• Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

    On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

    This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

    One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

    This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
    A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
    Providing equipment

    For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

    Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

    Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

    Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

    In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
    Trainings the authorities

    In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

    Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

    In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

    Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

    On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
    B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

    In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
    An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

    The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

    The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
    Data exchange with the EU

    The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

    What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

    In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

    While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

    However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

    This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

    To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
    C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
    Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

    In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

    The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

    The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

    This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

    In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

    According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

    The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
    The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

    Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

    Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

    A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
    Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

    In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

    *This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

    As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

    During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

    Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
    Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

    While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

    While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

    https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

    #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

    ping @_kg_

  • #Pre-frontier_information_picture

    Je découvre dans un billet de blog que j’ai lu ce matin, cette info :

    From the information gathered, Frontex produces, in addition to various dossiers, an annual situation report, which the agency calls an “Pre-frontier information picture.”

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/27/what-is-frontex-doing-in-senegal-secret-services-also-participate-in-t
    https://seenthis.net/messages/997841#message1014789

    ... et du coup, ce terme de « pre-frontier information picture ».

    ça me rappelle, évidemment, la carte de @reka de la #triple_frontière européenne (où une « pré-frontière » est dessinée au milieu du désert du Sahara) :


    https://visionscarto.net/mourir-aux-portes-de-l-europe

    Je découvre ainsi, en faisant un peu de recherches, qu’il y a un #projet_de_recherche financé par #Horizon_2020 dédié à cette #pré-frontière, #NESTOR :

    aN Enhanced pre-frontier intelligence picture to Safeguard The EurOpean boRders

    Un système intégré de #surveillance des #frontières de l’UE

    Les frontières de l’Europe sont soumises à une pression considérable en raison des flux migratoires, des conflits armés dans les territoires avoisinants, du trafic de biens et de personnes, et de la criminalité transnationale. Toutefois, certains obstacles géographiques, tels que les forêts denses, les hautes montagnes, les terrains accidentés ou les zones maritimes et fluviales entravent la surveillance des itinéraires empruntés par les réseaux criminels. Le projet NESTOR, financé par l’UE, fera la démonstration d’un #système_global_de_surveillance des frontières de nouvelle génération, entièrement fonctionnel et proposant des #informations sur la situation #en_amont des frontières et au-delà des frontières maritimes et terrestres. Ce système repose sur le concept de la gestion européenne intégrée des frontières et recourt à des #technologies d’analyse d’#images_optiques et du spectre de fréquences radio alimentées par un réseau de #capteurs_interopérables.

    Objectif

    For the past few years, Europe has experienced some major changes at its surrounding territories and in adjacent countries which provoked serious issues at different levels. The European Community faces a number of challenges both at a political and at a tactical level. Irregular migration flows exerting significant pressure to the relevant authorities and agencies that operate at border territories. Armed conflicts, climate pressure and unpredictable factors occurring at the EU external borders, have increased the number of the reported transnational crimes. Smuggling activity is a major concern for Eastern EU Borders particularly, as monitoring the routes used by smugglers is being hindered by mountainous, densely forested areas and rough lands aside with sea or river areas. Due to the severity and the abrupt emergence of events, the relevant authorities operate for a long-time interval, under harsh conditions, 24 hours a day. NESTOR aims to demonstrate a fully functional next generation holistic border surveillance system providing pre-frontier situational awareness beyond maritime and land border areas following the concept of the European Integrated Border Management. NESTOR long-range and wide area surveillance capabilities for detection, recognition classification and tracking of moving targets (e.g. persons, vessels, vehicles, drones etc.) is based on optical, thermal imaging and Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum analysis technologies fed by an interoperable sensors network including stationary installations and mobile manned or unmanned vehicles (aerial, ground, water, underwater) capable of functioning both as standalone, tethered and in swarms. NESTOR BC3i system will fuse in real-time border surveillance data combined with web and social media information, creating and sharing a pre-frontier intelligent picture to local, regional and national command centers in AR environment being interoperable with CISE and EUROSUR.

    https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101021851/fr

    Projet de 6 mio. d’euro et coordonné par la #police_grecque (#Grèce) :

    Les participants (#complexe_militaro-industriel) au projet :


    #business

    #données #technologie #interopérabilité #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #surveillance_des_frontières #_Integrated_Border_Management #fréquence_radio #NESTOR_BC3i_system #CISE #EUROSUR

  • Si formano a Gaeta le forze d’élite della famigerata Guardia Costiera libica

    Non bastava addestrare in Italia gli equipaggi delle motovedette libiche che sparano sui migranti nel Mediterraneo o li catturano in mare (oltre 15.000 nei primi sette mesi del 2021) per poi deportarli e torturarli nei famigerati centri di detenzione / lager in Libia. Dalla scorsa estate è nella #Scuola_Nautica della #Guardia_di_Finanza di #Gaeta che si “formano” pure le componenti subacquee di nuova costituzione della #Guardia_Costiera e della #General_Administration_for_Coastal_Security (#GACS).

    La presenza a Gaeta delle unità d’élite della #Libyan_Coast_Guard_and_Port_Security (#LCGPS) dipendente dal Ministero della Difesa e della GACS del Ministero dell’Interno è documentata dall’Ufficio Amministrazione - Sezione Acquisti della Guardia di Finanza. Il 18 giugno 2021 l’ente ha autorizzato la spesa per un servizio di interpretariato in lingua araba a favore dei sommozzatori libici “partecipanti al corso di addestramento che inizierà il 21 giugno 2021 presso la Scuola Nautica nell’ambito della Missione bilaterale della Guardia di Finanza in Libia”. Nell’atto amministrativo non vengono fornite informazioni né sul numero degli allievi-sub libici né la durata del corso, il primo di questa tipologia effettuato in Italia.

    Dal 29 agosto al 29 settembre del 2019 ne era stato promosso e finanziato uno simile a #Spalato, in Croazia da #EUNAVFOR_MED (la forza navale europea per le operazioni anti-migranti nel Mediterraneo, meglio nota come #Missione_Irini). Le attività vennero svolte in collaborazione con la Marina militare croate e riguardarono dodici sommozzatori della Guardia costiera e della Marina libica.

    A fine ottobre 2020 un’altra attività addestrativa del personale subacqueo venne condotta in Libia da personale della Marina militare della Turchia, provocando molte gelosie in Italia e finanche le ire dell’(ex) ammiraglio #Giuseppe_De_Giorgi, già comandante della Nato Response Force e Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina Militare dal 2013 al 2016.

    “In un tweet, la Marina turca riferisce che le operazioni rientrano a pieno nel novero di attività di supporto, consultazione e addestramento militare e di sicurezza incluse nell’accordo raggiunto nel novembre del 2019 tra il GNA tripolino e Ankara: non può sfuggire come questo avvenimento sia un ulteriore affondo turco a nostre spese e l’ennesimo spregio all’Italia”, scrisse l’ammiraglio #De_Giorgi su Difesaonline. “Nelle foto allegate al tweet, infatti, sono presenti le navi che proprio l’Italia nel 2018 aveva donato alla Libia in seguito all’accordo siglato con il primo #Memorandum che avrebbe previsto da parte nostra la presa in carico della collaborazione con la Guardia Costiera libica, non solo per tenere a bada il fenomeno migratorio in generale, ma soprattutto per dare un freno al vergognoso traffico di esseri umani. In particolare, si può vedere la motovedetta #Ubari_660, gemella della #Fezzan_658, entrambe della classe #Corrubia”.

    “Oltre al danno, anche la beffa di veder usare le nostre navi per un addestramento che condurrà un altro Stato, la Turchia”, concluse l’ex Capo di Stato della Marina. “Mentre Erdogan riporta la Tripolitania nella sfera d’influenza ottomana si conferma l’assenteismo italiano conseguenza di una leadership spaesata, impotente, priva di autorevolezza, inadeguata”.

    Le durissime parole dell’ammiraglio De Giorgi hanno colpito in pieno il bersaglio; così dal cappello dell’esecutivo Draghi è uscito bello e pronto per i sommozzatori libici un corso d’addestramento estivo a Gaeta, viaggio, vitto e alloggio, tutto pagato.

    Il personale dell’ultrachiacchierata Guardia costiera della Libia ha iniziato ad addestrarsi presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza nella primavera del 2017. Trentanove militari e tre tutor giunsero in aereo nella base dell’aeronautica di Pratica di Mare (Roma) il 1° aprile e vennero poi addestrati a Gaeta per un mese. “A selezionarli sono stati i vertici della Marina libica tra i 93 militari che hanno superato il primo modulo formativo di 14 settimane, svolto nell’ambito della missione europea Eunavformed, a bordo della nave olandese Rotterdam e della nostra nave San Giorgio”, riportò la redazione di Latina del quotidiano Il Messaggero.

    Nella scuola laziale i libici furono formati prevalentemente alla conduzione delle quattro motovedette della classe “#Bigliani”, già di appartenenza della Guardia di Finanza, donate alla Libia tra il 2009 e il 2010 e successivamente riparate in Italia dopo i danneggiamenti ricevuti nel corso dei bombardamenti NATO del 2011. Le quattro unità, rinominate #Ras_al_Jadar, #Zuwarah, #Sabratha e #Zawia sono quelle poi impiegate per i pattugliamenti delle coste della #Tripolitania e la spietata caccia ai natanti dei migranti in fuga dai conflitti e dalle carestie di Africa e Medio Oriente.

    Per la cronaca, alla cerimonia di chiusura del primo corso di formazione degli equipaggi libici intervenne a Gaeta l’allora ministro dell’Interno #Marco_Minniti. Ai giornalisti, #Minniti annunciò che entro la fine del mese di giugno 2017 il governo italiano avrebbe consegnato alla Libia una decina di motovedette. “Quando il programma di fornitura delle imbarcazioni sarà terminato la Marina libica sarà tra le strutture più importanti dell’Africa settentrionale”, dichiarò con enfasi Marco Minniti. “Lì si dovranno incrementare le azioni congiunte e coordinate per il controllo contro il terrorismo e i trafficanti di esseri umani: missioni cruciali per tutta la comunità internazionale”.

    Un secondo corso di formazione per 19 ufficiali della Guardia costiera libica venne svolto nel giugno 2017 ancora un volta presso la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta. Nel corso del 2018, con fondi del Ministero dell’Interno vennero svolti invece due corsi della durata ognuno di tre settimane per 28 militari libici, costo giornaliero stimato 606 euro per allievo.

    Nell’ambito del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Project, il progetto UE di “cooperazione e scambio di informazioni nell’area mediterranea tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione di Spagna, Italia, Francia, Malta, Grecia, Cipro e Portogallo e i paesi nordafricani nel quadro di #EUROSUR”, (valore complessivo di 7,1 milioni di euro), la Guardia di Finanza ha concluso uno specifico accordo con la Guardia Civil spagnola, capofila del programma, per erogare sempre nel 2018 un corso di conduzione di unità navali per 63 libici tra guardiacoste del Ministero della Difesa e personale degli Organi per la sicurezza del Ministero dell’Interno.

    Istituzionalmente la Scuola Nautica della Guardia di Finanza di Gaeta provvede alla formazione tecnico-operativa degli allievi finanzieri destinati al contingente mare, nonché all’aggiornamento ed alla specializzazione di ufficiali impiegati nel servizio navale. In passato ha svolto attività di formazione a favore del personale militare e della polizia della Repubblica d’Albania e della Guardia Civil spagnola.

    L’Istituto ha partecipato anche a due missioni internazionali: la prima sul fiume Danubio, nell’ambito dell’embargo introdotto nel maggio 1992 dal Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’ONU contro l’allora esistente Repubblica Federale di Jugoslavia; poi, a fine anni ’90, a Valona (Albania) per fornire assistenza e consulenza ai locali organi polizia nella “lotta ai traffici illeciti”.

    Adesso per la Scuola di Gaeta è scattata l’ora dell’addestramento dei reparti d’élite delle forze navali di Tripoli, sommozzatori in testa.

    http://antoniomazzeoblog.blogspot.com/2021/11/si-formano-gaeta-le-forze-delite-della.html

    –-> Articolo pubblicato in Africa ExPress il 30 novembre 2021, https://www.africa-express.info/2021/11/30/addestrata-in-italia-la-guardia-costiera-libica-accusata-di-crimini

    #Gaeta #formation #gardes-côtes_libyens #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #Libye #frontières #Méditerranée #plongeurs

    –---

    Ajouté à la métaiste sur les formations des gardes-côtes lybiens sur le territoire européen :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/938454

    ping @isskein

  • Se questa è l’Europa. Una cortina di ferro per i migranti

    La Polonia costruirà da dicembre una barriera per fermare il flusso di profughi spinti verso il confine dal governo della Bielorussia. Negli ultimi 50 anni costruiti 65 muri di confine

    Non sarà facile, quando toccherà agli storici, spiegare che l’epoca dei muri non è più solo quella del Vallo di Adriano o il tempo del cinese Qin Shi Huang, l’imperatore padre della Grande Muraglia. Epoche in cui le fortificazioni servivano a proteggersi dalle incursioni armate. Non nel 2021, quando miliardi di euro vengono investiti per respingere nient’altro che persone disarmate.

    Il 60% delle nuove barriere è stato voluto per ostacolare le migrazioni forzate. Negli ultimi 50 anni (1968-2018) sono stati costruiti oltre 65 muri di confine. L’Europa (26%) è seconda solo all’Asia (56%). A oltre trent’anni dalla caduta del muro di Berlino, il 60% della popolazione mondiale (circa 4,7 miliardi di persone) vive in Paesi che hanno costruito un qualche argine contro i flussi di persone.

    Il centro studi ’Transnational Institute’ ha calcolato che solo dal 1990 al 2019 i Paesi Ue dell’area Schengen si sono dotati di oltre mille chilometri di recinzioni. E presto saranno più del doppio. La spesa totale ha sfiorato il miliardo di euro. A cui andranno aggiunti gli stanziamenti per i 508 chilometri di frontiera che la Lituania ha deciso di puntellare con pali d’acciaio e filo spinato. Come la Polonia, del resto, che con i lituani condivide l’affaccio sulla Bielorussia. Ieri la conferma: da dicembre il governo polacco costruirà una nuova barriera al confine. «È sconcertante quanto avviene in più luoghi ai confini dell’Unione. È sorprendente – ha detto ieri il presidente Sergio Mattarella – il divario tra i grandi principi proclamati e il non tener conto della fame e del freddo cui sono esposti esseri umani ai confini dell’Unione» .

    Per venirne a capo bisogna seguire i soldi. Tanti soldi. Si scopre così che il filo spinato e le armi per ricacciare indietro i poveri sono prima di tutto un colossale giro d’affari. A poco servono le inchieste amministrative e quelle penali sulle operazioni condotte da agenzie come Frontex, nata per supportare la sorveglianza dei confini esterni e finita accusata di malversazioni e di aver cooperato nelle operazioni più cruente nei Balcani, nel Canale di Sicilia e nell’Egeo. Entro il 2027 si passerà dagli attuali 1.500 a 10mila effettivi, di cui 7 mila distaccati dalle forze dell’ordine nazionali, e avrà nel bilancio un budget superiore alla maggior parte delle agenzie dell’Unione Europea: circa 5,6 miliardi di euro fino al 2027.

    Direttamente o attraverso consociate, beneficiano dei cospicui investimenti europei le più importanti aziende del comparto difesa: tra cui #Airbus, #Thales, #Leonardo, #Lockheed_Martin, #General_Dynamics, #Northrop_Grumman, #L3_Technologies, #Elbit, #Indra, #Dat-Con, #Csra, #Leidos e #Raytheon. Tra i principali beneficiari degli appalti per i muri le grandi firme dell’industria bellica. C’è #European_Security_Fencing, produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, utilizzato nelle recinzioni al confine con Spagna/Marocco, Ungheria/Serbia, Bulgaria/Turchia, Auanche stria/Slovenia, Regno Unito/ Francia. Poi la società slovena “#Dat-Con” incaricata di costruire barriere in Croazia, a Cipro, in Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina.

    E ancora il costruttore navale olandese #Damen, le cui navi sono state utilizzate in operazioni di frontiera da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, oltre che Libia, Marocco, Tunisia e Turchia. I francesi siedono al tavolo dei grandi appalti con “#Sopra_Steria”, il principale contraente per lo sviluppo e la manutenzione del Sistema d’informazione visti ( #Vis), il Sistema d’informazione Schengen (#Sis_II) e Dattiloscopia europea (#Eurodac). Poi di nuovo una compagnia spagnola, la #Gmv incaricata di implementare #Eurosur, il sistema europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere esterne.

    Prima di oggi le imprese hanno beneficiato del budget di 1,7 miliardi di euro del Fondo per le frontiere esterne della Commissione europea (2007-2013) e del Fondo per la sicurezza interna – frontiere (2014-2020) di 2,76 miliardi di euro. Per il nuovo bilancio Ue (20212027), la Commissione europea ha stanziato 8,02 miliardi di euro al Fondo per la gestione integrata delle frontiere; 11,27 miliardi di euro a Frontex (di cui 2,2 miliardi di euro saranno utilizzati per acquisire e gestire mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spesa totale (20002027) per le sue banche dati di identità e Eurosur (il sistema europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).

    Commentando le ultime notizie dalla frontiera orientale, il presidente della commissione Cei per i migranti, il vescovo Giancarlo Perego, ha usato parole che ben riassumono la deriva del continente dei muri: «Una sconfitta dell’umanesimo su cui si fonda l’Europa, una sconfitta della democrazia. L’Europa dei muri è un’Europa che dimostra di cedere alla paura, un’Europa in difesa da un mondo che cammina». Oppure, per dirla con Papa Francesco, le moderne muraglie sono «una cosa insensata, che separa e contrappone i popoli».

    https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/una-cortina-di-ferro-per-i-migranti

    #murs #barrières_frontalières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business

  • Artificial intelligence : #Frontex improves its maritime surveillance

    Frontex wants to use a new platform to automatically detect and assess „risks“ on the seas of the European Union. Suspected irregular activities are to be displayed in a constantly updated „threat map“ with the help of self-learning software.

    The EU border agency has renewed a contract with Israeli company Windward for a „maritime analytics“ platform. It will put the application into regular operation. Frontex had initially procured a licence for around 800,000 Euros. For now 2.6 million Euros, the agency will receive access for four workstations. The contract can be extended three times for one year at a time.

    Windward specialises in the digital aggregation and assessment of vessel tracking and maritime surveillance data. Investors in the company, which was founded in 2011, include former US CIA director David Petraeus and former CEO’s of Thomson Reuters and British Petroleum. The former chief of staff of the Israeli military, Gabi Ashkenazi, is considered one of the advisors.

    Signature for each observed ship

    The platform is based on artificial intelligence techniques. For analysis, it uses maritime reporting systems, including position data from the AIS transponders of larger ships and weather data. These are enriched with information about the ship owners and shipping companies as well as the history of previous ship movements. For this purpose, the software queries openly accessible information from the internet.

    In this way, a „fingerprint“ is created for each observed ship, which can be used to identify suspicious activities. If the captain switches off the transponder, for example, the analysis platform can recognise this as a suspicuous event and take over further tracking based on the recorded patterns. It is also possible to integrate satellite images.

    Windward uses the register of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as its database, which lists about 70,000 ships. Allegedly, however, it also processes data on a total of 400,000 watercraft, including smaller fishing boats. One of the clients is therefore the UN Security Council, which uses the technology to monitor sanctions.

    Against „bad guys“ at sea

    The company advertises its applications with the slogan „Catch the bad guys at sea“. At Frontex, the application is used to combat and prevent unwanted migration and cross-border crime as well as terrorism. Subsequently, „policy makers“ and law enforcement agencies are to be informed about results. For this purpose, the „risks“ found are visualised in a „threat map“.

    Windward put such a „threat map“ online two years ago. At the time, the software rated the Black Sea as significantly more risky than the Mediterranean. Commercial shipping activity off the Crimea was interpreted as „probable sanction evasions“. Ship owners from the British Guernsey Islands as well as Romania recorded the highest proportion of ships exhibiting „risky“ behaviour. 42 vessels were classified as suspicious for drug smuggling based on their patterns.

    Frontex „early warning“ units

    The information from maritime surveillance is likely to be processed first by the „Risk Analysis Unit“ (RAU) at Frontex. It is supposed to support strategic decisions taken by the headquarters in Warsaw on issues of border control, return, prevention of cross-border crime as well as threats of a „hybrid nature“. Frontex calls the applications used there „intelligence products“ and „integrated data services“. Their results flow together in the „Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model“ (CIRAM).

    For the operational monitoring of the situation at the EU’s external borders, the agency also maintains the „Frontex Situation Centre“ (FSC). The department is supposed to provide a constantly updated picture of migration movements, if possible in real time. From these reports, Frontex produces „early warnings“ and situation reports to the border authorities of the member states as well as to the Commission and the Council in Brussels.

    More surveillance capacity in Warsaw

    According to its own information, Windward’s clients include the Italian Guardia di Finanza, which is responsible for controlling Italian territorial waters. The Ministry of the Interior in Rome is also responsible for numerous EU projects aimed at improving surveillance of the central Mediterranean. For the training and equipment of the Libyan coast guard, Italy receives around 67 million euros from EU funds in three different projects. Italian coast guard authorities are also installing a surveillance system for Tunisia’s external maritime borders.

    Frontex now wants to improve its own surveillance capacities with further tenders. Together with the fisheries agency, The agency is awarding further contracts for manned maritime surveillance. It has been operating such a „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS) in the central Mediterranean since 2017 and in the Adriatic Sea since 2018. Frontex also wants to station large drones in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, it is testing Aerostats in the eastern Mediterranean for a second time. These are zeppelins attached to a 1,000-metre long line.

    https://digit.site36.net/2021/01/15/artificial-intelligence-frontex-improves-its-maritime-surveillance
    #intelligence_artificielle #surveillance #surveillance_maritime #mer #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #AI #Windward #Israël #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #David_Petraeus #Thomson_Reuters #British_Petroleum #armée_israélienne #Gabi_Ashkenazi #International_Maritime_Organisation (#IMO) #thread_map #Risk_Analysis_Unit (#RAU) #Common_Integrated_Risk_Analysis_Model (#CIRAM) #Frontex_Situation_Centre (#FSC) #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #zeppelins

    ping @etraces

    • Data et nouvelles technologies, la face cachée du contrôle des mobilités

      Dans un rapport de juillet 2020, l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle (#EU-Lisa) présente l’intelligence artificielle (IA) comme l’une des « technologies prioritaires » à développer. Le rapport souligne les avantages de l’IA en matière migratoire et aux frontières, grâce, entre autres, à la technologie de #reconnaissance_faciale.

      L’intelligence artificielle est de plus en plus privilégiée par les acteurs publics, les institutions de l’UE et les acteurs privés, mais aussi par le #HCR et l’#OIM. Les agences de l’UE, comme Frontex ou EU-Lisa, ont été particulièrement actives dans l’#expérimentation des nouvelles technologies, brouillant parfois la distinction entre essais et mise en oeuvre. En plus des outils traditionnels de surveillance, une panoplie de technologies est désormais déployée aux frontières de l’Europe et au-delà, qu’il s’agisse de l’ajout de nouvelles #bases_de_données, de technologies financières innovantes, ou plus simplement de la récupération par les #GAFAM des données laissées volontairement ou pas par les migrant·e·s et réfugié∙e∙s durant le parcours migratoire.

      La pandémie #Covid-19 est arrivée à point nommé pour dynamiser les orientations déjà prises, en permettant de tester ou de généraliser des technologies utilisées pour le contrôle des mobilités sans que l’ensemble des droits des exilé·e·s ne soit pris en considération. L’OIM, par exemple, a mis à disposition des Etats sa #Matrice_de_suivi_des_déplacements (#DTM) durant cette période afin de contrôler les « flux migratoires ». De nouvelles technologies au service de vieilles obsessions…

      http://www.migreurop.org/article3021.html

      Pour télécharger le rapport :
      www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/note_12_fr.pdf

      ping @karine4 @rhoumour @_kg_ @i_s_

    • La #technopolice aux frontières

      Comment le #business de la #sécurité et de la #surveillance au sein de l’#Union_européenne, en plus de bafouer des #droits_fondamentaux, utilise les personnes exilées comme #laboratoire de recherche, et ce sur des #fonds_publics européens.

      On a beaucoup parlé ici ces derniers mois de surveillance des manifestations ou de surveillance de l’espace public dans nos villes, mais la technopolice est avant tout déployée aux #frontières – et notamment chez nous, aux frontières de la « forteresse Europe ». Ces #dispositifs_technopoliciers sont financés, soutenus et expérimentés par l’Union européenne pour les frontières de l’UE d’abord, et ensuite vendus. Cette surveillance des frontières représente un #marché colossal et profite grandement de l’échelle communautaire et de ses programmes de #recherche_et_développement (#R&D) comme #Horizon_2020.

      #Roborder – des essaims de #drones_autonomes aux frontières

      C’est le cas du projet Roborder – un « jeu de mots » entre robot et border, frontière en anglais. Débuté en 2017, il prévoit de surveiller les frontières par des essaims de #drones autonomes, fonctionnant et patrouillant ensemble. L’#intelligence_artificielle de ces drones leur permettrait de reconnaître les humains et de distinguer si ces derniers commettent des infractions (comme celui de passer une frontière ?) et leur dangerosité pour ensuite prévenir la #police_aux_frontières. Ces drones peuvent se mouvoir dans les airs, sous l’eau, sur l’eau et dans des engins au sol. Dotés de multiples capteurs, en plus de la détection d’activités criminelles, ces drones seraient destinés à repérer des “#radio-fréquences non fiables”, c’est-à-dire à écouter les #communications et également à mesurer la #pollution_marine.
      Pour l’instant, ces essaims de drones autonomes ne seraient pas pourvus d’armes. Roborder est actuellement expérimenté en #Grèce, au #Portugal et en #Hongrie.

      Un #financement européen pour des usages « civils »

      Ce projet est financé à hauteur de 8 millions d’euros par le programme Horizon 2020 (subventionné lui-même par la #Cordis, organe de R&D de la Commission européenne). Horizon 2020 représente 50% du financement public total pour la recherche en sécurité de l’UE. Roborder est coordonné par le centre de recherches et technologie de #Hellas (le #CERTH), en Grèce et comme le montre l’association #Homo_Digitalis le nombre de projets Horizon 2020 ne fait qu’augmenter en Grèce. En plus du CERTH grec s’ajoutent environ 25 participants venus de tous les pays de l’UE (où on retrouve les services de police d’#Irlande_du_Nord, le ministère de la défense grecque, ou encore des entreprises de drones allemandes, etc.).

      L’une des conditions pour le financement de projets de ce genre par Horizon 2020 est que les technologies développées restent dans l’utilisation civile, et ne puissent pas servir à des fins militaires. Cette affirmation pourrait ressembler à un garde-fou, mais en réalité la distinction entre usage civil et militaire est loin d’être clairement établie. Comme le montre Stephen Graham, très souvent les #technologies, à la base militaires, sont réinjectées dans la sécurité, particulièrement aux frontières où la migration est criminalisée. Et cette porosité entre la sécurité et le #militaire est induite par la nécessité de trouver des débouchés pour rentabiliser la #recherche_militaire. C’est ce qu’on peut observer avec les drones ou bien le gaz lacrymogène. Ici, il est plutôt question d’une logique inverse : potentiellement le passage d’un usage dit “civil” de la #sécurité_intérieure à une application militaire, à travers des ventes futures de ces dispositifs. Mais on peut aussi considérer la surveillance, la détection de personnes et la #répression_aux_frontières comme une matérialisation de la #militarisation de l’Europe à ses frontières. Dans ce cas-là, Roborder serait un projet à fins militaires.

      De plus, dans les faits, comme le montre The Intercept (https://theintercept.com/2019/05/11/drones-artificial-intelligence-europe-roborder), une fois le projet terminé celui-ci est vendu. Sans qu’on sache trop à qui. Et, toujours selon le journal, beaucoup sont déjà intéressés par Roborder.

      #IborderCtrl – détection d’#émotions aux frontières

      Si les essaims de drones sont impressionnants, il existe d’autres projets dans la même veine. On peut citer notamment le projet qui a pour nom IborderCtrl, testé en Grèce, Hongrie et #Lettonie.

      Il consiste notamment en de l’#analyse_d’émotions (à côté d’autres projets de #reconnaissances_biométriques) : les personnes désirant passer une frontière doivent se soumettre à des questions et voient leur #visage passer au crible d’un #algorithme qui déterminera si elles mentent ou non. Le projet prétend « accélérer le #contrôle_aux_frontières » : si le #détecteur_de_mensonges estime qu’une personne dit la vérité, un code lui est donné pour passer le contrôle facilement ; si l’algorithme considère qu’une personne ment, elle est envoyée dans une seconde file, vers des gardes-frontières qui lui feront passer un #interrogatoire. L’analyse d’émotions prétend reposer sur un examen de « 38 #micro-mouvements du visage » comme l’angle de la tête ou le mouvement des yeux. Un spectacle de gadgets pseudoscientifiques qui permet surtout de donner l’apparence de la #neutralité_technologique à des politiques d’#exclusion et de #déshumanisation.

      Ce projet a également été financé par Horizon 2020 à hauteur de 4,5 millions d’euros. S’il semble aujourd’hui avoir été arrêté, l’eurodéputé allemand Patrick Breyer a saisi la Cour de justice de l’Union Européenne pour obtenir plus d’informations sur ce projet, ce qui lui a été refusé pour… atteinte au #secret_commercial. Ici encore, on voit que le champ “civil” et non “militaire” du projet est loin de représenter un garde-fou.

      Conclusion

      Ainsi, l’Union européenne participe activement au puissant marché de la surveillance et de la répression. Ici, les frontières et les personnes exilées sont utilisées comme des ressources de laboratoire. Dans une optique de militarisation toujours plus forte des frontières de la forteresse Europe et d’une recherche de profit et de développement des entreprises et centres de recherche européens. Les frontières constituent un nouveau marché et une nouvelle manne financière de la technopolice.

      Les chiffres montrent par ailleurs l’explosion du budget de l’agence européenne #Frontex (de 137 millions d’euros en 2015 à 322 millions d’euros en 2020, chiffres de la Cour des comptes européenne) et une automatisation toujours plus grande de la surveillance des frontières. Et parallèlement, le ratio entre le nombre de personnes qui tentent de franchir la Méditerranée et le nombre de celles qui y laissent la vie ne fait qu’augmenter. Cette automatisation de la surveillance aux frontières n’est donc qu’une nouvelle façon pour les autorités européennes d’accentuer le drame qui continue de se jouer en Méditerranée, pour une “efficacité” qui finalement ne profite qu’aux industries de la surveillance.

      Dans nos rues comme à nos frontières nous devons refuser la Technopolice et la combattre pied à pied !

      https://technopolice.fr/blog/la-technopolice-aux-frontieres

    • Artificial Intelligence - based capabilities for European Border and Coast Guard

      In 2019, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commissioned #RAND Europe to carry out an Artificial intelligence (AI) research study.

      The purpose of the study was to provide an overview of the main opportunities, challenges and requirements for the adoption of AI-based capabilities in border managament. Frontex’s intent was also to find synergies with ongoing AI studies and initiatives in the EU and contribute to a Europe-wide AI landscape by adding the border security dimension.

      Some of the analysed technologies included automated border control, object recognition to detect suspicious vehicles or cargo and the use of geospatial data analytics for operational awareness and threat detection.

      As part of the study, RAND provided Frontex in 2020 with a comprehensive report and an executive summary with conclusions and recommendations.

      The findings will support Frontex in shaping the future landscape of AI-based capabilities for Integrated Border Management, including AI-related research and innovation projects which could be initiated by Frontex (e.g. under #EU_Innovation_Hub) or recommended to be conducted under the EU Research and Innovation Programme (#Horizon_Europe).

      https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/artificial-intelligence-based-capabilities-for-european-border-and-co

    • Pour les réfugiés, la #biométrie tout au long du chemin

      Par-delà les murs qui poussent aux frontières du monde depuis les années 1990, les réfugiés, migrants et demandeurs d’asile sont de plus en plus confrontés à l’extension des bases de #données_biométriques. Un « #mur_virtuel » s’étend ainsi à l’extérieur, aux frontières et à l’intérieur de l’espace Schengen, construit autour de programmes et de #bases_de_données.

      Des réfugiés qui paient avec leurs #iris, des migrants identifiés par leurs #empreintes_digitales, des capteurs de #reconnaissance_faciale, mais aussi d’#émotions… Réunis sous la bannière de la « #frontière_intelligente », ces #dispositifs_technologiques, reposant sur l’#anticipation, l’#identification et l’#automatisation du franchissement de la #frontière grâce aux bases de données biométriques, ont pour but de trier les voyageurs, facilitant le parcours des uns et bloquant celui des autres.

      L’Union européenne dispose ainsi d’une batterie de bases de données qui viennent compléter les contrôles aux frontières. Depuis 2011, une agence dédiée, l’#Agence_européenne_pour_la_gestion_opérationnelle_des_systèmes_d’information_à_grande_échelle, l’#EU-Lisa, a pour but d’élaborer et de développer, en lien avec des entreprises privées, le suivi des demandeurs d’asile.

      Elle gère ainsi plusieurs bases compilant des #données_biométriques. L’une d’elles, le « #Entry_and_Exit_System » (#EES), sera déployée en 2022, pour un coût évalué à 480 millions d’euros. L’EES a pour mission de collecter jusqu’à 400 millions de données sur les personnes non européennes franchissant les frontières de l’espace Schengen, afin de contrôler en temps réel les dépassements de durée légale de #visa. En cas de séjour prolongé devenu illégal, l’alerte sera donnée à l’ensemble des polices européennes.

      Se brûler les doigts pour ne pas être enregistré

      L’EU-Lisa gère également le fichier #Eurodac, qui consigne les empreintes digitales de chacun des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Utilisé pour appliquer le #règlement_Dublin III, selon lequel la demande d’asile est déposée et traitée dans le pays européen où le migrant a été enregistré la première fois, il entraîne des stratégies de #résistance.

      « On a vu des migrants refuser de donner leurs empreintes à leur arrivée en Grèce, ou même se brûler les doigts pour ne pas être enregistrés dans Eurodac, rappelle Damien Simonneau, chercheur à l’Institut Convergences Migrations du Collège de France. Ils savent que s’ils ont, par exemple, de la famille en Allemagne, mais qu’ils ont été enregistrés en Grèce, ils seront renvoyés en Grèce pour que leur demande y soit traitée, ce qui a des conséquences énormes sur leur vie. » La procédure d’instruction dure en effet de 12 à 18 mois en moyenne.

      La collecte de données biométriques jalonne ainsi les parcours migratoires, des pays de départs jusqu’aux déplacements au sein de l’Union européenne, dans un but de limitation et de #contrôle. Pour lutter contre « la criminalité transfrontalière » et « l’immigration clandestine », le système de surveillance des zones frontières #Eurosur permet, via un partage d’informations en temps réel, d’intercepter avant leur arrivée les personnes tentant d’atteindre l’Union européenne.

      Des contrôles dans les pays de départ

      Pour le Transnational Institute, auteur avec le think tank Stop Wapenhandel et le Centre Delàs de plusieurs études sur les frontières, l’utilisation de ces bases de données témoigne d’une stratégie claire de la part de l’Union européenne. « Un des objectifs de l’expansion des #frontières_virtuelles, écrivent-ils ainsi dans le rapport Building Walls (https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/building_walls_-_full_report_-_english.pdf), paru en 2018, est d’intercepter les réfugiés et les migrants avant même qu’ils n’atteignent les frontières européennes, pour ne pas avoir à traiter avec eux. »

      Si ces techniques permettent de pré-trier les demandes pour fluidifier le passage des frontières, en accélérant les déplacements autorisés, elles peuvent également, selon Damien Simonneau, avoir des effets pervers. « L’utilisation de ces mécanismes repose sur l’idée que la #technologie est un facilitateur, et il est vrai que l’#autonomisation de certaines démarches peut faciliter les déplacements de personnes autorisées à franchir les frontières, expose-t-il. Mais les technologies sont faillibles, et peuvent produire des #discriminations. »

      Ces #techniques_virtuelles, aux conséquences bien réelles, bouleversent ainsi le rapport à la frontière et les parcours migratoires. « Le migrant est confronté à de multiples points "frontière", disséminés un peu partout, analyse Damien Simonneau. Cela crée des #obstacles supplémentaires aux parcours migratoires : le contrôle n’est quasiment plus lié au franchissement d’une frontière nationale, il est déterritorialisé et peut se produire n’importe où, en amont comme en aval de la frontière de l’État. »

      Ainsi, la « politique d’#externalisation de l’Union européenne » permet au contrôle migratoire de s’exercer dans les pays de départ. Le programme européen « #SIV » collecte par exemple dès leur formulation dans les #consulats les données biométriques liées aux #demandes_de_visas.

      Plus encore, l’Union européenne délègue une partie de la gestion de ses frontières à d’autres pays : « Dans certains États du Sahel, explique Damien Simonneau, l’aide humanitaire et de développement est conditionnée à l’amélioration des contrôles aux frontières. »

      Un programme de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), le programme #MIDAS, financé par l’Union européenne, est ainsi employé par 23 pays, majoritairement en Afrique, mais aussi en Asie et en Amérique. Son but est de « collecter, traiter, stocker et analyser les informations [biométriques et biographiques] des voyageurs en temps réel » pour aider les polices locales à contrôler leurs frontières. Mais selon le réseau Migreurop, ces données peuvent également être transmises aux agences policières européennes. L’UE exerce ainsi un droit de regard, via Frontex, sur le système d’information et d’analyse de données sur la migration, installé à Makalondi au Niger.

      Des réfugiés qui paient avec leurs yeux

      Un mélange des genres, entre organisations humanitaires et États, entre protection, logistique et surveillance, qui se retrouve également dans les #camps_de_réfugiés. Dans les camps jordaniens de #Zaatari et d’#Azarq, par exemple, près de la frontière syrienne, les réfugiés paient depuis 2016 leurs aliments avec leurs iris.

      L’#aide_humanitaire_alimentaire distribuée par le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) leur est en effet versée sur un compte relié à leurs données biométriques. Il leur suffit de passer leurs yeux dans un scanner pour régler leurs achats. Une pratique qui facilite grandement la gestion #logistique du camp par le #HCR et le PAM, en permettant la #traçabilité des échanges et en évitant les fraudes et les vols.

      Mais selon Léa Macias, anthropologue à l’EHESS, cela a aussi des inconvénients. « Si ce paiement avec les yeux peut rassurer certains réfugiés, dans la mesure où cela les protège contre les vols, développe-t-elle, le procédé est également perçu comme une #violence. Les réfugiés ont bien conscience que personne d’autre au monde, dans une situation normale, ne paie ainsi avec son #corps. »

      Le danger de la fuite de données

      La chercheuse s’inquiète également du devenir des données ainsi collectées, et se pose la question de l’intérêt des réfugiés dans ce processus. « Les humanitaires sont poussés à utiliser ces nouvelles technologies, expose-t-elle, qui sont vues comme un gage de fiabilité par les bailleurs de fonds. Mais la #technologisation n’est pas toujours dans l’intérêt des réfugiés. En cas de fuite ou de hackage des bases de données, cela les expose même à des dangers. »

      Un rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW) (https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent), publié mardi 15 juin, alerte ainsi sur des #transferts_de_données biométriques appartenant à des #Rohingyas réfugiés au Bangladesh. Ces données, collectées par le Haut-commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) de l’ONU, ont été transmises par le gouvernement du Bangladesh à l’État birman. Si le HCR a réagi (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/6/60c85a7b4/news-comment-statement-refugee-registration-data-collection-bangladesh.html) en affirmant que les personnes concernées avaient donné leur accord à ce #transfert_de_données pour préparer un éventuel retour en Birmanie, rien ne permet cependant de garantir qu’ils seront bien reçus si leur nom « bipe » au moment de passer la frontière.

      https://www.rfi.fr/fr/technologies/20210620-pour-les-r%C3%A9fugi%C3%A9s-la-biom%C3%A9trie-tout-au-long-du-chemin

      #smart_borders #tri #catégorisation #déterritorialisation #réfugiés_rohingyas

      –---

      Sur les doigts brûlés pour ne pas se faire identifier par les empreintes digitales, voir la scène du film Qu’ils reposent en paix de Sylvain George, dont j’ai fait une brève recension :

      Instant tragique : ce qu’un migrant appelle la « prière ». Ce moment collectif où les migrants tentent de faire disparaître leurs empreintes digitales. Étape symbolique où ils se défont de leur propre identité.

      https://visionscarto.net/a-calais-l-etat-ne-peut-dissoudre

  • Migration : la #France et l’#Italie déploieront des #navires et des #avions pour alerter la Tunisie sur le départ des migrants

    Le ministre français de l’Intérieur, #Gérald_Darmanin, est attendu, ce weekend, en visite en Tunisie pour de décisives discussions dans la foulée de l’attentat contre la basilique de Nice commis par un migrant illégal tunisien, qui a fait trois morts. Une visite qui intervient aussi dans un climat de plus en plus tendu en France dont le gouvernement et le président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, s’emploient à restreindre au maximum les flux migratoires à travers la Méditerranée.

    A la veille de cette visite, le ministre français de l’Intérieur, qui se trouve ce vendredi à Rome , envisage avec son homologue italienne, #Luciana_Lamorgese, de déployer des navires ou des avions pour alerter la Tunisie du départ de #bateaux clandestins transportant des migrants vers les côtes italiennes, comme le jeune Tunisien qui est le principal suspect d’une attaque à l’arme blanche dans une église française la semaine dernière, a déclaré vendredi la ministre italienne.

    A l’issue d’une entrevue entre les deux ministres, Gerald Darmanin s’est gardé de critiquer l’Italie pour sa gestion du suspect tunisien, qui a débarqué sur l’île italienne de Lampedusa en septembre, a été mis en quarantaine en vertu du protocole sanitaire relatif à la pandémie et reçu des papiers d’expulsion des autorités italiennes avant de gagner la France en octobre.

    « A aucun moment, je n’ai pensé qu’il y avait quelque chose de défectueux » dans la façon dont l’Italie a géré l’affaire, a déclaré Darmanin, en réponse à une question posée lors d’une conférence de presse avec Lamorgese après leurs entretiens. Il a plutôt remercié Lamorgese et les services de renseignement italiens pour l’échange d’informations dans les jours qui ont suivi l’#attentat de #Nice.

    Les Tunisiens qui fuient une économie dévastée par les effets du virus, constituent le plus grand contingent de migrants débarqués en Italie cette année, et ils arrivent directement de Tunisie dans des bateaux assez solides pour ne pas avoir besoin de secours, souligne le Washington Post, rappelant que, ces dernières années, la majorité des migrants qui ont atteint les côtes méridionales de l’Italie venaient d’Afrique subsaharienne et traversaient la Méditerranée dans des embarcations de fortune , donc en mauvais état pour la plupart, et opérées par des trafiquants en Libye.

    Lamorgese a déclaré qu’elle avait discuté avec Darmarin d’un #plan prévoyant le déploiement de « moyens navals ou aériens qui pourraient alerter les autorités tunisiennes d’éventuels départs » et les aider à intercepter les bateaux, « dans le respect de leurs souveraineté et autonomie que nous ne voulons pas violer ».

    Selon ce plan, il n’y aurait « qu’une #alerte que nous donnerions aux autorités tunisiennes pour faciliter le #traçage des navires qui partent de leur territoire pour rejoindre les côtes italiennes », a déclaré la ministre italienne. « Il est évident que cela suppose la #collaboration des autorités tunisiennes ».

    La France aurait-elle son « #Patriot_Act ?

    Après sa réunion du matin à Rome, Darmarin a déclaré qu’il se rend en Tunisie, en Algérie et à Malte, pour discuter des questions de migration et de #terrorisme.

    « La France et l’Italie doivent définir une position commune pour la lutte contre l’immigration clandestine au niveau européen », a-t-il déclaré.

    Il a été demandé à Darmarin si, à la suite des récents attentats terroristes en France, le gouvernement français devrait adopter une loi comme le « USA Patriot Act » promulgué après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 pour intensifier les efforts de détection et de prévention du terrorisme.

    « Plus qu’un Patriot Act, ce qu’il faut, c’est un #acte_européen », a répondu Darmarin. « La France ne peut pas lutter seule contre la politique islamiste ».

    La Tunisie est l’un des rares pays à avoir conclu un accord de rapatriement avec l’Italie. Mais avec des milliers de Tunisiens arrivés par mer récemment et moins de 100 migrants expulsés et renvoyés dans le pays par voie aérienne chaque semaine, la priorité est donnée aux personnes considérées comme dangereuses, indique le Washington Post. Selon Lamorgese, rien n’indique que l’agresseur de Nice, Ibrahim Issaoui, 21 ans, constituait une menace.

    Les deux ministres se sont rencontrés un jour après que le président français Emmanuel Macron ait déclaré que son pays renforcera ses contrôles aux frontières après les multiples attaques de cet automne.

    L’Italie et la France lancent, sur une base expérimentale de six mois, des #brigades_mixtes de forces de sécurité italiennes et françaises à leurs frontières communes pour renforcer les contrôles, a déclaré Lamorgese aux journalistes.

    #externalisation #asile #réfugiés #migrations #frontières #surveillance_frontalière #Tunisie #militarisation_des_frontières #Darmanin #accord_de_réadmission

    ping @isskein @karine4

    • Union européenne – Tunisie : l’illusion d’une coopération équilibrée

      Dans la nuit de vendredi 12 au samedi 13 février, 48 personnes de différentes nationalités africaines sont parties de Sidi Mansour, dans la province de Sfax en Tunisie, direction les côtes italiennes. La marine tunisienne est intervenue à une centaine de kilomètres au nord-ouest de Lampedusa lorsque les passagers naviguaient dans une mer agitée. Tandis que 25 personnes ont pu être secourues, une personne est décédée et 22 autres sont déclarées « disparues », comme des milliers d’autres avant elles [1]. Cet énième naufrage témoigne des traversées plus importantes au cours des derniers mois depuis la Tunisie, qui sont rendues plus dangereuses alors que l’Union européenne (UE) renforce ses politiques sécuritaires en Méditerranée en collaboration avec les États d’Afrique du Nord, dont la Tunisie.

      Au cours de 2020, plus de 13 400 personnes migrantes parties de Tunisie ont été interceptées par les garde-côtes tunisiens et plus de 13 200 autres sont parvenues à rejoindre les côtes européennes [2]. Jamais les chiffres n’ont été aussi élevés et depuis l’été 2020, jamais la Tunisie n’a été autant au centre de l’attention des dirigeant·e·s européen·ne·s. A l’occasion d’une rencontre dans ce pays le 17 août 2020, l’Italie et la Tunisie ont ainsi conclu un accord accompagné d’une enveloppe de 11 millions d’euros pour le renforcement des contrôles aux frontières tunisiennes et en particulier la surveillance maritime [3]. Le 6 novembre 2020, à l’issue d’une réunion à Rome, la ministre italienne de l’Intérieur et son homologue français ont également décidé de déployer au large des côtes tunisiennes des « moyens navals ou aériens qui pourraient alerter les autorités tunisiennes d’éventuels départs » [4].

      Cette attention a été redoublée au lendemain de l’attentat de Nice, le 29 octobre 2020. Lors d’une visite à Tunis, le ministre français, jouant de l’amalgame entre terrorisme et migration, faisait du contrôle migratoire le fer de lance de la lutte contre le terrorisme et appelait à une coopération à l’échelle européenne avec les pays d’Afrique du Nord pour verrouiller leurs frontières. Suivant l’exemple de l’Italie qui coopère déjà de manière étroite avec la Tunisie pour renvoyer de force ses ressortissant·e·s [5], la France a demandé aux autorités tunisiennes la délivrance automatique de laissez-passer pour faciliter les expulsions et augmenter leurs cadences.

      Cette coopération déséquilibrée qui met la Tunisie face à l’UE et ses États membres, inlassablement dénoncée des deux côtés de la Méditerranée par les associations de défense des droits, n’est pas nouvelle et s’accélère.

      Alors qu’a augmenté, au cours de l’année 2020, le nombre d’exilé·e·s en provenance d’Afrique subsaharienne et quittant les côtes tunisiennes en direction de l’Italie [6], les dirigeant·e·s européen·ne·s craignent que la Tunisie ne se transforme en pays de départ non seulement pour les ressortissant·e·s tunisien·ne·s mais également pour des exilé·e·s venu·e·s de tout le continent. Après être parvenue à réduire les départs depuis les côtes libyennes, mais surtout à augmenter le nombre de refoulements grâce à l’intervention des pseudo garde-côtes libyens en Méditerranée centrale (10 000 rien qu’en 2020) [7], l’UE et ses États membres se tournent de plus en plus vers la Tunisie, devenue l’une des principales cibles de leur politique d’externalisation en vue de tarir les passages sur cette route. Dès 2018, la Commission européenne avait d’ailleurs identifié la Tunisie comme candidate privilégiée pour l’installation sur son sol de « plateformes de débarquement » [8], autrement dit des camps de tri externalisés au service de l’UE, destinés aux exilé·e·s secouru·e·s ou intercepté·e·s en mer. Le plan prévoyait également le renforcement des capacités d’interception des dits garde-côtes tunisiens.

      Si à l’époque la Tunisie avait clamé son refus de devenir le hotspot africain et le garde-frontière de l’Europe [9], Tunis, sous la pression européenne, semble accepter peu à peu d’être partie prenante de cette approche [10]. Le soutien que la Tunisie reçoit de l’UE pour surveiller ses frontières maritimes ne cesse de s’intensifier. Depuis 2015, Bruxelles multiplie en effet les programmes destinés à la formation et au renforcement des capacités des garde-côtes tunisiens, notamment en matière de collecte de données personnelles. Dans le cadre du programme « Gestion des frontières au Maghreb » [11] lancé en juillet 2018, l’UE a prévu d’allouer 24,5 millions d’euros qui bénéficieront principalement à la Garde nationale maritime tunisienne [12]. Sans oublier l’agence européenne Frontex qui contrôle les eaux tunisiennes au moyen d’images satellite, de radars et de drones [13] et récolte des données qui depuis quelques mois sont partagées avec les garde-côtes tunisiens [14], comme cela se fait déjà avec les (soi-disant) garde-côtes libyens [15]. Le but est simple : détecter les embarcations au plus tôt pour alerter les autorités tunisiennes afin qu’elles se chargent elles-mêmes des interceptions maritimes. Les moyens de surveillance navals et aériens que l’Italie et la France veulent déployer pour surveiller les départs de Tunisie viennent compléter cet édifice.

      Les gouvernements européens se félicitent volontiers des résultats de leur stratégie des « #refoulements_par_procuration » [16] en Libye. Cette stratégie occulte cependant les conséquences d’un partenariat avec des « garde-côtes » liés à des milices et des réseaux de trafiquants d’êtres humains [17], à savoir le renvoi des personnes migrantes dans un pays non-sûr, qu’elles tentent désespérément de fuir, ainsi qu’une hécatombe en mer Méditerranée. A mesure que les autorités européennes se défaussent de leurs responsabilités en matière de recherche et de secours sur les garde-côtes des pays d’Afrique du Nord, les cas de non-assistance et les naufrages se multiplient [18]. Alors que la route de la Méditerranée centrale est l’une des mieux surveillées au monde, c’est aussi l’une des plus mortelles du fait de cette politique du laisser-mourir en mer. Au cours de l’année 2020, près de 1 000 décès y ont été comptabilisés [19], sans compter les nombreux naufrages invisibles [20].

      Nous refusons que cette coopération euro-libyenne, dont on connaît déjà les conséquences, soit dupliquée en Tunisie. Si ce pays en paix et doté d’institutions démocratiques peut à première vue offrir une image plus « accueillante » que la Libye, il ne saurait être considéré comme un pays « sûr », ni pour les migrant·e·s, ni pour ses propres ressortissant·e·s, de plus en plus nombreux·ses à fuir la situation socio-économique dégradée, et aggravée par la crise sanitaire [21]. Les pressions exercées par l’UE et ses États membres pour obliger la Tunisie à devenir le réceptacle de tou·te·s les migrant·e·s « indésirables » sous couvert de lutte contre le terrorisme sont inacceptables. La complaisance des autorités tunisiennes et le manque de transparence des négociations avec l’UE et ses États membres le sont tout autant. En aucun cas le combat contre le terrorisme ne saurait justifier que soient sacrifiées les valeurs de la démocratie et du respect des droits fondamentaux, tels que la liberté d’aller et venir et le droit de trouver une véritable protection.

      De part et d’autre de la Méditerranée, nos organisations affirment leur solidarité avec les personnes exilées de Tunisie et d’ailleurs. Nous condamnons ces politiques sécuritaires externalisées qui génèrent d’innombrables violations des droits et ne font que propager l’intolérance et la haine.

      –—

      Notes :

      [1] « En Tunisie, 22 migrants sont portés disparus après le naufrage d’un bateau », La Presse.ca, 13 février 2021

      [2] Rapport du mois de décembre 2020 des mouvements sociaux, suicides, violences, et migrations, n°87, Observatoire social tunisien, FTDES

      [3] Quel est le contenu du récent accord entre la Tunisie et l’Italie ? Réponses aux demandes d’accès introduit par ASGI, FTDES et ASF, Projet Sciabaca & Oruka, 7 décembre 2020

      [4] « Migration : la France et l’Italie déploieront des navires et des avions pour alerter la Tunisie sur le départ des migrants », African Manager, 6 décembre 2020

      [5] Chaque semaine, deux charters partent de Sicile pour renvoyer une centaine de migrant·e·s tunisien·ne·s. En 2019, selon les chiffres du FTDES, 1 739 ressortissant·e·s tunisien·ne·s ont été expulsé·e·s d’Italie via ces vols. En 2020, ceux-ci étaient encore affrétés malgré la crise sanitaire.

      [6] Rapport du mois d’octobre 2020 des mouvements sociaux, suicides, violences, et migrations, n°85, Observatoire social tunisien, FTDES

      [7] Le nombre de migrant·e·s ayant été intercepté·e·s par les pseudo garde-côtes libyens en 2019 est estimé à 9 000 selon Alarmphone (voir : Central Mediterranean Regional Analysis 1 October 2019-31 December 2019, 5 janvier 2020).

      [8] Migration : Regional disembarkation arrangements - Follow-up to the European Council Conlusions of 28 June 2018

      [9] « Tri, confinement, expulsion : l’approche hotspot au service de l’UE », Migreurop, 25 juin 2019

      [10] « Comment l’Europe contrôle ses frontières en Tunisie ? », Inkyfada, 20 mars 2020

      [11] Programme du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique, mis en œuvre par l’ICMPD et le Ministère italien de l’intérieur - Document d’action pour la mise en œuvre du programme Afrique du Nord, Commission européenne (non daté)

      [12] Réponse de la Commission européenne à une question parlementaire sur les programmes de gestion des frontières financés par le Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence, 26 octobre 2020

      [13] « EU pays for surveillance in Gulf of Tunis », Matthias Monroy, 28 juin 2020

      [14] Réponse question parlementaire donnée par la Haute représentante/Vice-présidente Borrell au nom de la Commission européenne sur le projet Seahorse Mediterraneo 2.0, 7 mai 2020

      [15] « A Struggle for Every Single Boat- Central Mediterranean Analysis, July - December 2020 », Alarm Phone, 14 janvier 2021

      [16] « MARE CLAUSUM - Italy and the EU’s undeclared operation to stem migration across the Mediterranea » ; Forensic Oceanography, Forensic Architecture agency, Goldsmiths, Université de Londres, Mai 2018

      [17] « Migrants detained in Libya for profit, leaked EU report reveals », The Guardian, 20 novembre 2019

      [18] « Carnage in the Mediterranean is the direct result of European state policies », MSF 13 novembre 2020

      [19] Selon les chiffres de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) en Méditerranée : https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean?migrant_route%5B%5D=1376

      [20] « November Shipwrecks - Hundreds of Visible and Invisible Deaths in the Central Med », Alarmphone, 26 novembre 2020

      [21] « Politiques du non-accueil en Tunisie : des acteurs humanitaires au service des politiques sécuritaires européennes », Migreurop, FTDES juin 2020

      https://www.migreurop.org/article3028.html

    • La Tunisia come frontiera esterna d’Europa: a farne le spese sono sempre i diritti umani

      Migreurop, FTDES e EuroMed Rights lanciano un appello congiunto contro la riproposizione del “modello libico” in Tunisia.

      La Tunisia è divenuta negli ultimi anni uno degli interlocutori principali per le politiche securitarie europee basate sull’esternalizzazione delle frontiere. Il governo tunisino si presta, in modo sempre più evidente, a soddisfare le richieste dell’Unione europea e dei suoi paesi membri, Italia e Francia in particolare, che mirano a bloccare nel paese i flussi migratori, ancor prima che possano raggiungere il territorio europeo.

      Ma la situazione non può essere sostenibile sul lungo termine: una grande quantità di denaro viene investita nel finanziamento e supporto alla Guardia costiera tunisina e alle forze di polizia, che controllano i confini marittimi e riportano indietro le persone intercettate in mare, in quelli che sono stati definiti “respingimenti per procura” di cui le autorità europee non vogliono farsi carico, per non dover rispondere degli obblighi internazionali in materia di protezione e asilo.

      Intanto, nel paese imperversa una crisi socio-economica molto grave, che sta smorzando l’entusiasmo nei confronti della giovane democrazia tunisina, unico esperimento politico post-2011 ad aver resistito finora alle spinte autocratiche. Al malessere della popolazione, che nelle ultime settimane ha manifestato nelle strade di diverse città, lo Stato sembra saper rispondere solo con la forza e la repressione.
      La precarietà della situazione economica e sociale non farà che alimentare le partenze dalla Tunisia, che avevano registrato numeri consistenti durante il 2020.

      La guardia costiera, seppure ben equipaggiata e addestrata, non può rappresentare un vero deterrente per chi non ha nulla da perdere: e infatti negli ultimi giorni sono sbarcate a Lampedusa complessivamente più di 230 persone provenienti dall’area di Sfax, attualmente isolati nell’hotspot dell’isola. Altri arrivano invece a Pantelleria, situata a pochi chilometri dalle coste della capitale [1].

      Ma nel Mediterraneo si continua anche a morire: l’ultimo episodio noto che ha coinvolto la Tunisia è avvenuto tra il 12 e il 13 febbraio, quando un’imbarcazione in difficoltà è stata soccorsa dalla marina tunisina al largo di Lampedusa. Secondo le informazioni disponibili, la barca era partita da Sidi Mansour, nella provincia di Sfax, e le 48 persone a bordo erano di varie nazionalità africane. Il maltempo aveva spinto la marina tunisina a interrompere le operazioni di soccorso: delle 48 persone a bordo, 25 sono state tratte in salvo e ricondotte in Tunisia, una è morta e le altre 22 sono state dichiarate “disperse” [2].

      Sono numerose, ma ancora ampiamente inascoltate, le voci che contestano l’approccio del governo tunisino in tema di emigrazione nei rapporti con i paesi a nord del Mediterraneo. Un comunicato congiunto pubblicato il 17 febbraio da Migreurop, del Forum Tunisino per i Diritti Economici e Sociali e di EuroMed Rights, dal titolo “Unione europea - Tunisia: l’illusione di una cooperazione equilibrata” [3], denuncia la complicità delle autorità tunisine nell’assecondare le politiche securitarie europee, che rende sempre più preoccupante la situazione per chi tenta di raggiungere l’Europa dalla Tunisia. Lo Stato tunisino non è in grado di difendere i diritti dei propri cittadini o di chi, in generale, parte dalle proprie coste, di fronte alle pressioni europee che perseguono imperterrite delle politiche emergenziali insostenibili sul lungo periodo.

      Il comunicato esprime la propria contrarietà alla riproposizione in Tunisia del tristemente noto modello libico, basato sulla delegazione alle forze locali dei controlli frontalieri europei, sui respingimenti collettivi e sulla criminalizzazione delle persone migranti. Il 2020 è stato un anno cruciale per l’inasprimento dei controlli alle frontiere nel paese: l’aumento delle partenze dalle coste tunisine a causa della crisi economica, e l’attacco di Nizza ad opera di un cittadino tunisino hanno comportato una maggiore attenzione dei governi europei al paese nordafricano, con conseguente aumento dei finanziamenti destinati al controllo frontaliero. A farne le spese, nel caso tunisino come in quello libico, saranno ancora una volta le persone che vedranno violati i loro diritti:

      “Con le autorità europee che si sottraggono alle loro responsabilità in materia di ricerca e di soccorso in mare, affidandole alle guardie costiere dei paesi nordafricani, i casi di mancata assistenza sono in aumento e i naufragi proliferano. Benché la rotta del Mediterraneo centrale sia una delle più controllate al mondo, è anche una delle più mortali, a causa di questa politica di lasciar morire la gente in mare. Durante il 2020, sono stati registrati quasi 1.000 morti, senza contare i casi di naufragi invisibili.

      Ci rifiutiamo di lasciare che il modello di cooperazione euro-libica venga riproposto in Tunisia, con le conseguenze che già conosciamo. Se questo paese, in pace e con istituzioni democratiche, può a prima vista offrire un’immagine più «accogliente» della Libia, non può però essere considerato un paese «sicuro», né per le persone migranti né per i suoi stessi cittadini, che fuggono dal deterioramento della situazione socio-economica, aggravata dalla crisi sanitaria.

      La pressione esercitata dall’Ue e dai suoi Stati membri per costringere la Tunisia a diventare un rifugio per tutti/e i/le migranti «indesiderabili» con il pretesto della lotta al terrorismo è inaccettabile. La connivenza delle autorità tunisine e la mancanza di trasparenza nei negoziati con l’Ue e i suoi Stati membri sono altrettanto inaccettabili. In nessun caso la lotta contro il terrorismo può giustificare il sacrificio dei valori della democrazia e del rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, come la libertà di movimento e il diritto a una vera protezione.”

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-Tunisia-come-frontiera-esterna-d-Europa-a-farne-le-spese.html?var_mod

      #Tunisie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #modèle_libyen #externalisation

    • Unmanned surveillance for Fortress Europe

      The agencies #EMSA and Frontex have spent more than €300 million on drone services since 2016. The Mediterranean in particular is becoming a testing track for further projects.

      According to the study „Eurodrones Inc.“ presented by Ben Hayes, Chris Jones and Eric Töpfer for Statewatch seven years ago, the European Commission had already spent over €315 million at that time to investigate the use of drones for border surveillance. These efforts focused on capabilities of member states and their national contact centres for #EUROSUR. The border surveillance system, managed by Frontex in Warsaw, became operational in 2014 – initially only in some EU Member States.

      The Statewatch study also documented in detail the investments made by the Defence Agency (EDA) in European drone research up to 2014. More than €190 million in funding for drones on land, at sea and in the air has flowed since the EU military agency was founded. 39 projects researched technologies or standards to make the unmanned systems usable for civilian and military purposes.

      Military research on drone technologies should also benefit border police applications. This was already laid down in the conclusions of the “ First European High Level Conference on Unmanned Aerial Systems“, to which the Commission and the EDA invited military and aviation security authorities, the defence industry and other „representatives of the European aviation community“ to Brussels in 2010. According to this, once „the existing barriers to growth are removed, the civil market could be potentially much larger than the military market“.

      Merging „maritime surveillance“ initiatives

      Because unmanned flights over land have to be set up with cumbersome authorisation procedures, Europe’s unregulated seas have become a popular testing ground for both civilian and military drone projects. It is therefore not surprising that in 2014, in the action plan of its „Maritime Security Strategy“, the Commission also called for a „cross-sectoral approach“ by civilian and military authorities to bring together the various „maritime surveillance initiatives“ and support them with unmanned systems.

      In addition to the military EDA, this primarily meant those EU agencies that take on tasks to monitor seas and coastlines: The Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in Lisbon, founded in 2002, the Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in Warsaw since 2004, and the Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) in Vigo, Spain, which followed a year later.

      Since 2009, the three agencies have been cooperating within the framework of bi- and trilateral agreements in certain areas, this mainly concerned satellite surveillance. With „CleanSeaNet“, EMSA has had a monitoring system for detecting oil spills in European waters since 2007. From 2013, the data collected there was continuously transmitted to the Frontex Situation Centre. There, they flow into the EUROSUR border surveillance system, which is also based on satellites. Finally, EFCA also operates „Integrated Maritime Services“ (IMS) for vessel detection and tracking using satellites to monitor, control and enforce the common EU fisheries policy.

      After the so-called „migration crisis“ in 2015, the Commission proposed the modification of the mandates of the three agencies in a „set of measures to manage the EU’s external borders and protect our Schengen area without internal borders“. They should cooperate more closely in the five areas of information exchange, surveillance and communication services, risk analysis, capacity building and exchange. To this end, the communication calls for the „jointly operating Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (drones) in the Mediterranean Sea“.

      Starting in 2016, Frontex, EMSA and EFCA set out the closer cooperation in several cooperation agreements and initially carried out a research project on the use of satellites, drones and manned surveillance aircraft. EMSA covered the costs of €310,000, and the fixed-wing aircraft „AR 5 Evo“ from the Portuguese company Tekever and a „Scan Eagle“ from the Boeing offshoot Insitu were flown.

      EMSA took the lead

      Since then, EMSA has taken the lead regarding unmanned maritime surveillance services. The development of such a drone fleet was included in the proposal for a new EMSA regulation presented by the Commission at the end of 2015. Drones were to become a „complementary tool in the overall surveillance chain“. The Commission expected this to provide „early detection of migrant departures“, another purpose was to „support of law enforcement activities“.

      EMSA initially received €67 million for the new leased drone services, with further money earmarked for the necessary expansion of satellite communications. In a call for tenders, medium-sized fixed-wing aircraft with a long range as well as vertical take-off aircraft were sought; as basic equipment, they were to carry optical and infrared cameras, an optical scanner and an AIS receiver. For pollution tracking or emission monitoring, manufacturers should fit additional sensors.

      From 2018, EMSA awarded further contracts totalling €38 million for systems launching either on land or from ships. Also in 2018, the agency paid €2.86 million for quadrocopters that can be launched from ships. In the same year, EMSA signed a framework contract worth €59 million for flights with the long-range drone „Hermes 900“ from Israeli company Elbit Systems. In 2020, for €20 million, the agency was again looking for unmanned vertical take-off aircraft that can be launched either on land or from ships and can stay in the air for up to four hours.

      In addition to the „Hermes 900“, the EMSA drone fleet includes three fixed-wing aircraft, the „AR5 Evo“ from Tekever (Portugal), the „Ouranos“ from ALTUS (Greece) and the „Ogassa“ from UAVision (Portugal). The larger helicopter drones are the „Skeldar V-200“ from UMS (Sweden) and the „Camcopter S-100“ from Schiebel GmbH (Austria), as well as the „Indago“ quadrocopter from Lockheed Martin (USA).

      EMSA handles flights with different destinations for numerous EU member states, as well as for Iceland as the only Schengen state. Due to increasing demand, capacities are now being expanded. In a tender worth €20 million, „RPAS Services for Maritime Surveillance with Extended Coastal Range“ with vertically launched, larger drones are being sought. Another large contract for „RPAS Services for Multipurpose Maritime Surveillance“ is expected to cost €50 million. Finally, EMSA is looking for several dozen small drones under 25 kilograms for €7 million.

      Airbus flies for Frontex

      As early as 2009, the EU border agency hosted relevant workshops and seminars on the use of drones and invited manufacturers to give demonstrations. The events were intended to present marketable systems „for land and sea border surveillance“ to border police from member states. In its 2012 Work Programme, Frontex announced its intention to pursue „developments regarding identification and removing of the existing gaps in border surveillance with special focus on Unmanned Aircraft Systems“.

      After a failed award in 2015, Frontex initially tendered a „Trial of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) for long endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance“ in Crete and Sicily in 2018. The contract was awarded to Airbus (€4.75 million) for flights with a „Heron 1“ from Israel Aeronautics Industries (IAI) and Leonardo (€1.7 million) with its „Falco Evo“. The focus was not only on testing surveillance technology, but also on the use of drones within civilian airspace.

      After the pilot projects, Frontex then started to procure its own drones of the high-flying MALE class. The tender was for a company that would carry out missions in all weather conditions and at day and night time off Malta, Italy or Greece for €50 million. The contract was again awarded to the defence company Airbus for flights with a „Heron 1“. The aircraft are to operate in a radius of up to 250 nautical miles, which means they could also reconnoitre off the coasts of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. They carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called „daylight spotters“ to track moving targets. Other equipment includes mobile and satellite phone tracking systems.

      It is not yet clear when the Frontex drones will begin operations, nor does the agency say where they will be stationed in the central Mediterranean. However, it has announced that it will launch two tenders per year for a total of up to 3.000 contracted hours to operate large drones.

      Drone offensive for „pull backs“

      So since 2016, EMSA and Frontex have spent more than €300 million on drone services. On top of that, the Commission has spent at least €38 million funding migration-related drone research such as UPAC S-100, SARA, ROBORDER, CAMELOT, COMPASS2020, FOLDOUT, BorderUAS. This does not include the numerous research projects in the Horizon2020 framework programme, which, like unmanned passenger transport, are not related to border surveillance. Similar research was also carried out during the same period on behalf of the Defence Agency, which spent well over €100 million on it.

      The new unmanned capabilities significantly expand maritime surveillance in particular and enable a new concept of joint command and control structures between Frontex, EMSA and EFCA. Long-range drones, such as those used by EMSA with the „Hermes 900“ and Frontex with the „Heron 1“ in the Mediterranean, can stay in the air for a whole day, covering large sea areas.

      It is expected that the missions will generate significantly more situational information about boats of refugees. The drone offensive will then ensure even more „pull backs“ in violation of international law, after the surveillance information is passed on to the coast guards in countries such as Libya as before, in order to intercept refugees as quickly as possible after they set sail from the coasts there.

      https://digit.site36.net/2021/04/30/unmanned-surveillance-for-fortress-europe
      #drones

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • EU pays for surveillance in Gulf of Tunis

    A new monitoring system for Tunisian coasts should counter irregular migration across the Mediterranean. The German Ministry of the Interior is also active in the country. A similar project in Libya has now been completed. Human rights organisations see it as an aid to „#pull_backs“ contrary to international law.

    In order to control and prevent migration, the European Union is supporting North African states in border surveillance. The central Mediterranean Sea off Malta and Italy, through which asylum seekers from Libya and Tunisia want to reach Europe, plays a special role. The EU conducts various operations in and off these countries, including the military mission „#Irini“ and the #Frontex mission „#Themis“. It is becoming increasingly rare for shipwrecked refugees to be rescued by EU Member States. Instead, they assist the coast guards in Libya and Tunisia to bring the people back. Human rights groups, rescue organisations and lawyers consider this assistance for „pull backs“ to be in violation of international law.

    With several measures, the EU and its member states want to improve the surveillance off North Africa. Together with Switzerland, the EU Commission has financed a two-part „#Integrated_Border_Management Project“ in Tunisia. It is part of the reform of the security sector which was begun a few years after the fall of former head of state Ben Ali in 2011. With one pillar of this this programme, the EU wants to „prevent criminal networks from operating“ and enable the authorities in the Gulf of Tunis to „save lives at sea“.

    System for military and border police

    The new installation is entitled „#Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance“ (#ISMariS) and, according to the Commission (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000891-ASW_EN.html), is intended to bring together as much information as possible from all authorities involved in maritime and coastal security tasks. These include the Ministry of Defence with the Navy, the Coast Guard under the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard, and IT management and telecommunications authorities. The money comes from the #EU_Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa, which was established at the Valletta Migration Summit in 2015. „ISMariS“ is implemented by the Italian Ministry of the Interior and follows on from an earlier Italian initiative. The EU is financing similar projects with „#EU4BorderSecurity“ not only in Tunisia but also for other Mediterranean countries.

    An institute based in Vienna is responsible for border control projects in Tunisia. Although this #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (ICMPD) was founded in 1993 by Austria and Switzerland, it is not a governmental organisation. The German Foreign Office has also supported projects in Tunisia within the framework of the #ICMPD, including the establishment of border stations and the training of border guards. Last month German finally joined the Institute itself (https://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/download/dokumente/1493-deutscher-beitritt-zum-international-centre-for-migration-policy-development/file). For an annual contribution of 210,000 euro, the Ministry of the Interior not only obtains decision-making privileges for organizing ICMPD projects, but also gives German police authorities the right to evaluate any of the Institute’s analyses for their own purposes.

    It is possible that in the future bilateral German projects for monitoring Tunisian maritime borders will also be carried out via the ICMPD. Last year, the German government supplied the local coast guard with equipment for a boat workshop. In the fourth quarter of 2019 alone (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/194/1919467.pdf), the Federal Police carried out 14 trainings for the national guard, border police and coast guard, including instruction in operating „control boats“. Tunisia previously received patrol boats from Italy and the USA (https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/tunisia).

    Vessel tracking and coastal surveillance

    It is unclear which company produced and installed the „ISMariS“ surveillance system for Tunisia on behalf of the ICPMD. Similar facilities for tracking and displaying ship movements (#Vessel_Tracking_System) are marketed by all major European defence companies, including #Airbus, #Leonardo in Italy, #Thales in France and #Indra in Spain. However, Italian project management will probably prefer local companies such as Leonardo. The company and its spin-off #e-GEOS have a broad portfolio of maritime surveillance systems (https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/sea/maritime-domain-awareness/coastal-surveillance-systems).

    It is also possible to integrate satellite reconnaissance, but for this the governments must conclude further contracts with the companies. However, „ISMariS“ will not only be installed as a Vessel Tracking System, it should also enable monitoring of the entire coast. Manufacturers promote such #Coastal_Surveillance_Systems as a technology against irregular migration, piracy, terrorism and smuggling. The government in Tunisia has defined „priority coastal areas“ for this purpose, which will be integrated into the maritime surveillance framework.

    Maritime „#Big_Data

    „ISMariS“ is intended to be compatible with the components already in place at the Tunisian authorities, including coastguard command and control systems, #radar, position transponders and receivers, night vision equipment and thermal and optical sensors. Part of the project is a three-year maintenance contract with the company installing the „ISMariS“.

    Perhaps the most important component of „ISMariS“ for the EU is a communication system, which is also included. It is designed to improve „operational cooperation“ between the Tunisian Coast Guard and Navy with Italy and other EU Member States. The project description mentions Frontex and EUROSUR, the pan-European surveillance system of the EU Border Agency, as possible participants. Frontex already monitors the coastal regions off Libya and Tunisia (https://insitu.copernicus.eu/FactSheets/CSS_Border_Surveillance) using #satellites (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003212-ASW_EN.html) and an aerial service (https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/26/frontex-air-service-reconnaissance-for-the-so-called-libyan-coast-guar).

    #EUROSUR is now also being upgraded, Frontex is spending 2.6 million Euro (https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:109760-2020:TEXT:EN:HTML) on a new application based on artificial intelligence. It is to process so-called „Big Data“, including not only ship movements but also data from ship and port registers, information on ship owners and shipping companies, a multi-year record of previous routes of large ships and other maritime information from public sources on the Internet. The contract is initially concluded for one year and can be extended up to three times.

    Cooperation with Libya

    To connect North African coastguards to EU systems, the EU Commission had started the „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ project two years after the fall of North African despots. To combat irregular migration, from 2013 onwards Spain, Italy and Malta have trained a total of 141 members of the Libyan coast guard for sea rescue. In this way, „Seahorse Mediterranean“ has complemented similar training measures that Frontex is conducting for the Coastal Police within the framework of the EU mission #EUBAM_Libya and the military mission #EUNAVFOR_MED for the Coast Guard of the Tripolis government.

    The budget for „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ is indicated by the Commission as 5.5 million Euro (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000892-ASW_EN.html), the project was completed in January 2019. According to the German Foreign Office (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/196/1919625.pdf), Libya has signed a partnership declaration for participation in a future common communication platform for surveillance of the Mediterranean. Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are also to be persuaded to participate. So far, however, the governments have preferred unilateral EU support for equipping and training their coastguards and navies, without having to make commitments in projects like „Seahorse“, such as stopping migration and smuggling on the high seas.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/28/eu-pays-for-surveillance-in-gulf-of-tunis

    #Golfe_de_Tunis #surveillance #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance_des_frontières #Tunisie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #Algérie #Egypte #Suisse #EU #UE #Union_européenne #Trust_Fund #Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Allemagne #Italie #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #intelligence_artificielle #IA #données #Espagne #Malte #business

    ping @reka @isskein @_kg_ @rhoumour @karine4

    –—

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330

    Et celle-ci sur le lien entre développement et contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

  • Corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes : le Conseil adopte un règlement révisé.

    Le Conseil a adopté ce jour un nouveau règlement relatif au corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, qui constitue un élément important de l’approche globale de l’UE en matière de gestion des migrations et des frontières.

    L’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) est renforcée en termes de #personnel et d’#équipements_techniques. En outre, son #mandat est élargi en vue de soutenir l’action des États membres, notamment en matière de #contrôle_des_frontières, de #retour et de #coopération avec les #pays_tiers. Le nouveau règlement intégrera dans le cadre du corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes le système européen de surveillance des frontières (#Eurosur), afin d’améliorer son fonctionnement.

    Le bon fonctionnement de la gestion des #frontières_extérieures est essentiel au maintien d’un #espace_Schengen pleinement fonctionnel et à une gestion des migrations efficace et humaine. Les nouvelles règles permettront à Frontex de jouer un rôle plus important dans le soutien aux États membres pour le contrôle aux frontières, les retours et la coopération avec les pays tiers.
    Maria Ohisalo, ministre finlandaise de l’intérieur

    #Contingent permanent de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et experts en matière de retour

    Pour assurer une gestion cohérente des frontières extérieures de l’UE et être en mesure de répondre aux crises, Frontex aura à sa disposition un #contingent_permanent. Ce contingent, qui sera mis en place progressivement, comprendra jusqu’à 10 000 agents opérationnels d’ici 2027. Il sera notamment composé de membres du #personnel_opérationnel de Frontex, ainsi que de #personnes_détachées par les États membres pour une longue durée ou déployées pour une courte durée, et d’une réserve de réaction rapide qui sera maintenue jusqu’à la fin de 2024.

    #Retours

    Les règles envisagées permettront à Frontex d’apporter un soutien technique et opérationnel aux États membres dans le cadre des opérations de retour. L’Agence apportera un soutien soit à la demande de l’État membre concerné soit de sa propre initiative et en accord avec l’État membre concerné. Ce soutien portera sur toutes les phases du retour, des activités préparatoires au retour aux activités consécutives au retour et consécutives à l’arrivée.

    Coopération avec les pays tiers

    Les règles envisagées contribueront à renforcer la coopération avec les pays tiers, en élargissant le champ d’action de l’Agence, sans limiter les possibilités d’opérations conjointes aux seuls pays voisins.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/?amp;utm_medium=email
    #Frontex #règlement #frontières #EU #UE #contrôles_frontaliers #renvois #expulsions

    Pour télécharger le règlement :
    https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

    ping @isskein

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • À la frontière ukraino-polonaise. “Ici, ce n’est pas l’entrée de la Pologne. C’est celle de l’Europe”

    Quand quelqu’un traverse cette ligne, il n’entre pas seulement en Pologne. Il entre en Europe. Demain, il peut être à Bruxelles. Après-demain, en Espagne ou au Portugal...”.

    Paolo, un officier de police portugais détaché à #Medyka, en Pologne, se tient sur une ligne rouge entourée de bandes blanches. “Ne la dépassez pas, sinon on va avoir des problèmes avec les Ukrainiens”, avertit-il.

    “On n’a pas besoin de mur ici”

    Devant lui, des voitures font la file pour sortir d’Ukraine. Des champs bordent le poste-frontière. La terre y a été retournée sur une quinzaine de mètres : sept et demi côté ukrainien, sept et demi côté polonais.
    “Si quelqu’un passe la frontière, il nous suffit de suivre les traces de pied dans la boue. À 10 kilomètres d’ici, il y a une #tour_de_contrôle avec des #caméras_de_surveillance (infrarouge et thermique) qui balaient l’horizon. Quand les conditions météo sont bonnes, elles peuvent voir jusqu’ici. Une deuxième tour va être installée de l’autre côté du #BCP (border check point, NdlR). Peut-être qu’un jour on aura une barrière comme en Hongrie. Mais je ne pense pas. On n’en a pas besoin ici, on a suffisamment d’équipements”, détaille Piotr, un officier qui ressemble comme deux gouttes d’eau au caporal Blutch dans Les Tuniques Bleues.

    Des détecteurs d’explosifs et de radioactivité - “ils sont très puissants et captent même si quelqu’un a suivi un traitement aux isotopes pour guérir du cancer” -, de battements de coeur - “le plus souvent, celui des souris dans les camions” -, #scanners à rayons X pour les véhicules et les cargos, caméras avec #thermo-vision qui peuvent identifier des objets, définir et enregistrer leurs coordonnées géographiques, capables de filmer à une distance maximale de 20 kilomètres, scanners de documents, lecteurs d’empreintes digitales, #terminaux_mobiles pour contrôler les trains... “On ne déconne pas à Medyka”, sourit Piotr.

    De barrière, il y en a bien une. Ou plutôt une simple #clôture, sortie de terre lorsque la Pologne appartenait au camp soviétique.

    Le BCP de Medyka, qui protège une section de 21 kilomètres de frontières entre les deux pays, a été construit en 1945. Parmi les quatorze postes de la frontière (dont onze avec la frontière ukrainienne), il s’agit du plus fréquenté : 14 000 piétons et 2 600 véhicules y passent chaque jour dans les deux sens. À cela, il faut encore ajouter les camions et les trains de passagers et de marchandises. “Certaines personnes passent toutes les semaines pour aller faire leurs courses - contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait croire, la vie est moins chère en Pologne qu’en Ukraine - et on finit par les connaître. Certains en profitent pour faire du trafic. Ils pensent que comme on les connaît et qu’on sait qu’ils sont réglos, on sera moins vigilants. C’est pour ça qu’il ne faut pas laisser la routine s’installer”, observe Piotr.

    Quand la Pologne adhère à l’Union européenne, en 2004, sa frontière orientale devient une des frontières extérieures de la zone Schengen (rejointe quant à elle en 2007). Cette même année, l’agence européenne de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières (#Frontex) voit le jour. Les opérations de coopération internationale aux postes-frontières polonais se sont multipliées depuis.

    Tous les officiers de la #Bieszczady_BGRU font ainsi partie d’un pôle de #garde-frontières et sont régulièrement envoyés en mission pour Frontex dans d’autres pays européens. À l’inverse, des officiers issus de différents États membres son envoyés par Frontex à Medyka (il y en a trois en ce moment : un Portugais, un Bulgare et un Espagnol). En cela, postuler comme garde-côte ou garde-frontière, c’est comme faire un mini Erasmus de trois mois.

    Dans quelques semaines, Piotr partira pour la treizième fois en mission pour Frontex. Ce sera la deuxième fois qu’il ira à la frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Serbie. Paolo est quant à lui le tout premier policier portugais à être déployé ici. Sa spécialité : détecter les voitures volées. À Medyka, on en repère entre 75 et 90 chaque année. “C’est particulier de travailler ici, à la limite du monde européen : on réalise ce que veut vraiment dire "libre-circulation" et "coopération internationale". C’est ici la première ligne, ici qu’on protège l’Europe, ici qu’on peut détecter si un voyageur est "régulier" ou pas. Si on ne le repère pas... Bonjour pour le retrouver dans Schengen ! En tant que policier, je savais tout ça. Mais je crois que je ne le comprenais pas vraiment. C’est lors de mon premier jour ici, quand j’ai vu la frontière, les files, les contrôles, que j’ai vraiment compris pourquoi c’est super important. Dans mon pays, je suis enquêteur. J’ai fait des tas d’arrestations pour toutes sortes de crimes qui ont été commis au Portugal, en Espagne, en France, en Belgique. Si j’avais pu les stopper ici, en première ligne, peut-être que ce ne serait pas arrivé”, note Paolo.

    Mimi et Bernardo

    Pour la première fois éloigné de sa famille, Paolo a voulu sortir de sa routine en venant à Medyka. Enquêteur principal, la cinquantaine, il estimait avoir fait le tour de sa profession et commençait sérieusement à s’ennuyer. “Dans mon pays, j’étais le type vers qui se tournaient les autres pour avoir des conseils, des réponses. Ici, je suis le petit nouveau, je repars de zéro”, dit-il en buvant son café, entouré par trois collègues, tous nommés Piotr.

    “Raconte-lui l’histoire !”, s’exclame l’un d’eux. “Deux poissons sont dans un aquarium : Mimi et Bernardo. Bernardo est un petit poisson-rouge et Mimi est le plus grand. Il pense qu’il est le roi, qu’il a tout pour lui. Le jour où Mimi est placé dans un autre aquarium, beaucoup plus grand, avec un requin, Mimi se rend compte qu’il est tout petit ! Ici, je suis comme Mimi, je ne suis même pas une sardine (rires) !”. Morale de l’histoire : la taille du poisson dépend de la taille de l’aquarium. Et un enquêteur au top de sa carrière a toujours quelque chose à apprendre. “Oh allez Paolo, la taille ça ne compte pas !”, plaisante un autre Piotr.

    À Medyka, Paolo perfectionne sa connaissance en voitures volées et documents frauduleux. “Quand je faisais des contrôles d’identité au Portugal, je ne savais pas trop comment les reconnaître. Ici, j’apprends tous les jours grâce à leur expérience en la matière. Quand je rentrerai, j’enseignerai tout ça à mes collègues”, se réjouit-il.

    En guise d’illustration, Paolo contrôle notre passeport. Les fibres qui ressortent en couleurs fluo dans le lecteur de documents prouvent qu’il est authentique. “Premier bon signe”, glissent Paolo et Piotr. D’autres détails, qu’il est préférable de ne pas divulguer, confirment leurs certitudes. Un séjour en Afghanistan, un autre en Jordanie, un transit en Turquie et des tampons dans différents pays africains soulèvent toutefois des suspicions. “Si vous passiez la frontière avec ce passeport, on vous aurait signalé aux services secrets”, lâche Paolo.

    "Mon premier jour, on a découvert une Lexus volée"

    Ce cinquantenaire a le droit de circuler où bon lui semble - “c’est l’oiseau libre du BCP” - dans le poste-frontière. Il porte toujours un badge sur lui pour expliquer qui il est et dans quel cadre il intervient. Un détail important qui permet de calmer les tensions avec certains voyageurs qui ne comprennent pas pourquoi ils sont contrôlés par un officier portant un uniforme avec lequel ils ne sont pas familiers.

    Chaque matin, après avoir bu son café et fumé son cigare (il en grille trois par jour), Paolo se rend au terminal des voitures, son terrain de jeu. “Mon premier jour, on a découvert une Lexus volée ! Tout était bon : le numéro de châssis, la plaque d’immatriculation (espagnole), les pièces, les données... Mais un de mes collègues me répétait que quelque chose n’allait pas. J’ai contacté les autorités espagnoles pour leur demander une faveur. Ils ont accepté de vérifier et il se trouve que l’originale était garée à Valence ! Quand il y a deux voitures jumelles dans le monde, ça signifie qu’une des deux est volée. Et il faut trouver l’originale pour le prouver”, explique-t-il.

    Quelques instants plus tard, dans ce même terminal, il scrute un autre véhicule sous toutes ses coutures. Quelque chose cloche avec la vitre avant-gauche. Mais lui faut au moins deux détails suspects pour décider de placer le véhicule dans une autre file, où les fouilles et les vérifications sont plus poussées.

    Le #crime_organisé a toujours une longueur d’avance

    En 2018, Frontex a saisi 396 véhicules volés. Trois Joint Action Days, des opérations internationales organisées par l’agence visant à lutter contre les organisations criminelles, ont mené à la saisie de 530 voitures, 12 tonnes de tabac et 1,9 tonne de différentes drogues. 390 cas de fraudes aux documents de voyage ont été identifiés et 117 passeurs arrêtés.

    À la fin de sa journée, Paolo écrit un rapport à Frontex et signale tout ce qui s’est produit à Medyka. Le tout est envoyé au Situation Centre, à Varsovie, qui partage ensuite les informations récoltées sur des criminels suspectés à Europol et aux autorités nationales.

    Ce travail peut s’avérer décourageant : le crime organisé a toujours une longueur d’avance. “Il faut en être conscient et ne pas se laisser abattre. Parmi les vols, on compte de moins en moins de voitures entières et de plus en plus de pièces détachées. Ce qu’on peut trouver dans les véhicules est assez dingue. Un jour, on a même déniché un petit hélicoptère !”, se rappelle Piotr.

    Derrière lui, un agent ouvre le coffre d’une camionnette, rempli de différents moteurs de bateaux et de pneus. Plus loin, une agent des Douanes a étalé sur une table le contenu d’une voiture : CD, jouets, DVD... Elle doit tout vérifier avant de la laisser passer vers la frontière, où l’attendent Paolo et ses trois comparses.

    Par-delà l’entrée du BCP, la file s’étend sur quelques kilomètres. Les moteurs ronronnent, les passagers sortent pour griller une cigarette. Dans la file pour les piétons, certains s’impatientent et chantent une chanson invitant les officiers à travailler un peu plus vite. “Là où il y a une frontière, il y a toujours une file”, dit Piotr en haussant les épaules. Il faut une minute pour vérifier l’identité d’une personne, trente minutes à une heure pour “innocenter” une voiture.

    "Avant 2015, je ne connaissais pas Frontex"

    Le travail des garde-frontières est loin de refléter l’ensemble des tâches gérées par Frontex, surtout connue du grand public depuis la crise de l’asile en Europe et pour le volet "migration" dont elle se charge (sauvetages en mer, identification des migrants et rapatriements). Son rôle reste flou tant son fonctionnement est complexe. “Je n’avais jamais entendu parler de Frontex avant la crise de 2015. J’ai appris son existence à la télévision et je suis allé me renseigner sur Internet”, avance Paolo.

    Les images des migrants traversant la Méditerranée, qui font régulièrement le tour du monde depuis quatre ans, l’ont bouleversé. “Je trouve ça tellement normal de vouloir une vie meilleure. Quand on voit les risques qu’ils prennent, on se dit qu’ils doivent vraiment être désespérés. Je me souviens que je regardais ma fille qui se plaignait de son iPhone qui n’avait qu’un an mais qu’elle trouvait déjà trop vieux. Je me suis dit que j’étais très bien loti et que je pouvais peut-être faire quelque chose. Alors, j’ai décidé de déposer ma candidature. Je ne savais pas où j’allais être envoyé et j’ai fini ici, à Medyka. Ce n’est pas la même chose que de sauver des vies mais... dans quelques années, je pourrai dire que j’ai fait quelque chose. Que je ne suis pas resté les bras croisés chez moi, à regarder ma fille et son iPhone”.

    Dans le Situation Center de Frontex, coeur névralgique de la surveillance des frontières

    La migration et la #criminalité_transfrontalière sur grand écran

    Le cœur névralgique de l’Agence européenne de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières (Frontex) est situé à son siège principal, à #Varsovie. Une douzaine d’agents s’y relaient en permanence pour surveiller les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne.

    Devant eux, trois larges écrans meublent les murs du #Situation_Center. Des points verts apparaissent sur celui du milieu, le plus large, principalement près des côtes grecques et espagnoles. Ils représentent diverses “détections” en mer (sauvetages en mer, navire suspect, etc.).

    Sur une autre carte, les points verts se concentrent près des frontières terrestres (trafic de drogue, voitures volées, migration irrégulière, etc.) de l’Albanie, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie et la Grèce. À gauche, une carte affiche d’autres informations portant sur les “incidents” aux postes-frontières détectés par les États membres. “Ce que vous voyez ici n’est pas diffusé en temps réel mais on tend à s’en rapprocher le plus possible. Voir les données nous aide à évaluer la situation aux frontières, constater si certaines sont soumises à une pression migratoire et à effectuer des analyses de risques”, explique un porte-parole de l’agence. Les images diffusées lors de notre passage datent de février. Dès que nous quittons la pièce, elles seront remplacées par d’autres, plus récentes qui ne sont pas (encore) publiables.

    Le #Frontex_Situation_Centre (#FSC) est une sorte de plate-forme où parviennent toutes sortes d’informations. Elle les les compile et les redispatche ensuite vers les autorités nationales, Europol ou encore la Commission européenne.

    Sur demande, Frontex peut également suivre, par exemple, tel vaisseau ou telle camionnette (le suivi en temps réel dans le cadre de missions spécifiques se déroule dans une autre pièce, où les journalistes ne sont pas les bienvenus) grâce au système européen de surveillance des frontières baptisé #Eurosur, un système de coopération entre les États membres de l’Union européenne et Frontex qui “vise à prévenir la criminalité transfrontalière et la migration irrégulière et de contribuer à la protection de la vie des migrants”.

    Pour tout ce qui touche à l’observation terrestre et maritime, Frontex exploite du Centre satellitaire de l’Union européenne, de l’Agence européenne pour la sécurité maritime et l’Agence européenne de contrôle des pêches.

    Un exemple : en septembre 2015, les garde-côtes grecs ont intercepté Haddad I, un vaisseau surveillé par Eurosur depuis le début de l’année. Le navire, en route vers la Libye, transportait 5 000 armes, 500 000 munitions et 50 millions de cigarette. Autre exemple : en octobre 2015, un radar-satellite utilisé par Eurosur a détecté des objets en mer, au nord de la Libye. Envoyé sur place par les autorités italiennes dans le cadre de l’opération Sophia, le Cavour, porte-aéronefs de la Marine militaire, a trouvé plusieurs bateaux avec des migrants à bord. 370 personnes ont été sauvées et amenées à bon port.

    Surveillance accrue des médias

    Dans un coin de la pièce, des images diffusées par France 24, RaiNews et CNBC défilent sur d’autres écrans. Au FSC, on suit l’actualité de très près pour savoir ce qui se dit sur la migration et la criminalité transfrontalière. Parfois, les reportages ou les flash info constituent une première source d’information. “La plupart du temps on est déjà au courant mais les journalistes sont souvent mieux informés que les autorités nationales. La couverture médiatique de la migration change aussi d’un pays à l’autre. Par exemple, les Italiens et les Grecs connaissent mieux Frontex que les autres”, glisse un porte-parole.

    Les médias sociaux (Twitter, Facebook, Youtube) sont également surveillés quotidiennement par une équipe dédiée depuis 2015. “Pendant la crise migratoire, Facebook était une source importante d’information. On peut y trouver pas mal de choses sur le trafic d’êtres humains, même si ce n’est pas évident. Ça peut être aussi utile quand une personne a traversé une frontière illégalement et poste une vidéo pour dire qu’il a réussi. Mais on ne mène pas d’enquête. On transmet à Europol ce qui peut être intéressant”, décrit-on chez Frontex.

    Depuis 2009, le FSC publie une newsletter en interne, du lundi au vendredi. L’agence a également créé le Frontex Media Monitor, une application gérée par le staff du FSC qui collecte les articles portant sur la gestion des frontières, Frontex et les agences frontalières des États membres. Ils sont issus de 6 000 sources ouvertes en 28 langues différentes.

    Une partie des agents qui travaillent au FSC, des nationaux issus des États membres qui vont-viennent selon une rotation effectuées tous les trois mois, rédige des rapports durant les périodes dites “de crise”. Ceux-ci portent sur les incidents majeurs aux frontières européennes, la situation migratoire dans les différents États membres, les développements politiques et institutionnels au niveau national et international et les crises dans les pays non-européens.

    Paradoxe kafkaïen

    À l’avenir, le programme Eurosur permettra-t-il de sauver des vies, comme dans l’exemple susmentionné ? Alors que l’Union européenne vient de suspendre la composante navale de l’opération Sophia (ou EUNAVFORMED), Frontex va bientôt acquérir ses propres navires grâce à l’élargissement de son mandat. Selon le directeur exécutif de Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, ceux-ci pourront couvrir plus de kilomètres que ceux déployés par les autorités nationales.

    En vertu du droit maritime international, Frontex est, comme tout navire, tenue de porter assistante aux naufragés et de les ramener dans un port sûr. De port sûr, condition requise par ce même droit pour débarquer des personnes à terre, les autorités européennes considèrent qu’il n’y en a pas en Libye. Mais l’Italie refuse désormais de porter seule la charge des migrants secourus en mer et les Européens n’ont pas réussi à trouver d’accord pour se les répartir à l’avenir. D’où la suspension des activités maritime de Sophia.

    Quid si l’agence est amenée à procéder à un sauvetage pendant une mission de surveillance des frontières extérieures ? L’Europe finira-t-elle par obliger les navires de Frontex, son “bras opérationnel”, à rester à quai ? Et si oui, qui surveillera les frontières ? À quoi serviront alors les investissements que Frontex s’apprête à réaliser, au frais du contribuable européen, pour s’acheter son propre matériel ? Seul l’avenir donnera des réponses.

    “Nous ne construisons pas une Europe forteresse”

    Fabrice Leggeri, directeur exécutif de l’Agence européenne de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières (Frontex)

    Douze secondes pour décider. C’est le temps dont dispose, en moyenne, un garde-frontière pour décider si un voyageur est “légal” et si ses documents sont authentiques. C’est ce que dit une brochure produite par l’équipe “Information et Transparence” de Frontex, l’Agence européenne de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières, exposée dans une salle d’attente de ladite agence.

    La tour qui abrite le siège de l’agence a été réalisée par le constructeur flamand Ghelamco, en plein centre des affaires de Varsovie.

    Début avril, l’agrandissement du mandat de Frontex a été confirmé. Dotée de 1 500 garde-côtes et garde-frontières (majoritairement déployés en Grèce, en Italie et en Espagne) empruntés aux États-membres, Frontex en comptera 10 000 d’ici 2027 et pourra acquérir son propre équipement (avions, bateaux, voitures, hélicoptères, etc.). Le tout doit encore être adopté par le Parlement européen et le Conseil – une formalité qui ne devrait pas remettre en question ce projet. Depuis son bureau à Varsovie, situé dans une tour sortie de terre par le constructeur flamand Ghelamco, Fabrice Leggeri, directeur exécutif de l’agence, revient en détails sur cette décision, qu’il considère comme “une grande avancée pour l’Union européenne” .

    Le mandat de Frontex a déjà été élargi en 2016. Celui qui vient d’être avalisé va encore plus loin. Des États membres avaient exprimé leurs réticences par rapport à celui-ci. Qu’est-ce qui a changé ces dernières semaines ?

    2016 a été un véritable tournant pour notre agence, qui a été investie d’un mandat plus robuste avec des moyens plus importants. Aujourd’hui, on ne doit plus seulement renforcer des équipes pour réagir en cas de crise – c’est nécessaire mais insuffisant, on l’a compris en 2015 et 2016. Il s’agit de renforcer de manière durable la capacité européenne de gestion des frontières. Concernant notre futur mandat, il est clair que certains États seront vigilants dans la manière dont il sera mis en œuvre. 2020 était une date qui paraissait, à juste titre, très difficile pour la plupart des acteurs (la Commission européenne souhaitait que les effectifs soient portés à 10 000 en 2020, NdlR). D’ailleurs, j’ai observé qu’on parlait beaucoup plus de cette date que du nombre d’agents lui-même, ce qui me laisse penser que nous sommes donc largement soutenus.

    Un corps européen n’a jamais existé auparavant à une telle échelle. Expliquez-nous comment il va fonctionner.

    Construire la capacité de gestion de frontières efficaces, ça ne veut pas dire qu’on doit se cantonner à l’immigration irrégulière. Il faut aussi s’occuper du bon fonctionnement des franchissements réguliers aux points de passages (dans les aéroports, aux postes-frontières, etc.). En 2018, on a eu 150  000 franchissements irréguliers mais on a 700 millions de franchissements réguliers par an. Donc, on ne construit pas une Europe forteresse mais un espace intérieur de libertés, de sécurité et de justice. L’objectif de la création de ce corps européen et des propositions budgétaires proposées par la Commission est de pouvoir recruter davantage pour augmenter le nombre total de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières. Ce corps européen doit être construit ensemble avec les États. On est là pour se compléter les uns les autres et pas pour entrer en concurrence (lire ci-dessous) . Selon un chiffre qui vient des États membres eux-mêmes, le nombre théorique de garde-frontières que l’Union européenne devrait avoir est de 115  000. Quand on regarde combien il y en a de façon effective, selon les planifications nationales, il y en a – à peu près – 110  000.

    “Nos grosses opérations et nos nouveaux déploiements en dehors de l’Union européenne, sont deux gros morceaux qui vont absorber pas mal de ressources”.

    Au niveau opérationnel, quels sont les grands changements que permet le nouveau mandat ?

    Nous allons pouvoir déployer, en mai, une opération hors du territoire européen, en Albanie. Nous pourrons aussi aller dans un pays tiers sans que ce soit nécessairement un pays directement voisin de l’Union européenne, à condition évidemment que celui-ci nous appelle, donne son consentement et qu’il y ait un accord entre l’Union européenne et ce pays. Autrement dit  : on va avoir des contingents de plus en plus nombreux hors des frontières européennes. Nos grosses opérations et nos nouveaux déploiements en dehors de l’Union européenne, sont deux gros morceaux qui vont absorber pas mal de ressources.

    Une de vos missions qui prend de plus en plus d’importance est d’organiser le rapatriement de personnes dans les pays tiers.

    À ce niveau-là, l’Union européenne est passée dans une autre dimension. L’Europe est devenu un acteur à part entière de l’éloignement. Par rapport à ce qu’on pouvait seulement imaginer il y a quatre ou cinq ans (13 729 personnes ont été rapatriées en 2018 contre 3 576 en 2015, NdlR), on a fait un bond énorme. Pour les éloignements, une partie des ressources humaines sera utilisée soit comme escorteurs, soit comme spécialiste de l’éloignement qui vont aider les États membres à les préparer. Cette dimension est nécessaire à cause d’un goulot d’étranglement administratif  : les États membres n’ont pas augmenté le personnel qui doit préparer les décisions d’éloignement alors que le nombre d’étrangers en situation irrégulière et de demandeurs d’asile déboutés à éloigner croît. Le corps européen peut répondre à cette faiblesse pour qu’elle ne se transforme pas en vulnérabilité.

    Vous parlez de complémentarité avec les États. Certains sont méfiants face à l’élargissement du mandat de Frontex, voire carrément hostiles à sa présence sur leur territoire, en vertu de leur souveraineté nationale. Ont-ils raison de craindre pour celle-ci ?

    Qu’il y ait des craintes, ça peut se comprendre. Mais les déploiements du corps européens se feront toujours avec le consentement de l’État concerné et l’activité se déroulera toujours sous l’autorité tactique de celui-ci. Vous savez, je ne sais pas combien de personnes s’en souvienne mais la libre-circulation dans l’espace Schengen existe depuis bientôt 25 ans. Ça fait donc près d’un quart de siècle que les gardes-frontières nationaux gardent la frontière de “nous tous”. Donc ce qu’on fait aujourd’hui, ce n’est pas si différent… Le vrai changement, c’est que ce sera plus visible. Plus assumé. Que Frontex devient le bras opérationnel de l’Union européenne. Moi, je considère l’agence comme une plateforme d’entraide opérationnelle. Et ce n’est pas parce qu’un État membre nous demande de l’aide qu’il est défaillant. Il ne faut pas non plus percevoir nos actions comme une sanction, une faiblesse ou une substitution à la souveraineté. À l’avenir, il faudra que chaque État puisse avoir un petit bout de ce corps européen présent chez lui. Il contribue à renforcer une culture de travail commune, à homogénéiser des pratiques. Les frontières extérieures sont communes à tous, à notre espace de circulation et il serait absolument incompréhensible qu’on travaille de façon radicalement différente en divers endroits de cette frontière commune.

    Le nouveau mandat vous donne tout de même plus d’autonomie…

    On aura une autonomie opérationnelle plus forte et une flexibilité dans la gestion des ressources humaines, ce qui est effectivement une force. Mais c’est une force pour nous et qui bénéficie aux États membres. On aura aussi une plus grande autonomie technique renforcée grâce à nos propres moyens opérationnels (Frontex emprunte actuellement ce matériel aux États membres et les défraye en échange, NdlR).

    À vous entendre, on croirait que la libre-circulation des personnes a été tellement menacée qu’elle aurait pu disparaître…

    C’est le cas. La crise de 2015-2016 a montré que ce qui était remis en question, c’était la libre-circulation effective. D’ailleurs, un certain nombre d’États membres ont rétablis les contrôles aux frontières. C’est le signe d’un dysfonctionnement. L’objectif des autorités au niveau de l’Union européenne, c’est de retourner au fonctionnement normal. C’est “retour à Schengen”.

    Le visa Schengen est le représentant du collectif des 26 pays européens qui ont mutuellement décidé d’éliminer les contrôles à leurs frontières communes.

    Schengen, c’est quelque chose que l’on prend trop pour acquis ?

    Quand on voyage à l’intérieur de cet espace, ça paraît surprenant de se voir demander sa carte d’identité ou d’entendre que le contrôle a été rétabli aux frontières intérieures. Ça a un impact économique monstrueux qui se chiffre en millions, même en milliards d’euros et ça détricote l’Europe petit à petit. Un espace de libre-circulation, c’est un espace où on circule pour faire du commerce, pour étudier, etc. Et c’est là que le rôle de l’agence de garde-côtes et de garde-frontières est crucial  : les frontières doivent fonctionnent correctement pour sauver et maintenir Schengen. Sans vouloir faire une digression, c’est un peu la même chose avec qu’avec la zone euro. C’est quelque chose de très concret pour le citoyen européen. Vous remarquez que quand vous arrivez en Pologne (nous sommes à Varsovie, où se situe le siège de Frontex, NdlR), vous ne pouvez pas payer votre bus avec une pièce dans le bus. L’espace Schengen, c’est pareil. C’est quand on ne l’a pas ou qu’on ne l’a plus, qu’il est suspendu temporairement, qu’on se dit que c’est quand même bien. Frontex évolue dans un domaine où “plus d’Europe” est synonyme de meilleur fonctionnement et de meilleure utilisation des deniers publics.

    En 2015, le budget de Frontex dédié aux retours était de 13 millions d’euros. En 2018, 54 millions y étaient dédiés. La Belgique n’organisait quasiment pas de vols sécurisés, en collaboration avec Frontex avant 2014. Ces "special flights" sont plus avantageux sur le plan financier pour les États car ceux-ci sont remboursés entre 80 % et 100 % par Frontex.


    https://dossiers.lalibre.be/polono-ukrainienne/login.php
    #frontières #Europe #pologne #Ukraine #gardes-frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #surveillance #contrôles_frontaliers

  • Drone Surveillance Operations in the Mediterranean: The Central Role of the Portuguese Economy and State in EU Border Control

    Much has been written in the past years about the dystopic vision of EU borders increasingly equipped with drone surveillance (see here: http://www.europeanpublicaffairs.eu/high-tech-fortress-europe-frontex-and-the-dronization-of-borde, here: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-next-phase-of-european-border-and.html, here: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/EU-startet-Langstreckendrohnen-zur-Grenzueberwachung-4038306.html and here: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/11/role-technology). Yet, when the first joint drone surveillance operation of #Frontex, the #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) and Portuguese authorities was launched on 25 September 2018, there was a lack of response both from the media and concerned activists or researchers. Yet, the EMSA offered details about the operation on its website, and Frontex as well. In addition, Frontex mentioned in its press statement parallel operations undertaken in Italy and Greece in the same period.

    These operations were a crucial step for the setup of the joint European information system for border surveillance, #EUROSUR. The drone surveillance program in the context of Frontex operations is a major step in the operational setup of the EUROSUR program that aims to integrate databases and national coordination centres of 24 European countries. EUROSUR was officially introduced with a policy paper in 2008, and the system itself was launched on 1 December 2013 as a mechanism of information exchange among EU member states. But it is not yet fully operational, and drone surveillance is commonly seen as a central component for full operationability. Thus, the cooperation between the EMSA, Frontex and the Portuguese state in the recent operation is a crucial milestone to achieve the aim of EUROSUR to create a unified European border surveillance system.

    This is why the operation launched in Portugal in September 2018 is of higher significance to the ones in Italy and Greece since it includes not only national authorities but also the EMSA, located in Lisbon, as a new key actor for border surveillance. EMSA was founded in 2002 as a response to various shipping disasters that lead to environmental pollution and originally focuses on monitoring the movement of ships, with a focus on the safety of shipping operations, environmental safety at sea and the trading of illegal goods via maritime transport.

    In 2016 the EMSA was allocated 76 million Euros in a bid for the production of drones for the surveillance of the Mediterranenan in the context of Frontex missions. EMSA`s bid foresaw that drones would be hired by EMSA itself. EMSA would run the operation of drones and share real-time data with Frontex. The largest part of this bid, 66 million Euros, went to the Portuguese company #Tekever, while smaller portions went to the Italian defence company #Leonardo and to the Portuguese air force that will operate drones produced by the Portuguese company #UA_Vision. At the same time, the successful bid of Tekever and the integration of Portuguese authorities in surveillance operations catapults Portugal onto the map of the defence and surveillance industry that profits immensely from the recent technological craze around border surveillance (see here, here and here).

    Lisbon-based Tekever set up a factory for the production of drones in the Portuguese mainland in #Ponte_de_Sor, an emerging new hub for the aerospace industry. Together with French #Collecte_Localisation_Service, which specialises in maritime surveillance, Tekever founded the consortium #REACT in order to produce those specific drones. Under the Portuguese operation, ground control, i.e. the technical coordination of the flight of the drones, was located in Portugal under the authority of the Portuguese air force, while the operation was coordinated remotely by Frontex experts and Portuguese authorities in the #Frontex_Situational_Centre in Poland where data were shared in real-time with EMSA. This first operation is a crucial step, testing the technical and administrative cooperation between EMSA and Frontex, and the functionality of the drones that were specifically produced for this purpose. These drones are lighter than the ones used in Greece and Italy, and they are equipped with special cameras and #radars that can detect ship movements and receive emergency calls from the sea. This allows to run data collected by the drones through an algorithm that is programmed to distinguish so-called ´#migrant_vessels´ from other ships and boats.

    The Portuguese government has set up a number of initiatives to foster this industry. For example, a national strategy called #Space_2030 (#Estratégia_Portugal_Espaço_2030) was launched in 2018, and the newly founded #Portuguese_Space_Agency (#Agência_Espacial_Portuguesa) will begin to work in the first months of 2019. The fact that border surveillance is one of the larger European programs boosting the defence and surveillance industry financially has not generated any controversy in Portugal; neither the fact that a center-left government, supported by two radical left parties is propping up surveillance, aerospace and defence industries. The colonial continuities of this industrial strategy are all too visible since narratives like ‘from the discovery of the sea to the technology of space’ are used not only by industry actors, but also, for example, by the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce in the UK on its website. In this way, social and political #domination of non-European territories and the control of the movement of racialized bodies are reduced to the fact of technological capability – in the colonial period the navigation of the seas with optical instruments, astronomic knowledge and ships, and today the electronic monitoring of movements on the sea with drones and integrated computer systems. The Portuguese aerospace industry is therefore presented as a cultural heritage that continues earlier technological achievements that became instruments to set up a global empire.

    The lack of any mention about the start of the drone surveillance programme does not only demonstrate that border surveillance goes largely unquestioned in Europe, but also that the sums spent for surveillance and defence by EU agencies create incentives to engage more in the defence and surveillance industry. This goes all the more for countries that have been hit hard by austerity and deindustrialisation, such as Portugal. The recent increase of 9.3 billion Euros for the period 2021 to 2027 for border surveillance funding in the EU with the creation of the #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund focused on border protection, is a telling example of the focus of current EU industrial policies. For the same period, the European Commission has earmarked 2.2 billion Euro for Frontex in order to acquire, operate and maintain surveillance assets like drones, cameras, fences, and the like. In this situation, the political consensus among EU governments to restrict migration reinforces the economic interests of the defence industry and vice versa, and the interest of national governments to attract #high-tech investment adds to this. Those lock-in effects could probably only be dismantled through a public debate about the selective nature of the entrepreneurial state whose funding has decisive influence on which industries prosper.

    While the Portuguese government does not currently have a single helicopter operating in order to control and fight forest fires that have caused more than 100 deaths in the past two years, much EU and national public funding goes into technology aimed at the control of racialized bodies and the observation of earth from space. At the same time, there is considerable concern among experts that surveillance technology used for military means and border security will be rolled out over the entire population in the future for general policing purposes. For this reason, it remains important to keep an eye on which technologies are receiving large public funds and what are its possible uses.


    https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/02/drone
    #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #technologie_de_la_surveillance #externalisation #business #algorithme #colonialisme #néo-colonialisme #impérialisme #héritage_culturel #austérité #désindustrialisation

    ping @daphne @marty @albertocampiphoto @fil

    • Des drones en renfort dans l’#opération_Sophia

      Pour renforcer la surveillance aérienne, après le départ des navires, l’opération Sophia déployée en Méditerranée (alias #EUNAVFOR_Med) va bénéficier d’un renfort d’au moins un drone #Predator de l’aeronautica militare.

      L’#Italie a indiqué sa disponibilité à fournir un drone à l’opération Sophia, selon nos informations confirmées à bonne source. Ce pourrait être un #MQ-9A Predator B, la version la plus avancée et la plus récente du drone, d’une longueur de 10,80 m avec une envergure de plus de 20 mètres, qui peut voler à 445 km / heure. De façon alternative, selon les moyens disponibles, un MQ-1C Predator A, plus modeste (longueur de 8,20 m et envergure de 14,80 m), pouvant voler à 160 km/heure, pourrait aussi être déployé.

      http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/04/09/des-drones-en-renfort-dans-loperation-sophia
      #operation_Sophia

  • #Chronologie des #politiques_migratoires européennes

    En octobre #2013, l’#Italie lance l’opération #Mare_Nostrum suite au naufrage survenu à quelques kilomètres de l’île de Lampedusa en Sicile où 366 personnes ont perdu la vie. Elle débloque alors des moyens matériels (hélicoptères, bateaux, garde-côtes, aide humanitaire) et des fonds considérables (environ 9 millions d’euros par mois) pour éviter de nouveaux naufrages et contrôler les migrants arrivant au sud de l’Italie.

    Au sein de l’Union Européenne, les États votent la résolution #Eurosur qui met en place système européen de surveillance des frontières qui sera assuré par l’agence #Frontex. Frontex est chargée d’assister techniquement les pays pour protéger leurs frontières extérieures et former leurs garde-côtes. En 2018, son siège à Varsovie lui a accordé un budget de 320 millions d’euros. Elle dispose à ce jour (février 2019) de 976 agents, 17 bateaux, 4 avions, 2 hélicoptères, et 59 voitures de patrouille, des moyens qui seront accrus d’ici 2020 avec la formation d’un corps permanent de 10 000 agents et un pouvoir d’exécution renforcé et souhaité par la Commission européenne d’ici 2027.

    Dans le cadre de leur mission de surveillance de la mer, les agents de Frontex interceptent les embarcations d’exilés, contrôlent les rescapés et les remettent aux autorités du pays où ils sont débarqués. Les bateaux Frontex sillonnent ainsi les eaux internationales du Maroc à l’Albanie. Les ONG humanitaires l’accusent de vouloir repousser les migrants dans leurs pays d’origine et de transit comme le prévoient les États de l’Union Européenne.

    Octobre 2014, l’opération Mare Nostrum qui a pourtant permis de sauver 150 000 personnes en un an et d’arrêter 351 passeurs, est stoppée par l’Italie qui investit 9 millions d’euros par mois et ne veut plus porter cette responsabilité seule. L’agence européenne Frontex via l’opération Triton est chargée de reprendre le flambeau avec des pays membres. Mais elle se contente alors de surveiller uniquement les eaux territoriales européennes là où Mare Nostrum allait jusqu’aux côtes libyennes pour effectuer des sauvetages. La recherche et le sauvetage ne sont plus assurés, faisant de ce passage migratoire le plus mortel au monde. L’Italie qui est alors pointée du doigts par des États membres car elle n’assure plus sa mission de sauvetage, de recherche et de prise en charge au large de ses côtes est dans le même temps accusée par les mêmes d’inciter les traversées « sécurisées » en venant en aide aux exilés et de provoquer un appel d’air. Une accusation démentie très rapidement par le nombre de départs qui est resté le même après l’arrêt de l’opération Mare Nostrum.

    L’Italie qui avait déployé un arsenal impressionnant pour le sauvetage durant cette période n’avait pas pour autant assuré la prise en charge et procédé à l’enregistrement des dizaines de milliers d’exilés arrivant sur son sol comme le prévoit l’accord de Dublin (prise empreintes et demande d’asile dans le premier pays d’accueil). Le nombre de demandes d’asile enregistrées fut bien supérieur en France, en Allemagne et en Suède à cette même période.

    #2015 marque un tournant des politiques migratoires européennes. Le corps du petit syrien, #Aylan_Kurdi retrouvé sans vie sur une plage turque le 2 septembre 2015, a ému la communauté européenne seulement quelques semaines, rattrapée ensuite par la peur de ne pas pouvoir gérer une crise humanitaire imminente. « Elle n’a jusqu’ici pas trouvé de réponse politique et collective à l’exil », analysent les chercheurs. Les pays membres de l’Union Européenne ont opté jusqu’à ce jour pour des politiques d’endiguement des populations de migrants dans leurs pays d’origine ou de transit comme en Turquie, en Libye ou au Maroc, plutôt que pour des politiques d’intégration.

    Seule l’#Allemagne en 2015 avait opté pour une politique d’accueil et du traitement des demandes d’asile sans les conditions imposées par l’accord de #Dublin qui oblige les réfugiés à faire une demande dans le premier pays d’accueil. La chancelière allemande avait permis à un million de personnes de venir en Allemagne et d’entamer une demande d’asile. « Elle démontrait qu’on peut être humaniste tout en légalisant le passage de frontières que l’Europe juge généralement indésirables. Elle a aussi montré que c’est un faux-semblant pour les gouvernements de brandir la menace des extrêmes-droites xénophobes et qu’il est bien au contraire possible d’y répondre par des actes d’hospitalité et des paroles », décrit Michel Agier dans son livre “Les migrants et nous”.

    En mars #2016, la #Turquie et l’Union européenne signent un #accord qui prévoit le renvoi des migrants arrivant en Grèce et considérés comme non éligibles à l’asile en Turquie. La Turquie a reçu 3 milliards d’aide afin de garder sur son territoire les candidats pour l’Europe. A ce jour, des réseaux de passeurs entre la Turquie et la #Grèce (5 kms de navigation) sévissent toujours et des milliers de personnes arrivent chaque jour sur les îles grecques où elles sont comme à Lesbos, retenues dans des camps insalubres où l’attente de la demande d’asile est interminable.
    #accord_UE-Turquie

    En #2017, l’OIM (Office international des migrations), remarque une baisse des arrivées de réfugiés sur le continent européen. Cette baisse est liée à plusieurs facteurs qui vont à l’encontre des conventions des droits des réfugiés à savoir le renforcement des contrôles et interceptions en mer par l’agence Frontex, le refus de l’Europe d’accueillir les rescapés secourus en mer et surtout la remise entre les mains des garde-côtes libyens des coordinations de sauvetages et de leur mise en place, encouragés et financés par l’UE afin de ramener les personnes migrantes en #Libye. Cette baisse ne signifie pas qu’il y a moins de personnes migrantes qui quittent leur pays, arrivent en Libye et quittent ensuite la Libye : 13 185 personnes ont été ainsi interceptées par les Libyens en Méditerranée en 2018, des centaines ont été secourues par les ONG et plus de 2 250 seraient mortes, sans compter celles dont les embarcations n’ont pas été repérées et ont disparu en mer.

    En avril #2018, le président Macron suggérait un pacte pour les réfugiés pour réformer le système de #relocalisation des migrants en proposant un programme européen qui soutienne directement financièrement les collectivités locales qui accueillent et intègrent des réfugiés : « nous devons obtenir des résultats tangibles en débloquant le débat empoisonné sur le règlement de Dublin et les relocalisations », déclarait-il. Mais les pourparlers qui suivirent n’ont pas fait caisse de raisonnance et l’Europe accueille au compte goutte.

    La #Pologne et la #Hongrie refuse alors l’idée de répartition obligatoire, le premier ministre hongrois
    Victor #Orban déclare : « Ils forcent ce plan pour faire de l’Europe un continent mixte, seulement nous, nous résistons encore ».

    Le 28 juin 2018, lors d’un sommet, les 28 tentent de s’accorder sur les migrations afin de répartir les personnes réfugiées arrivant en Italie et en Grèce dans les autres pays de l’Union européenne. Mais au terme de ce sommet, de nombreuses questions restent en suspend, les ONG sont consternées. La politique migratoire se durcit.

    Juillet 2018, le ministre italien Matteo #Salvini fraîchement élu annonce, en totale violation du droit maritime, la #fermeture_des_ports italiens où étaient débarquées les personnes rescapées par différentes entités transitant en #Méditerranée dont les #ONG humanitaires comme #SOS_Méditerranée et son bateau l’#Aquarius. Les bateaux de huit ONG se retrouvent sans port d’accueil alors que le droit maritime prévoit que toute personne se trouvant en danger en mer doit être secourue par les bateaux les plus proches et être débarquées dans un port sûr (où assistance, logement, hygiène et sécurité sont assurés). Malgré la condition posée par l’Italie de ré-ouvrir ses ports si les autres États européens prennent en charge une part des migrants arrivant sur son sol, aucun d’entre eux ne s’est manifesté. Ils font aujourd’hui attendre plusieurs jours, voir semaines, les bateaux d’ONG ayant à leur bord seulement des dizaines de rescapés avant de se décider enfin à en accueillir quelques uns.

    Les 28 proposent des #zones_de_débarquement hors Europe, dans des pays comme la Libye, la Turquie, le Maroc, le Niger où seraient mis en place des centres fermés ou ouverts dans lesquels serait établie la différence entre migrants irréguliers à expulser et les demandeurs d’asile légitimes à répartir en Europe, avec le risque que nombre d’entre eux restent en réalité bloqués dans ces pays. Des pays où les droits de l’homme et le droit à la sécurité des migrants en situation de vulnérabilité, droits protégés en principe par les conventions dont les Européens sont signataires, risquent de ne pas d’être respectés. Des représentants du Maroc, de la Tunisie et d’Albanie, pays également évoqués par les Européens ont déjà fait savoir qu’ils ne sont pas favorables à une telle décision.
    #plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement #regional_disembarkation_platforms

    Malgré les rapports des ONG, Médecins sans frontières, Oxfam, LDH, Amnesty International et les rappels à l’ordre des Nations Unies sur les conditions de vie inhumaines vécues par les exilés retenus en Grèce, en Libye, au Niger, les pays de l’Union européenne, ne bougent pas d’un millimètre et campent sur la #fermeture_des_frontières, avec des hommes politiques attachés à l’opinion publique qui suit dangereusement le jeu xénophobe de la Hongrie et de la Pologne, chefs de file et principaux instigateurs de la peur de l’étranger.

    Réticences européennes contre mobilisations citoyennes :
    Malgré les positions strictes de l’Europe, les citoyens partout en Europe poursuivent leurs actions, leurs soutiens et solidarités envers les ONG. SOS Méditerranée active en France, Allemagne, Italie, et Suisse est à la recherche d’une nouveau bateau et armateur, les bateaux des ONG Sea Watch et Sea Eye tentent leur retour en mer, des pilotes solidaires originaires de Chamonix proposent un soutien d’observation aérienne, la ligne de l’association Alarm Phone gérée par des bénévoles continue de recevoir des appels de détresse venant de la Méditerranée, ils sont ensuite transmis aux bateaux présents sur zone. Partout en Europe, des citoyens organisent la solidarité et des espaces de sécurité pour les exilés en mal d’humanité.

    https://www.1538mediterranee.com/2019/02/28/politique-migratoire-europeenne-chronologie
    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #EU #UE #frontières

    ping @reka

  • #métaliste (qui va être un grand chantier, car il y a plein d’information sur seenthis, qu’il faudrait réorganiser) sur :
    #externalisation #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #migrations #réfugiés

    Des liens vers des articles généraux sur l’externalisation des frontières de la part de l’ #UE (#EU) :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/569305
    https://seenthis.net/messages/390549
    https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

    Ici une tentative (très mal réussie, car évidement, la divergence entre pratiques et les discours à un moment donné, ça se voit !) de l’UE de faire une brochure pour déconstruire les mythes autour de la migration...
    La question de l’externalisation y est abordée dans différentes parties de la brochure :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/765967

    Petit chapitre/encadré sur l’externalisation des frontières dans l’ouvrage "(Dé)passer la frontière" :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/769367

    Les origines de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers (maritimes) : accord #USA-#Haïti de #1981 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/768694

    L’externalisation des politiques européennes en matière de migration
    https://seenthis.net/messages/787450

    "#Sous-traitance" de la #politique_migratoire en Afrique : l’Europe a-t-elle les mains propres ?
    https://seenthis.net/messages/789048

    Partners in crime ? The impacts of Europe’s outsourced migration controls on peace, stability and rights :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/794636
    #paix #stabilité #droits #Libye #Niger #Turquie

    Proceedings of the conference “Externalisation of borders : detention practices and denial of the right to asylum”
    https://seenthis.net/messages/880193

    Brochure sur l’externalisation des frontières (passamontagna)
    https://seenthis.net/messages/952016

  • Budget de l’Union : La Commission propose une importante augmentation des financements visant à renforcer la gestion des migrations et des frontières

    Pour le prochain #budget à long terme de l’UE se rapportant à la période 2021-2027, la Commission propose de quasiment tripler les financements destinés à la gestion des #migrations et des #frontières, qui atteindraient 34,9 milliards d’euros contre 13 milliards d’euros au cours de la période précédente.

    La proposition de la Commission est une réponse aux défis accrus qui se posent en matière de migration et de #sécurité, avec des instruments de financement plus flexibles pour faire face aux événements imprévus, la #protection_des_frontières étant au cœur du nouveau budget. Un nouveau fonds séparé pour la gestion intégrée des frontières sera créé et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes sera renforcée par un nouveau corps permanent de quelque 10 000 #gardes-frontières. Ce nouveau fonds aidera aussi les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant des équipements de contrôle douanier.

    M. Frans Timmermans, premier vice-président, a fait la déclaration suivante : « Sur la base de l’expérience passée et sachant que la migration restera un défi à l’avenir, nous proposons une augmentation des financements sans précédent. Le renforcement de nos frontières communes, notamment avec l’#Agence_européenne_de_garde-frontières_et_de_garde-côtes, continuera de figurer parmi les grandes #priorités. Une #flexibilité accrue de nos instruments de financement signifie que nous sommes prêts à fournir un soutien rapide aux États membres ; au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin - en particulier en cas de #crise. »

    M. Dimitris Avramopoulos, commissaire pour la migration, les affaires intérieures et la citoyenneté, a déclaré quant à lui : « Une meilleure gestion de nos frontières extérieures et des flux migratoires restera une priorité clé pour l’Union européenne, les États membres et nos citoyens dans les années à venir. Des défis plus grands exigent de faire appel à des ressources plus importantes - c’est pourquoi nous proposons de quasiment tripler le budget dans ce domaine. Le renforcement des financements jouera un rôle essentiel en nous permettant de mettre en œuvre nos priorités politiques : davantage sécuriser nos #frontières_extérieures, continuer à accorder une protection à ceux qui en ont besoin, mieux soutenir la #migration_légale et les efforts d’#intégration, lutter contre la migration irrégulière, et assurer le retour effectif et rapide de ceux qui ne bénéficient pas du droit de séjour. »

    M. Pierre Moscovici, commissaire pour les affaires économiques et financières, la fiscalité et les douanes, s’est exprimé en ces termes : « Les 115 000 fonctionnaires des douanes de l’UE sont en première ligne pour protéger les citoyens européens contre les produits contrefaits ou dangereux et les autres formes de commerce illicite. Afin de les soutenir dans cette mission capitale, nous proposons aujourd’hui un nouveau fonds doté de 1,3 milliard d’euros, afin que les pays de l’UE puissent acquérir les équipements douaniers les plus avancés. L’#union_douanière de l’UE fêtera son 50e anniversaire le mois prochain : nous devons veiller à ce qu’elle continue à prendre de l’ampleur. »

    Durant la crise des réfugiés de 2015 et de 2016, l’appui financier et technique que l’Union européenne a fourni aux États membres a été déterminant dans le soutien apporté à ceux d’entre eux qui se trouvaient sous pression, dans le développement des capacités de recherche et de sauvetage, dans l’intensification des retours et dans l’amélioration de la gestion des frontières extérieures. Tirant les enseignements du passé, la Commission propose de quasiment tripler les financements destinés aux domaines essentiels que représentent la gestion des migrations et celle des frontières.

    1. #Sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE

    La protection effective des frontières extérieures de l’UE est essentielle pour gérer les flux migratoires et garantir la sécurité intérieure. Des frontières extérieures solides sont aussi ce qui permet à l’UE de maintenir un espace Schengen sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures. La Commission propose d’allouer 21,3 milliards d’euros à la gestion globale des frontières et de créer un nouveau #Fonds_pour_la_gestion_intégrée_des_frontières (#FGIF) doté d’une enveloppe supérieure à 9,3 milliards d’euros.

    Les principaux éléments du nouveau Fonds sont les suivants :

    – Une palette adéquate de priorités :

    Renforcement des frontières extérieures de l’Europe : Le nouveau #Fonds s’inscrira dans le prolongement du travail réalisé ces dernières années et s’appuiera sur lui pour mieux protéger les frontières de l’UE, avec la mise en place du corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, des vérifications systématiques aux frontières, de nouveaux systèmes informatiques à grande échelle et interopérables, y compris le futur système d’entrée/sortie. Le financement sera mis à disposition dans des domaines tels que la lutte contre le #trafic_de_migrants et la #traite des êtres humains, les opérations visant à intercepter et stopper les personnes représentant une #menace, l’appui aux opérations de recherche et de sauvetage en mer, les équipements et la formation des gardes-frontières, ainsi que l’appui opérationnel rapide aux États membres sous pression.
    Une politique des #visas plus solide et plus efficace : Le Fonds garantira également l’évolution continue et la modernisation de la politique des visas de l’UE, tout en renforçant la sécurité et en atténuant les risques liés à la migration irrégulière.

    – Soutien aux États membres : Le nouveau Fonds consacrera un financement à long terme de 4,8 milliards d’euros aux mesures prises par les États membres en matière de gestion des frontières et à la politique des visas. Le financement correspondra exactement aux besoins des États membres et un examen à mi-parcours tiendra compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires. Chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, le reste étant distribué selon la charge de travail, la pression et le niveau de menace aux frontières extérieures terrestres (30 %), aux frontières extérieures maritimes (35 %), dans les aéroports (20 %) et dans les bureaux consulaires (15 %).

    – Une réponse souple et rapide : Un montant de 3,2 milliards d’euros sera consacré à des actions d’appui ciblé aux États membres, aux projets de dimension européenne, et permettra de faire face aux besoins urgents. Le nouveau Fonds a été conçu pour garantir une souplesse suffisante permettant de fournir aux États membres une aide d’urgence en cas de besoin et de faire face aux priorités nouvelles et critiques à mesure qu’elles surviennent.

    – Des équipements de contrôle douanier plus performants aux frontières extérieures : Le nouvel instrument comportera une enveloppe de 1,3 milliard d’euros pour aider les États membres à acquérir, entretenir et remplacer des équipements douaniers modernes, tels que de nouveaux #scanners, des systèmes de reconnaissance automatique des plaques minéralogiques, des équipes de #chiens_renifleurs et des #laboratoires_mobiles d’analyse d’échantillons.

    – Renforcement des organismes chargés de la gestion des frontières : En plus de ce Fonds, une enveloppe supérieure à 12 milliards d’euros devant être présentée séparément sera consacrée à la poursuite du renforcement de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et de l’agence #eu-LISA.

    2. Migrations : soutenir une politique solide, réaliste et équitable

    La Commission propose de renforcer le financement destiné à la gestion des migrations à raison de 51 % et de le porter ainsi à 10,4 milliards d’euros au titre du Fonds « Asile et migration » renouvelé (#FAM). Le Fonds soutiendra les efforts déployés par les États membres dans trois domaines clés : l’asile, la migration légale et l’intégration, la lutte contre la migration irrégulière et le retour. Les principaux éléments du nouveau Fonds sont les suivants :

    – Une palette adéquate de priorités : Le nouveau Fonds continuera de fournir un appui vital aux systèmes d’asile nationaux et mettra un accent renouvelé sur la mise à disposition des aides de l’UE en faveur des questions les plus urgentes, telles que :

    Un #régime_d'asile_européen plus solide et plus efficace : Le Fonds contribuera à renforcer et à développer tous les aspects du #régime_d'asile_européen_commun, y compris sa dimension extérieure :
    Un soutien accru à la migration légale et à l’intégration : Le Fonds consacrera des ressources additionnelles au soutien de l’intégration précoce des ressortissants de pays tiers séjournant légalement dans l’UE sur le court terme, lesquelles seront complétées par un financement au titre du #Fonds_de_cohésion_pour_l'intégration_socio-économique à plus long terme.
    Des retours plus rapides et plus fréquents : Le Fonds soutiendra une approche plus coordonnée pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière, améliorer l’efficacité des retours et intensifier davantage la coopération avec les pays tiers en matière de réadmission.

    – Soutien aux États membres : Le Fonds consacrera un financement à long terme de 6,3 milliards d’euros à des actions de soutien aux États membres dans la gestion de la migration, en concordance avec leurs besoins. Un examen à mi-parcours tiendra compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires. Chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, le reste étant distribué sur la base d’une évaluation des pressions s’exerçant sur lui et en tenant compte des proportions prévues en matière d’asile (30 %), de migration légale et d’intégration (30 %) et de retour (40 %).

    – Une meilleure préparation : Une enveloppe de 4,2 milliards d’euros sera réservée aux projets présentant une véritable valeur ajoutée européenne, telle que la #réinstallation, ou pour répondre à des besoins impérieux et pour faire parvenir des financements d’urgence aux États membres au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin.

    Une plus grande coordination entre les instruments de financement de l’UE : Le Fonds « Asile et migration » sera complété par les fonds additionnels affectés au titre des instruments de politique extérieure de l’UE pour accélérer la coopération en matière de migration avec les pays partenaires, notamment dans le cadre des efforts visant à lutter contre la migration irrégulière, à améliorer les perspectives dans les pays d’origine, à renforcer la coopération en matière de retour, de réadmission, et de migration légale ;

    – Renforcement des organismes de l’UE : En plus de ce fonds, une enveloppe de près de 900 millions d’euros devant être présentée séparément sera consacrée au renforcement de la nouvelle #Agence_de_l'Union_européenne_pour_l'asile.

    Prochaines étapes

    Il est essentiel de parvenir à un accord rapide sur le budget global à long terme de l’UE et sur ses propositions sectorielles de manière à garantir que les fonds de l’UE commencent à produire leurs effets le plus tôt possible sur le terrain.

    Des retards pourraient compromettre la capacité de l’Union européenne à réagir aux crises si elles venaient à éclater, et pourraient priver les projets de ressources essentielles - telles que les programmes européens d’aide au retour volontaire et de réadmission, et la poursuite du financement de l’UE en faveur de la réinstallation.

    Un accord sur le prochain budget à long terme en 2019 permettrait d’assurer une transition sans heurts entre l’actuel budget à long terme (2014-2020) et le nouveau, ce qui garantirait la prévisibilité et la continuité du financement, pour le bénéfice de tous.

    Historique du dossier

    Depuis le début du mandat de la Commission Juncker, la gestion des frontières et celle des migrations constituent une priorité politique - depuis les orientations politiques présentées en juillet 2014 par le président Juncker jusqu’à son dernier discours sur l’état de l’Union prononcé le 13 septembre 2017.

    Cependant, l’Europe a été surprise par l’ampleur et l’urgence de la crise des réfugiés de 2015-2016. Pour éviter une crise humanitaire et permettre une réponse commune à ce défi sans précédent, ainsi qu’aux nouvelles menaces pesant sur la sécurité, l’UE a fait usage de toute la souplesse possible dans le budget existant afin de mobiliser des fonds supplémentaires. En plus des dotations initiales pour la période 2014-2020 s’élevant à 6,9 milliards d’euros pour l’#AMIF et le #FSI (frontières et police), un montant supplémentaire de 3,9 milliards d’euros a été mobilisé pour atteindre 10,8 milliards d’euros en faveur de la migration, de la gestion des frontières et de la sécurité intérieure - et cela ne comprend même pas le financement important mobilisé pour faire face à la crise des réfugiés à l’extérieur de l’UE.

    Tirant les enseignements du passé, la Commission propose à présent de doubler le financement dans tous les domaines, avec 10,4 milliards d’euros pour la migration, 9,3 milliards d’euros pour la gestion des frontières, 2,5 milliards d’euros pour la sécurité intérieure et 1,2 milliard d’euros pour le déclassement sécurisé des installations nucléaires dans certains États membres - soit plus de 23 milliards d’euros au total.

    En outre, le soutien aux organismes de l’UE dans le domaine de la sécurité, de la gestion des frontières et des migrations sera revu à la hausse, passant de 4,2 milliards à 14 milliards d’euros.

    http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4106_fr.htm
    #EU #UE #migrations #asile #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #interopérabilité #Fonds_Asile_et_migration #machine_à_expulser #accords_de_réadmission #coopération_internationale #aide_au_développement

    –-----------------

    Comme dit Sara Prestianni, voici la réponse à la tragédie de l’Aquarius...
    –-> « la #protection_des_frontières étant au cœur du nouveau budget »
     :-(

    Création d’ « un nouveau fonds séparé pour la gestion intégrée des frontières sera créé et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes sera renforcée par un nouveau corps permanent de quelque 10 000 #gardes-frontières. Ce nouveau fonds aidera aussi les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant des équipements de contrôle douanier »
    #Frontex n’est plus suffisant... un nouveau fonds est nécessaire... yuppi !
    #contrôles_frontaliers #complexe_militaro-industriel

    • Voici une contre-proposition, de #Gabriele_Del_Grande:

      Lettera al Ministro dell’Interno Matteo Salvini

      Confesso che su una cosa sono d’accordo con Salvini: la rotta libica va chiusa. Basta tragedie in mare, basta dare soldi alle mafie libiche del contrabbando. Sogno anch’io un Mediterraneo a sbarchi zero. Il problema però è capire come ci si arriva. E su questo, avendo alle spalle dieci anni di inchieste sul tema, mi permetto di dare un consiglio al ministro perché mi pare che stia ripetendo gli stessi errori dei suoi predecessori.

      Blocco navale, respingimenti in mare, centri di detenzione in Libia. La ricetta è la stessa da almeno quindici anni. Pisanu, Amato, Maroni, Cancellieri, Alfano, Minniti. Ci hanno provato tutti. E ogni volta è stato un fallimento: miliardi di euro persi e migliaia di morti in mare.

      Questa volta non sarà diverso. Per il semplice fatto che alla base di tutto ci sono due leggi di mercato che invece continuano ad essere ignorate. La prima è che la domanda genera l’offerta. La seconda è che il proibizionismo sostiene le mafie.

      In altre parole, finché qualcuno sarà disposto a pagare per viaggiare dall’Africa all’Europa, qualcuno gli offrirà la possibilità di farlo. E se non saranno le compagnie aeree a farlo, lo farà il contrabbando.

      Viviamo in un mondo globalizzato, dove i lavoratori si spostano da un paese all’altro in cerca di un salario migliore. L’Europa, che da decenni importa manodopera a basso costo in grande quantità, in questi anni ha firmato accordi di libera circolazione con decine di paesi extraeuropei. Che poi sono i paesi da dove provengono la maggior parte dei nostri lavoratori emigrati: Romania, Albania, Ucraina, Polonia, i Balcani, tutto il Sud America. La stessa Europa però, continua a proibire ai lavoratori africani la possibilità di emigrare legalmente sul suo territorio. In altre parole, le ambasciate europee in Africa hanno smesso di rilasciare visti o hanno reso quasi impossibile ottenerne uno.

      Siamo arrivati al punto che l’ultima e unica via praticabile per l’emigrazione dall’Africa all’Europa è quella del contrabbando libico. Le mafie libiche hanno ormai il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord del Mediterraneo centrale. Riescono a spostare fino a centomila passeggeri ogni anno con un fatturato di centinaia di milioni di dollari ma anche con migliaia di morti.

      Eppure non è sempre stato così. Davvero ci siamo dimenticati che gli sbarchi non esistevano prima degli anni Novanta? Vi siete mai chiesti perché? E vi siete mai chiesti perché nel 2018 anziché comprarsi un biglietto aereo una famiglia debba pagare il prezzo della propria morte su una barca sfasciata in mezzo al mare? Il motivo è molto semplice: fino agli anni Novanta era relativamente semplice ottenere un visto nelle ambasciate europee in Africa. In seguito, man mano che l’Europa ha smesso di rilasciare visti, le mafie del contrabbando hanno preso il sopravvento.

      Allora, se davvero Salvini vuole porre fine, come dice, al business delle mafie libiche del contrabbando, riformi i regolamenti dei visti anziché percorrere la strada del suo predecessore. Non invii i nostri servizi segreti in Libia con le valigette di contante per pagare le mafie del contrabbando affinché cambino mestiere e ci facciano da cane da guardia. Non costruisca altre prigioni oltremare con i soldi dei contribuenti italiani. Perché sono i nostri soldi e non vogliamo darli né alle mafie né alle polizie di paesi come la Libia o la Turchia.

      Noi quelle tasse le abbiamo pagate per veder finanziato il welfare! Per aprire gli asili nido che non ci sono. Per costruire le case popolari che non ci sono. Per finanziare la scuola e la sanità che stanno smantellando. Per creare lavoro. E allora sì smetteremo di farci la guerra fra poveri. E allora sì avremo un obiettivo comune per il quale lottare. Perché anche quella è una balla. Che non ci sono soldi per i servizi. I soldi ci sono, ma come vengono spesi? Quanti miliardi abbiamo pagato sottobanco alle milizie libiche colluse con le mafie del contrabbando negli anni passati? Quanti asili nido ci potevamo aprire con quegli stessi denari?

      Salvini non perda tempo. Faccia sbarcare i seicento naufraghi della Acquarius e anziché prendersela con le ONG, chiami la Farnesina e riscrivano insieme i regolamenti per il rilascio dei visti nei paesi africani. Introduca il visto per ricerca di lavoro, il meccanismo dello sponsor, il ricongiungimento familiare. E con l’occasione vada a negoziare in Europa affinché siano visti validi per circolare in tutta la zona UE e cercarsi un lavoro in tutta la UE anziché pesare su un sistema d’accoglienza che fa acqua da tutte le parti.

      Perché io continuo a non capire come mai un ventenne di Lagos o Bamako, debba spendere cinquemila euro per passare il deserto e il mare, essere arrestato in Libia, torturato, venduto, vedere morire i compagni di viaggio e arrivare in Italia magari dopo un anno, traumatizzato e senza più un soldo, quando con un visto sul passaporto avrebbe potuto comprarsi un biglietto aereo da cinquecento euro e spendere il resto dei propri soldi per affittarsi una stanza e cercarsi un lavoro. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di lavoratori immigrati in Italia, che guardate bene non sono passati per gli sbarchi e tantomeno per l’accoglienza. Sono arrivati dalla Romania, dall’Albania, dalla Cina, dal Marocco e si sono rimboccati le maniche. Esattamente come hanno fatto cinque milioni di italiani, me compreso, emigrati all’estero in questi decenni. Esattamente come vorrebbero fare i centomila parcheggiati nel limbo dell’accoglienza.

      Centomila persone costrette ad anni di attesa per avere un permesso di soggiorno che già sappiamo non arriverà in almeno un caso su due. Perché almeno in un caso su due abbiamo davanti dei lavoratori e non dei profughi di guerra. Per loro non è previsto l’asilo politico. Ma non è previsto nemmeno il rimpatrio, perché sono troppo numerosi e perché non c’è la collaborazione dei loro paesi di origine. Significa che di qui a un anno almeno cinquantamila persone andranno ad allungare le file dei senza documenti e del mercato nero del lavoro.

      Salvini dia a tutti loro un permesso di soggiorno per motivi umanitari e un titolo di viaggio con cui possano uscire dal limbo dell’accoglienza e andare a firmare un contratto di lavoro, che sia in Italia o in Germania. E dare così un senso ai progetti che hanno seguito finora. Perché l’integrazione la fa il lavoro. E se il lavoro è in Germania, in Danimarca o in Norvegia, non ha senso costringere le persone dentro una mappa per motivi burocratici. Altro che riforma Dublino, noi dobbiamo chiedere la libera circolazione dentro l’Europa dei lavoratori immigrati. Perché non possiamo permetterci di avere cittadini di serie a e di serie b. E guardate che lo dobbiamo soprattutto a noi stessi.

      Perché chiunque di noi abbia dei bambini, sa che cresceranno in una società cosmopolita. Già adesso i loro migliori amici all’asilo sono arabi, cinesi, africani. Sdoganare un discorso razzista è una bomba a orologeria per la società del domani. Perché forse non ce ne siamo accorti, ma siamo già un noi. Il noi e loro è un discorso antiquato. Un discorso che forse suona ancora logico alle orecchie di qualche vecchio nazionalista. Ma che i miei figli non capirebbero mai. Perché io non riuscirei mai a spiegare ai miei bambini che ci sono dei bimbi come loro ripescati in mare dalla nave di una ONG e da due giorni sono bloccati al largo perché nessuno li vuole sbarcare a terra.

      Chissà, forse dovremmo ripartire da lì. Da quel noi e da quelle battaglie comuni. Dopotutto, siamo o non siamo una generazione a cui il mercato ha rubato il futuro e la dignità? Siamo o non siamo una generazione che ha ripreso a emigrare? E allora basta con le guerre tra poveri. Basta con le politiche forti coi deboli e deboli coi forti.

      Legalizzate l’emigrazione Africa –Europa, rilasciate visti validi per la ricerca di lavoro in tutta l’Europa, togliete alle mafie libiche il monopolio della mobilità sud-nord e facciamo tornare il Mediterraneo ad essere un mare di pace anziché una fossa comune. O forse trentamila morti non sono abbastanza?

      https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2105161009497488&id=100000108285082

    • Questions et réponses : les futurs financements de l’UE en faveur de la gestion des frontières et des migrations

      Quel sera le montant des financements disponibles pour la gestion des frontières et des migrations ?

      34,9 milliards d’euros.

      Tirant les enseignements du passé, et sachant que la question des migrations et de la gestion des frontières demeurera un défi à l’avenir, la Commission propose d’augmenter fortement les financements en la matière au titre du prochain budget de l’UE pour la période 2021-2027.

      Un montant de financements sans précédent sera alloué par l’intermédiaire de deux Fonds principaux :

      le nouveau Fonds « Asile et migration » (qui continuera de s’appeler FAMI sous sa dénomination abrégée) sera modifié et renforcé ;
      l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure sera intégré à un nouveau Fonds, le Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF), qui comprendra aussi un autre instrument, également nouveau, l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Au total, ce sont 34,9 milliards d’euros qui seront mis à disposition sur la prochaine période de 7 ans, contre 13 milliards d’euros environ pour la période budgétaire en cours :

      il est proposé d’augmenter de 51 % le budget alloué à la politique migratoire, qui passerait ainsi de 6,9 milliards d’euros actuellement à 10,4 milliards d’euros ;
      dans le cadre du nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF), il est proposé de multiplier par quatre les financements alloués à la gestion des frontières, qui passeraient de 2,7 milliards d’euros actuellement (pour la période 2014-2020) à un montant qui pourrait atteindre 9,3 milliards d’euros (+ 241%).

      En outre, la Commission a proposé d’octroyer plus de 12 milliards d’euros à l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et à l’agence eu-LISA et près de 900 millions d’euros à l’Agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile (actuellement le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile, EASO). Cette proposition sera présentée ultérieurement.

      1. Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (FGIF)

      Pourquoi créer un nouveau Fonds distinct pour la gestion des frontières ?

      Dans le cadre de l’actuel budget de l’UE, la gestion des frontières relève du Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure (FSI), qui est scindé en FSI-Frontières et FSI-Police.

      Si un Fonds dédié à la gestion des frontières est créé en vertu du prochain cadre financier pluriannuel, c’est parce qu’aussi bien la gestion des frontières que la sécurité intérieure sont devenues des priorités de plus en plus pressantes, qui méritent chacune que des instruments financiers dédiés et plus ciblés leur soient consacrés.

      Pour pouvoir gérer les flux migratoires et garantir la sécurité intérieure, il est crucial de protéger efficacement les frontières extérieures de l’UE. Des frontières extérieures fortes sont aussi ce qui permet à l’UE de conserver un espace Schengen sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

      Le nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières comprend l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas et inclura également un nouvel instrument : l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier, en reconnaissance du rôle joué par les autorités douanières dans la défense de toutes les frontières de l’UE (frontières maritimes, aériennes et terrestres et transits postaux), ainsi que dans la facilitation des échanges et la protection des personnes contre les marchandises dangereuses et les contrefaçons.

      Quelles sont les priorités du nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières ?

      Au cours des dernières années, un certain nombre de mesures ont été prises afin de répondre aux priorités du moment, mais aussi de poser tous les fondements importants nécessaires pour garantir la solidité des frontières.

      Le nouveau Fonds confortera ces efforts et apportera un soutien renforcé à la sécurisation de nos frontières extérieures, en s’attachant prioritairement :

      à soutenir davantage les États membres dans leurs efforts de sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE ;
      à favoriser une plus grande uniformité des contrôles douaniers ;
      à garantir que les systèmes informatiques à grande échelle utilisés pour gérer les frontières sont solides et fonctionnent sans problème les uns avec les autres, ainsi qu’avec les systèmes nationaux ;
      à garantir l’adaptabilité de la politique commune des visas de l’UE à l’évolution des problèmes de sécurité et des défis liés à la migration, ainsi qu’aux nouvelles possibilités offertes par le progrès technologique.

      Comment les financements seront-ils répartis ?

      La dotation totale de 9,3 milliards d’euros au Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières se répartit comme suit :

      4,8 milliards d’euros iront à des financements à long terme destinés à soutenir les mesures de gestion des frontières et la politique des visas des États membres, dont un financement initial aux États membres de 4 milliards d’euros (soit 50 %) et un ajustement de 0,8 milliard d’euros (soit 10 %) à mi-parcours pour tenir compte des pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires ;
      3,2 milliards d’euros (soit 40 %), distribués sur l’ensemble de la période de financement, iront à un « mécanisme thématique », destiné à apporter un soutien ciblé aux États membres, à financer des projets à valeur ajoutée européenne et à répondre en outre aux urgences ;
      1,3 milliard d’euros ira à l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Les financements alloués aux États membres reflèteront précisément les besoins de chacun. Au début de la période de programmation, chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, tandis que le solde sera distribué en fonction de la charge de travail, de la pression et du niveau de menace aux frontières extérieures terrestres (30 %) et maritimes (35 %), dans les aéroports (20 %) et dans les bureaux consulaires (15 %).

      En outre, sur les 4,8 milliards d’euros alloués aux États membres, 157,2 millions d’euros seront réservés au régime de transit spécial appliqué par la Lituanie.

      Comment les dotations nationales au titre de l’instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas seront-elles calculées ? Pourquoi n’est-il pas possible de fournir dès à présent la ventilation par État membre ?

      Chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros au début de la période de financement. Au-delà, leurs dotations respectives seront calculées sur la base d’une évaluation des besoins les plus pressants. Cette évaluation sera de nouveau réalisée à mi-parcours.

      Pour chaque État membre, cette évaluation tiendra compte :

      de la longueur de tout tronçon des frontières extérieures terrestres et maritimes que gère cet État membre et de la charge de travail liée (sur la base du nombre de franchissements et du nombre de refus d’entrée), ainsi que du niveau de menace (sur la base d’une évaluation de la vulnérabilité réalisée par l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes) ;
      de la charge de travail (sur la base du nombre de franchissements et du nombre de refus d’entrée) dans les aéroports de cet État membre ;
      du nombre de bureaux consulaires que compte cet État membre et de la charge de travail liée (sur la base du nombre de demandes de visa).

      Les calculs se fonderont sur des données statistiques collectées par Eurostat, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et les États membres sur les trois années (36 mois) ayant précédé l’entrée en application du nouveau budget.

      De plus, outre leurs dotations et en application des calculs susmentionnés, les États membres recevront, tout au long de la période de programmation, des financements ciblés en faveur de priorités thématiques ou en réponse à des besoins pressants. Ces financements proviendront du « mécanisme thématique ».

      Étant donné que le prochain budget à long terme doit couvrir une période s’ouvrant en 2021, il n’est pas possible de prédire dès à présent ce que montreront les données futures. Une ventilation basée sur les données d’aujourd’hui donnerait une image biaisée, ne correspondant pas à ce que seront les dotations effectives.

      Ce budget revu à la hausse servira-t-il aussi à renforcer les agences de l’UE chargées de la gestion des frontières ?

      Oui. Outre les 9,3 milliards d’euros alloués au Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières, et au titre d’une proposition qui sera présentée séparément, plus de 12 milliards d’euros serviront à renforcer encore l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, y compris par le financement d’un corps permanent de quelque 10 000 garde-frontières, ainsi qu’à financer l’agence eu-LISA (l’Agence européenne pour la gestion opérationnelle des systèmes d’information à grande échelle au sein de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice).

      La Commission va-t-elle désormais financer aussi la construction de clôtures ?

      Non. Le travail de la Commission vise à garantir un contrôle adéquat des frontières, non à les fermer. La Commission n’a jamais financé de clôtures et n’entend pas le faire non plus dans le cadre du nouveau budget de l’UE.

      Le Fonds soutiendra-t-il la réalisation de vérifications systématiques obligatoires aux frontières extérieures ?

      Oui.

      Depuis le 7 avril 2017, outre les vérifications systématiques qui étaient déjà réalisées sur tous les ressortissants de pays tiers entrant dans l’espace Schengen, les États membres sont tenus de procéder à des vérifications systématiques, dans les bases de données pertinentes, sur les citoyens de l’UE qui franchissent les frontières extérieures de l’UE.

      Le nouveau Fonds pour la gestion intégrée des frontières (via son instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas) apportera un soutien supplémentaire aux États membres, pour les aider à s’acquitter de ces responsabilités.

      Il s’agira d’un soutien aux infrastructures, aux équipements (tels que des scanners de documents) et aux systèmes informatiques utilisés pour contrôler les frontières, mais aussi d’un soutien à la formation des garde-frontières et à des actions visant à améliorer la coopération interservices. Les États membres pourront également couvrir les frais de personnel et de fonctionnement liés aux vérifications systématiques obligatoires aux frontières extérieures.

      Comment le nouvel instrument relatif aux visas soutiendra-t-il l’élaboration de la politique commune des visas ?

      Le nouveau Fonds aidera à moderniser la politique commune des visas de l’UE. Les financements seront essentiels, notamment parce qu’ils permettront d’améliorer l’efficacité du traitement des demandes de visa, par exemple en termes de détection et d’évaluation des risques de sécurité et de migration irrégulière, et de faciliter les procédures de visa pour les voyageurs de bonne foi.

      En 2018, la Commission a présenté une proposition de modification ciblée du code des visas et une proposition de révision du cadre juridique sous-tendant le système d’information sur les visas (VIS). Il faudra soutenir financièrement la mise en œuvre de certaines des mesures proposées, telles que la modernisation du VIS aux fins de son utilisation combinée avec d’autres systèmes d’information de l’Union et d’une coopération améliorée entre les autorités des États membres dans le cadre du traitement des demandes de visa.

      Le Fonds servira en outre à évaluer plus avant la possibilité de numériser le traitement des demandes de visa. Sur le moyen à long terme, il sera essentiel à la mise en place de procédures électroniques de visa rapides, sûres et conviviales, pour le plus grand avantage tant des demandeurs de visa que des consulats.

      Pourquoi accorder une telle importance aux contrôles douaniers ?

      L’union douanière est unique au monde. Elle constitue un fondement de l’Union européenne et elle est essentielle au bon fonctionnement du marché unique. Une fois les formalités douanières accomplies dans un État membre, les marchandises peuvent circuler librement sur le territoire de l’Union, puisque tous les États membres sont censés appliquer les mêmes règles en matière de recettes et de protection aux frontières extérieures. Les administrations douanières de l’UE doivent coopérer étroitement pour faciliter les échanges et protéger la santé et la sécurité de tous les citoyens de l’UE. L’UE est l’un des plus grands blocs commerciaux du monde : en 2015, elle a pesé pour près de 15 % (représentant 3 500 milliards d’euros) dans les échanges mondiaux de marchandises.

      Pour gérer ce volume d’échanges internationaux, il faut traiter chaque année, de manière rapide et efficace, des millions de déclarations en douane. Mais les douanes jouent également un rôle protecteur. Elles participent activement à la lutte contre le terrorisme, en procédant à des vérifications pour détecter le trafic d’armes et le commerce illégal d’œuvres d’art et de biens culturels, et elles protègent les consommateurs contre les marchandises qui présentent un risque pour leur santé et leur sécurité. Ainsi, 454,2 tonnes de stupéfiants, 35 millions de marchandises de contrefaçon et 3,2 milliards de cigarettes ont été saisis dans l’Union en 2014. La réalisation de contrôles appropriés passe par l’échange rapide d’informations de haute qualité et à jour et par une bonne coordination entre les administrations douanières de nos États membres.

      Que prévoit le nouvel « instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier » ?

      Le nouvel instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier vise à aider les États membres à effectuer les contrôles douaniers en finançant les équipements nécessaires. Si ce nouvel instrument, doté d’une enveloppe de 1,3 milliard d’euros, est créé, c’est afin de permettre l’acquisition, la maintenance et le remplacement d’équipements douaniers innovants, dès lors que ni le Programme « Douane » ni d’autres instruments financiers existants ne sont disponibles à cette fin.

      Cet instrument financera les équipements douaniers pour les quatre types de frontières (terrestres, maritimes, aériennes et postales), un groupe de travail composé d’États membres volontaires étant chargé de superviser et d’évaluer les besoins en équipement pour chaque type de frontière. Les fonds seront mis à la disposition de tous les États membres. Des travaux ont déjà été menés par l’équipe d’experts douaniers de la frontière terrestre est et sud-est de l’Union (CELBET), qui réunit les onze États membres chargés des frontières terrestres de l’Union. L’équipe CELBET poursuivra ses activités. S’agissant des autres types de frontières, les travaux peuvent désormais commencer afin que les besoins des États membres puissent être évalués, et des fonds alloués, dès l’entrée en vigueur, en 2021, de l’instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier.

      Quel type d’équipement est-il possible d’acquérir au moyen du nouvel instrument ?

      L’instrument a pour objectif de financer des équipements qui ne sont pas intrusifs, mais qui permettent la réalisation de contrôles douaniers efficaces et efficients. Parmi les équipements que les États membres pourraient acquérir ou moderniser ou dont ils pourraient solliciter la maintenance, citons les scanners, les systèmes de détection automatisée des plaques d’immatriculation, les équipes de chiens renifleurs et les laboratoires mobiles d’analyse d’échantillons. Les besoins en équipement seront définis dans le cadre du Programme « Douane » qui s’applique parallèlement au nouvel instrument relatif aux équipements de contrôle douanier annoncé aujourd’hui. Les équipements de contrôle douanier mis à disposition au titre de ce Fonds pourront également être utilisés pour d’autres contrôles de conformité, réalisés, par exemple, en application de dispositions en matière de visas ou de prescriptions de police, le cas échéant, ce qui permettra d’en maximiser l’impact.

      L’instrument établit des priorités en matière de financement des équipements selon certains critères d’éligibilité. Les équipements pourront être achetés au titre de la nouvelle réglementation uniquement s’ils se rapportent à au moins un des six objectifs suivants : inspections non intrusives ; détection d’objets cachés sur des êtres humains ; détection des rayonnements et identification de nucléides ; analyse d’échantillons en laboratoire ; échantillonnage et analyse sur le terrain des échantillons ; et fouille à l’aide de dispositifs portables, Cette liste pourra être réexaminée en tant que de besoin. L’instrument soutiendra également l’acquisition ou la modernisation d’équipements de contrôle douanier pour l’expérimentation de nouveaux dispositifs ou de nouvelles conditions sur le terrain avant que les États membres n’entament des achats à grande échelle d’équipements neufs.

      2. Fonds « Asile et migration » (FAMI)

      Quelles sont les priorités du Fonds « Asile et migration » ?

      Au cours des vingt dernières années, l’Union européenne a mis en place des normes communes en matière d’asile qui comptent parmi les plus élevées au monde. S’agissant des migrations, la politique européenne a progressé à pas de géant ces trois dernières années, sous l’effet de l’agenda européen en matière de migration proposé par la Commission Juncker en mai 2015. Une ligne de conduite plus homogène se dégage peu à peu pour faire face au phénomène.

      Outre qu’il soutiendra les efforts déployés actuellement, le nouveau Fonds accroîtra encore le soutien octroyé à la gestion des migrations, en s’attachant prioritairement :

      à offrir davantage de soutien aux États membres soumis aux pressions migratoires les plus fortes ;
      à soutenir davantage la migration légale et l’intégration rapide des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier ;
      à lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière, en accroissant le nombre de retours effectifs des personnes qui n’ont pas le droit de séjourner dans l’UE et en renforçant la coopération en matière de réadmission avec les pays tiers ;
      à équiper l’Union de moyens plus rapides et plus souples pour faire face aux crises.

      Comment les fonds prévus au titre du FAMI seront-ils répartis entre les États membres ?

      La Commission a proposé de consacrer 10,4 milliards d’euros au nouveau Fonds « Asile et migration » (FAMI).

      Un montant de 4,2 milliards d’euros (40 %) de cette enveloppe sera distribué tout au long de la période de financement pour apporter un appui ciblé aux États membres, qui concernera des projets ayant une véritable valeur ajoutée européenne comme la réinstallation ou servira à répondre à des besoins urgents et à orienter les financements d’urgence vers les États membres au moment et à l’endroit où ils en ont besoin.

      Le Fonds consacrera 6,3 milliards d’euros (60 %) à des financements de long terme destinés à soutenir les États membres en matière de gestion des migrations.

      Dans ce cadre sont prévus une dotation initiale accordée aux États membres (50 % de l’intégralité du Fonds, soit 5,2 milliards d’euros) et un ajustement à mi-parcours pour tenir compte de pressions nouvelles ou supplémentaires (10 %, soit 1,1 milliard d’euros).

      Chaque État membre recevra une somme forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros, tandis que le solde sera réparti en fonction de la pression migratoire et des besoins des États membres dans les domaines de l’asile (30 %), de l’intégration et de la migration régulière (30 %) et de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale et du retour (40 %).

      Comment les dotations nationales seront-elles calculées ? Pourquoi n’est-il pas possible de fournir dès à présent la ventilation par État membre ?

      Les financements alloués aux États membres reflèteront précisément les besoins de chacun. Au début de la période de programmation, chaque État membre recevra un montant forfaitaire de 5 millions d’euros. Au-delà, leurs dotations respectives seront calculées sur la base d’une évaluation des besoins les plus pressants. Le solde sera réparti en fonction de la pression migratoire et des besoins des États membres en matière d’asile. Pour chaque État membre, cette évaluation tiendra compte :

      pour l’asile (pondération de 30 %) : du nombre de bénéficiaires reconnus d’une protection internationale (30 %), de demandeurs d’asile (60 %) et de personnes réinstallées (10 %) ;
      pour la migration légale et l’intégration (pondération de 30 %) : du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour régulier (40 %) et du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers qui ont obtenu un premier permis de séjour (les travailleurs saisonniers, les étudiants et les chercheurs ne relèvent pas de cette catégorie) ;
      pour le retour (pondération de 40 %) : du nombre de ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier qui ont fait l’objet d’une décision de retour (50 %) et du nombre de retours effectivement réalisés (50 %).

      Les calculs seront basés sur des données statistiques recueillies par Eurostat au cours des trois années civiles précédant l’entrée en application du nouveau budget.

      Étant donné que le prochain budget à long terme doit couvrir une période s’ouvrant en 2021, il n’est possible de prédire dès à présent ce que montreront des données futures. Une ventilation basée sur les données d’aujourd’hui donnerait une image biaisée, ne correspondant pas à ce que seront les dotations effectives.

      Quelles sont les mesures qui ont été prises au titre des Fonds actuels pour soutenir les États membres au cours de la crise migratoire ?

      Dans l’ensemble, l’actuel Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » (FAMII) a soutenu efficacement et avec succès la réponse commune apportée par l’Union à l’aggravation des problèmes de migration et de sécurité, tout en envoyant également un message de solidarité aux États membres situés en première ligne. Par ailleurs, face à la crise migratoire, aux difficultés accrues sur le plan de la sécurité et à un environnement politique en perpétuelle évolution, la Commission a dû recourir à une multitude de modalités financières ad hoc pour appuyer une réponse commune et adéquate de l’UE, et ce d’autant plus que les mécanismes et réserves de flexibilité ont été créés à une époque où les flux migratoires étaient stables.

      Les augmentations budgétaires réalisées jusqu’au milieu de la période de financement actuelle 2014-2020 ont clairement prouvé que les moyens budgétaires avaient atteint leurs limites. La dotation du Fonds « Asile, migration et intégration » a plus que doublé (+ 123 %), les financements destinés aux organismes décentralisés pratiquement doublé (+ 86 %), et l’aide d’urgence augmenté de près de 500 %. Outre des instruments de financement de l’Union, dont certains devaient être modifiés pour être utilisés à l’intérieur de l’Union (notamment l’instrument d’aide d’urgence), l’Union a dû mettre en place des solutions de financement innovantes comme les Fonds fiduciaires pour mobiliser des financements au-delà des limites du cadre financier.

      L’expérience acquise avec l’actuel cadre financier fait apparaître un besoin évident de montants de financement considérablement accrus et d’une plus grande souplesse, de manière à garantir une gestion budgétaire saine et prévisible.

      Qu’en est-il de l’intégration qui figurant dans le Fonds précédent ?

      La Commission propose de donner un nouvel élan au soutien aux politiques d’intégration au titre du prochain budget à long terme en associant la force de frappe de plusieurs instruments de financement.

      Au titre du Fonds « Asile et migration », le soutien à l’intégration se concentrera sur les mesures d’intégration rapide et aura pour objectif d’apporter une aide lors des premières étapes clés de l’intégration comme les cours de langue, tout en soutenant également le renforcement des capacités des autorités chargées de la politique d’intégration, les guichets uniques d’information pour les migrants en séjour régulier récemment arrivés et les échanges entre les migrants en séjour régulier récemment arrivés et les membres de la communauté d’accueil.

      L’intégration à plus long terme bénéficiera d’un soutien au titre des Fonds de cohésion de l’UE, en particulier le futur Fonds social européen + et le futur Fonds européen de développement régional. Ces mesures d’intégration à long terme incluront des mesures d’appui structurel comme la formation professionnelle, l’éducation et le logement.

      Y aura-t-il des financements à la réinstallation ?

      Oui. La Commission propose que les États membres reçoivent 10 000 euros par personne réinstallée, comme dans le cadre des actuels programmes de réinstallation de l’UE.

      Comment les politiques de retour seront-elles soutenues ?

      Des retours effectifs sont une composante essentielle d’une politique migratoire de l’UE qui soit équitable et humaine, mais aussi – et c’est tout aussi important – viable. Le Fonds aidera à combattre la migration irrégulière, en garantissant la pérennité du retour et la réadmission effective dans les pays tiers. Comme pour toutes les politiques de l’UE, cela se fera dans le plein respect des droits fondamentaux et de la dignité des personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de retour.

      Seront soutenus : la mise en œuvre des retours ; le renforcement des infrastructures de retour et des capacités de rétention ; le développement de la coopération avec les pays d’origine, afin de faciliter la conclusion d’accords de réadmission, assortis de modalités pratiques, et leur mise en œuvre ; et la réintégration. Le Fonds soutiendra également les mesures visant d’abord à prévenir la migration irrégulière (campagnes d’information, collecte de données, suivi des flux et des routes migratoires, etc.).

      Quel est le lien avec la gestion des flux migratoires externes ?

      Les dimensions interne et externe à l’UE de la gestion des migrations sont étroitement liées. Le Fonds « Asile et migration » sera à même de soutenir la dimension externe des politiques internes de l’Union.

      Ce soutien sera largement complété par les fonds alloués, au titre de la politique extérieure de l’Union, à la lutte contre la dimension extérieure de la migration irrégulière, et notamment aux efforts déployés pour remédier à ses causes profondes, améliorer les perspectives d’avenir qu’offrent les pays d’origine et développer la coopération en matière de retour, de réadmission et de migration légale (voir les propositions sectorielles distinctes qui seront présentées dans les jours à venir).

      Les autorités locales et les organisations de la société civile pourront-elles également bénéficier de financements du Fonds ?

      La Commission considère que les administrations locales et régionales et la société civile jouent un rôle fondamental, notamment en matière d’intégration, et devraient en conséquence recevoir autant de soutien que possible.

      C’est pourquoi, alors que les fonds allaient jusqu’à présent aux autorités nationales en couverture de 75 % des coûts d’une mesure (taux de cofinancement), à l’avenir, lorsque des régions, des municipalités ou des organisations de la société civile mettront en œuvre semblables mesures, le budget de l’UE couvrira 90 % des coûts.

      Pourquoi des financements au nouveau système de Dublin sont-ils prévus au titre du FAMI, alors qu’il n’y a pas encore eu d’accord à ce sujet ?

      La proposition relative au FAMI prévoit d’ores et déjà un soutien au transfert des demandeurs d’asile en application du règlement de Dublin tel qu’il est proposé de le réformer. Les financements couvriraient les mesures de premier accueil et d’assistance de base, l’aide à l’intégration si le demandeur reçoit un statut de protection et l’aide aux personnes qui devraient faire l’objet d’une mesure de retour au cas où elles n’obtiendraient pas de protection ou de droit de séjour.

      La proposition reflète le règlement de Dublin en l’état actuel des négociations, mais elle sera adaptée en fonction du résultat final de ces négociations.

      Comment le suivi des fonds alloués à la gestion des frontières et des migrations sera-t-il assuré ?

      La Commission suivra la mise en œuvre des actions en gestion directe et indirecte. Pour les fonds dont la gestion est partagée entre l’UE et les États membres, la responsabilité première d’assurer le suivi des projets financés par l’UE incombera à ces derniers. Les autorités administrant les fonds de l’UE dans les États membres doivent mettre en place des systèmes de gestion et de contrôle satisfaisant aux exigences de l’UE, y compris en matière de suivi. Le suivi des actions faisant l’objet d’une gestion partagée sera assuré par chaque État membre, dans le cadre d’un système de gestion et de contrôle conforme au droit de l’UE (règlement portant dispositions communes). Une priorité nouvelle sera accordée à la réalisation d’évaluations régulières selon des indicateurs de performance (les États membres devront communiquer des données pour chaque programme, jusqu’à six fois par an).

      Les États membres devront également communiquer un rapport annuel de performance, fournissant des informations sur l’état de mise en œuvre du programme et indiquant si les valeurs intermédiaires et les valeurs cibles ont été atteintes. Une réunion de réexamen sera organisée tous les deux ans entre la Commission et chaque État membre pour apprécier la performance de chaque programme. À la fin de la période, chaque État membre présentera un rapport de performance final.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-4127_fr.htm

    • LE VERE RAGIONI DELL’IMMIGRAZIONE AFRICANA : IL FURTO DELLA TERRA

      L’Unione europea ha appena deciso di triplicare i fondi per la gestione dei migranti: la somma messa a bilancio passerà dagli attuali 13 miliardi di euro (anni 2014-2021) ai futuri 35 miliardi di euro (anni 2021-2027).
      Prima di compiere l’analisi dei costi preventivati, dove i soldi vanno, per fare cosa, dobbiamo sapere cosa noi prendiamo dall’Africa, e cosa restituiamo all’Africa. Se noi aiutiamo loro oppure se loro, magari, danno una mano a noi.
      Conviene ripetere e magari ripubblicare. Quindi partire dalle basi, dai luoghi in cui i migranti partono.

      https://raiawadunia.com/le-vere-ragioni-dellimmigrazione-africana-il-furto-della-terra
      #land_grabbing #accaparement_de_terres

    • UE- #JAI : course effrénée au renforcement de Frontex au détriment des #droits_fondamentaux Featured

      Le 12 octobre, les #Conseil_Justice_et_Affaires_Intérieurs discutera de la nouvelle proposition de #réforme de Frontex, l’#agence_européenne_des_garde-côtes_et_garde-frontières, deux ans après la dernière révision du mandat en 2016. Peu importe les critiques relatives aux violations des droits inhérentes à ses activités : l’agence est en passe d’acquérir des #compétences_exécutives ainsi qu’un rôle accru pour expulser depuis les Etats membres et depuis les Etats non européens.

      Le collectif Frontexit réitère ses très fortes préoccupations quant à cette énième réforme et appelle le Etats membres et les parlementaires européens à refuser cette course législative symbole d’une obsession du contrôle des frontières au détriment des droits des personnes migrantes.

      La Commission européenne propose de porter le #personnel de Frontex à 10’000 hommes d’ici 2020 et son #budget à 1,3 milliards pour la période 2019/2020, soit une augmentation de plus de 6000% du budget prévisionnel en à peine 12 ans. L’agence jouera un rôle central et inédit dans la préparation des décisions de retour depuis les Etats-membres et dans la conduite des #expulsions entre/depuis des pays « tiers » sans prérogatives claires.

      Face au doublement du nombre de personnes expulsées depuis l’UE entre 2015 et 2017, au vu des mécanismes de contrôle politiques faibles, voire inexistants (aucune activité hors UE sous contrôle du Parlement européen) et des réponses aux violations des droits ineffectives et inefficaces, cette réforme mettra davantage en danger les personnes migrantes et affaiblira leurs maigres droits.

      L’UE poursuit une course effrénée au renforcement de Frontex alors qu’aucune étude d’impact de ses activités actuelles sur les droits fondamentaux n’a été réalisée. Il est urgent que les parlementaires européens exercent un droit de contrôle sur les activités de Frontex y compris hors de l’UE (déploiement croissant de l’agence en Afrique par exemple), de l’arsenal à sa disposition (#EUROSUR compris) et de leurs conséquences.

      Aucune justification tangible n’existe pour cette énième révision du mandat, si ce n’est – aux dires de l’UE – l’urgence de la situation. Pourtant, cette urgence n’existe pas (le nombre d’arrivées a été divisé par cinq depuis 2015 selon l’OIM), pas plus que la soi-disant « crise migratoire ». L’effondrement du nombre des arrivées est directement imputable à l’augmentation des dispositifs sécuritaires aux frontières et à la coopération sans limite avec des pays où les violations des droits sont légion.

      Frontex, prompte à qualifier de « passeurs » des pêcheurs tunisiens qui sauvent des vies, prompte à collaborer voire dispenser des formations à des Etats où les violations des droits sont documentées, est à l’image d’une Europe qui s’enfonce dans une logique toujours plus sécuritaire au détriment des droits des personnes exilées, mais également de leurs soutiens.

      Cette #fermeture_des_frontières est également une menace pour le respect des droits des personnes qui se voient obligées d’exercer leur droit à quitter tout pays par des voies toujours plus dangereuses.

      http://www.frontexit.org/fr/actus/item/904-ue-jai-course-effrenee-au-renforcement-de-frontex-au-detriment-des-dr
      #droits_humains

    • NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights

      The Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights has expressed “serious concerns about the effectiveness of Frontex’s serious incident reporting mechanism,” saying that it should be revised and that the border agency must “take additional measures to set up an effective system to monitor respect for fundamental rights in the context of its activities.”

      The inadequacy of the serious incident reporting (SIR) mechanism is raised in the latest annual report of the Consultative Forum (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-annual-report-2018.pdf), which is made up of nine civil society organisations, two EU agencies and four UN agencies and other intergovernmental bodies. It was established in October 2012 to provide independent advice to the agency on fundamental rights.

      Its report notes that during 2018, Frontex “only received 3 serious incident reports for alleged violations of fundamental rights and 10 complaints,” described by as an “almost negligible number” given that the agency has some 1,500 officers deployed at the external borders of the EU.

      Fundamental rights violations

      The Consultative Forum highlights “fundamental rights violations in areas where the Agency is operational, including the Hungarian-Serbian and the Greek-Turkish land borders.”

      For example, interviews by Human Rights Watch with asylum seekers in Greece and Turkey found that:

      “Greek law enforcement officers at the land border with Turkey in the northeastern Evros region routinely summarily return asylum seekers and migrants… The officers in some cases use violence and often confiscate and destroy the migrants’ belongings.” (https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/18/greece-violent-pushbacks-turkey-border)

      This is simply the latest in a long line of reports and investigations documenting mistreatment and abuse at the Greek-Turkish border, where The Christian Science Monitor also heard allegations that Frontex was directly involved in pushback operations (https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2018/1221/Are-Greek-and-EU-officials-illegally-deporting-migrants-to-Turkey).

      The Consultative Forum’s report also points to numerous instances of collective expulsion from Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina; ill-treatment at the Bulgarian-Turkish border; and what the Hungarian Helsinki Committee refers to as “systemic violations of asylum-seekers’ human rights in Hungary.” (https://www.osce.org/odihr/396917?download=true)

      Repeat: suspend activities at Hungary-Serbia border

      In its report, the Consultative Forum repeats a recommendation it has made previously: until fundamental rights can be guaranteed, the Executive Director should use the powers available under the 2016 Frontex Regulation to “suspend operational activities” at the Hungarian-Serbian border.

      The agency offers little obvious information about its activities at that border on its website (https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/main-operations/operations-in-the-western-balkans), merely stating that it “deploys specialised officers and border surveillance vehicles and other equipment” in both Hungary and Croatia, where its officers “assist the national authorities in the detection of forged documents, stolen cars, illegal drugs and weapons.”

      The December 2018 report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee cited above doesn’t mention Frontex, but details serious malpractice by the Hungarian state: immediate pushbacks that negate the right to seek asylum; a lack of procedural safeguards for those that do manage to claim asylum; and a lack of state support to integrate and assist those that receive protection.

      Lack of staff “seriously undermining” fundamental rights obligations

      The Consultative Forum’s report also repeats a longstanding complaint that the inadequate provision of staff to the agency’s Fundamental Rights Officer is “seriously undermining the fulfilment” of their mandate “and, more generally Frontex’s capacity to fulfil its fundamental rights obligations”.

      According to the report, while there were 58 posts for administrators foreseen in the agency’s recruitment plan for 2018, not a single one was allocated to the Fundamental Rights Officer.

      Furthermore, “during the year, only three Senior Assistants… joined the Fundamental Rights Office,” and its work “continues to be compromised in areas such as monitoring of operations, handling of complaints, provision of advice on training, risk analysis, third country cooperation and return activities” - in short, those areas of the agency’s work raising the most high-profile fundamental rights concerns.

      Independence of Fundamental Rights Office at risk

      The report also warns that the independence of the Fundamental Rights Office is at risk.

      The problem centres on the appointment of an Advisor in the Executive Director’s Cabinet as interim replacement for the Fundamental Rights Officer, who in the second half of 2018 “took an extended period of sick leave”.

      The Consultative Forum has “noted that the appointment of a member of the Executive Director’s cabinet as Fundamental Rights Officer ad interim raises issues under the EBCG [Frontex] Regulation.”

      In particular, the “previous and future reporting expectations on the incumbent in relation to the Executive Director” make it:

      “difficult… to ensure that the Fundamental Rights Officer ad interim and the Fundamental Rights Officer’s team maintain their independence in the performance of their duties and avoid potential conflicts of interest.”

      A long list of issues

      The report also examines a number of other issues concerning fundamental rights and the agency’s work, including the ongoing amendments to its governing legislation; the treatment of stateless persons in Frontex operations; “gender mainstreaming at Frontex”; and the need for a revision of the Fundamental Rights Strategy, amongst other things.

      Full report: Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights: Sixth annual report (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/eu-frontex-consultative-forum-annual-report-2018.pdf)

      Further reading

      Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations (Statewatch News Online, 21 May 2018: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm)

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm

  • Migranti soccorsi nel Mediterraneo, cade l’obbligo di trasferirli in Italia

    Il nuovo accordo siglato dal Dipartimento Immigrazione del Viminale con #Frontex

    I migranti soccorsi nel Mediterraneo dovranno essere trasferiti nel porto più vicino. E dunque cade l’obbligo che vengano portati direttamente in Italia, come era invece previsto dalla missione Triton. È quanto prevede il nuovo accordo siglato dall’Italia con Frontex, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera. Nell’intesta siglata dai rappresentati del Dipartimento di immigrazione del Viminale con i rappresentanti Ue si prevede di arretrare la linea di pattugliamento dei nostri mezzi navali a 24 miglia, restringendo in questo modo il campo d’azione.
    In una nota Frontex sottolinea come la nuova operazione nel mar Mediterraneo centrale, «servirà per assistere l’Italia nelle attività di controllo dei confini». La nuova operazione congiunta si chiamerà Themis, «inizierà il 1 febbraio e sostituirà l’operazione Triton lanciata nel 2014. L’operazione Themis continuerà a includere la ricerca e soccorso come componente cruciale. Allo stesso tempo, la nuova operazione avrà un focus rafforzato sulle forze dell’ordine». L’area in cui sarà operativa «coprirà il mar Mediterraneo centrale, dalle acque che coprono i flussi da Algeria, Tunisia, Libia, Egitto, Turchia e Albania».

    http://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_gennaio_31/migranti-soccorsi-mediterraneo-cade-l-obbligo-trasferirli-italia-168b6

    #Italie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerranée #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #opération_Themis #frontières_mobiles
    cc @isskein

    • Frontex lance une opération en Méditerranée centrale, nommée Thémis
      Dénommée Themis, cette opération démarre ce 1er février. Elle remplace l’opération Triton, lancée en 2014. L’opération Themis continuera d’inclure la recherche et le sauvetage. Des missions menées sous la coordination des « différents centres de coordination du sauvetage maritime responsables ». Mais la nouvelle opération aura aussi un axe plus important sur le respect de la loi. Sa zone opérationnelle s’étendra sur la mer Méditerranée centrale dans les eaux couvrant les flux venant d’Algérie, de Tunisie, Libye, Egypte, Turquie et Albanie. NB : la zone d’opération est donc plus large que celle de l’opération Sophia, puisqu’elle couvre également le flanc est (Egypte, Turquie) et le flanc ouest (Algérie) et l’Adriatique.

      Dans le cadre de cette opération, Frontex va aussi poursuivre sa présence dans les hotspots en Italie, où les agents déployés par l’agence aideront les autorités nationales à enregistrer les migrants, notamment en prenant leurs empreintes digitales et en confirmant leur nationalité.

      –-> sauf que le programme de #relocalisations n’est plus actif... pauvre Italie, obligée de prendre des empreintes digitales, mais plus possible de compter sur le programme de relocalisation (même si c’était un échec)

      Le volet sécurité de l’opération Themis comprendra également la collecte de #renseignements et d’autres mesures visant à détecter les #combattants_étrangers et autres menaces terroristes aux frontières extérieures.

      #terrorisme #ISIS #Etat_islamique

      http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/01/31/frontex-lance-une-operation-en-mediterranee-centrale-nommee-themis

      –-> Dans cet article il n’est pas fait mention d’un élément mis en avant par Il Corriere :

      I migranti soccorsi nel Mediterraneo dovranno essere trasferiti nel porto più vicino. E dunque cade l’obbligo che vengano portati direttamente in Italia, come era invece previsto dalla missione Triton. È quanto prevede il nuovo accordo siglato dall’Italia con Frontex, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera. Nell’intesta siglata dai rappresentati del Dipartimento di immigrazione del Viminale con i rappresentanti Ue si prevede di arretrare la linea di pattugliamento dei nostri mezzi navali a 24 miglia, restringendo in questo modo il campo d’azione.

      –-> les personnes sauvées en Méditerranée devront être transférées dans le #port_le_plus_proche, il n’y a plus l’obligation de les transporter en Italie... Le port le plus proche = retour en Libye, notamment...
       :-(

    • Frontex launching new operation in Central Med

      Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is launching a new operation in the Central Mediterranean to assist Italy in border control activities.

      The new Joint Operation Themis will begin on 1 February and will replace operation Triton, which was launched in 2014. Operation Themis will continue to include search and rescue as a crucial component. At the same time, the new operation will have an enhanced law enforcement focus. Its operational area will span the Central Mediterranean Sea from waters covering flows from Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Albania.

      “Operation Themis will better reflect the changing patterns of migration, as well as cross border crime. Frontex will also assist Italy in tracking down criminal activities, such as drug smuggling across the Adriatic,” said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri.

      The security component of Operation Themis will include collection of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign fighters and other terrorist threats at the external borders.

      “We need to be better equipped to prevent criminal groups that try to enter the EU undetected. This is crucial for the internal security of the European Union,” Leggeri said.

      As part of Operation Themis, Frontex will continue its presence in the hotspots in Italy, where officers deployed by the agency will assist the national authorities in registering migrants, including taking their fingerprints and confirming their nationalities.

      Frontex vessels will continue search and rescue operations under the coordination of the responsible Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres. Last year, Frontex assisted in the rescue of 38 000 people at sea in operations in Italy, Greece and Spain.

      http://frontex.europa.eu/thumb/Images_News/2018/new_misson_planning_small.prop_300x.37d0f4e879.JPG
      http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launching-new-operation-in-central-med-OESzij

    • FRONTEX ed il governo italiano contro il diritto internazionale del mare, contro il diritto alla vita dei migranti

      Un articolo del Corriere della Sera ha anticipato la nuova operazione Themis di Frontex che dovrebbe sostituire la precedente operazione TRITON e limitare il ruolo dei mezzi italiani nelle attività di soccorso, addirittura a 24 miglia a sud di Lampedusa, con la possibilità di sbarcare i naufraghi soccorsi in alto mare ( in acque internazionali) nel “porto più vicino” e non nel “place of safetty” imposto dalle Convenzioni internazionali di Montego Bay (UNCLOS) del 1984 e di Amburgo (SAR) del 1979.

      Risalendo alla fonte della notizia le informazioni diffuse dal Corriere appaiono frutto di una visione fortemente influenzata dai rapporti con le polizie e i servizi di informazione. La posizione ufficiale di Frontex è affidata ad un comunicato. Ma un comunicato di polizia non costituisce fonte del diritto. Almeno finora.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2018/02/01/frontex-ed-il-governo-italiano-contro-il-diritto-internazionale-del-mare-cont

    • Con Themis le navi Ue riporteranno i migranti salvati in Libia? No, ma...

      La nuova Operazione dell’agenzia europea Frontex fa prevalere l’opzione del porto più vicino rispetto a quello più sicuro: stop alla prassi di arrivo esclusivo in Italia e incertezza sui futuri luoghi di sbarco, anche se Frontex stessa rassicura sul rispetto della legge marittima internazionale. Manzione, sottosegretario agli Interni: “L’Europa si conferma a due velocità sul tema migranti: per le operazioni di controllo delle frontiere si decide rapidamente, per le alternative ai drammatici viaggi in mare - come i corridoi umanitari - non si arriva mai al dunque”

      http://www.vita.it/it/article/2018/02/01/la-ue-riportera-i-migranti-salvati-in-libia-dietro-le-quinte-della-nuo/145828

    • Opération Thémis. L’agence Frontex agit-elle sans contrôle démocratique ?

      Le lancement récent d’une nouvelle opération au large de la Méditerranée par le corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (l’agence Frontex) est interpellant.

      Un objectif très flou

      Le communiqué diffusé à cette occasion laisse planer un certain flou et pose plus de questions qu’il n’en résout. La nouvelle opération s’occupe à la fois de recherche et sauvetage en mer, de renforcement de la loi, de lutte contre la criminalité, contre les réseaux terroristes (lire : Frontex lance une opération en Méditerranée centrale, nommée Thémis). Mais on ne comprend pas vraiment bien l’objectif de la nouvelle mission.

      Une proximité d’objectifs avec EUNAVFOR Med

      Nous avons demandé des précisions à Frontex (basée à Varsovie), surtout sur la façon dont les deux opérations EUNAVFOR Med et Thémis allaient se coordonner. La réponse reçue tout à l’heure (à 13h) est un peu vasouillarde…. Tout d’abord, on nous a annoncé doctement que THEMIS était civile là où EUNAVFOR Med militaire. Une vraie information ! (1). Ensuite, on nous a expliqué que cette mission n’avait pour fonction que le sauvetage en mer et n’avait pas pour tâche la lutte contre les trafics de migrants. Ce qui est, là, en pleine contradiction avec l’énoncé même du communiqué officiel.

      « At the same time, the new operation will have an enhanced law enforcement focus. Its operational area will span the Central Mediterranean Sea from waters covering flows from Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey and Albania. « Operation Themis will better reflect the changing patterns of migration, as well as cross border crime. (…) said Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri.

      Les mots ne sont pas totalement identiques. Mais ils sont très proches des mots employés pour l’opération EUNAVFOR Med. En tout cas, rien ne permet de faire un réel distinguo entre les deux opérations.

      Une opération déployée sans contrôle démocratique

      Ce raté dans la communication révèle en fait un problème plus général. A la différence des opérations PSDC, qui opèrent dans un cadre précis, ces opérations sont menées sans aucun cadre ni autorisation légale. Certes il y a un règlement définissant l’action du corps européen, certes il y a eu un plan d’opération approuvé au sein de Frontex, en accord avec le pays d’origine. Mais tout cela se fait de façon discrète, « sous la table », à un niveau infrapolitique, sans approbation formelle, ni transparence. Bref, sans contrôle démocratique d’une façon ou d’une autre et sans aucune transparence. Ce qui est contraire aux règles, et surtout, à l’esprit européen.

      … sans aucun cadre légal publié

      Aucune autorité politique compétente au niveau de l’Union européenne — le conseil des ministres par exemple — n’a approuvé une telle opération. Aucune décision cadre n’en a fixé l’objectif, les moyens, les limites, voire la zone d’opération. Aucune décision n’a été publiée au journal officiel ou sur un autre support. Aucune information n’a été donnée sur le coût de cette opération, ni sa durée. Aucun procès verbal n’a été constaté et est accessible publiquement. Aucune information au parlement européen n’a été effectuée officiellement. Aucune traduction même dans les principales langues concernées par cette opération n’a été publiée.

      Une absence de justification expliquant l’exception

      Les bons esprits estimeront sans doute que la nécessité opérationnelle impose cette absence de formalisme. On peut douter de la pertinence de cet argument, du moins au plan européen. Une opération militaire menée au nom de l’Union européenne, financée par les seuls États membres, respecte toutes ces conditions : une décision cadre est approuvée par les ministres et publiée au journal officiel dans toutes les langues. Elle fixe l’objectif, les missions, les moyens, les règles tenant au secret et à la protection des données, donne des indications sur la zone d’opération, le budget affecté, la durée de l’opération et le contrôle politique de l’opération.

      Commentaire : les militaires respectent une certaine obligation démocratique, pourquoi pas les garde-frontières ?

      On peut se demander pourquoi une opération civile, menée toujours au nom de l’Union européenne, dans un cadre communautaire, avec de l’argent communautaire, sous une hiérarchie communautaire, puisse s’abstraire du respect de ces procédures. Quel est le raisonnement politique, démocratique, constitutionnel, juridique, qui peut justifier pareille exception ? (2) Les militaires y arrivent très bien, le corps des garde-frontières et des garde-côtes européens s’il veut garder sa pertinence et sa légitimité devrait y arriver fort bien.

      (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde)

      (1) Ce qui est un peu prendre le public européen pour un imbécile. Nos questions sur l’utilité d’avoir deux opérations plus ou moins dans la même zone, avec plus ou moins les mêmes objectifs, les moyens de coordination, l’utilisation adéquate des financements européens est en revanche restée sans réponse.

      (2) Nous avons demandé la raison d’un tel manque. Aucune réponse satisfaisante n’a été fourni.

      https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/02/01/lagence-frontex-est-elle-democratique

    • #Themis: la missione di Frontex voluta da Minniti di cui ora dispone Matteo Salvini

      Themis sostituisce la vecchia missione #Triton, con un mandato allargato e che poco si concentra sugli sbarchi dalla Libia. Per la prima volta una missione dell’agenzia europea Frontex supporta le forze dell’ordine marittime di un governo che dice di voler respingere i “clandestini” direttamente in mare.

      Il 28 agosto 2014 la Lega non era ancora al governo, e Matteo Salvini si esprimeva così sulla sua pagina Facebook: “Secondo voi dire che FRONTEX PLUS è una PRESA PER IL CULO è troppo forte??? Il 18 ottobre TUTTI A MILANO per dire NO a Mare Nostrum, Frontex, Frontex Plus o come diavolo vorranno chiamare operazioni che, invece di respingere i clandestini, favoriscono l’invasione!”.

      #Frontex_Plus, diventata poi Triton, è stata fino a febbraio di quest’anno la missione di Frontex a difesa della frontiere marittime italiane. Non è “indipendente”: infatti lo scopo è il supporto ai mezzi italiani impiegati per la ricognizione in mare, cioè Guardia di Finanza, Guardia costiera e Polizia di stato. L’Agenzia europea per il pattugliamento delle frontiere – Frontex appunto – finanzia e aiuta il coordinamento della missione Themis, mentre i paesi partecipanti contribuiscono mettendo a disposizione uomini e mezzi, a seconda delle esigenze espresse dall’Italia.

      Alla fine del 2016, la storia tra Salvini e Frontex ha preso un’altra piega: il Financial Times ha pubblicato il famoso report interno (ve ne raccontammo qui: http://openmigration.org/analisi/accuse-alle-ong-cosa-ce-di-falso-o-di-sviante) in cui l’agenzia sosteneva che i trafficanti dessero ai migranti “precise indicazioni prima di partire per raggiungere le navi delle Ong”. Luigi Di Maio, ad aprile 2017, ha attribuito a un altro report di Frontex (Risk Analysis 2017: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf) la tanto citata espressione “taxi del mare” per definire le Ong. Quella frase nel report non c’è, ma ci sono critiche all’atteggiamento poco collaborativo delle Ong e a salvataggi che avverrebbero “prima di chiamate d’emergenza”.

      Quello è stato l’inizio delle intese tra Lega e Cinque Stelle sull’immigrazione, con Frontex citata a sostegno delle argomentazioni anti-Ong – il primo atto della campagna condotta dalla procura di Catania e dal suo capo Carmelo Zuccaro. “Io sto con Zuccaro, io sto con Frontex”, diceva Salvini a maggio 2017, “che certificano, sostengono e confermano quello che qualunque normodotato in Italia e nel mondo ha ormai intuito: l’immigrazione clandestina è organizzata, finanziata, è un business da 5 miliardi di euro e ha portato a 13 mila morti sul fondo del mare”.

      Ora la missione di Frontex cominciata a febbraio è cambiata per nuove esigenze dell’Italia. La “revisione” del mandato è cominciata a luglio del 2017 per volere dell’allora ministro Marco Minniti, che aveva inserito questa missione nella strategia più complessiva dell’Italia in Libia. Come vedremo, il compito principale di raccordo con le autorità marittime locali lo svolge la Marina Militare.

      La nuova missione di Frontex è stata battezzata Themis. È la prima a supporto di un governo che dice di voler respingere i “clandestini” in mare.
      Da paese di frontiera, è ovvio che l’Italia sia uno dei principali interlocutori di Frontex. Il fatto che il governo Lega-Cinque Stelle abbia in animo di respingere i migranti prima che sbarchino, presumibilmente anche con l’ausilio dei mezzi messi a disposizione da Themis, è invece un fatto unico.

      Queste sono le caratteristiche della missione pensata da Minniti e che si ritroverà a gestire, invece, Matteo Salvini. E questo è il modo in cui la missione si inserisce all’interno del piano italiano ed europeo sulla Libia, spesso scoordinato e incomprensibile.
      Le novità di Themis e l’allargamento del mandato deciso dal Viminale

      Nella missione Themis partecipano insieme a Frontex 27 stati membri. La missione dispone di dieci navi, due elicotteri e altrettanti aerei e un budget annuale di 39 milioni di euro, con i quali Frontex paga sia per i propri mezzi, sia per quelli appartenenti ai paesi europei impiegati poi nella missione.

      Themis ha alcune caratteristiche differenti rispetto alla precedente Triton. In primo luogo, come spiega il Viminale, il limite dalle coste italiane della linea di pattugliamento: Triton arrivava fino a 30 miglia nautiche dalle nostre coste, Themis si fermerà a 24, ossia il confine delle cosiddette acque continue. È il limite canonico delle acque di competenza di un paese, superato in occasione della missione Triton a causa delle condizioni particolari del 2014, il suo anno di nascita. C’è da ipotizzare che il lieve indietreggiare di Themis sia anche un modo per dare maggiore spazio di manovra alle nuove autorità libiche, alle quali l’Italia sta fornendo assistenza per realizzare a Tripoli un nuovo Mrcc, il centro di coordinamento dei salvataggi a Tripoli.

      Una seconda differenza tra Triton e Themis riguarda il mandato. Themis non ha come unico scopo il contrasto all’immigrazione irregolare, né si concentra solo sul Mediterraneo centrale: copre anche i flussi di uomini e droga nel Mediterraneo orientale (Albania e Turchia) e occidentale (Tunisia e Algeria), che erano fuori dal mandato di Triton. Uno spostamento di focus legato anche al calo negli sbarchi.

      Le nuove aree interessano a Frontex e agli inquirenti italiani soprattutto per gli “sbarchi fantasma” dalla Tunisia. Pescherecci, barche a vela, motoscafi con poche decine di persone a bordo che sbarcano sulle coste della Sicilia meridionale senza che i migranti a bordo passino da strutture di accoglienza o identificazione: ogni loro spostamento è gestito da organizzazioni italo-tunisine. Sono vittime di tratta? Lavoratori forzati? Manodopera criminale? Potenziali terroristi? Le ipotesi sono tutte al vaglio degli inquirenti.

      Sulla carta, poi, Themis rompe il vincolo stabilito da Triton per il quale ogni migrante salvato nella missione doveva sbarcare in un porto sicuro italiano. Al momento, però, non sono registrati sbarchi, a parte per urgenze mediche individuali, in porti diversi da quelli italiani. E il 7 giugno c’è stato l’ennesimo braccio di ferro tra Malta e l’Italia, quando le autorità dell’isola non hanno concesso a Sea Watch di sbarcare 120 migranti in un momento in cui l’imbarcazione dell’Ong era in difficoltà per le condizioni del mare. Ora, con il caso Aquarius, lo scontro con La Valletta è diventato aperto e duro.
      Poca trasparenza

      Da parte di Frontex c’è molta riservatezza sulle operazioni in corso. Piano operativo e contratti di utilizzo di ogni mezzo impiegato in mare sono i documenti fondamentali per capire esattamente cosa faccia Themis. L’agenzia per il pattugliamento delle frontiere, però, fino a oggi ha diffuso questo genere di documenti soltanto a missioni concluse.

      “Nella mia esperienza, Frontex è molto riluttante a condividere i dati delle proprie missioni, soprattutto i piani operativi”, spiega Luisa Izuzquiza, ricercatrice indipendente che da un anno e mezzo deposita richieste di accesso agli atti presso gli uffici dell’Agenzia europea per il pattugliamento delle frontiere. La motivazione con cui le viene negato l’accesso è sempre la stessa: la pubblica sicurezza.

      A gennaio 2018, dopo l’ennesimo rifiuto, Luisa Izuzquiza ha portato Frontex di fronte alla Corte di giustizia europea per ottenere la pubblicazione dei contratti impiegati nella scorsa missione, Triton. Alcuni Stati membri, come la Svezia, non hanno avuto problemi a rendere pubblici i documenti con cui mettono a disposizione di Triton i propri mezzi. Tipologia di accordi e costi sono certamente molto simili anche nel caso di Themis. Le spese coperte interamente da Frontex sono un forte incentivo affinché i paesi diano il proprio contributo alle missioni.
      Il coordinamento e i sistemi di condivisione dei dati

      A partire da settembre 2015, la Commissione europea ha introdotto gli hotspot, sviluppati in via sperimentale in Grecia e in Italia, come prime strutture di identificazione dei migranti. A Catania c’è la sede della Task force regionale (Eurtf), che coordina le strutture italiane. Qui, per evitare sovrapposizioni fra le missioni gestite da ciascuno, siedono nello stesso ufficio uomini di Frontex, Easo (l’ufficio europeo per il sostegno all’asilo), Europol, Eurojust, operazione Sophia, polizia, Guardia di finanza e Guardia costiera.

      Meno chiara, però, è la situazione dei canali di comunicazione delle diverse missioni, specialmente fuori dai confini europei. Il principale canale di condivisione dei dati per i paesi del Mediterraneo si chiama Seahorse Mediterraneo Network, una piattaforma utilizzata dalle polizie dei paesi dell’area allo scopo di “rafforzare il controllo delle frontiere”. È un database al momento adottato da Spagna, Italia, Malta, Francia, Grecia, Cipro e Portogallo. La Commissione europea ha messo sul piatto 10 milioni di euro per fare in modo che possano partecipare allo scambio anche Libia, Egitto, Tunisia e Algeria. Se ne discute da ormai tre anni, ma l’unico paese che sembra poterci (e volerci) entrare – tramite l’Italia – è la Libia. Vuol dire che la guardia costiera locale avrà accesso, almeno via Seahorse, agli stessi database marittimi delle nostre forze dell’ordine.

      Nella “Relazione sulla performance per il 2016” (http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/332676.pdf) del Viminale si legge che Seahorse “è stata installata nel Centro Interforze di Gestione e Controllo (Cigc) Sicral di Vigna di Valle (Roma), teleporto principale del Ministero della Difesa, mentre presso il Centro Nazionale di Coordinamento per l’immigrazione “Roberto Iavarone” – Eurosur, sede del Mebocc [Mediterranean Border Cooperation Center], sono stati installati gli altri apparati funzionali alla rete di comunicazione”.

      Il nodo italiano, dunque, sembrerebbe operativo: Seahorse è gestito dal Cigc Sicral, mentre il database-ombrello per mappare in tempo reale tutto ciò che sta accadendo in mare, Eurosur, è gestito dal Centro Roberto Iavarone, che è anche sede del Mebocc, la centrale operativa da cui passano le comunicazioni tra paesi europei, Frontex e paesi terzi.

      Nella stessa relazione c’è anche un secondo passaggio, che conferma la partecipazione dei libici: si legge che nel 2016 in tutto sei “ufficiali della Guardia Costiera-Marina Militare Libica” sono stati ospitati in Italia “con funzioni di collegamento con le autorità libiche e per migliorare/stimolare la cooperazione nella gestione degli eventi di immigrazione irregolare provenienti dalla Libia” nell’ambito del progetto Sea Horse Mediterranean Network. Non è chiaro, al momento, se gli ufficiali libici hanno poi avuto l’accesso al sistema Seahorse anche da Tripoli.
      La sovrapposizione fra Marina militare italiana e autorità marittima libica

      Nel Mediterraneo centrale agisce poi la Marina militare. Rispetto alle tre forze dell’ordine che collaborano con Frontex ha altre regole di ingaggio e un’altra linea di comando. Come ora vedremo, ha anche altre priorità.

      Oltre a partecipare alle operazioni congiunte di Eunavformed, infatti, la Marina militare italiana ha riattivato la cooperazione con la Libia nata nel 2002, all’epoca di Gheddafi, con il nome in codice di Nauras. Difficile sapere quali navi vengono utilizzate e quali siano gli obiettivi strategici attuali dell’accordo militare tra Roma e Tripoli.

      I pochi elementi certi sono emersi grazie al caso giudiziario che ha portato questa primavera prima al sequestro e poi al dissequestro della nave Open Arms, fermata alla fine di marzo 2018 dopo un salvataggio in zona Sar, che aveva visto un duro scontro con le motovedette libiche. Attraverso le informative del comando generale della Guardia costiera italiana, i magistrati – prima di Catania e poi di Ragusa – hanno potuto ricostruire la gestione dei salvataggi del 15 marzo, quando il Mrcc di Roma aveva affidato il coordinamento delle operazioni alle motovedette libiche. Lì emergeva che la nave Capri della Marina militare italiana era intervenuta fin dalle prime ore del mattino parlando con Roma per conto di Tripoli e chiedendo espressamente di fermare l’intervento della Ong – le informative riportano anche un messaggio partito dall’addetto militare italiano a Tripoli.

      Dai brogliacci delle comunicazioni partite e ricevute dal Mrcc di Roma durante le operazioni di salvataggio si ricava inoltre che la Marina militare è intervenuta più volte – sia da unità navali inserite nell’operazione Nauras, sia dal Comando della squadra navale (Cincinav), che dipende direttamente dallo Stato maggiore della Difesa. Tra le carte dell’inchiesta c’è anche una relazione del comando di un’altra nave militare coinvolta, la Alpino – qui nelle vesti di polizia giudiziaria e presente a poche miglia dall’area di salvataggio dove stavano agendo contemporaneamente la Open Arms e la Guardia costiera di Tripoli.

      Lo stretto legame che esiste tra la Guardia costiera libica e la Marina Militare italiana appare ancora più evidente da un messaggio inviato dal comando delle motovedette libiche al Mrcc di Roma. Il numero di telefono del mittente – ovvero dell’autorità marittima libica – ha il prefisso +39 della rete italiana, e porta direttamente alla nave Capri. In altre parole, se chiami la Guardia costiera libica risponde la Marina militare italiana. E non è l’unico caso. Un paio di mesi dopo, la nave di soccorso tedesca Sea Watch ha ricevuto una telefonata dai libici durante un’operazione di salvataggio, che appariva sul display con un numero italiano.

      Quanto siano coinvolte la Marina militare e la Guardia costiera italiana nel respingimento dei migranti è un tema che presto verrà affrontato dalla Corte europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo, chiamata a discutere una denuncia presentata nei mesi scorsi contro le autorità di Roma.


      http://openmigration.org/analisi/themis-la-missione-di-frontex-voluta-da-minniti-di-cui-ora-dispone-ma
      #Eurtf #Mebocc #Eurosur #Eunavfor_med

    • Themis: la missione di Frontex voluta da Minniti di cui ora dispone Matteo Salvini

      Themis sostituisce la vecchia missione Triton, con un mandato allargato e che poco si concentra sugli sbarchi dalla Libia. Per la prima volta una missione dell’agenzia europea Frontex supporta le forze dell’ordine marittime di un governo che dice di voler respingere i “clandestini” direttamente in mare.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/themis-la-missione-di-frontex-voluta-da-minniti-di-cui-ora-dispone-ma
      cc @albertocampiphoto

  • La industria del control migratorio ¿Quién gana con las políticas fronterizas de la Unión Europea?

    La investigación de porCausa permite, por primera vez, probar que existe en España una Industria del Control Migratorio, identificar a los actores que operan en ella, estimar su magnitud y acceder a las herramientas para estudiarla en detalle.

    https://porcausa.org/industriacontrolmigratorio
    #rapport #frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #business #Espagne #INDRA #AMPER #EUROCOPTER #ALBIE #TELECOMUNICACIÓN-ELECTRÓNICA Y CONMUTACIÓN #ATOS #DRAGADOS #FERROVIAL #SIEMENS #TELEFÓNICA_ESPAÑOLA_Y_GMV #industrie #complexe_militaro-industriel #frontex

    Lien vers le rapport:
    https://www.porcausa.org/industriacontrolmigratorio/media/porcausa_LaIndustriaDelControlMigratorio.pdf

    • How the Security Industry Reaps the Rewards of E.U. Migration Control

      In austerity-stricken Europe, increasing funds are flowing to arms and security firms positioning themselves as experts on border control. Researcher Mark Akkerman documents the companies profiting from E.U. border externalization and the industry’s lobbying power.

      At a time when European Union budgets are threatened by Brexit, Italian political instability and an unfinished economic crisis, the European Commission’s proposal for triple funding for borders, migration and asylum suggests an unusual consensus in favor of border security.

      The increase in funding gained considerable press attention, but the role of the European military and security industry in shaping these policies and then reaping the plentiful financial rewards remains largely underexposed.

      Research by the United Kingdom’s Statewatch and Belgian NGO “Vredesactie” shows how successful these industries have been in shaping E.U. military and security policies. Large European arms companies, such as #Airbus (Pan-European), #Leonardo (Italian, formerly called #Finmeccanica) and #Thales (French) engage in extensive lobbying. Their lobby associations, notably the #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) and the #AeroSpace_and_Defence Industries Association of Europe (#ASD), have gained influence to the point that their proposals are sometimes adopted almost wholesale by E.U. bodies.

      E.U. and member states’ officials and industry executives forge strong relationships through a constant cycle of congresses, conferences, roundtables, security fairs and industry days by E.U. border agency #Frontex. Since December 2014, senior European Commission officials met with EOS 15 times and ASD 29 times, as well as holding many meetings with Airbus (131), Leonardo (25) and Thales (18).

      Concrete proposals that were first advocated by the industry, such as the establishment of a European border guard and of the E.U.-wide border monitoring system #EUROSUR, eventually become E.U. policies. These then create the demand that fuels an expanding global border security market, valued at more than 16 billion euros ($18.7 billion) in 2017 and estimated to grow 8 percent annually in coming years.

      According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen at the Aalborg University in Copenhagen, arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to ever more security threats in need of ever more” purchases of the products they sell.

      The increasing focus on exporting border control measures to countries neighboring Europe has further expanded the market, as my recent report “Expanding the Fortress” for the research groups Stop Wapenhandel and the Transnational Institute (TNI) shows.

      Many non-E.U.-countries, especially in Africa, get donations of border security equipment or funding for such purchases. Some examples include donations of large amounts of equipment from Airbus and #Hensoldt (the former border security division of Airbus) to Tunisia by Germany, Italian donations of patrol boats from shipbuilder Intermarine to Libya and the E.U.-funded purchase of six vessels from Dutch shipbuilder #Damen to Turkey, to strengthen the capacities of its coast guard.

      Despite the austerity measures in place in some areas of Europe, the increase in funding for militarizing border security seems to be limitless. Frontex, which now has new powers to buy its own equipment, could see its current annual budget of 320 million euros ($375 million) increase almost sixfold to 1.87 billion euros ($2.19 billion) by 2027.

      During 2018, Frontex will test two military drones for maritime border surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea: the #Heron from #Israeli_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) and the #Falco from #Leonardo. IAI will be paid 4.75 million euros ($5.57 million) for 600 hours of trial flights, while Leonardo will secure 1.7 million euros ($2 million) for 300 hours of trial flights.

      The proposed E.U. Integrated Border Management Fund will have a 9.3 billion euro ($10.9 billion) budget for 2021–27, almost double the combined budget of its predecessors for the period 2004–20 (#External_Borders_Fund, the #Internal_Security_Fund – Borders and the Schengen Facility). With these funds, member states have purchased thousands of vehicles for border patrol, dozens of patrol vessels, airplanes, border surveillance systems, cameras, thermal vision equipment, biometric and I.T. systems – many bought from European arms and security firms.

      In the case of Finland and Romania, E.U.-financed helicopter purchases came from Airbus, while Leonardo delivered helicopters to Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia and Malta. This has led to the perverse outcome that some of these companies profit from both sides of the refugee tragedy. As our 2016 report “Border Wars” shows, some firms are both arming countries at war, repressive regimes and human rights violators in the Middle East and North Africa – thereby fueling the reasons people are forced to flee – and then winning the contracts to prevent refugees entering Europe.

      The preferential role for industry is no coincidence nor just the result of the industry’s own efforts. In fact, it is a stated objective of the E.U. to support the global competitiveness of the European military and security industry. And the E.U. does all it can to further intensify the close ties.

      In February 2018, for example, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home) organized an “Industry Day on Border Surveillance and Integrated Border Management” in which Giorgi Gulienetti of Italian arms firm Leonardo gave a keynote address. Later DG Home wrote that it hoped the day “on a longer term […] would set the foundations of an improved cooperation with research and industry communities in the area of border surveillance and border management.”

      While the proposed increases of the E.U. border security and control budget clearly respond to a number of factors, the increasing role, funding and support for industry will ensure that they become one of the few beneficiaries from the refugee “crisis.” Ultimately this is not just a concern about corporate influence but also about entrenching a militarized response to a complex crisis. This will do little to tackle the root causes of the refugee crisis but rather provides another arena for profiteering from human suffering.

      https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/06/04/how-the-security-industry-reaps-the-rewards-of-e-u-migration-control

    • Juncker : « les États membres contribuent trop peu au fonds pour l’Afrique »

      Après un premier tour de négociations lors du premier jour du Conseil, le président de la Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, a prévenu devant la presse que l’action extérieure de l’UE atteignait ses limites à cause d’un manque de financement.

      https://www.euractiv.fr/section/migrations/news/juncker-member-states-committed-too-little-for-africa-fund
      #fonds_pour_l'afrique

    • “EU-Africa migration funds were used on Libya’s coast guard patrol vessels »

      Genoa - EU international cooperation funding destined for development projects in Africa was used to refurbish patrol boats for Libya’s coast guard, and handed over to Libyan militia units who practice torture and extrajudicial killings, in violation of Libyan and international standards.

      http://www.themeditelegraph.com/en/markets/finance-and-politics/2017/11/16/africa-migration-funds-were-used-libya-coast-guard-patrol-vessels-ZxeIfzI2rMZYW6ixGchHKP/index.html

      #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement

      –-> je ne sais pas si le fonds dans lequel il est question ici c’est aussi celui qui est mentionné dans le premier article de la liste... @isskein : tu en sais plus ?

    • Europe’s Plan to Close Its Sea Borders Relies on Libya’s Coast Guard Doing Its Dirty Work, Abusing Migrants

      When a Libyan coast guard officer raised his hands and pointed, as if holding a rifle, Thomas Schaible wasn’t too worried. It wasn’t his first violent encounter with the Libyan coast guard, but this time, with a helicopter from the Italian navy overhead and Italian and French warships nearby, Schaible knew it was an empty threat.

      https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/libya-coast-guard-europe-refugees

    • Libya human bondage risks overshadowing Africa-EU summit

      #Mogherini was questioned about the EU’s strategy of outsourcing the migration crisis to foreign countries such as Libya and Turkey, which received billions to prevent Syrian refugees from crossing to Greece.

      She said the situation was different on two counts: first, the migrants stranded in Libya were not legitimate asylum seekers like those fleeing the war in Syria. And second, different international bodies were in charge.

      “When it comes to Turkey, it is mainly refugees from Syria; when it comes to Libya, it is mainly migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the relevant international laws apply in different manners and the relevant UN agencies are different – the UNHCR on one side, especially in Turkey, and the IOM especially in Libya.”

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/libya-human-bondage-risks-overshadowing-africa-eu-summit
      #IOM #OIM #HCR #Libye #Turquie #migrants_économiques #réfugiés #tri #catégorisation

      En lien avec cela, lire:
      http://seen.li/dn2v
      #mixed_migrations

    • Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouveaux programmes

      Trois nouveaux programmes d’un montant de 29,6 millions d’euros ont été adoptés dans le cadre du Fonds fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique. Ces programmes complètent l’action de l’UE visant à relever les défis de la migration en Méditerranée. Ces nouveaux programmes intensifieront le travail en cours de l’UE pour renforcer la protection des migrants, soutenir leur réintégration durable et permettre une augmentation du nombre de retours volontairement assistés depuis la Libye. Ils contribueront également à la lutte contre les réseaux criminels dans la région.

      Three new programmes worth €29.6 million have been adopted in the framework of the EU Trust Fund for Africa as part of EU work in addressing migration challenges in the Mediterranean. A set of priorities for 2018 have also been agreed.

      These new programmes will step up the EU’s ongoing work to strengthening protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration and provide assisted voluntary returns. The programmes will also contribute to fight criminal networks across the region.

      High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini said: “Last week we established a joint EU/AU/UN Task Force to accelerate our work to protect migrants and refugees and fight the criminal networks. With these new programmes, we will step up our commitments, save lives, guarantee the respect of human rights and of international standards, provide alternatives to those wishing to return to their homes and support to host communities. We already assisted over 14,000 people stranded in Libya to return and will support an additional 15,000 returns by February 2018. And we will support our partners to counter traffickers and smugglers, assisting them in bringing peace and security to the region.”

      Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn said: “The current challenges in the Mediterranean Sea remain a top priority for the European Union. The EU Trust Fund for Africa continues to take action to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and to defend the rights of people who risk falling into the hands of traffickers and smugglers. With our new programmes, we will help dismantle criminal networks in North of Africa, support migrants who wish to return to their home countries and facilitate access for migrants to legal advice. We will also promote socio-economic integration in Morocco and will foster socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities”.

      Regional programme - Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa, €10 million

      This programme will be implemented by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and will further contribute to the ongoing efforts under the assistance voluntary return scheme. It will strengthen protection of migrants, support sustainable reintegration systems in North Africa and provide assisted voluntary return to migrants wishing to return to their home from Northern Africa. This Facility is conceived as a regional flexible mechanism able to adapt to the specific needs of the countries. This is yet another action towards enhancing support to stranded migrants as well as reinforcing national return and reintegration systems across the North of Africa region.

      Regional programme - Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa and involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, €15 million

      This project will focus on regional dimension of fight against smugglers and traffickers. It will target the public sector of the countries in the region (in particular the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and Health). Under this programme, implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), capacity-building as well as light equipment, such as IT and forensic tools, will be provided to actors dealing with law enforcement and criminal justice. The final beneficiaries will be the general public, victims of trafficking, smuggled migrants, and families of the latter two categories.

      Morocco - Legal Empowerment for migrants, €4.58 million

      This programme implemented by the Belgian Technical Cooperation will reinforce the protection and resilience of migrants and refugees, displaced persons and host communities in Morocco. Whilst strengthening awareness on their rights and access to legal counselling, the project will also contribute to promote the socio-economic integration of migrants and facilitate migrants’ integration in the Moroccan society. This is a new very specific action complementing the EU support to the implementation of the Moroccan National Strategy on Migration (SNIA). The programme will support actors who help migrants and refugees access to their rights, such as lawyers, students, civil society associations and justice staff. It will develop and create legal clinics in Rabat, Casablanca, Tanger and Oujda.

      Objectives for 2018

      The Commission also outlined the priorities of the EUTF/North of Africa window for 2018. The situation in Libya will remain a top priority, with on the one hand increased efforts for the protection of migrants and refugees, including through the support for additional assisted voluntary returns and support for evacuation of the most vulnerable ones (in line with the recent decision of the EU-African Union summit); and on the other hand support to host communities. More specifically, funding will be provided to the UNHCR’s evacuation mechanism through the EUTF and discussions with the IOM on additional measures under the assisted voluntary return scheme are being finalised. The Commission is also working together with Italy on a new initiative to be presented to the Operational Committee early in 2018, which is aimed at fostering the socio-economic development of the Libyan Municipalities, on the basis of needs of local authorities and in close coordination with the PC/Government of National Accord (GNA).

      http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-

    • Come viene usato il Fondo Fiduciario per l’Africa?

      “Vertice UE-Africa: l’Europa non paga”. Così titolava il settimanale tedesco Der Spiegel alla vigilia del Summit di Abidjan di fine novembre, evidenziando un problema crescente nell’approccio europeo al contenimento dei flussi migratori: come reperire le risorse con cui finanziare il Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa. Perché se da un lato aumentano obiettivi e programmi da finanziare, dall’altro non cresce il coinvolgimento economico dei governi europei.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/come-viene-usato-il-fondo-fiduciario-per-lafrica

    • 2.12.2017 – Commission européenne - Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique - Nouvelles actions pour renforcer la stabilité dans la corne de l’Afrique

      Le Comité opérationnel du Fond fiduciaire d’urgence pour l’Afrique a adopté une nouvelle série de 13 programmes d’un montant de 174,4 millions d’euros pour la région de la #Corne_de_l'Afrique

      http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/fr/articles/actualites/commission-europeenne-fond-fiduciaire-d-urgence-pour-l-afrique-

    • Fondo Africa, quelle risorse destinate a progetti lontani dall’aiuto allo sviluppo

      Il dossier realizzato sugli atti di delibera e ottenuto grazie alla richiesta dell’Associazione per gli Studi giuridici sull’Immigrazione (ASGI) e sulla risposta del sottosegretario agli Esteri Della Vedova all’interrogazione del PD sull’utilizzo delle risorse stanziate. Risorse spese in Tunisia, Niger e Libia che pongono, secondo ActionAid, problemi di costituzionalità e trasparenza

      http://www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/cooperazione/2017/12/18/news/fondo_africa-184514509

    • A ‘blind spot’ in the migration debate? International responsibility of the EU and its Member States for cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and militias

      The discussion on the restrictive migration management policies of the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) has so far focused on the potential violation of the primary rules of international law that determine the conduct of subjects of international law. The question of applicability of the secondary rules of international responsibility that provide for the consequences of the commitment of a wrongful act has attracted less attention. The main question in the current context is whether the cooperation of the EU and its MS with the Libyan coastguard and militias with the view of stemming irregular migration flows to Europe generates international responsibility for the above actors. More specifically, it is asked whether there is an autonomous basis in the law of international responsibility for holding the EU and its the MS responsible for the violations of human rights occurring in Libya, even if they do not exercise directly jurisdiction over migrants. Three aspects of this theme will be developed here: first, the nature and scope of the cooperation of the EU and its MS, in particular Italy, with the Libyan authorities, coastguard and militias in view of restricting the access of migrants to the EU; second, the extent of human rights violations of migrants in Libya; and third, the alleged complicity and responsibility of the EU and MS for the violations of these rights.

      http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-blind-spot-in-the-migration-debate-international-responsibility

    • L’Europe affirme que la formation des gardes-côtes libyens avance

      La formation des gardes-côtes libyens, notamment pour le sauvetage de migrants, avance, a déclaré jeudi à Tunis le commandant de l’opération navale européenne Sophia, chargée de lutter contre les passeurs.

      « La formation se passe bien », a affirmé Enrico Credendino, commandant de la force navale européenne en Méditerranée (Sophia).

      « Les gardes-côtes libyens ont été très actifs, en particulier au cours du second semestre 2017. Ils ont secouru beaucoup de migrants, presque 18.000 alors qu’en 2015 par exemple, ils en avaient secouru seulement 800 », a-t-il précisé.

      Lancée en 2015 par l’UE, l’opération navale Sophia est chargée de lutter contre les passeurs et de former les gardes-côtes libyens.

      Sa mission a été reconduite en juillet par le Conseil européen jusqu’en décembre 2018.

      Déchirée par les rivalités entre groupes armés et les autorités qui se disputent le pouvoir, la Libye a sombré dans le chaos depuis la chute du régime de Mouammar Kadhafi en 2011.

      Des centaines de milliers de migrants, certains fuyant des conflits, d’autres la pauvreté tentent de traverser la Méditerranée depuis la Libye pour rejoindre l’Europe. Depuis le début de l’année, au moins 337 d’entre eux sont morts ou disparus au large de la Libye, selon l’Organisation internationale des migrations.

      https://www.voaafrique.com/a/migrations-formations-de-garde-cotes-libyens-avance/4300524.html
      #Opération_sophia

      A mettre en lien avec cet article :
      La guardia costiera libica minaccia l’ong Proactiva Open Arms
      https://www.internazionale.it/bloc-notes/annalisa-camilli/2018/03/16/guardia-costiera-libica-open-arms

    • Un film de #Andrea_Segre, à voir absolument. Il montre les manoeuvres italiennes en Libye :
      L’ordine delle cose (L’ordre des choses) :

      Rinaldi, policier italien de grande expérience, est envoyé par son gouvernement en Libye afin de négocier le maintien des migrants sur le sol africain. Sur place, il se heurte à la complexité des rapports tribaux libyens et à la puissance des trafiquants exploitant la détresse des réfugiés.
      Au cours de son enquête, il rencontre dans un centre de rétention, Swada, une jeune somalienne qui le supplie de l’aider. Habituellement froid et méthodique, Rinaldi va devoir faire un choix douloureux entre sa conscience et la raison d’Etat : est-il possible de renverser l’ordre des choses ?


      https://lordinedellecose.it

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_b8mp4N4Blw

      Il est actuellement en salle à Grenoble...

      #film

    • Migranti, gli occhi della Libia sui radar europei nel Mediterraneo

      A dicembre 2016 un ufficiale di collegamento della guardia costiera libica è entrato nel cuore del #Sea_Horse_Mediterranean_Network, il sistema di monitoraggio dell’Unione per il controllo delle frontiere Sud del Mediterraneo e che vede in prima linea l’Italia. Ma il governo libico era ritenuto inaffidabile dalla Commissione Ue nel 2015 ed escluso dal progetto. Ora perché è coinvolto? E a quale titolo?

      Occhi elettronici. Radar potenti e sofisticati. Satelliti militari in grado di scansionare ogni centimetro quadrato del Mediterraneo centrale, quel pezzo di mare tra la Libia e l’Italia divenuto tomba per migliaia di migranti, morti mentre cercavano di fuggire alle guerre dei loro paesi e alle torture dei carcerieri libici. Mezzi straordinariamente potenti, soprattutto se messi in rete, formando un flusso di dati in grado di salvare vite – avvistando ogni piccolo gommone che tenta la traversata – e di bloccare i traffici. Non solo di esseri umani, ma anche di petrolio, droga, armi. Si chiama Sea Horse Mediterranean Network ed è l’asset più prezioso della rete di controllo della frontiera sud dell’Europa.

      Un progetto costato milioni di euro, promosso direttamente dall’Unione europea e che vede un ruolo da protagonista dell’Italia. Una rete che – stando a documenti consultati da Famiglia Cristiana – potrebbe però cadere in pessime mani. Quelle delle milizie libiche, ovvero le forze di Tripoli che compongono quella stessa Guardia costiera pronta ad usare le armi contro le Ong, accusata un anno fa dalle Nazioni Unite di essere stata complice in alcuni casi degli stessi trafficanti. Il progetto in origine riguardava l’area dell’Atlantico. La responsabilità, in quel caso, era stata affidata alla Guardia Civil spagnola e l’area interessata era sostanzialmente il tratto di mare a sud delle Canarie, una delle rotte delle migrazioni via mare attive fino a una decina di anni fa. Il sistema permette di «scambiare informazioni via satellite per combattere l’immigrazione irregolare via mare», si legge in un documento delle autorità spagnole che abbiamo consultato, creando dei punti di contatto in ogni paese coinvolto «per accedere a questa rete sicura».

      Le informazioni raccolte sono estremamente sensibili e costituiscono una base di conoscenza e di intelligence sicuramente strategica. Dopo l’avvio di una prima fase sulla zona atlantica, il progetto Sea Horse punta, dal 2015, al Mediterraneo. Tre i paesi del nord Africa coinvolti: l’Egitto, la Tunisia e la Libia. Nel novembre del 2015 il commissario europeo Dimitris Avramopoulos aveva risposto ad una interrogazione delle deputate europee Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst (GUE/NGL), spiegando che il progetto era in una fase di stallo. Il problema principale riguardava proprio la Libia: «A causa della situazione d’insicurezza e alla mancanza di stabilità del governo nazionale libico – si legge nella risposta all’interrogazione pubblicata sul sito del Parlamento europeo – tutte le attività per installare il #National_Contact_Point in Libia sono sospese. Di conseguenza le autorità libiche interessate non sono collegate al #Mebocc, che sarà ospitato dal centro di coordinamento italiano per la sorveglianza delle frontiere».

      La sigla Mebocc sta per #Mediterranean_Border_Cooperation_Center, ed è il cuore della rete di controllo del mare tra Italia e Libia. La collocazione di questo centro, come ha spiegato il commissario europeo, è prevista nel nostro paese, con un backup a Malta. Tutto, però, sembrava fermo fino al novembre del 2015.

      Un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime

      Alla fine del 2016, dopo il cambio ai vertici del ministero dell’Interno e l’arrivo di Marco Minniti, il progetto ha subito un’accelerazione. Nella “Relazione sulla performance per il 2016” del Viminale c’è un paragrafo dove si annuncia l’operatività del progetto: «L’infrastruttura satellitare», si legge nel documento, «è stata installata nel #Centro_Interforze_di_Gestione_e_Controllo (#CIGC) #SICRAL di Vigna di Valle, teleporto principale del Ministero della Difesa, mentre presso il Centro Nazionale di Coordinamento per l’immigrazione “Roberto Iavarone” – #EUROSUR, sede del MEBOCC, sono stati installati gli altri apparati funzionali alla rete di comunicazione. Al 31 dicembre 2016, quello dell’Italia risultava essere l’unico nodo realmente attivo e pronto per le comunicazioni».

      Tutto pronto, dunque, per operare. Pronto e operativo, a quanto sembra, era anche il governo libico, che solo un anno prima veniva definito instabile dalla Commissione europea. Si legge nel rapporto del Ministero dell’Interno, documento che Famiglia Cristiana ha consultato: «Si segnala inoltre che nel 2016, nell’ambito del progetto Sea Horse Mediterranean Network, quattro ufficiali della Guardia Costiera – Marina Militare Libica sono stati ospitati in Italia, in qualità di osservatori, uno presso l’#ICC - #International_Coordination_Center, altri due imbarcati sull’assetto spagnolo “#Rio_Segura” durante il mese di settembre e uno presso il Centro nazionale di coordinamento – EUROSUR della Direzione Centrale per l’Immigrazione dal 5 al 9 dicembre, con funzioni di collegamento con le autorità libiche e per migliorare/stimolare la cooperazione nella gestione degli eventi di immigrazione irregolare provenienti dalla Libia».

      Dunque un ufficiale di collegamento libico era presente nel cuore della rete europea di sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime del Mediterraneo poco più di un anno fa. Fatto che potrebbe avere come conseguenza la possibilità di accesso al sistema Sea Horse da parte del governo di Tripoli, impegnato, come abbiamo visto, nel respingimento in mare dei migranti che fuggono dal Nord Africa verso l’Europa. La sensibilità delle informazioni che il network raccoglie e gestisce è evidente. Un mese fa è stata presentata una seconda interrogazione al Parlamento europeo per capire se i libici già sono in grado di accedere ai dati dei satelliti che monitorano il Mediterraneo: «Dove, in Libia o in Italia, sono stati realizzati i Centri Operativi (ad esempio il Mebocc) e quali autorità o milizie sono coinvolte?», hanno chiesto i deputati Sabine Lösing e Cornelia Ernst. Al momento non hanno ottenuto nessuna risposta. La Libia è sempre più vicina.

      http://www.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-gli-occhi-della-libia-sui-radar-europei-nel-mediterraneo.
      #Egypte #Tunisie #Libye #images_satellitaires

    • Migranti, affidarne i soccorsi alla Libia significa respingerli

      Un verbale della riunione dell’ Organizzazione mondiale del mare del 30 ottobre scorso svela la contrarietà di creare un coordinamento libico dei salvataggi nel Mediterraneo. Ma giovedì scorso la nave della Ong spagnola Open Arms è stata affidata proprio alle motovedette di Tripoli come ha spiegato anche la Guardia Costiera italiana. Ora cominciano i respingimenti collettivi per conto terzi?

      http://m.famigliacristiana.it/articolo/migranti-affidarne-i-soccorsi-in-mare-alla-libia-significa-respi

    • EU Trust Fund for Africa: five new programmes adopted for the Sahel and Lake Chad region

      The European Commission has adopted five new programmes worth over €141 million under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

      Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven Mimica said: "Our new EU programmes, worth €141 million, are particularly focusing on important opportunities for young people. They will furthermore support our #G5-Sahel partners to strengthen development and stability in border areas, as well as help us to save more lives and fight human traffickers, who take advantage of vulnerable people’s despair. We also continue our actions to support partner countries to better manage migration and to develop civil registries. Those needs do not decrease, and the resources from the EU Trust Fund are quickly depleting”

      At the regional level, two programmes totalling €75 million will seek to shore up stability and youth participation in the G5 #Sahel countries (#Burkina_Faso, Chad, #Mali, Mauritania and #Niger). A new €70 million Emergency programme will increase people’s access to social services in border areas. The programme was designed under the Sahel Alliance and responds directly to the needs voiced by the G5 Sahel countries under the #Priority_Investment_Programme. Another €5 million will ensure the implementation of the second phase of “#The_Voices_of_young_people_in_the_Sahel” programme, which was launched in 2017 and contributes to integrating youth organisations into the processes of designing and implementing development and social policies.

      A new €7.6 million programme in Niger will further boost migrant protection on migratory routes and support host communities. Also in Niger, the ongoing AJUSEN budget support programme in the justice, security and border management sectors will receive an additional €10 million to continue this work.

      In Senegal, a €9 million initiative will help tackle criminal networks that are linked to irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and enhance regional cooperation in this area.

      In #Côte_d'Ivoire, a new programme worth €30 million will support the country’s ongoing efforts to create a coherent and robust civil registry system that will help improve the management of public policies, enable people to exercise their fundamental rights and improve their access to public services, including the facilitation of voluntary return and the sustainable reintegration of migrants.

      Last but not least, the #Technical_Cooperation_Facility covering all Trust Fund regions and the Research and Evidence Facility covering the Sahel and Lake Chad and the North of Africa regions have been reinforced with an additional amount of €12 million. In line with the evidence-based approach under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to ensure strategic and efficient interventions, this additional funding will facilitate more studies and research, as well as technical support when necessary.

      The five programmes adopted today bring the total number of programmes adopted since December 2015 for the Sahel and Lake Chad region to 91, with a total value of €1.7 billion.

      Background

      The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in 2015 to address the root causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement. Resources currently allocated to this Trust Fund are €4.1 billion from EU institutions, European Member States and other donors.

      Today’s assistance adds to the 165 programmes already approved across the three regions (North of Africa, Sahel and Lake Chad region and Horn of Africa), worth a total of €3,157 million. These funds were divided up as follows: Sahel/Lake Chad €1,549 million (86 programmes); Horn of Africa €1,141.3 million (58 programmes); North of Africa €467.1 million (17 programmes). This amount includes 4 cross-region programmes (€145.1 million).

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6447_en.htm?locale=EN
      #Tchad #Mauritanie #jeunesse #Sénégal #réintégration #retours_volontaires #retour_volontaire

  • #Vinci, Company Profile

    Corporate Watch profiles controversial French construction giant, Vinci.

    Vinci has been involved in numerous scandals both in France and globally. In #Calais, it was responsible for demolishing the Jungle refugee camp and building the anti-migrant wall. In the west of France, Vinci is the concessionaire behind the controversial airport scheme at #Notre_Dame_des_Landes, which has led to the “#ZAD” resistance movement.

    https://corporatewatch.org/news/2017/jun/13/vinci-company-profile

    #murs #barrières_frontalières #Calais #multinationales #business #économie #NDdL #aéroport #France #réfugiés #asile #migrations #jungle #campement #démolition #destruction #frontières #privatisation
    cc @albertocampiphoto @daphne @marty

    • The EU has built #1000_km of border walls since fall of Berlin Wall

      European Union states have built over 1,000km of border walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a new study into Fortress Europe has found.

      Migration researchers have quantified the continent’s anti-immigrant infrastructure and found that the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to 15 by 2017.

      Ten out of 28 member states stretching from Spain to Latvia have now built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 migration panic, when seven new barriers were erected.

      Despite celebrations this year that the Berlin Wall had now been down for longer than it was ever up, Europe has now completed the equivalent length of six Berlin walls during the same period. The barriers are mostly focused on keeping out undocumented migrants and would-be refugees.

      The erection of the barriers has also coincided with the rise of xenophobic parties across the continent, with 10 out of 28 seeing such parties win more than half a million votes in elections since 2010.

      “Europe’s own history shows that building walls to resolve political or social issues comes at an unacceptable cost for liberty and human rights,” Nick Buxton, researcher at the Transnational Institute and editor of the report said.

      “Ultimately it will also harm those who build them as it creates a fortress that no one wants to live in. Rather than building walls, Europe should be investing in stopping the wars and poverty that fuels migration.”

      Tens of thousands of people have died trying to migrate into Europe, with one estimate from June this year putting the figure at over 34,000 since the EU’s foundation in 1993. A total of 3,915 fatalities were recorded in 2017.

      The report also looked at eight EU maritime rescue operations launched by the bloc, seven of which were carried out specifically by the EU’s border agency Frontex.

      The researchers found that none of the operations, all conducted in the Mediterranean, had the rescue of people as their principal goal – with all of them focused on “eliminating criminality in border areas and slowing down the arrival of displaced peoples”.

      Just one, Operation Mare Nostrum, which was carried out by the Italian government, included humanitarian organisations in its fleets. It has since been scrapped and replaced by Frontex’s Operation Triton, which has a smaller budget.

      “These measures lead to refugees and displaced peoples being treated like criminals,” Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, researcher for Delàs Center and co-author of the report said.

      At the June European Council, EU leaders were accused by NGOs of “deliberately condemning vulnerable people to be trapped in Libya, or die at sea”, after they backed the stance of Italy’s populist government and condemned rescue boats operating in the sea.

      https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-border-wall-berlin-migration-human-rights-immigration-borders-a862

    • Building walls. Fear and securitization in the European Union

      This report reveals that member states of the European Union and Schengen Area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls, the equivalent of more than six times the total length of the Berlin Walls, since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. These physical walls are accompanied by even longer ‘maritime walls’, naval operations patrolling the Mediterranean, as well as ‘virtual walls’, border control systems that seek to stop people entering or even traveling within Europe, and control movement of population.
      Authors
      Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Pere Brunet
      In collaboration with
      Stop Wapenhandel, Centre Delàs d’Estudis per la Pau
      Programmes
      War & Pacification

      On November 9th 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, marking what many hoped would be a new era of cooperation and openness across borders. German President Horst Koehler celebrating its demise some years later spoke of an ‘edifice of fear’ replaced by a ‘place of joy’, opening up the possibility of a ‘cooperative global governance which benefits everyone’. 30 years later, the opposite seems to have happened. Edifices of fear, both real and imaginary, are being constructed everywhere fuelling a rise in xenophobia and creating a far more dangerous walled world for refugees fleeing for safety.

      This report reveals that member states of the European Union and Schengen Area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls, the equivalent of more than six times the total length of the Berlin Walls, since the nineties to prevent displaced people migrating into Europe. These physical walls are accompanied by even longer ‘maritime walls’, naval operations patrolling the Mediterranean, as well as ‘virtual walls’, border control systems that seek to stop people entering or even traveling within Europe, and control movement of population. Europe has turned itself in the process into a fortress excluding those outside– and in the process also increased its use of surveillance and militarised technologies that has implications for its citizens within the walls.

      This report seeks to study and analyse the scope of the fortification of Europe as well as the ideas and narratives upon which it is built. This report examines the walls of fear stoked by xenophobic parties that have grown in popularity and exercise an undue influence on European policy. It also examines how the European response has been shaped in the context of post-9/11 by an expanded security paradigm, based on the securitization of social issues. This has transformed Europe’s policies from a more social agenda to one centred on security, in which migrations and the movements of people are considered as threats to state security. As a consequence, they are approached with the traditional security tools: militarism, control, and surveillance.

      Europe’s response is unfortunately not an isolated one. States around the world are answering the biggest global security problems through walls, militarisation, and isolation from other states and the rest of the world. This has created an increasingly hostile world for people fleeing from war and political prosecution.

      The foundations of “Fortress Europe” go back to the Schengen Agreement in 1985, that while establishing freedom of movement within EU borders, demanded more control of its external borders. This model established the idea of a safe interior and an unsafe exterior.

      Successive European security strategies after 2003, based on America’s “Homeland Security” model, turned the border into an element that connects local and global security. As a result, the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became increasingly militarised, and migration was increasingly viewed as a threat.

      Fortress Europe was further expanded with policy of externalization of the border management to third countries in which agreements have been signed with neighbouring countries to boost border control and accept deported migrants. The border has thus been transformed into a bigger and wider geographical concept.
      The walls and barriers to movement

      The investigation estimates that the member states of the European Union and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1000 km of walls on their borders since nineties, to prevent the entrance of displaced people and migration into their territory.


      The practice of building walls has grown immensely, from 2 walls in the decade of the 1990s to 15 in 2017. 2015 saw the largest increase, the number of walls grew from 5 to 12.

      Ten out of 28 member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built walls on their borders to prevent immigration, all of them belonging to the Schengen area except for Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.

      One country that is not a member of the European Union but belongs to the Schengen area has built a wall to prevent migration (Norway). Another (Slovakia) has built internal walls for racial segregation. A total of 13 walls have been built on EU borders or inside the Schengen area.

      Two countries, both members of the European Union and the Schengen area, (Spain and Hungary) have built two walls on their borders for controlling migration. Another two (Austria and the United Kingdom) have built walls on their shared borders with Schengen countries (Slovenia and France respectively). A country outside of the European Union, but part of of the so-called Balkan route (Macedonia), has built a wall to prevent migration.


      Internal controls of the Schengen area, regulated and normalized by the Schengen Borders Code of 2006, have been gone from being an exception to be the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control and political events (such as political summit, large demonstrations or high profile visitors to a country). From only 3 internal controls in 2006, there were 20 in 2017, which indicates the expansion in restrictions and monitoring of peoples’ movements.


      The maritime environment, particularly the Mediterranean, provides more barriers. The analysis shows that of the 8 main EU maritime operations (Mare Nostrum, Poseidon, Hera, Andale, Minerva, Hermes, Triton and Sophia) none have an exclusive mandate of rescuing people. All of them have had, or have, the general objective of fighting crime in border areas. Only one of them (Mare Nostrum) included humanitarian organisations in its fleet, but was replaced by Frontex’s “Triton” Operation (2013-2015) which had an increased focus on prosecuting border-related crimes. Another operation (Sophia) included direct collaboration with a military organisation (NATO) with a mandate focused on the persecution of persons that transport people on migratory routes. Analysis of these operations show that their treatment of crimes is sometimes similar to their treatment of refugees, framed as issues of security and treating refugees as threats.

      There are also growing numbers of ‘virtual walls’ which seek to control, monitor and surveil people’s movements. This has resulted in the expansion, especially since 2013, of various programs to restrict people’s movement (VIS, SIS II, RTP, ETIAS, SLTD and I-Checkit) and collect biometric data. The collected data of these systems are stored in the EURODAC database, which allows analysis to establish guidelines and patterns on our movements. EUROSUR is deployed as the surveillance system for border areas.

      Frontex: the walls’ borderguards

      The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) plays an important role in this whole process of fortress expansion and also acts and establishes coordination with third countries by its joint operation Coordination Points. Its budgets have soared in this period, growing from 6.2 million in 2005 to 302 million in 2017.


      An analysis of Frontex budget data shows a growing involvement in deportation operations, whose budgets have grown from 80,000 euros in 2005 to 53 million euros in 2017.

      The European Agency for the Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) deportations often violate the rights of asylum-seeking persons. Through Frontex’s agreements with third countries, asylum-seekers end up in states that violate human rights, have weak democracies, or score badly in terms of human development (HDI).


      Walls of fear and the influence of the far-right

      The far-right have manipulated public opinion to create irrational fears of refugees. This xenophobia sets up mental walls in people, who then demand physical walls. The analysed data shows a worrying rise in racist opinions in recent years, which has increased the percentage of votes to European parties with a xenophobic ideology, and facilitated their growing political influence.

      In 28 EU member states, there are 39 political parties classified as extreme right populists that at some point of their history have had at least one parliamentary seat (in the national Parliament or in the European Parliament). At the completion of this report (July 2018), 10 member states (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Sweden) have xenophobic parties with a strong presence, which have obtained more than half a million votes in elections since 2010. With the exception of Finland, these parties have increased their representation. In some cases, like those in Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden, there has been an alarming increase, such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) winning 94 seats in the 2017 elections (a party that did not have parliamentary representation in the 2013 elections), the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland winning 235 seats after the 2015 elections (an increase of 49%), and Lega Nord’s (LN) strong growth in Italy, which went from 18 seats in 2013 to 124 seats in 2018.

      Our study concludes that, in 9 of these 10 states, extreme right-wing parties have a high degree of influence on the government’s migration policies, even when they are a minority party. In 4 of them (Austria, Finland, Italy and Poland) these parties have ministers in the government. In 5 of the remaining 6 countries (Germany, Denmark, Holland, Hungary, and Sweden), there has been an increase of xenophobic discourse and influence. Even centrist parties seem happy to deploy the discourse of xenophobic parties to capture a sector of their voters rather than confront their ideology and advance an alternative discourse based on people’s rights. In this way, the positions of the most radical and racist parties are amplified with hardly any effort. In short, our study confirms the rise and influence of the extreme-right in European migration policy which has resulted in the securitization and criminalization of migration and the movements of people.

      The mental walls of fear are inextricably connected to the physical walls. Racism and xenophobia legitimise violence in the border area Europe. These ideas reinforce the collective imagination of a safe “interior” and an insecure “outside”, going back to the medieval concept of the fortress. They also strengthen territorial power dynamics, where the origin of a person, among other factors, determines her freedom of movement.

      In this way, in Europe, structures and discourses of violence have been built up, diverting us from policies that defend human rights, coexistence and equality, or more equal relationships between territories.

      https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls
      #rapport

      Pour télécharger le rapport:
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/building_walls_-_full_report_-_english.pdf

      #murs_virtuelles #surveillance #murs_maritimes #murs_terrestres #EUROSUR #militarisation_des_frontières #frontières #racisme #xénophobie #VIS #SIS #ETIAS #SLTD

  • Clingendael report : EU external migration policies misaligned with reality

    On the February 1, Dutch think tank #Clingendael released a report on the relationship between irregular migration and conflict and stability in Mali, Niger and Libya. The report’s main finding is that current EU policies are misaligned with the reality of trans-Saharan migration.

    The report argues that European external migration policies fail to take into account the diverse socio-political dynamics of intra-African migration. EU policies focus on stemming migration flows through securitised measures as a means to stop human smuggling. However, it disregards local actors such as transportation companies facilitating irregular movements, local security forces gaining income by bribery and road taxes, political elites facilitating irregular migration in exchange for money and local population offering to sell food and lodging to earn a living. Ignoring such essential local dynamics prevents the establishment of effective migration management policies. A worrying mistake given the EU’s increased focus on the external dimension of migration in the context of the Partnership Framework.

    The report encourages the EU to focus on peace building processes and invest in both conflict- and politically sensitive state building as well as regional cooperation.

    http://www.ecre.org/clingendael-report-eu-external-migration-policies-misaligned-with-reality
    #rapport #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Libye #Sahel #Gao #Agadez #Niger #routes_migratoires #Mali #Tamanrasset #Niamey #Sebba #Arlit #Séguédine #Algérie #Murzuq #Ghadames #Ghat #Tripoli #EU #UE #Union_européenne #détention_administrative #rétention #passeurs #trafiquants #trafic_d'êtres_humains #gardes-côtes

    Lien vers le rapport :


    https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/turning_the_tide.pdf

    cc @isskein @reka

    • Our analyses from January: externalisation of migration control

      We pay but others do it. This first and foremost has been the response of the European Union
      to the so
      –called “refugee crisis”. Under the title of the
      European Agenda on Migration
      , in May
      2015 the European Commission proposed a series of measures to stop what
      it called “the
      human misery created by those who exploit migrants.” This document established as a priority
      cooperation with third countries to jointly address the causes of emigration. In practice, this
      cooperation has been limited to promoti
      ng the readmission of irregular migrants, border control
      and the reception of asylum
      –seekers and refugees in third countries. The EU’s agreements
      with Turkey (March 2016) and more recently with Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia
      (June 2016) represent the implementation of this approach.

      http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-305-viewpoint-migration-more-externalisation.pdf

    • Ecco l’accordo con la Libia sui migranti…

      Praticamente si chiede di far soffrire, di far subire violazioni, magari anche di uccidere, o di estorcere soldi ai migranti lontano dai nostri confini. Lontano dalle macchine fotografiche dei giornalisti, lontano da chi può raccontare cosa succede.


      http://www.africarivista.it/ecco-laccordo-con-la-libia-sui-migranti/111726

    • Profughi: un piano studiato per tenerli lontano, ad ogni costo

      Ora è operativo. Dal pomeriggio del 2 febbraio, con la firma congiunta del premier Gentiloni e del presidente del Governo di Alleanza di Tripoli, Fayez Serraj, è entrato in vigore a tutti gli effetti il piano sull’immigrazione concordato tra Italia e Libia dal ministro Minniti all’inizio di gennaio. Lo hanno chiamato memorandum sui migranti. Gentiloni lo ha presentato come “una svolta nella lotta al traffico degli esseri umani”, sollecitando il sostegno politico e finanziario dell’Unione Europea. In realtà è un piano di respingimento e deportazione, da attuare in più fasi e in modi diversi, a seconda delle condizioni e delle circostanze: l’ultima di tutta una serie di barriere messe su da Roma e da Bruxelles, negli ultimi dieci anni, per esternalizzare le frontiere della Fortezza Europa, spostandole il più a sud possibile e affidandone la sorveglianza a Stati “terzi” come, appunto, la Libia. Sorveglianza remunerata con milioni di euro, ben inteso: milioni per affidare ad altri il lavoro sporco di bloccare i profughi, non importa come, prima che raggiungano il Mediterraneo e, ancora, di “riprendersi” quelli respinti dall’Europa, con l’obiettivo, poi, di convincerli in qualche modo a ritornare “volontariamente” nel paese d’origine. A prescindere se il “paese d’origine” è sconvolto da guerre, terrorismo, dittature e persecuzioni, miseria e fame endemiche, carestia.

      http://habeshia.blogspot.ch/2017/02/profughi-un-piano-studiato-per-tenerli.html

    • La « forteresse » Europe commence en #Afrique_du_nord

      Le 3 février 2017, les représentants de l’Union européenne réunis à Malte se sont séparés après avoir entériné un plan d’action destiné à freiner – et éventuellement arrêter - les arrivées de réfugiés en provenance de #Libye principalement. Face à une situation incontrôlable dans ce pays, les dirigeants européens se tournent de plus en plus vers les pays voisins, la #Tunisie, l’#Egypte et l’#Algérie afin de les pousser à respecter ou intégrer les dispositifs de gestion des flux migratoires qu’ils ont mis en place. La chancelière allemande Angela Merkel a fait personnellement le déplacement pour convaincre les responsables de ces Etats à coopérer moyennant de substantielles aides matérielles et financières. Si les rencontres n’ont pas abouti aux résultats escomptés, force est de constater que les pratiques de contrôle et de répression de ces pays se professionnalisent et s’adaptent progressivement aux exigences de leurs partenaires du Nord.

      http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/analyse/mellah_forteresse.htm

    • L’Afrique du Nord, dernier recours de l’Europe ?

      Depuis que l’accord controversé, conclu entre la Turquie et l’Union européenne (UE) en mars 2016, a largement réussi à empêcher les demandeurs d’asile d’atteindre l’Europe par la Méditerranée orientale, les dirigeants européens se sont tournés vers la partie centrale de cette mer. Avec les élections qui approchent dans plusieurs États de l’Union et les craintes suscitées par la perspective de voir de nouvelles vagues de migrants entrer en Europe au printemps, les responsables politiques tentent de trouver des solutions rapides pour montrer qu’ils sont capables de gérer la crise.

      Au-delà de ce contexte électorale, l’UE dans son ensemble est pressée de formuler, et pas seulement des solutions d’urgence, une vision stratégique de long à même de relever le défi que présente la question migratoire. Et pour trouver de telles solutions, elle est contrainte de se tourner vers les pays nord-africains.

      http://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/lafrique-nord-dernier-recours-de-leurope/00077792

      En anglais : carnegieendowment.org/sada/68097

    • Migration monitoring in the Mediterranean region – Libyan military to be linked up to European surveillance systems

      The Mediterranean countries of the EU are establishing a network to facilitate communication between armed forces and the border police. Libya, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia are also set to take part. This would make them, through the back door, part of the surveillance system #EUROSUR. Refugees could then be seized on the open seas before being returned to Libya.

      https://digit.site36.net/2017/04/25/migration-monitoring-in-the-mediterranean-region-libyan-military-to-be

    • Security and migration amongst EU priorities for cooperation with “modern, democratic” Egypt

      Joint priorities adopted today by the EU and Egypt for 2017 to 2020 include a commitment from the EU to “support the Egyptian government’s efforts to strengthen its migration governance framework, including elements of legislative reform and strategies for migration management,” and to “support Egypt’s efforts to prevent and combat irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling of human beings, including identifying and assisting victims of trafficking.”

      http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jul/eu-egypt-priorities.htm

    • Niger : #ingérence et #néocolonialisme, au nom du #Développement

      Le 10 octobre 2016, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel était reçue en grande pompe à Niamey. Elle ne faisait pas mystère que ses deux préoccupations étaient la « #sécurité » et « l’#immigration ». Il s’agissait de mettre en œuvre des « recommandations » répétées à l’envie : le Niger, « pays de transit », devait être accompagné afin de jouer le rôle de filtre migratoire. Des programmes de « renforcement des institutions locales » feraient advenir cette grande césure entre les « réfugiés » à protéger sur place et les « migrants » à « reconduire » vers leurs « pays d’origine ». Autrement dit, comme l’a récemment exprimé le président français, le Niger et ses voisins (Libye, Tchad…) devaient accepter de se couvrir de camps et de jouer le rôle de #hotspot (voir Note #4). Le #néo-colonialisme d’une telle vision des rapports euro-africains a poussé les très conciliantes autorités nigériennes à rappeler que les intérêts de leurs ressortissants et la souveraineté nationale devaient être l’objet de plus d’égards. Ces négociations inter-gouvernementales sont toujours en cours alors qu’en Libye elles ont été directement menées avec des chefs de milices, prêts à jouer les geôliers à condition de pouvoir capter les fonds qui se déversent sur les gardes-frontières de l’Union européenne (UE).

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2840.html

    • Niger : #Niamey, capitale cernée par les crises

      Exode de migrants, conflits ethniques exacerbés par une guerre contre le jihad et une montée de l’islam politique… Dans la ville, devenue réceptacle des problèmes actuels du Sahel, la tension est omniprésente.

      Ce sont des victimes invisibles. Emportées par un cycle sans fin de représailles dans un coin reculé du monde. La scène de la tuerie est pourtant terrifiante : « Les assaillants sont arrivés vers 17 heures et se sont rendus directement à la mosquée où ils ont tué à coup de mitraillettes automatiques une dizaine de personnes. Puis ils se sont dirigés à l’intérieur du campement nomade où ils ont tiré sur des personnes qu’ils ont croisées », affirme un communiqué officiel relayé par la presse au Niger. Bilan ? 17 morts, vendredi à Inates, un bled perdu dans le sud de ce pays sahélien et proche de la frontière avec le Mali. A part les autorités du pays, aucun témoin extérieur, journaliste ou humanitaire, n’a pu se rendre seul sur place. Car Inates se trouve dans cette nouvelle zone de tous les périls, située au nord de Niamey, la capitale. Le 11 avril, Joerg Lang, un humanitaire allemand, pensait pouvoir s’y rendre incognito en dissimulant son visage sous un keffieh, foulard traditionnel, et en circulant à bord d’une voiture banalisée. Il a été enlevé sur la route du retour, non loin d’Inates.

      L’attaque du 19 mai n’est que la dernière d’une longue série, qui oppose depuis peu des nomades, touaregs et peuls, de chaque côté de la frontière qui sépare le Niger et le Mali. « Il y a trois semaines, de jeunes Peuls, venus du Niger, ont exécuté 18 Touaregs de l’autre côté de la frontière, au Mali. Cette fois-ci, les assaillants voulaient en tuer autant chez les Peuls, en représailles. Sauf que l’une des victimes a finalement survécu », indique Mohamed Bazoum, ministre de l’Intérieur du Niger. Les forces de sécurité sont pourtant loin d’être absentes dans ce pays, qui est même devenu le nouveau hub militaire régional d’une coalition internationale en lutte contre les forces jihadistes au Sahel. A Niamey, la capitale, située à seulement 250 kilomètres d’Inates, des gaillards musclés aux cheveux très courts ont remplacé les touristes dans les hôtels, qui ne désemplissent pas. On y croise des Français, des Américains, et même désormais des Allemands.
      Théories complotistes

      C’est au Mali, pays gangrené depuis plusieurs années par les mouvements jihadistes, et désormais aussi au Burkina Faso voisin, que se joue l’essentiel de cette guerre asymétrique. Mais c’est bien au Niger que s’implantent de plus en plus les bases arrières étrangères engagées dans cette bataille du Sahel. Pourtant le Niger n’a jamais connu de mouvement jihadiste autochtone. Son point faible, ce sont justement ses frontières. Et notamment celles avec le Mali et le Burkina Faso, dans ce petit triangle où se trouve aussi Niamey. Une capitale en apparence assoupie, particulièrement en ce mois de mai où la température frôle souvent les 45 °C. Mais le calme de la ville est trompeur. Tous les accès extérieurs sont verrouillés par des barrages, les fameuses « ficelles ». Et les entrées et les sorties sont fortement contrôlées. Les dunes orange qu’on aperçoit parfois au loin évoquent ainsi un monde potentiellement hostile, qui donne à la capitale nigérienne un air de forteresse isolée guettant l’ennemi, comme dans le roman de l’Italien Dino Buzzati, le Désert des Tartares. Mais qui est exactement l’ennemi ?

      A Niamey, nombreux sont ceux qui s’interrogent : « Les Américains ont construit une immense base à Agadez [à 950 kilomètres au nord-est de Niamey, ndlr]. Les Français et les Allemands renforcent leurs installations près de l’aéroport. Visiblement, ils sont là pour rester longtemps. Mais dans quel but ? Est-ce seulement pour notre sécurité ? » s’inquiète Abdoulaye, un jeune entrepreneur de la capitale. Les intentions « réelles » des Occidentaux au Niger font l’objet de nombreuses conversations et les théories complotistes ne manquent pas. Pourtant, même dans ce cas de la tuerie d’Inates, c’est bien l’influence des jihadistes qui est aussi en jeu. « Les Peuls se sont fait piéger. Depuis quelques années, la pression démographique et la raréfaction des terres pastorales les ont poussés vers le nord du Mali. Mais en s’y implantant, ils ont dû choisir leur camp dans un conflit purement malien. Et se sont laissé instrumentaliser par les forces jihadistes de l’Etat islamique en Afrique de l’Ouest alors qu’une partie des Touaregs soutient désormais la coalition internationale », affirme le général Abou Tarka qui dirige la Haute Autorité pour la consolidation de la paix, un organisme né lors des rébellions touaregs des années 90 et qui tente aujourd’hui de désamorcer cette bombe communautariste parée des oripeaux jihadistes. « C’est une guerre de pauvres, de populations qui se sentent souvent abandonnées », confie le général.

      Le conflit dans le sud-ouest est récent. Mais dans le sud-est du pays, une autre zone dessine depuis plus longtemps un front sensible avec la présence de la secte Boko Haram qui a infiltré la région de Diffa, en provenance du Nigeria voisin. Il existe d’autres frontières sensibles dans ce vaste « pays de sable, en apparence immobile », comme le décrit le père Mauro, un prêtre italien très investi aux côtés des migrants. Les Nigériens immigrent peu, et encore moins vers l’Europe. Mais depuis longtemps, le pays est une zone de passage pour tous ceux qui veulent tenter la traversée de la Méditerranée à partir des côtes libyennes. Depuis 2016, les Européens ont fait pression sur le pouvoir en place pour restreindre ces mouvements. En criminalisant les passeurs, mais aussi en faisant de Niamey et d’Agadez des « hot spots » censés dissuader les traversées clandestines, grâce à l’espoir d’un passage légal vers l’Europe, du moins pour ceux qui peuvent prétendre au statut de réfugié. Ces derniers mois, des charters ont même ramené au Niger des candidats à l’asile en Europe, jusqu’alors détenus dans les geôles libyennes. « Mais aujourd’hui ces rotations sont quasiment à l’arrêt car les autorités se sont rendu compte que les Européens, et notamment les Français, n’acceptaient les réfugiés qu’au compte-gouttes, malgré leurs promesses », explique un responsable du Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés (HCR) à Niamey.

      Cette nouvelle stratégie impose aussi un tri entre « bons » et « mauvais » migrants. Dans une rue ombragée du centre de la capitale, des hommes prennent l’air, assis devant une maison gardée par des vigiles. Les visages sont maussades, les regards fuyants, et les gardiens ont vite fait d’éconduire les visiteurs étrangers qui tentent de parler à ces migrants rapatriés de Libye et qui ont, eux, accepté de rentrer dans leur pays. Ceux qui refusent ce retour « volontaire » se dispersent dans la ville, formant une cohorte invisible qui échappe aux radars. « En réalité, les passages de migrants ne se sont pas arrêtés. Il y a de nouvelles routes, plus dangereuses », confie un officiel nigérien. En revanche, la création des hot spots attire désormais d’autres candidats à l’exil. Début mai, des centaines de Soudanais ont ainsi envahi les rues d’Agadez dans l’espoir d’obtenir le sésame miraculeux de l’asile en Europe. Mais, excédées par ces arrivées massives, les autorités de la ville ont envoyé de force, le 12 mai, 145 d’entre eux à la frontière libyenne, en plein désert. Depuis, leur sort est inconnu.
      Arrestations

      En privé, les responsables nigériens se moquent parfois de l’autosatisfaction des Européens sur les mirages de cette nouvelle politique migratoire. Et fustigent les faux-semblants de l’aide, en principe massive, accordée au pays : « On nous dit que le Niger est désormais le pays d’Afrique le plus aidé par l’Europe. Mais ce sont les ONG étrangères qui captent toute cette aide », peste un haut responsable. Ce n’est pas le seul mirage financier dans l’un des pays les plus pauvres de la planète. En décembre, un grand raout organisé à Paris avait permis en principe au Niger d’engranger 23 milliards de dollars (19 milliards d’euros) de promesses d’investissements. Six mois plus tard, les promesses sont restées… des promesses : « La concrétisation des projets est effectivement assez lente », reconnaît, un peu gênée, la responsable d’une agence onusienne. Reste qu’en raison des enjeux sécuritaires et migratoires, le Niger est bien devenu « le chouchou de la communauté internationale », comme le rappelle Issa Garba, porte-parole local de l’association Tournons la page.

      Au début de l’année, la société civile avait organisé des manifestations dans les rues de Niamey pour protester contre une loi de finances qui instaure de nouvelles taxes et augmente les prix de l’électricité et de l’eau. Mais à partir du 25 mars, le mouvement a été brutalement décapité avec l’arrestation d’une vingtaine de leaders de la société civile. « Ils ne représentent rien, ils veulent juste créer le chaos et susciter un coup d’Etat militaire », balaye Mohamed Bazoum, le ministre de l’Intérieur. « Tout ce que nous demandons, c’est une bonne gouvernance et l’abandon de lois qui frappent les plus pauvres », rétorque Issa Garba. Reste que face aux arrestations, la communauté internationale se tait. Et la rue, elle, a compris le message : une journée ville morte décrétée par la société civile le 14 mai a été un échec et les manifestations n’ont pas repris. « Je soutiens ces leaders, mais je n’ai aucune envie de me retrouver moi aussi en prison », résume Mokhtar, un jeune homme très pieux. Dans la base arrière des Occidentaux en guerre contre le jihadisme au Sahel, d’autres influences s’imposent pourtant silencieusement. « Au Niger, l’islam gagne du terrain », souligne un professeur d’université, citant le nombre exponentiel de femmes voilées et de salles de prières dans les facs. « Le jour où les imams nous demanderont de sortir dans la rue, là, j’obéirais. Car l’islam est dans nos cœurs », constate de son côté Mokhtar.


      http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/05/23/niger-niamey-capitale-cernee-par-les-crises_1652220

      Signalé par Alizée Dauchy sur la liste Migreurop, avec ce commentaire :

      un article rédigé par Maria Malagardis publié dans Libération le 23 mai :
      http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/05/23/niger-niamey-capitale-cernee-par-les-crises_1652220

      et à écouter sur France Culture un podcast avec Maria Malagardis en première partie :
      https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/cultures-monde/culturesmonde-du-vendredi-25-mai-2018

      sur la question migratoire :
      Elle revient (min’9) notamment sur ’l’hypocrisie des #hotspot", avec très peu de #réinstallation en Europe, malgré les engagements pris (la France s’est engagée à 3000 #réinstallations jusqu’en 2019).

      Procédure d’asile : Idée admise de trier sur la base de la nationalité à la place des demandes individuelles. Autrement : rapatriement volontaire dans les pays d’origine / les migrants se fondent dans la nature.
      Effet pervers : de nouvelles populations se rendent au Niger pour demander l’asile, exemple des soudanais à #Agadez (Cf. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180526-niger-refugies-soudanais-darfour-agadez-statut-migrants).
      Elle qualifie le Niger de « passoire de mouvements », en « rotation perpétuelle ».

      sur la loi de finance :
      Augmentation des taxes sur l’électricité et l’eau, loi typique d’austérité. Manifestations dans la rue dès la promulgation.
      Interdiction des manifestations par les autorités nigériennes, arrestations d’activistes dès le 25 mars, 26 personnes de la société civile ont été arrêtées.
      Silence de la part de la communauté internationale, elle parle de dérive autoritaire car chèque en blanc de la communauté internationale.

      Loi de finance élaborée avec le parrainage des européens, notamment des français avec des conseillers techniques français du ministère de l’économie.
      « Accord tacite » davantage que « silence tacite ». Communauté internationale a besoin d’un Niger calme et silencieux.

      sur la question jihadiste :
      Pas de mouvement nigérien jihadiste autochtone contrairement au Mali et au Burkina Faso.
      Niger était un exemple de stabilité, où l’on louait le règlement de la question touareg, il est aujourd’hui le pays le plus menacé.

      #hotspots #tri #catégorisation #djihadisme #EI #Etat_islamique

    • « Pour le HCR, l’essentiel est d’aider les pays qui hébergent vraiment les réfugiés, en Afrique ou en Asie »

      Filippo Grandi : « L’essentiel est qu’on nous donne les moyens d’aider les pays qui hébergent vraiment les réfugiés »

      Le haut-commissaire des Nations unies pour les réfugiés revient sur les difficultés de l’UE à apporter une solution commune à la crise migratoire et s’inquiète de la diminution de la solidarité en Europe.

      LE MONDE | 09.11.2018
      Propos recueillis par Jean-Baptiste Chastand

      A la tête de l’Agence des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) depuis 2016, Filippo Grandi appelle l’Union européenne (UE) à préserver le droit d’asile et considère que le retour des réfugiés syriens dans leur pays se fera au compte-gouttes.

      La crise migratoire déchirait l’Union européenne depuis 2015. Elle semble être passée au second plan des pré­occupations. Le problème est-il réglé ?

      Il y a eu des manipulations excessives de la part de ceux qui ont parlé d’invasion, de la fin de l’identité européenne ou de menaces sécuritaires. Maintenant que l’intérêt politique se décale, le risque consiste à ne pas faire ce qu’il faudrait pour mieux gérer ces mouvements de populations. L’Europe n’a pas encore donné toutes les réponses. Or, un report ne peut qu’aggraver la situation en cas de nouvelle crise.

      Les « centres contrôlés » et les « plates-formes de débarquement » destinés à centraliser le traitement des demandeurs d’asile paraissent dans l’impasse…

      La convention de Dublin, destinée à éviter le « tourisme de l’asile » en prévoyant que le premier pays d’accueil doit gérer les de­mandes d’asile, est mise à l’épreuve par les arrivées nombreuses dans quelques pays, qui se sont retrouvés pénalisés par rapport aux autres. Il faut passer à autre chose. On a longuement évoqué une répartition entre les 28 Etats, mais ça ne fonctionne pas, car seuls quelques pays y sont prêts. Moins de 100 000 personnes arrivées en Europe en 2018, c’est gérable.

      La prise en charge par des Etats d’une partie des passagers de l’Aquarius, par exemple, ressemble à une forme de partage, sauf que chaque nouveau bateau s’est transformé en crise. Un tel système devrait être décidé au préalable. Le problème est l’absence de consensus sur le lieu où ce partage doit se faire. Ce n’est pas au HCR de déterminer où ces centres d’accueil et de réception doivent se trouver, mais à l’Europe. Le rôle du HCR est de donner tous les instruments pour les gérer de manière correcte.

      Et qu’en est-il de l’idée de « centres ­d’accueil » hors Europe, comme au Maghreb ?

      Le HCR travaille dans tous les pays du monde pour gérer l’asile. Le gérer avec efficacité aide à stabiliser ces flux. Par ailleurs, nous n’accepterons jamais que les demandes d’asile en Europe soient gérées hors de son territoire. L’Europe doit garder ses portes ouvertes. Il faut qu’il y soit toujours possible de demander l’asile, sans être renvoyé vers des pays tiers. Cela dit, si l’Europe est prête à prendre des réfugiés dès le Niger, par exemple, dans le cadre de la « réinstallation » [transfert au sein de l’UE, par des voies sûres et légales, de personnes déplacées ayant besoin d’une protection], ce processus peut être renforcé.

      Vous êtes donc opposé à des plates-formes pour débarquer, en Afrique, des migrants sauvés en Méditerranée ?

      Si quelqu’un est sauvé dans les eaux territoriales tunisiennes, puis renvoyé en Tunisie, c’est légitime. C’est le droit. En Libye, les garde-côtes ont été renforcés par l’Europe de manière plus ou moins transparente. C’est une bonne idée, à condition de renforcer aussi les institutions qui gèrent les migrants, et pas seulement celles qui les empêchent de partir.

      L’Autriche, qui assure ce semestre la présidence tournante de l’UE, cherche à instaurer un accord avec l’Egypte. Y êtes-vous ­favorable ?

      Nous travaillons depuis longtemps en Egypte, qui héberge plus de 250 000 réfugiés. Si les Etats veulent nous aider à y renforcer les structures, c’est une bonne chose, mais cela ne doit pas être un moyen d’empêcher les gens de partir vers l’Europe.

      Pourquoi le HCR participe-t-il à cette politique d’externalisation des frontières européennes ?

      La Turquie héberge 4 millions de réfugiés. Vous voudriez qu’on ne les aide pas ? Au moment de l’accord UE-Turquie, auquel le HCR n’a pas été associé, on nous a demandé de vérifier que son contenu n’allait pas à l’encontre des normes internationales. Le HCR a travaillé avec la Grèce pour s’assurer qu’il n’y ait pas d’expulsion vers la Turquie de personnes qui pourraient y courir des risques.

      En 2015, l’Europe a lancé l’initiative d’un fonds pour l’Afrique. Il est sous-financé, et la plupart des ressources sont utilisées pour le contrôle des frontières et non pour traiter les causes des départs. Je le regrette.

      La situation de surpopulation et ­d’insalubrité du camp de Moria, sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, est catastrophique. Le HCR y participe…

      C’est difficile en effet, d’autant que le nombre d’arrivées continue à augmenter J’en ai parlé au premier ministre grec, Alexis ­Tsipras, et au ministre de l’immigration, qui vont faire un effort pour transférer des personnes sur le continent. J’ai reçu des assurances. Si on arrive à réguler la population dans les îles, on arrivera à mieux gérer la situation.

      Accordez-vous foi aux perspectives démographiques alarmistes du journaliste et chercheur Stephen Smith, qui prévoit une explosion migratoire venue d’Afrique ?

      L’invasion est un peu une légende : 70 % des mouvements de population en Afrique restent à l’intérieur du continent et ne vont pas vers l’Europe. Cela dit, il y aura toujours des migrations : les gens se déplacent toujours vers la prospérité. Quand il n’y a pas de possibilité d’émigrer de manière légale, ne reste que l’asile. Ce n’est pas bien, car ces demandes encombrent les systèmes d’asile et les délégitimisent, en créant dans l’opinion publique une confusion entre immigration et asile.

      Aujourd’hui, 80 % des demandeurs d’asile en Europe sont venus pour des raisons économiques, comment faire ?

      L’un des problèmes est l’impossibilité pour les déboutés du droit d’asile de retourner chez eux. Il faut trouver des accords de réadmission avec les pays d’origine, mais c’est coûteux et politiquement difficile pour ces derniers. En Libye, un accord avec l’Union africaine autorisant le HCR et l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations d’y travailler, a permis le retour de 30 000 migrants chez eux [depuis début 2017]. Ils ont été réadmis parce que les images terribles des gens exploités dans les prisons libyennes ont eu un impact. Ce processus doit s’élargir.

      Pensez-vous que les réfugiés syriens retourneront dans leur pays ?

      Il y a une petite augmentation des demandes de retour de Syriens vivant en Jordanie et au Liban, mais il ne s’agit que de quelques milliers de personnes sur plusieurs millions. Le droit au retour existe, mais il doit être le résultat d’un choix personnel. Il reste des obstacles sécuritaires et matériels. Les réfugiés ont peur d’être enrôlés pour le service militaire, ils redoutent des représailles ou de ne pas retrouver leurs biens. La situation dans la province d’Idlib [minée par les affrontements inter-rebelles et l’insécurité galopan­te] n’encourage pas non plus les gens à rentrer. La reconstruction de la Syrie est un sujet politiquement sensible, mais j’appelle les pays donateurs à au moins aider les gens qui font le choix du retour.

      Comment jugez-vous la politique migratoire d’Emmanuel Macron ?

      En France, il faut améliorer la mise à l’abri, l’accueil, certains aspects de la procédure, mais la loi asile et immigration [définitivement adoptée à l’Assemblée le 1er août] a permis des progrès. A l’échelle européenne, le discours solidaire du président est très positif [il s’était engagé, en automne 2017, à offrir en deux ans 10 000 places de réinstallation aux réfugiés liés au HCR, notamment au Niger et au Tchad]. L’augmentation relative des places de réinstallation pour les réfugiés et l’action rapide de l’Ofpra [Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides] au Niger ont été exemplaires.

      Comprenez-vous que l’afflux massif d’une population culturellement musulmane dans une région majoritairement judéo-chrétienne puisse créer des tensions ?

      Toute absorption de personnes issues d’une culture minoritaire est complexe, mais elle est possible et souhaitable ! Je crois à la diversité, même si je sais que ce n’est pas populaire de le dire. Lors de réunions européennes, en particulier dans l’est de l’Europe, j’ai entendu certains pays parler d’homogénéité. Mais ce n’est pas dans la tradition de l’Europe. Les valeurs chrétiennes sont précisément des valeurs de solidarité et de partage. L’homogénéité est une utopie négative qu’il faut contrer à tout prix. La diversité est un élément d’enrichissement. Les villes vivantes dans le monde sont des villes diverses ; ce sont elles qui sont à l’avant-garde ! Les Européens ont suffisamment d’outils économiques, sociaux et culturels pour gérer cette diversité.

      Etes-vous inquiet de la montée de l’extrême droite en Italie ?

      [Le ministre de l’intérieur italien] Matteo Salvini mène plusieurs batailles. Sur la question de la répartition des migrants en Europe, je suis d’accord avec lui : l’Italie ne peut pas recevoir tout le monde. Mais son discours très agressif, même s’il n’est pas forcément raciste, est susceptible de créer une atmosphère où le racisme peut prospérer. Cela m’inquiète beaucoup. Son langage ouvre la porte à des tendances extrêmes au sein des sociétés.

      La montée du populisme dans le monde pose-t-elle des problèmes pour une organisation multilatérale comme le HCR ?

      Pour l’instant, personne ne nous dit d’arrêter notre travail, qui, il faut le rappeler, est effectué à 90 % hors de l’Europe. Pour nous, l’essentiel est d’obtenir les ressources pour aider les pays qui hébergent vraiment les réfugiés, c’est-à-dire souvent des pays pauvres en Afrique ou en Asie. Je crains que la diminution de la solidarité en Europe et la stigmatisation du droit d’asile aux Etats-Unis donnent un mauvais exemple. Les pays pauvres me demandent de plus en plus pourquoi ils devraient prendre des réfugiés alors que l’Europe n’en veut pas. Or, pour des Etats voisins de pays en guerre, cela signifierait renvoyer des gens dans ces zones de conflit. C’est cela qui m’inquiète le plus.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/11/09/filippo-grandi-l-essentiel-est-qu-on-nous-donne-les-moyens-d-aider-les-pays-

      Avec ce commentaire de Emmanuel Blanchard via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      Une interview inquiétante à plus d’un titre : #Filippo_Grandi suggère que le HCR pourrait être plus impliqué encore en Lybie et dans tout pays d’Afrique du Nord prêt à s’impliquer dans des programmes de retours de boat-people et autres projets de gestion de « centres d’accueil et de réception ». Il ouvre même grand la porte pour une collaboration poussée avec l’UE en Egypte, même s’il prévient que le rôle du HCR ne peut pas être de contribuer à « des moyens d’empêcher les gens de partir vers l’Europe ». Il critique en effet à mots couverts certaines dimensions des politiques européennes de contrôle des frontières extérieures (voir passages soulignés en gras).
      A noter que sous couvert « d’équilibre », le journaliste du Monde - qui s’est autorisé une critique de la « politique d’externalisation des frontières européennes » - reprend certains des argumentaires « anti-migrants » les plus éculés.

  • Il grande affare della sicurezza europea. Ecco quanto si spende per i controlli

    Metti sicurezza qua e là e tutti sono d’accordo. Il tema della sicurezza è oggi l’unico intorno a cui i paesi europei ritrovano l’unità perduta. L’abbiamo visto al recente summit di Bratislava, il 16 settembre scorso. I capi di governo hanno promesso solennemente di «prendere tutte le misure necessarie per aiutare gli Stati ad assicurare la sicurezza interna e la lotta al terrorismo». E cosi’ quel giorno si è evitato di litigare sulle quote dei migranti, sulla Brexit, sull’austerità. Ormai tutto si confonde, tutto si amalgama: sicurezza-immigrazione-terrorismo. In una corsa agli investimenti per trasformare il nostro continente in una fortezza pronta a difendersi dal nemico. Banche dati, agenzie europee, satelliti spia e droni. Ma nel controllo delle frontiere la sicurezza e la militarizzazione che le va ormai a braccetto, servono? Servono a gestire meglio i flussi migratori, a ridurre l’immigrazione clandestina, i traffici di esseri umani? Abbiamo cercato di rispondere a queste domande mettendoci insieme, nove giornalisti provenienti da otto paesi europei.


    http://www.corriere.it/esteri/16_dicembre_10/grande-affare-sicurezza-europea-ecco-quanto-si-spende-controlli-e2f6f1f4-be

    #business #économie #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-frontières_européens #EBCG #drones #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #SIS_II #LISA #VIS #Eurodac #PNR #Eurosur #Méditerranée #Italie #EUNAVFOR_MED #Opération_Sophia #Libye #Horizon_2020 #EOS #EUCISE #Finmeccanica #Pasag #SERIT #ECSO #infographie #visualisation #migrations #asile #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #EU #Europe #UE #budget #business #coûts
    cc @daphne @albertocampiphoto @marty

  • New FRONTEX agency: satellite reconnaissance and drones over the Mediterranean

    The EU is taking its maritime surveillance to a new level. The three agencies responsible for coastal and maritime surveillance are to be merged. 81 million euros has been earmarked for unmanned aerial vehicles alone, with hundreds of millions also being spent on the necessary satellite capabilities. The money is flowing into the coffers of arms companies.


    https://digit.site36.net/2016/06/10/new-frontex-agency-satellite-reconnaissance-and-drones-over-the-medite
    #Frontex #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #asile #migrations #mer #Méditerranée #réfugiés #surveillance #surveillance_maritime #Eurosur
    cc @fil @albertocampiphoto

  • Sécurité des frontières : l’Europe prête pour des solutions coûteuses et inefficaces ?

    Face à la montée du terrorisme et à la crise des migrants, un sentiment d’impuissance politique semble frapper les institutions et les États membres de l’Union européenne. À ce sentiment, les industriels répondent par une innovation technologique, un système de contrôle automatique aux frontières. Coûteuse, sans preuve d’efficacité probante, cette solution pourrait surtout faire le jeu de sociétés en recherche de relais de croissance sur le Vieux Continent.

    selon la société américaine d’études Acuity Market Intelligence. “Nous estimons que le marché du contrôle automatisé aux frontières représente 500 millions d’euros en Europe aujourd’hui et devrait atteindre pas moins de 1,2 milliard d’euros d’ici à 2019-2020.

    Si la Commission européenne a refusé de répondre à nos questions, quelques recherches dans les archives de communiqués de presse permettent de déceler que le Fonds pour les frontières extérieures (External Borders Fund) compte, parmi cinq sujets d’investissement, la mise en œuvre d’équipement technologique à l’état de l’art dédié au contrôle aux frontières. Cette partie du programme “Solidarité et management des flux migratoires” a tout de même représenté 1,82 milliard d’euros entre 2007 et 2013, dont un cinquième était exclusivement dédié aux aéroports où les premières portes “intelligentes” ont été prioritairement déployées.

    En parallèle, la Commission a également financé des programmes de recherche sur ces frontières “intelligentes”. Entre 2007 et 2013, dans le volet Sécurité de son programme-cadre FP7, plus de 51 millions ont été versés à des consortiums souvent dirigés par des entreprises auxquelles se sont associés laboratoires et acteurs publics pour réfléchir à la gestion de ces nouvelles frontières. Dans son dernier opus H2020 “Sociétés sûres”, l’instance européenne a déjà investi plus de 21 millions à ce sujet. Des sommes non comprises dans le budget Smart Borders.

    Ainsi, sur les six projets du FP7 consacrés aux frontières “intelligentes”, l’entreprise française #Morpho en a supervisé trois. Rien que pour #Effisec, elle a touché 1 859 921 euros exactement. En tout, près de 4 millions d’euros. #Safran, la maison mère, a refusé de nous dire sur quoi ce subside avait concrètement débouché. L’autre géant français n’est pas en reste. #Thales a lui reçu des subventions européennes de plus de 1,8 million d’euros pour travailler sur la thématique, dans le cadre du FP7. Son aventure européenne continue dans le #H2020. “Nous participons actuellement à un projet appelé #Bodega, qui a pour but d’étudier le facteur humain, comment les passagers interagissent avec les #e-gates, précise Yann Haguet, directeur du secteur identitaire chez Thales. À la fin, nous produirons un rapport pour l’Union européenne, qui pourra aider à l’application des Smart Borders.”


    http://www.lelanceur.fr/securite-des-frontieres-leurope-prete-pour-des-solutions-couteuses-et-inef
    #technologie #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #business #smart_borders #industrie_sécuritaire
    cc @reka