• How European countries wrongfully classify children seeking asylum as adults

    Thousands of children seeking protection in Greece, Italy, and the UK have likely been registered as adults – a failure with serious consequences.

    In July 2015, a Gambian teenager named Omar boarded a dinghy in Libya and crossed the Mediterranean Sea. Hours after landing in Italy, he was accused of steering the boat and arrested for people smuggling – a charge levelled against many asylum seekers and migrants attempting to reach Europe.

    Omar, whose name has been changed to protect his identity, told Italian authorities that he was 16 – a minor. But they didn’t believe him and X-rayed his hand and wrist to determine his age. Based on the results of the medical exam, authorities determined Omar was over 18.

    The exam that was used can have a margin of error of over two years, and many medical organisations believe it to be inaccurate. But it is still administered in numerous European countries.

    Omar was sent to Pagliarelli prison, the largest adult carceral facility in Sicily, to await trial. After months being there, he was able to connect with a lawyer, Cinzia Pecoraro, who had successfully defended other detainees facing smuggling charges.

    “You could see from his face he was a child,” Pecoraro, reflecting on her first visit to see Omar, told Solomon. “You can’t stay here,” she remembers telling him.

    But by the time Pecοraro was able to prove Omar was a minor, he had already spent a year in adult prison. Nearly a decade later, “he remains traumatised,” Pecoraro said. “He stutters, and he’s afraid of everything.”

    Omar’s case isn’t isolated. Solomon and The New Humanitarian spent more than six months investigating the wrongful classification of asylum seeking minors as adults in Greece, Italy, and the UK, speaking to over 30 lawyers, doctors, and human rights advocates, and analysing court documents and reports. The reporting showed that:

    - Unaccompanied children seeking asylum in all three countries have been repeatedly classified as adults, including by border security force officials who sometimes arbitrarily decided the age of asylum seekers;

    - The assessment systems that are used to determine people’s ages are unreliable, poorly implemented, and often violate the legal rights of children;

    - And that systemic issues – including a lack of qualified interpreters – makes it difficult for children who are wrongfully qualified as adults to appeal their cases.

    ‘Consequences can be disastrous‘

    Every year, tens of thousands of children undertake dangerous journeys to Europe on their own, often in search of safety or to reunite with relatives. In 2023, more than 41,500 unaccompanied children applied for asylum in EU countries.

    Over the past decade, that number has ebbed and flowed, along with the overall number of asylum seekers reaching Europe, from a low of around 13,500 in 2020 to a high of nearly 92,000 in 2015. In the UK, out of around 75,000 asylum applications submitted last fiscal year (ending in October), around 4,600 came from unaccompanied minors.

    It is difficult to know how many children have been wrongfully classified as adults because many cases are never documented.

    Italy does not collect data on the number of age classification cases that have been challenged and overturned. Numerous requests by Solomon and The New Humanitarian to the Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum for data have gone unanswered. A document provided by the ministry to the Greek parliament, however, said that, between the end of April 2021 and the end of March 2023, there were 1,024 age dispute cases. In 37% of these cases, the people involved were found to be children.

    Meanwhile, in the UK, between the start of 2020 and September 2023, there were 9,681 age dispute cases. In 55% of these, the people were found to be children.

    The stakes for children when are high. Obtaining an accurate age assessment can make the difference between having access to shelter or being forced to live on the streets and between gaining legal status or being deported.

    Like Omar, other children wrongfully classified as adults have been tried in the adult criminal justice system.

    In one high-profile case, six young Afghan asylum seekers were accused of starting the fire that burned down the notorious Moria refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesvos in September 2020. Two of them were already registered as minors. Three of the other four said they were under 18, but were tried as adults after being given an age assessment exam. They were convicted and sentenced to 10-year jail terms.

    Last month, a judge in an appeals case found the three of the defendants who said they were minors were in fact under 18 at the time of the fire and that the age assessment exam they had been given had not followed procedures. The judge declared a mistrial, and the three defendants will now be tried again as minors. They have been released from prison – although they are barred from leaving Greece – as they await their new trial, but only after spending three and a half years in a prison for inmates between the ages of 18 and 25.

    In general, children being incorrectly classified as adults during trials leads to harsher sentences, and time spent in adult prisons increases the likelihood of them being exposed to violence and abuse.

    Outside the criminal justice system, children wrongfully classified as adults are also denied rights, such as access to education, and face bureaucratic barriers to reuniting with family members in other European countries.

    “These consequences can be disastrous,” Monica Mazza, a psychologist based in Turin, Italy and a member of the Italian Society of Migration Medicine, told Solomon. “They can affect [minors] for long periods of their life.”
    ‘There’s bias built into the system’

    The problem of minors being classified as adults is a symptom of often overburdened and under-resourced asylum systems in EU countries and the UK, according to some of the experts Solomon spoke to.

    Governments say that they use age assessments to protect minors and to prevent adults from pretending to be children to try to gain easier access to legal status, protection from deportation, and better services. But some experts say the dysfunction of asylum systems – which in many places (including the UK, Italy, and Greece) are being made increasingly draconian as a strategy to try to deter migration – creates an incentive for some people to try to game the system.

    “If you know that after turning 18 you’re screwed, then you do anything to remain 17 your whole life,” said Nikolaos Gkionakis, a psychologist and co-founder of Babel Day Center, which provides mental health services to asylum seekers and migrants in Athens, Greece.

    At the same time, minors also sometimes claim to be adults, according to lawyers Solomon spoke to, especially when they have relatives in other European countries and want to avoid getting stuck in formal family reunification processes that often move at a glacial pace. “They know they’d end up stuck in a childcare facility,” Rosa Lo Faro, a lawyer who works with asylum seekers and migrants in Catania, Italy, said.

    Underaged girls who are victims of human trafficking are also often forced by traffickers to claim that they are over 18 so they don’t end up in the more robust child protection system. “This is why an accurate age assessment process is important,” Mazza, the Turin-based psychologist, added.

    At best, however, the evaluation methods EU countries and the UK rely on when doubts are raised to determine people’s age have their limitations. At worst, they are fundamentally flawed.

    With hundreds of thousands of people applying for asylum each year, accurately categorising applicants as adults or children, and channelling them into the corresponding system, presents a significant challenge. A few countries (including the UK, Serbia, and Ireland), have relied on visual and biographical age assessments to do this. But many European countries (including Italy and Greece), frequently use medical testing, despite numerous warnings from experts and medical associations that they are inaccurate and unethical.

    “There is no scientific test that can be used to tell you precisely how old a child is in terms of looking at their age for immigration and asylum purposes,” says professor Andew Roland, a consultant in paediatric emergency medicine and officer for child protection at the UK’s Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. “The methods that have been proposed to be used in this age assessment process, the answer that they give is often an age range.”

    One of the most commonly used methods – which was used on Omar – is a bone age assessment done by x-raying the hand and wrist using the Greulich-Pyle atlas. Developed in the 1950s using data gathered from Caucasian children, the test doesn’t take ethnicity or other variables, such as socioeconomic background and nutritional status, into account.

    “It’s important to know that there’s bias built into the system,” Ranit Mishori, a senior medical advisor for Physicians for Human Rights who has written about the inaccuracy of medical age assessments, told Solomon.

    In 2018, the European Society of Pediatric Radiology recommended against using the Greulich-Pyle atlas, as well as other bone measurement methods, as age assessment tests. Despite this, the Greulich-Pyle atlas continues to be widely used.

    In 2019, the World Medical Association (WMA) released a statement recommending that “medical age assessments only be carried out in exceptional cases and only after all non-medical methods have been exhausted”.

    “There is conflicting evidence about the accuracy and reliability of the available methods of age assessment, which may generate significant margins of error,” the statement said.

    Countries like Italy and Greece, however, continue to use medical age assessments as the primary method to determine the age of minors.
    ‘Without observing basic fairness’

    In addition to concerns about the accuracy of tests, authorities often disregard laws on how age assessments are supposed to be conducted.

    In Greece and Italy, medical testing is only supposed to be conducted after a psychosocial assessment by social workers, child psychologists, and neuropsychiatrists. But lawyers and NGO workers said this step is often skipped in both countries.

    In Greece, this is often due to a shortage of qualified professionals. In 2021, for example, age assessments on the island of Lesvos were suspended for six months because of a lack of qualified personnel. During this time, people who said they were minors but were not believed by authorities were placed in tents with hundreds of adults at the reception centre on the island.

    One Afghan asylum seeker who claimed to be 16 was placed in a tent with 180 men where he was threatened with rape before eventually being attacked with a knife in the toilets.

    In Italy, a recent report found that out of 102 local health authorities (the main institutions that conduct age assessments), only 29 implemented a 2017 law aimed at improving the asylum system for children, which included a more comprehensive age assessment procedure involving a social worker and a psychological or neuropsychiatric evaluation. Instead, most still use age assessments that heavily rely on medical exams.

    In addition to the Greulich-Pyle atlas, Italy is one of several countries – including Germany, Austria, and Croatia – that still uses highly intrusive sexual maturation genital exams to determine age. “A minor can decide not to do it, but he could be declared over eighteen,” Alice Argento, an Italian immigration lawyer, said.

    In the UK, where authorities have relied almost exclusively on visual and psychosocial age assessments in recent years, issues have still arisen.

    On 14 December 2020, an asylum seeker – who is referred to as MA in court documents – arrived in the UK in the back of a lorry after being separated from his mother. Police picked him up at a gas station in the middle of the night after he asked for help. His age assessment happened at noon the following day. Lasting just 42 minutes, the assessment concluded he was 20 years-old – despite his claims that he was 16.

    “I had only just arrived and I was very tired and so I was not certain of what happened or what was said,” MA said in a witness statement. “The interpreter was there, but they were only on the phone and there was no one there to look out for me, just the two people who were asking me many questions. It was a very difficult experience.”

    MA ended up spending three days in an immigration removal centre before being sent to an accommodation for adult asylum seekers. According to his lawyers, he wasn’t given a copy of his age assessment or made aware that he could challenge the result.

    In June 2022, a High Court judge noted that MA had been given an age assessment that was unlawful. “Hundreds of children were subject to this guidance and age disputed under a truncated process that operated without observing basic fairness or providing young people with an appropriate adult,” MA’s lawyers said in a statement.
    ‘Life changing implications’

    Under a legal principle called favor minoris (favouring the minor) international law requires that asylum seekers who declare themselves to be under 18 should be treated as minors until their age can be confirmed. This principle is often disregarded.

    In Greece, for example, children spent months stranded in camps for adults. “Through correspondence with the authorities, we found out that the presumption to minority was not applied in cases where minors who were wrongly registered as adults were waiting for the age assessment results,” said Dimitra Linardaki, who works with the NGO Fenix.

    In Italy, “there is no favor minoris”, immigration lawyer Nicola Datena said. Instead of being protected, children are often left at the mercy of a system that questions them, he added.

    Unaccompanied minors often don’t know that they can challenge an age misclassification, and they struggle to access quality legal representation. The onus for overturning an incorrect age classification is almost entirely on the children, according to experts. And lawyers in Italy said that authorities sometimes intentionally register minors as adults to allow them to be deported. The Italian Ministry of Interior has not responded to The New Humanitarian’s request for comment on this allegation.

    As political attitudes toward migration in Europe continue to shift rightward, there is little sign of governments being interested in improving or replacing current age assessment systems, despite the clearly documented problems. In fact, in the UK, as part of its efforts to crack down on migration, the government has announced that it intends to introduce medical age testing.

    While the flaws in current approaches are apparent, the question remains: what would a better system look like?

    Some medical associations advocate for the use of multiple assessment tools, combining psychosocial and medical exams that involve X-rays and CT scans. But other medical experts worry about the risks associated with exposing children to radiation. “You have to balance the risks of these exams with the benefits. And all this radiation really kind of gives me a pause,” said Mishori from Physicians for Human Rights.

    “These decisions that have been taken have absolutely life changing implications for some of the most vulnerable young people in our society,” said Roland, from the UK’s Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. “To base some of those decisions on unspecific scientific outcomes, to expose those young people to radiation – it really is not ethically acceptable; it’s not scientifically robust.”

    Overall, the flaws in age assessment systems are reflective of the problems within European asylum systems as a whole, lawyers, researchers, and migration experts said. With the focus on reducing migration rather than providing people protection, “what’s missing is the willingness to do a good job,” Argento said.

    #enfants #enfance #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Grèce #Italie #UK #Angleterre #âge #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #test #test_osseux #estimation


    sur les tests osseux pour déterminer l’âge, voir aussi :
    – la position de la Société Suisse de Pédiatrie : https://asile.ch/2017/05/29/position-de-societe-suisse-de-pediatrie-determination-de-lage-jeunes-migrants
    – la position des Sociétés Suisses de Radiologie Pédiatrique (SSRP) ainsi que d’Endocrinologie et Diabétologie Pédiatriques (SSEDP) : https://asile.ch/2016/09/01/paediatrica-lage-osseux-ne-permet-de-determiner-lage-jeunes-requerants-dasile

    • La construction des prix à la SNCF, une socio-histoire de la tarification. De la #péréquation au yield management (1938-2012)

      Cet article analyse les conditions de production et de légitimation des systèmes de prix des billets de train en France, depuis la création de la SNCF en 1938. Initialement fondé sur le principe d’un tarif kilométrique uniforme, le système historique de péréquation est lentement abandonné au cours des décennies d’après-guerre, au profit d’une tarification indexée sur les coûts marginaux. Au tournant des années 1980-1990, ce paradigme est lui-même remplacé par un dispositif de tarification en temps réel – le yield management – visant à capter le maximum du surplus des consommateurs. Les transformations des modèles tarifaires à la SNCF, qui s’accompagnent d’une redéfinition de la notion éminemment polymorphe de service public ferroviaire, résultent du travail de quelques acteurs de premier plan. Ces « faiseurs de prix », qui mobilisent les instruments de la discipline économique et usent de leur capacité d’influence, agissent dans des contextes (politiques, sociaux, techniques et concurrentiels) particuliers, qui rendent possibles, nécessaires et légitimes les innovations qu’ils proposent.



    • Noël : est-ce vraiment moins cher de réserver son train SNCF 3 mois à l’avance ?

      C’est un fait : les tarifs des trajets en train pour la période de Noël ont explosé entre octobre et fin décembre 2023. Nous avons suivi, semaine après semaine, leur évolution. Voici les résultats, parfois surprenants, de notre enquête.

      « Plus on réserve un train à l’avance, plus les prix sont bas. » La phrase de la SNCF semble logique. Mais est-elle vérifiée ? À l’approche des fêtes de Noël, nous avons décidé de nous lancer dans une petite enquête. Numerama a relevé les tarifs d’une vingtaine de trajets en train à travers la France, sur les douze dernières semaines, pour en mesurer l’évolution.

      Nous avions une question principale : est-ce vrai qu’il vaut mieux réserver son billet de train trois mois à l’avance, pour le payer moins cher ? Suivie d’une autre : comment les tarifs évoluent-ils à travers le temps, et à quel rythme les trains deviennent-ils complets ?

      Nous avons choisi arbitrairement dix allers-retours à travers la France. La date est toujours la même, pour simuler un voyage pour les fêtes de fin d’année : un aller le 22 décembre, un retour le 27 décembre. Nous avons choisi un train par jour et suivi l’évolution du tarif des billets chaque semaine, à compter du mercredi 4 octobre, soit la date de l’ouverture des ventes (qui avaient d’ailleurs mis en panne SNCF Connect).
      Prendre ses billets tôt pour Noël permet d’éviter le pire

      Après douze semaines de relevés et une agrégation des données, le premier constat est clair : les tarifs ont énormément augmenté sur cette période. Il est évident que, même s’il y a des exceptions, il reste très intéressant de prendre son billet le plus tôt possible. C’est d’ailleurs ce que la SNCF nous a confirmé, par mail : « Plus on réserve à l’avance, plus les prix sont bas. Le mieux est donc de réserver dès l’ouverture des ventes, ou alors dans les semaines qui suivent. »

      Sur ce graphique, nous avons matérialisé la hausse de tous les trajets confondus. À part une ou deux exceptions (en TER), tous les billets ont augmenté, parfois beaucoup. Certains trajets se sont retrouvés complets très vite — nous les avons matérialisés avec un petit rond barré sur le graphique ci-dessous.

      Les prix peuvent parfois varier du simple au double. Le trajet Nantes-Bordeaux, par exemple, est passé de 58 euros à 136 euros (dernières places en première classe), soit une augmentation de 164 %. Un Strasbourg-Paris a terminé à 153 euros, au lieu de 93 euros il y a trois mois.

      Des hausses de prix jusqu’à 150 %

      Au global, les TGV sont les trains qui subissent les plus grosses hausses à travers le temps, sauf quelques exceptions (Marseille-Nice n’a pas changé d’un iota au fil des 12 semaines, par exemple).

      Sur cette carte réalisée par l’équipe design de Numerama, Adèle Foehrenbacher et Claire Braikeh, on observe quels sont les trajets qui ont subi la plus forte hausse (en rouge foncé), par rapport à ceux qui n’ont pas beaucoup bougé sur 3 mois (en rose).

      Pour les retours de Noël sur la journée du 27 décembre, les trajets les plus onéreux sont les mêmes (Paris-Toulouse, Paris-Strasbourg, Nantes-Bordeaux).

      Certains billets sont moins chers quelques jours avant le départ

      Lorsque nous avons commencé cette enquête, nous nous sommes demandé s’il serait possible qu’un billet devienne moins cher à l’approche de la date du voyage, ce qui est plutôt contre-intuitif. Une occurrence est venue, sur la dernière semaine, être l’exception qui confirme la règle : le trajet Paris-La Rochelle (en jaune ci-dessous) est devenu, au dernier moment, moins cher à l’approche du voyage, par rapport au tarif d’il y a trois mois.

      Autre cas curieux : nous avons constaté au fil des semaines une variation à la baisse sur le trajet Nancy-Grenoble, avec une correspondance. « Ce phénomène est extrêmement rare », nous assure la SNCF. « Nancy-Grenoble n’est pas un train direct. Il se peut que l’un des deux trains se remplissent moins vite et que des petits prix aient été rajoutés à un moment donné », explique-t-on. Le voyage a fini par augmenter de nouveau, pour devenir complet deux semaines avant le départ.

      Le trajet n’est pourtant pas le seul exemple. Prenons le trajet en TER et Train NOMAD Caen-Le Havre. Le 4 octobre, le voyage revenait à 38,4 euros. Surprise ! Dès la semaine suivante, il est tombé à 18 euros, pour rester fixe pendant plusieurs mois. Jusqu’au 13 décembre, où le prix a re-grimpé jusqu’à 48 euros — l’horaire du train de départ ayant été modifié de quelques minutes. Ici, ce n’est pas la SNCF, mais les conseils régionaux qui valident les prix. Par mail, l’établissement régional des lignes normandes nous assure que « la baisse des prix 15 jours après l’ouverture des ventes est impossible ». C’est pourtant le constat que nous avons fait, dès une semaine après l’ouverture.

      Pourquoi de telles hausses ?

      Cela fait plusieurs années que la SNCF a commencé à modifier la manière dont elle décide des tarifs, selon le journaliste spécialisé Gilles Dansart. La compagnie aurait décidé de « faire payer beaucoup plus cher à mesure que l’on s’approche de la date de départ du train », alors qu’auparavant, elle se calquait sur la longueur des kilomètres parcourus pour étalonner ses prix, a-t-il analysé sur France Culture le 21 décembre.

      Contactée, la SNCF nous explique : « Les prix sont les mêmes que pour n’importe quelles dates. Il n’y a pas de prix spécifiques pour Noël. Ce qui fait évoluer les prix, c’est le taux de remplissage et la demande. À Noël les trains se remplissent plus vite et les paliers maximum peuvent être atteints plus rapidement. »

      Ces paliers sont un véritable enjeu, lorsque l’on voit que certains trajets se retrouvent complets très rapidement — le Paris-Toulouse du 22 décembre s’est en effet retrouvé complet, selon nos constats, en à peine une semaine, début octobre.

      En 10 ans, la SNCF a perdu 105 TGV, soit 30 000 sièges, a calculé récemment France 2 dans un reportage. « On n’arrivait plus à remplir les TGV, il y avait des taux d’occupation à moins de 60 % », a expliqué à leur micro Christophe Fanichet, directeur général de SNCF Voyageurs.

      Cette politique de financement de la SNCF ne va pas aller en s’arrangeant pour les voyageurs et voyageuses : l’entreprise a déjà entériné une augmentation du prix des TGV pour 2024, rappelle le Parisien.


    • Mais on sait que l’investissement sur l’infra était sous dimensionnée autour de 2005, donc voir monter les coûts de péages de l’infra n’a rien d’anormal.
      Nos voisins sont-ils sous le prix réel ? Alors il vont subir un effet boomerang plus tard (effet dette).

  • The Social Cost of Automobility, Cycling and Walking in the European Union

    #Cost-benefit-analyses (#CBA) are widely used to assess transport projects. Comparing various CBA frameworks, this paper concludes that the range of parameters considered in EU transport CBA is limited. A comprehensive list of criteria is presented, and unit costs identified. These are used to calculate the external and private cost of automobility, cycling and walking in the European Union. Results suggest that each kilometer driven by car incurs an external cost of €0.11, while cycling and walking represent benefits of €0.18 and €0.37 per kilometer. Extrapolated to the total number of passenger kilometers driven, cycled or walked in the European Union, the cost of automobility is about €500 billion per year. Due to positive health effects, cycling is an external benefit worth €24 billion per year and walking €66 billion per year. CBA frameworks in the EU should be widened to better include the full range of externalities, and, where feasible, be used comparatively to better understand the consequences of different transport investment decisions.

    #marche #piétons #vélo #voiture #coût #bénéfice #calcul #mobilité #externalités #externalités_positives #externalités_négatives #économie #transport

    voir aussi:
    How Much Does Your Choice Of Commute Really Cost?

    via @freakonometrics

  • The Economist – Frozen Out – How the world is leaving Europe behind

    Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, is using energy as a weapon. Our data journalists set themselves a difficult question: how many people is this weapon likely to kill outside Ukraine? The answer they came up with was alarming. Although heatwaves get more press, cold temperatures are usually deadlier than hot ones. To estimate the relationship between energy costs and deaths, we built a statistical model that predicts how many people die per winter week in each of 226 European regions. This model found that a 10% rise in electricity prices is associated with a 0.6% increase in deaths, concentrated among the elderly and infirm. If the historical relationships between mortality, weather and energy costs continue to apply—which they may not, given how high current prices are—the death toll from the energy weapon could exceed the number of soldiers who have died so far in direct combat from bullets, shells, missiles and drones. It is one more reason why Ukraine’s fight against Russia is Europe’s, too. 
    Our data team’s work sets the scene for our cover this week. Europe faces a crisis of energy and geopolitics that will weaken it—and could threaten its global position. If you ask Europe’s friends around the world what they think of the old continent’s prospects they often respond with two emotions. One is admiration. In the struggle to help Ukraine and resist Russian aggression, Europe has displayed unity, grit and a principled willingness to bear enormous costs. But the second is alarm. A brutal economic squeeze will pose a test of Europe’s resilience in 2023 and beyond. There is a growing fear that the recasting of the global energy system, American economic populism and geopolitical rifts threaten the long-run competitiveness of all European countries, Britain included. The worry is not just about the continent’s prosperity; the health of the transatlantic alliance is at risk, too.

  • L’impact des passes sanitaires sur le taux de vaccination, la Santé, et L’économie
    Avec un résumé en français !
    Le Conseil d’Analyse Économique est un organisme qui dépend du gouvernement.

    Résumé de l’arnaque intellectuelle du #CAE :

    1/2 - Ils supposent (et non pas prouvent) que la vaccination empêche de tomber malade et de mourir.
    - Ils constatent que le passe sanitaire force les gens à accepter la vaccination.
    - Ils concluent que le passe sanitaire sauve des vies.

    2/2 et préserve l’économie en empêchant de tomber malade.

    C’est donc le sophisme habituel : si je suppose que ça fonctionne, alors je conclue que ça fonctionne (mais j’ai fait des graphiques et des modèles mathématiques au milieu pour noyer le poisson)


    • mais c’est é-vi-dent que si on sait pas / veut pas faire de campagne vaccination publique sans faire un pass et que celui-ci entraîne des vaccinations, il sauve des vies. pas besoin du cae pour savoir ça. et moins besoin encore de le nier parce que donc c’est puisque c’est le cae. tu cavale après pas mal de leurres que tu te crée. arrête toi un moment, respire par le nez, médite, rêvasse, ça peut être - qui sait ? - l’occasion d’arriver à s’orienter.

    • Arrête toi un moment, respire par le nez, médite, rêvasse, ça peut être - qui sait ? ...

      C’est fait ! 17 km de ski fond seule sur les pistes ensoleillées ! Neige parfaite ! Super Glisse ! Le plein de vitamines D et C !
      Là je me détends en regardant la course individuelle masculine de Biathlon en savourant une tranche de Bescoing du coin tout en étant connectée à mes comptes préférés !

      J’ai pas l’impression d’être désorientée ! :)) @colporteur !

    • La vaccination n’empêche pas d’être malade, protège seulement des formes graves du Covid et de finir en réa. C’est peut-être déjà beaucoup mais ce n’est pas suffisant.
      Je suis consternée par tous les triples-dosés bientôt les quadruples injectées qui continuent de s’infecter en présentant pour la plupart certes de faibles symptômes.

      Pour évaluer l’impact du pass vaccinal dans chacun de ces pays, nous construisons des #contrefactuels c’est‐à‐dire que nous modélisons ce que la dynamique de #vaccination aurait été sans la mise en place du pass. Pour cela, nous utilisons une #estimation basée sur la théorie de diffusion des innovations qui permet de quantifier la manière dont une innovation – ici la vaccination – est graduellement adoptée par la population. En effet, une partie de l’augmentation du taux de vaccination dans les trois pays considérés aurait eu lieu même sans #pass-sanitaire.

      En utilisant les données disponibles sur l’impact de la vaccination (en distinguant entre première et seconde doses) sur les admissions à l’hôpital ainsi que sur le nombre de décès Covid, on peut aussi estimer l’impact du pass sur ces variables de santé. On estime ainsi le nombre de décès évités dans les trois pays : environ 4 000 en France, 1 100 en Allemagne et 1 300 en Italie.

      C’est surtout par rapport au procédé de faire accepter le #passe-vaccinal en utilisant la formule on suppose, on estime, ça fonctionne, que je réagis !

    • Je me demandais d’où venaient le chiffre wtf de 4000 vies épargnées par le pass sanitaire cité par Castex !
      Il vient d’une étude menée par des gens qui ont pris conseil auprès d’Arnaud Fontanet, #Philippe-Aghion, économiste,et #Patrick-Artus, économiste, directeur de la recherche et des études de Natixis et administrateur de Total, qui gravitent tous autour de Macron


      ( Source Libé)

  • ÉDITO : Quand la fièvre spéculative s’empare du jeu vidéo… – Le Mag de MO5.COM

    Ce qui a changé par rapport aux précédents records, c’est que l’agence de notation WataGames lui a décerné un 9.8A++, a priori la note maximale qu’un exemplaire de ce jeu pourrait décrocher, mais cela reste étonnant quand un 9.4A+ faisait presque quarante fois moins en début d’année. Et dans la mesure où Heritage Auctions récupère 20% de la transaction – le jeu a en réalité été adjugé à 1,3 millions – plus 5% de la somme touchée par le vendeur, on peut effectivement se demander s’il n’y a pas anguille sous roche… Car si la maison de vente aux enchères assure faire toutes les vérifications nécessaires, l’acheteur demeure en général anonyme à moins de se manifester publiquement. Les arnaques ne sont hélas pas nouvelles dans le jeu vidéo, avec des faux prototypes et kits de développement par exemple, mais c’est bien sûr à tout autre chose que l’on a affaire ici, bien plus subtile et plus légale en apparence.

    Sur l’étonnante envolée des prix de jeux vidéo anciens, avec une relation consanguine, voire collusion, entre organisateurs des enchères et les évaluateurs des jeux, dont les acheteurs anonymes sont tantôt associés à des fonds d’investissements, tantôt les vendeurs, désireux de faire gonfler artificiellement les prix.

    De manière connexe, on peut s’intéresser à la concentration constatée dans le marché de l’art en général :

    The Art Market is a Scam (And Rich People Run It)

    #jeu_vidéo #jeux_vidéo #art #spéculation #enchères #population #édité #enquête #estimation #wastagames #heritage_auctions #console_nes #console_playstation #jeu_vidéo_super_mario_bros #jeu_vidéo_stadium_events #deniz_khan #jeu_vidéo_the_legend_of_zelda #jeu_vidéo_super_mario_64 #chris_kohler #frank_cifaldi #magazine_superman #comics_superman #karl_jobst #jim_halperin #just_press_play #seth_abramson #otis #mythic_markets #jeu_vidéo_super_mario_bros_3 #dain_anderson #gocollect #sec #nintendoage #gamevaluenow #jeu_vidéo_tomb_raider #console_saturn #kelsey_lewin #video_game_history_foundation #jeu_vidéo_spiderman #console_atari_2600 #seth_abramson #yūji_naka #jeu_vidéo_sonic #mega_drive #goodwill

  • Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions de sans-papiers vivent en Europe

    Leur nombre a augmenté en 2015, avec la hausse de la demande d’asile, mais s’est stabilisé dès 2019. La moitié d’entre eux se trouvent en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni.

    Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions d’étrangers vivent en situation irrégulière en Europe et la moitié d’entre eux résident en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Dans une étude parue mercredi 13 novembre, le centre de recherche américain Pew Research Center évalue le nombre de personnes qui se trouvaient sans papiers sur le continent en 2017. C’est la première étude du genre depuis dix ans, qui permet notamment d’évaluer l’impact de ce qui a été communément appelé la « crise migratoire ».

    Selon les travaux du Pew Research Center, les sans-papiers représenteraient moins de 1 % de la population européenne (évaluée à 500 millions de personnes). A titre de comparaison, la part des sans-papiers est de 3 % aux Etat-Unis, avec plus de 10 millions de personnes.

    Le Pew Research Center note toutefois une « augmentation récente » du nombre de sans-papiers
    en Europe, due essentiellement à la hausse des demandeurs d’asile depuis 2015, qui pèsent pour
    environ un quart de l’ensemble des personnes en situation irrégulière. Les auteurs de l’étude ont
    en effet choisi d’inclure dans leur estimation les personnes sollicitant un statut de réfugié et qui
    n’ont pas encore obtenu de réponse du fait de leur avenir incertain (38 % des demandeurs ont
    obtenu une protection en 2018). Il est toutefois important de souligner que les auteurs ont
    constaté une stabilisation du nombre de migrants sans titre de séjour à partir de 2016.

    L’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Italie, principales destinations
    Environ un million de sans-papiers vivent en Allemagne et autant au Royaume-Uni. Si les volumes
    sont comparables, le nombre de sans-papiers outre-Rhin a presque doublé entre 2014 et 2016,
    alors qu’il est resté plutôt stable outre-Manche, les îles britanniques n’ayant pas été l’une des
    principales destinations des demandeurs d’asile arrivés à partir de 2015. De la même manière, si
    l’Allemagne compte environ quatre fois plus de migrants réguliers qu’irréguliers – ce qui
    correspond à la moyenne européenne –, le Royaume-Uni a autant d’étrangers sans titres que
    d’étrangers pourvus d’un titre de séjour.

    La France et l’Italie arrivent en troisième et quatrième positions avec, respectivement, autour
    de 350 000 et 600 000 sans-papiers. « Comparé aux grands pays de destination des migrants
    en Europe, la France a un nombre relativement plus faible de sans-papiers, soulignent les auteurs.
    Une des raisons possibles est que certains sans-papiers peuvent être régularisés après plusieurs
    années s’ils remplissent certains critères ». Autour de 30 000 personnes bénéficient d’une
    admission exceptionnelle au séjour chaque année, pour des motifs liés principalement à leur
    situation familiale ou professionnelle. Cette particularité montre l’impact des politiques
    gouvernementales sur le volume de sans-papiers.

    Le plus souvent des hommes de moins de 35 ans
    Sur l’ensemble du continent, 56 % des sans-papiers sont présents depuis moins de cinq ans, mais
    plus d’un quart sont présents depuis plus de dix ans. Ils sont, pour les deux tiers d’entre eux, âgés
    de moins de 35 ans et sont des hommes dans plus d’un cas sur deux.
    En Europe, les origines des migrants sans papiers sont plus diverses qu’aux Etats-Unis, où
    l’écrasante majorité d’entre eux viennent du sous-continent américain et en particulier du
    Mexique. En Europe, environ un tiers des sans-papiers sont originaires d’Asie Pacifique – c’est
    particulièrement le cas au Royaume-Uni où ils comptent pour plus de la moitié des sans-papiers ;
    23 % viennent d’Europe et 21 % du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique du Nord, tandis que 17 % sont
    originaires d’Afrique subsaharienne.

    #statistiques #estimations #chiffres #sans-papiers #Pew_Research_Center #Europe

    • Europe’s Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off

      New estimates find half live in Germany and the United Kingdom.

      Europe has experienced a high level of immigration in recent years, driving debate about how countries should deal with immigrants when it comes to social services, security issues, deportation policies and integration efforts. Among these recently arrived immigrants are many who live in Europe without authorization. Coupled with unauthorized immigrants who were already in Europe, their numbers reach into the millions, though together they make up a small share of Europe’s total population.

      A new Pew Research Center analysis based on European data sources estimates that at least 3.9 million unauthorized immigrants – and possibly as many as 4.8 million – lived in Europe in 2017. The total is up from 2014, when 3.0 million to 3.7 million unauthorized migrants lived in Europe, but is little changed from a recent peak of 4.1 million to 5.3 million in 2016.1

      Overall, unauthorized immigrants accounted for less than 1% of Europe’s total population of more than 500 million people living in the 28 European Union member states, including the United Kingdom, and four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). And among the roughly 24 million noncitizens of EU-EFTA countries living in Europe, fewer than one-fifth were unauthorized immigrants in 2017.

      The recent rise in Europe’s long-standing unauthorized immigrant population from nations outside of EU-EFTA countries is largely due to a surge of asylum seekers who mostly arrived in 2015, when more than 1.3 million people applied for asylum in EU-EFTA countries. Many from that wave have been approved to remain in Europe. Many others, however, have had their applications rejected. Some have appealed those denials. Still others whose applications were rejected or withdrawn continue to live in Europe.

      Meanwhile, many asylum seekers in Europe are still awaiting a decision on their pending application, a group that is part of our estimates, and accounted for nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s unauthorized immigrant population in 2017. Although asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary legal standing, their future in Europe is uncertain. Most entered their country of residence without permission, and the majority of applicants are now seeing their applications rejected. Consequently, many have been or could be subject to deportation orders in the future.

      Since asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary lawful status, the Center also produced estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population without this group. These estimates are lower – 2.9 million to 3.8 million in 2017 – yet still show an apparent increase from 2014 before the asylum seeker surge, when the unauthorized immigrant population without asylum seekers waiting for a decision was an estimated 2.4 million to 3.2 million. (For estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population in Europe and by country without waiting asylum seekers, see Appendix C.)

      Unauthorized immigrants made up roughly one-fifth (16% to 20%) of Europe’s total non-EU-EFTA population in 2017, according to estimates, with 4% being unauthorized immigrants with a pending asylum claim that year. This means authorized non-EU-EFTA citizens living in Europe outnumbered unauthorized immigrants by about four to one.
      Who’s counted as an unauthorized immigrant?

      Unauthorized immigrants in this report are people living without a residency permit in their country of residence who are not citizens of any European Union or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country. Most unauthorized immigrants entered an EU-EFTA country without authorization, overstayed a visa, failed to leave after being ordered to do so or have had their deportation temporarily stayed. The unauthorized population also includes those born in EU-EFTA countries to unauthorized immigrant parents, since most European countries do not have birthright citizenship. Finally, the European unauthorized immigrant population estimate includes asylum seekers with a pending decision. This last group makes up nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s estimated total unauthorized immigrant population.

      Many different immigrant groups can be counted as unauthorized immigrants, as there is no universal definition and the inclusion of some groups over others is a point of debate. A broad definition could include anyone who entered the country without authorization and has yet to procure permanent residency. This definition could include those with subsidiary protection status, a group that does not qualify for refugee status but receives humanitarian protection that can be renewed for one or two years at a time. Those with this status can sometimes sponsor family members and after several years apply for permanent residency.

      By contrast, a narrower definition for unauthorized immigrants would not include those with legal protection from deportation, even if such protection is temporary. From this perspective, unauthorized immigrant populations would not include asylum seekers waiting on a decision, those whose deportation has been deferred or stayed, or children of unauthorized immigrants.

      Pew Research Center has selected an approach that considers a combination of authorized entry, legal certainty and likely permanency. In the U.S., the Center considers those with deportation relief (for example, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or Temporary Protected Status) as well as asylum seekers waiting on their cases as unauthorized immigrants. Although these groups are authorized to work, many entered without permission and their legal future in the U.S. is uncertain, as evidenced by recent policy changes implemented by the U.S. government and subsequent court cases.

      In the same way in EU-EFTA countries, deportees with a stayed or deferred deportation who have a legal right of residence and may even be allowed to work are included as unauthorized immigrants. Children born in Europe to unauthorized immigrant parents are considered part of the unauthorized immigrant population. Similarly, asylum seekers with a pending decision, of whom many entered without permission and whose acceptance rates continue to fall, are also included as unauthorized immigrants. Since the definition of an unauthorized immigrant is a point of debate, the Center has published estimates without asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their application (see Appendix C). Waiting asylum seekers, at nearly 1 million people in Europe in 2017, are likely the largest of unauthorized immigrant groups with an uncertain legal status.

      The Center’s new estimates come at a time when publics across Europe express mixed opinions on the place of immigrants in their societies. A 2018 multi-nation survey from the Center found that majorities in several European countries support the deportation of immigrants living in their countries illegally. On the other hand, when asked about refugees fleeing war and violence, the 2018 survey also found that majorities across Europe support taking them in, a group that has often entered Europe without permission and claims asylum.

      This is the first time Pew Research Center has estimated the size of Europe’s unauthorized migrant population. The methodology used for these new estimates builds on the Center’s more than 15 years of experience in estimating the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States. The unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. is more than double the size (10.3 million to 10.7 million in 2017) of that in Europe (3.9 million to 4.8 million); has been decreasing in number since 2007; and makes up a larger share of the total population (roughly 3% in the U.S. compared with less than 1% in Europe). (See our related blog post for more details on how unauthorized immigrant populations and their characteristics differ between Europe and the U.S.)

      The Center’s estimates are also the first comprehensive estimate for Europe in a decade. Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was last estimated for 2008 by an EU-funded team of European researchers called the Clandestino project. At that time, the number living in the EU was estimated to be 1.9 million to 3.8 million, not including asylum seekers with pending decisions. By comparison, our estimate for 2017 for EU countries only, excluding asylum seekers with a pending application, is 2.8 million to 3.7 million – the upper end of Clandestino’s 2008 estimate.2
      The Center’s estimates compared with others

      Pew Research Center’s unauthorized immigrant estimates in Europe are in line with other reputable data, including estimates from previous studies, statistics on the number of unauthorized immigrants regularized by governments and analysis of recent migration flows.

      In Germany, for example, a separate 2014 estimate using a different method than the one used by the Center and that did not include waiting asylum seekers, estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants to have been 180,000 to 520,000. For the same year, the Center estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants in Germany to be between 300,000 and 400,000 without waiting asylum seekers, within the 2014 study’s range. Moving forward, our 2017 estimate for Germany of 600,000 to 700,000 unauthorized immigrants, excluding asylum seekers waiting for a resolution in their case, is in line with expected trends. For more, see our Germany estimate methodology.

      Meanwhile, in the UK, a London School of Economics study placed the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the country between 417,000 and 863,000 in 2007. Ten years later, after hundreds of thousands of additional migrants from non-EU-EFTA countries entered and stayed in the UK, our 2017 estimate of 800,000 to 1.2 million unauthorized immigrants with waiting asylum seekers would be consistent with recent migration trends. For more methodological background, see our UK estimate methodology.

      In Italy, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers have landed on the country’s shores during the past decade. Many have had their asylum cases rejected, and some have remained in Italy without authorization. Adjusting for regularizations of unauthorized immigrants to authorized status during the past decade, deaths, out-migration and additional arrivals, our estimate of 500,000 to 700,000 for 2017, including asylum seekers with a pending asylum case, is similar to the estimate published by the Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità Foundation. For more information, see our Italy estimate methodology.

      In France, our estimate shows between 300,000 and 400,000 unauthorized immigrants lived in the country in 2017, including some 38,000 asylum seekers waiting for a decision on their case. This estimate is similar to that cited by government leaders as well as several French demographers. Also, some 300,000 people in 2017 were enrolled in a government medical plan accessed by unauthorized immigrants. For more, see our methodology for our France estimate.


      Pour télécharger le #rapport :

    • Commentaire de Serge Slama sur twitter :

      Le journal @lemondefr @JuliaPascualita pourrait prendre des précautions méthodologiques à l’égard de cette étude @pewresearch avec une appréhension très américaine de l’irrégularité qui inclut les demandeurs d’asile entrés illégalement.


      En France on n’a pas de moyens de comptabiliser le nombre exact de sans-papiers. On connaît les bénéficiaires de l’aide médicale d’Etat (315 835 en 2017), le nombre de déboutés du droit d’asile (80 000 à 90 000 par an), le nombre d’OQTF non exécutées (environ 60 000 par an).
      Enfin on sait qu’environ 30 000 jeunes nés en France de parents étrangers deviennent français à leur majorité (mais on ignore le statut de leurs parents).



      Et ce commentaire de Nando Sigona, toujours sur twitter :

      I need to have a closer look at the report, but the estimate for the UK seems too high. The UK has only marginally being affected by the 2013-2015 #refugeecrisis, and does more forced/voluntary removals than other EU states...
      Previous estimates, including LSE, Home Office, Clandestino project and our own on #undocumentedchildren, identified pre-accession EU nationals as one of the larger group of undocumented migrants in the UK. A group that was ’regularised’ through the EU enlargement.
      refused but not removed asylum seekers also contributes to the estimate, but total asylum refusals minus returns may be in the thousands but nothing like what the estimate would require.
      The report is also counting people with short term legal status like subsidiary protection which is again questionable. The report recognises that this approach may be controversial and in Appendix C provides an estimate without asylum seekers.
      and yet they went for the splash number for the press release and from initial media reports it is clear that some of the nuances are lost.
      and by the way, it would seem that there is no variation in the UK between the estimates with and without asylum seekers...


    • @Pewresearch a publié une étude sur la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en #Europe, dont les résultats ont été largement médiatisés depuis hier https://pewrsr.ch/2OalGIV un certain nombre d’éléments ont retenu l’attention de @DesinfoxMig :
      L’étude adopte un parti pris méthodologique basé sur le contexte américain pour définir le groupe étudié, à savoir la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en E. Cela inclut entre autre les #demandeursasile et les enfants nés en E. de parents en situation irrégulière.
      reconnait que l’acception très large de la notion #immigré « non-autorisé » qui considère une combinaison de facteurs (entrée autorisée, séjour régulier et la probabilité de séjour permanent) fait débat.
      Dans le contexte FR il y a débat car la traduction du terme « unauthorized » en #sanspapier, #clandestin ou en situation irrégulière renvoi à un contexte juridique et administratif différent du contexte US.
      Par ex, en France l’immigré ayant introduit une #demandeasile se voit délivrer par la #préfecture une autorisation provisoire de séjour, il ne peut pas être expulsé, et n’est donc pas considéré comme « sans-papiers » aux yeux du droit français.
      Si on peut ne pas être d’accord avec certains choix méthodologiques – et on apprécierait certaines précautions et nuances de la part des médias qui diffusent cette étude - elle propose une approche comparative d’un phénomène par sa nature même très difficile à quantifier.
      Pour la France, on peut retenir que la part des « non-autorisés » dans #immigration est particulièrement basse (10%), comparé à Allemagne ou aux Etats-Unis (environ 20%) et au Royaume-Uni (45%). Ils représentent au total moins de 1% de la population totale.


    • Pew Research Centre Estimates on the Irregular Migrant Population the UK and the rest of Europe

      The Pew Research Centre has produced new estimates of the number of irregular (‘illegal’ or ‘unauthorised’) migrants in the EU, including the UK. Here we explain briefly what they find and how they reach their conclusions.

      What are the key findings for the UK?

      The report estimates that in 2017 there were between 800,000 and 1.2m people living in the UK without a valid residence permit. The authors also estimate that, in 2017:

      Around one third of irregular migrants had been living in the UK for 10 years or more;
      They included similar shares of men and women, and around 14% were children;
      There was no evidence of any increase in the number of irregular migrants living in the UK since 2014;
      Half came from the ‘Asia Pacific’ region, but there no breakdown by individual countries within that region;
      The UK had one of the largest irregular migrant populations in Europe, alongside Germany.

      How are the figures calculated and are they accurate?

      The study uses the ‘residual method’. It compares the estimated the number of non-EU citizens living in the UK to an estimate of the number holding a valid residence permit in the same year.

      The results come with a high degree of uncertainty, because both of these figures are just estimates—as the Pew report recognises.

      In 2017, ONS estimated that there were around 2.4m non-EU citizens living in the UK (this is lower than the 5.7m non-EU born migrants living in the UK that year, because most people born in non-EU countries now hold UK citizenship). The precise figure is uncertain for various reasons, including because it is drawn from a statistical survey to which not everyone agrees to respond.

      Separately, the Home Office is required to report to Eurostat an estimate of the number of the non-EU citizens holding a valid residence permit each year – ranging from temporary work permit holders to long-term residents with Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). In 2017, this estimate was roughly 1.5m. The UK government does not actually know the precise number of legally resident non-EU citizens, so the estimate requires various assumptions, for example about how many people with ILR have left the country or died.

      Pew’s ‘lower-bound’ estimate of 800,000 compares the estimated non-EU citizen population with the number of valid residence permits of at least 3 months duration. The ‘upper bound’ estimate of 1.2m instead looks only at those with permits lasting at least a year, and also adjusts the figure upwards to account for the possibility that ONS has underestimated the number of non-EU citizens living here.

      The comparison between the UK and other EU countries is particularly uncertain because the estimates of the number of legal residents are produced in very different ways and are not thought to be comparable.

      In summary, without more accurate data on both the number non-EU citizens in the UK and the number holding valid residence authorisation, it is difficult to know how accurate the figures are likely to be.

      Earlier this year, ONS and the Home Office produced a joint statement suggesting they did not plan to produce a new estimate using this method, because of limitations in the data and methodologies.

      What are the remaining evidence gaps?

      Even if we cannot be certain about the number, it is reasonable to assume based on this and previous estimates that the UK has a substantial irregular migrant population. There are still many things that are not known about the unauthorised population, notably:

      It is not known how many entered illegally vs. came legally but later overstayed or were not able to renew their residence authorisation.
      The figures do not tell us what the impacts of policy have been on the decisions irregular migrants make, and/or whether the figure would have been higher or lower if different policies had been in place.

      Migration Observatory comment

      Madeleine Sumption, Director of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, said: “This report relies on a standard methodology to estimate the irregular migrant population, and gives us the most up-to-date estimate that is available. The big challenge when using this method in the UK in particular is that the data required for the calculation are not very good. In particular, the UK government simply doesn’t have an accurate record of exactly how many people are living in the UK legally. Without more precise data, there will continue to be a high degree of uncertainty around the number of people living here without authorisation.”


    • The Trouble with Pew’s estimates of the “unauthorized” migrant population in Europe

      The Pew Research Center, where I once held a leadership position, published a report on November 13, 2019 entitled, “Europe’s Unauthorized Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off.” The document is at best misleading, the product of an inappropriate statistical exercise. Given the reality of immigration politics in Europe, it is a made-to-order talking point for right-wing nationalists, echoing their attacks on asylum policies and on the migrants themselves. .

      This is Pew’s first effort to estimate the “unauthorized” population in Europe by applying a terminology I authored in 2002 for use in the United States. The current report has led me to conclude that the terminology and aspects of the statistical method that underlie its application are anachronisms that fail to take into account fundamental changes in the nature of migration flow to both Europe and the United States. As such, and no doubt unintentionally, the very knowledgeable people at Pew, including several I value highly as friends and colleagues, have fallen into a perceptual trap with significant political consequences.

      Pew’s critical error is to count as “unauthorized” people who have presented themselves to immigration authorities as required on arrival, have been identified, screened and registered in the lawful exercise of their right to seek asylum and have been granted permission to reside in their country of destination after an initial processing of that asylum claim. Nearly a quarter of the total “unauthorized” population in Europe, and closer to half in Germany, are asylum seekers, according to Pew’s account of its methodology. The estimate claims to be a statistical snapshot of this population on December 31, 2017, but as of that date these individuals, with few exceptions, had been granted documents attesting to their right to reside in these countries legally without fear of deportation and in many cases to work and receive social benefits.

      Pew counts these individuals as “unauthorized” because they had not yet been granted permission to remain as residents on a permanent basis. Germany and other European countries have several different degrees of asylum, including categories that grant protection for a period of years pending developments in their countries of origin and other matters. Moreover, in Europe as in the US, final disposition of asylum cases can take years due to backlogs and appeals, but those with pending cases are fully authorized to remain in the meantime. And, there is another category of persons whose claims have been denied, a small number in the 2017 Pew European estimates but more by now, who are not subject to deportation either by virtue of explicit administrative decisions or the prioritization of enforcement resources, a situation that occurs in the United States as well.

      In an exercise of highly subjective — and, to my mind, ill-informed — speculation, Pew concludes the individuals it observed in 2017 will never be granted permanent status in the future and that they will be subject to removal some day and so they should be counted as “unauthorized” in the present. This prognostication is as highly freighted politically as it is unjustified on any empirical basis. But, it is even more biased and inflammatory as a historical narrative.

      Almost the entire increase in the “unauthorized” population in Europe that peaked as of 2016, according to Pew, is the result of the extraordinary surge of Syrians, more than a million, who came across the Aegean from Turkey from the summer of 2015 to the spring of 2016 to seek refuge. By retroactively categorizing about half of those migrants as “unauthorized,” Pew is offering its statistical support to narratives that characterize that event as illegitimate, an abuse of Europe’s humanitarian values, a criminal effort to exploit social services and rich labor markets, a cynical abuse of the asylum system, a willing dilution of European identity by globalists, a pollution of Europe’s racial purity, etc.

      The methodology is explained in the fine print, and Pew even offers estimates minus the asylum seekers in an appendix. But, that does nothing to change the report’s deliberately attention-grabbing conclusion, its analytical perspective and the way it will be used for political purposes.

      Pew’s US estimates of the “unauthorized” are vulnerable to the same manipulation. They too include asylum seekers and produce the same statistical support for a demagogic portrayal of current migration.

      In the US, more than a million asylum seekers are sitting in an immigration court backlog awaiting adjudication of their claims, a number that has doubled since President Trump took office. These people have identified themselves to immigration officials, registered an asylum claim and have passed a “credible fear” interview with a finding that their claim is worthy of full consideration. By counting them as “unauthorized,” Pew fully embraces the Trump administration’s portrayal of the underlying migration phenomena as illegitimate even criminal. In the US asylum seekers account for a much smaller share of the Pew estimates than in Europe, about 10%, but that does not lessen the weight of the statistical fallacy. They are “unauthorized” only in the eyes of the beholders, in this case Pew and Trump. The result is a highly biased data point.

      In my view the problem with the Pew estimates is that they fail to account for new developments in migration flows to the United States and Europe.

      It was my great fortune to have been asked by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 2001 to create the Pew Hispanic Center and to then be part of the management committee that merged that center and several other stand-alone projects into the Pew Research Center in 2004. When the Pew Hispanic Center began publishing estimates of the “unauthorized migrant” population in 2002, the target was made up overwhelmingly of Mexican labor migrants who had either entered the country illegally or who had overstayed a legal entry and who would be subject to removal if apprehended. I am proud to say those estimates served an important and constructive role in repeated policy initiatives to legalize this population from 2004 to 2014. (I left Pew in 2007 to take a position on the faculty of the University of Southern California.)

      Both the migration phenomena and the focus of policy debate have shifted in the past few years, but Pew’s methodology has not.

      The number of cases in the immigration court backlog did not exceed 200,000 until 2009 and only crossed the 400,000 mark in 2014, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, a source of pure data, just the numbers, on immigration. As such, asylum seekers were a small fraction of the total population which we were measuring in the 00’s which stood at about 11 million people, plus or minus, throughout that period.

      But, in the past decade, as Pew has ably chronicled, migration flows to the United States have changed. Mexican labor migration outside legal channels has been negligible for a decade and meanwhile the number of Central American asylum seekers has increased dramatically in the past five years. In Europe, the 2015–16 events and subsequent arrivals of asylum seekers represent an even more singular event compared to the very small ongoing irregular labor migrations.

      The Pew Research Center remains committed to its version of strict political neutrality, portraying itself as a “fact-tank” that produces data with no spin, no advocacy and only as much analysis as is necessary to make sense of the numbers. (The exercise is fraught and one of the reasons I left, but that is another story.) Taking the institution at its word about its intention, the distortions created by the current report on the “unauthorized” population in Europe should be occasion for a reconsideration of the methodology and terminology.

      First there is a technical issue.

      Both in the United States and in Europe, the population of migrants who are not citizens or legal permanent residents now comprises several categories of individuals with different kinds of status in national immigration systems. Some are indeed “unauthorized” in that they have no legal basis to reside in those countries and would be subject to removal with little recourse if apprehended and put in proceedings. But, there is also this large, and in the United States rapidly growing, population of persons who have presented asylum claims and have been awarded permission to remain in the country until those claims are fully adjudicated. So it is technically a mistake to apply “unauthorized” as a blanket term, and it retrospect it was a technical mistake when I first did it nearly 20 years ago.

      But, now there is a much graver issue about how the data is communicated.

      The nature of the migration phenomena that produce asylum seekers as well as the laws governing migration and the processes to administer it are all the subject of vociferous, brutally-polarized, high-stakes political debates in the United States and across Europe. Pew is taking sides in that debate when it counts asylum seekers as “unauthorized migrants.”


  • Ceci n’est pas une crise | Les Belges surestiment le nombre de réfugiés accueillis

    La fondation Ceci n’est pas une crise vient de publier une enquête d’opinion intitulée « Les réfugiés, l’Europe déchirée et les amnésiques ». L’étude est consacrée à la perception des réfugiés en Belgique. Celle-ci révèle qu’une majorité de la population surestime le nombre de réfugiés et de demandeurs d’asile. Seules 13% des personnes interrogées indiquent un pourcentage proche […]

  • I «90.000 irregolari in Italia», spiegati bene. Riascoltando la conferenza stampa, e ammesso che i calcoli siano corretti, Salvini dice una cosa corretta: «90.000 è il massimo stimabile di immigrati irregolari di questi ultimi quattro anni e mezzo». La chiave sta lì.

    Quello che probabilmente voleva dire Salvini è che, dal 1 gennaio 2015 a oggi, delle persone sbarcate in Italia ne sono rimaste solo tot. Ma prima del 1 gennaio 2015 c’era tutto lo stock pregresso da prendere in considerazione.

    Tornando ai 90.000, il calcolo è sbagliato. Due tra gli errori più macroscopici: (1) parte dal 2015, ma gli sbarchi aumentano da fine 2013. Nel 2014, 170.100 sbarcati. Non li consideri? (2) non si arriva soltanto via mare. E i c.d. visa overstayers dove sono?

    NOTA BENE: l’errore nasce dal fatto che spesso si pensa che la stima di 500.000 - 600.000 irregolari presenti in Italia si riferisca agli oltre 700.000 sbarcati dal 2013.

    Invece i due numeri sono simili, generano confusione, ma non c’entrano nulla l’uno con l’altro.


    #statistiques #chiffres #sans-papiers #Salvini #déconstruction #estimation #Italie #fact-checking

  • Estimation — how can we estimate with confidence in software delivery?

    Estimation — how can we estimate with confidence in software development?Introduction‘When will it be done?’ is one of the most common and difficult questions to answer in software development.Estimating in software is traditionally difficult, inaccurate most of the time, with project teams spending a significant amount of time on the process.There are a number of contributing factors to this. Part of it is that software development is a design activity, and thus hard to plan and estimate. Software is done with people, and it depends which individual people are involved. Individuals are hard to predict and quantify and humans in general are inherently bad at predictions [1]. Those teams that build the software are operating in an ever-changing business and technology landscape.The cost of (...)

    #estimations #software-development #agile #hackernoon-top-story #noestimates

  • Using object detection in home pictures for improving price estimation

    Estimating the price of a home is both science and art. Home characteristics, such as square footage, location or the number of bathrooms, are given different weights according to their influence on home sale prices in each specific geography over a specific period of time, resulting in a set of valuation rules, or models that are applied to generate each home’s Zestimate. Specifically, some of the structured data that is used in the estimation include Physical attributes: Location, lot size, square footage, number of bedrooms and bathrooms and many other details. Tax assessments: Property tax information, actual property taxes paid, exceptions to tax assessments and other information provided in the tax assessors’ records. Prior and current transactions: Actual sale prices over time of (...)

    #estimations #real-estate #machine-learning #image-detection #object-detection

  • Estimating #agile Projects with User Stories

    How to Estimate anAgile Project With User StoriesEstimating software projects is hard. Early on in the development process, you can’t precisely define the scope of a project. Because inevitably, the scope will change after development kicks off, since the team will have learned more about the project and its context by then. Still, teams have to estimate the resources they need for a project, at least approximately, before getting started.So, how should you tackle this, then?The traditional approach is to enter an analysis phase where you create a detailed specification of what needs to be built. But like we said, the scope of a project isn’t exactly clear before development begins. For that reason, analysis isn’t the best approach.What is a user story?Simple but powerful, a user story is a (...)

    #estimations #user-stories #startup #software-development

  • The Cost of Non-Europe in Asylum Policy

    Current structural weaknesses and shortcomings in the design and implementation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have a cost of EUR 50.5 billion per year, including costs due to irregular migration, lack of accountability in external action, inefficiencies in asylum procedures, poor living conditions and health, and dimmer employment prospects leading to lower generation of tax revenue. Seven policy options for the EU to tackle the identified gaps and barriers would bring about many benefits including better compliance with international and EU norms and values, lower levels of irregular migration to the EU and costs of border security and surveillance, increased effectiveness and efficiency of the asylum process, faster socio-economic integration of asylum-seekers, increased employment and tax revenues and reinforced protection of human rights in countries of return. Once, considered the costs, the net benefits of these policy options would be at least EUR 23.5 billion per year.

    #rapport #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #droits_humains #Dublin #Règlement_Dublin

    Ici une estimation des coûts liés à la perte de vies en Méditerranée :

    “To estimate the loss of life, we considered a hypothetical scenario where the asylum-seekers who died managed to survive and subsequently applied for asylum in the EU. A share of these asylum-seekers would receive a positive decision on their asylum application and could remain in the EU. The remainder would receive a negative decision and be ordered to leave the EU. We applied a VSL to each of these two groups drawing from a base value of USD 9.6 million (Viscusi and Masterman, 2017)153. Through this approach we estimated the loss of life to be 15 billion in 2016 and 9 billion in 2017.”

    #mourir_en_mer #coût #estimation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #décès #Méditerranée #économie #politique_migratoire #politiques_restrictives #prix

    En fait, il faudrait le lire dans les détails ce rapport...

    ping @reka @fil

    • Global migration figures higher than previously thought, study finds

      US researchers reveal that up to 87 million people migrate every five years.

      Over a five-year period, about one in 80 people around the world migrate to another country, researchers have revealed, in a study that shows more than a quarter of that movement is down to people returning to their country of birth.

      Global migration is difficult to measure, with data often lacking for developing countries and inaccurate for others.

      But a pair of researchers in the US say they have come up with a model that provides the most reliable “big picture” view of human migration yet. Crucially, they say, it takes into account the “churn” of people moving into and out of countries, something previous global estimates had not included.

      “Policies that are set based on a quota of a number of people who enter the country miss out on the fact that you should also be expecting a lot of the existing migrant population to be leaving the country,” said Dr Jonathan Azose, a co-author of the study from the University of Washington.

      The study, published in the journal PNAS, reveals a model for estimating migration around the world between 1990 and 2015, broken down into five-year chunks. The team say they were able to show the model worked by comparing its results with high-quality migration data from Europe.

      A key problem with the previous leading global migration estimates, says Azose, is that the approach looked at overall changes in the net number of immigrants in a country over time, without taking into account that many individuals left and others arrived, resulting in underestimates of movement, something the new model tackles.

      It suggests that between 67 million and 87 million people, including refugees, migrated for each five-year chunk – far higher than previous global estimates of 34m-46 m migrations – and corresponding to 1.13%-1.29% of the global population.

      The team note that while absolute numbers of people migrating appear to have risen, there has been little change in the proportion of the world’s population who are on the move. That said, key origins and destinations change over time: for example,movement of Syrians in Saudi Arabia to Turkey between 2010 and 2015 were a leading contributor to “transit” migrations, while migration of Syrians from Syria to Turkey and Lebanon were among the largest emigration movements in that period.

      The new study suggests that while migration to a new country makes up the biggest proportion of human movement, return migration – in which individuals return to their country of birth – accounted for between 26% and 31% of migration in each five-year period.

      However, the team admit the new model has limitations, including the fact that different countries require individuals to stay there for different lengths of time to be registered as a migrant, and figures for the total number of migrants in each country might not be accurate to start with, meaning possible errors in the data used.

      But the team say their work could help researchers delve deeper into what causes people to migrate and help them build predictive models for this.

      Dr Nando Sigona, an expert in international migration and forced displacement at the University of Birmingham, who was not involved in the research, welcomed the study.

      “Estimating migration flows is extremely difficult. Data are limited and incomplete, especially in less economically developed countries. This contributes to a perception in the west that all migration flows are directed towards the global north,” he said.

      While the new model had limitations, he added, it offered a more rounded view of global migration, including showing movements between countries in the south and highlighting the large proportion of return journeys. “Finally,” he said, “it shows a world which is more dynamic and on the move than previously thought.”


      Lien vers l’article/étude:

  • “You can not observe a developer without altering their behavior”


    He introduced us to ‘Jira’, a word that strikes fear into the soul of a developer.

    Ici le problème, à mon avis, n’est pas l’outil mais l’utilisation qui en est faite : flicage, surveillance, suivi du temps dépensé. Jira ne pose aucun problème quand il est utilisé par les développeurs, pour les développeurs : Suivi de l’état d’avancement de la correction / fonctionnalité (eg. Les projets open source)

    As one explained to me, “you take the next item off the list, do the work, check it in, and you don’t have to worry about it.”

    Finely grained management is a recipe for ‘talent evaporation’. The people who live and breathe software will leave – they usually have few problems getting jobs elsewhere. The people who don’t like to take decisions and need an excuse, will stay. You will find yourself with a compliant team that meekly carries out your instructions, doesn’t argue about the utility of features, fills in Jira correctly, meets their estimates, and produces very poor quality software.

    So how should one manage developers?

    Simple: give them autonomy. It seems like a panacea, but finely grained management is poisonous for software development. It’s far better to give high level goals and allow your developers to meet them as they see fit. Sometimes they will fail; you need to build in contingency for this. But don’t react to failure by putting in more process and control . Work on building a great team that you can trust and that can contribute to success rather than employing rooms full of passive code monkeys.

    Commencer déjà par prendre en compte l’avis des développeurs, leur retour. Généralement ça permet de corriger d’améliorer le process actuel, tout en impliquant et motivant les troupes.

    #micro_management #autonomie #développeur #Jira #estimation #motivation #productivité

  • Publier les estimations du premier tour dimanche dès 18h ? Non, sauf si... | Slate

    Il y a aussi dans cette crainte une attitude infantilisante de l’électorat français. Il serait « sous influence », facile à manipuler. Peut-on réellement le croire ? Ces internautes qui seraient prêts à attendre le dernier moment pour voter, après avoir écumé les réseaux sociaux à la recherche de l’information la plus fraîche, sont probablement très politisés, et au moins aussi stratèges que les candidats pour qui ils vont voter.

    #présidentielles #2012 #twitter #facebook #estimations #vote

  • Le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris a rendu un jugement ce soir (N° RG : 11/58052) concernant le blocage d’un site de « CopWatch » français. Outre que seuls les principaux FAI ont été appelés à bloquer les URL par le Ministre de l’Intérieur, on notera que le bureau d’enregistrement, Gandi, français, était absent, alors qu’une requête auprès de celui-ci aurait soit permis d’identifier le propriétaire du domaine, ou encore de le dénoncer pour fausse identité, et donc le faire fermer peut-être même plus rapidement encore que le passage devant le juge, et très certainement pour moins cher.

    Quoi qu’il en soit, ce paragraphe a attiré mon attention dans la décision de justice, celui-ci concerne le DPI :

    JUGEMENT rendu le 14 octobre 2011

    Que toutefois, ce système nécessite l’acquisition d’ordinateurs “Deep Packet Inspectors” destinés à analyser toutes les requêtes d’abonnés afin de déterminer si le fournisseur d’accès peut ou non les transmettre vers le site ; que les experts ont conclu que chaque fournisseur au réseau internet français se trouverait contraint de faire l’acquisition de “20 à 30 systèmes de ce type” auxquels il faudrait ajouter “au moins un site web de détournement des requêtes” ainsi que “plusieurs ordinateurs de supervision et de maintenance de ces équipements” le tout pour un coût de 10 000 euros auquel s’ajouterait le coût de la maintenance et de la surveillance de ces matériels soit 20 % de l’investissement initial ; que par ailleurs, la mise en place d’une telle mesure serait de l’ordre de six mois à un an ; qu’enfin , au delà de ces considérations de coûts et de délais, les experts ont également souligné que l’analyse du contenu des equêtes de tous les internautes que requiert cette mesure pose une difficulté liée à la protection des libertés individuelles ;

    #dpi #fai #faisabilité #justice #tribunal #censure #filtrage #france #estimation #coût #copwatch #internet

  • Ne pas (trop) négocier les jours hommes

    « Lorsqu’une équipe vous donne un chiffrage en jours ou en nombre de patates, marquez-le et gardez-le sur une feuille de papier, avec les détails de la discussion. Si l’équipe s’est engagée, elle vous livrera ce que vous avez demandé, en temps et en heure. »

    #scrum #agile #user_story #chiffrage #jours_hommes #charge #développement #équipe #estimation #clevermarks