• #Niger : Europe’s Migration Laboratory
    (publié en 2018, pour archivage ici)

    Mahamane Ousmane is an unrepentant people smuggler. He makes no effort to deny transporting migrants “countless times” across the Sahara into Libya. When he is released from prison in Niger’s desert city of Agadez, he intends to return to the same work.

    The 32-year-old is even more adamant he has done nothing wrong. “I don’t like criminals. I am no thief. I have killed no one,” he says.

    As Ousmane speaks, a small circle of fellow inmates in filthy football shirts and flip-flops murmur in agreement. The prison at Agadez, where the French once stabled their horses in colonial times, now houses an increasing number of people smugglers. These “passeurs,” as they are known in French, have found themselves on the wrong side of a recent law criminalizing the movement of migrants north of Agadez.

    Aji Dan Chef Halidou, the prison director who has gathered the group in his office, does his best to explain. “Driving migrants out into the Sahara is very dangerous, that’s why it is now illegal,” he interjects.

    Ousmane, a member of the Tubu tribe, an ethnic group that straddles the border between Niger and Libya, is having none of it. “Nobody ever got hurt driving with me,” he insists. “You just have to drive at night because in the day the sun can kill people.”

    A powerfully built man who speaks in emphatic bursts of English and Hausa, Ousmane worked in the informal gold mines of Djado in northern Niger until they were closed by the military. Then he borrowed money to buy a pickup truck and run the route from Agadez to Sebha in Libya. His confiscated truck is now sinking into the sand at the nearby military base, along with more than 100 others taken from people smugglers. Ousmane still owes nearly $9,000 on the Toyota Hilux and has a family to support. “There is no alternative so I will go back to work,” he says.

    “We need to implement this law gently as many people were living off migration and they were promised compensation by Europe for leaving it behind, but this hasn’t happened yet.”

    While the temperature outside in the direct sun nears 120F (50C), the air conditioner in the warden’s office declares its intention to get to 60F (16C). It will not succeed. As mosquitoes circle overhead, Halidou’s earlier enthusiasm for the law evaporates. “Agadez has always been a crossroads where people live from migration,” he says. “We need to implement this law gently as many people were living off migration and they were promised compensation by Europe for leaving it behind, but this hasn’t happened yet.”

    Ali Diallo, the veteran among the inmates, blames Europe for his predicament. Originally from Senegal, he made his way across West Africa to Libya working in construction. His life there fell apart after the Western-backed ouster of the Gadhafi regime. The steady supply of work became more dangerous and his last Libyan employer shot him in the leg instead of paying him at the end of a job.

    “In Senegal there are no jobs, in Mali there are no jobs, but there were jobs in Libya and that was all right,” he says. “Then the West killed Gadhafi and now they want to stop migration.” Diallo retreated two years ago to Agadez and found a job as a tout or “coxeur” matching migrants with drivers. This was what he was arrested for. He has a question: “Didn’t the Europeans think about what would happen after Gadhafi?”

    The Little Red Town

    Niger is prevented from being the poorest country in the world only by the depth of misery in Central African Republic. It was second from bottom in last year’s U.N. Human Development Index. Niamey, the country’s humid capital on the banks of the River Niger, has a laid-back feeling and its population only recently passed the 1 million mark.

    But the city’s days as a forgotten backwater are coming to an end.

    Along the Boulevard de la Republique, past the machine-gun nests that block approaches to the presidential palace, concrete harbingers of change are rising from the reddish Saharan dust. Saudi Arabia and the U.S. have vast new embassy complexes under construction that will soon overshadow those of Libya and France, the two traditional rivals for influence in Niger.

    Further north in the Plateau neighborhood, the development aid complex is spreading out, much of it funded by the European Union.

    “What do all these foreigners want from our little red town?” a senior Niger government adviser asked.

    In the case of the E.U. the answer is clear. Three-quarters of all African migrants arriving by boat in Italy in recent years transited Niger. As one European ambassador said, “Niger is now the southern border of Europe.”

    Federica Mogherini, the closest the 28-member E.U. has to a foreign minister, chose Niger for her first trip to Africa in 2015. The visit was seen as a reward for the Niger government’s passage of Law 36 in May that year that effectively made it illegal for foreign nationals to travel north of Agadez.

    “We share an interest in managing migration in the best possible way, for both Europe and Africa,” Mogherini said at the time.

    Since then, she has referred to Niger as the “model” for how other transit countries should manage migration and the best performer of the five African nations who signed up to the E.U. Partnership Framework on Migration – the plan that made development aid conditional on cooperation in migration control. Niger is “an initial success story that we now want to replicate at regional level,” she said in a recent speech.

    Angela Merkel became the first German chancellor to visit the country in October 2016. Her trip followed a wave of arrests under Law 36 in the Agadez region. Merkel promised money and “opportunities” for those who had previously made their living out of migration.

    One of the main recipients of E.U. funding is the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which now occupies most of one street in Plateau. In a little over two years the IOM headcount has gone from 22 to more than 300 staff.

    Giuseppe Loprete, the head of mission, says the crackdown in northern Niger is about more than Europe closing the door on African migrants. The new law was needed as networks connecting drug smuggling and militant groups were threatening the country, and the conditions in which migrants were forced to travel were criminal.

    Loprete echoes Mogherini in saying that stopping “irregular migration” is about saving lives in the desert. The IOM has hired community officers to warn migrants of the dangers they face farther north.

    “Libya is hell and people who go there healthy lose their minds,” Loprete says.

    A side effect of the crackdown has been a sharp increase in business for IOM, whose main activity is a voluntary returns program. Some 7,000 African migrants were sent home from Niger last year, up from 1,400 in 2014. More than 2,000 returns in the first three months of 2018 suggest another record year.

    Loprete says European politicians must see that more legal routes are the only answer to containing irregular migration, but he concludes, “Europe is not asking for the moon, just for managed migration.”

    The person who does most of the asking is Raul Mateus Paula, the E.U.’s top diplomat in Niamey. This relatively unheralded country that connects West and North Africa is now the biggest per capita recipient of E.U. aid in the world. The European Development Fund awarded $731 million to Niger for the period 2014–20. A subsequent review boosted this by a further $108 million. Among the experiments this money bankrolls are the connection of remote border posts – where there was previously no electricity – to the internet under the German aid corporation, GIZ; a massive expansion of judges to hear smuggling and trafficking cases; and hundreds of flatbed trucks, off-road vehicles, motorcycles and satellite phones for Nigerien security forces.

    This relatively unheralded country that connects West and North Africa is now the biggest per capita recipient of E.U. aid in the world.

    Normally, when foreign aid is directed to countries with endemic corruption – Transparency International ranks Niger 112th out of 180 countries worldwide – it is channeled through nongovernmental organizations. Until 2014 the E.U. gave only one-third of its aid to Niger in direct budget support; in this cycle, 75 percent of its aid goes straight into government coffers. Paula calls the E.U. Niger’s “number one partner” and sees no divergence in their interests on security, development or migration.

    But not everyone agrees that European and Nigerien interests align. Julien Brachet, an expert on the Sahel and Sahara, argues that the desire to stop Europe-bound migration as far upstream as possible has made Niger, and particularly Agadez, the “perfect target” for E.U. migration policies. These policies, he argues, have taken decades-old informal migration routes and made them clandestine and more dangerous. A fellow at the French National Research Institute for Development, Brachet accuses the E.U. of “manufacturing smugglers” with the policies it has drafted to control them.

    Niger, which has the fastest-growing population in the world, is a fragile setting for grand policy experiments. Since independence from France in 1960 it has witnessed four coups, the last of which was in 2010. The regular overthrow of governments has seen political parties proliferate, while the same cast of politicians remains. The current president, Mahamadou Issoufou, has run in every presidential election since 1993. His latest vehicle, the Party for Democracy and Socialism, is one of more than 50 active parties. The group’s headquarters stands out from the landscape in Niamey thanks to giant streamers, in the party’s signature pink, draped over the building.

    The biggest office in the pink house belongs to Mohamed Bazoum, Niger’s interior minister and its rising political star. When European diplomats mention who they deal with in the Nigerien government, his name is invariably heard.

    “We are in a moment with a lot of international attention,” Bazoum says. “We took measures to control migration and this has been appreciated especially by our European partners.”

    Since the crackdown, the number of migrants passing checkpoints between Niamey and Agadez has dropped from 350 per day, he claims, to 160 a week.

    “We took away many people’s livelihoods,” he says, “but we have to say that the economy was linked to banditry and connected to other criminal activities.”

    “Since independence, we never had a government that served so many foreign interests,”

    E.U. officials say privately that Bazoum has taken to issuing shopping lists, running to helicopters and vehicles, of goods he expects in return for continued cooperation.
    By contrast, the World Food Programme, which supports the roughly one in ten of Niger’s population who face borderline malnutrition, has received only 34 percent of the funding it needs for 2018.

    At least three E.U. states – France, Italy and Germany – have troops on the ground in Niger. Their roles range from military advisers to medics and trainers. French forces and drone bases are present as part of the overlapping Barkhane and G5 Sahel counterinsurgency operations which includes forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Mauritania. The U.S., meanwhile, has both troops and drone bases for its own regional fight against Islamic militants, the latest of which is being built outside Agadez at a cost of more than $100 million.

    “Since independence, we never had a government that served so many foreign interests,” says Hamadou Tcherno Boulama, a civil society activist. His organization, Alternative Espaces Citoyens, often has an armed police presence outside its gates these days to prevent people gathering. Four of Niger’s main civil society leaders were jailed in late March after 35,000 people took to the streets in Niamey in the biggest demonstrations Niger has seen in a decade. Much of the public anger is directed against this year’s budget, which hiked taxes on staples such as rice and sugar.

    Foreign aid accounts for 45 percent of Niger’s budget, so the austerity budget at a time of peak foreign interest has stoked local anger.

    Boulama calls Bazoum “the minister of repression” and says Issoufou has grown fond of foreign travel and spends so little time in Niger that his nickname is “Rimbo” – Niger’s best-known international bus company.

    “Issoufou uses international support related to migration and security issues to fortify his power,” Boulama says.

    The E.U. and the International Monetary Fund have praised the government for this year’s budget, saying it will ease dependence on donors. The most that European diplomats will concede is that the Nigerien government is “bloated” with 43 ministers, each with an expensive retinue.

    European leaders’ “focus on migration is 100 percent,” says Kirsi Henriksson, the outgoing head of EUCAP Sahel, one of those E.U. agencies that few Europeans have ever heard of. When it was conceived, its brief was to deliver a coordinated strategy to meet the jihadi threat in Mali, but its mandate changed recently to prioritize migration. Since then its international staff has trebled.

    Henriksson, whose term ended in April, compares the security and development push to a train where everything must move at the same speed: “If the carriages become too far apart the train will crash,” she says.

    As one of the few Europeans to have visited the border area between Libya and Niger, she is concerned that some European politicians have unrealistic expectations of what is achievable. The border post at Tummo is loosely controlled by ethnic Tubu militia from southern Libya and no Nigerien forces are present.

    “Ungoverned spaces” confuse some E.U. leaders, she says, who want to know how much it will cost to bring the border under control. These kinds of questions ignore both the conditions and scale of the Sahara. On the wall of Henriksson’s office is a large map of the region. It shows the emerald green of West Africa, veined with the blue of its great rivers, fading slowly to pale yellow as you look north. If you drew a line along the map where the Saharan yellow displaces all other colors, it would run right through Agadez. North of that line is a sea of sand nearly four times the size of the Mediterranean.

    The Development Delusion

    Bashir Amma’s retirement from the smuggling business made him an Agadez celebrity after he plowed his past earnings into a local soccer team, where he makes a show of recruiting migrant players. Bashir once ran a ghetto, the connection houses where migrants would wait until a suitable ride north could be found. These days a handful of relatives are the only occupants of a warren of rooms leading off a courtyard amid the adobe walls of the old town.

    He is the president of the only officially recognized association of ex-passeurs and has become the poster boy for the E.U.-funded effort to convert smugglers into legitimate business people. The scheme centers on giving away goods such as cheap motorcycles, refrigerators or livestock up to a value of $2,700 to an approved list of people who are judged to have quit the migration business.

    Bashir is accustomed to European questioners and holds court on a red, black and gold sofa in a parlor decorated with framed verses from the Quran, plastic flowers and a clutch of E.U. lanyards hanging from a fuse box. Flanked by the crutches he has used to get around since a botched injection as a child left him with atrophied legs, he says his conscience led him to give up smuggling. But the more he talks, the more his disenchantment with his conversion seeps out.

    Some of his colleagues have kept up their trade but are now plying different, more dangerous routes to avoid detection. “The law has turned the desert into a cemetery, for African passengers and for drivers as well,” Bashir says.

    You either have to be foolhardy or rich to keep working, Bashir says, because the cost of bribing the police has increased since Law 36 was implemented. As he talks, the two phones on the table in front of him vibrate constantly. His public profile means everyone is looking to him to help them get European money.

    “I’m the president but I don’t know what to tell them. Some are even accusing me of stealing the money for myself,” he says.

    His anxious monologue is interrupted by the appearance of man in a brilliant white suit and sandals at the doorway. Bashir introduces him as “one of the most important passeurs in Agadez.”

    The visitor dismisses the E.U. compensation scheme as “foolish” and “pocket money,” saying he earns more money in a weekend. The police are trying to stop the smugglers, he says, but they do not patrol more than 10 miles (15km) outside the city limits. When asked about army patrols north of Agadez, he replies, “the desert is a big place.”

    After he leaves, Bashir hints darkly at continuing corruption in the security forces, saying some smugglers are freer to operate than others. The old way was effectively taxed through an open system of payments at checkpoints; it is unrealistic to expect this to disappear because of a change in the law.

    “We know that the E.U. has given big money to the government of Niger, we’re seeing plenty of projects opening here,” he says. “But still, one year after the conversion program launched, we’re waiting to receive the money promised.”

    But his biggest frustration is reserved for the slow pace of compensation efforts. “We know that the E.U. has given big money to the government of Niger, we’re seeing plenty of projects opening here,” he says. “But still, one year after the conversion program launched, we’re waiting to receive the money promised.”

    Even the lucky few who make it onto the list for the Action Plan for Rapid Economic Impact in Agadez (PAIERA) are not getting what they really need, which is jobs, he says. The kits are goods to support a small business idea, not a promise of longer-term employment.

    “National authorities don’t give a damn about us,” he says. “We asked them to free our jailed colleagues, to give us back the seized vehicles, but nothing came.”

    There is a growing anti-E.U. sentiment in Agadez, Bashir warns, and the people are getting tired. “Almost every week planes land with leaders from Niamey or Europe. They come and they bring nothing,” he says.

    Agadez is not a stranger to rebellions. The scheme to convert smugglers is run by the same government department tasked with patching up the wreckage left by the Tuareg rebellion, the latest surge of northern resentment at perceived southern neglect that ended in 2009. The scheme sought to compensate ex-combatants and to reduce tensions amid the mass return of pro-Gadhafi fighters and migrant workers that followed from Libya, in 2011 and 2012. Many of them were ethnic Tubu and Tuareg who brought vehicles and desert know-how with them.

    The offices of the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace in the capital have the air of a place where there has not been much to do lately. Two men doze on couches in the entrance hall. Inside, Jacques Herve is at his desk, the picture of a well-ironed French bureaucrat. He bristles at the accusation that the PAIERA program has failed.

    “The media has often been negative about the conversion program, but they have not always had the right information,” he says. Herve is one of the legion of French functionaries rumored to be seconded to every nook of Niger’s government, and is well-versed in the complaints common in Agadez.

    “During the preparatory phase, people did not see anything, so they were frustrated, but now they are starting to see concrete progress,” he says.

    Herve says 108 small business kits have been given out while another 186 were due to be handed over. When a small number of four-person projects are added in, the total number of people who have been helped is 371. The pilot for the conversion scheme that Bashir and others are waiting on is worth just $800,000.

    If the program was rolled out to all 5,118 ex-smugglers on the long list, it would cost $13 million in funding over the next three years, according to a letter sent to the E.U. Delegation in Niamey. There are other E.U.-funded cash-for-jobs schemes worth another $7 million in Agadez, but these are not related to the former passeur.

    This leaves an apparent mismatch in funding between security, in effect enforcement, and development spending, or compensation. The E.U. Trust Fund for Africa, which European leaders have earmarked to address the “root causes” of migration, has allocated $272 million in Niger.

    Money, Herve acknowledges, is not the problem. He says the principle has been to “do no harm” and avoid channeling funds to organized smuggling kingpins. He also says the task of compiling a roll call of all the workers in an informal economy in a region larger than France had been enormous. “The final list may not be perfect but at least it exists,” he says.

    Herve’s struggles are part of the E.U.’s wider problem. The bloc has pushed for the mainstay of northern Niger’s economy to be criminalized but it remains wary of compensating the individuals and groups it has helped to brand as criminals. There is no precedent for demolishing an informal economy in one of the world’s poorest countries and replacing it with a formal model. Some 60 percent of Niger’s GDP comes from the informal sector, according to the World Bank.

    As a senior government adviser put it, “When you slap a child you cannot ask it not to cry.”

    According to an E.U. official who followed the program, “the law was imposed in a brutal way, without any prior consultation, in a process where the government of Niger was heavily pressured by the E.U., France and Germany, with a minimal consideration of the fact Nigerien security forces are involved in this traffic.”

    “exodants” – a French word used locally to denote economic migrants who fled poverty and conflict in northern Niger to work in Libya or Algeria.

    The group listens as Awal presents the latest draft of an eight-page plan featuring carpentry, restoration, tailoring and sheep-farming ideas. Making it a reality would cost $160,000, they estimate.

    “Some of us have been jailed, some vehicles are lying uselessly under the sun in the military base, but the reality is that we don’t know any other job than this.”

    All those present listen and pledge to respect the new law but they are not happy. The oldest man in the group, a Tuareg with a calm and deep voice, speaks up, “Some of us have been jailed, some vehicles are lying uselessly under the sun in the military base, but the reality is that we don’t know any other job than this,” he says.

    Then his tone turns bitter, “I feel like we have been rejected and the option to move to Libya, like we did in the past, is not there anymore.” Before he can finish, one of the frequent Agadez power cuts strikes, leaving everyone sitting in darkness.

    Unintended Consequences

    Alessandra Morelli uses the fingers of her right hand to list the emergencies engulfing Niger. The country representative of the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR) starts with her little finger to represent the 240,000 people displaced by the Boko Haram crisis in Niger’s southeast. Next is the Malian refugee crisis in the regions of Tillabery and Tahoua, a strip of land that stretches northeast of the capital, along the border with Mali, where 65,000 people have fled conflict into Niger. Her middle finger is the situation along the border with Algeria where migrants from all over West Africa are being pushed back or deported, often violently, into Niger. Her index finger stands for the thousands of refugees and migrants who have retreated back into Niger across the border from Libya. And her thumb represents the refugees the U.N. has evacuated from Libya’s capital Tripoli under a tenuous plan to process them in Niger ahead of resettlement to Europe.

    “I can no more tell you which is more important than I can choose a finger I don’t need,” says Morelli, the survivor of a roadside bombing in Somalia.

    Her depiction of a country beset by emergencies is at odds with the E.U. officials who talk of security and development benefits for Niger from its burgeoning international partnerships. UNHCR opened its office in Niger in 2012 and had been attempting to identify refugees and asylum cases among the much larger northward flow of economic migrants. The agency already has tens of thousands of refugees scattered across camps in the region, where many have already been in the queue for resettlement to the rich world for more than 15 years.

    Her depiction of a country beset by emergencies is at odds with the E.U. officials who talk of security and development benefits for Niger from its burgeoning international partnerships.

    A delicate negotiation with the government of Niger – which is aware that European money and plaudits flow from stopping migrants, not identifying more refugees – led to a fledgling project in Agadez, which in partnership with IOM was meant to identify a small number of test cases.

    But the concentration of international resources in Agadez can also have unintended side effects and the UNHCR guest houses were overwhelmed soon after they opened their doors.
    In December a trickle of young Sudanese men started to appear at the IOM transit center. When they made it clear they did not want passage home to Darfur, they were moved into the guest houses as soon as these opened in January. Hundreds more Sudanese quickly followed, the majority of them from Darfur but some from as far away as South Sudan. Most of them had spent half a lifetime in camps in Sudan or Chad and brought with them stories of hardship, abuse and torture in Libya, where they said they had either worked or been seeking passage to Europe.

    By February the first of the men’s families started to arrive, some from Libya and others from camps in neighboring Chad or from Darfur itself. By the time the number of Sudanese passed 500, UNHCR and its partner – an Italian NGO, COOPI – saw their funds exhausted. The influx continued.

    By early March more than 1,500 Sudanese had gathered in Agadez, many camped in front of the government’s office for refugees. The government of Niger wanted to expel them, said an E.U. security adviser. They were suspicious of possible links with Darfuri rebel groups who have been active in southern Libya. “They gave them a 10-day deadline to leave then revoked it only after a delicate negotiation,” the security adviser said.

    Rumors that the Sudanese were demobilized fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement and Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi spread in Agadez. In the comment section of local media outlet Air Info, anger has been rising. “Agadez is not a dumping ground,” wrote one person, while another said, “we’re tired of being Europe’s dustbin.”

    Still only 21 years old, Yacob Ali is also tired. He has been on the run since he was 8 years old, first escaping the bombs of Sudanese government forces in al-Fasher, northern Darfur. He remembers battling for a tent in Zam Zam, one of the world’s biggest camps for displaced people. The eldest of six children, he left for Libya at 20, hoping to find a job. After being abused and exploited on a farm outside Murzuq, an oasis town in southern Libya, he decided “to cross the sea.”

    Agadez is not a dumping ground,” wrote one person, while another said, “we’re tired of being Europe’s dustbin.

    Once again there was no escape and “after hours on a dinghy,” Ali says, “a Libyan vessel with plainclothes armed men forced us back.”

    For the next five months he was trapped in a warehouse in Tripoli, where he and hundreds of others were sold into forced labor. Eventually he managed to free himself and was told that Agadez “was a safe place.”

    Any hopes Ali or other Sudanese may have harbored that Agadez with its presence of international agencies might offer a swifter and safer route to resettlement are vanishing.
    “For refugees who are stuck in Libya, coming to Niger is the only way to safety and protection,” Morelli says, “but it’s difficult to offer them a real solution.”

    Fears that the Sudanese may be deported en masse intensified in early May, when 132 of them were arrested and removed from the city by Nigerien authorities. They were transported to Madama, a remote military outpost in the northern desert, before being forcibly pushed over the border into Libya.

    The accusation that Niger has become a dumping ground for unwanted Africans has become harder for the government to dismiss over the past six months as its neighbor Algeria has stepped up a campaign of pushbacks and deportations along the desert border. Arbitrary arrests and deportations of West Africans working without documents have long been a feature of Algeria’s economy, but the scale of current operations has surprised observers.

    Omar Sanou’s time in Algeria ended abruptly. The Gambian, who worked in construction as a day laborer, was stopped on the street one evening by police. When he asked for the chance to go to his digs and collect his things he was told by officers he was just going to a registration center and would be released later. Another policeman told him he was African, so had “no right to make money out of Algeria.”

    That is when he knew for sure he would be deported.

    Without ever seeing a court or a lawyer, Sanou found himself with dozens of other migrants on a police bus driving east from the Algerian city of Tamanrasset. The men had been stripped of their belongings, food and water.

    The bus stopped in a place in the desert with no signs and they were told the nearest shelter was 15 miles (25km) away. Although several of the men in his group died on the ensuing march, Sanou was lucky. Other groups have been left more than 30 miles from the border. Some men talk of drinking their own urine to survive, and reports of beatings and gunshot wounds are common. As many as 600 migrants have arrived in a single day at Assamaka border post, the only outpost of the Nigerien state in the vast Tamesna desert, where IOM recently opened an office. Survivors such as Sanou have found themselves at the IOM transit center in Agadez where there is food, shelter, healthcare and psychological support for those willing to abandon the road north and go home.

    After nearly five years, Sanou now faces returning home to Gambia empty-handed. The money he earned during the early years of his odyssey was given to his little brother more than a year ago to pay his way north from Agadez. Now 35 and looking older than his age, he admits to feeling humiliated but refuses to despair. “A man’s downfall is not his end,” he says.

    After nearly five years, Sanou faces returning home to Gambia empty-handed. Now 35 and looking older than his age, he admits to feeling humiliated but refuses to despair. “A man’s downfall is not his end.”

    Algeria’s brutal campaign has hardly drawn comment from the E.U., and a Nigerien diplomat said U.S. and European anti-migrant rhetoric is being parroted by Algerian officials. At a recent gathering of Algerian military commanders, discussions centered on the need to “build a wall.”

    The perception among senior figures in the Niger government that they have allowed themselves to become a soft touch for unwanted refugees and migrants has created acute tension elsewhere.

    In March a small-scale effort to evacuate the most vulnerable refugees from Tripoli to Niamey before processing them for resettlement in Europe was suspended. The deal with UNHCR hinged on departures for Europe matching arrivals from Libya. When only 25 refugees were taken in by France, the government of Niger pulled the plug. It has been partially reactivated but refugee arrivals at 913 far outweigh departures for the E.U. at 107. Some reluctant E.U. governments have sent asylum teams to Niamey that are larger in number than the refugees they are prepared to resettle. Meanwhile, people who have suffered horrifically in Libya are left in limbo. They include a Somali mother now in Niamey whose legs are covered in the cigarette burns she withstood daily in Libya at the hands of torturers who said they would start on her two-year-old daughter if she could not take the pain.

    The knock-on effects of the experiments in closing Niger as a migration corridor are not felt only by foreigners. Next to the rubbish dump in Agadez, a few hundred yards from the airstrip, is a no-man’s land where the city’s landless poor are allowed to pitch lean-to shelters. This is where Fatima al-Husseini, a gaunt 60-year-old, lives with her toddler granddaughter Malika. Her son Soumana Abdullahi was a fledgling passeur who took the job after failing to find any other work.

    What had always been a risky job has become potentially more deadly as police and army patrols have forced smugglers off the old roads where there are wells and into the deep desert. Abdullahi’s friends and fellow drivers cannot be sure what happened to him but his car got separated from a three-vehicle convoy on a night drive and appears to have broken down. It took them hours to find the vehicle and its human cargo but Abdullahi had struck out for help into the desert and disappeared.

    His newly widowed wife had to return to her family and could support only two of their three children, so Malika came to live with al-Husseini. Tears look incongruous on her tough and weatherworn face but she cries as she remembers that the family had been close to buying a small house before her son died.

    Epilogue

    All that remains of Mamadou Makka is his phone. The only traces on the scratched handset of the optimistic and determined young Guinean are a few songs he liked and some contacts. It is Ousman Ba’s most treasured possession. “I have been hungry and refused to sell it,” he says, sitting on the mud floor of a smuggler’s ghetto outside Agadez.

    Makka and Ba became friends on the road north to the Sahara; they had never met in Conakry, the capital of their native Guinea. The younger man told Ba about his repeated attempts to get a visa to study in France. Makka raised and lost thousands of dollars through intermediaries in various scams before being forced to accept that getting to Europe legally was a dead end. Only then did he set out overland.

    “It was not his fate to study at a university in France, it was his fate to die in the desert,” says Ba, who was with him when, on the last day of 2017, he died, aged 22.

    “It was not his fate to study at a university in France, it was his fate to die in the desert”

    The pair were among some 80 migrants on the back of a trio of vehicles roughly two days’ drive north of Agadez. The drivers became convinced they had been spotted by an army patrol and everything began to go wrong. Since the 2016 crackdown the routes have changed and distances doubled, according to active smugglers. Drivers have also begun to take amounts of up to $5,000 to pay off security patrols, but whether this works depends on who intercepts them. Some drivers have lost their vehicles and cash and been arrested. News that drivers are carrying cash has drawn bandits, some from as far afield as Chad. Faced with this gauntlet, some drivers unload their passengers and try to outrun the military.

    In Makka and Ba’s case, they were told to climb down. With very little food or water, the group did not even know in which direction to walk. “In that desert, there are no trees. No houses, no water … just mountains of sand,” Ba says.

    It took four days before an army patrol found them. In that time, six of the group died. There was no way to bury Makka, so he was covered with sand. Ba speaks with shame about the selfishness that comes with entering survival mode. “Not even your mother would give you her food and water,” he says.

    When they were finally picked up by the Nigerien army, one of the officers demanded to know of Ba why he had put himself in such an appalling situation and said he could not understand why he hadn’t gotten a visa.

    Half dead from heat stroke and dehydration, Ba answered him, “It is your fault that this happened. Because if you weren’t here, the driver would never abandon us.”

    Four months on and Ba has refused the offer from IOM of an E.U.-funded plane ticket home. He is back in the ghetto playing checkers on a homemade board and waiting to try again. He used Makka’s phone to speak to the young man’s father in Conakry, who begged him to turn back. Ba told him, “Your son had a goal and I am still following that goal. Either I will reach it or I will die. God will decide.”

    https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/articles/2018/05/22/niger-europes-migration-laboratory

    #laboratoire #migrations #asile #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #Agadez #modèle #modèle_nigérien #loi_36 #loi #IOM #OIM #Giuseppe_Loprete #risques #retours_volontaires #Raul_Mateus_Paula #European_development_fund #fond_européen_pour_le_développement #Allemagne #GTZ #Mohamed_Bazoum #France #Italie #G5_Sahel #Action_Plan_for_Rapid_Economic_Impact_in_Agadez (#PAIERA)

  • At what cost? Funding the EU’s security, defence, and border policies, 2021–2027.
    A guide for civil society on how EU budgets work

    This report reveals that:

    The 2021–27 #Multi-annual_Financial_Framework allocates an unprecedented amount of European public money for security and defence purposes, more than doubling its budget from one spending cycle to the next.

    - The overall amount of money earmarked for security and defence spending is €43.9 billion, an increase of more than 123% when compared to the previous seven-year budgetary cycle, which allocated €19.7 billion for the same purpose.
    - The largest increase from the previous budgetary cycle can be seen in the European Defence Fund, which replaces its precursor programmes (Preparatory Action on Defence Research and European Defence Industrial Development Programme) with a massive funding increase of 1256%, to reach a total of almost €8 billion. This money will, for the first time, be used for the research and development of high-tech military weaponry.
    - The #European_Peace_Facility, which may be understood as replacing the Athena mechanism and African Peace Facility, will increase its budget by 119% to €5.7 billion. This means that 31% of the overall spending will go on military weaponry research and development and an off-budget military initiative with almost no democratic scrutiny, oversight or transparency whatsoever.
    - Other significant budget hikes include the #Internal_Security_Fund, which will increase by 90% to €1.9 billion, the Integrated Border Management Fund – Border and Visa, which will increase by 131% to €6.2 billion and the funds being made available to agencies such as Frontex and Europol, which will increase by 129% to €9.6 billion. The increase of the Asylum and Migration Fund is less notable at 43% but the instrument will still receive a substantial €9.9 billion.
    - The Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme will increase its budget by 124%, to reach €1.4 billion, but this figure should be put in to context – it pales in comparison to the €43.9 billion being invested in militarised security and defence initiatives. Funding for law enforcement, border control, military research and development and operations (€43.9bn) is 31 times higher than funding for rights, values and justice (€1.4bn). Furthermore, the majority of the latter funds will still be awarded to states rather than independent organisations.

    In addition to the aforementioned funds, development aid will be redirected towards border management and will play an increased role in enhancing non-EU states’ ability to control migratory movements. The #European_Development_Fund and #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa have both been used to pursue migration policy objectives, and in the 2021–27 period 10% of the new €79 billion #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) ‘should be dedicated particularly to actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement within the objectives of the Instrument’.

    The massive increase in security spending will also strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’ and further the long-standing goal of the EU and its member states to externalise border control to third countries regardless of these policies’ devastating consequences. The objective of containing unwanted people fleeing war and persecution outside Europe’s borders has been strongly prioritised in the 2021–27 security and migration funds:

    – The new home affairs fund seeks to enhance the ability of countries outside the EU to control migration and one of the main objectives of the #AMF is centred on the external dimension of asylum and migration management.
    – One aim of the IBMF is ‘to facilitate legitimate border crossings, to prevent and detect illegal immigration and cross-border crime and to effectively manage migratory flows’, and one of the ways in which this can be done is through ‘the enhancement of inter-agency cooperation’ between member states, Union bodies and third countries.
    – The IBMF will finance the deployment of immigration liaison officers to third countries to gather information and intelligence on migratory movements. Frontex, the EU’s border and coast guard agency, has its own pool of liaison officers who undertake similar work.
    – The consequences of border #externalisation policies are felt in regions as far south as the Sahel or as far east as countries neighbouring Afghanistan, where immigration and asylum authorities have, in effect, become the border guards of the EU, detaining and containing those on the move in search of safety.

    The European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility mark a new point of departure for the EU in pivoting towards hard power and militarism.

    - The #European_Peace_Facility (#EPF) is an off-budget fund which will circumvent, and may eventually render redundant, EU rules against funding military projects. Under the EPF lethal weapons may be provided to third countries for defence purposes. The financing and provision of weapons to Ukraine is the first such example.
    - The #European_Defence_Fund (#EDF) will, for the first time, provide funding for the research and development of high-tech military equipment, which until now was largely prohibited by the EU.
    - A substantial amount of funding will also bolster the European security industrial complex and serve to subsidise the already highly lucrative homeland security industry. This complex has long promoted a vision of security based on the development and deployment of technical ‘solutions’, many of which are premised on novel and enhanced surveillance techniques.
    – The lion’s share of EU funding for homeland security research has long gone to private companies that are likely to continue being the main beneficiaries of these funds in the 2021–27 period.
    - The European Defence Fund will provide a new source of finance for many of the same corporations that have been significant recipients of security research funding. There is a requirement for the European Commission and other actors to ensure ‘synergies’ between the two programmes, and to exploit dual-use technology that may be of use to both the homeland security and military sectors. In practice, this is likely to mean the further militarisation of the civil sphere and the continuation of the long-standing trend to blur the lines between war, policing and internal security initiatives.
    – The significance of the EPF and EDF for the EU as a political project should not be underestimated. The creation of these funds marks a new point of departure for the EU, which began as a peace project. Under these funds it is actively shifting course and is now pursuing militarised objectives.
    - Determining the priorities of these funds will remain matters of state – apart from a limited role in negotiating legislation, the role of the European Parliament and civil society after laws have been passed is severely restricted, raising serious questions regarding parliamentary and public scrutiny, transparency and oversight.

    The EU’s Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, will be provided with unprecedented funding of €5.6 billion from 2021-2027, a 194% increase compared to the previous budgetary cycle, and a key role in overseeing member states’ use of EU migration funds.

    – While #Frontex received €6 million in 2005, it now receives an average of €800 million a year – a 13,200% increase in budget over less than 20 years.
    - The agency will receive several hundred million euros a year to fulfil its expanded role, and in particular to develop its ‘standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards.
    - The European Commission is obliged to take into account Frontex’s views on national spending using the AMF and IBMF, and the agency is to be consulted on how member states should address recommendations resulting from evaluations on how they manage their borders.
    - Any equipment purchased by national border authorities using the IBMF must meet Frontex’s technical standards, and be made available for use by the agency.
    – Frontex is to play a key role in identifying and evaluating relevant research activities as part of the Civil Security for Society homeland security research programme

    Although the funding is being allocated for activities that carry significant risk, such as research into and development of lethal weapons, intrusive surveillance and policing, or the reinforcement of deadly border control practices, transparency, oversight, and accountability are all sorely lacking:

    - Although the EU’s new security funds will be subject to some measure of democratic scrutiny and oversight, and there will be some transparency regarding the projects and activities funded, this is largely restricted to the provision of information on spending and results, while democratic participation in setting priorities is strictly limited. With regard to the ISF, the European Commission is obliged to compile reports, to which the Parliament can then propose recommendations, which the Commission ‘shall endeavour to take into account’. There is no such requirement however, for the AMF or IBMF.
    – For the most part, it will be state officials in EU member states who determine how these funds are spent, while elected representatives and civil society organisations have only been granted a post-facto oversight role with no capacity to opine or influence spending beforehand.
    – There are a number of loopholes for the home affairs funds that could be used to inhibit transparency and, in turn, accountability. National authorities are obliged to publish information on the AMF, IBMF and ISF, ‘except where Union law or national law excludes such publication for reasons of security, public order, criminal investigations, or protection of personal data’ – in the hands of over-zealous officials, ‘security’ and ‘public order’ could be interpreted very broadly as a means of restricting public access.
    - Transparency has been kept to an absolute minimum with regard to the European Defence Fund and European Peace Facility.
    - The distribution of spending on external migration policies across different funding streams (such as development, migration, and security) means that political responsibility is distributed and diluted, further reducing the Parliament’s capacity to exert democratic scrutiny and oversight.

    What is notable by its absence from the 2021–2027 Multi-annual Financial Framework?

    - There is no funding to undertake search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, but rather to provide assistance or actively participate in ‘push or pull back’ operations to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching Europe’s shores.
    – There are only limited requirements to consult the EU’s own expert body on fundamental rights, the Fundamental Rights Agency, when drafting and approving spending programmes, while there is no obligation whatsoever to consult the European Institute for Gender Equality or national human rights bodies.
    - These funds attempt to address the consequences, and not root causes, of political and social conflict. For example, with regard to racism and xenophobia towards migrants and refugees, they appear to placate such sentiments rather than to find creative ways to effectively challenge them.

    https://eubudgets.tni.org
    #guide #budget #EU #UE #Union_européenne #défense #frontières #sécurité #coût
    #Asylum_and_Migration_Fund (#AMF) #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund (#IBMF) #Internal_Security_Fund (#ISF) #fonds #migrations #asile #réfugiés #statistiques #chiffres #transparence

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes

    How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
    In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.

    What do all these people have in common?

    All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.

    Since the summer of 2015,
    Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
    when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
    Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
    And much of this money is being spent in Africa.

    Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.

    However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.

    The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?

    At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.

    In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.

    If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.

    This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?

    This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.

    For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?

    While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
    in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.

    Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
    Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’

    It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.

    But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.

    It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.

    The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
    the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
    the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
    the French president, to Mark Rutte,

    the Dutch prime minister.

    Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
    ‘No data available’

    But let’s get back to those funding streams.

    The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.

    But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”

    Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
    but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
    or “no data available”.

    The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,

    the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.

    This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”

    At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
    Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti

    “There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”

    This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.

    Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.

    The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.

    Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.

    The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.

    Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.

    Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
    in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.

    In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
    the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.

    But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.

    Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.

    But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.

    The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
    The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.

    But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.

    To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”

    (DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

    Still with me?

    Because this was just the Netherlands.

    Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).

    Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.

    This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.

    Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.

    Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.

    Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.

    Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,

    which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.

    And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
    organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.

    This is the European migration spaghetti.
    How we managed to compile a list nonetheless

    By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?

    We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?

    Nope.

    We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).

    No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.

    In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
    This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
    was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.

    So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.

    More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.

    For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

    What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?

    Each country has its own way of categorising projects.

    There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.

    When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.

    While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
    1) Where is the money going?

    In Nigeria, we found

    If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
    50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.

    Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
    more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative

    to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.

    The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities

    in Nigeria: at least €92m.

    Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.

    We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
    Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
    Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.

    2) Where isn’t the money going?

    When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.

    “The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.

    See their website here.
    “Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”

    We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.

    Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.

    But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”

    Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.

    3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?

    We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?

    Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.

    One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”

    Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
    And we’ve only looked at one country ...

    That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.

    When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?

    Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?

    But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP

    called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.

    Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.

    But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.

    So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.

    https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/171168048128-fac42704
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et ajouté à la métaliste développement/migrations :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

    ping @isskein @isskein @pascaline @_kg_

    • Résumé en français par Jasmine Caye (@forumasile) :

      Pour freiner la migration en provenance d’Afrique les dépenses européennes explosent

      Maite Vermeulen est une journaliste hollandaise, cofondatrice du site d’information The Correspondent et spécialisée dans les questions migratoires. Avec deux autres journalistes, l’italien Giacomo Zandonini (Italie) et le nigérian Ajibola Amzat, elle a tenté de comprendre les raisons derrières la flambée des dépenses européennes sensées freiner la migration en provenance du continent africain.

      Depuis le Nigéria, Maite Vermeulen s’est intéressée aux causes de la migration nigériane vers l’Europe et sur les milliards d’euros déversés dans les programmes humanitaires et sécuritaires dans ce pays. Selon elle, la politique sécuritaire européenne n’empêchera pas les personnes motivées de tenter leur chance pour rejoindre l’Europe. Elle constate que les fonds destinés à freiner la migration sont toujours attribués aux mêmes grandes organisations gouvernementales ou non-gouvernementales. Les financements européens échappent aussi aux évaluations d’impact permettant de mesurer les effets des aides sur le terrain.

      Le travail de recherche des journalistes a duré six mois et se poursuit. Il est financé par Money Trail un projet qui soutient des journalistes africains, asiatiques et européens pour enquêter en réseau sur les flux financiers illicites et la corruption en Afrique, en Asie et en Europe.

      Les Nigérians ne viennent pas en Europe pour obtenir l’asile

      L’équipe a d’abord tenté d’élucider cette énigme : pourquoi tant de nigérians choisissent de migrer vers l’Europe alors qu’ils n’obtiennent quasiment jamais l’asile. Le Nigéria est un pays de plus de 190 millions d’habitants et l’économie la plus riche d’Afrique. Sa population représente le plus grand groupe de migrants africains qui arrivent en Europe de manière irrégulière. Sur les 180 000 migrants qui ont atteint les côtes italiennes en 2016, 21% étaient nigérians. Le Nigéria figure aussi régulièrement parmi les cinq premiers pays d’origine des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Près de 60% des requérants nigérians proviennent de l’Etat d’Edo dont la capitale est Bénin City. Pourtant leurs chance d’obtenir un statut de protection sont minimes. En effet, seuls 9% des demandeurs d’asile nigérians reçoivent l’asile dans l’UE. Les 91% restants sont renvoyés chez eux ou disparaissent dans la nature.

      Dans l’article Want to make sense of migration ? Ask the people who stayed behind, Maite Vermeulen explique que Bénin City a été construite grâce aux nigérians travaillant illégalement en Italie. Et les femmes sont peut-être bien à l’origine d’un immense trafic de prostituées. Elle nous explique ceci :

      “Pour comprendre le présent, il faut revenir aux années 80. À cette époque, des entreprises italiennes étaient établies dans l’État d’Edo. Certains hommes d’affaires italiens ont épousé des femmes de Benin City, qui sont retournées en Italie avec leur conjoint. Ils ont commencé à exercer des activités commerciales, à commercialiser des textiles, de la dentelle et du cuir, de l’or et des bijoux. Ces femmes ont été les premières à faire venir d’autres femmes de leur famille en Italie – souvent légalement, car l’agriculture italienne avait cruellement besoin de travailleurs pour cueillir des tomates et des raisins. Mais lorsque, à la fin des années 80, la chute des prix du pétrole a plongé l’économie nigériane à l’arrêt, beaucoup de ces femmes d’affaires ont fait faillite. Les femmes travaillant dans l’agriculture ont également connu une période difficile : leur emploi est allé à des ouvriers d’Europe de l’Est. Ainsi, de nombreuses femmes Edo en Italie n’avaient qu’une seule alternative : la prostitution. Ce dernier recours s’est avéré être lucratif. En peu de temps, les femmes ont gagné plus que jamais auparavant. Elles sont donc retournées à Benin City dans les années 1990 avec beaucoup de devises européennes – avec plus d’argent, en fait, que beaucoup de gens de leur ville n’en avaient jamais vu. Elles ont construit des appartements pour gagner des revenus locatifs. Ces femmes étaient appelées « talos », ou mammas italiennes. Tout le monde les admirait. Les jeunes femmes les considéraient comme des modèles et voulaient également aller en Europe. Certains chercheurs appellent ce phénomène la « théorie de la causalité cumulative » : chaque migrant qui réussit entraîne plus de personnes de sa communauté à vouloir migrer. A cette époque, presque personne à Benin City ne savait d’où venait exactement l’argent. Les talos ont commencé à prêter de l’argent aux filles de leur famille afin qu’elles puissent également se rendre en Italie. Ce n’est que lorsque ces femmes sont arrivées qu’on leur a dit comment elles devaient rembourser le prêt. Certaines ont accepté, d’autres ont été forcées. Toutes gagnaient de l’argent. Dans les premières années, le secret des mammas italiennes était gardé au sein de la famille. Mais de plus en plus de femmes ont payé leurs dettes – à cette époque, cela prenait environ un an ou deux – et elles ont ensuite décidé d’aller chercher de l’argent elles-mêmes. En tant que « Mamas », elles ont commencé à recruter d’autres femmes dans leur ville natale. Puis, lentement, l’argent a commencé à manquer à Benin City : un grand nombre de leurs femmes travaillaient dans l’industrie du sexe en Italie.”

      Aujourd’hui, l’Union européenne considère le Nigéria comme son plus important “partenaire migratoire”et depuis quelques années les euros s’y déversent à flots afin de financer des programmes des sécurisation des frontières, de création d’emploi, de lutte contre la traite d’être humains et des programmes de sensibilisation sur les dangers de la migration vers l’Europe.
      Le “cartel migratoire” ou comment peu d’organisation monopolisent les projets sur le terrain

      Dans un autre article intitulé A breakdown of Europe’s € 1.5 billion migration spending in Nigeria, les journalistes se demandent comment les fonds européens sont alloués au Nigéria. Encore une fois on parle ici des projets destinés à freiner la migration. En tout ce sont 770 millions d’euros investis dans ces “projets migration”. En plus, le Nigéria bénéficie d’autres fonds supplémentaires à travers les “projets régionaux” qui s’élèvent à 775 millions d’euros destinés principalement à coordonner et organiser les retours vers les pays d’origines. Mais contrairement aux engagements de l’Union européenne les fonds alloués aux projets en faveur de la migration légale sont très inférieurs aux promesses et représentent 0.09% des aides allouées au Nigéria.

      A qui profitent ces fonds ? Au “cartel migratoire” constitué du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), de l’UNICEF, de l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIL), de l’Organisation internationale des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (UNODC). Ces organisations récoltent près de 60% des fonds alloués par l’Union européenne aux “projets migration” au Nigéria et dans la région. Les ONG et les consultants privés récupèrent 13% du total des fonds alloués, soit 89 millions d’euros, le double de ce qu’elles reçoivent en Europe.
      Les montants explosent, la transparence diminue

      Où va vraiment l’argent et comment mesurer les effets réels sur les populations ciblées. Quels sont les impacts de ces projets ? Depuis 2015, l’Europe a augmenté ses dépenses allouées à la migration qui s’élèvent désormais à plusieurs milliards.

      La plus grande partie de ces fonds est attribuée à l’Afrique. Dans l’article Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes, Maite Vermeulen, Ajibola Amzat et Giacomo Zandonini expliquent que l’UE prévoit de doubler ces dépenses dans le budget 2021-2027 et quadrupler les dépenses sur le contrôle des frontières.

      Des mois de recherche n’ont pas permis de comprendre comment étaient alloués les fonds pour la migration. Les sites internet sont flous et de nombreux bureaucrates européens se disent incapables concilier les dépenses car la transparence fait défaut. Difficile de comprendre l’allocation précise des fonds de l’Union européenne et celle des fonds des Etats européens. Le tout ressemble, selon les chercheurs, à un immense plat de spaghettis. Ils se posent une question importante : si eux n’y arrivent pas après des mois de recherche comment les députés européens pourraient s’y retrouver ? D’autres chercheurs et fonctionnaires européens qualifient les dépenses de migration de l’UE d’opaques. La consultation de nombreux sites internet, documents officiels, rapports annuels et budgets, et les nombreuses demandes d’accès à l’information auprès de plusieurs pays européens actifs au Nigéria ainsi que les demandes d’explications adressées à la Commission européenne n’ont pas permis d’arriver à une vision globale et précise des budgets attribués à la politique migratoire européenne. Selon Tineke Strik, député vert au parlement européen, ce manque de clarté a des conséquences importantes sur le processus démocratique, car sans vision globale précise, il n’y a pas vraiment de surveillance possible sur les dépenses réelles ni sur l’impact réel des programmes sur le terrain.

      https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/102663569008-2e2c2159