbia, where migrants were loosely directed to follow the path of the corridor (see e.g. Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017; Kasparek 2016: 6), migrants in other states like North Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia were literally in the corridor’s power, i.e. forced to follow the corridor (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Chudoska Blazhevska/Flores Juberías 2016: 231–232; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47; Petrović 2018). The corridor was operative in different and constantly changing modalities until March 2016. Since then, migration through the Balkan region still takes place, with migrants struggling on a daily basis with the diverse means of tightened border controls that all states along the Balkan route have been practicing since.

    This movements issue wants to look back on these events in an attempt to analytically make sense of them and to reflect on the historical rupture of the months of 2015 and 2016. At the same time, it tries to analyze the ongoing developments of bordering policies and the struggles of migration. It assembles a broad range of articles reaching from analytical or research based papers shedding light on various regional settings and topics, such as the massive involvement of humanitarian actors or the role of camp infrastructures, to more activist-led articles reflecting on the different phases and settings of pro-migrant struggles and transnational solidarity practices. In an attempt to better understand the post-2015 border regime, the issue furthermore presents analyses of varying political technologies of bordering that evolved along the route in response to the mass mobilities of 2015/2016. It especially focuses on the excessive use of different dimensions of violence that seem to characterize the new modalities of the border regime, such as the omnipresent practice of push-backs. Moreover, the articles shed light on the ongoing struggles of transit mobility and (transnational) solidarity that are specifically shaped by the more than eventful history of the region molded both by centuries of violent interventions and a history of connectivity.

    Our transnational editorial group came together in the course of a summer school on the border regime in the Balkans held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2018. It was organized by the Network for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies (kritnet), University of Göttingen, Department of Cultural Anthropology/European Ethnology (Germany), the Research Centre of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Slovenia), the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research (Croatia), and the Institute of Ethnography SASA (Serbia). The summer school assembled engaged academics from all over the region that were involved, in one form or another, in migration struggles along the route in recent years.1 The few days of exchange proved to be an exciting and fruitful gathering of critical migration and border regime scholars and activists from different regional and disciplinary backgrounds of the wider Balkans. Therefore, we decided to produce this movements issue by inviting scholars and activists from the region or with a deep knowledge on, and experience with, regional histories and politics in order to share their analyses of the Balkan route, the formalized corridor, and the developments thereafter. These developments have left a deep imprint on the societies and regional politics of migration, but they are very rarely taken into consideration and studied in the West as the centuries long entanglements that connect the Balkan with the rest of Europe.

    In this editorial, we will outline the transnational mobility practices in the Balkans in a historical perspective that includes the framework of EU-Balkan relations. With this exercise we try to historize the events of 2015 which are portrayed in many academic as well as public accounts as ›unexpected‹ and ›new‹. We also intend to write against the emergency and escalation narrative underlying most public discourses on the Balkans and migration routes today, which is often embedded in old cultural stereotypes about the region. We, furthermore, write against the emergency narrative because it erodes the agency of migration that has not only connected the region with the rest of the globe but is also constantly reinventing new paths for reaching better lives. Not only the history of mobilities, migrations, and flight connecting the region with the rest of Europe and the Middle East can be traced back into the past, but also the history of political interventions and attempts to control these migrations and mobilities by western European states. Especially the EU accession processes produce contexts that made it possible to gradually integrate the (Western) Balkan states into the rationale of EU migration management, thus, setting the ground for today’s border and migration regime. However, as we will show in the following sections, we also argue against simplified understandings of the EU border regime that regard its externalization policy as an imperial top-down act. Rather, with a postcolonial perspective that calls for decentering western knowledge, we will also shed light on the agency of the national governments of the region and their own national(ist) agendas.
    The Formalized Corridor

    As outlined above, the formalized corridor of 2015 reached from Greece to Northern and Central Europe, leading across the states established in the 1990s during the violent breakdown of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, today, are additionally stratified vis-à-vis the EU. Slovenia and Croatia are EU member states, while the others are still in the accession process. The candidate states Serbia, North Macedonia and Montenegro have opened the negotiation process. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—still not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia and some EU member states—have the status of potential candidates. However, in 2015 and 2016, the states along the corridor efficiently collaborated for months on a daily basis, while, at the same time, fostering separate, sometimes conflicting, migration politics. Slovenia, for example, raised a razor-wire fence along the border to Croatia, while Croatia externalized its border to Serbia with a bilateral agreement (Protokol) in 2015 which stated that the »Croatian Party« may send a »train composition with its crew to the railway station in Šid [in Serbia], with a sufficient number of police officers of the Republic of Croatia as escort« (Article 3 Paragraph 2).

    Despite ruptures and disputes, states nevertheless organized transit in the form of corridor consisting of trains, buses, and masses of walking people that were guarded and directed by the police who forced people on the move to follow the corridor’s direction and speed. The way the movements were speedily channeled in some countries came at the cost of depriving people of their liberty and freedom of movement, which calls for an understanding of the corridor as a specific form of detention: a mobile detention, ineligible to national or EU legislation (see Hameršak/Pleše 2018; Kogovšek Šalamon 2016: 44–47). In the context of the corridor, camps became convergence points for the heterogeneous pathways of movements. Nevertheless, having in mind both the proclaimed humanitarian purpose of the corridor, and the monumental numbers of people to whom the corridor enabled and facilitated movement, the corridor can be designated as an unprecedented formation in recent EU history. In other words: »The corridor – with all its restrictions – remains a historical event initiated by the movement of people, which enabled thousands to reach central Europe in a relatively quick and safe manner. […] But at the same time it remained inscribed within a violent migration management system« (Santer/Wriedt 2017: 148).

    For some time, a broad consensus can be observed within migration and border studies and among policy makers that understands migration control as much more than simply protecting a concrete borderline. Instead, concepts such as migration management (Oelgemoller 2017; Geiger/Pécoud 2010) and border externalization (as specifically spelled out in the EU document Global Approach to Migration of 2005) have become increasingly important. In a spatial sense, what many of them have in common is, first, that they assume an involvement of neighboring states to govern migration in line with EU migration policies. Second, it is often stated that this leads to the creation of different zones encircling the European Union (Andreas/Snyder 2000). Maribel Casas-Cortes and Sebastian Cobarrubias, for instance, speak of four such zones: the first zone is »formed by EU member states, capable of fulfilling Schengen standards«, the second zone »consists of transit countries« (Casas-Cortes/Cobarrubias 2019), the third zone is characterized by countries such as Turkey, which are depicted by emigration as well as transit, and the fourth zone are countries of origin. While Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias rightly criticize the static and eurocentric perspective of such conceptualizations, they nevertheless point to the unique nature of the formalized corridor because it crisscrossed the above mentioned zones of mobility control in an unprecedented way.

    Furthermore, the corridor through the Balkans can be conceived as a special type of transnational, internalized border. The internalized European borders manifest themselves to a great extent in a punctiform (see Rahola 2011: 96–97). They are not only activated in formal settings of border-crossings, police stations, or detention centers both at state borders and deep within state territories, but also in informal settings of hospitals, hostels, in the streets, or when someone’s legal status is taken as a basis for denying access to rights and services (i.e. to obtain medical aid, accommodation, ride) (Guild 2001; Stojić Mitrović/Meh 2015). With the Balkan corridor, this punctiform of movement control was, for a short period, fused into a linear one (Hameršak/Pleše 2018).

    The rules of the corridor and its pathways were established by formal and informal agreements between the police and other state authorities, and the corridor itself was facilitated by governmental, humanitarian, and other institutions and agencies. Cooperation between the countries along the route was fostered by representatives of EU institutions and EU member states. It would be too simple, though, to describe their involvement of the countries along the route as merely reactive, as an almost mechanical response to EU and broader global policies. Some countries, in particular Serbia, regarded the increasing numbers of migrants entering their territory during the year 2015 as a window of opportunity for showing their ›good face‹ to the European Union by adopting ›European values‹ and, by doing so, for enhancing their accession process to the European Union (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016; Greenberg/Spasić 2017). As Tošić points out, »this image was very convenient for Serbian politicians in framing their country as ›truly European‹, since it was keeping its borders open unlike some EU states (such as Hungary)« (2017: 160). Other states along the corridor also played by their own rules from time to time: Croatia, for example, contrary to the Eurodac Regulation (Regulation EU No 603/2013), avoided sharing registration data on people in transit and, thus, hampered the Dublin system that is dependent on Eurodac registration. Irregular bureaucracies and nonrecording, as Katerina Rozakou (2017) calls such practices in her analysis of bordering practices in the Greek context, became a place of dispute, negotiations, and frustrations, but also a clear sign of the complex relationships and different responses to migration within the European Union migration management politics itself.

    Within EU-member states, however, the longer the corridor lasted, and the more people passed through it, the stronger the ›Hungarian position‹ became. Finally, Austria became the driving force behind a process of gradually closing the corridor, which began in November 2015 and was fully implemented in March 2016. In parallel, Angela Merkel and the European Commission preferred another strategy that cut access to the formalized corridor and that was achieved by adopting a treaty with Turkey known as the »EU-Turkey deal« signed on 18 March 2016 (see Speer 2017: 49–68; Weber 2017: 30–40).

    The humanitarian aspect for the people on the move who were supposed to reach a safe place through the corridor was the guiding principle of public discourses in most of the countries along the corridor. In Serbia, »Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić officially welcomed refugees, spoke of tolerance, and compared the experience of refugees fleeing war-torn countries to those of refugees during the wars of Yugoslav Succession« (Greenberg/Spasić 2017: 315). Similar narratives could also be observed in other countries along the corridor, at least for some period of time (see, for Slovenia, Sardelić 2017: 11; for Croatia, Jakešević 2017: 184; Bužinkić 2018: 153–154). Of course, critical readings could easily detect the discriminatory, dehumanizing, securitarizing, and criminalizing acts, practices, tropes, and aspects in many of these superficially caring narratives. The profiling or selection of people, ad hoc detentions, and militarization—which were integral parts of the corridor—were, at the time, only denounced by a few NGOs and independent activists. They were mostly ignored, or only temporarily acknowledged, by the media and, consequently, by the general public.

    Before May 2015, ›irregular‹ migration was not framed by a discourse of ›crisis‹ in the countries along the route, rather, the discourse was led by a focus on ›separate incidents‹ or ›situations‹. The discursive framing of ›crisis‹ and ›emergency‹, accompanied by reports of UN agencies about ›unprecedented refugee flows in history‹, has been globally adopted both by policy makers and the wider public. »In the wake of the Summer of Migration, all involved states along the Balkan route were quick to stage the events as an ›emergency‹ (Calhoun 2004) and, in best humanitarian fashion, as a major humanitarian ›crisis‹, thus legitimizing a ›politics of exception‹« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). Following the logic that extraordinary situations call for, and justify, the use of extraordinary measures, the emergency framework, through the construction of existential threats, resulted, on the one hand, in a loosely controlled allocation of resources, and, on the other hand, in silencing many critical interpretations, thus allowing various ›risk management activities‹ to happen on the edge of the law (Campesi 2014). For the states along the route, the crisis label especially meant a rapid infusion of money and other resources for establishing infrastructures for the urgent reception of people on the move, mainly deriving from EU funds. Politically and practically, these humanitarian-control activities also fastened the operational inclusion of non-EU countries into the European border regime.

    As Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek have pointed out, the politics of proclaiming a ›crisis‹ is at the heart of re-stabilizing the European border regime, »making it possible to systematically undermine and lever the standards of international and European law without serious challenges to date« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66). The authors:

    »have observed carefully designed policy elements, which can be labelled as anti-litigation devices. The design of the Hungarian transit zones is a striking case in point. They are an elementary part of the border fence towards Serbia and allow for the fiction that the border has not been closed for those seeking international protection, but rather that their admission numbers are merely limited due to administrative reasons: each of the two transit zones allows for 14 asylum seekers to enter Hungary every day« (Hess/Kasparek 2017: 66; on the administrative rationale in Slovenia see e.g. Gombač 2016: 79–81).

    The establishment of transit zones was accompanied by a series of legislative tightenings, passed under a proclaimed ›crisis situation caused by mass immigration‹, which, from a legal point of view, lasts until today. Two aspects are worth mentioning in particular: First, the mandatory deportation of all unwanted migrants that were detected on Hungarian territory to the other side of the fence, without any possibility to claim for asylum or even to lodge any appeal against the return. Second, the automatic rejection of all asylum applications as inadmissible, even of those who managed to enter the transit zones, because Serbia had been declared a safe third country (Nagy/Pál 2018). This led to a completely securitized border regime in Hungary, which might become a ›role model‹, not only for the countries in the region but also for the European border regime as a whole (ECtHR – Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary Application No. 47287/15).
    The Long Genealogy of the Balkan Route and its Governance

    The history of the Balkan region is a multiply layered history of transborder mobilities, migration, and flight reaching back as far as the times of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires connecting the region with the East and Western Europe in many ways. Central transportation and communication infrastructures partially also used by today’s migratory projects had already been established at the heydays of Western imperialism, as the Orient Express, the luxury train service connecting Paris with Istanbul (1883), or the Berlin-Baghdad railway (built between 1903 and 1940) indicate. During World War II, a different and reversed refugee route existed, which brought European refugees not just to Turkey but even further to refugee camps in Syria, Egypt, and Palestine and was operated by the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA).

    The Yugoslav highway, the Highway of Brotherhood and Unity (Autoput bratstva i jedinstva) often simply referred to as the ›autoput‹ and built in phases after the 1950s, came to stretch over more than 1,000 km from the Austrian to the Greek borders and was one of the central infrastructures enabling transnational mobilities, life projects, and exile. In the 1960s, direct trains departing from Istanbul and Athens carried thousands of prospective labor migrants to foreign places in Germany and Austria in the context of the fordist labor migration regime of the two countries. At the end of that decade, Germany signed a labor recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia, fostering and formalizing decades long labor migrations from Croatia, Serbia, and other countries to Germany (Gatrell 2019, see e.g. Lukić Krstanović 2019: 54–55).

    The wars in the 1990s that accompanied the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the consequent establishment of several new nation states, created the first large refugee movement after the Second World War within Europe and was followed by increasing numbers of people fleeing Albania after the fall of its self-isolationist regime and the (civil) wars in the Middle East, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan since the mid-1990s. As the migratory route did not go north through the Balkan Peninsula, but mainly proceeded to Italy at the time, the label Balkan route was mostly used as a name for a drugs and arms smuggling route well known in the West. Although there was migration within and to Europe, the Balkan migratory route, with the exception of refugee movements from ex-Yugoslavia, was yet predominantly invisible to the broader European public.

    Sparse ethnographic insights from the beginning of the 2000s point this out. Academic papers on migrant crossings from Turkey to the island of Lesbos mention as follows: »When the transport service began in the late 1980s it was very small and personal; then, in the middle of the 1990s, the Kurds began to show up – and now people arrive from just about everywhere« (Tsianos/Hess/Karakayali 2009: 3; see Tsianos/Karakayali 2010: 379). A document of the Council of the European Union from 1997 formulates this as following:

    »This migration appears to be routed essentially either through Turkey, and hence through Greece and Italy, or via the ›Balkans route‹, with the final countries of destination being in particular Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several suggestions were put forward for dealing with this worrying problem, including the strengthening of checks at external borders, the stepping up of the campaign against illegal immigration networks, and pre-frontier assistance and training assignments in airports and ports in certain transit third countries, in full cooperation with the authorities in those countries« (ibid. quoted in Hess/Kasparek 2020).

    During this time, the EU migration management policies defined two main objectives: to prevent similar arrivals in the future, and to initiate a system of control over migration movements toward the EU that would be established outside the territories of the EU member states. This would later be formalized, first in the 2002 EU Action Plan on Illegal Immigration (see Hayes/Vermeulen 2012: 13–14) and later re-confirmed in the Global Approach to Migration (2005) framework concerning the cooperation of the EU with third states (Hess/Kasparek 2020). In this process, the so-called migratory routes-approach and accompanying strategies of controlling, containing, and taming the movement »through epistemology of the route« (Hess/Kasparek 2020) became a main rationale of the European border control regime. Thus, one can resume that the route was not only produced by movements of people but also by the logic, legislation, investment etc. of EU migration governance. Consequently, the clandestine pathways across the Balkans to Central and Western Europe were frequently addressed by security bodies and services of the EU (see e.g. Frontex 2011; Frontex 2014), resulting in the conceptual and practical production of the Balkan as an external border zone of the EU.

    Parallel to the creation of ›Schengenland‹, the birth of the ›Area of Freedom, Security and Justice‹ inter alia as an inner-EU-free-mobility-zone and EU-based European border and migration regime in the late 1990s, the EU created the Western Balkans as an imaginary political entity, an object of its neighborhood and enlargement policy, which lies just outside the EU with a potential ›European future‹. For the purpose of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) initiated in 1999, the term Western Balkan was launched in the EU political context in order to include, at that moment, ›ex-Yugoslav states minus Slovenia plus Albania‹ and to presumably avoid potential politically sensitive notions. The Western Balkans as a concept represents a combination of a political compromise and colonial imagery (see Petrović 2012: 21–36). Its aim was to stabilize the region through a radical redefinition that would restrain from ethno-national toponyms and to establish a free-trade area and growing partnership with the EU. The SAP set out common political and economic goals for the Western Balkan as a region and conducted political and economic progress evaluations ›on a countries’ own merits‹. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 strengthened the main objectives of the SAP and formally took over elements of the accession process—institutional domains and regulations that were to be harmonized with those existing in the EU. Harmonization is a wide concept, and it basically means adopting institutional measures following specific demands of the EU. It is a highly hierarchized process in which states asked to ›harmonize‹ do not have a say in things but have to conform to the measures set forth by the EU. As such, the adoption of the EU migration and border regime became a central part of the ongoing EU-accession process that emerged as the main platform and governmental technology of the early externalization and integration of transit and source countries into the EU border regime. This was the context of early bilateral and multilateral cooperation on this topic (concerning involved states, see Lipovec Čebron 2003; Stojić Mitrović 2014; Župarić-Iljić 2013; Bojadžijev 2007).

    The decisive inclusion of the Western Balkan states in the EU design of border control happened at the Thessaloniki European Summit in 2003, where concrete provisions concerning border management, security, and combating illegal migration were set according to European standards. These provisions have not been directly displayed, but were concealed as part of the package of institutional transformations that respective states had to conduct. The states were promised to become members of the EU if the conditions were met. In order to fulfill this goal, prospective EU member states had to maintain good mutual relations, build statehoods based on ›the rule of law‹, and, after a positive evaluation by the EU, begin with the implementation of concrete legislative and institutional changes on their territories (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019). The control of unwanted movements toward the EU was a priority of the EU accession process of the Western Balkan states from the very beginning (Kacarska 2012). It started with controlling the movement of their own nationals (to allow the states to be removed from the so-called Black Schengen list) during the visa facilitation process. If they managed to control the movement of their own nationals, especially those who applied for asylum in the EU via biometric passports and readmission obligations (asylum seekers from these states comprise a large portion of asylum seekers in the EU even today), they were promised easier access to the EU as an economic area. Gradually, the focus of movement control shifted to third-country nationals. In effect, the Western Balkan states introduced migration-related legislative and institutional transformations corresponding to the ones already existing in the EU, yet persistent ›non-doing‹ (especially regarding enabling access to rights and services for migrants) remained a main practice of deterrence (Valenta/Zuparic-Iljic/Vidovic 2015; Stojić Mitrović 2019).

    From the very beginning, becoming an active part of the European border regime and implementing EU-centric migration policies, or, to put it simply, conducting control policies over the movements of people, has not been the goal of the states along the Balkan route per se but a means to obtain political and economic benefits from the EU. They are included into the EU border regime as operational partners without formal power to influence migration policies. These states do have a voice, though, not only by creating the image of being able to manage the ›European problem‹, and accordingly receive further access to EU funds, but also by influencing EU migration policy through disobedience and actively avoiding conformity to ›prescribed‹ measures. A striking example of creative state disobedience are the so-called 72-hour-papers, which are legal provisions set by the Serbian 2007 Law on Asylum, later also introduced as law in North Macedonia in June 2015: Their initial function was to give asylum seekers who declared their ›intention to seek asylum‹ to the police the possibility to legally proceed to one of the asylum reception centers located within Serbia, where, in a second step, their asylum requests were to be examined in line with the idea of implementing a functioning asylum system according to EU standards. However, in practice, these papers were used as short-term visas for transiting through North Macedonia and Serbia that were handed out to hundreds of thousands of migrants (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 17–19, 36).

    Furthermore, the introduction of migration control practices is often a means for achieving other political and economic goals. In the accessing states, migration management is seen as services they provide for the EU. In addition, demands created by migration management goals open new possibilities for employment, which are essential to societies with high unemployment rates.

    Besides direct economic benefits, migration has been confirmed to be a politically potent instrument. States and their institutions were more firmly integrated into existing EU structures, especially those related to the prevention of unwanted migration, such as increased police cooperation and Frontex agreements. On a local level, political leaders have increasingly been using migration-related narratives in everyday political life in order to confront the state or other political competitors, often through the use of Ethno-nationalist and related discourses. In recent times, as citizens of the states along the Balkan route themselves migrate in search for jobs and less precarious lives, migration from third states has been discursively linked to the fear of foreigners permanently settling in places at the expense of natives.
    Contemporary Context

    According to a growing body of literature (e.g. Hess/Kasparek 2020; Lunaček Brumen/Meh 2016; Speer 2017), the Balkan route of the year 2015 and the first months of 2016 can be conceptualized in phases, beginning with a clandestine phase, evolving to an open route and formalized corridor and back to an invisible route again. It is necessary to point to the fact that these different phases were not merely the result of state or EU-led top-down approaches, but the consequence of a »dynamic process which resulted from the interplay of state practices, practices of mobility, activities of activists, volunteers, and NGOs, media coverage, etc. The same applies for its closure« (Beznec/Speer/Stojić Mitrović 2016: 6).

    The closure of the corridor and stricter border controls resulted in a large transformation of the Balkan route and mobility practices in the recent years, when push-backs from deep within the EU-territory to neighboring non-EU states, erratic movements across borders and territories of the (Western) Balkan states, or desperate journeys back to Greece and then back to the north became everyday realities. In the same period, the route proliferated into more branches, especially a new one via Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proliferation lead to a heightened circulation of practices, people, and knowledge along these paths: a mushrooming of so-called ›jungle camps‹ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an escalation of border violence in Croatia, chain push-backs from Slovenia, significant EU financial investments into border control in Croatia and camp infrastructures in neighboring countries, the deployment of Frontex in Albania, etc. As the actual itineraries of people on the move multiplied, people started to reach previously indiscernible spots, resulting in blurring of the differences between entering and exiting borders. Circular transit with many loops, involving moving forward and backwards, became the dominant form of migration movements in the region. It transformed the Balkan route into a »Balkan Circuit« (Stojić Mitrović/Vilenica 2019: 540; see also Stojić Mitrović/Ahmetašević/Beznec/Kurnik 2020). The topography changed from a unidirectional line to a network of hubs, accommodation, and socializing spots. In this landscape, some movements still remain invisible—undetected by actors aiming to support, contain, and even prevent migration. »We have no information about persons who have money to pay for the whole package, transfer, accommodation, food, medical assistance when needed, we have no idea how many of them just went further«, a former MSF employee stressed, »we only see those who reach for aid, who are poor or injured and therefore cannot immediately continue their journey.« Some movements are intentionally invisibilized by support groups in order to avoid unwanted attention, and, consequently, repressive measures have also become a common development in border areas where people on the move are waiting for their chance to cross. However, it seems that circular transnational migration of human beings, resulting directly from the securitarian practices of the European border regime, have also become a usual form of mobility in the region.

    The Balkan route as a whole has been increasingly made invisible to spectators from the EU in the last years. There were no mass media coverage, except for reports on deplorable conditions in certain hubs, such as Belgrade barracks (Serbia), Vučjak camp (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or violent push-backs from Croatia that received global and EU-wide attention. However, this spectacularization was rarely directly attributed to the externalization of border control but rather more readily linked to an presumed inability of the Balkan states to manage migration, or to manage it without the blatant use of violence.

    As Marta Stojić Mitrović and Ana Vilenica (2019) point out, practices, discourses, knowledge, concepts, technologies, even particular narratives, organizations, and individual professionals are following the changed topography. This is evident both in the securitarian and in the humanitarian sector: Frontex is signing or initiating cooperation agreements with non-EU member Balkan states, border guards learn from each other how to prevent movements or how to use new equipment, obscure Orbanist legislative changes and institutionalized practices are becoming mainstream, regional coordinators of humanitarian organizations transplant the same ›best practices‹ how to work with migrants, how to organize their accommodation, what aid to bring and when, and how to ›deal‹ with the local communities in different nation-states, while the emergency framework travels from one space to another. Solidarity groups are networking, exchanging knowledge and practices but simultaneously face an increased criminalization of their activities. The public opinion in different nation states is shaped by the same dominant discourses on migration, far-right groups are building international cooperations and exploit the same narratives that frame migrants and migration as dangerous.
    About the Issue

    This issue of movements highlights the current situation of migration struggles along this fragmented, circular, and precarious route and examines the diverse attempts by the EU, transnational institutions, countries in the region, local and interregional structures, and multiple humanitarian actors to regain control over the movements of migration after the official closure of the humanitarian-securitarian corridor in 2016. It reflects on the highly dynamic and conflicting developments since 2015 and their historical entanglements, the ambiguities of humanitarian interventions and strategies of containment, migratory tactics of survival, local struggles, artistic interventions, regional and transnational activism, and recent initiatives to curb the extensive practices of border violence and push-backs. In doing so, the issue brings back the region on the European agenda and sheds light on the multiple historical disruptions, bordering practices, and connectivities that have been forming its presence.

    EU migration policy is reaffirming old and producing new material borders: from border fences to document checks—conducted both by state authorities and increasingly the general population, like taxi drivers or hostel owners—free movement is put in question for all, and unwanted movements of migrants are openly violently prevented. Violence and repression toward migrants are not only normalized but also further legalized through transformations of national legislation, while migrant solidarity initiatives and even unintentional facilitations of movement or stay (performed by carriers, accommodation providers, and ordinary citizens) are increasingly at risk of being criminalized.

    In line with this present state, only briefly tackled here, a number of contributions gathered in this issue challenge normative perceptions of the restrictive European border regime and engage in the critical analysis of its key mechanisms, symbolic pillars, and infrastructures by framing them as complex and depending on context. Furthermore, some of them strive to find creative ways to circumvent the dominance of linear or even verbal explication and indulge in narrative fragments, interviews, maps, and graphs. All contributions are focused and space- or even person-specific. They are based on extensive research, activist, volunteer or other involvement, and they are reflexive and critical towards predominant perspectives and views.

    Artist and activist Selma Banich, in her contribution entitled »Shining«, named after one of her artistic intervention performed in a Zagreb neighborhood, assembles notes and reflections on her ongoing series of site-specific interventions in Zagreb made of heat sheet (hallmarks of migrants’ rescue boats and the shores of Europe) and her personal notes in which she engages with her encounters with three persons on the move or, rather, on the run from the European border control regime. Her contribution, formulated as a series of fragments of two parallel lines, which on the surface seem loosely, but in fact deeply, connected, speaks of the power of ambivalence and of the complexities of struggles that take place everyday on the fringes of the EU. Andrea Contenta visualizes and analyzes camps that have been mushrooming in Serbia in the recent years with a series of maps and graphs. The author’s detailed analysis—based on a critical use of available, often conflicting, data—shows how Serbia has kept thousands of people outside of the western EU territory following a European strategy of containment. Contenta concludes his contribution with a clear call, stating: »It is not only a theoretical issue anymore; containment camps are all around us, and we cannot just continue to write about it.« Serbia, and Belgrade in particular, is of central importance for transmigration through the Balkans. On a micro-level, the maps of Paul Knopf, Miriam Neßler and Cosima Zita Seichter visualize the so-called Refugee District in Belgrade and shed light on the transformation of urban space by transit migration. On a macro-level, their contribution illustrates the importance of Serbia as a central hub for migrant mobility in the Balkans as well as for the externalization of the European border regime in the region. The collective efforts to support the struggle of the people on the move—by witnessing, documenting, and denouncing push-backs—are presented by the Push-Back Map Collective’s self-reflection. In their contribution to this issue, the Push-Back Map Collective ask themselves questions or start a dialogue among themselves in order to reflect and evaluate the Push-Back map (www.pushbackmap.org) they launched and maintain. They also investigate the potentials of political organizing that is based on making an invisible structure visible. The activist collective Info Kolpa from Ljubljana gives an account of push-backs conducted by the Slovenian police and describes initiatives to oppose what they deem as systemic violence of police against people on the move and violent attempts to close the borders. The text contributes to understanding the role of extralegal police practices in restoring the European border regime and highlights the ingenuity of collectives that oppose it. Patricia Artimova’s contribution entitled »A Volunteer’s Diary« could be described as a collage of diverse personal notes of the author and others in order to present the complexity of the Serbian and Bosnian context. The genre of diary notes allows the author to demonstrate the diachronic line presented in the volunteers’ personal engagements and in the gradual developments occurring in different sites and states along the route within a four-year period. She also traces the effects of her support for people on the move on her social relations at home. Emina Bužinkić focuses on the arrest, detention, and deportation of a non-EU national done by Croatia to show the implications of current securitization practices on the everyday lives and life projects of migrants and refugees. Based on different sources (oral histories, official documentation, personal history, etc.), her intervention calls for direct political action and affirms a new genre one could provisionally call ›a biography of a deportation‹. In her »Notes from the Field« Azra Hromadžić focuses on multiple encounters between the locals of Bihać, a city located in the northwestern corner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people on the move who stop there while trying to cross into Croatia and the EU. Some of the sections and vignettes of her field notes are written as entries describing a particular day, while others are more anthropological and analytical reflections. Her focus lies on the local people’s perspectives, the dynamics of their daily encounters with migrants and alleged contradictions, philigram distinctions, as well as experiences of refugeeness that create unique relationships between people and histories in Bihać. Karolína Augustová and Jack Sapoch, activists of the grassroots organization No Name Kitchen and members of the Border Violence Monitoring Network, offer a systematized account of violence towards people on the move with their research report. The condensed analysis of violent practices, places, victims, and perpetrators of the increasingly securitized EU border apparatus is based on interviews conducted with people on the move in border areas with Croatia, Šid (Serbia) and Velika Kladuša (BiH). They identify a whole range of violence that people on the move are facing, which often remains ignored or underestimated, and thus condoned, in local national settings as well as on the EU and global level. They conclude that border violence against people on the move cannot be interpreted as mere aggression emanating from individuals or groups of the police but is embedded in the states’ structures.

    We also gathered scientific papers discussing and analyzing different aspects of the corridor and the years thereafter. In their article, Andrej Kurnik and Barbara Beznec focus on assemblages of mobility, which are composed of practices of migrants and local agencies that strive to escape what the authors call ›the sovereign imperative‹. In their analysis of different events and practices since 2015, they demonstrate how migratory movements reveal the hidden subalternized local forms of escape and invigorate the dormant critique of coloniality in the geopolitical locations along the Balkan route. In their concluding remarks, the authors ask to confront the decades-long investments into repressive and exclusionary EU migration policies and point to the political potential of migration as an agent of decolonization. The authors stress that post-Yugoslav European borderland that has been a laboratory of Europeanization for the last thirty years, a site of a ›civilizing‹ mission that systematically diminishes forms of being in common based on diversity and alterity is placed under scrutiny again. Romana Pozniak explores the ethnography of aid work, giving special attention to dynamics between emotional and rational dimensions. Based primarily on interviews conducted with humanitarians employed during the mass refugee transit through the Balkan corridor, she analyzes, historizes, and contextualizes their experiences in terms of affective labor. The author defines affective labor as efforts invested in reflecting on morally, emotionally, and mentally unsettling affects. She deals with local employment measures and how they had an impact on employed workers. Pozniak discusses the figure of the compassionate aid professional by it in a specific historical context of the Balkan corridor and by including personal narrations about it. The article of Robert Rydzewski focuses on the situation in Serbia after the final closure of the formalized corridor in March 2016. Rydzewski argues that extensive and multidirectional migrant movements on the doorstep of the EU are an expression of hope to bring a ›stuckedness‹ to an end. In his analysis, he juxtaposes the representations of migrant movements as linear with migrant narratives and their persistent unilinear movement despite militarized external European Union borders, push-backs, and violence of border guards. Rydzewsky approaches the structural and institutional imposition of waiting with the following questions: What does interstate movement mean for migrants? Why do migrants reject state protection offered by government facilities in favor of traveling around the country? In her article, Céline Cantat focuses on the Serbian capital Belgrade and how ›solidarities in transit‹ or the heterogeneous community of actors supporting people on the move emerged and dissolved in the country in 2015/2016. She analyzes the gradual marginalization of migrant presence and migration solidarity in Belgrade as an outcome of imposing of an institutionalized, official, camp-based, and heavily regulated refugee aid field. This field regulates the access not only to camps per se, but also to fundings for activities by independent groups or civil sector organizations. Teodora Jovanović, by using something she calls ›autoethnography of participation‹, offers a meticulous case study of Miksalište, a distribution hub in Belgrade established in 2015, which she joined as a volunteer in 2016. The transformation of this single institution is examined by elaborating on the transformation within the political and social contexts in Serbia and its capital, Belgrade, regarding migration policies and humanitarian assistance. She identifies three, at times intertwined, modes of response to migration that have shaped the development of the Miksalište center in corresponding stages: voluntarism, professionalization, and re-statization. She connects the beginning and end of each stage of organizing work in Miksalište by investigating the actors, roles, activities, and manners in which these activities are conducted in relation to broader changes within migration management and funding.

    Finishing this editorial in the aftermath of brutal clashes at the borders of Turkey and Greece and in the wake of the global pandemic of COVID-19—isolated in our homes, some of us even under curfew—we experience an escalation and normalization of restrictions, not only of movement but also of almost every aspect of social and political life. We perceive a militarization, which pervades public spaces and discourses, the introduction of new and the reinforcement of old borders, in particular along the line of EU external borders, a heightened immobilization of people on the move, their intentional neglect in squats and ›jungles‹ or their forceful encampment in deplorable, often unsanitary, conditions, where they are faced with food reductions, violence of every kind, and harrowing isolation. At the same time, we witness an increase of anti-migrant narratives not only spreading across obscure social networks but also among high ranked officials. Nonetheless, we get glimpses of resistance and struggles happening every day inside and outside the camps. Videos of protests and photos of violence that manage to reach us from the strictly closed camps, together with testimonies and outcries, are fragments of migrant agency that exist despite overwhelming repression.

    https://movements-journal.org/issues/08.balkanroute
    #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #revue #humanitarisme #espoir #attente #mobilité #Belgrade #Serbie #solidarité #Miksaliste #Bihac #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #encampement #corridor #cartographie #visualisation

  • #Nadezhda_De_Santis

    Sa tombe, dans le cimetière de #Florence :


    https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cimitero_degli_inglesi,_tomba_Nadezhda_De_Santis,_schiava_

    Je découvre cette tombe et son nom dans le livre La linea del colore de #Igiaba_Scego :


    https://www.bompiani.it/catalogo/la-linea-del-colore-9788830101418

    Sur internet, je trouve très peu d’informations sur cette dame enterrée à Venise :

    Nadezhda De Santis, a black Nubian slave brought to Florence at fourteen from #Jean-François_Champollion ’s 1827 expedition to Egypt and Nubia, while the French Royalist exile Félicie de Fauveau sculpted two tombs here

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Cemetery,_Florence
    #esclavage #Nubie #colonialisme #colonisation #histoire

    –-> peut-être des seenthisien·nes en savent plus ? @simplicissimus ?

    J’ajoute à la métaliste Italie coloniale, car cette femme est enterrée en Italie...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/871953

  • La pandémie a réactivé la route des migrants vers les îles Canaries

    La semaine dernière, 27 migrants sont décédés en mer au large des îles Canaries. Cette route depuis l’Afrique est à nouveau largement utilisée par les passeurs depuis la pandémie, alors qu’en #Méditerranée de nombreux Tunisiens tentent désormais de gagner l’Italie.

    « Cette route vers les Canaries, utilisée en 2005-2006, n’avait plus été utilisée pendant de nombreuses années et a été réactivée », explique l’envoyé spécial pour la situation en Méditerranée centrale du Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) vendredi dans a Matinale. « Depuis le début de l’année, on voit six fois plus de départs des côtes marocaines, du #Sahara_occidental, de la #Mauritanie, du #Sénégal et de la #Gambie vers les Canaries », précise Vincent Cochetel.

    Des frontières fermées mais poreuses

    Plus de 40 pays africains ont pourtant fermé leurs frontières pour cause de pandémie. Mais « ce n’est pas des frontières toujours très faciles à contrôler », souligne ce responsable au HCR. « Il s’agit de déserts, de lieux très peu habités, et les trafiquants multiplient les offres pour essayer d’amener un maximum de clients vers les pays d’Afrique du Nord ».

    Et avec ce déplacement géographique partiel des traversées par la mer, l’Espagne se retrouve directement touchée. « L’Espagne a toujours été un pays d’arrivées, mais principalement pour de jeunes Marocains », rappelle Vincent Cochetel. « Aujourd’hui, on voit une baisse des départs du Maroc directement vers la Péninsule ibérique. L’augmentation des départs se fait surtout vers les îles Canaries ».

    La désillusion des Tunisiens

    Et si les traversées diminuent depuis les côtes marocaines, c’est désormais la Tunisie qui est devenue le premier pays de départ - principalement vers l’Italie. « En termes de chiffres, cela reste gérable », assure l’envoyé spécial pour la situation en Méditerranée centrale. « On parle de 10’000 personnes, dont 34% ont été sauvées ou interceptées par les garde-côtes tunisiens et ramenées sur les côtes tunisiennes. Mais c’est une augmentation très forte, qui touche les populations pauvres du sud de la Tunisie principalement ».

    Cette forte progression des Tunisiens voulant rejoindre l’Europe s’explique notamment par le #désespoir et les #désillusions. « Beaucoup de gens attendaient des changements politiques en Tunisie qui ne sont pas encore intervenus », explique #Vincent_Cochetel. C’est l’effet aussi de la pandémie et des mesures restrictives imposées sur le plan de la fermeture des frontières avec la Libye. « Les gens ne voient pas d’autre #espoir que dans leur #mobilité_personnelle. Et bien entendu les passeurs jouent là-dessus et vendent leurs projets de mort facilement ».

    https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/11531202-la-pandemie-a-reactive-la-route-des-migrants-vers-les-iles-canaries.htm

    #Canaries #routes_migratoires #parcours_migratoires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #îles_Canaries #tunisiens #migrants_tunisiens #réfugiés_tunisiens

    ping @_kg_

  • https://www.franceculture.fr/societe/anselm-japp-esperons-de-garder-ce-que-cette-crise-a-de-positif

    [...] la gravité de cette crise de la société capitaliste mondiale n’est pas la conséquence directe et proportionnée de l’ampleur de la maladie. Elle est plutôt la conséquence de la fragilité extrême de cette société et un révélateur de son état réel. L’économie capitaliste est folle dans ses bases mêmes – et non seulement dans sa version néolibérale.

    Le capitalisme industriel dévaste le monde depuis plus de deux siècles. Il est miné par des contradictions internes, dont la première est l’usage de technologies qui, en remplaçant les travailleurs, augmentent les profits dans l’immédiat, mais font tarir la source ultime de tout profit : l’exploitation de la force de travail. Depuis cinquante ans, le capitalisme survit essentiellement grâce à l’endettement qui est arrivé à des dimensions astronomiques. La finance ne constitue pas la cause de la crise du capitalisme, elle l’aide au contraire à cacher son manque de rentabilité réelle – mais au prix de la construction d’un château de cartes toujours plus vacillant. On pouvait alors se demander si l’effondrement de ce château adviendrait par des causes « économiques », comme en 2008, ou plutôt écologiques.

    Avec l’épidémie, un facteur de crise inattendu est apparu – l’essentiel n’est pourtant pas le virus, mais la société qui le reçoit.

    NB : concernant le tarissement du travail, il faut préciser que le travail source de (sur)valeur indispensable à la reproduction du capital ne peut être qu’un travail accompli selon le standard de productivité du moment (qui est par ailleurs en constante augmentation sous l’effet de la concurrence entre capitalistes). Tous les travailleurs exploités à bas prix dans les zones de faible productivité sont des opportunités de profit pour certains capitalistes, mais pas une possibilité de reproduction du capital au niveau global. Le capital ne peut se reproduire que s’il produit par ailleurs des consommateurs solvables à hauteur de la masse de capitaux mise en mouvement. Comme l’indique Jappe, ce n’est plus le cas depuis au moins cinquante ans (et ce ne sera plus jamais le cas, compte tenu des niveaux de productivité atteints et des masses de capitaux accumulés).

  • Durant cette période de #confinement, restons en #lien, ne laissons pas la morosité nous gagner. Apportons-nous mutuellement #soutien et #réconfort ! Une pensée, des pistes d’entraide, une réflexion commune pour repenser ce monde qui part en vrille. Et tout ce qui pourra réenchanter un quotidien qui s’assombrit. Faisons vivre notre idéal de #fraternité et de solidarité, quel que soit notre sexe, notre couleur de peau, notre milieu ou notre âge ! Ouvrons l’horizon, faisons germer l’#espoir à partir de cette crise... Montrons qu’un autre monde est possible !


    https://fraternite-covid19.fr/?PagePrincipale
    #solidarité #covid-19 #coronavirus #France #cartographie #visualisation ##COVID-ENTRAIDE #entraide

    Adresse url pour la carte :
    https://covidentraide.gogocarto.fr/annuaire#/carte/@48.27,22.63,4z?cat=all

    • Retournons la « #stratégie_du_choc » en déferlante de #solidarité !

      Depuis une semaine la France est entrée dans une nouvelle réalité vertigineuse. Le Covid-19 n’est plus une « petite grippe », selon nos gouvernants, mais la « pire crise sanitaire depuis un siècle ». Un choc intime qui nous fait trembler pour nos proches et toutes les personnes particulièrement fragiles. Une secousse géopolitique qui fait s’effondrer la mondialisation néolibérale comme un château de cartes. 2019 avait été une année d’incendies ravageurs en Australie, Amazonie et ailleurs, et d’immenses soulèvements populaires. 2020 a d’ores et déjà les traits d’une paralysie totale, une crise systémique majeure.

      Cette pandémie achève de rendre irrespirable la vie dans un système politique et économique délirant, néfaste, mais surtout inutile au moment où un immense besoin de soin se fait sentir. Après être resté attentiste pendant un mois et demi, Emmanuel Macron a promis, pour ne pas perdre la face, que « l’État paiera […] quoi qu’il en coûte ». La « mobilisation générale » est décrétée. « Nous sommes en guerre », paraît-il, contre un « ennemi invisible ».

      Face à cette rhétorique militariste, nous affirmons une autre logique. À « l’union nationale » nous préférons l’entraide générale. À la guerre, nous opposons le soin, de nos proches jusqu’aux peuples du monde entier et au vivant. En France, comme dans les autres pays, nous allons tenir ensemble pour faire face à l’épidémie. Nous allons transformer l’isolement imposé en immense élan d’auto-organisation et de solidarité collective.

      Avec nos voisin.e.s, nos ami.e.s, nos familles, nos proches, nos collègues ; dans nos immeubles, nos rues, nos quartiers, nos villes et nos villages ; notamment en utilisant les réseaux sociaux, nous allons construire l’entraide à la base. Pour aider les plus fragiles qui ne peuvent pas sortir à obtenir de la nourriture. Pour garder les enfants de celles et ceux qui doivent continuer de travailler. Pour partager des informations vérifiées sur la situation. Pour se donner des nouvelles et se réconforter dans cette situation déchirante. Pour soutenir les plus précaires dans leurs luttes pour vivre. Pour faire face à une crise économique, bancaire et financière qui s’annonce dévastatrice malgré les annonces faussement rassurantes des banques centrales. En restant chez nous pour le moment, mais dans la rue dès que possible.

      Face à l’ampleur du bouleversement, même Emmanuel Macron appelle à « innover dans la solidarité ». Mais nous ne sommes pas dupes du fameux « en même temps » : l’entraide que nous construisons n’est pas l’auxiliaire d’un État néolibéral défaillant. Elle ne sera pas le cheval de Troie d’une future « stratégie du choc » à base de télétravail, de « volontariat citoyen » dans des services publics détruits, et de poursuite dans la destruction des acquis sociaux au nom de « l’état d’urgence sanitaire ».

      Notre solidarité est celle du peuple, de ceux d’en bas, qui se serrent les coudes pour survivre et pour vivre dignement. Elle n’a rien à voir avec celle des élites mondiales – facilement dépistées, elles -, qui se retranchent dans leurs palais dorés, protégés et désinfectés pendant que les soignant-e-s sont « au front » sans moyens et fabriquent leurs propres masques de protection en prenant tous les risques.

      Pendant que les travailleurs sociaux et les institutrices gardent leurs enfants, sans consigne officielle pour se protéger, s’exposant à une contamination. Pendant que les plus précaires, les sans logis, sans papiers, sans réseaux sociaux, les intérimaires sans chômage partiel, les « indépendants » contraints au travail en danger ou sans activité, seront encore plus frappé.e.s par la crise. Pendant que les « déjà confiné.e.s », les migrant.e.s enfermé.e.s en centres de rétentions et les prisonnier-e-s voient leur situation encore aggravée. Pendant que les habitant.e.s des quartiers populaires et les personnes racisé.e.s sont parmi les premier.e.s visé.e.s par la répression liée au confinement.

      Jamais l’alternative n’a été si claire, le scandale si palpable : nous jouons notre vie pendant qu’eux gèrent l’économie.

      L’entraide que nous allons construire s’inscrit dans le sillage du soulèvement des peuples partout dans le monde au cours des derniers mois, du Chili au Liban, de l’Algérie au Soudan. Cette vague a répandu sur la planète la nécessité de mettre nos corps en jeu. Le Covid-19 rend indispensable, pour l’heure, leur confinement. Mais révoltées ou confinés, nous mourrons d’un système qui recherche le profit et l’efficacité et pas le soin, le pouvoir et la compétition et pas l’entraide.

      Cette épidémie ravageuse n’est pas une simple réalité biologique. Elle est amplifiée par les politiques néolibérales, la destruction méthodique de l’hôpital et de l’ensemble des services publics. Si ce virus tue autant, c’est aussi parce qu’il n’y a plus assez de soignant.e.s et de lits, pas assez de respirateurs ou parce que l’hôpital tend à devenir une entreprise à flux tendu. Et si nous applaudissons chaque soir à 20h les soignant.e.s, c’est aussi pour contenir notre colère contre les gouvernants qui savaient que la tempête arrivait depuis deux mois sans rien faire.

      Nous appelons donc à renforcer la solidarité et l’auto-organisation pour faire face à la pandémie et la crise systémique, partout où c’est possible, sous toutes les formes imaginables, tout en respectant la nécessité absolue du confinement pour freiner la propagation. Plus particulièrement, nous appelons à rejoindre le réseau de solidarité auto-organisé #COVID-ENTRAIDE FRANCE (https://covid-entraide.fr) qui se constitue dans des dizaines de lieux depuis une dizaine de jours. Nous invitons à créer des groupes d’entraides locaux en ligne et sur le terrain, de notre hameau à notre village, de notre immeuble à notre ville. Nous appelons à recenser les centaines d’initiatives qui se créent à travers une cartographie collaborative (https://covidentraide.gogocarto.fr).

      Ne restons pas sidéré.e.s face à cette situation qui nous bouleverse, nous enrage et nous fait trembler. Lorsque la pandémie sera finie, d’autres crises viendront. Entre temps, il y aura des responsables à aller chercher, des comptes à rendre, des plaies à réparer et un monde à construire. À nous de faire en sorte que l’onde de choc mondiale du Covid-19 soit la « crise » de trop et marque un coup d’arrêt au régime actuel d’exploitation et de destruction des conditions d’existence sur Terre. Il n’y aura pas de « sortie de crise » sans un bouleversement majeur de l’organisation sociale et économique actuelle.

      Il y aura un avant et un après. Nous sommes pour l’instant confiné-e-s, mais nous nous organisons. Et, pour sûr, nous reprendrons les rues, les jardins, les outils de travail, les moyens de communication et les assemblées, ensemble.

      La stratégie du choc doit s’inverser. Cette fois-ci le choc ne servira pas à affermir le contrôle, le pouvoir central, les inégalités et le néolibéralisme, mais à renforcer l’entraide et l’auto-organisation. À les inscrire dans le marbre.

      INFOS :

      Site internet : https://covid-entraide.fr
      Inscrivez votre groupe local ici : https://covidentraide.gogocarto.fr
      Contact : covidentraidefrance@riseup.net

      https://www.terrestres.org/2020/03/21/face-a-la-pandemie-retournons-la-strategie-du-choc-en-deferlante-de-soli
      #épidémie #coronavirus #pandémie

  • Manif des ’gilets jaunes’ : « Moi, dircab du Préfet, de leur point de vue, j’ai basculé dans le camp de l’ennemi »
    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-pieds-sur-terre/manifs-changer-de-camp

    Laurent est passé dans « l’autre camp ». Il était directeur de cabinet du Préfet en charge du maintien de l’ordre. Il dit aujourd’hui manifester avec les ’gilets jaunes’ au « nom des mêmes valeurs qui lui ont fait servir l’Etat ». Laurent et Philippe racontent leurs choix et leur changement de camp.

    Beau #témoignage #violences_policières #Gilets_jaunes

    • Les blairistes ont été assez stupides pour combiner leur promotion de « Cool Britannia » avec des réformes massives de l’aide sociale, ce qui a effectivement conduit à ce que ce projet explose en vol : presque tous ceux qui avaient le potentiel pour devenir le prochain John Lennon doivent désormais passer le reste de leur vie à empiler des caisses pour les supermarchés Tesco, comme les y obligent les nouvelles formes de conditionalité des aides sociales.
      En fin de compte, tout ce que les blairistes ont réussi à produire, c’est un secteur de marketing de classe mondiale (puisque c’est ce que les classes moyenne savent faire). A part ça, elles n’avaient rien d’autre à offrir.

      […]

      Je me souviens d’avoir assisté à une conférence universitaire sur le sujet et de m’être demandé : « D’accord, je comprends la partie vapeur, c’est évident, mais... quel est le rapport avec le punk ? » Et puis ça m’est venu à l’esprit. No future ! L’ère victorienne était la dernière fois que la plupart des britanniques croyaient vraiment en un avenir axé sur la technologie qui allait mener à un monde non seulement plus prospère et égalitaire, mais aussi plus amusant et excitant. Puis, bien sûr, vint la Grande Guerre, et nous avons découvert à quoi le XXe siècle allait vraiment ressembler, avec son alternance monotone de terreur et d’ennui dans les tranchées. Le Steampunk n’était-il pas une façon de dire : ne pouvons-nous pas simplement revenir en arrière, considérer tout le siècle dernier comme un mauvais rêve, et recommencer à zéro ?

      #David_Graeber #désespoir #espoir #Royaume-Uni #classe_sociale #politique #économie #steampunk #crash #stratégie_du_choc (y compris pour lui, car il voudrait mettre en avant un récit qui accuse les conservateurs, en attendant un prochain crash pour les éjecter)

      Les nouveaux dirigeants travaillistes font les premiers pas : ils appellent à de nouveaux modèles économiques ("socialisme avec un iPad") et cherchent des alliés potentiels dans l’industrie high-tech. Si nous nous dirigeons vraiment vers un avenir de production décentralisée, de taille réduite, high-tech et robotisée, il est fort possible que les traditions particulières du Royaume-Uni en matière de petite entreprise et de science amateur - qui ne l’ont jamais rendu particulièrement adapté aux conglomérats bureaucratisés géants qui ont si bien réussi aux États-Unis et en Allemagne, dans leurs manifestations capitalistes ou socialistes - puissent se révéler tout particulièrement appropriés.

      Et par contre #technophilie voire #techno-béat si la solution est basée sur la #high-tech (qui ne sera jamais séparable du capitalisme et de l’impérialisme).

  • #Pour_Sama

    #Waad_al-Kateab est une jeune femme syrienne qui vit à Alep lorsque la guerre éclate en 2011. Sous les bombardements, la vie continue. Waad tombe amoureuse, se marie avec Hamza et donne naissance à sa fille, Sama. Elle filme au quotidien les #pertes, les #espoirs et la #solidarité du peuple d’Alep. Son mari médecin sauve des centaines de vies dans un hôpital de fortune. Le couple est déchiré entre la protection de leur enfant et leur combat pour la #liberté.


    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGp7C79Pvzg

    #film #documentaire #film_documentaire #Alep #guerre #vie #bombardements #hôpital #Syrie #révolution #résistance #ville #ville_en_guerre #témoignage #siège

  • No Go World. How Fear Is Redrawing Our Maps and Infecting Our Politics

    War-torn deserts, jihadist killings, trucks weighted down with contraband and migrants—from the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands to the Sahara, images of danger depict a new world disorder on the global margins. With vivid detail, #Ruben_Andersson traverses this terrain to provide a startling new understanding of what is happening in remote “danger zones.” Instead of buying into apocalyptic visions, Andersson takes aim at how Western states and international organizations conduct military, aid, and border interventions in a dangerously myopic fashion, further disconnecting the world’s rich and poor. Using drones, proxy forces, border reinforcement, and outsourced aid, risk-obsessed powers are helping to remap the world into zones of insecurity and danger. The result is a vision of chaos crashing into fortified borders, with national and global politics riven by fear. Andersson contends that we must reconnect and snap out of this dangerous spiral, which affects us whether we live in Texas or Timbuktu. Only by developing a new cartography of hope can we move beyond the political geography of fear that haunts us.

    https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520294608/no-go-world
    #livre #peur #géographie_politique #marges #désordre #inégalités #pauvres #riches #pauvreté #richesse #drones #fermeture_des_frontières #insécurité #danger #chaos #militarisation_des_frontières #espoir
    ping @cede @karine4 @isskein

  • #De_l'autre_côté

    Hamza est un jeune tunisien résolu à quitter son pays par tous les moyens. De moyen, il n’en a qu’un seul : payer des passeurs pour traverser la méditerranée sur un minuscule bateau de pêche plein à craquer, et rejoindre clandestinement l’Europe et la France.
    Pourtant Hamza a des attaches, une compagne, une famille, des amis avec qui il a lutté durant les révolutions arabes. Mais il aspire a autre chose qu’une vie de misère, il veut aller au-delà de ce qu’il connaît, affronter le réel, croire que la vie a autre chose à lui offrir. Il n’est pas naïf, il sait que les risques sont grands, et minces les espoirs d’une vie meilleure, mais il veut voir par lui-même. Cette traversée est une expérience intime.
    Car Hamza est un rêveur et toujours ses images mentales, ses espoirs, ses peurs viennent se mêler à la réalité extérieure, la contaminer, lui offrir une échappatoire et un but à poursuivre. Si sa situation est particulière, ses aspiration sont universelles. Qui n’a jamais rêvé de partir, de se réinventer ?
    Le danger pour lui n’est pas simplement de mourir noyé, de se voir terrassé par la faim, d’être renvoyé d’où il vient, de ne pas trouver de logement, de travail, mais également de se voir privé de ce qui fonde sa condition d’homme : ses #espoirs, ses #craintes, son #imaginaire.

    http://enfantsrouges.com/les-titres/isturiale/de-lautre-cote
    #BD #livre #migrations #Tunisie #Méditerranée #Lampedusa #migrants_tunisiens #printemps_arabe

  • #Eric_Piolle sur France inter

    Le maire écologiste de Grenoble est l’invité d"Eric Delvaux à l’occasion de la parution aux éditions Les liens qui libèrent de son livre « Grandir ensemble. Les villes réveillent l’espoir ».

    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-invite-du-week-end/l-invite-du-week-end-20-octobre-2019
    #Grenoble

    –----------

    Quelques extraits :

    « C’est à l’échelle des villes qu’on peut allier #justice_sociale et #justice_environnementale, qui fait défaut à l’échelle nationale ».

    « Pour relever le défi de justice sociale et environnementale, il faut cultiver ensemble des #biens_communs, garantir des sécurités pour chacun »

    « Les habitants du territoire quels qu’ils soient, c’est des habitants légitimes pour travailler sur des budgets participatifs, pour aménager un morceau de quartier, pour s’entraîner à la #démocratie_locale »
    –-> « Le gouvernement Macron nous a attaqués au tribunal pour notre dispositif de #votation_citoyenne parce qu’il était ouvert aux + de 16 ans, parce qu’il était ouvert à tous les résidents quel que soit leur statut par rapport aux listes électorales et parce que les élus, c’était le troisième argument, ne pouvaient pas se déposséder de leur capacité de décision ».

    ping @karine4

  • If world leaders choose to fail us, my generation will never forgive them

    We are in the middle of a climate breakdown, and all they can talk about is money and fairytales of eternal economic growth.

    This is all wrong. I shouldn’t be standing here. I should be back in school on the other side of the ocean. Yet you all come to me for hope? How dare you! You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words. And yet I’m one of the lucky ones. People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction. And all you can talk about is money and fairytales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!

    For more than 30 years the science has been crystal clear. How dare you continue to look away, and come here saying that you are doing enough, when the politics and solutions needed are still nowhere in sight.

    You say you “hear” us and that you understand the urgency. But no matter how sad and angry I am, I don’t want to believe that. Because if you fully understood the situation and still kept on failing to act, then you would be evil. And I refuse to believe that.

    The popular idea of cutting our emissions in half in 10 years only gives us a 50% chance of staying below 1.5C degrees, and the risk of setting off irreversible chain reactions beyond human control.

    Maybe 50% is acceptable to you. But those numbers don’t include tipping points, most feedback loops, additional warming hidden by toxic air pollution or the aspects of justice and equity. They also rely on my and my children’s generation sucking hundreds of billions of tonnes of your CO2 out of the air with technologies that barely exist. So a 50% risk is simply not acceptable to us – we who have to live with the consequences.

    To have a 67% chance of staying below a 1.5C global temperature rise – the best odds given by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – the world had 420 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide left to emit back on 1 January 2018. Today that figure is already down to less than 350 gigatonnes. How dare you pretend that this can be solved with business-as-usual and some technical solutions. With today’s emissions levels, that remaining CO2 budget will be entirely gone in less than eight and a half years.

    There will not be any solutions or plans presented in line with these figures today. Because these numbers are too uncomfortable. And you are still not mature enough to tell it like it is.

    You are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us I say we will never forgive you. We will not let you get away with this. Right here, right now is where we draw the line. The world is waking up. And change is coming, whether you like it or not.

    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/23/world-leaders-generation-climate-breakdown-greta-thunberg
    #Greta_Thunberg #climat #jeunesse #résistance #croissance #croissance_économique #espoir #discours #collapsologie #effondrement #nouvelle_génération #accusation #responsabilité #technicisme #action

    ping @reka

    • Environnement.À l’ONU, Greta Thunberg s’en prend aux leaders du monde

      Conviée à New York pour s’exprimer lors d’un sommet spécial des Nations unies sur la question du climat, la jeune activiste suédoise s’est lancée dans une allocution enflammée.

      Les paroles utilisées sont fortes et l’image qui les accompagne est tout aussi poignante. Lundi 23 septembre, lors du sommet sur l’urgence climatique organisée par les Nations unies, Greta Thunberg s’est attaquée une nouvelle fois aux leaders du monde, coupables de ne pas en faire suffisamment face aux bouleversements climatiques en cours.

      Je ne devrais pas être là, je devrais être à l’école, de l’autre côté de l’océan. […] Comment osez-vous ? Vous avez volé mes rêves et mon enfance avec vos paroles creuses. Les gens souffrent, les gens meurent. Des écosystèmes entiers s’effondrent, nous sommes au début d’une extinction de masse et tout ce dont vous pouvez parler, c’est de l’argent. Comment osez-vous ? Comment osez-vous regarder ailleurs et venir ici en prétendant que vous en faites assez ? […] Vous dites que vous nous entendez et que vous comprenez l’urgence, mais je ne veux pas le croire.”

      La jeune Suédoise a prononcé ces phrases le visage rempli d’émotion et presque en larmes, comme on peut le voir sur les images de cette vidéo relayée par le quotidien britannique The Guardian :

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMrtLsQbaok

      Hier, le 22 septembre, la veille de cette allocution de Greta Thunberg aux Nations unies, le journal suédois Svenska Dagbladet avait également épinglé le comportement des responsables de la planète en faisant aussi référence aux nombreuses manifestations pour le climat organisées par des jeunes activistes ces deux derniers jours.

      “Pour les hommes politiques et les entreprises, cela a une grande valeur en matière de relations publiques d’être associés à des jeunes représentant l’espoir pour l’avenir […], mais il y a quelque chose dans les cris de soutien joyeux qui néglige le sérieux du message de ces jeunes”, pointe le journal qui ajoute :

      “Les adultes utilisent des clichés quand ils parlent de la prochaine génération […]. Mais ils deviennent rarement sérieux et ne mènent pas de dialogue réel avec ceux qui, un jour, prendront le relais. Seuls ceux qui ont vraiment le pouvoir peuvent décider du monde qu’ils laissent derrière eux.”

      https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/environnement-lonu-greta-thunberg-sen-prend-aux-leaders-du-mo

      #this_is_all_wrong

    • Women and non-binary people of colour on what the Global Climate Strike means to them

      Today, millions of people across the world mobilised for the Global Climate Strike, calling on their governments to start enacting solutions to climate breakdown.

      Here in the UK, the environmental movement has a whiteness problem. People of colour will be the first to be affected by climate change, but they’re the voices we seem to hear from the least on this matter. The face of the climate movement has seemingly become the white middle-class because they have the privilege of being able to take time off work for these protests, the money to significantly change their lifestyles to be more eco-friendly and the security of being able to trust the police.

      With that in mind, I headed out to Westminster to join the protests and talk to women and non-binary people of colour about why they came out today and what organisers could be doing to better include people colour.


      https://gal-dem.com/women-and-non-binary-people-of-colour-on-what-the-global-climate-strike-mea

    • On environmentalism, whiteness and activist superstars

      After a powerful and emotional speech at the climate summit in New York, climate activist Greta Thunberg’s profile is bigger than ever, as if that were even possible. Founder of the school strike movement, it feels that Greta has played a huge part in galvanising an incredibly cohesive and urgent movement for climate justice in the short period of one year. I am also personally a huge admirer of hers, and am particularly heartened by the way she has discussed disability in the spotlight. But in the past few days, I’ve seen a number of people, notably artist and activist Bree Newsome Bass, discussing Greta’s whiteness in relation to size of her platform.

      In some ways this is an important point – activists of colour like Mari Copeny a.k.a. Little Miss Flint, who has been raising awareness and funds for the water crisis since she was eight, have received far less attention for their activism. But I’m less interested in this criticism levelled towards Greta as a person – she is a 16-year-old, autistic girl who has endured a lot of ableism and misogyny in her time in the public eye. Instead, I think it’s important that we think about the structures that consistently centre whiteness, and white individuals, both within coverage of the climate crisis and outside of it. It is this that speaks to a larger problem of white supremacy and an obsession with individuals in the media.

      We know that under white supremacism, both the media and its audiences disproportionately spotlight and uplift whiteness. And as we saw most recently in criticisms of Extinction Rebellion, the climate justice movement certainly isn’t exempt from reducing people of colour to an afterthought. This feels all the more frustrating when the issue of climate justice disproportionately affects indigenous communities and people of colour, and has rightly led many people of colour to ask: will white people only pay attention to the climate catastrophe when it’s other white people delivering the message? This doesn’t mean we should pay less attention towards Greta on the basis of her whiteness, but instead we should criticise the white supremacist climate that means that activists like Mari Copeny get sidelined.

      “The media prefers individual ‘star’ activists to faceless movements. But this complicates representation”

      Part of this problem also lies in the issue of fame in and of itself. To a certain extent, we buy into the cult of the individual when we inject 16-year-old activists into the realm of celebrity, when they really came to tell us to take action. The media prefers individual “star” activists to faceless movements. But this complicates representation – it’s impossible for one person to truly represent everyone. Equally, when we suggest swapping out one activist for another (e.g. swapping a white autistic woman for say, a black neurotypical man), we buy into a mindset that insists there is only space for one person to speak.

      This focus on the individual is evident in conversations around Greta’s work; each time she makes a speech, pens an article or crafts a viral Instagram post, it feels as though around 50% of the aftermath involves discussion of the climate issues she’s talking about – while the other 50% is usually about Greta herself. This is also why the pressure and criticism directed towards her sometimes feels unfair – it’s worth considering that Greta didn’t ask to be a celebrity, we made her into one. We can address and deconstruct this problem by thinking beyond individuals – and also talking about movements, community groups and even our most abstract modes of thinking about the climate crisis (particularly with regards to decolonisation). This will naturally involve making much-needed space for the voices of people of colour. Although we may always seek leaders and figureheads for movements, an obsession with star power can only take us so far.

      The first and most obvious thing we should do is to remain aware of the ways in which the media, and viewers who participate in it, centre whiteness. Then we should resist it. This doesn’t mean attacking white activists who are doing good work, but instead spotlighting and uplifting activists of colour whose messages equally need to be heard. A good place to start would be reading and listening to the words of Artemisa Xakriabá, Helena Gualinga, Mari Copeny and Isra Hirsi. When we bring focus towards activists of colour, we prove that activism isn’t a project that has only limited space for a certain number of voices. It reduces the amount of misogynistic and ableist abuse that young activists like Greta face, whilst in turn tackling the issue of putting whiteness on a pedestal. Importantly, this goes hand-in-hand with pushing against the media’s constant need to position individual people as the monolithic faces of particular movements. Signal-boosting groups like Black Lives Matter, Wretched of the Earth, Indigenous Environmental Network, Grassroots Global Justice Alliance and Climate Justice Alliance also emphasises the importance of collective work. After all – the issue of the climate operates along so many axes of oppression, including racism, misogyny, ableism and class – so we need more marginalised voices than ever involved in the conversation.

      http://gal-dem.com/on-individualism-whiteness-and-activist-superstars

      #blancs #noirs #activisme #activisme_climatique

    • La haine contre Greta : voici ceux, avec nom et adresse, qui la financent !

      Il est généralement accepté que les vainqueurs des élections européennes du 26 mai ont été l’extrême droite et les Verts. Et il est aussi généralement accepté qu’aux succès des Verts ont contribué grandement les mobilisations sans précédent d’une jeunesse s’inspirant de la combativité et des thèses radicales de la jeune suédoise Greta Thunberg. En conséquence, il n’est pas surprenant que cette extrême droite choisisse d’attaquer ce qu’elle appelle « le mythe du changement climatique » et surtout, cible de plus en plus son attaque sur la personne de cette Greta Thunberg qui galvanise la jeunesse en Europe et au-delà !

      À la tête de la campagne contre Greta, ponctuée de centaines de textes et de photomontages souvent très vulgaires, il y a trois des plus importants partis européens d’extrême droite : Le Rassemblement National français, le #AFD allemand et l’#UKIP britannique. Et derrière ces partis d’extrême droite et de leur campagne abjecte, deux think-tanks climato-sceptiques conservateurs, le #EIKE (Institut Européen pour le Climat et l’Énergie) et le #CFACT-Europe (Comité pour un Lendemain Créatif), lesquels soutiennent de manière multiforme, et pas seulement avec des « arguments » et des conférences, la négation de la catastrophe climatique par l’extrême droite.

      L’Institut #EIKE, de la bouche de son vice-président, nie évidemment d’avoir le moindre rapport avec AFD, bien que ce vice-président du nom de #Michael_Limburg ait été récemment candidat de ce même... AFD ! Il faut dire que EIKE qui, ensemble avec AFD, a pu organiser des journées climato-sceptique même... à l’intérieur du Parlement allemand, est sorti de l’anonymat grâce à la conférence annuelle qu’il organise depuis des années avec un certain succès, puisqu’elle a pu influencer l’attitude de l’Union européenne au sujet du changement climatique. Cependant, c’est exactement cette conférence annuelle de EIKE qui est coorganisée par deux organisations américaines : Le CFACT-US, lequel finance évidemment sa filiale européenne du même nom. Et surtout, l’#Institut_Heartland, lequel, selon The Economist, « est le think-tank mondialement le plus connu parmi ceux qui défendent le scepticisme au sujet du changement climatique dû à l’homme ».

      C’est exactement à ce moment que les enquêtes et les révélations du Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) britannique et de Greenpeace acquièrent une énorme importance politique car elles mettent en lumière les forces économiques qui sont derrière ceux qui nient la catastrophe climatique, mais aussi derrière le « phénomène » d’une extrême droite européenne (et mondiale) qui monte en flèche. En effet, tant CFACT-US que l’Institut Heartland sont financés plus que généreusement par le très grand capital américain, par #ExxonMobil, la famille #Koch, deuxième plus riche famille nord-américaine qui domine – entre autres – dans le secteur du pétrole, la famille #Mercer qui est aussi un des principaux financeurs du président #Trump, ou même #Microsoft et #RJR_Tobacco ! Il faut noter que Heartland a des antécédents en tant que serviteur des visées inavouables du grand capital, puisqu’il fut jadis l’agent principal de la propagande des géants du tabac qui niaient le rapport existant entre le tabagisme et le cancer. Ce n’est pas donc surprenant qu’à cette époque son principal financeur fut... #Philip_Morris... [1]

      Mais, il ne faut pas croire que l’Institut Heartland est un simple “outil” indolore et incolore dépourvu de ses propres thèses et actions. De ce point de vue, le CV de son nouveau président #Tim_Huelskamp est très éloquent et didactique. Dirigeant du très conservateur #Tea_Party, #Huelskamp s’est distingué comme député (qu’il a été jusqu’à 2017) de l’aile la plus réactionnaire des Républicains et a toujours entretenu des liens étroits avec l’extrême droite américaine. Il est aussi à noter que de tous les députés américains, c’est lui qui, pendant très longtemps, a reçu les plus grandes sommes d’argent de la part des compagnies de combustibles fossiles, et qu’il les a « remerciés » en votant toujours contre toute tentative de légiférer contre leurs intérêts...

      Grâce à un document interne de Heartland, qui a fuité, on a pu apprendre – et en détail – non seulement l’étendue de son financement par le très grand capital (plusieurs millions de dollars), mais aussi l’ « investissement » de ces sommes dans un large éventail d’activités qui vont du paiement des « salaires » à des bloggeurs qui influencent l’opinion publique et des « scientifiques » qui parcourent le monde niant la catastrophe climatique, à l’écriture et la publication du matériel propagandiste qui cible les écoles et leurs élèves. Par exemple, le groupe de « scientifiques » chargé de « contredire » les conclusions des travaux du Groupe d’Experts Intergouvernemental... coûte 300 000 dollars par an, tandis que la propagation de la thèse qui veut que « la question du changement climatique soit controversée et incertaine »... dans les écoles primaires leur coûte 100 000 dollars !

      Nous voici donc devant la révélation d’une réalité qui jette quelque lumière sur quelques-uns des grands « mystères » de notre époque. Tout d’abord, l’extrême droite européenne ou tout au moins quelques-uns de ses poids lourds, entretiennent des liens étroits – s’ils ne sont pas dépendants – avec un centre/état-major politique et économique qui se trouve aux États-Unis, et plus précisément à la Maison Blanche et aux financeurs et autres soutiens du président Trump [2] ! Ensuite, ce n’est pas aussi un hasard que cette « internationale brune » semble être arrivée à la conclusion que la question de la catastrophe climatique et plus précisément, le – plus en plus ample et radical – mouvement de jeunes qui luttent contre elle représentent la plus grande menace pour ses intérêts et pour la domination du système capitaliste dans les années à venir. Et enfin, ce n’est pas également un hasard si cette « internationale brune » et plus précisément sa « section » européenne concentrent aujourd’hui en toute priorité leur attaques sur la personne de Greta Thunberg, l’incontestable égérie, théoricienne et en même temps coordinatrice des mobilisations de jeunes presque partout en Europe et au-delà.

      Voici donc comment se présente actuellement le rapport de l’extrême droite avec le grand capital. Non pas de façon abstraite et dogmatique, mais concrètement, avec des financeurs et financés qui ont non seulement nom et adresse, mais aussi des intérêts tangibles et des « causes » à servir. Cependant, tout ce beau monde ne fait que son boulot. Si la gauche faisait le sien, la situation serait bien différente…

      http://www.cadtm.org/La-haine-contre-Greta-voici-ceux-avec-nom-et-adresse-qui-la-financent

  • « Le mouvement des gilets jaunes a permis à beaucoup d’inventer une parole politique », Laurent Jeanpierre
    https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2019/08/23/laurent-jeanpierre-le-mouvement-des-gilets-jaunes-a-permis-a-beaucoup-d-i

    Si on raisonne à l’échelle du mouvement, il faut distinguer deux moments : une phase ascendante à partir de novembre 2018, puis une phase de déclin qui débute avec la destruction des abris sur les ronds-points fin janvier 2019. Dans la première période, on observe un des effets quasi miraculeux du mouvement : des divisions très ancrées dans les imaginaires, entre « ceux qui bossent » et « ceux qui ne foutent rien », s’estompent (elles reviendront lors du déclin du mouvement).

    #Gilets_jaunes #subjectivité #reproduction

    • « In girum », de Laurent Jeanpierre : situer les « gilets jaunes » ?, Jean Birnbaum
      https://www.lemonde.fr/livres/article/2019/08/29/in-girum-de-laurent-jeanpierre-situer-les-gilets-jaunes_5504038_3260.html

      Dans un essai captivant « In girum », le professeur de science politique et intellectuel de gauche tente de cerner la « révolte des ronds-points », en se laissant ébranler par elle.

      Des « gilets jaunes » au « rond point des Gaulois », à Saint-Beauzire (Puy-de-Dôme), le 15 décembre 2018. THIERRY ZOCCOLAN/AFP

      Si l’essai de Laurent Jeanpierre émeut d’emblée, c’est qu’il assume la fragilité qui donne force à ce genre : méditant le mouvement des « gilets jaunes », l’auteur « essaye » pour de bon, et proclame la nécessité d’un humble tâtonnement. Ici, la modestie requise est à la fois scientifique et politique. Laurent Jeanpierre dit en substance : comme professeur de science politique mais aussi comme intellectuel de gauche, je suis l’héritier de modèles qui menacent d’écraser la nouveauté des actions vécues sous le poids d’une spéculation vétuste ; voilà pourquoi je ne prétends pas énoncer la « vérité cachée » de la rébellion jaune, je souhaiterais simplement me « laisser ébranler » par elle.

      Cette révolte a ruiné les certitudes des docteurs en insurrection
      De fait, l’ensemble de l’ouvrage, rédigé d’une plume sensible, se déplie au conditionnel. Son auteur rappelle d’abord les traits spécifiques de cette révolte : en rupture avec les légitimités traditionnelles, apparemment privée de cohérence idéologique et de débouchés politiques, obtenant par l’émeute ce que les défilés syndicaux étaient impuissants à conquérir, elle a ruiné les certitudes des docteurs en insurrection, militants de gauche comme chercheurs en sciences sociales.

      Les uns et les autres vacillent devant les ronds-points ? Oui, parce que leur culture commune demeure ancrée dans une certaine période, celle du capitalisme fordiste. A l’époque, le mouvement ouvrier formait l’archétype de tout combat émancipateur ; l’usine se tenait au centre des ­conflits ; les syndicats comptaient ; et même la sociologie. Quiconque a lu Alain Touraine, entre autres, sait que ce monde-là est entré en crise depuis des lustres. Mais Jeanpierre montre bien que le « moment jaune » marque son cruel enterrement.

      Au point d’ouvrir un nouveau cycle de luttes ? Laurent Jeanpierre se garde de toute réponse trop assurée. Mais il suggère une hypothèse. Par-delà leur diversité générationnelle et sociale, avance-t-il, les « gilets jaunes » auraient en commun d’être des « entravés », dont la mobilité spatiale ne recoupe plus aucune mobilité sociale ; sur les ronds-points, ils et elles auraient voulu rebâtir un lieu de vie, des espaces de rencontre et de solidarité ; sans rêver de révolution anticapitaliste, les « gilets jaunes » appelleraient donc de leurs vœux « le réencastrement de l’économie dans les réseaux de solidarité effectifs, plutôt que dans le marché, et au service des individus ». Conclusion : leur action viendrait essentiellement conforter une « relocalisation de la politique », à rebours de l’élan internationaliste qui avait animé, au tournant des années 2000, la galaxie « altermondialiste ». Afin d’étayer cette hypothèse, Laurent Jeanpierre situe la révolte des ronds-points dans une constellation planétaire « d’utopies politiques locales », dont il décrit avec finesse les succès et les impasses : zadisme, mouvement des « places » grecques, kibboutzim israéliens, révolte au Chiapas, « mairies rebelles » de Catalogne…

      Cette façon de prendre recul et hauteur produit des effets ambivalents. D’une part, elle permet à Laurent Jeanpierre de signer les pages les plus passionnantes de son livre. Mais, d’autre part, elle en ­exhibe la contradiction intime, celle qu’endure tout théoricien de l’émancipation confronté à un mouvement social, et désireux de dévoiler sa signification. A l’origine de ce bref essai, on s’en souvient, il y a le refus des jugements surplombants. En cela, Laurent Jeanpierre se place dans le sillage d’une certaine pensée anarchiste : pure dissidence des âmes et des corps, la révolte se passerait d’explication.

      Psychanalyste malgré lui

      Mais on ne se refait pas. Le savant a la mémoire longue et l’esprit conquérant. Si bien qu’au fil des pages Laurent Jeanpierre prête aux révoltés des ronds-points telle ambition « inconsciente », telle intention « qui leur échappe ». Sous sa plume, on voit alors resurgir ce maudit lexique de la « vérité cachée » dont il prétendait s’affranchir. Psychanalyste malgré lui, il évoque même les « tendances conservatrices ou néofascistes qui ont traversé le mouvement ».

      Ce point est mentionné à plusieurs reprises, comme en passant. L’approfondir aurait ­permis de « se laisser ébranler » jusqu’au bout en posant les questions suivantes : est-il possible de refuser, comme Laurent Jeanpierre le fait, la disqualification globale du mouvement par ceux qui le réduisent à ces « tendances néofascistes », tout en interrogeant le sens de ces pulsions ? Alors que d’autres mobilisations, au cours des dernières décennies, avaient aussi imposé un nouveau répertoire d’action collective (happenings d’Act Up, occupations par les sans-papiers, coordinations infirmières, forums altermondialistes…), comment expliquer qu’aucune d’entre elles n’ait jamais été suspectée d’une quelconque « tendance néofasciste » ? S’il y a là une singularité, se pourrait-il que la mobilisation des « gilets jaunes », loin de s’inscrire dans l’histoire des gauches et des luttes d’émancipation, ait eu pour vocation de rompre avec la tradition du mouvement ouvrier, voire d’en finir avec elle ?

      « In girum. Les leçons politiques des ronds-points », de #Laurent_Jeanpierre, La Découverte, « Cahiers libres », 192 p., 12 €.

      #livre #révolte #insurrection #émeute #militants #capitalisme-fordiste #usine #Mouvement_ouvrier #entravés #rupture #utopies_politiques_locales #néofasciste (tendance)

    • In Girum - Les leçons politiques des ronds-points, Laurent Jeanpierre, extrait
      https://books.google.fr/books?id=uAaqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT10&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepa

      « ... la politique en trouve pas sa consistance dans les discours et n’est pas avant tout une affaire d’opinion, de revendications, de programmes. »

      #entravés #espoirs_périphériques #reproduction #communes
      @monolecte @parpaing @kaparia @cie813 @vanderling @mona @recriweb et aux autres, bien sûr.

    • Rencontre avec l’auteur ce soir vendredi 6 septembre 2019.

      « La Librairie Petite Egypte (35 Rue des Petits Carreaux, 75002 Paris, Métro Sentier) me fait l’amabilité de m’inviter à présenter l’essai que je viens de publier aux Éditions La Découverte (In Girum. Les leçons politiques des ronds-points).
      J’en présenterai quelques aspects sous forme de dialogue à partir de 19 heures. La discussion sera suivie d’un pot amical. »

  • Attendre dans un foyer dʹ#aide_dʹurgence

    Quelle est la vie des personnes logées dans des foyers dʹaide dʹurgence ? Dès 2008, lʹextension de la suppression de lʹ#aide_sociale à toutes les personnes déboutées du droit dʹasile sʹest matérialisée par lʹouverture de #centres_dʹaide_dʹurgence, où seul le #minimum_vital est délivré et les personnes nʹayant pas suivi lʹordre de quitter le territoire y sont soumises à un #contrôle quotidien. A partir dʹune approche ethnographique, #Giada_de_Coulon a enquêté dans lʹun de ces centres où des femmes et des hommes sont immobilisés des années entières, conservant lʹ#espoir dʹêtre un jour régularisés. Elle montre ainsi comment la vie de ces personnes prend forme au cœur dʹun appareil administratif qui a comme raison dʹêtre leur #disparition du territoire suisse.
    Entretien avec Giada de Coulon, docteur en anthropologie de lʹUniversité de Neuchâtel.

    https://www.rts.ch/play/radio/versus-lire-et-penser/audio/attendre-dans-un-foyer-daide-durgence?id=10369100
    #déboutés #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Suisse #hébergement #régularisation #expulsions #renvois #surveillance

  • Des nouvelles de #Syrie... de la part d’un ami, réfugié syrien en Suisse (reçu aujourd’hui, 05.05.2019) :

    #Idlib est complètement oubliée, La région où on a rassemblé des million des syriens déplacés par la force du régime d’Assad et russes, est en train de se massacrée par des #bombardements_aériens syriens et russes, des milliers des camions qui transportent des des familles avec ce qu’ils leur restent de leur déplacement, plusieurs fois, d’une région à l’autre.
    Pas un seul mot sur le média, la cause Syrienne est complètement oubliée, ...
    Ce qu’il se passe à Idlib, pour la première fois, notre village entier cherche un abri pour se protéger du bombardement aérien syro-russe, la stratégie de la terre brûlée. Un offensif Inédit, sur Idlib , sous silence absolu de la communauté internationale, tous les habitants des villages de #Jabal_Alzawi, sont tous vidés, ils sont maintenant à 11 km de mon village #Orim_AlJoz, donc mon projet du stage pour la zone de désescalade n’a plus de sens, le dernier #espoir est tombé à l’eau. Je ne sais qu’il faut que je cherche un autre stage, ... c’est vraiment triste ☹

    #déplacés_internes #IDPs #réfugiés #guerre #conflit #migrerrance #géographie_du_vide
    ping @reka

  • A #Oran, les #jeunes_Algériens remettent à plus tard leur projet de migration

    Les côtes oranaises sont habituées, depuis les années 2000, à voir de nombreux jeunes partir clandestinement à bord d’embarcations de fortune pour tenter de rejoindre l’Europe. Depuis le début du #soulèvement_populaire en Algérie, le phénomène de la #harraga est cependant presque à l’arrêt, signe que les candidats au départ commencent à croire qu’ils ont un avenir dans leur pays natal.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/260419/oran-les-jeunes-algeriens-remettent-plus-tard-leur-projet-de-migration?ong

    #espoir #Algérie #migrations #migrants_algériens #révolution #avenir #jeunes

    • Cette semaine dans une réunion, j’ai entendu (encore) : « Depuis le début du hirak, il n’y a plus de harraga ». Comme c’est venu d’un acteur associatif a priori bien informé, je me suis dit qu’il était temps de réagir.

      1. D’abord, c’est faux :) Depuis le 22 février , le MDN a annoncé avoir intercepté 578 personnes qui tentaient de quitter le territoire par la mer. La terminologie utilisée par le MDN permet d’affirmer qu’il parle de personnes algériennes.

      (NB : Ce chiffre vient de la compilation des communiqués du MDN. L’armée harmonise ses chiffres à la fin de chaque semestre, dans un bilan publié par El Djeich. Donc possible légère évolution du chiffre)

      (NB2 : Ces chiffres, ce sont les personnes arrêtées. Ça n’inclut pas ceux qui ont réussi à passer. Donc le nombre de départ est toujours supérieur. Mais ça donne une idée de la tendance)

      2. Vous allez me dire : oui, mais ça a quand même beaucoup diminué. Exact. Du 22/02 à aujourd’hui, le MDN a arrêté moitié moins de personnes que dans le seul mois de décembre 2018.

      Mais, désolée de vous décevoir, en liant cette baisse des départs au mouvement, vous oubliez un facteur essentiel de la harga : la météo. Et il a fait sacrement moche aux mois de janvier, février, mars et avril.

      Indice :
      Octobre : 544 arrêtés.
      Novembre : 532.
      Décembre : 929.
      Janvier : 77.

      (Pas de manifestation en janvier).

      Autre facteur important, qui peut expliquer le ralentissement des départs : le travail des forces de sécurité. Plusieurs passeurs ont été arrêtés et jugés en janvier/février. Mais cela a peu d’impact sur la « volonté de départ », un facteur de migration complexe.

      Revenons à la météo. Avril, temps pourri, 0 arretés. Mai, timide retour du soleil, 269 arrêtés. Juin (jusqu’à aujourd’hui), 128 arrêtés. Les jeunes qui partent expliquent qu’il faut 2 jours de beau temps au départ et à l’arrivée pour décider de lancer le bateau.

      3. Je m’arrête là avec une idée supplémentaire. Si vous pensez que le mouvement redonne de l’espoir, en tout cas suffisamment d’espoir pour repousser un projet de départ, pensez aux milieux d’où viennent ceux qui partent et à leurs problèmes quotidiens.

      Vous visualisez ces problèmes ? Maintenant, demandez vous, de quelle amélioration ont ils bénéficié depuis le 22 février ? Voilà, vous avez compris :) Je sais que c’était pourtant romantique comme idée, désolée de faire la rabat joie :/ Fin du thread.

      https://twitter.com/LeilaBeratto/status/1142476231918727168?s=19

      #fact-checking #émigration #Leïla_Beratto

  • IM TUNNEL | Theaterstück von Kai-Uwe Kohlschmidt

    Und wenn wir fliehen, dann hoffen wir.

    Wir hoffen auf die andere Welt.

    Das Land gelobt von unser Not und Träumen.

    Die Sphinx ein Auge hebt. Ihr Lächeln goldenstarr.

    Gehst du den Schritt, den nächsten.

    Menemenetekel. Was wiegt mein Ich.

    Die Asylrichterin Anna wird mit dem geheimnisvollen Fall der Syrerin Naida konfrontiert. Während der Anhörungen sieht die Richterin plötzlich Gesichter, hat Déjà-vus. Es scheint, als evoziere die Syrerin in ihr diese Bilder von einem Ort, an dem die Richterin als Baby ihre Eltern verlor: ein Fluchttunnel im Berlin der 60er Jahre.

    Ihre Mutter Hanna, Schriftstellerin, und ihr Vater Bartsch, Stasi-Offizier, haben sich in zunehmenden Konflikten mit der Gesellschaft in der DDR auseinandergelebt. Fritz, der Bruder der Mutter, ist bereits nach Westberlin geflohen. Er beginnt nun, einen Tunnel zu graben, um ihr und ihrer kleinen Tochter, die noch ein Baby ist, die Flucht zu ermöglichen. Die Widerstände sind vielfältig: Wassereinbrüche, ein Stasi-Gegentunnel, Streit und Verrat...

    Alb-und Schachtelträume — die Geschichte der Richterin Anna — die Geschichte der Syrerin Naida. Sind sie nur Reflektionen ihres eigenen Schicksals? Nur eine Imagination? Vielleicht der Schlüssel zu ihrem eigenen Trauma...

    http://www.kaiuwekohlschmidt.com/theater.html

    #théâtre #Allemagne #RDA #Syrie #asile #migration #confrontation #histoire

  • Post mai 68

    Que sont devenues dans les années 70 et après la pensée, les idées nées avec mai 68 : toute la semaine, la Fabrique interroge ces évolutions, et questionne la vision parfois trop idéaliste du mouvement actuellement célébré. Car des germes de dureté ont poussé aussi avec mai 68, une certaine radicalité a pu émerger et engendrer avec elle de nouveaux clivages, et certaines déceptions... Première étape ce matin avec notre grand témoin #Isabelle_Saint-Saëns qui fut membre du mouvement du #22_mars_1968 à #Nanterre. Elle nous raconte ici l’après de ces #espoirs ou de ces #utopies_anarchistes : comment certains se sont perdus, comment d’autres ont au contraire durci leur posture. Elle nous raconte aussi le lendemain des mythologies ouvriéristes et l’évolution de son propre #militantisme : comment elle s’est finalement investi dans de nouvelles formes d’action à partir des années 1980, via #Act_Up, le #Gisti, ou la revue #Vacarme .

    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/la-fabrique-de-lhistoire/post-mai-68-14
    #mai_68 #histoire

    –-> une interview qui date de 2008!

    Avec... @isskein en grand témoin!

  • #WARDI
    de #Mats_Grorud

    #Beyrouth, #Liban, aujourd’hui.
    Wardi, une jeune Palestinienne de onze ans, vit avec toute sa famille dans le #camp_de_réfugiés où elle est née.
    Sidi, son arrière-grand-père adoré, fut l’un des premiers à s’y installer après avoir été chassé de son village en 1948.
    Le jour où Sidi lui confie la clé de son ancienne maison en Galilée, Wardi craint qu’il ait perdu l’espoir d’y retourner un jour.
    Mais comment chaque membre de la famille peut-il aider à sa façon la petite fille à renouer avec cet #espoir ?


    https://www.jour2fete.com/distribution/wardi

    Bande-annonce :
    https://vimeo.com/314049635

    #film_d'animation #cinéma #film #réfugiés #réfugiés_palestiniens
    #graines #semences #arbres #odeur #fleurs #mémoire #histoires #occupation #clé #Histoire #Nakba #Israël #camps_de_réfugiés

    On y voit très bien l’évolution du camp de réfugiés... de quelques #tentes à un habitat dense, construit dans la #verticalité
    #urbanisme #architecture

    Sur le site il y a aussi un #dossier_pédagogique

    ping @reka

  • Germany pulls out of Mediterranean migrant mission Sophia

    Germany is suspending participation in Operation Sophia, the EU naval mission targeting human trafficking in the Mediterranean. The decision reportedly relates to Italy’s reluctance to allow rescued people to disembark.
    Germany will not be sending any more ships to take part in the anti-people smuggling operation Sophia in the Mediterranean Sea, according to a senior military officer.

    The decision means frigate Augsburg, currently stationed off the coast of Libya, will not be replaced early next month, Bundeswehr Inspector General Eberhard Zorn told members of the defense and foreign affairs committees in the German parliament.

    The 10 German soldiers currently working at the operation’s headquarters will, however, remain until at least the end of March.

    The European Union launched Operation Sophia in 2015 to capture smugglers and shut down human trafficking operations across the Mediterranean, as well as enforce a weapons embargo on Libya. Sophia currently deploys three ships, three airplanes, and two helicopters, which are permitted to use lethal force if necessary, though its mandate also includes training the North African country’s coast guard. The EU formally extended Operation Sophia by three months at the end of December.

    The Bundeswehr reported that, since its start, the naval operation had led to the arrest of more than 140 suspected human traffickers and destroyed more than 400 smuggling boats.

    But Operation Sophia’s efforts have largely focused on rescuing thousands of refugees from unseaworthy vessels attempting to get to Europe. According to the Bundeswehr, Operation Sophia has rescued some 49,000 people from the sea, while German soldiers had been involved in the rescue of 22,534 people.

    European impasse

    The operation has caused some friction within the EU, particularly with Italy, where the headquarters are located, and whose Interior Minister Matteo Salvini has threatened to close ports to the mission.

    Salvini, chairman of the far-right Lega Nord party, demanded on Wednesday that the mission had to change, arguing that the only reason it existed was that all the rescued refugees were brought to Italy. “If someone wants to withdraw from it, then that’s certainly no problem for us,” he told the Rai1 radio station, but in future he said the mission should only be extended if those rescued were distributed fairly across Europe. This is opposed by other EU member states, particularly Poland and Hungary.

    Italy’s position drew a prickly response from German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, who accused Sophia’s Italian commanders of sabotaging the mission by sending the German ship to distant corners of the Mediterranean where there were “no smuggling routes whatsoever” and “no refugee routes.”

    “For us it’s important that it be politically clarified in Brussels what the mission’s task is,” von der Leyen told reporters at the Davos forum in Switzerland.

    Fritz Felgentreu, ombudsman for the Bundestag defense committee, told public broadcaster Deutschlandfunk that Italy’s refusal to let migrants rescued from the sea disembark at its ports meant the operation could no longer fulfill its original mandate.

    The EU played down Germany’s decision. A spokeswoman for the bloc’s diplomatic service, the EEAS, told the DPA news agency that Germany had not ruled out making other ships available for the Sophia Operation in future, a position confirmed by a German Defense Ministry spokesman.

    Decision a ’tragedy’

    The decision sparked instant criticism from various quarters in Germany. Stefan Liebich, foreign affairs spokesman for Germany’s socialist Left party, called the government’s decision to suspend its involvement a “tragedy.”

    “As long as Sophia is not replaced by a civilian operation, even more people will drown,” he told the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung.

    The Green party, for its part, had a more mixed reaction. “We in the Green party have always spoken out against the military operation in the Mediterranean and have consistently rejected the training of the Libyan coast guard,” said the party’s defense spokeswoman, Agnieszka Brugger. But she added that Wednesday’s announcement had happened “for the wrong reasons.”

    Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, defense policy spokeswoman for the Free Democratic Party (FDP), called the decision a sign of the EU’s failure to find a common refugee policy.

    Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), meanwhile, defended the decision. “The core mission, to fight trafficking crimes, cannot currently be effectively carried out,” the party’s defense policy spokesman, Henning Otte, said in a statement. “If the EU were to agree to common procedure with refugees, this mission could be taken up again.”

    Otte also suggested a “three-stage model” as a “permanent solution for the Mediterranean.” This would include a coast guard from Frontex, the European border patrol agency; military patrols in the Mediterranean; and special facilities on the North African mainland to take in refugees and check asylum applications.

    https://www.dw.com/en/germany-pulls-out-of-mediterranean-migrant-mission-sophia/a-47189097
    #Allemagne #résistance #Operation_Sophia #asile #migrations #réfugiés #retrait #espoir (petit mais quand même)

    • EU: Italy’s choice to end or continue Operation Sophia

      The European Commission says it is up to Italy to decide whether or not to suspend the EU’s naval operation Sophia.

      “If Italy decides, it is the country in command of operation Sophia, to stop it - it is up to Italy to make this decision,” Dimitris Avramopoulos, the EU commissioner for migration, told reporters in Brussels on Wednesday (23 January).

      The Italian-led naval operation was launched in 2015 and is tasked with cracking down on migrant smugglers and traffickers off the Libyan coast.

      It has also saved some 50,000 people since 2015 but appears to have massively scaled back sea rescues, according to statements from Germany’s defence minster.

      German defence minister Ursula von der Leyen was cited by Reuters on Wednesday saying that the Italian command had been sending the Germany navy “to the most remote areas of the Mediterranean where there are no smuggling routes and no migrant flows so that the navy has not had any sensible role for months.”

      Germany had also announced it would not replace its naval asset for the operation, whose mandate is set to expire at the end of March.

      But the commission says that Germany will continue to participate in the operation.

      “There is no indication that it will not make another asset available in the future,” said Avramopoulos.

      A German spokesperson was also cited as confirming Germany wants the mission to continue beyond March.

      The commission statements follow threats from Italy’s far-right interior minister Matteo Salvini to scrap the naval mission over an on-going dispute on where to disembark rescued migrants.

      Salvini was cited in Italian media complaining that people rescued are only offloaded in Italy.

      The complaint is part of a long-outstanding dispute by Salvini, who last year insisted that people should be disembarked in other EU states.

      The same issue was part of a broader debate in the lead up to a renewal of Sophia’s mandate in late December.

      https://euobserver.com/migration/143997

    • #Operazione_Sophia

      In riferimento alle odierne dichiarazioni relative all’operazione Sophia dell’UE, il Ministro degli Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale Enzo Moavero Milanesi ricorda che «L’Italia non ha mai chiesto la chiusura di Sophia. Ha chiesto che siano cambiate, in rigorosa e doverosa coerenza con le conclusioni del Consiglio Europeo di giugno 2018, le regole relative agli sbarchi delle persone salvate in mare». Infatti, gli accordi dell’aprile 2015 prevedono che siano sbarcate sempre in Italia, mentre il Consiglio Europeo del giugno scorso ha esortato gli Stati UE alla piena condivisione di tutti gli oneri relativi ai migranti.

      https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/operazione-sophia.html

    • First Light – Migration in the Swiss alps

      “Escape from hardship, because it is the only hope.” is what the father of the little Iranian boy explained to me as to why his son is named Vihan. (In Persian, the name Vihan can be translated as “First light” or hope)

      From August to October 2016 I had the opportunity to work as ‘artist in residence’, on a project for SMART (Sustainable Mountain Art programme) in Switzerland, creating pictures to raise awareness on the challenges facing mountain regions. I chose the theme of migration that has interested me for some time already.

      Since the middle ages, demographic pressure, armed conflict and oppression, natural disasters and overpopulation have driven the cause for Migration in the Swiss mountain regions. The largest mass emigration being of the Walser people from Lötschental, who over the course of 2 centuries established themselves over the Valais region and even as far as Austria.

      The foreigner’s lot was that of having very limited rights and labeled with the status of ‘inhabitant’, often not welcomed and even restricted by opposition to marriage to locals.

      I stayed in the historical village of #Medergen in the Graubünden, established by the #Walser people as early as 1300 with houses dating back to the 1700s, high in the alps at 2000m above sea level. A special, tiny village almost frozen in time, as people live a very modest life with no running water inside the house, which also means no flushing toilets or showers. Wooden stoves are used for cooking and heating water for washing, as there is no electricity either, except for the recent additions of solar panels. People use buckets to fetch water from the fresh water fountains, just like Heidi! :)

      In Litzirüti the closest village to Medergen, there is an old ski-hotel, that has been transformed into a temporary home for about 100 asylum seekers from various war torn and heavily oppressed countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Siria, Gambia, Tibet, awaiting the decision of the Swiss government to announce their fate, if they will be rejected or if they will be given permission to stay in Switzerland.

      During the time I worked on the project, I hiked four hours up and down the mountain every second or third day, spending time and getting to know some of the people who reside here. If you ask anyone they will say that they are very thankful to be here in this peaceful village of Litzirüti and to be so well looked after in this beautiful place. And thankful to be in a country where there is peace and modern prosperity.

      However, thankful for escaping the unimaginable oppression and life threatening situations in their home countries, it is clear that they now have to deal with new challenges and difficulty in their lives. The youth in particular find it challenging to be in such a tiny village where there isn’t a single shop or anything to stimulate their growing minds. Furthermore, most of the people have been in Switzerland for a year or more, still waiting to have an interview to have their reasons for needing asylum assessed and their fate and extent of freedom, decided accordingly.

      What I’ve learnt from my research and looking at both the history of migration and what is happening today, is that the same challenges that existed centuries ago still exist today, namely that whenever there are newcomers, inevitably there is at least a degree of resistance to their acceptance that they are met with and state control that is the decider of their fate, prolonging the process of integration, usually in order to protect the fears of the established.

      “Cultural diversity is as essential to humanity as biodiversity is to nature. It makes the world a richer and more varied place and enlarges the range of choices available. It is the breeding ground that allows different cultures to continue and develop and enrich themselves through contact with each other, without drifting towards rigid identities. It is one of the sources of development, which must be perceived not merely in terms of economic growth , but also as a means of attaining to a satisfying intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence.”

      (Quote from the SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation on the importance of culture for development).

      By depicting the contrast between the history of migration in the Swiss alps and the rich traditions that has become established in time, with the current asylum seeker and refugee situation mostly being a state of limbo, I aim to raise awareness of the current day migrants (asylum seekers) and remind people that sooner or later in life we all were or will be migrants again.

      I believe that through time, if cultures can embrace their differences, be it language, colour, traditions or spirituality, they will see that on the other side is another human being with the same hopes and desires as themselves and that we can all benefit and be so much richer for getting to know each other and giving each other the freedom to live out our own identity that makes us complete and wholesome human beings.


      http://lavonne.co.za/lavonnebosmanphotographicart/portfolio/first-light-migration-swissalps
      #Suisse #Alpes #Grisons

    • The Italian Ski Resort

      From Libya via Lampedusa. In the dark, the hotel that loomed after the last hairpin bend looked rather like Overlook in Stanley Kubrick’s film The Shining. But that’s where the resemblance ends. Montecampione, altitude 1,800 meters, is a ski resort at the end of the road winding up the Camonica Valley in Lombardy. The most striking thing on arrival here is being greeted with the faces and voices from another continent. Since June 2011, more than 100 Africans who fled the war inhave been settled in this hotel by the Brescia police authority, in line with the Italian government’s policy of spreading thearound the country. In most places the local authorities have been required to house them, but here private enterprise has also been asked to contribute. The hotel in Montecampione houses and feeds the migrants for 40 euros a head per day. The nearest village in the valley is more than 20km away, so the migrants are cut off from the outside world while they await a decision on their fates.
      “We live in a strange situation here,” admitted a lively young Ghanaian called Michael. “We’ve got absolutely nothing to do, but we’re all impatient to find work and start our lives again.” The last five migrants to arrive in Montecampione are equally bewildered. They reached Lampedusa early in August, and were taken across Italy. They have got plenty of time to find out about where they have ended up.

      http://www.bclaudia.com/libya-refugees/eleanor-rigby
      #Italy #stations_de_ski

    • Des photos, mais aussi un #film...

      Ilmurrán

      Nell’estate 2014, una giovane ragazza Maasai ha raggiunto una “pastora” piemontese sui pascoli delle Alpi Marittime. Due donne lontanissime tra loro, diverse per colore di pelle, generazione e lingua hanno vissuto una stagione d’alpeggio insieme, condividendo il lavoro, raccontandosi la loro storia, riconoscendosi più vicine.

      Le loro voci arrivano da lontano. Silvia si muove tra elementi primordiali, produce il formaggio con gli strumenti dei suoi antenati, ha tramandato la passione a suo figlio come in un rituale. Leah ha impressi a fuoco sulla pelle i simboli di un popolo pastore che ancora sopravvive sugli altipiani del Kenya. L’una e l’altra incarnano culture che oggi si trovano di fronte a scelte decisive, necessarie per la loro sopravvivenza. Ilmurrán significa “guerrieri”, perché la loro è una storia di resistenza.

      L’incontro è nato come un’esperienza antropologica a tutti gli effetti, realizzata in regime di completa autoproduzione dall’Associazione Culturale Geronimo Carbonò.


      http://www.ilmurran.it
      #Italie #Maasaï #pastoralisme #Alpes_maritimes #femmes