• Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes

    How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
    In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.

    What do all these people have in common?

    All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.

    Since the summer of 2015,
    Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
    when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
    Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
    And much of this money is being spent in Africa.

    Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.

    However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.

    The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?

    At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.

    In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.

    If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.

    This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?

    This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.

    For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?

    While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
    in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.

    Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
    Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’

    It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.

    But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.

    It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.

    The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
    the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
    the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
    the French president, to Mark Rutte,

    the Dutch prime minister.

    Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
    ‘No data available’

    But let’s get back to those funding streams.

    The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.

    But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”

    Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
    but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
    or “no data available”.

    The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,

    the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.

    This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”

    At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
    Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti

    “There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”

    This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.

    Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.

    The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.

    Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.

    The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.

    Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.

    Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
    in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.

    In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
    the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.

    But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.

    Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.

    But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.

    The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
    The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.

    But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.

    To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”

    (DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

    Still with me?

    Because this was just the Netherlands.

    Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).

    Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.

    This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.

    Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.

    Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.

    Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.

    Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,

    which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.

    And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
    organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.

    This is the European migration spaghetti.
    How we managed to compile a list nonetheless

    By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?

    We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?


    We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).

    No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.

    In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
    This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
    was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.

    So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.

    More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.

    For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

    What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?

    Each country has its own way of categorising projects.

    There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.

    When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.

    While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
    1) Where is the money going?

    In Nigeria, we found

    If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
    50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.

    Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
    more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative

    to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.

    The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities

    in Nigeria: at least €92m.

    Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.

    We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
    Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
    Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.

    2) Where isn’t the money going?

    When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.

    “The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.

    See their website here.
    “Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”

    We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.

    Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.

    But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”

    Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.

    3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?

    We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?

    Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.

    One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”

    Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
    And we’ve only looked at one country ...

    That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.

    When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?

    Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?

    But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP

    called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.

    Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.

    But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.

    So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    Et ajouté à la métaliste développement/migrations :

    ping @isskein @isskein @pascaline @_kg_

  • Croatia wrongly deports Nigerian table tennis players to Bosnia | Global development | The Guardian


    Quinze jours de cauchemars et ils n’auront même pas les excuses des autorités...


    Abia Uchenna Alexandro and Eboh Kenneth Chinedu, students at the Federal University of Technology Owerri in Nigeria, arrived in Zagreb on 12 November, on their way to participate in the fifth World InterUniversities Championships, held this year in Pula, Croatia.

    The 18-year-old table tennis players left Pula for Zagreb after the tournament, and were supposed to fly back to Lagos on 18 November. However, the night before their departure, while taking a walk in the Croatian capital they were stopped by two police officers who asked them for identification documents.
    ’They didn’t give a damn’: first footage of Croatian police ’brutality’
    Read more

    “We tried to explain who we were and that our documents were in the hostel, but they took us to a police station,” Chinedu told the Bosnian website Žurnal. “They paid no attention to what we were saying.”

  • Carte. De l’adhésion au rejet (parfois) : géohistoire des frontières de l’Union européenne


    Comment les frontières de l’#UE évoluent-elles dans le temps, entre élargissements, candidatures délicates et rejets ? T. Merle répond brillamment avec une carte commentée disponible sous deux formats. En pied de page, vous trouverez la carte en grande taille format JPEG... et un lien secret pour la télécharger au format PDF.

    #europe #union_européenne #frontières

  • Why return from Europe is causing problems for The Gambia

    Roughly 38,500 Gambians left the country through ‘irregular’ means between 2013 and 2017. Today, almost every family has ties abroad. The influx of immigrants to Europe and elsewhere was caused by political oppression under the long-serving former president Yahya Jammeh. His oppressive politics also severely affected the economic prospects of The Gambia’s young population.

    As a result, a large number of citizens, mostly young men, sought asylum in Europe. But very few have been allowed to stay. Even more were turned away when Jammeh was toppled after elections in 2017 and the country returned to democracy. More recently, there has been a big push from European Union (EU) member states to return failed asylum seekers back home to The Gambia.

    The question of returns is particularly volatile in the west African nation of 2 million people, reflected in the country’s and European press.

    A slight increase in Gambian deportations began in November 2018 after the EU and the government agreed on a ‘good practice’ agreement for efficient return procedures.

    This intensified cooperation became possible due to the governmental change in 2017, with President Adama Barrow becoming President after the elections, as we found in our research on the political economy of migration governance in The Gambia.

    Despite initial cooperation with the EU on returns, in March 2019 Barrow’s government imposed a moratorium on any further deportations of its nationals from the EU. After a standoff of several months, the moratorium has now been lifted. Though only temporary, the moratorium was an important tool for the government to manage problems with its domestic legitimacy.
    Relationship challenges

    Jammeh’s ousting ended years of severe repression and corruption that had discouraged donor countries from cooperating with The Gambia. When he left, the country quickly established positive relations with the EU which has become its most important development partner. It provides €55 million in budgetary support and runs three projects to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration. But the moratorium was a stress test for this new relationship.

    Before the moratorium was imposed in March 2019, the government had started to tentatively cooperate with the EU on return matters. For example, it sent regular missions to Europe to issue nationals with identification documents to facilitate their return.

    Relations began to sour when European governments increased returns in a way that authorities in The Gambia viewed as inconsistent with the ‘good practice’ agreement. The agreement stipulates that return numbers should not overstretch the country’s capacity to receive returnees. It also states that adequate notice must be given before asylum seekers are returned. Both of these provisions were allegedly breached.
    Problems at home

    The incoming returns quickly led to heated debates among the population and on social media. The rumblings peaked in February 2019 with one particular return flight from Germany. Authorities in Banjul claimed they had not been well informed about it and initially refused entry. Public demonstrations followed in March. The moratorium, which European partners had already been notified about, was declared shortly afterwards.

    The moratorium can be linked to diplomatic and technical inefficiencies, but it is also based on a more fundamental problem for Barrow’s government. By cooperating with the EU on returns, they risk their domestic legitimacy because by and large, most Gambians in Europe do not want to return home.

    The initial euphoria that surrounded the democratic transition is wearing off. Many reform processes such as in the security sector and in the media environment are dragging. The economic situation of many has not improved. Allowing more deportations from the EU is perceived as betrayal by many migrants and their families.

    The government is frequently suspected to play an active role in returns and is accused of witholding information about their dealings with the EU and member states like Germany. Incidentally, President Barrow is currently seeking to extend his rule beyond the three-year transition period originally agreed upon, ending in January 2020. Opposition to these plans is widespread.

    In these politically tense times, pressing a pause button on returns fulfilled a symbolic function by defending Gambians against foreign national interests. The recent lifting of the moratorium is politically very risky. It paves the way for more of the deeply unpopular chartered return operations.

    What next?

    On the whole, The Gambia has little room to manoeuvre. It is highly dependent on the EU’s goodwill and financial support for its reforms process. In line with the development focus of the EU, the position of the government is to prepare the ground for more “humane” repatriations, which will need more time and joint efforts.

    This would include better and more comprehensive reintegration opportunities for returned migrants. Reintegration is already the focus of various projects funded by the European Union Trust Fund. Programmes like the International Organisation for Migration’s ‘Post-Arrival Reintegration Assistance’ for returnees from Europe are up and running. However, they only serve a limited number of returnees and cannot meet all their needs.

    It is important to note that the role of the Gambian state in providing reintegration support has been marginal.

    With the lifting of the moratorium EU-Gambia cooperation stands at a crossroads. If EU member states maintain their hardline returnee approach The Gambia’s new government will continue to struggle with its legitimacy challenges. This could potentially jeopardise democratisation efforts.

    In the alternative, the EU could take a more cooperative stance by working on more holistic, development-oriented solutions. A starting point would be to move away from plans to return high numbers of failed asylum seekers. Sending back large numbers of migrants has never been feasible.

    The Gambian government will be more honest about its migration dealings with the EU if the agreements are fair and practical. Most importantly, if Gambians had access to fair and practical migration pathways this would lessen cases of irregular migration, which continue to remain high.

    Without a greater share of legal migration, the issue of return will continue to be particularly contentious.

    #Gambie #retour #renvois #expulsions #réfugiés_gambiens #développement #coopération_au_développement #aide_au_développement #conditionnalité_de_l'aide #Allemagne #moratoire #réintégration #European_Union_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #Post-Arrival_Reintegration_Assistance #OIM #IOM
    ping @karine4 @_kg_

    J’ai ajouté « #deportees » dans la liste des #mots autour de la migration :
    Et plus précisément ici : https://seenthis.net/messages/414225#message812066
    #terminologie #vocabulaire
    ping @sinehebdo

    Ajouté à la métaliste développement-migrations, autour de la conditionnalité de l’aide :

  • « Le système ne peut s’autoriser qu’un lanceur d’alerte gagne » : l’affaire Rudolf Elmer, dissident de la #Finance

    Poursuivi pendant quatorze ans pour avoir révélé les pratiques d’évasion fiscale de sa banque, emprisonné, interdit d’exercer son métier, cible de la vengeance de son ex-employeur, le lanceur d’alerte suisse Rudolf Elmer poursuit son combat. « Les lanceurs d’alerte ne sont pas protégés, alors qu’ils rendent un grand service à notre société », avertit Rudolf Elmer. Le sexagénaire suisse a osé s’attaquer à l’évasion fiscale, et en a payé le prix fort. Comme Stéphanie Gibault, qui a dénoncé les pratiques de la (...) #Résister

    / Indignés de tous les pays..., #Europe, Que faire face à la crise financière ?, #Paradis_fiscaux, Finance, A la (...)

    #Indignés_de_tous_les_pays... #Que_faire_face_à_la_crise_financière_ ?

  • Transcender



    Paris, le 7 novembre 2019

    Ce sous-titre (premier pas vers l’auto-évaluation de votre adaptabilité langagière) signale que les développements à venir sont en prolongement de ce qui avait pourtant été annoncé, au « Plancher des vaches IV|II », comme enfin achevé.

    Le sujet étant, comme on le sait, en renouvellement permanent, il se trouve que la lecture, ce jour, de la synthèse du rapport « Le business de l’édification des murs », par Mark Akkerman (synthèse dont je vous recommande vivement la lecture), m’a incitée à me balader dans les sites de quelques-unes des organisations et entreprises mentionnées dans ledit rapport.

    Mark Akkerman : « Un grand nombre des entreprises répertoriées dans les présentes, notamment les grandes sociétés d’armement, font partie de l’EOS (Organisation européenne pour la sécurité), le plus important groupe de pression sur la sécurité des frontières. »

    Ça vous rappelle quelque chose ? (...)

    #langage #symbole #capitalisme #biométrie #La_Vache_qui_rit #libre-service #Schengen #Europe #interaction_digitale #X-Reality #migrants #asile #Paris

  • Vincenzo Vecchi, condamné à de la prison en Italie pour avoir manifesté, et menacé d’extradition, est libre

    Vincenzo Vecchi était la cible d’un mandat d’arrêt européen, pourtant réservé à la grande criminalité et au terrorisme, alors que son seul « délit » est d’avoir participé à une manifestation altermondialiste. La #Justice française vient de lui rendre la liberté. Vincenzo Vecchi est libre. Arrêté le 8 août dernier en Bretagne, et incarcéré depuis, il était sous la menace d’un renvoi vers l’Italie où l’attendait une peine de 12 ans de prison, pour sa participation à la manifestation altermondialiste de Gênes en (...) #Résister

    / #Atteintes_aux_libertés, Justice, #Droits_fondamentaux, A la une, #Europe

  • Thierry Breton, PDG d’une multinationale financée par les fonds européens en voie de devenir commissaire... européen

    Après le rejet de Sylvie Goulard par le Parlement européen, Emmanuel Macron a proposé Thierry Breton au poste de commissaire européen au Marché intérieur. Au vu du curriculum vitæ du personnage et des marchés sur lesquels intervient l’entreprise dont il était PDG, Atos, ce choix pose de sérieuses questions. Le 12 novembre, le Parlement de Strasbourg a approuvé en commission la candidature de Thierry Breton au poste de commissaire européen. À 12 voix contre 11, les députés de la commission des Affaires (...) #Décrypter

    / #Europe, #Multinationales, #Capitalisme, #Surveillance_et_biométrie, A la une

  • Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions de sans-papiers vivent en Europe

    Leur nombre a augmenté en 2015, avec la hausse de la demande d’asile, mais s’est stabilisé dès 2019. La moitié d’entre eux se trouvent en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni.

    Entre 3,9 et 4,8 millions d’étrangers vivent en situation irrégulière en Europe et la moitié d’entre eux résident en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Dans une étude parue mercredi 13 novembre, le centre de recherche américain Pew Research Center évalue le nombre de personnes qui se trouvaient sans papiers sur le continent en 2017. C’est la première étude du genre depuis dix ans, qui permet notamment d’évaluer l’impact de ce qui a été communément appelé la « crise migratoire ».

    Selon les travaux du Pew Research Center, les sans-papiers représenteraient moins de 1 % de la population européenne (évaluée à 500 millions de personnes). A titre de comparaison, la part des sans-papiers est de 3 % aux Etat-Unis, avec plus de 10 millions de personnes.

    Le Pew Research Center note toutefois une « augmentation récente » du nombre de sans-papiers
    en Europe, due essentiellement à la hausse des demandeurs d’asile depuis 2015, qui pèsent pour
    environ un quart de l’ensemble des personnes en situation irrégulière. Les auteurs de l’étude ont
    en effet choisi d’inclure dans leur estimation les personnes sollicitant un statut de réfugié et qui
    n’ont pas encore obtenu de réponse du fait de leur avenir incertain (38 % des demandeurs ont
    obtenu une protection en 2018). Il est toutefois important de souligner que les auteurs ont
    constaté une stabilisation du nombre de migrants sans titre de séjour à partir de 2016.

    L’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Italie, principales destinations
    Environ un million de sans-papiers vivent en Allemagne et autant au Royaume-Uni. Si les volumes
    sont comparables, le nombre de sans-papiers outre-Rhin a presque doublé entre 2014 et 2016,
    alors qu’il est resté plutôt stable outre-Manche, les îles britanniques n’ayant pas été l’une des
    principales destinations des demandeurs d’asile arrivés à partir de 2015. De la même manière, si
    l’Allemagne compte environ quatre fois plus de migrants réguliers qu’irréguliers – ce qui
    correspond à la moyenne européenne –, le Royaume-Uni a autant d’étrangers sans titres que
    d’étrangers pourvus d’un titre de séjour.

    La France et l’Italie arrivent en troisième et quatrième positions avec, respectivement, autour
    de 350 000 et 600 000 sans-papiers. « Comparé aux grands pays de destination des migrants
    en Europe, la France a un nombre relativement plus faible de sans-papiers, soulignent les auteurs.
    Une des raisons possibles est que certains sans-papiers peuvent être régularisés après plusieurs
    années s’ils remplissent certains critères ». Autour de 30 000 personnes bénéficient d’une
    admission exceptionnelle au séjour chaque année, pour des motifs liés principalement à leur
    situation familiale ou professionnelle. Cette particularité montre l’impact des politiques
    gouvernementales sur le volume de sans-papiers.

    Le plus souvent des hommes de moins de 35 ans
    Sur l’ensemble du continent, 56 % des sans-papiers sont présents depuis moins de cinq ans, mais
    plus d’un quart sont présents depuis plus de dix ans. Ils sont, pour les deux tiers d’entre eux, âgés
    de moins de 35 ans et sont des hommes dans plus d’un cas sur deux.
    En Europe, les origines des migrants sans papiers sont plus diverses qu’aux Etats-Unis, où
    l’écrasante majorité d’entre eux viennent du sous-continent américain et en particulier du
    Mexique. En Europe, environ un tiers des sans-papiers sont originaires d’Asie Pacifique – c’est
    particulièrement le cas au Royaume-Uni où ils comptent pour plus de la moitié des sans-papiers ;
    23 % viennent d’Europe et 21 % du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique du Nord, tandis que 17 % sont
    originaires d’Afrique subsaharienne.

    #statistiques #estimations #chiffres #sans-papiers #Pew_Research_Center #Europe

    • Europe’s Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off

      New estimates find half live in Germany and the United Kingdom.

      Europe has experienced a high level of immigration in recent years, driving debate about how countries should deal with immigrants when it comes to social services, security issues, deportation policies and integration efforts. Among these recently arrived immigrants are many who live in Europe without authorization. Coupled with unauthorized immigrants who were already in Europe, their numbers reach into the millions, though together they make up a small share of Europe’s total population.

      A new Pew Research Center analysis based on European data sources estimates that at least 3.9 million unauthorized immigrants – and possibly as many as 4.8 million – lived in Europe in 2017. The total is up from 2014, when 3.0 million to 3.7 million unauthorized migrants lived in Europe, but is little changed from a recent peak of 4.1 million to 5.3 million in 2016.1

      Overall, unauthorized immigrants accounted for less than 1% of Europe’s total population of more than 500 million people living in the 28 European Union member states, including the United Kingdom, and four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). And among the roughly 24 million noncitizens of EU-EFTA countries living in Europe, fewer than one-fifth were unauthorized immigrants in 2017.

      The recent rise in Europe’s long-standing unauthorized immigrant population from nations outside of EU-EFTA countries is largely due to a surge of asylum seekers who mostly arrived in 2015, when more than 1.3 million people applied for asylum in EU-EFTA countries. Many from that wave have been approved to remain in Europe. Many others, however, have had their applications rejected. Some have appealed those denials. Still others whose applications were rejected or withdrawn continue to live in Europe.

      Meanwhile, many asylum seekers in Europe are still awaiting a decision on their pending application, a group that is part of our estimates, and accounted for nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s unauthorized immigrant population in 2017. Although asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary legal standing, their future in Europe is uncertain. Most entered their country of residence without permission, and the majority of applicants are now seeing their applications rejected. Consequently, many have been or could be subject to deportation orders in the future.

      Since asylum seekers waiting for a decision have a temporary lawful status, the Center also produced estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population without this group. These estimates are lower – 2.9 million to 3.8 million in 2017 – yet still show an apparent increase from 2014 before the asylum seeker surge, when the unauthorized immigrant population without asylum seekers waiting for a decision was an estimated 2.4 million to 3.2 million. (For estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population in Europe and by country without waiting asylum seekers, see Appendix C.)

      Unauthorized immigrants made up roughly one-fifth (16% to 20%) of Europe’s total non-EU-EFTA population in 2017, according to estimates, with 4% being unauthorized immigrants with a pending asylum claim that year. This means authorized non-EU-EFTA citizens living in Europe outnumbered unauthorized immigrants by about four to one.
      Who’s counted as an unauthorized immigrant?

      Unauthorized immigrants in this report are people living without a residency permit in their country of residence who are not citizens of any European Union or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) country. Most unauthorized immigrants entered an EU-EFTA country without authorization, overstayed a visa, failed to leave after being ordered to do so or have had their deportation temporarily stayed. The unauthorized population also includes those born in EU-EFTA countries to unauthorized immigrant parents, since most European countries do not have birthright citizenship. Finally, the European unauthorized immigrant population estimate includes asylum seekers with a pending decision. This last group makes up nearly a quarter (20% to 24%) of Europe’s estimated total unauthorized immigrant population.

      Many different immigrant groups can be counted as unauthorized immigrants, as there is no universal definition and the inclusion of some groups over others is a point of debate. A broad definition could include anyone who entered the country without authorization and has yet to procure permanent residency. This definition could include those with subsidiary protection status, a group that does not qualify for refugee status but receives humanitarian protection that can be renewed for one or two years at a time. Those with this status can sometimes sponsor family members and after several years apply for permanent residency.

      By contrast, a narrower definition for unauthorized immigrants would not include those with legal protection from deportation, even if such protection is temporary. From this perspective, unauthorized immigrant populations would not include asylum seekers waiting on a decision, those whose deportation has been deferred or stayed, or children of unauthorized immigrants.

      Pew Research Center has selected an approach that considers a combination of authorized entry, legal certainty and likely permanency. In the U.S., the Center considers those with deportation relief (for example, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or Temporary Protected Status) as well as asylum seekers waiting on their cases as unauthorized immigrants. Although these groups are authorized to work, many entered without permission and their legal future in the U.S. is uncertain, as evidenced by recent policy changes implemented by the U.S. government and subsequent court cases.

      In the same way in EU-EFTA countries, deportees with a stayed or deferred deportation who have a legal right of residence and may even be allowed to work are included as unauthorized immigrants. Children born in Europe to unauthorized immigrant parents are considered part of the unauthorized immigrant population. Similarly, asylum seekers with a pending decision, of whom many entered without permission and whose acceptance rates continue to fall, are also included as unauthorized immigrants. Since the definition of an unauthorized immigrant is a point of debate, the Center has published estimates without asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their application (see Appendix C). Waiting asylum seekers, at nearly 1 million people in Europe in 2017, are likely the largest of unauthorized immigrant groups with an uncertain legal status.

      The Center’s new estimates come at a time when publics across Europe express mixed opinions on the place of immigrants in their societies. A 2018 multi-nation survey from the Center found that majorities in several European countries support the deportation of immigrants living in their countries illegally. On the other hand, when asked about refugees fleeing war and violence, the 2018 survey also found that majorities across Europe support taking them in, a group that has often entered Europe without permission and claims asylum.

      This is the first time Pew Research Center has estimated the size of Europe’s unauthorized migrant population. The methodology used for these new estimates builds on the Center’s more than 15 years of experience in estimating the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States. The unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. is more than double the size (10.3 million to 10.7 million in 2017) of that in Europe (3.9 million to 4.8 million); has been decreasing in number since 2007; and makes up a larger share of the total population (roughly 3% in the U.S. compared with less than 1% in Europe). (See our related blog post for more details on how unauthorized immigrant populations and their characteristics differ between Europe and the U.S.)

      The Center’s estimates are also the first comprehensive estimate for Europe in a decade. Europe’s unauthorized migrant population was last estimated for 2008 by an EU-funded team of European researchers called the Clandestino project. At that time, the number living in the EU was estimated to be 1.9 million to 3.8 million, not including asylum seekers with pending decisions. By comparison, our estimate for 2017 for EU countries only, excluding asylum seekers with a pending application, is 2.8 million to 3.7 million – the upper end of Clandestino’s 2008 estimate.2
      The Center’s estimates compared with others

      Pew Research Center’s unauthorized immigrant estimates in Europe are in line with other reputable data, including estimates from previous studies, statistics on the number of unauthorized immigrants regularized by governments and analysis of recent migration flows.

      In Germany, for example, a separate 2014 estimate using a different method than the one used by the Center and that did not include waiting asylum seekers, estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants to have been 180,000 to 520,000. For the same year, the Center estimated the number of unauthorized immigrants in Germany to be between 300,000 and 400,000 without waiting asylum seekers, within the 2014 study’s range. Moving forward, our 2017 estimate for Germany of 600,000 to 700,000 unauthorized immigrants, excluding asylum seekers waiting for a resolution in their case, is in line with expected trends. For more, see our Germany estimate methodology.

      Meanwhile, in the UK, a London School of Economics study placed the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the country between 417,000 and 863,000 in 2007. Ten years later, after hundreds of thousands of additional migrants from non-EU-EFTA countries entered and stayed in the UK, our 2017 estimate of 800,000 to 1.2 million unauthorized immigrants with waiting asylum seekers would be consistent with recent migration trends. For more methodological background, see our UK estimate methodology.

      In Italy, hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers have landed on the country’s shores during the past decade. Many have had their asylum cases rejected, and some have remained in Italy without authorization. Adjusting for regularizations of unauthorized immigrants to authorized status during the past decade, deaths, out-migration and additional arrivals, our estimate of 500,000 to 700,000 for 2017, including asylum seekers with a pending asylum case, is similar to the estimate published by the Iniziative e Studi sulla Multietnicità Foundation. For more information, see our Italy estimate methodology.

      In France, our estimate shows between 300,000 and 400,000 unauthorized immigrants lived in the country in 2017, including some 38,000 asylum seekers waiting for a decision on their case. This estimate is similar to that cited by government leaders as well as several French demographers. Also, some 300,000 people in 2017 were enrolled in a government medical plan accessed by unauthorized immigrants. For more, see our methodology for our France estimate.


      Pour télécharger le #rapport :

    • Commentaire de Serge Slama sur twitter :

      Le journal @lemondefr @JuliaPascualita pourrait prendre des précautions méthodologiques à l’égard de cette étude @pewresearch avec une appréhension très américaine de l’irrégularité qui inclut les demandeurs d’asile entrés illégalement.


      En France on n’a pas de moyens de comptabiliser le nombre exact de sans-papiers. On connaît les bénéficiaires de l’aide médicale d’Etat (315 835 en 2017), le nombre de déboutés du droit d’asile (80 000 à 90 000 par an), le nombre d’OQTF non exécutées (environ 60 000 par an).
      Enfin on sait qu’environ 30 000 jeunes nés en France de parents étrangers deviennent français à leur majorité (mais on ignore le statut de leurs parents).



      Et ce commentaire de Nando Sigona, toujours sur twitter :

      I need to have a closer look at the report, but the estimate for the UK seems too high. The UK has only marginally being affected by the 2013-2015 #refugeecrisis, and does more forced/voluntary removals than other EU states...
      Previous estimates, including LSE, Home Office, Clandestino project and our own on #undocumentedchildren, identified pre-accession EU nationals as one of the larger group of undocumented migrants in the UK. A group that was ’regularised’ through the EU enlargement.
      refused but not removed asylum seekers also contributes to the estimate, but total asylum refusals minus returns may be in the thousands but nothing like what the estimate would require.
      The report is also counting people with short term legal status like subsidiary protection which is again questionable. The report recognises that this approach may be controversial and in Appendix C provides an estimate without asylum seekers.
      and yet they went for the splash number for the press release and from initial media reports it is clear that some of the nuances are lost.
      and by the way, it would seem that there is no variation in the UK between the estimates with and without asylum seekers...


    • @Pewresearch a publié une étude sur la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en #Europe, dont les résultats ont été largement médiatisés depuis hier https://pewrsr.ch/2OalGIV un certain nombre d’éléments ont retenu l’attention de @DesinfoxMig :
      L’étude adopte un parti pris méthodologique basé sur le contexte américain pour définir le groupe étudié, à savoir la population immigrée « non-autorisée » en E. Cela inclut entre autre les #demandeursasile et les enfants nés en E. de parents en situation irrégulière.
      reconnait que l’acception très large de la notion #immigré « non-autorisé » qui considère une combinaison de facteurs (entrée autorisée, séjour régulier et la probabilité de séjour permanent) fait débat.
      Dans le contexte FR il y a débat car la traduction du terme « unauthorized » en #sanspapier, #clandestin ou en situation irrégulière renvoi à un contexte juridique et administratif différent du contexte US.
      Par ex, en France l’immigré ayant introduit une #demandeasile se voit délivrer par la #préfecture une autorisation provisoire de séjour, il ne peut pas être expulsé, et n’est donc pas considéré comme « sans-papiers » aux yeux du droit français.
      Si on peut ne pas être d’accord avec certains choix méthodologiques – et on apprécierait certaines précautions et nuances de la part des médias qui diffusent cette étude - elle propose une approche comparative d’un phénomène par sa nature même très difficile à quantifier.
      Pour la France, on peut retenir que la part des « non-autorisés » dans #immigration est particulièrement basse (10%), comparé à Allemagne ou aux Etats-Unis (environ 20%) et au Royaume-Uni (45%). Ils représentent au total moins de 1% de la population totale.


    • Pew Research Centre Estimates on the Irregular Migrant Population the UK and the rest of Europe

      The Pew Research Centre has produced new estimates of the number of irregular (‘illegal’ or ‘unauthorised’) migrants in the EU, including the UK. Here we explain briefly what they find and how they reach their conclusions.

      What are the key findings for the UK?

      The report estimates that in 2017 there were between 800,000 and 1.2m people living in the UK without a valid residence permit. The authors also estimate that, in 2017:

      Around one third of irregular migrants had been living in the UK for 10 years or more;
      They included similar shares of men and women, and around 14% were children;
      There was no evidence of any increase in the number of irregular migrants living in the UK since 2014;
      Half came from the ‘Asia Pacific’ region, but there no breakdown by individual countries within that region;
      The UK had one of the largest irregular migrant populations in Europe, alongside Germany.

      How are the figures calculated and are they accurate?

      The study uses the ‘residual method’. It compares the estimated the number of non-EU citizens living in the UK to an estimate of the number holding a valid residence permit in the same year.

      The results come with a high degree of uncertainty, because both of these figures are just estimates—as the Pew report recognises.

      In 2017, ONS estimated that there were around 2.4m non-EU citizens living in the UK (this is lower than the 5.7m non-EU born migrants living in the UK that year, because most people born in non-EU countries now hold UK citizenship). The precise figure is uncertain for various reasons, including because it is drawn from a statistical survey to which not everyone agrees to respond.

      Separately, the Home Office is required to report to Eurostat an estimate of the number of the non-EU citizens holding a valid residence permit each year – ranging from temporary work permit holders to long-term residents with Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR). In 2017, this estimate was roughly 1.5m. The UK government does not actually know the precise number of legally resident non-EU citizens, so the estimate requires various assumptions, for example about how many people with ILR have left the country or died.

      Pew’s ‘lower-bound’ estimate of 800,000 compares the estimated non-EU citizen population with the number of valid residence permits of at least 3 months duration. The ‘upper bound’ estimate of 1.2m instead looks only at those with permits lasting at least a year, and also adjusts the figure upwards to account for the possibility that ONS has underestimated the number of non-EU citizens living here.

      The comparison between the UK and other EU countries is particularly uncertain because the estimates of the number of legal residents are produced in very different ways and are not thought to be comparable.

      In summary, without more accurate data on both the number non-EU citizens in the UK and the number holding valid residence authorisation, it is difficult to know how accurate the figures are likely to be.

      Earlier this year, ONS and the Home Office produced a joint statement suggesting they did not plan to produce a new estimate using this method, because of limitations in the data and methodologies.

      What are the remaining evidence gaps?

      Even if we cannot be certain about the number, it is reasonable to assume based on this and previous estimates that the UK has a substantial irregular migrant population. There are still many things that are not known about the unauthorised population, notably:

      It is not known how many entered illegally vs. came legally but later overstayed or were not able to renew their residence authorisation.
      The figures do not tell us what the impacts of policy have been on the decisions irregular migrants make, and/or whether the figure would have been higher or lower if different policies had been in place.

      Migration Observatory comment

      Madeleine Sumption, Director of the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, said: “This report relies on a standard methodology to estimate the irregular migrant population, and gives us the most up-to-date estimate that is available. The big challenge when using this method in the UK in particular is that the data required for the calculation are not very good. In particular, the UK government simply doesn’t have an accurate record of exactly how many people are living in the UK legally. Without more precise data, there will continue to be a high degree of uncertainty around the number of people living here without authorisation.”


    • The Trouble with Pew’s estimates of the “unauthorized” migrant population in Europe

      The Pew Research Center, where I once held a leadership position, published a report on November 13, 2019 entitled, “Europe’s Unauthorized Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off.” The document is at best misleading, the product of an inappropriate statistical exercise. Given the reality of immigration politics in Europe, it is a made-to-order talking point for right-wing nationalists, echoing their attacks on asylum policies and on the migrants themselves. .

      This is Pew’s first effort to estimate the “unauthorized” population in Europe by applying a terminology I authored in 2002 for use in the United States. The current report has led me to conclude that the terminology and aspects of the statistical method that underlie its application are anachronisms that fail to take into account fundamental changes in the nature of migration flow to both Europe and the United States. As such, and no doubt unintentionally, the very knowledgeable people at Pew, including several I value highly as friends and colleagues, have fallen into a perceptual trap with significant political consequences.

      Pew’s critical error is to count as “unauthorized” people who have presented themselves to immigration authorities as required on arrival, have been identified, screened and registered in the lawful exercise of their right to seek asylum and have been granted permission to reside in their country of destination after an initial processing of that asylum claim. Nearly a quarter of the total “unauthorized” population in Europe, and closer to half in Germany, are asylum seekers, according to Pew’s account of its methodology. The estimate claims to be a statistical snapshot of this population on December 31, 2017, but as of that date these individuals, with few exceptions, had been granted documents attesting to their right to reside in these countries legally without fear of deportation and in many cases to work and receive social benefits.

      Pew counts these individuals as “unauthorized” because they had not yet been granted permission to remain as residents on a permanent basis. Germany and other European countries have several different degrees of asylum, including categories that grant protection for a period of years pending developments in their countries of origin and other matters. Moreover, in Europe as in the US, final disposition of asylum cases can take years due to backlogs and appeals, but those with pending cases are fully authorized to remain in the meantime. And, there is another category of persons whose claims have been denied, a small number in the 2017 Pew European estimates but more by now, who are not subject to deportation either by virtue of explicit administrative decisions or the prioritization of enforcement resources, a situation that occurs in the United States as well.

      In an exercise of highly subjective — and, to my mind, ill-informed — speculation, Pew concludes the individuals it observed in 2017 will never be granted permanent status in the future and that they will be subject to removal some day and so they should be counted as “unauthorized” in the present. This prognostication is as highly freighted politically as it is unjustified on any empirical basis. But, it is even more biased and inflammatory as a historical narrative.

      Almost the entire increase in the “unauthorized” population in Europe that peaked as of 2016, according to Pew, is the result of the extraordinary surge of Syrians, more than a million, who came across the Aegean from Turkey from the summer of 2015 to the spring of 2016 to seek refuge. By retroactively categorizing about half of those migrants as “unauthorized,” Pew is offering its statistical support to narratives that characterize that event as illegitimate, an abuse of Europe’s humanitarian values, a criminal effort to exploit social services and rich labor markets, a cynical abuse of the asylum system, a willing dilution of European identity by globalists, a pollution of Europe’s racial purity, etc.

      The methodology is explained in the fine print, and Pew even offers estimates minus the asylum seekers in an appendix. But, that does nothing to change the report’s deliberately attention-grabbing conclusion, its analytical perspective and the way it will be used for political purposes.

      Pew’s US estimates of the “unauthorized” are vulnerable to the same manipulation. They too include asylum seekers and produce the same statistical support for a demagogic portrayal of current migration.

      In the US, more than a million asylum seekers are sitting in an immigration court backlog awaiting adjudication of their claims, a number that has doubled since President Trump took office. These people have identified themselves to immigration officials, registered an asylum claim and have passed a “credible fear” interview with a finding that their claim is worthy of full consideration. By counting them as “unauthorized,” Pew fully embraces the Trump administration’s portrayal of the underlying migration phenomena as illegitimate even criminal. In the US asylum seekers account for a much smaller share of the Pew estimates than in Europe, about 10%, but that does not lessen the weight of the statistical fallacy. They are “unauthorized” only in the eyes of the beholders, in this case Pew and Trump. The result is a highly biased data point.

      In my view the problem with the Pew estimates is that they fail to account for new developments in migration flows to the United States and Europe.

      It was my great fortune to have been asked by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 2001 to create the Pew Hispanic Center and to then be part of the management committee that merged that center and several other stand-alone projects into the Pew Research Center in 2004. When the Pew Hispanic Center began publishing estimates of the “unauthorized migrant” population in 2002, the target was made up overwhelmingly of Mexican labor migrants who had either entered the country illegally or who had overstayed a legal entry and who would be subject to removal if apprehended. I am proud to say those estimates served an important and constructive role in repeated policy initiatives to legalize this population from 2004 to 2014. (I left Pew in 2007 to take a position on the faculty of the University of Southern California.)

      Both the migration phenomena and the focus of policy debate have shifted in the past few years, but Pew’s methodology has not.

      The number of cases in the immigration court backlog did not exceed 200,000 until 2009 and only crossed the 400,000 mark in 2014, according to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University, a source of pure data, just the numbers, on immigration. As such, asylum seekers were a small fraction of the total population which we were measuring in the 00’s which stood at about 11 million people, plus or minus, throughout that period.

      But, in the past decade, as Pew has ably chronicled, migration flows to the United States have changed. Mexican labor migration outside legal channels has been negligible for a decade and meanwhile the number of Central American asylum seekers has increased dramatically in the past five years. In Europe, the 2015–16 events and subsequent arrivals of asylum seekers represent an even more singular event compared to the very small ongoing irregular labor migrations.

      The Pew Research Center remains committed to its version of strict political neutrality, portraying itself as a “fact-tank” that produces data with no spin, no advocacy and only as much analysis as is necessary to make sense of the numbers. (The exercise is fraught and one of the reasons I left, but that is another story.) Taking the institution at its word about its intention, the distortions created by the current report on the “unauthorized” population in Europe should be occasion for a reconsideration of the methodology and terminology.

      First there is a technical issue.

      Both in the United States and in Europe, the population of migrants who are not citizens or legal permanent residents now comprises several categories of individuals with different kinds of status in national immigration systems. Some are indeed “unauthorized” in that they have no legal basis to reside in those countries and would be subject to removal with little recourse if apprehended and put in proceedings. But, there is also this large, and in the United States rapidly growing, population of persons who have presented asylum claims and have been awarded permission to remain in the country until those claims are fully adjudicated. So it is technically a mistake to apply “unauthorized” as a blanket term, and it retrospect it was a technical mistake when I first did it nearly 20 years ago.

      But, now there is a much graver issue about how the data is communicated.

      The nature of the migration phenomena that produce asylum seekers as well as the laws governing migration and the processes to administer it are all the subject of vociferous, brutally-polarized, high-stakes political debates in the United States and across Europe. Pew is taking sides in that debate when it counts asylum seekers as “unauthorized migrants.”


  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.


    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.


    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

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    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.


  • Jusqu’à quand l’#OTAN ?, par Serge Halimi (Le Monde diplomatique, novembre 2019)

    Dorénavant, l’Union compte une majorité d’États qui ont participé aux aventures impériales des #États-Unis (seize de ses membres actuels ont contribué à la guerre d’#Irak) ; elle relaie l’ingérence de Washington en Amérique latine (d’où la reconnaissance absurde de l’opposition vénézuélienne comme gouvernement légal) ; elle feint de s’opposer aux caprices de l’administration Trump, mais rentre dans le rang sitôt que celle-ci menace de la punir (#sanctions économiques contre les entreprises qui commercent avec l’Iran). L’#Europe pesait davantage au #Proche-Orient avant son élargissement. Et si Charles de Gaulle s’opposait à l’adhésion du #Royaume-Uni au Marché commun parce qu’il pensait que ce pays deviendrait le cheval de Troie américain sur le Vieux Continent, les États-Unis n’ont rien à craindre du Brexit. Car, au fil des décennies, l’#Union_européenne est devenue leur écurie.


  • The Money Farmers: How Oligarchs and Populists Milk the E.U. for Millions - The New York Times

    The European Union spends $65 billion a year subsidizing agriculture. But a chunk of that money emboldens strongmen, enriches politicians and finances corrupt dealing.

    Every year, the 28-country bloc pays out $65 billion in farm subsidies intended to support farmers around the Continent and keep rural communities alive. But across Hungary and much of Central and Eastern Europe, the bulk goes to a connected and powerful few. The prime minister of the Czech Republic collected tens of millions of dollars in subsidies just last year. Subsidies have underwritten Mafia-style land grabs in Slovakia and Bulgaria.[...]

    A New York Times investigation, conducted in nine countries for much of 2019, uncovered a subsidy system that is deliberately opaque, grossly undermines the European Union’s environmental goals and is warped by corruption and self-dealing.

    #Pac #fraude #agriculture #Europe #UE

  • Évacués au #Rwanda, les #réfugiés de #Libye continuent de rêver d’#Europe - RFI

    Par Laure Broulard

    Un jeune réfugié dans le centre de transit de Gashora au Rwanda.
    © FFI/Laure Broulard

    Publié le 03-11-2019 Modifié le 03-11-2019 à 07:25

    Le Rwanda accueille depuis quelques semaines des #demandeurs_d’asile évacués de Libye, dans le cadre d’un accord avec le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés et l’#Union_africaine signé le mois dernier. Un programme d’urgence présenté comme une réponse à la crise des quelque 4 700 réfugiés et migrants bloqués dans ce pays en guerre. Reportage.

    Le centre de #Gashora est en pleine effervescence. Situé dans la région du #Bugesera, au sud de #Kigali, il accueillait auparavant des réfugiés venus du #Burundi. Aujourd’hui, des équipes s’affairent pour rénover et agrandir les structures afin d’héberger les quelque 500 réfugiés évacués de Libye que le Rwanda a promis d’accueillir dans un premier temps.

    Les 189 demandeurs d’asile déjà arrivés sont logés dans de petites maisons de briques disséminées dans les bois alentour. Un groupe de jeunes en jogging et baskets se passent la balle sur un terrain de volley. D’autres, le regard fuyant, parfois égaré, sont assis sur des bancs à l’ombre.

    « Je n’ai pas encore réalisé mon rêve »

    #Rodouane_Abdallah accepte de parler aux journalistes, arrivés en groupe dans un bus acheminé par le gouvernement rwandais. Originaire du Darfour, ce jeune homme de 18 ans au regard doux a posé le pied en Libye en 2017. Il a tenté sept fois de traverser la #Méditerranée. Il a survécu par miracle.

    Aujourd’hui, il se souvient encore de toutes les dates avec précision : le nombre de jours et d’heures passées en mer, les mois en détention. Deux ans entre les mains de geôliers ou de passeurs. « Là bas, vous êtes nourris seulement une fois par jour, vous buvez l’eau des toilettes, vous ne pouvez pas vous doucher et vous devez travailler gratuitement sinon vous êtes battus », se souvient-il.

    Rodouane est aujourd’hui logé et nourri à Gashora. Il bénéficie également de soins médicaux et psychologiques. Cependant, il voit le Rwanda comme une simple étape : « Je suis heureux d’avoir eu la chance de pouvoir venir ici. C’est mieux qu’en Libye. Mais je ne suis pas arrivé à la fin de mon voyage, car je n’ai pas encore réalisé mon rêve. Je veux aller en Europe et devenir ingénieur en informatique », assure-t-il. Ce rêve, cette idée fixe, tous la martèlent aux journalistes. Pourtant les places en Europe risquent d’être limitées.

    « #Emergency_Transit_Mechanism »

    Dans le cadre de l’Emergency Transit Mechanism (#ETM), le nom donné à ce programme d’évacuation d’urgence, les réfugiés de Gashora ont aujourd’hui plusieurs possibilités. Ils peuvent soit faire une demande d’asile dans un pays occidental, soit rentrer chez eux si les conditions sécuritaires sont réunies, soit bénéficier d’un processus de #réinstallation dans un pays tiers sur le continent africain. Les mineurs non accompagnés pourraient ainsi rejoindre leur famille et les étudiants s’inscrire dans des universités de la région selon le #HCR.

    « Ils ont beaucoup souffert pour atteindre l’Europe, c’est donc un objectif qui est encore très cher à leur cœur. Mais maintenant qu’ils sont au Rwanda, nous essayons d’identifier avec eux toute une palette de solutions », explique #Élise_Villechalane, chargée des relations extérieures du HCR au Rwanda.

    Mais la démarche inquiète déjà certains réfugiés : « Les pays européens dépensent beaucoup d’argent pour nous éloigner de la mer Méditerranée. Et si c’est pour cela qu’on a été amenés ici, ce serait honteux. La seule chose que je pourrais faire serait de retourner en Libye et de tenter de traverser la Méditerranée », explique un jeune Érythréen, qui préfère garder l’anonymat.

    Une solution viable ?

    Le Rwanda n’est pas le premier pays à mettre en place ce type de mécanisme. Le Niger a lui aussi lancé un ETM en 2017. Depuis, environ 2 900 réfugiés y ont été évacués de Libye. Environ 1 700 d’entre eux ont été réinstallés dans des pays occidentaux à ce jour. Aujourd’hui, l’Union africaine et le HCR appellent d’autres pays africains à suivre l’exemple. Mais certaines ONG sont sceptiques quant à la viabilité du système.

    Au #Niger, le traitement des dossiers est long, ce qui crée des tensions. Le Mixed Migration Center, un centre de recherche indépendant, rapporte que des réfugiés auraient ainsi attaqué un véhicule du HCR en signe de protestation dans le centre de transit d’Hamdallaye en juin dernier.

    Plus généralement, #Johannes_Claes, chef de projet Afrique de l’Ouest au MMC, dénonce une externalisation des obligations des pays occidentaux en matière de droit d’asile : « Avec ce type schéma, l’UE délègue une part de sa responsabilité au continent africain. C’est d’autant plus cynique quand on sait que l’Union européenne finance les garde-côtes libyens qui interceptent les migrants avant de les envoyer en centre de #détention », explique-t-il.

    Du côté des signataires de l’accord, on présente le projet sous un jour différent : « Ce qui compte aujourd’hui, c’est que ces personnes sont en sécurité le temps que leurs dossiers soient traités. Et je suis fière que le Rwanda se soit porté volontaire », indique Hope Tumukunde, représentante permanente du Rwanda à l’Union africaine.

    Début septembre, au moment de la signature de l’accord, #Vincent_Cochetel, l’envoyé spécial du HCR pour la situation en Méditerranée, assurait à Reuters que la plus grande partie du financement de ce mécanisme d’évacuation d’urgence viendrait de l’Union européenne. Il est depuis revenu sur ces déclarations. Pour le moment, c’est le HCR qui assure la totalité du financement de l’opération.


    ping @cdb_77 —> je me demande encore comment organiser les messages seenthis. En fait, j’aime bien tes métalistes et je me demande si je peux ajouter direct par commenaire ? Mais pas sûre que je connais assez bien ton système. Sinon je te marque et t’ajoutes toi même ? Ou bien je fais mes métalistes à moi...mais peut-être moins efficace qu’essayer de faire ensemble ? ...voilà, j’aime vraiment bien le seenthis et je suis toujours en train d’essayer de comprendre comment faire. En tout cas j’ai du temps maintenant pour m’en investir plus ;)

    • Tout à fait d’accord, j’ai voulu dire cela, c’est parce que je connais pas encore très bien le vocabulaire SeenThis. Alors les métalistes (=liste avec fils de discussion) c’est très bien si tu organises cela, je ne veux pas m’impliquer. Ma question était si je peux ajouter des infos aux fils de discussion (= liste regroupé avec articles autour du même sujet) ? Parce que pour les fils, peut-être possible que je ne choissis pas le bien et j’ai peur de faire de désordre dans ton système. T’es d’accord que j’essaie ? Si cela te dérange tu me le dis ? Et pour l’article là-haut, si tu l’as déjà mis, pourquoi le triangle n’est pas rempli (y a-t-il un autre indice, si oui, je te marque plus ;) ) ?

    • ...oh lala impossible que c’est rempli, j’ai passé trop de temps devant mon ordi alors, n’importe quoi, mieux que je pars checker les structures autonomes...

      Allez, je commence à ajouter alors !

  • A-t-on enterré trop vite le cash ? Le Temps du débat par Emmanuel Laurentin - 30 Octobre 2019 - france culture

    "Bitcoin", "Lydia", "Libra" ... La disparition du cash est annoncée depuis plusieurs années, et dans certains pays (Chine, Suède) les espèces deviennent obsolètes. A-t-on encore besoin du cash ? Quels avantages, quels inconvénients ? A qui profite de la disparition des espèces, et qui en pâtit ?


    Création récente de la monnaie virtuelle initiée par Facebook, la Libra, lancement possible d’une crypto monnaie en Chine, création d’un service Uber Money : toutes ces nouvelles récentes laissent présager le pire pour la survie des monnaies classiques telles que nous les connaissions sous leur forme papier ou métallique. Et une même petite musique laisse entendre que pour des raisons fiscales et de lutte contre le blanchiment en particulier les gouvernements voudraient se débarrasser du cash. Pourtant il y a dix jours, la Monnaie de Paris rendait un diagnostic exactement inverse, imaginant la survie du paiement en espèces.

    • Entretien avec Manuel Valente, directeur de CoinHouse, pour le Journal du Net, le 05/07/2018
    • Entretien avec Jeanne Lazarus , « Les Français semblent mûrs » , Le Parisien le 23/08/2014
    • Sur la Monnaie de Paris et son PDG, Marc Schwartz : Monnaie de Paris : comment le nouveau patron veut consolider le modèle économique, Les Echos, le 17/05/2019 et La Monnaie de Paris ne croit pas à la disparition du cash, Les Echos, le 21/10/2019

    #argent #cash #banques #finances #blokchain #économie #monnaie #euro #argent #bitcoin #libra #économie #europe #union_européenne #contrôle #confiance #Suède #liberté #blockchain #flicage #crypto-monnaie #monnaie_numérique #confiance

  • Scaling Fences : Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe

    The Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe report presents the results of an extensive study exploring the perspectives and experiences of 1970 individuals who migrated through irregular routes from Africa to Europe, originating from 39 African countries.

    Its aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between migration and development. The Scaling Fences report is the second major review of contemporary development issues affecting Africa to be published by UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Africa.


    58% of respondents were either earning (49%) or in school (9%) at the time of their departure. For a majority of those earning, income appears to have been competitive in the national context.
    For 66% of respondents earning, or the prospect of earning, was not a factor that constrained the decision to migrate.
    62% of respondents felt they had been treated unfairly by their governments, with many pointing to ethnicity and political views as reasons for perception of unfair treatment.
    77% felt that their voice was unheard or that their country’s political system provided no opportunity through which to exert influence on government.
    41% of respondents said ‘nothing’ would have changed their decision to migrate to Europe Average earnings in Europe far outstrip average earnings in Africa, even in real terms.
    67% of those who did not want to stay permanently in Europe said their communities would be happy if they returned, compared to 41% of those who did want to live permanently in Europe.

    #rapport #migrations #asile #réfugiés #rapport #PNUD #push-factors #facteurs_push #motivations #profil

    ping @_kg_ @karine4

    • Les politiques migratoires européennes créent du #populisme en Afrique, sans limiter les départs clandestins

      Dans un rapport, le PNUD estime ces politiques inefficaces et contre-productives et dénonce une instrumentalisation politique de l’Aide au développement

      En matière de lutte contre l’immigration clandestine, « les décideurs politiques doivent changer d’approche ». La conclusion du rapport « En escaladant les clôtures », du Programme des Nations unies pour le développement (PNUD), rendu public lundi 21 octobre, porte un jugement sévère sur les stratégies européennes face à l’immigration irrégulière. « L’instrumentalisation de l’aide internationale au développement à des fins politiques ne devrait pas avoir un impact à long terme sur les facteurs des migrations africaines irrégulières », préviennent ses auteurs.

      Au moment où le gouvernement d’Édouard Philippe veut faire de l’aide publique au développement un levier, le PNUD rappelle au contraire que ce type d’approche envoie « un mauvais signal aux électorats européens en leur faisant croire que de telles stratégies marcheront sur le long terme ».

      Fruit de plus de 1900 entretiens réalisés auprès de migrants africains installés dans treize pays d’Europe, le rapport du PNUD analyse en profondeur le profil des personnes qui quittent leur pays pour entrer de façon irrégulière en Europe et les raisons qui ont présidé à leur choix.

      L’émigration va s’accentuer

      L’étude montre que les candidats au départ - qui avaient en moyenne 24 ans au moment de leur arrivée en Europe - sont en général, dans leur pays, mieux lotis que leurs pairs. Sans faire partie d’une élite, ils ont « manifestement bénéficié des progrès du développement en Afrique au cours des dernières décennies ». Originaires des zones urbaines à 85 %, ils présentent des niveaux d’études supérieurs à la moyenne des gens de leur génération. Ainsi, 43 % des sondés avaient complété le cycle secondaire. En outre, 49 % avaient des revenus au moment de leur départ et, parmi eux, les deux tiers gagnaient au-dessus du revenu moyen dans leur pays.

      Ces éléments laissent entendre que « le développement de l’Afrique est de nature à encourager les mouvements migratoires, et que ces derniers vont nécessairement s’accentuer tandis que « la plupart des pays d’Afrique atteignent à peine les niveaux de croissance et de développement à partir desquels l’émigration commence à s’intensifier ». Par conséquent, les auteurs battent en brèche « l’idée qu’il est possible de réduire la migration par le biais de réponses programmatiques et politiques conçues pour l’empêcher ».

      Les entretiens menés par le PNUD montrent qu’un des facteurs décisifs au départ est, chez les jeunes Africains, un sentiment d’exclusion sociale et de frustration vis-à-vis d’aspirations et de rêves qui n’ont aucune perspective de réalisation dans les pays d’origine. Malgré des situations plus favorables que celles de leurs pairs, les personnes sondées avaient pour 70 % d’entre elles le sentiment de ne pas gagner assez. Et pour 77 %, le sentiment que leur voix n’est pas entendue par leurs gouvernements. « Leur ambition a dépassé les opportunités disponibles localement, résume les auteurs. Le développement ne va pas assez vite et ses gains sont inégaux et limités ». L’immigration se révèle alors, pour ces personnes dont la trajectoire de vie est ascendante, un « investissement pour un meilleur avenir », un choix rationnel qui engage une « prise de risque calculée ».

      Les résultats de l’étude montrent aussi que les sondés proviennent de foyers plus nombreux que la moyenne de leur pays, ce qui laisse supposer une pression économique supplémentaire. En effet, 51 % des migrants interrogés contribuaient à l’économie du foyer avant leur départ. Même si la migration reste une décision multifactorielle, qui repose aussi sur des considérations en matière d’accès à l’éducation, de gouvernance ou de sécurité, 60 % des sondés ont évoqué le travail et le fait d’envoyer de l’argent à leur famille comme étant la première raison qui a motivé leur départ.
      Transferts bien supérieurs à l’aide au développement

      En 2017, les transferts d’argent depuis l’Europe vers l’Afrique subsaharienne ont représenté 25,3 milliards de dollars en 2017, rappelle le PNUD, qui souligne au passage que les montants sont bien supérieurs à ceux de l’aide publique au développement, de quoi mettre en doute la capacité de ce levier financier à dissuader les mouvements migratoires. En Europe, parmi les 38 % de migrants sondés qui déclarent des revenus, 78 % envoient de l’argent à leur famille. Ils gagnent alors en moyenne 1 020 dollars par mois, un salaire inférieur au salaire moyen du pays d’accueil - et même au salaire minimum en vigueur lorsqu’il en existe un -, mais cela représente trois fois la somme que les migrants percevaient en Afrique (lorsqu’ils y travaillaient) et leur permet d’envoyer un « salaire africain » à leur famille. Ce qui fait dire aux auteurs que la mobilité sociale ainsi obtenue est équivalente à un saut générationnel, malgré un phénomène de déclassement. En effet, les migrants qui travaillent en Europe occupent à 60 % des emplois peu qualifiés, le plus souvent dans le nettoyage, l’agriculture ou au domicile de particuliers, contre 29 % dans leur pays d’origine.

      En outre, les opportunités de travail sont limitées par l’absence de statut légal : 64 % des sondés déclarent ne pas avoir d’autorisation de travail dans le pays d’accueil, une proportion qui diminue au fil du temps. Parmi ceux arrivés avant 2005 en Europe, ils ne sont plus que 28 % dans ce cas. A ce propos, les auteurs soulignent que dans la recherche d’un droit au travail, le système d’asile est devenu l’une des seules options disponibles, en l’absence d’autres voies légales, alors même que les personnes n’ont pas migré pour des raisons humanitaires.

      Plus généralement, l’entrée irrégulière en Europe va de pair avec une vulnérabilité accentuée dans le pays d’accueil, qui pour une minorité significative, va perdurer dans le temps. La perspective d’une vie stable devient alors pour eux inatteignable, tandis que des expériences de privation, de faim, de difficultés d’accès aux soins, d’absence de revenus et de sans-abrisme se prolongent.
      Du « gagnant-gagnant »

      Pour le PNUD, l’approche - qui caractérise de plus en plus d’États européens - qui consiste à détériorer les conditions d’accueil des migrants pour dissuader leur venue, ne fait qu’aggraver les populismes : « La présence de migrants sans-papiers plongés dans les limbes de la clandestinité de façon prolongée nourrit l’inquiétude de l’opinion publique et les discours inflammatoires ».

      Il existe pourtant des solutions « gagnant-gagnant » face à la migration, assure le PNUD. Les entretiens montrent que le succès relatif rencontré par les migrants est corrélé à la façon dont ils se projettent dans l’avenir. Ainsi, 70 % des sondés ont déclaré vouloir vivre de façon permanente en Europe. Mais cette proportion diminue à mesure que grandit le sentiment de « mission accomplie », ce qui renforce l’idée d’une migration vécue comme un investissement. « Aider les personnes à atteindre leurs objectifs leur permettra non seulement de contribuer légalement et pleinement au marché du travail européen mais, à terme, devrait encourager le retour dans leur pays d’origine », soulignent les auteurs.

      Le développement de voies de migration circulaire, la régularisation des migrants déjà établis en Europe, mais aussi le développement d’opportunités pour la jeunesse en Afrique et la lutte contre les systèmes gérontocrates sont autant de défis que le PNUD encourage à relever. « Cependant, reconnaissent les auteurs du rapport, cela nécessite du courage politique en Afrique comme en Europe ».

      #politique_migratoire #politiques_migratoires #EU #Europe #UE

    • Un rapport de l’ONU favorable aux régularisations de migrants

      Un rapport analyse la situation et le parcours des migrants économiques arrivés irrégulièrement en Europe et pointe des politiques mal ajustées. Non seulement, il est vain de chercher à stopper la migration économique issue des pays africains, mais les mesures « décourageantes » contribuent à fixer la population en Europe.

      Dans la lignée des engagements formulés dans le pacte pour les migrations de Marrakech, qui appelait à récolter davantage de données objectives, le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement apporte un nouvel éclairage sur des mouvements migratoires sous-investigués : la migration économique irrégulière. L’occasion de régler quelques « malentendus » (politiques) en travaillant sur un échantillon large. Le PNUD a interrogé plus de 3.000 migrants arrivés en situation irrégulière en Europe (dont 275 en Belgique) pour n’étudier les profils que des 1.970 déclarants être venus pour des motifs économiques.

      93 % des répondants se sont trouvés en danger dans leur trajet vers l’Europe, la moitié ne s’y attendant pas au moment du départ. Pour autant, ils ne sont que 2 % à déclarer qu’ils n’auraient pas migré sachant ce qui les attendait. Et lorsqu’on leur demande ce qui les aurait fait rester au pays (une meilleure situation économique, pas de problème personnel, connaître les conditions de vie réelle une fois en Europe…), 41 % répondent : « rien ». Une détermination de nature à interroger la capacité de quelque mesure que ce soit à stopper les flux Afrique-Europe pour cette population. « Les données challengent la faisabilité de la dissuasion directe et des interventions préventives, suggérant que les décideurs politiques devraient revoir leur approche », souligne le rapport. « L’instrumentalisation de l’aide au développement à des fins politiques ne peut pas, de manière réaliste, amener à une réduction des facteurs de migration. »
      Plus la situation est précaire, moins on souhaite rentrer

      Interrogées sur leur avenir, 70 % des personnes affirment vouloir rester définitivement en Europe. Mais si l’on affine les critères en se penchant sur les migrants ayant une situation stable et des revenus (parce qu’ils ont été régularisés ou travaillent au noir), la proportion s’inverse : 51 % pensent rentrer dans leur pays d’origine. Des résultats plutôt contre-intuitifs, dans la mesure où on pourrait s’attendre à ce que les personnes ayant les situations les plus précaires soient davantage tentées de repartir. « Il semble que les politiques censées avoir un effet décourageant n’ont pas d’impact sur l’envie de rentrer, relève Mohamed Yahya, auteur principal du rapport. C’est plutôt l’inverse qui se passe parce que les personnes doivent récupérer l’investissement de la famille et des amis. » Le rapport souligne la honte de rentrer sur un récit d’échec, sans avoir été capable d’envoyer de l’argent régulièrement. Cette pression s’illustre dans une autre réponse du questionnaire : parmi les migrants souhaitant rentrer, 67 % pensent que leur communauté serait heureuse de les voir rentrer, contre seulement 41 % pour ceux souhaitant rester définitivement.

      Paradoxalement donc, en maintenant les personnes dans un statut précaire, l’Etat encourage la fixation des personnes. Dans ses recommandations, le rapport encourage à recourir aux régularisations, soulignant que les marchés du travail parvenaient déjà à absorber une partie de la population concernée.

      « Toute l’attention côté européen porte sur le management de la migration – comment réduire les flux –, tandis que côté africain, l’enjeu c’est “comment avoir des voies légales” », constate Mohamed Yahya. « Il y a un vide pour l’instant au niveau des voies d’accès légales. Or, vu les conditions en Afrique et le profil des personnes qu’on a rencontrées, il est possible de faire quelque chose qui fonctionne. Ce qui est sûr, c’est que la migration irrégulière génère du stress sur la communauté hôte, donne l’impression qu’on ne contrôle pas les frontières. On espère que le rapport contribuera à construire quelque chose parce que sinon, on va continuer à renforcer des perspectives négatives. Il faut que les sociétés se posent la question : quelle migration peut bien fonctionner en Europe ? »

      Les résultats de l’enquête menée dans 13 pays européens dessinent une population jeune (24 ans en moyenne), plus urbaine, plus éduquée et plus argentée que la moyenne des pays d’origine. « Ce n’est pas le manque de travail qui pousse majoritairement à partir mais le manque de travail de qualité, le manque de choix, de perspectives », souligne Mohamed Yahya, principal auteur de l’étude du Pnud. Le rapport recommande de poursuivre la création de zone de libre-échange en Afrique et de travailler sur les structures de pouvoirs dans lesquels les jeunes ne se reconnaissent pas.
      Une stratégie familiale

      Les migrants interrogés viennent souvent de familles plus nombreuses que la moyenne du pays d’origine. 53 % ont bénéficié du soutien financier de la famille ou d’amis pour couvrir le coût de la migration (jusqu’à 20 fois le salaire moyen pour un ressortissant de l’Afrique de l’Est). Les chercheurs voient une stratégie familiale dans nombre de ces trajectoires qui induit un besoin de retour sur investissement.
      38 % travaillent

      38 % des migrants interrogés travaillent dans le pays hôte. Parmi eux, seuls 38 % le font de manière légale. D’après les projections, le niveau de salaire atteint en Europe équivaut à un bon de 40 ans en avant par rapport à la courbe de développement du pays d’origine. 78 % des personnes qui travaillent renvoient de l’argent vers leur pays d’origine.


      #travail #stratégie_familiale

  • Catalogne : « Une situation alarmante pour les droits humains, la répression et la violence policière »

    Depuis la condamnation de neuf dirigeants séparatistes catalans le 14 octobre, les mobilisations n’ont pas faibli à Barcelone. Nous publions ici une tribune de l’Observatoire de la dette dans la la globalisation (ODG), basée à Barcelone. Le 14 octobre, neuf dirigeants séparatistes catalans ont été condamnés à des peines de neuf à treize ans d’emprisonnement pour sédition. Depuis, les mobilisations pacifiques n’ont pas faibli à Barcelone. Mais vendredi, la journée s’est terminée par des affrontements avec (...) #Débattre

    / Démocratie !, #Europe, #Droits_fondamentaux, A la une

    #Démocratie_ !

  • Malgré les risques, plus de 90% des #migrants africains prêts à nouveau à voyager vers l’#Europe (PNUD) | #ONU Info

    Une étude des #Nations_Unies sur les #migrations, publiée lundi, montre que 93% des Africains qui se rendent dans des pays européens en empruntant des routes irrégulières le feraient de nouveau, malgré le danger souvent mortel qui les menace.

  • Le #gorafi encore plagié : Brexit, Bruxelles : “Ce n’est pas fini !”, crient les partisans du maintien dans l’UE au rond-point Schuman 17 octobre 2019 - 17 Octobre 2019 - Belga - BX1

    Quelques dizaines de partisans du maintien du Royaume-Uni dans l’Union européenne se sont rassemblés jeudi en début d’après-midi au rond-point Schuman à Bruxelles, au pied de la Commission européenne, pour affirmer leur conviction que l’accord engrangé ce midi entre l’exécutif européen et le gouvernement britannique ne signifiait pas la fin de leurs espoirs.

    “Ce n’est pas fini, continuons à nous battre“, haranguait un orateur sur un podium aux couleurs du “Stop Brexit”. D’aucuns rappelaient que la situation n’était pas si différente d’il y a quelques mois, lorsque la Première ministre Theresa May avait engrangé un accord de retrait avec le reste de l’UE, mais n’avait pu lui faire passer l’obstacle de la Chambre des Communes. C’est l’heure maintenant de “mobiliser le Parlement”, soulignaient les “remainers” présents.

    #brexit #europe #royaume-uni #international #union_européenne #ue #grande-bretagne #angleterre #uk #référendum

  • Calais : « Le Brexit dur ne serait pas synonyme de chaos » Annick Capelle - 16 Octobre 2019 - RTBF

    Entre 4 et 6000 : c’est le nombre de poids lourds qui, chaque jour, transitent par Calais. Dans une fluidité impressionnante, les ferries embarquent ou débarquent ces véhicules chargés de marchandises destinées au Royaume-Uni ou au continent européen. En cas de Brexit dur, les formalités douanières seront rétablies… Du jour au lendemain. Faut-il donc craindre la paralysie ? Non, si l’on en croit les douaniers et les exploitants du port de Calais, qui depuis des mois, se préparent au rétablissement du poste-frontière. Il y a quelques jours, ils organisaient une répétition générale. Objectif : tester leur « frontière intelligente », un dispositif censé éviter les bouchons en cas de sortie brutale du Royaume-Uni.

    La clé de voûte de ce dispositif, c’est l’anticipation, souligne Eric Meunier, directeur interrégional des douanes et droits indirects des Hauts de France. « L’entreprise qui importe ou exporte de la marchandise devra effectuer préalablement une déclaration de douane sur internet, et recevra un code-barres. Muni de ce code-barres, le chauffeur de poids lourd se présentera ensuite à la frontière, où notre nouveau système informatique établira automatiquement un lien entre le code-barres, la plaque d’immatriculation et la marchandise transportée. C’est ce qu’on appelle l’appairage. »

    Le temps d’attente sera réduit au minimum, puisque, une fois son code-barres scanné, le chauffeur de poids lourd montera directement sur le ferry : « C’est pendant la traversée de la Manche que le système traitera la déclaration de douane ».

    Des panneaux verts et orange
    Dans le port de Calais, une nouvelle signalétique verte et orange a été mise en place pour aiguiller les poids lourds qui débarquent des ferries en provenance du Royaume-Uni. « Avant même de quitter le ferry, le chauffeur saura quelle voie il doit emprunter à son arrivée », explique Benoît Rochet, directeur général délégué de la SEPD, la société d’exploitation des ports du Détroit. « Si la sortie est autorisée par la douane, le poids lourd prend la ligne verte – une sortie aussi fluide qu’aujourd’hui. En moins de deux minutes, le camion est sur l’autoroute. Si le poids lourd doit emprunter la file orange, cela veut dire qu’il doit se soumettre à un contrôle. »

    Plus de 150 places de parking
    Les panneaux orange mènent, un peu plus loin, vers des parkings de délestage pouvant accueillir plus de 150 poids lourds en attente de régularisation douanière. Deux nouvelles plateformes y ont été construites. Elles disposent ensemble de dix quais de déchargement. C’est là que les contrôles seront effectués.

    Un des poids lourds participant au test, rejoint la première plateforme. Il transporte du ciment. Deux agents de douane vérifient aussitôt la conformité de la marchandise avec la déclaration de douane. Quelques minutes plus tard, le chauffeur peut repartir. Le dispositif semble bien rodé.

    La deuxième plateforme sera réservée aux contrôles vétérinaires et phytosanitaires. « Aujourd’hui, il existe déjà des contrôles vétérinaires et phytosanitaires, mais ils sont réalisés dans les Etats membres. En cas de Brexit, il faudra appliquer ces formalités ici, lors du passage à la frontière », explique Jean Michel Thillier, directeur général adjoint des douanes et droits indirects.

    Fins prêts
    Les douanes et les autorités portuaires sont convaincues que l’on peut éviter l’engorgement du terminal. Tout dépendra de la façon dont les entreprises jouent le jeu de l’anticipation. Eric Meunier : « Il existe une marge d’incertitude : c’est la proportion d’entreprises qui n’auraient pas réalisé les formalités préalables. Pour nous, il est très important que ces entreprises soient le moins nombreuses possible, parce qu’elles vont générer des retards pour elles-mêmes, mais également entraîner une charge de travail qui, sur le port, pourrait entraîner des retards pour l’ensemble des transporteurs. »

    Pourtant, Eric Meunier ne croit pas que le Brexit dur sera synonyme de chaos. Depuis plusieurs mois, les douanes françaises mènent une large campagne d’information auprès des entreprises, notamment via les réseaux sociaux. Cette campagne vise bien sûr les compagnies françaises, mais pas seulement : « Sur le franchissement à Calais, 80% des poids lourds ne sont pas français, mais viennent de l’Europe entière. C’est pourquoi, les douanes de tous les pays européens ont informé – et informent encore aujourd’hui – leurs opérateurs de la nécessité d’anticipation. Pour un opérateur, où qu’il soit, dans n’importe quel pays de l’Union, il sera tout à fait possible, de manière dématérialisée, via internet, de déclarer la marchandise préalablement, et une fois à Calais, de franchir la frontière de manière fluide. »

    La véritable inconnue, conclut Eric Meunier, concernera les petits opérateurs qui, à l’heure actuelle, ne travaillent qu’au sein de l’Union européenne, et qui ne sont pas habitués aux formalités douanières. Ce sont ces entreprises-là – françaises ou pas – qu’il faut impérativement toucher.

    #brexit #france #douane #europe #royaume-uni #international #union_européenne #ue #grande-bretagne #angleterre #uk #référendum #actualités_internationales #politique #frontières

  • #Bruxelles : La gare du Midi se met à l’heure du Brexit Barbara Boulet - 15 Octobre 2019 RTBF

    Un divorce à l’amiable entre l’Union européenne et le Royaume-Uni est-il encore possible ? La Belgique en tout cas se prépare à un départ possible de la Grande-Bretagne à la fin du mois. La gare du Midi à Bruxelles en est un exemple. Les services de douane s’apprêtent à devoir gérer à tout moment l’accueil des voyageurs en provenance du Royaume-Uni et à aider ceux qui s’y rendent à remplir leurs formalités.

    Une équipe de 28 douaniers a été recrutée, elle est actuellement en formation. Deux locaux sont aussi en train d’être aménagés dans le terminal Eurostar. L’un, à l’arrivée, est déjà là ; il permet le contrôle des marchandises (drogues et armes, mais aussi les marchandises soumises à des taxes comme l’alcool ou le tabac). L’autre, un conteneur qui doit arriver d’ici la fin octobre dans la salle d’attente des départs, permettra le cas échéant de remplir les formalités. Par exemple pour le remboursement de la TVA.

    « On se prépare pour éventuellement au 1er novembre pouvoir accueillir des passagers en provenance du Royaume-Uni ou qui partent vers le Royaume-Uni, déclare Florence Angelici, porte-parole du SPF Finance (en charge de l’administration des douanes). Il faut pouvoir s’occuper de toutes les démarches et assurer les contrôles douaniers » 

    Qu’est ce qui changerait ? 
    Car, en cas de Brexit sans deal, il y aurait du changement pour les voyageurs. Pas en ce qui les concerne directement en tant que personne, donc leur droit à eux de circuler (puisque le Royaume-Uni ne fait déjà pas partie aujourd’hui de l’espace Schengen), mais une sortie sans accord de la Grande Bretagne impliquerait de facto une sortie de l’union douanière. Les marchandises ne pourraient alors plus circuler librement, explique Marianne Dony, professeure de droit européen à l’ULB. "Toute marchandise pour entrer dans l’Union européenne doit disposer d’un papier attestant qu’elle répond bien à la réglementation européenne. La douane doit vérifier ces attestations. Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne les contrôles fiscaux, il faut bien se dire qu’une fois qu’on sort de l’Union, il peut y avoir des remboursements de TVA. On ne peut pas non plus exporter nécessairement la même quantité de marchandises qui ne soient pas taxées. Et il faut aussi vérifier que les marchandises en provenance du Royaume-Uni ont bien payé leur droit de douane".

    Autant de contrôles douaniers qu’on ne connaissait plus entre nos voisins du Nord et nous. Et qui devraient revoir le jour en cas de Brexit sans accord préalable. 

    #brexit #référendum #démocratie #europe #royaume-uni #international #union_européenne #ue #grande-bretagne #angleterre #uk #référendum #actualités_internationales #politique #frontières #Belgique #boris_johnson

  • Intervention turque en Syrie
    La révolution politique du Rojava menacée de toute part

    Stéphane Ortega


    Pour la troisième fois en trois ans, l’armée turque pénètre dans le nord de la Syrie, menaçant l’auto-organisation démocratique, féministe et multiethnique créée par les Kurdes au Rojava.

    Pour les forces kurdes du nord de la Syrie, il y a d’abord les ennemis acharnés. Ce qu’il reste de Daech bien sûr, mais aussi la Turquie associée aux milices djihadistes qu’elle soutient et pilote. Et puis, il y a tous les autres : vrais adversaires ou faux amis. De la coalition internationale à la Russie, en passant par l’Iran ou le régime syrien, ils sont nombreux à jouer leur propre partition qui passe pour beaucoup par la fin de la tentative révolutionnaire au Rojava, nom de la région autoadministrée par les Kurdes au nord de la Syrie.

    Profitant du déplacement des troupes de Bashar al-Assad de leur région vers Alep à l’été 2012, les Kurdes ont entamé un processus d’autogouvernement dans les cantons d’Afrine, Kobané et Djézireh. Le Parti pour l’unité démocratique (PYD), proche du PKK, et les milices de protection du peuple (YPG/YPJ) supplantent les partis concurrents pour devenir la force dominante. Ils s’appuient sur l’auto-organisation des communes, pensées comme une alternative à la création d’un État-nation (...)

    #Syrie #Rojava #Turquie #Kurdistan #autogouvernement #Erdogan #djihadistes #offensive #résistance #Russie #USA #Europe