#eutf

La Corte dei conti europea critica il sostegno alla Guardia costiera “libica”

Con una relazione pubblicata recentemente, la

Corte dei conti europea ha rafforzato le sue precedenti critiche al fondo fiduciario dell’UE per l’Africa, istituito nel 2015 per contrastare, i tentativi di traversata del Mediterraneo per raggiungere l’Europa. Mentre i fondi sono stati in gran parte spesi, le critiche mettono sotto accusa l’esito dei progetti sul campo ed i governi europei che hanno concluso accordi con il governo di Tripoli, che adesso sono stati seguiti da ulteriori accordi dell’UE con l’Egitto e la Tunisia. Secondo il rapporto della Corte dei conti europea Il fondo fiduciario per l’Africa,“non è ancora adeguatamente concentrato sulle priorità” e “i rischi per i diritti umani non sono affrontati correttamente”.

Le critiche più severe sollevate dalla Corte dei conti UE riguardano la Libia, e in particolare il governo di Tripoli, con il quale l’Unione Europea, ed alcuni Stati come l’Italia, pure beneficiari dei fondi europei, hanno accordi per finanziare la sedicente guardia costiera che fa riferimento al governo provvisorio di Dbeibah, per svolgere attività di ricerca e salvataggio (SAR) nel Mediterraneo centrale. Si dà atto che i migranti riportati in Libia, tutti provenienti da paesi terzi, vengono detenuti in centri di detenzione gestiti dal governo dove, secondo i rapporti delle ONG, ma anche delle Nazioni Unite, occorre aggiungere, sono stati soggetti a torture, violenze sessuali e percosse. Come denunciava lo scorso anno anche la Commissaria ai diritti umani del Consiglio d’Europa.

Sarebbe tuttavia troppo facile concentrare tutte le responsabilità sull’Unione europea, nascondendo il ruolo decisivo dei governi dei paesi costieri nel Mediterraneo centrale, e dell’Italia in particolare. Questa relazione della Corte dei conti europea mette allo scoperto le complicità delle autorità italiane ed europee negli abusi commessi dalle milizie, dalle tante guardie costiere e forze di sicurezza, che si contendono il campo, e il controllo del mare, all’ombra del governo provvisorio di Tripoli.

La frammentazione politica, militare e territoriale della Libia è tanto percepibile che risulta davvero offensivo per le vittime, per le persone intrappolate nei centri lager o riportate indietro dalla guardia costiera “libica”, continuare a parlare di una unica zona SAR (di ricerca e salvataggio) “libica”, e di una centrale di cordinamento unificata (JRCC), quando la realtà dei fatti smentisce ogni giorno quello che i governanti europei affermano per garantirsi consensi elettorali e rapporti economici privilegiati. La Libia come Stato unitario, titolare di una zona di ricerca e soccorso (SAR) dotata di una unica Centrale di coordinamento (MRCC) non esiste.

Un contributo importante per modificare una situazione che vede contrastati ogni giorno di più il soccorso in mare ed il diritto di accedere ad un porto sicuro per chiedere asilo, può venire dai tribunali italiani, e dal Tribunale penale internazionale, al quale è giunta recentemente una denuncia sulla collusione tra le autorità libiche ed italiane nelle operazioni di intercettazione in mare e di riconduzione nei porti libici. Operazioni di respingimento collettivo su delega, delle quali il ministro dell’interno Piantedosi si vanta in ogni occasione, anche sui canali social a disposizione del Viminale, con dichiarazioni che suonano come una ammissione di responsabilità per tutti gli abusi commessi dalla guardia costiera libica, e poi a terra dalle milizie che riescono a ottenere i finanziamenti europei, per essere rifornite di mezzi e attrezzature dalle autorità italiane.

Sarebbe tempo che su questioni tanto gravi il governo la smetta con le strumentalizzazioni, che arrivano al punto di appropriarsi di vittime della mafia che hanno pagato con la vita la loro lotta per la legalità. Come riporta l’ANSA, secondo quanto affermato da Giorgia Meloni, alla conclusione dell’ultimo G7, “sulla lotta al traffico di essere umani abbiamo portato un modello tutto italiano che nasce da due grandi italiani come Falcone e Borsellino e che ci dice di seguire i soldi: follow the money”, e la Presidente del Consiglio aggiunge che tale approccio “può fare la differenza”. Negli ultimi mesi, non a caso, le notizie su quanto sono costretti a pagare ai trafficanti i migranti che riescono a fuggire dalla Libia e dalla Tunisia precedono le notizie sulle tante vittime, anche bambini, delle politiche di deterrenza e di abbandono in mare. Quanto rileva adesso la Corte dei conti europea conferma che occorre davvero “seguire i soldi”. Ma non sono certo quelli estorti a chi lotta per la sopravvivenza, quanto piuttosto quelli che vengono pagati dagli Stati membri e dall’Unione europea alle milizie ed ai governi con i quali si concludono accordi “per combattere l’immigrazione clandestina”, un fiume di danaro che, come confermano i revisori contabili europei con il loro linguaggio felpato, finisce nelle tasche delle stesse organizzazioni criminali che Meloni, Piantedosi ed i loro partner europei ed africani sostengono di volere contrastare.

1. Quasi in contemporanea con il fermo amministrativo inflitto ad una nave del soccorso civile per non avere obbedito agli ordini della sedicente Guardia costiera “libica”, impegnata nell’ennesimo tentativo in armi per interrompere una azione di soccorso in acque internazionali, la Corte dei conti dell’Unione europea critica gli accordi di collaborazione con il governo di Tripoli e con la stessa Guardia costiera “libica”, per il rischio che i finanziamenti pervenuti da Bruxelles, e in parte transitati dall’Italia, concorrano ad arricchire milizie criminali, piuttosto che aumentare le capacità di ricerca e soccorso, che sarebbero gli obiettivi perseguiti sulla carta negli accordi con i libici. Accordi che in realtà sono finalizzati alla deterrenza delle traversate, ad esternalizzare le attività di respingimento collettivo, delegandole ad una guardia costiera che, secondo i rapporti internazionali più accreditati delle Nazioni Unite, è collusa con le milizie e le organizzazioni criminali che in Libia, soprattutto in Tripolitania, gestiscono il traffico di esseri umani ed i centri di detenzione, luoghi di abusi indicibili. Eppure, malgrado tutto questo fosse già noto da tempo, e sancito da importanti decisioni della giurisprudenza italiana, il Decreto Piantedosi n.1 del 2023 (legge n.15/2023) continua a costituire lo strumento legale più utilizzato per sanzionare con i fermi amministrativi le navi delle ONG che durante, se non alla fine, come si è verificato in questa ultima occasione, delle operazioni di soccorso, si rifiutano di obbedire ai comandi provenienti dalle motovedette donate dall’Italia al governo di Tripoli. Motovedette, ancora assistite dalle autorità italiane che ne “formano” anche il personale, che vengono indirizzate sui target dagli assetti aerei di Frontex. Secondo il Decreto Piantedosi infatti, se i soccorsi si verificano in acque internazionali, i comandanti delle navi soccorritrici dovrebbero operare sotto il coordinamento delle “autorità competenti”, che nel caso dei soccorsi operati nella nefasta zona SAR “libica”, creata a tavolino nel 2018, sarebbero costitituite non dalla inesistente centrale di coordinamento di Tripoli (JRCC), ma dalle diverse centrali di comando delle milizie alle quali rimane affidata la sorveglianza dei vari tratti delle coste libiche, in corrispondenza delle città e delle relative zone costiere che controllano a terra. Non è certo un caso, ed è emerso nei processi intentati in Italia contro le ONG, che, a parte gli interventi di intercettazione, o di disturbo, delle motovedette donate dall’Italia, quella che dovrebbe essere la Centrale di coordinamento libica non risponde sistematicamente alle chiamate di soccorso. In questo modo si svela la natura del Decreto Piantedosi, finalizzato esclusivamente a costituire precedenti per legittimare la riconduzione dei naufraghi in un porto non sicuro, in LIbia, e poi per “preparare” fermi amministrativi, che nella maggior parte dei casi vengono sospesi dagli organi giurisdizionali italiani.

Da ultimo, nel caso del fermo amministrativo della Geo Barents di MSF, le autorità italiane hanno riutilizzato anche il vecchio espediente degli accertamenti di sicurezza sulle navi straniere in transito nei porti italiani, che già la Corte di Giustizia UE aveva fortemente circoscritto con una decisione del 2022, decisione che evidentemente non è stata seguita da una successiva sentenza definitiva del giudice nazionale, ma che continua a costituire un precedente, che nessun tribunale, chiamato a pronunciarsi sulla legittimità dei fermi amministrativi delle mavi umanitarie, potrà ignorare. Ed adesso sarà ancora un tribunale che dovrà occuparsi del fermo amministrativo della Geo Barents di Medici senza frontiere.

2. Con una relazione pubblicata recentemente, la Corte dei conti europea ha rafforzato le sue precedenti critiche al fondo fiduciario dell’UE per l’Africa, istituito nel 2015 per contrastare, i tentativi di traversata del Mediterraneo per raggiungere l’Europa. Mentre i fondi sono stati in gran parte spesi, le critiche mettono sotto accusa l’esito dei progetti sul campo ed i governi europei che hanno concluso accordi con il governo di Tripoli, che adesso sono stati seguiti da ulteriori accordi dell’UE con l’Egitto e la Tunisia. Secondo il rapporto della Corte dei conti europea Il fondo fiduciario per l’Africa,“non è ancora adeguatamente concentrato sulle priorità” e “i rischi per i diritti umani non sono affrontati correttamente”.

Le critiche più severe sollevate dalla Corte dei conti UE riguardano la Libia, e in particolare il governo di Tripoli, con il quale l’Unione Europea, ed alcuni Stati come l’Italia, pure beneficiari dei fondi europei, hanno accordi per finanziare la sedicente guardia costiera che fa riferimento al governo provvisorio di Dbeibah, per svolgere attività di ricerca e salvataggio (SAR) nel Mediterraneo centrale. Si dà atto che i migranti riportati in Libia, tutti provenienti da paesi terzi, vengono detenuti in centri di detenzione gestiti dal governo dove, secondo i rapporti delle ONG, ma anche delle Nazioni Unite, occorre aggiungere, sono stati soggetti a torture, violenze sessuali e percosse. Come denunciava lo scorso anno anche la Commissaria ai diritti umani del Consiglio d’Europa.

La relazione della Corte dei conti europea ha rilevato che le attrezzature finanziate dall’UE in Libia, come le imbarcazioni, potrebbero essere utilizzate da persone “diverse dai beneficiari previsti”, mentre le auto e gli autobus finanziati dall’UE “potrebbero aver facilitato il trasferimento dei migranti” nei centri di detenzione, “esacerbando il sovraffollamento”. Allo stesso modo, le attrezzature finanziate dall’UE per i centri di detenzione, secondo l’ECA (Commissione europea di monitoraggio), avrebbero potuto essere vendute o “avrebbero potuto potenzialmente avvantaggiare le organizzazioni criminali”. Infine la stessa relazione certifica che ad oggi “La Libia non ha ancora un Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre operativo, nonostante l’equipaggiamento finanziato dall’EUTF sia stato consegnato a dicembre 2021”. Non si vede dunque con quali modalità di comunicazione i comandanti delle navi delle ONG dovrebbero sottoporsi al coordinamento “delle autorità competenti”, per la zona SAR nella quale avvengono i soccorsi, come prevede il Decreto Piantedosi (legge n.15/2023).

Il gruppo di indagine inviato dalla Corte dei conti dell’ Unione europea ha visitato la Libia, ma non ha potuto visitare un solo centro di detenzione. Né le autorità libiche hanno potuto dire ai revisori dei conti chi era responsabile dei centri di detenzione che erano stati chiusi avendo precedentemente beneficiato di fondi UE. Più in generale, la Corte ha concluso che le clausole contrattuali che minacciano di congelare i fondi dell’UE in caso di violazione dei diritti umani “non sono state applicate sistematicamente”, soprattutto “in relazione alla sicurezza, alla gestione delle frontiere o ad altre attività sensibili”.

I revisori dei conti europei hanno rilevato che la Commissione europea non dispone di “procedure formali per denunciare e valutare presunte violazioni dei diritti umani” e l’hanno esortata a colmare questa lacuna. “Abbiamo riscontrato che il rischio per i diritti umani non è stato affrontato in modo esauriente dalla commissione”, ha affermato Bettina Jakobsen, il membro dell’ECA che ha guidato l’audit. Ha aggiunto che la Commissione ha “fatto quello che poteva” assumendo un’organizzazione terza per monitorare i diritti umani in Libia, ma c’era ancora “una mancanza di procedure formali presso la commissione per denunciare, registrare e dare seguito alle accuse di attacchi alle persone”., che si traducono in violazioni dei diritti in relazione ai progetti finanziati dall’UE”.

Quanto rilevano adesso i componenti della Corte dei conti dell’Unione europea non è nuovo. Ma purtroppo le scadenze elettorali e lo spostamento del consenso verso le destre europee sta consentendo di nascondere gli abusi più gravi, che potrebbero proseguire anche dopo la implementazione, prevista entro maggio del 2026, dei nuovi Regolamenti introdotti dal Patto europeo sulla migrazione e l’asilo, che rimane orientato verso la cooperazione con i paesi terzi nella esternalizzazione delle frontiere.

Da tempo l’Unione europea è pienamente consapevole, e lo confermano documenti su documenti, che la maggior parte degli attori istituzionali libici che fanno parte del comitato direttivo per il sostegno alla gestione integrata delle frontiere e della migrazione in Libia (SIBBMMIL), finanziato dall’UE, configurano un quadro frammentato della governance della migrazione in Libia, che è priva di forti istituzioni centrali, soprattutto nella Libia occidentale. È inoltre pienamente consapevole, ed il rapporto dell’ECA lo conferma, che le milizie sono collegate in diversi modi agli attori governativi poiché la gestione della migrazione è diventata un business redditizio. Le milizie beneficiano del circuito economico della gestione della migrazione sia formalmente (attraverso contratti) che informalmente (schiavitù, estorsione). I principali soggetti istituzionali coinvolti nella migrazione e nella gestione delle frontiere e con i quali l’UE collabora sono la Direzione per la lotta all’immigrazione illegale (DCIM), la Guardia costiera libica (LCG), l’Autorità generale per la sicurezza costiera (GACS), l’Agenzia per la sicurezza delle frontiere (BSA) ), l’autorità competente per i passaporti, le guardie di frontiera terrestri (LBG), il ministero degli Interni (MOI) e il ministero degli Affari esteri (MOFA).

Malgrado gli abusi commessi dalle autorità libiche ai danni dei migranti intercettati in mare o internati nei centri di detenzione siano confermati da inchieste giudiziarie e da report di tutte le agenzie umanitarie, come Amnesty International o Human Rights Watch, sembra ormai prossimo un ulteriore rafforzamento del supporto dell’Unione europea alla sedicente Guardia costiera “libica”. La composizione del nuovo Parlamento europeo, e della probabile Commissione, guidata ancora una volta da Ursula von der Leyen, non promettono nulla di buono.

3. Come scrive Lorenzo Bagnoli in un recente articolo pubblicato da OpenDemocracy, “Lo scorso luglio, davanti a una delegazione di giornalisti, il capo della Guardia costiera libica (LCG) ha dichiarato che quest’anno i suoi equipaggi hanno salvato più di 9.300 persone dal Mar Mediterraneo. Masoud Abdul Samad ha elogiato la professionalità del gruppo e ha affermato che continuerà a svolgere i propri compiti dal nuovo Centro di coordinamento del salvataggio marittimo della Libia, finanziato dall’UE, una volta che diventerà operativo a ottobre.” Secondo la stesso articolo, “Il discorso di Samad è arrivato il giorno dopo che il primo ministro libico, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, ha esortato l’Europa a inviare più soldi per impedire alle persone di transitare attraverso la Libia per cercare di raggiungere l’Europa. Ha detto agli Stati che hanno una “responsabilità morale” nei confronti dei migranti e dei rifugiati e che dovrebbero sostenere i loro partner nordafricani nel proteggere i loro confini.“

Sembrano dunque tracciate le prossime tappe di una ulteriore cooperazione rafforzata tra Unione europea e governo di Tripoli. Che poi la Cirenaica ed il Fezzan, zona di transito di tutti i migranti subsahariani diretti verso le coste del Mediterraneo, non siano sotto il controllo del governo provvisorio di Dbeibah, sembra non interessare a nessuno. Tanto basta annunciare ulteriori accordi con la Guardia costiera “libica” ed addirittura l’avvio di una Centrale unificata dei soccorsi in mare (MRCC), che sarebbe stata anche una precondizione per il riconoscimento di una zona SAR (di ricerca e salvataggio), che alla Libia manca da anni. E si continuano a lodare i successi delle sedicenti guardie costiere libiche. sotto l’occho vigile degli assetti aerei di Frontex, che contribuiscono al tracciamento ed alla intercettazione delle imbarcazioni con cui i migranti cercano di fuggire dalla Libia.

Sarebbe tuttavia troppo facile concentrare tutte le responsabilità sull’Unione europea, nascondendo il ruolo decisivo dei governi dei paesi costieri nel Mediterraneo centrale, e dell’Italia in particolare. Questa relazione della Corte dei conti europea mette allo scoperto le complicità delle autorità italiane ed europee negli abusi commessi dalle milizie, dalle tante guardie costiere e forze di sicurezza, che si contendono il campo, e il controllo del mare, all’ombra del governo provvisorio di Tripoli. Una contesa che continua a dilaniare al suo interno la Tripolitania, a sua volta in conflitto con la Cirenaica sotto il controllo del generale Haftar. Si tratta di una situazione ormai degenerata, che cancella il rispetto dei diritti umani, oltre che del diritto di asilo, che non può essere rimossa dal governo italiano che spaccia il successo degli accordi di collaborazione con i libici, nascondendo fatti gravi come i tanti naufragi “al largo delle coste libiche”, magari a poche miglia da Lampedusa, e gravissimi conflitti interni confermati dalla crisi della Banca centrale e dall’uccisione del comandante dell’Accademia navale libica,. Una vicenda che rimane torbida anche dopo gli arresti dei presunti colpevoli, a loro volta componenti di altre milizie di sicurezza che controllano intere parti della Tripolitania. La frammentazione politica, militare e territoriale della Libia è tanto percepibile che risulta davvero offensivo per le vittime, per le persone intrappolate nei centri lager o riportate indietro dalla guardia costiera “libica”, continuare a parlare di una unica zona SAR (di ricerca e salvataggio) “libica”, e di una centrale di cordinamento unificata (JRCC), quando la realtà dei fatti smentisce ogni giorno quello che i governanti europei affermano per garantirsi consensi elettorali e rapporti economici privilegiati. La Libia come Stato unitario, titolare di una zona di ricerca e soccorso (SAR) dotata di una unica Centrale di coordinamento (MRCC) non esiste.

Un contributo importante per modificare una situazione che vede contrastati ogni giorno di più il soccorso in mare ed il diritto di accedere ad un porto sicuro per chiedere asilo, può venire dai tribunali italiani, e dal Tribunale penale internazionale, al quale è giunta recentemente una denuncia sulla collusione tra le autorità libiche ed italiane nelle operazioni di intercettazione in mare e di riconduzione nei porti libici. Operazioni di respingimento collettivo su delega, delle quali il ministro dell’interno Piantedosi si vanta in ogni occasione, anche sui canali social a disposizione del Viminale, con dichiarazioni che suonano come una ammissione di responsabilità per tutti gli abusi commessi dalla guardia costiera libica, e poi a terra dalle milizie che riescono a ottenere i finanziamenti europei, per essere rifornite di mezzi e attrezzature dalle autorità italiane.

Sarebbe tempo soprattutto che su questioni tanto gravi il governo la smetta con le strumentalizzazioni, che arrivano al punto di appropriarsi di vittime della mafia che hanno pagato con la vita la loro lotta per la legalità. Come riporta l’ANSA, secondo quanto affermato da Giorgia Meloni, alla conclusione dell’ultimo G7, “sulla lotta al traffico di essere umani abbiamo portato un modello tutto italiano che nasce da due grandi italiani come Falcone e Borsellino e che ci dice di seguire i soldi: follow the money”, e la Presidente del Consiglio aggiunge che tale approccio “può fare la differenza”. Negli ultimi mesi, non a caso, le notizie su quanto sono costretti a pagare ai trafficanti i migranti che riescono a fuggire dalla Libia e dalla Tunisia precedono le notizie sulle tante vittime, anche bambini, delle politiche di deterrenza e di abbandono in mare. Quanto rileva adesso la Corte dei conti europea conferma che occorre davvero “seguire i soldi”. Ma non sono certo quelli estorti a chi lotta per la sopravvivenza, quanto piuttosto quelli che vengono pagati dagli Stati menbri e dall’Unione europea alle milizie ed ai governi con i quali si concludono accordi “per combattere l’immigrazione clandestina”, un fiume di danaro che come confermano i revisori contabili europei con il loro linguaggio felpato, finisce nelle tasche delle stesse organizzazioni criminali che Meloni, Piantedosi ed i loro partner europei ed africani sostengono di volere contrastare.

▻https://www.a-dif.org/2024/09/26/la-corte-dei-conti-europea-critica-il-sostegno-alla-guardia-costiera-libica

Special report 17/2024 : The EU #trust_fund_for_Africa – Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/19c3981d1-f52fd9/OETqZi6ggj41/ocbvveGPrFbbXFT8q082EpDOIohFQZGkeRkddvXo.png

Established in 2015, the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is an EU response to address the root causes of migration, instability and internal displacements in Africa. We followed up our 2018 recommendations and assessed whether the EUTF has improved the focus of its support, while showing due concern for human rights. We found that supported projects have reported the delivery of many results. However, the #EUTF support remains insufficiently focused on the agreed priorities. Furthermore, there are weaknesses in the accuracy and sustainability of reported results and a lack of procedures and follow-up on allegations of human rights violations. With a view to the ending of the EUTF and/or future development action, we make four recommendations.

▻https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-17
#European_court_of_auditors

A bottomless pit: billions more euros for externalised border controls

In view of the recently concluded mid-term review of the EU’s budget, funding for the externalisation of migration control has been at the top of the political agendas of EU member states and institutions. In the words of the European Commission and the European External Action Service, funding “ensure[s] that the actions undertaken… continue delivering results.” A substantial increase in the EU budget is on the cards, at the same time as a possible shift towards a supposedly new “preventive model” for external migration control.

Funding externalisation under the 2021-2027 EU budget

Under the current budget, EU border externalisation initiatives are funded through three Commission Directorate-Generals: Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). They oversee a variety of different funds that, either in whole or in part, provide what in EU jargon is called “external funding” – that is, funding for projects outside EU territory.

DG NEAR is responsible for the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) as well as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (#NDICI) funds earmarked for the EU’s “neighbourhood.” DG INTPA administers NDICI funds which are destined for countries beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. This fund, also referred to as “Global Europe,” channels the biggest share of external funding.

DG HOME is responsible for the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (#AMIF), the Border Management and Visa Instrument (#BMVI), and the Internal Security Fund (#ISF). With regard to externalisation, the AMIF focuses “on supporting actions that are not development-oriented and serve the interest of internal Union policies.” The ISF focuses on enhancing cooperation with third countries “in areas of relevance to the Union’s internal security,” including “combating cross-border criminal smuggling networks.” A report by Statewatch and the Transnational Institute explains in more detail how the home affairs funds finance border externalisation.

Finally, certain agencies, such as Frontex, the European Asylum Agency (EUAA) and Europol, hold their own budgets which may be used for migration and border related projects beyond EU borders.

NDICI: institutionalising “#containment_development”

NDICI is fundamental to the external dimension of EU migration control. With a budget of €79.5 billion, it replaces and merges ten different external funding instruments into one. It is the EU’s main development instrument and, as set out in the founding legislation, 93% of NDICI funds must comply with Official Development Assistance (#ODA) criteria, such as recipient country ownership. ODA is supposed to promote and specifically target the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

At the same time, the NDICI Regulation sets a target for 10% of the total fund to be “dedicated particularly to actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement.” As the Commission’s report on the use of external funding instruments for 2022 shows, 13.6% of the total committed in 2022 was dedicated to migration. This not only underscores the often-raised criticism of diverting development aid for migration control purposes, but also represents a risk to the integrity of ODA. Evaluations of funding under the NDICI by CeSPI and Oxfam have further cemented these concerns.

Some of the projects funded under NDICI are a direct continuation of projects financed by the European #Trust_Fund for Africa (#EUTF), a €5 billion initiative launched in 2015 which fostered what has been termed the “containment” approach to development. Through this, development interventions for issues such as job creation or adaptation to climate change are based on the idea that addressing these “root causes” will diminish majority world citizens’ ambitions to move to Europe.

A draft action file produced by the Council of the EU’s Operational Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration (MOCADEM) in January 2023 shows that NDICI is seen as a direct continuation of the EUTF. There is therefore an evident path dependency and normalisation of such migration-related interventions creeping into broader development aims.

This instrumentalisation of development is further highlighted by the built-in “flexible incitative [sic] approach” of NDICI. This “positive” conditionality mechanism aims to reward countries for their willingness to engage in, for example, fighting against smuggling and trafficking or showing cooperation on deportation and readmission. However, making access to development aid conditional on migration control objectives has been criticised, not least because it goes against the EU’s own development principles and leads to ineffective assistance when funding does not go where it is most needed.

For the EU’s “Southern Neighbourhood”[1] there is a “Multi-Country Migration Programme for the Southern Neighbourhood” (MCMP) which is supposed to “provide a flexible source of funding”, allowing for special measures and “country-specific actions that… offer to selected countries an incentive to go beyond what their country MIP [multiannual indicative programme] offers, in line with a flexible incitative approach”. In Sub-Saharan Africa this approach is operationalised through the action “Flexible Mechanism for Migration and Forced Displacement”. However, there is a lack of transparency regarding what is funded under this mechanism, which has so far mobilised €200m, and how countries are selected to receive additional funding.

Member states in the driving seat

While civil society and the European Parliament lament a lack of oversight and transparency of NDICI projects, member states have increased their role through the “NDICI Coordination Group on Migration,” which was set up specifically for member states to oversee migration programming under the NDICI.

Member states are also highly involved in the Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs). These are initiatives involving EU and national institutions and agencies “around which European funding instruments and modalities coalesce to bring a transformational impact“ in a selected priority area – one of which is irregular migration. NDICI projects are supposed to support these initiatives, but other funding methods and partners are also used.

For example, the TEI on the Central Mediterranean brings together the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), along with 11 EU and Schengen member states,[2] which have together mobilised €1.13 billion in national and EU funding. The TEI on the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean Route is taken forward by the Commission and the EEAS, with nine EU and Schengen member states,[3] which have so far mobilised €908 million. Even if “Team Europe” is essentially a branding exercise, it is one which provides another way to create alliances for further externalising migration control.

Mid-term review: more funding for migration control

The mid-term review of the current EU budget, the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–27, was finalised this spring. It was launched by the Commission in June 2023, with the institution calling for an increase in the EU budget due to the economic situation and the war in Ukraine, which had “pushed the resources of the EU budget to the point of exhaustion.”

Several important changes have been agreed. Earlier this year, the Council gave final approval to a total of €64.6 billion in additional funding, which was approved by the Parliament. Of this amount, €7.6 billion is for NDICI, aiming at, amongst other things, the “continuation of actions previously undertaken through the EU Trust Fund for Africa.”

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An additional €2 billion will go to the AMIF and BMVI funds, as well as the budget of the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA). This is to address “urgent challenges and needs related to migration and border management” and the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the heavily criticized border procedure.

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Finally, the maximum amount of the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) has been increased by €1.5 billion. This fund is dedicated to both natural disasters on European territories and natural disasters and humanitarian crises in non-EU states.

A Spanish Council presidency paper discussed in the following section gives some indication of how the additional funding may be used.

Spanish presidency paper: proposals to improve the “effectiveness” of externalisation funding

A November 2023 document illustrates both the priorities of the Spanish Council presidency (in place from July-December 2023) and grants some insight into how the increased funding may be used. It builds on an earlier presidency paper that called for the necessity “to achieve more and better funding for the external dimension of migration.”

The paper contains several suggestions to render internal EU coordination more efficient. It proposes strengthening existing Council working parties or establishing a new ad hoc Council mechanism to monitor the use of funds more closely. It also calls for more regular and systematic dissemination of information on externalisation funding, including the improvement of online databases such as the Financial Transparency System (FTS) and EU Aid Explorer.

A “migration marker” used by EU officials to track the use of NDICI funds for migration purposes could be extended to other funds, the paper suggests. It also strongly emphasises the need for more “executive and short-term funding mechanisms” to prevent irregular migration, and highlights that the development objective of NDICI restrains the more operational needs required for a “preventive model”.

The Spanish presidency’s proposed “preventive model” (a term coined in September 2023) deviates from the more common, but equally contested, understanding of a preventive approach that focuses on “root causes”. Instead, it is primarily concerned with operational border and migration management efforts in non-EU states: for example, the purchase of vehicles, vessels, and surveillance equipment; or meeting the needs of forcibly displaced persons hosted by partner countries. To back up this approach, the paper says EU member states “should consider the possibilities of strengthening other funding tools of our external dimension toolbox.”

Whose crisis?

According to the Spanish Presidency, a “preventive approach” is necessary because longer-term actions focusing on root causes both fail to “effectively address the migration crises that have already erupted” and “to prevent impending crises that are building up.” This framing overshadows the structural reasons that cause “crises” to emerge in the first place and demonstrates the productivity of crisis labelling.

Firstly, labelling something as a “migration crisis” shifts the focus from the humanitarian crises produced by the absence of safe and legal pathways to a perceived crisis of state sovereignty. In doing so, it silences the fact that migrants encounter crises on their journeys, which are themselves the result of restrictive migration governance and the absence of legal pathways.

Secondly, crisis and emergency framing has been used by EU agencies and member states to derogate from legal norms and safeguards. An emphasis on operational cooperation with third states is likely to enhance this trend.

Thirdly, EU-funded border and migration control capacities in non-EU countries are likely to aggravate the very crises they aim to solve – rendering available pathways more dangerous without significantly reducing migration. This possibility is particularly concerning given the use of the “more for more principle,” heralded by the Spanish presidency as ensuring “genuine involvement of partner countries.” Ultimately, this means that more financial, material and other resources are given to the countries most willing to cooperate in the EU’s migration containment agenda.

Putting “capacity building” into perspective

The Spanish presidency’s emphasis on operational support and the “more for more principle” are not new. Two decades ago, the EU set up its first financial instrument dedicated to the provision of financial and material support to non-EU countries for migration and border management operations. Meanwhile, the “more for more principle” was first introduced in 2011 under the EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

Since then, scholars have considered how this so-called capacity building has helped frame migration control initiatives as technocratic, neutral and apolitical. Other research has shown that it reproduces Eurocentric categories of migration governance that do not neatly map onto, for example, less state-centric notions of mobility in countries such as Niger. Further, research has warned of the possibility of it negatively affecting freedom of movement within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, scholars have pointed to the often self-serving nature of capacity building as such, often profiting and being driven by the European (and global) border-industrial complex.

Migration control considerations that require strengthening the security apparatus of partner states are a central element in capacity building initiatives. Strong concerns have been raised by journalists and rights groups. These concerns pertain to human rights abuses and a lack of scrutiny.

EU funding for so-called migration management has resulted in pushbacks of refugees and migrant workers to the deserts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania. Finally, rights groups have repeatedly warned over the negative human rights implications of some projects funded under the NDICI in Tunisia and Libya, especially those building the capacities of the Tunisian and Libyan coast guards. Furthermore, recurrent drownings have been reported at the hands of the Senegalese navy, which has received support from the EU and its member states, in particular Spain, for almost two decades.

Concerns also relate to the question of who is being funded. For example, prior to the outbreak of the current civil war in Sudan, EU migration funds have reportedly indirectly supported the Rapid Support Forces. Another recurrent question raised by journalists pertains to the question of what (else) is happening with donated materials. In Senegal, vehicles donated by the EU through the EUTF were used to violently repress democratic protests in 2023.

Finally, there is the collateral damage accepted by EU policy makers. These concerns have been raised strongly in regard to the EU’s anti-smuggling agenda in pre-coup Niger, but also more recently in the context of the EU- Mauritania deal and its linked support for capacity building. Here, observers have raised strong concerns over how these measures aggravate acute risks for the Afro-Mauritanian community, (further) inflaming racial tensions and social polarization in the country.

Besides these concerns, shifting geopolitical alliances on the African continent also puts in question the future feasibility of the EU externalisation agenda. The ongoing political reconfigurations are likely to impact the EU’s ability to be an “agenda setter”. This is most starkly illustrated by the 2023 military coup in Niger which has resulted not only in the suspension of security cooperation and financial support to the country by the EU, but also the abrogation of the much-criticized 2015 law against migrant smuggling by the Nigerien government. In a statement announcing the repeal, the military government stated that the law “did not take into account the interests of Niger and its citizens.”

Put differently, the shifting geopolitical context has enabled African states to challenge the EU and EU member states as hegemonic actors. Therefore, an additional question emerges: whether the EU is at risk of undermining its relations with non-EU countries when it pushes them to adopt migration policies which contribute to the global racialized exclusion of their citizens, negatively affect local economies and lead to human insecurity.

Besides the wider concerns raised above, policies that perpetuate longstanding asymmetric and unequal relations in the field of migration and beyond, are untenable in the longer term. Working towards establishing truly mutually beneficial relations is not only advisable but necessary. The emphasis on enhancing operational cooperation in the EU’s external migration and border management, mirrored both in the proposed MFF budget increase and the Spanish presidency paper, instead falls within the longer-term, broader logics of the increasingly challenged toolbox of EU security and migration control.

Ways forward

Billions more euros are being made available for EU migration and border control externalisation initiatives through the mid-term revision of the EU budget. The Spanish presidency paper offers a glimpse behind the scenes of the negotiations and offers some idea of what moving towards a “preventive approach”, centred around operational capacity-building, means in practice.

While the risks of such an approach are not unknown, the key to challenging it is to build a better understanding of what is happening on the ground. To do so, European civil society needs to develop and reinforce alliances with partners in countries affected by EU policies, to enable joint challenges and confrontations to the externalisation agenda. Civil society may also make use of the concern of some member states – or, at least, the Spanish delegation – over the opacity of EU spending on externalisation. This may make it possible to exert pressure for more transparency of EU external migration funding and its translation into projects on the ground.

Leonie Jegen and Zina Weisner for migration-control.info

Notes

[1] Encompassing Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.

[2] Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

[3] Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland

►https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/a-bottomless-pit-billions-more-euros-for-externalised-border-controls

#root_causes #causes_profondes #développement #réfugiés_syriens

Visa sanctions to increase deportations

Changes to the EU’s rules on visa issuance that came into force in 2020 have made it possible for sanctions to be introduced against states that fail to cooperate with deportations. For example, non-EU states that consistently fail to provide identity documents for their own nationals facing deportation from the EU can have visa fees increased, or the examination of applications slowed down. The tool appears to be popular with EU institutions and member states, and changes are on the way to “improve” its functioning. This analysis examines the mechanism itself, measures proposed or adopted under the mechanism, and recent proposals to develop and reform the system, and considers the way in which the idea of “solidarity” (between EU member states and EU bodies) is used as a weapon against third countries.

Visas: privilege and apartheid

In May 2024 the Commission published figures indicating that 10.3 million worldwide short-stay visa applications were received by EU and Schengen-associated countries, a 37% increase compared to 2022’s 5.9 million applications, but much lower than the figure for 2019 (17 million). A similar pattern applies to the number of visas issued (8.5 million in 2023; 5.9 million in 2022; and 15 million in 2019), as the visa refusal rate declined slightly (from 17.9% in 2022 to 16% in 2023). Over half the visas issued in 2023 (54.2%) allowed multiple entry, compared to 58.1% in 2022, marking a slight decrease. In addition, 85,200 uniform visas were issued at external border points in 2023.

The visa mechanism also operates within a context that has been criticised for establishing a situation of “passport privilege” and “visa apartheid”, particularly regarding Africans’ access to Europe and America. A 2020 study documented the experiences of Tunisians suffering from higher costs and more restrictive policies, and complaints about the costly, burdensome and discriminatory nature of EU visa procedures often arise from civil society groups in non-EU countries. For instance, in late 2022 high refusal rates for north Africans were criticised, and in November 2023 complaints emerged from Senegal about north-south discrimination, costs and profiteering practices linked to securing interviews and access to the procedure. The visa sanction mechanism outlined in this piece is likely to intensify such problems, yet this does not appear to have been considered amidst efforts to make cooperation between EU and non-EU states on deportation and readmission more “effective”.

Article 25a: visa sanctions for deportations

The EU’s longstanding push to increase deportations (“returns”, in official jargon) has seen efforts targeted at all parts of the deportation procedure. The possibility for visa sanctions introduced by article 25a of the Visa Code relates to readmission procedures: the political and bureaucratic guarantees required from non-EU states to enable the return and admission of their citizens removed from EU territory into their country, such as agreeing to accept deportations in the first place, the provision of identity documents for individuals, or landing permits for deportation flights.

Article 25a(1) of the revised Visa Code establishes that insufficient cooperation by a non-EU state with readmission proceedings may entail a suspension of favourable measures for citizens of the country concerned that apply for Schengen visas. For example, the EU can choose to suspend:

- fast-track procedures for applicants “known to the consulate or the central authorities for his integrity and reliability, in particular as regards the lawful use of previous visas” (article 14.6);
- the waiving of visa fees for holders of diplomatic or service passports (article 16(5b));
- the 15-day time limit for decisions on applications (article 23(1));
- issuance of multi-entry visas (art. 24(2)) and five-year multi-entry visas (art. 24(2c))for all nationals.

If the adoption of such measures fails to improve cooperation, higher visa fees (€120 or €160) for nationals of the third country in question (except for children under 12 years old) may be introduced.

The procedure under article 25a lays out a framework for continuous monitoring of cooperation on readmission and returns, with the Commission obliged to produce an annual report for the Council’s consideration. The criteria to be considered include return decisions issued, forced returns, readmission requests accepted (by member state), assistance in identification, acceptance of an EU travel document or laissez-passer for returns, acceptance of people to be returned to their home country, of return flights and operations. Attention is also paid to how many third-country nationals residing illegally in EU territory have transited through a third country, and whether they accept returns of people who travelled through their territory.

The intensive nature of this monitoring has led to member state complaints (see the “effectiveness of the visa leverage” section, below) about the administrative burden in relation to third states from which they have few visa applications and/or a low number of people subject to expulsion orders for illegal entry and stay. It must be noted that in the Visa Code itself, and in subsequent policy and discussion documents, third countries and their authorities feature merely as actors to be subjected to concerted pressure to secure cooperation.

Proposals to date

Since February 2020, when the Visa Code reform introduced the possibility to apply restrictive visa measures to third countries for inadequate cooperation on readmission, the Commission has tabled proposals concerning Iraq, Bangladesh, Senegal, The Gambia and Ethiopia. A document (17111/23) circulated by the Spanish Council presidency in January this year, for a meeting of the Council’s Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX), summarised the history of each proposal.

In the presidency paper, Iraq is repeatedly cited as an example of best practices. Adoption of a first proposal for restrictive visa measures in July 2021 was averted after constructive engagement by Iraq to help resolve the Belarus border crisis, although shortcomings in cooperation continued, as reported by member states. Measures were proposed again in 2022, and Iraq promised to cooperate in March 2023. In May 2023, Iraq announced that it had lifted a moratorium on accepting forced returns, flanked by outreach towards EU states and indication of a willingness to sign bilateral readmission agreements. The EU deadline thus slid to the October meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, when Iraqi willingness to conclude a non-binding EU-Iraq instrument on readmission and return resulted in the opening of a discussion, scheduled for January 2024.

Restrictive visa measures were proposed for Bangladesh in July 2021. Improved cooperation levels resulted in the measures not being adopted, but member states insisted on keeping the proposal on the table until improvement with all member states was deemed sustainable, but the quality of cooperation was reported as having decreased “significantly” in 2022.

In the case of Senegal, restrictive measures were proposed in November 2022 (and discussed in the Council’s Visa Working Party), alongside intense contacts and an improvement in cooperation with some member states, although the picture was mixed and the outcome of February 2024 elections was pending.

Germany notified the Commission in February 2021 of “substantial and persisting practical problems” with The Gambia, and restrictive visa measures were proposed in July 2021 and adopted in October. A Commission report concluded that the measures had been ineffective despite limited improvements, leading to the proposal and adoption of an increased visa fee in November and December 2022. Cooperation in organising return flights and operations led to repeal of the visa fee measure in December 2023, but the original visa restriction measures were maintained due to insufficient overall cooperation on readmission (assistance in identification, timely issuing of travel documents, frequency of flights). Nevertheless, deportations to The Gambia have resumed, with Yahya Sonko, an advocate for the rights of Gambian migrants in Germany, recently said:

“…deportations exacerbate the already challenging situation in The Gambia, where the government is struggling to manage high youth unemployment rates. The return of hundreds of citizens each year without adequate reintegration support only serves to worsen the socioeconomic conditions for deportees and their families.”

In the case of Ethiopia, a Commission evaluation led to a proposal for visa sanctions in September 2023 (suspension of waiver of visa document requirement, of 15-day processing deadline, of multi-entry visa issuing and of visa fee waiver for diplomats and holders of service passports). The following month, a “note verbale” by the Ethiopian authorities announced resumption of the implementation of the 2018 readmission arrangement, alongside a request to renegotiate it. Discussion on the measures has taken place in the EU’s Visa Working Party, and The Commission proposed early 2024 meetings for the EU-Ethiopia working group. Significantly, acknowledgement of an armed conflict in northern Ethiopia from November 2021 to February 2022 did not interrupt these endeavours, nor bring into play considerations as to whether returns to Ethiopia may place people at risk, as reported return rates were low (10% in 2021 and 2022).

Member states discuss a “new approach”

In a document (5114/24) circulated for the January meeting of the Visa Working Party, the Spanish presidency proposed a “new approach” for the 25a procedure that would rejig the way in which internal EU discussions take place.

The proposed approach suggests that introducing punitive visa measures be discussed in the Working Party on Integration, Migration and Expulsion (IMEX) and MOCADEM (operational coordination mechanism for the external dimension of migration), with the Visa Working Party (VWP) only to be involved “at a later stage.” Thus, after an IMEX decision that lack of progress on readmission cooperation warrants adopting visa measures, the VWP would approve such measures and analyse other visa-related aspects.

Alleged shortcomings in past Visa Working Party scrutiny are mentioned in the presidency document:

“…the Visa WP has so far missed the opportunity to examine further the implications of the considered visa measures, especially when adopting visa sanctions towards The Gambia. Those ‘visa-related aspects’ to be discussed could include: the number of visas delivered by the Member States in the third country, the additional administrative burden to be expected and to be considered when deciding on the entry into force of the measures, the potential problems that could arise from the adoption of the measures, etc.”

This appears to be an effort by member states and the Council to seize control of the mechanism and speed it up, as part of efforts to hold the Commission to deadlines to systematically issue visa restriction proposals and to speed up the cycle in pursuit of increased effectiveness (see below).

A further discussion paper (17110/23) on the “Visa Code Article 25a exercise” was circulated by the presidency on 9 January, to prepare the IMEX working party meeting on 16 January (it was also reported on by Statewatch here). The paper reaffirms the purpose of the “visa leverage” provided by article 25a, as the “only legal tool at our disposal for all third countries to improve readmission cooperation.” The “external dimension” (that is, relations with non-EU states) is deemed crucial to increase the number of returns and ensure satisfactory cooperation by third states to readmit “illegally staying third country nationals vis-à-vis all Member States,” regardless of their caseload. Prioritisation of this objective in this semester requires a “strategic discussion” on the visa leverage’s effectiveness, says the document.

The moving of preliminary discussions on the “state of play of outreach towards the relevant third countries and the developments in terms of cooperation on readmission” away from the VWP to the IMEX is also noted in the document, adding that this should “increase the coherence and the effectiveness of the mechanism.” Ensuring that the Commission has concrete deadlines to issue proposals on restrictive visa measures is viewed as potentially fruitful, and follow-up to proposals that are on the table are to be discussed within IMEX.

Weaponising “solidarity” against third countries and a systematic adoption of visa measures

The presidency document on “effectiveness of the visa leverage” (17110/23) contains a troubling assessment of the mechanism’s “credibility, strategy and solidarity.” Credibility requires “a search for the right and delicate balance between incentivizing cooperation by giving enough time and space for dialogue and taking restrictive visa measures when no real progress is observed.” Member states are required to act jointly, “in a true spirit of solidarity, which sometimes might mean prioritizing a wider European interest over the national interests.” Thus, even if progress with some member states is observed, this should not impede visa restriction measures unless it applies to all member states, regardless of caseloads.

Member state requests to lessen administrative burdens by linking the information requested to the size of caseloads have led the Commission to adapt its data collection methods. A timeline adopted in December 2023 aims to reduce gaps between data collection, the Commission’s annual evaluation and subsequent visa measure proposals. The adoption of visa measures is deemed secondary to fostering progress in cooperation by third countries. As the presidency puts it, “[t]he power of the mechanism lies in the political message conveyed by the proposals, rather than the measures themselves,” strengthening the Commission’s credibility in outreach activities.

Nonetheless, “the Presidency believes that the Commission should issue more proposals with regard to other relevant third countries not yet concerned by the proposals currently on the table”. The adoption of positive measures like reducing the visa fee from 80 to 60 euros, the deadline for a decision from 15 to 10 days, or increasing the duration of multiple entry visas also features in the article 25a mechanism, but none have been proposed to date, because the third countries identified already had more favourable visa regimes.

Regarding the Commission’s selection of third countries to be targeted, the paper notes that having to consider the EU’s overall relations with the third country in question (rather than just cooperation on readmission) should not be treated as a “blocking element,” to prevent the mechanism becoming “inoperative towards some priority countries.” Following the Commission report, member states identify priority countries among those whose cooperation is deemed unsatisfactory, which fall into three categories: those facing visa restriction measures proposals; those not facing such proposals but identified by the Council as priorities; and those which do not face visa sanctions proposals and are not deemed priorities. Close scrutiny of all states that do not cooperate adequately is necessary, but its intensity should be tailored to their category, the presidency paper argues.

The strategy section argues that the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) contribution to assessing the “third country national context” is crucial for taking decisions in an “enlightened manner,” and that member state involvement when the Commission prepares outreach and visits to third states enables “strategic decision-making.” The communication of clear deadlines to third country authorities is deemed a best practice, drawing on the example of Iraq. Failure to make progress would result in restrictive visa measures, allowing “the EU to put pressure on the third country in a transparent and precise way.” Dilatory tactics (“delays in the appointment of interlocutors or hindrances to meetings”) should not excuse delays in improving operational cooperation. Formal steps like the negotiation or extension of readmission agreements or arrangements should be deemed separate from “concrete progress on readmission cooperation on the ground,” without affecting cooperation evaluation deadlines.

Regarding the stock of proposals for visa restriction measures under the article 25a mechanism, the management of existing proposals that have not been adopted for years could lead to the Commission withdrawing a proposal but, the presidency paper stresses, this should not be automatic. Moreover, the time that passes without substantial improvement should be a “decisive element” when considering adoption of a decision. Returns of third country nationals posing a security threat must be prioritised, requiring “smooth cooperation on identification, issuance of travel documents and readmission”, for which the article 25a mechanism could contribute to improvement.

The final section on “solidarity” is striking, because it spells out the power play theme mentioned above. In fact, working as “Team Europe” in a coordinated way, “the message brought collectively is more influential and bears concrete results,” says the paper. Iraq is again cited as an example of success in this regard. The possibility provided by article 25a for a simple majority of member states to compel the Commission to submit proposals within 12 months (while continuing efforts to improve cooperation) has not been used to date. Yet, it is viewed as a “solution” to demonstrate “solidarity” among member states and to “send a strong signal to third countries.”

Moreover, improving cooperation with some member states should not be deemed adequate to prevent adoption of restrictive visa measures towards a third country unless it applies to all member states regardless of caseloads. A united Council position to prioritise EU interests when outreach does not produce “substantial and sustainable progress” should adopt restrictive measures:

“The importance of solidarity between Member States at this stage of the mechanism is a key element to further put the third country under pressure and also to ensure the credibility of the Article 25a mechanism.”

Visa Code evaluation: speeding up cooperation on readmission

Whilst member states were considering ways to enhance the implementation of article 25a, the Commission was undertaking a broader assessment of the EU’s Visa Code. The evaluation includes an examination of cooperation on return, readmission and migration management, which suggests that procedures should be accelerated to increase effectiveness.

The main problem identified in the evaluation was the length of the cycles, which was deemed to have hindered accomplishment of the Visa Code reform’s three main goals (below). These are supposed to run annually but have previously exceeded a year in length, resulting in overlaps and faulty evaluation. Nevertheless, the Commission supports a need for flexibility to factor in different aspects to the discussion. The delay between approval of the Commission report and the submission of Commission proposals is identified as the main impediment. Seven member states, and the French and Czech Council presidencies, called for a shorter cycle to address these shortcomings.

Discussions mentioned in the annual evaluation of the Visa Code include the involvement of different stakeholders and Eurostat and Frontex data used in the annual assessment report, which the EU Court of Auditors identified as containing “weaknesses” in 2021. Frontex has bemoaned the lack of a “robust, integrated electronic data collection system” in several member states, but it supports them in developing integrated return case management systems connected to a central hub operated by the agency, intended to improve data on removals and readmission. Despite member states putting mechanisms in place to temper such shortcomings and duly fill in the relevant questionnaire, they complain about the administrative burden involved.

The overall evaluation on the three goals that motivated the Visa Code reform complains that:

- visa fees did not fully cover administrative expenses incurred by member states for visa issuing;
- an unclear legal basis has resulted in discrepancies and in most member states developing “restrictive practices when issuing multiple-entry visas” (MEVs); and
- a lack of cooperation and “low levels of readmission and return of irregular migrants to countries of origin” persist.

Strikingly, while the EEAS called for further involvement in providing expertise about the situation in third countries for the annual article 25a evaluation report (and three member states calling for more information on the political context), this was opposed by the Commission because “including this type of political analysis would detract from the current technical focus and factual nature of the reports.” Eurostat data is used regarding expulsion decisions and effective return rates, whereas Frontex data is used for readmission requests (by member states) and travel documents issued (by third countries). This apparently restricts the scope of the article 25a requirement for the Commission to take into account overall relations with a third state when deciding upon proposals for visa restriction measures. It also appears to exemplify efforts to subordinate the formal level (such as ensuring that deportations do not violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) in cooperation with third countries to the operative level, squarely focused on achieving strategic migration policy goals (like higher rates of removal, regardless of other considerations).

Single-minded approach

The documents examined display a wilful lack of critical scrutiny of the mechanism (other than on the basis of achieving operational goals) and of assessment on proportionality based on the size of caseloads and on conditions in third countries that may mean that some deportations may be unsafe from a formal viewpoint. There appears to be a strong drive to improve “effectiveness” and to speed up the process to pressure third country authorities, even if this may worsen the quality of decision-making and limit the information and stakeholders involved. Only four years after the mechanism was first introduced, amidst admissions that it is burdensome, the Council and some member states already appear eager to pile on pressure to cooperate on targeted third countries and to limit the Commission’s margins of appreciation and initiative before imposing or threatening to impose restrictions to visa access for their citizens, for the sake of “effectiveness”.

The idea of “solidarity” being used as a weapon to break a third country’s resistance to measures that may penalise their citizens – for example, by increasing the likelihood of them being targeted by police operations in the EU to enable deportations, to lessen remittances from abroad, or give rise to opposition by civil society – is not palatable. Moreover, successes and best practices that are highlighted may amount to the EU and its member states (as “Team Europe”) succeeding in achieving unlawful outcomes (in the case of returns that may place people at risk, for instance in Iraq and Ethiopia).

Furthermore, the risk that good cooperation on readmission and returns may lead to unsafe third countries being declared “safe” to enable swift refusals of asylum and/or protection, linked to speedy returns at the operative level, may restrict access to protection for bona fide refugees and protection seekers. There is no guarantee that people may not be targeted by authorities and/or armed groups in target countries like Senegal and The Gambia, whereas the Bangladeshi example also brings the issue of potential climate refugees into the picture.

►https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-2/visa-sanctions-to-increase-deportations

Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (2/4) : « Nous avons besoin d’aide, pas d’outils sécuritaires »

Au Sénégal, la création et l’équipement de postes-frontières constituent des éléments clés du partenariat avec l’Union européenne. Une stratégie pas toujours efficace, tandis que les services destinés aux migrants manquent cruellement de financements.

Par une étouffante journée de mars, j’arrive au poste de contrôle poussiéreux du village sénégalais de #Moussala, à la frontière avec le #Mali. Des dizaines de camions et de motos attendent, en ligne, de traverser ce point de transit majeur. Après avoir demandé pendant des mois, en vain, la permission au gouvernement d’accéder au poste-frontière, j’espère que le chef du poste m’expliquera dans quelle mesure les financements européens influencent leurs opérations. Refusant d’entrer dans les détails, il me confirme que son équipe a récemment reçu de l’Union européenne (UE) des formations et des équipements dont elle se sert régulièrement. Pour preuve, un petit diplôme et un trophée, tous deux estampillés du drapeau européen, trônent sur son bureau.

La création et l’équipement de postes-frontières comme celui de Moussala constituent des éléments clés du partenariat entre l’UE et l’#Organisation_internationale_pour_les_migrations (#OIM). Outre les technologies de surveillance fournies aux antennes de la Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), chaque poste-frontière est équipé de systèmes d’analyse des données migratoires et de systèmes biométriques de reconnaissance faciale et des empreintes digitales.

Officiellement, l’objectif est de créer ce que les fonctionnaires européens appellent un système africain d’#IBM, à savoir « #Integrated_Border_Management » (en français, « gestion intégrée des frontières »). Dans un communiqué de 2017, le coordinateur du projet de l’OIM au Sénégal déclarait : « La gestion intégrée des frontières est plus qu’un simple concept, c’est une culture. » Il avait semble-t-il en tête un changement idéologique de toute l’Afrique, qui ne manquerait pas selon lui d’embrasser la vision européenne des migrations.

Technologies de surveillance

Concrètement, ce système IBM consiste à fusionner les #bases_de_données sénégalaises (qui contiennent des données biométriques sensibles) avec les données d’agences de police internationales (comme #Interpol et #Europol). Le but : permettre aux gouvernements de savoir qui franchit quelle frontière et quand. Un tel système, avertissent les experts, peut vite faciliter les expulsions illégales et autres abus.

Le risque est tout sauf hypothétique. En 2022, un ancien agent des services espagnols de renseignement déclarait au journal El Confidencial que les autorités de plusieurs pays d’Afrique « utilisent les technologies fournies par l’Espagne pour persécuter et réprimer des groupes d’opposition, des militants et des citoyens critiques envers le pouvoir ». Et d’ajouter que le gouvernement espagnol en avait parfaitement conscience.

D’après un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, « tous les projets qui touchent à la sécurité et sont financés par l’UE comportent un volet de formation et de renforcement des capacités en matière de droits humains ». Selon cette même personne, l’UE effectue des études d’impact sur les droits humains avant et pendant la mise en œuvre de ces projets. Mais lorsque, il y a quelques mois, l’eurodéputée néerlandaise Tineke Strik a demandé à voir ces études d’impact, trois différents services de la Commission lui ont envoyé des réponses officielles disant qu’ils ne les avaient pas. En outre, selon un de ces services, « il n’existe pas d’obligation réglementaire d’en faire ».

Au Sénégal, les libertés civiles sont de plus en plus menacées et ces technologies de surveillance risquent d’autant plus d’être utilisées à mauvais escient. Rappelons qu’en 2021, les forces de sécurité sénégalaises ont tué quatorze personnes qui manifestaient contre le gouvernement ; au cours des deux dernières années, plusieurs figures de l’opposition et journalistes sénégalais ont été emprisonnés pour avoir critiqué le gouvernement, abordé des questions politiques sensibles ou avoir « diffusé des fausses nouvelles ». En juin, après qu’Ousmane Sonko, principal opposant au président Macky Sall, a été condamné à deux ans d’emprisonnement pour « corruption de la jeunesse », de vives protestations ont fait 23 morts.

« Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi »

Alors que j’allais renoncer à discuter avec la police locale, à Tambacounda, autre grand point de transit non loin des frontières avec le Mali et la Guinée, un policier de l’immigration en civil a accepté de me parler sous couvert d’anonymat. C’est de la région de #Tambacounda, qui compte parmi les plus pauvres du Sénégal, que proviennent la plupart des candidats à l’immigration. Là-bas, tout le monde, y compris le policier, connaît au moins une personne qui a tenté de mettre les voiles pour l’Europe.

« Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi », me confie-t-il par l’entremise d’un interprète, après s’être éloigné à la hâte du poste-frontière. Les investissements de l’UE « n’ont rien changé du tout », poursuit-il, notant qu’il voit régulièrement des personnes en provenance de Guinée passer par le Sénégal et entrer au Mali dans le but de gagner l’Europe.

Depuis son indépendance en 1960, le Sénégal est salué comme un modèle de démocratie et de stabilité, tandis que nombre de ses voisins sont en proie aux dissensions politiques et aux coups d’Etat. Quoi qu’il en soit, plus d’un tiers de la population vit sous le seuil de pauvreté et l’absence de perspectives pousse la population à migrer, notamment vers la France et l’Espagne. Aujourd’hui, les envois de fonds de la diaspora représentent près de 10 % du PIB sénégalais. A noter par ailleurs que, le Sénégal étant le pays le plus à l’ouest de l’Afrique, de nombreux Ouest-Africains s’y retrouvent lorsqu’ils fuient les problèmes économiques et les violences des ramifications régionales d’Al-Qaida et de l’Etat islamique (EI), qui ont jusqu’à présent contraint près de 4 millions de personnes à partir de chez elles.

« L’UE ne peut pas résoudre les problèmes en construisant des murs et en distribuant de l’argent, me dit le policier. Elle pourra financer tout ce qu’elle veut, ce n’est pas comme ça qu’elle mettra fin à l’immigration. » Les sommes qu’elle dépense pour renforcer la police et les frontières, dit-il, ne servent guère plus qu’à acheter des voitures climatisées aux policiers des villes frontalières.

Pendant ce temps, les services destinés aux personnes expulsées – comme les centres de protection et d’accueil – manquent cruellement de financements. Au poste-frontière de Rosso, des centaines de personnes sont expulsées chaque semaine de Mauritanie. Mbaye Diop travaille avec une poignée de bénévoles du centre que la Croix-Rouge a installé du côté sénégalais pour accueillir ces personnes expulsées : des hommes, des femmes et des enfants qui présentent parfois des blessures aux poignets, causées par des menottes, et ailleurs sur le corps, laissées par les coups de la police mauritanienne. Mais Mbaye Diop n’a pas de ressources pour les aider. L’approche n’est pas du tout la bonne, souffle-t-il : « Nous avons besoin d’aide humanitaire, pas d’outils sécuritaires. »

La méthode de la carotte

Pour freiner l’immigration, l’UE teste également la méthode de la carotte : elle propose des subventions aux entreprises locales et des formations professionnelles à ceux qui restent ou rentrent chez eux. La route qui mène à Tambacounda est ponctuée de dizaines et de dizaines de panneaux publicitaires vantant les projets européens.

Dans la réalité, les offres ne sont pas aussi belles que l’annonce l’UE. Binta Ly, 40 ans, en sait quelque chose. A Tambacounda, elle tient une petite boutique de jus de fruits locaux et d’articles de toilette. Elle a fait une année de droit à l’université, mais le coût de la vie à Dakar l’a contrainte à abandonner ses études et à partir chercher du travail au Maroc. Après avoir vécu sept ans à Casablanca et Marrakech, elle est rentrée au Sénégal, où elle a récemment inauguré son magasin.

En 2022, Binta Ly a déposé une demande de subvention au Bureau d’accueil, d’orientation et de suivi (BAOS) qui avait ouvert la même année à Tambacounda, au sein de l’antenne locale de l’Agence régionale de développement (ARD). Financés par l’UE, les BAOS proposent des subventions aux petites entreprises sénégalaises dans le but de dissuader la population d’émigrer. Binta Ly ambitionnait d’ouvrir un service d’impression, de copie et de plastification dans sa boutique, idéalement située à côté d’une école primaire. Elle a obtenu une subvention de 500 000 francs CFA (762 euros) – soit un quart du budget qu’elle avait demandé –, mais peu importe, elle était très enthousiaste. Sauf qu’un an plus tard, elle n’avait toujours pas touché un seul franc.

Dans l’ensemble du Sénégal, les BAOS ont obtenu une enveloppe totale de 1 milliard de francs CFA (1,5 million d’euros) de l’UE pour financer ces subventions. Mais l’antenne de Tambacounda n’a perçu que 60 millions de francs CFA (91 470 euros), explique Abdoul Aziz Tandia, directeur du bureau local de l’ARD. A peine de quoi financer 84 entreprises dans une région de plus d’un demi-million d’habitants. Selon un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, la distribution des subventions a effectivement commencé en avril. Le fait est que Binta Ly a reçu une imprimante et une plastifieuse, mais pas d’ordinateur pour aller avec. « Je suis contente d’avoir ces aides, dit-elle. Le problème, c’est qu’elles mettent très longtemps à venir et que ces retards chamboulent tout mon business plan. »

Retour « volontaire »

Abdoul Aziz Tandia admet que les BAOS ne répondent pas à la demande. C’est en partie la faute de la bureaucratie, poursuit-il : Dakar doit approuver l’ensemble des projets et les intermédiaires sont des ONG et des agences étrangères, ce qui signifie que les autorités locales et les bénéficiaires n’exercent aucun contrôle sur ces fonds, alors qu’ils sont les mieux placés pour savoir comment les utiliser. Par ailleurs, reconnaît-il, de nombreuses régions du pays n’ayant accès ni à l’eau propre, ni à l’électricité ni aux soins médicaux, ces microsubventions ne suffisent pas à empêcher les populations d’émigrer. « Sur le moyen et le long termes, ces investissements n’ont pas de sens », juge Abdoul Aziz Tandia.

Autre exemple : aujourd’hui âgé de 30 ans, Omar Diaw a passé au moins cinq années de sa vie à tenter de rejoindre l’Europe. Traversant les impitoyables déserts du Mali et du Niger, il est parvenu jusqu’en Algérie. Là, à son arrivée, il s’est aussitôt fait expulser vers le Niger, où il n’existe aucun service d’accueil. Il est alors resté coincé des semaines entières dans le désert. Finalement, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) l’a renvoyé en avion au Sénégal, qualifiant son retour de « volontaire ».

Lorsqu’il est rentré chez lui, à Tambacounda, l’OIM l’a inscrit à une formation de marketing numérique qui devait durer plusieurs semaines et s’accompagner d’une allocation de 30 000 francs CFA (46 euros). Mais il n’a jamais touché l’allocation et la formation qu’il a suivie est quasiment inutile dans sa situation : à Tambacounda, la demande en marketing numérique n’est pas au rendez-vous. Résultat : il a recommencé à mettre de l’argent de côté pour tenter de nouveau de gagner l’Europe.

►https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/07/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-2-4-nous
#OIM #retour_volontaire

Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (3/4) : « Il est presque impossible de comprendre à quoi sert l’argent »

A coups de centaines de millions d’euros, l’UE finance des projets dans des pays africains pour réduire les migrations. Mais leur impact est difficile à mesurer et leurs effets pervers rarement pris en considération.

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Au chapitre migrations, rares sont les projets de l’Union européenne (UE) qui semblent adaptés aux réalités africaines. Mais il n’est pas sans risques de le dire tout haut. C’est ce que Boubacar Sèye, chercheur dans le domaine, a appris à ses dépens.

Né au Sénégal, il vit aujourd’hui en Espagne. Ce migrant a quitté la Côte d’Ivoire, où il travaillait comme professeur de mathématiques, quand les violences ont ravagé le pays au lendemain de l’élection présidentielle de 2000. Après de brefs séjours en France et en Italie, Boubacar Sèye s’est établi en Espagne, où il a fini par obtenir la citoyenneté et fondé une famille avec son épouse espagnole. Choqué par le bilan de la vague de migration aux Canaries en 2006, il a créé l’ONG Horizons sans frontières pour aider les migrants africains en Espagne. Aujourd’hui, il mène des recherches et défend les droits des personnes en déplacement, notamment celles en provenance d’Afrique et plus particulièrement du Sénégal.

En 2019, Boubacar Sèye s’est procuré un document détaillant comment les fonds des politiques migratoires de l’UE sont dépensés au Sénégal. Il a été sidéré par le montant vertigineux des sommes investies pour juguler l’immigration, alors que des milliers de candidats à l’asile se noient chaque année sur certaines des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Lors d’entretiens publiés dans la presse et d’événements publics, il a ouvertement demandé aux autorités sénégalaises d’être plus transparentes sur ce qu’elles avaient fait des centaines de millions d’euros de l’Europe, qualifiant ces projets de véritable échec.

Puis, au début de l’année 2021, il a été arrêté à l’aéroport de Dakar pour « diffusion de fausses informations ». Il a ensuite passé deux semaines en prison. Sa santé se dégradant rapidement sous l’effet du stress, il a fait une crise cardiaque. « Ce séjour en prison était inhumain, humiliant, et il m’a causé des problèmes de santé qui durent jusqu’à aujourd’hui, s’indigne le chercheur. J’ai juste posé une question : “Où est passé l’argent ?” »

Ses intuitions n’étaient pas mauvaises. Les financements de la politique anti-immigration de l’UE sont notoirement opaques et difficiles à tracer. Les demandes déposées dans le cadre de la liberté d’information mettent des mois, voire des années à être traitées, alors que la délégation de l’UE au Sénégal, la Commission européenne et les autorités sénégalaises ignorent ou déclinent les demandes d’interviews.

La Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), la police des frontières, le ministère de l’intérieur et le ministère des affaires étrangères – lesquels ont tous bénéficié des fonds migratoires européens – n’ont pas répondu aux demandes répétées d’entretien pour réaliser cette enquête.
« Nos rapports doivent être positifs »

Les rapports d’évaluation de l’UE ne donnent pas de vision complète de l’impact des programmes. A dessein ? Plusieurs consultants qui ont travaillé sur des rapports d’évaluation d’impact non publiés de projets du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’UE_pour_l’Afrique (#EUTF), et qui s’expriment anonymement en raison de leur obligation de confidentialité, tirent la sonnette d’alarme : les effets pervers de plusieurs projets du fonds sont peu pris en considération.

Au #Niger, par exemple, l’UE a contribué à élaborer une loi qui criminalise presque tous les déplacements, rendant de fait illégale la mobilité dans la région. Alors que le nombre de migrants irréguliers qui empruntent certaines routes migratoires a reculé, les politiques européennes rendent les routes plus dangereuses, augmentent les prix qu’exigent les trafiquants et criminalisent les chauffeurs de bus et les sociétés de transport locales. Conséquence : de nombreuses personnes ont perdu leur travail du jour au lendemain.

La difficulté à évaluer l’impact de ces projets tient notamment à des problèmes de méthode et à un manque de ressources, mais aussi au simple fait que l’UE ne semble guère s’intéresser à la question. Un consultant d’une société de contrôle et d’évaluation financée par l’UE confie : « Quel est l’impact de ces projets ? Leurs effets pervers ? Nous n’avons pas les moyens de répondre à ces questions. Nous évaluons les projets uniquement à partir des informations fournies par des organisations chargées de leur mise en œuvre. Notre cabinet de conseil ne réalise pas d’évaluation véritablement indépendante. »

Selon un document interne que j’ai pu me procurer, « rares sont les projets qui nous ont fourni les données nécessaires pour évaluer les progrès accomplis en direction des objectifs généraux de l’EUTF (promouvoir la stabilité et limiter les déplacements forcés et les migrations illégales) ». Selon un autre consultant, seuls les rapports positifs semblent les bienvenus : « Il est implicite que nos rapports doivent être positifs si nous voulons à l’avenir obtenir d’autres projets. »

En 2018, la Cour des comptes européenne, institution indépendante, a émis des critiques sur l’EUTF : ses procédures de sélection de projets manquent de cohérence et de clarté. De même, une étude commanditée par le Parlement européen qualifie ses procédures d’« opaques ». « Le contrôle du Parlement est malheureusement très limité, ce qui constitue un problème majeur pour contraindre la Commission à rendre des comptes, regrette l’eurodéputée allemande Cornelia Ernst. Même pour une personne très au fait des politiques de l’UE, il est presque impossible de comprendre où va l’argent et à quoi il sert. »

Le #fonds_d’urgence pour l’Afrique a notamment financé la création d’unités de police des frontières d’élite dans six pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, et ce dans le but de lutter contre les groupes de djihadistes et les trafics en tous genres. Or ce projet, qui aurait permis de détourner au moins 12 millions d’euros, fait actuellement l’objet d’une enquête pour fraude.
Aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains

En 2020, deux projets de modernisation des #registres_civils du Sénégal et de la Côte d’Ivoire ont suscité de vives inquiétudes des populations. Selon certaines sources, ces projets financés par l’EUTF auraient en effet eu pour objectif de créer des bases de #données_biométriques nationales. Les défenseurs des libertés redoutaient qu’on collecte et stocke les empreintes digitales et images faciales des citoyens des deux pays.

Quand Ilia Siatitsa, de l’ONG britannique Privacy International, a demandé à la Commission européenne de lui fournir des documents sur ces projets, elle a découvert que celle-ci n’avait réalisé aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains. En Europe, aucun pays ne possède de base de données comprenant autant d’informations biométriques.

D’après un porte-parole de la Commission, jamais le fonds d’urgence n’a financé de registre biométrique, et ces deux projets consistent exclusivement à numériser des documents et prévenir les fraudes. Or la dimension biométrique des registres apparaît clairement dans les documents de l’EUTF qu’Ilia Siatitsa s’est procurés : il y est écrit noir sur blanc que le but est de créer « une base de données d’identification biométrique pour la population, connectée à un système d’état civil fiable ».

Ilia Siatitsa en a déduit que le véritable objectif des deux projets était vraisemblablement de faciliter l’expulsion des migrants africains d’Europe. D’ailleurs, certains documents indiquent explicitement que la base de données ivoirienne doit servir à identifier et expulser les Ivoiriens qui résident illégalement sur le sol européen. L’un d’eux explique même que l’objectif du projet est de « faciliter l’identification des personnes qui sont véritablement de nationalité ivoirienne et l’organisation de leur retour ».

Quand Cheikh Fall, militant sénégalais pour le droit à la vie privée, a appris l’existence de cette base de données, il s’est tourné vers la Commission de protection des données personnelles (CDP), qui, légalement, aurait dû donner son aval à un tel projet. Mais l’institution sénégalaise n’a été informée de l’existence du projet qu’après que le gouvernement l’a approuvé.

En novembre 2021, Ilia Siatitsa a déposé une plainte auprès du médiateur de l’UE. En décembre 2022, après une enquête indépendante, le médiateur a rendu ses conclusions : la Commission n’a pas pris en considération l’impact sur la vie privée des populations africaines de ce projet et d’autres projets que finance l’UE dans le cadre de sa politique migratoire.

Selon plusieurs sources avec lesquelles j’ai discuté, ainsi que la présentation interne du comité de direction du projet – que j’ai pu me procurer –, il apparaît que depuis, le projet a perdu sa composante biométrique. Cela dit, selon Ilia Siatitsa, cette affaire illustre bien le fait que l’UE effectue en Afrique des expériences sur des technologies interdites chez elle.

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/08/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-3-4-il-e

The (human) cost of Artificial Intelligence and Surveillance technology in migration

The ethical cost of Artificial Intelligence tools has triggered heated debates in the last few months. From chatbots to image generation software, advocates and detractors have been debating the technological pros and societal cons of the new technology.

In two new reports, Europe’s Techno-Borders and Artificial Intelligence: The New Frontier of the EU’s Border Externalisation Strategy, EuroMed Rights, Statewatch and independent researcher Antonella Napolitano have investigated the human and financial costs of AI in migration. The reports show how the deployment of AI to manage migration flows actively contribute to the instability of the Middle East and North African region as well as discriminatory border procedures, threatening the right to asylum, the right to leave one’s country, the principle of non-refoulement as well as the rights to privacy and liberty.

European borders and neighbouring countries have been the stage of decades-long efforts to militarise and securitise the control of migration. Huge sums of public money have been invested to deploy security and defence tools and equipment to curb arrivals towards the EU territory, both via externalisation policies in countries in the Middle East and North Africa and at the EU’s borders themselves. In this strategy of “muscling-up” the borders, technology has played a crucial role.

EuroMed Rights’ new reports highlight how over the decades, surveillance technology has become a central asset in the EU’s migration policies with serious impacts on fundamental rights and privacy. In Artificial Intelligence: The New Frontier of the EU’s Border Externalisation Strategy we analyse how surveillance technology has been a crucial part of the European policy of externalisation of migration control. When surveillance technologies are deployed with the purpose of anti-smuggling, trafficking or counterterrorism in countries where democracies are fragile or there are authoritarian governments, they can easily end up being used for the repression of civic space and freedom of expression. What is being sold as tools to curb migrant flows, could actually be used to reinforce the security apparatus of repressive governments and fuel instability in the region.

At the same time, Europe’s Techno-Borders highlights how this security obsession has been applied to the EU’s borders for decades, equipping them with ever-more advanced technologies. This architecture for border surveillance has been continuously expanding in an attempt to detect, deter and repel refugees and migrants. For those who manage to enter, they are biometrically registered and screened against large-scale databases, raising serious concerns on privacy violations, data protection breaches and questions of proportionality.

Decades of “muscling-up” the EU’s borders keep showing the same thing: military, security, defence tools or technology do not stop migration, they only make it more dangerous and lethal. Nonetheless, the security and surveillance apparatus is only expected to increase: more and more money is being invested to research and develop new tech tools to curb migration, including through Artificial Intelligence.

In a context that is resistant to public scrutiny and accountability, and where the private military and security sector has a vested interest in expanding the surveillance architecture, it is crucial to keep monitoring and denouncing the use of these technologies, in the struggle for a humane migration policy that puts the right of people on the move at the centre!

Read our reports here:

- Artificial Intelligence: the new frontier of the EU’s border externalisation strategy: ►https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf
- Europe’s Techno-Borders: ▻https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/EuroMed-Rights_Statewatch_Europe-techno-borders_EN-1.pdf

▻https://euromedrights.org/publication/the-human-cost-of-artificial-intelligence-and-surveillance-technology
#rapport #EuroMed_rights

European funds for African IDs: migration regulation tool or privacy risk?

The first person you meet after you land at Blaise Diagne Airport in Dakar is a border guard with a digital scanner.

The official will scan your travel document and photograph and take a digital print of your index fingers.

It’s the most visible sign of the new state-of-the-art digital biometrics system that is being deployed in the airport with the help of EU funding.

The aim is to combat the increasingly sophisticated fake passports sold by traffickers to refugees.

But it also helps Senegal’s government learn more about its own citizens.

And it’s not just here: countries across West Africa are adopting travel documentation that has long been familiar to Europeans.

Passports, ID cards and visas are all becoming biometric, and a national enrolment scheme is underway.

In Europe too, there are proposals to create a biometric database of over 400 million foreign nationals, including fingerprints and photographs of their faces.

The new systems are part of efforts to battle illegal migration from West Africa to the EU.

‘Fool-proof’ EU passport online

Many are still plying the dangerous route across the Sahara and the Mediterranean to reach Europe, but a growing number are turning to the criminal gangs selling forged passports to avoid the treacherous journey over desert and sea.

There’s a burgeoning market in travel documents advertised as ‘fake but real”.

Prices vary according to the paperwork: an EU Schengen transit visa costs €5,000, while a longer-stay visa can be twice as high.

Some forgers have even mastered the ability to incorporate holograms and hack the biometric chips.

“Morphing” is an image processing technique that merges two people’s photographs into a single new face that appears to contain entirely new biometric data.

Frontex, the EU’s border guard agency, says 7,000 people were caught trying to enter the Schengen area in 2019 carrying such documents — but it admits the true figure could be much higher.

Sending migrants back

Last year, the largest number of travellers with fake documents arrived via Turkish and Moroccan international airports.

Many were caught in Italy, having arrived via Casablanca from sub-Saharan countries like Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal.

A Frontex team responsible for deporting migrants without the correct paperwork was deployed this year at Rome’s Fiumicino Airport.

It’s the first sign of a new European Commission regulation expanding the agency’s role, which includes access to biometric data held by member states, according to Jane Kilpatrick, a researcher at the civil liberties think-tank Statewatch.

“The agency’s growing role in the collection of data, it links overtly to the agency’s role in deporting individuals from the EU,” she said.

Over 490,000 return decisions were issued by member states last year, but only a third were actually sent back to a country outside the EU.

There are multiple reasons why: some countries, for example, refuse to accept responsibility for people whose identity documents were lost, destroyed or stolen.

Legally binding readmission agreements are now in place between the EU and 18 other countries to make that process easier.
There are no records

But a bigger problem is the fact that many African countries know very little about their own citizens.

The World Bank estimates the continent is home to roughly half of the estimated one billion people on the planet who are unable to prove their identities.

An absence of digitisation means that dusty registers are piling up in storage rooms.

The same goes for many borders: unlike the scene at Dakar’s airport, many are still without internet access, servers, scanners and cameras.

That, the Commission says, is why EU aid funds are being used to develop biometric identity systems in West African countries.

The EU Trust Fund for Africa has allotted €60 million to support governments in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire in modernising their registry systems and creating a national biometric identity database.

Much of the funding comes through Civipol, a consulting firm attached to France’s interior ministry and part-owned by Milipol, one of the most important arms trade fairs in the world.

It describes the objective of the programme in Côte d’Ivoire as identifying “people genuinely of Ivorian nationality and organising their return more easily”.
Data security concerns

European sources told Euronews that the EU-funded projects in West Africa were not designed to identify potential migrants or deport existing ones.

A Commission spokesperson insisted no European entity — neither Frontex, nor member states, nor their partners — had access to the databases set up by West African countries.

But the systems they are funding are intimately connected to anti-migration initiatives.

One is the Migrant Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS), a migration database that can send automatic queries to Interpol watchlists to detect travel documents and people possibly linked to organised crime, including human trafficking.

Connections like these, and the role of French arms giants like Thales in the growing biometric market, has led data protection experts to become worried about possible abuses of privacy.
World’s newest biometric market

As Africa becomes the coveted market for biometric identification providers, the watchdog Privacy International has warned it risks becoming a mere testing ground for technologies later deployed elsewhere.

So far 24 countries on the continent out of 53 have adopted laws and regulations to protect personal data.

A letter by Privacy International, seen by Euronews, says EU must “ensure they are protecting rights before proceeding with allocating resources and technologies which, in absence of proper oversight, will likely result in fundamental rights abuses.”

It has published internal documents tracking the development of Senegal’s system that suggest no privacy or data protection impact assessments have been carried out.

Civipol, the French partner, denies this: it told Euronews that the Senegalese Personal Data Commission took part in the programme and Senegalese law was respected at every stage.

Yet members of Senegal’s independent Commission of Personal Data (CDP), which is responsible for ensuring personal data is processed correctly, admit implementation and enforcement remained a challenge — even though they are proud of their country’s pioneering role in data governance in Africa.

For the Senegalese cyber activist Cheick Fall, the charge is more serious: “Senegal has sinned by entrusting the processing of these data to foreign companies.”

▻https://www.euronews.com/2021/07/30/european-funds-for-african-ids-migration-regulation-tool-or-privacy-risk

#biométrie #aéroport #Afrique #étrangers #base_de_données_biométrique #empreintes_digitales #passeports #visas #hologramme #Morphing #image #photographie #Frontex #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Trust_Fund #Civipol #Milipol #armes #commerce_d'armes #Côte_d’Ivoire #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Migrant_Information_and_Data_Analysis_System (#MIDAS) #Interpol #Thales #Sénégal #Senegalese_Personal_Data_Commission #Commission_of_Personal_Data (#CDP)

EU Watchdog Finds Commission Failed to Protect Human Rights From its Surveillance Aid to African Countries

The European #Ombudsman has found that the European Commission failed to take necessary measures to ensure the protection of human rights in the transfers of technology with potential surveillance capacity supported by its multi-billion #Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa. 

The decision by the EU’s oversight body follows a year-long inquiry prompted by complaints outlining how EU bodies and agencies are cooperating with governments around the world to increase their surveillance powers filed by Privacy International, Access Now, the Border Violence Monitoring Network, Homo Digitalis, International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), and Sea-Watch.

The complainants welcome the decision by the European Ombudsman and call on the Commission to urgently review its support for surveillance in non-EU countries and to immediately implement the Ombudsman’s recommendations in their entirety. 

The inquiry, which investigated the support of projects across Africa aimed at bolstering surveillance and tracking powers and involved extensive evidence-gathering from the Commission and complainants, found that “the Commission was not able to demonstrate that the measures in place ensured a coherent and structured approach to assessing the human rights impacts”.

It recommends that the Commission now require that an “assessment of the potential human rights impact of projects be presented together with corresponding mitigation measures.” The lack of such protections, which the Ombudsman called a “serious shortcoming”, poses a clear risk that these surveillance transfer might cause serious violations of or interferences with other fundamental rights. 

 

Ioannis Kouvakas, Senior Legal Officer at Privacy International, commenting on the decision:

“This landmark decision in response to our complaint marks a turning point for the European Union’s external policy and sets a precedent that will hopefully protect the rights of communities in some of the most vulnerable situations for the years to come.”

An FIDH Spokesperson said:

“Indeed, this decision warns once again the European Commission about its failure to comply with its human rights obligations. The decision makes clear that the EU has to better develop its processes to effectively put the protection of human rights at core of the design and the implementation of its policies and external activities. All human rights and all activities are at stake.”

Marwa Fatafta from Access Now said:

“We welcome the Ombudsman’s decision which scrutinises the EU’s failure to protect and respect the human rights of people living off its shores. The EU’s ongoing surveillance transfers to authoritarian regimes in Africa and elsewhere cannot continue business as usual. We hope this decision will help hold the EU accountable to its values overseas, and protect the rights and freedoms of vulnerable communities from intrusive tracking and government surveillance.”

Homo Digitalis said:

“The shortcomings that the Ombudsman has identified prove that the Commission is not able to demonstrate that the measures in place ensure a coherent and structured approach to assessing the human rights impacts of #EUTFA projects. This is an important first step, but we need specific accountability mechanisms in place to address violations of rights and freedoms in EUTFA projects. This cannot be ensured via just some revised templates.”

▻https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/4992/eu-watchdog-finds-commission-failed-protect-human-rights-its-s
#EUTF_for_Africa

ping @deka

Complaint to the European Court of Auditors Concerning the Mismanagement of EU Funds by the EUTrust Fund for Africa’s ‘Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya’ (IBM) Programme Submitted by Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), and Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI)

▻https://c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_ae6a20e6b5ea4b00b0aa0e77ece91241.pdf

EU: Time to review and remedy cooperation policies facilitating abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya

One year after the resumption of the armed conflict in Tripoli, and at a time when the humanitarian situation in Libya continues to deteriorate due to further military escalation and the spreading of the Covid-19 virus, Amnesty International, the Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EuroMed Rights), the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), Oxfam International, Migreurop, and Saferworld are calling on EU institutions to stop any actions trapping people in a country where they are in constant, grave danger.

EU institutions should review and reform the bloc’s policies of cooperation with Libya on migration and border management and control. During the past three years, these have facilitated the containment of tens of thousands of women, men and children in a country where they have been exposed to appalling abuse.

The call coincides with the submission by GLAN, ASGI and ARCI of a complaint before the European Court of Auditors (ECA). In their complaint, the three organisations are requesting the body to launch an audit into EU’s cooperation with Libya. Such an audit would seek to determine whether the EU has breached its financial regulations, as well as its human rights obligations, in its support for Libyan border management.

▻https://euromedrights.org/publication/eu-time-to-review-and-remedy-cooperation-policies-facilitating-abuse-

Stop cooperation with and funding to the Libyan coastguard, MEPs ask

The EU should stop channeling funds to Libya to manage migration and to train its coastguard, as the violation of human rights of migrants and asylum-seekers continues.

In a debate in the Civil Liberties Committee with representatives of the Commission, Frontex, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and NGOs, a majority of MEPs insisted that Libya is not a “safe country” for disembarkation of people rescued at sea and demanded that the cooperation with the Libyan coastguard stops.

Most of the speakers acknowledged the challenges faced by front line countries receiving most of the migrants and asylum-seekers fleeing Libya, namely Italy and Malta, and underlined that the European common asylum system needs to be reshuffled, with a focus on solidarity among member states and respect of international legislation. Others made clear that member states are entitled to protect their borders, especially in the middle of a health crisis such as the current one. Some instead criticised the closure of ports due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stressed that letting people drown cannot be a solution.

Background

According to UNHCR, the human rights situation inside Libya is extremely complicated, in the context of intensifying combat, the coronavirus crisis and the high number of economic migrants, refugees and internally displaced people needing material and humanitarian assistance. Around 1,500 people remain in detention centers in appalling conditions, arbitrary detentions continue to take place and resettlement schemes of the most vulnerable people to neighbouring countries have been suspended.

Since the beginning of the year, 3,277 persons have arrived in Italy by sea and 1,135 in Malta. On 1 April, the EU naval Operation Irini succeeded Operation Sophia, with a focus on enforcing the arms embargo to Libya, in an attempt to contribute to the pacification of the country.

You can watch the debate again: ▻https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/es/libe-committee-meeting_20200427-1600-COMMITTEE-LIBE_vd

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200427IPR77915/stop-cooperation-with-and-funding-to-the-libyan-coastguard-meps-ask

EU : Time to review and remedy cooperation policies facilitating abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya

One year after the resumption of the armed conflict in Tripoli, and at a time when the humanitarian situation in Libya continues to deteriorate due to further military escalation and the spreading of the Covid-19 virus, Amnesty International, the Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EuroMed Rights), the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), Oxfam International, Migreurop, and Saferworld are calling on EU institutions to stop any actions trapping people in a country where they are in constant, grave danger.
EU institutions should review and reform the bloc’s policies of cooperation with Libya on migration and border management and control. During the past three years, these have facilitated the containment of tens of thousands of women, men and children in a country where they have been exposed to appalling abuse.
The call coincides with the submission by GLAN, ASGI and ARCI of a complaint before the European Court of Auditors (ECA)*. In their complaint, the three organisations are requesting the body to launch an audit into EU’s cooperation with Libya. Such an audit would seek to determine whether the EU has breached its financial regulations, as well as its human rights obligations, in its support for Libyan border management.

The EU cooperation with Libya on border control and its consequences

EU Member States and Institutions have long responded to the arrival of refugees and migrants, crossing the central Mediterranean on unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, by cooperating with Libyan authorities to stop departures and ensure that people rescued or intercepted at sea would be disembarked in Libya. In recent years, this policy has been pursued through new and numerous means, including the provision of training, speedboats, equipment and various forms of assistance to Libyan authorities such as the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security (LCGPS, under the Ministry of Defence) and the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS, under the Ministry of Interior), both under Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA).

EU institutions have played a key role in the definition and execution of this strategy. While significant resources have been invested in projects aimed at alleviating the suffering of refugees and migrants stranded in Libya and remain central to EU public communications on the topic, EU actions have nonetheless facilitated and perpetuated this policy of containment. The contained people have become victims of human rights violations and abuse, including indefinite, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, which such cosmetic measures have not remedied.

Indeed, the overall policy of cooperation with the Libyan authorities on border control and management has been designed and consistently implemented at the EU level. It started with the launch of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) in 2013, with the goal to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. [1] It continued with the modification of the mandate of naval operation EunavforMed Sophia, tasked since June 2016 [2] to train members of the Libyan Coast Guard. It expanded with the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 January 2017, indicating action to step up the capacity of the Libyan Coast Guard as a key priority. [3]] The strategy was completed through the Malta Declaration [4], of 3 February 2017, which explicitly indicated “training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies” as its first priority. Crucially, this declaration also affirmed the intention to strengthen the mainstreaming of migration within the EU’s official development assistance for Africa, including through the mobilization of resources under the EU Emergency trust fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTFA).

The EU has then concretely implemented this strategy through the funding of specific projects, in particular the project “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya” (IBM project), launched in July 2017 and funded by the EUTFA with a total of €91.3m. [5] The project has focused almost entirely on enhancing the operational capacity of Libyan authorities in maritime surveillance : assisting with the supply and maintenance of speedboats ; setting up basic facilities to coordinate operations and planning the establishment of fully-fledged operational rooms ; and supporting the definition of a Libyan Search and Rescue Region, declared by Libya in December 2017. This, notwithstanding the fact that the country cannot be considered a place of safety for the disembarkation of people rescued at sea, a fact that even the Libyan authorities admitted earlier this month. It should also be noted that, despite the assistance provided, Libya has been unable to attend to this rescue area and has benefited from extensive and decisive support from Italy to coordinate maritime operations, including many triggered following sightings by EU assets. [6]

While this strategy has achieved its objective of drastically reducing the number of people reaching Europe via the central Mediterranean – as well as the absolute number of deaths at sea, given the plummeting departures – it has also led to dramatic human consequences. Following disembarkation in Libya, since 2016 tens of thousands of women, men and children have been transferred to detention centres nominally under the control of the Libyan Ministry of Interior, where people have been detained arbitrarily for an indeterminate period of time, and where inhumane conditions and overcrowding are accompanied by the prevalence of torture and other ill-treatment. Cases of beatings, sexual violence, exploitation, forced labour, unlawful killings, and deaths in custody due to inadequate medical treatment or lack of adequate food, have been widely documented. Even outside of detention centres, refugees and migrants are constantly exposed to the risk of kidnappings, robberies, trafficking and exploitation. [7]

The already dire humanitarian situation has been compounded, in recent weeks, by newly escalating violence in Tripoli as well as by the spreading of Covid-19 disease. All parties to the conflict, including the GNA and the Libyan National Army (LNA), have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law. Indiscriminate attacks have resulted in deaths among civilians, including dozens of refugees and migrants killed in the bombing of the detention centre of Tajoura, near Tripoli, in July 2019. [8] The risk of an escalation of violence in Libya due to the fragile political situation should have been foreseen by EU decision-makers.

Many risks were well-known by EU Member States’ and institutions’ officials when designing the cooperation with Libya. In particular, the systematic human rights violations in detention centres – the very centres where Libyan authorities detain people who, with EU support, they intercept at sea – have been documented widely for a number of years, including by UN agencies who have also attempted to respond to such risks through human rights due diligence steps and the adoption of restrictive measures on their programmes. [9]

While fully conscious of the horrific violations and abuses experienced by refugees and migrants taken to Libya, EU institutions have undertaken to implement the above-mentioned strategy for the past four years.

The EU has thus contributed to the disembarkation in Libya and transfer to detention centres of tens of thousands of women, men and children. What is more, taking into account the 2012 European Court of Human Rights decision in the case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ruling that maritime pushbacks towards Libya breach the European Convention on Human Rights – this strategy has been designed to circumvent responsibility under international and EU laws, in multiple ways. [10] First, the focus on the capacity-building of the LCGPS is meant to ensure that people are intercepted at sea and subsequently disembarked in Libya by non-European actors – since both international and EU law prohibit the transfer of anyone to a country where their rights and freedoms are at serious risk. Second, EU institutions have tried to minimise the EU’s direct involvement and deflect attention from their responsibility for the serious abuses they have contributed to by focusing on funding projects implemented primarily by Member States. Finally, by transferring European
development and other aid resources into the EUTFA, a fund that can be used with reduced transparency and limited supervision, and then using those funds to realize projects such as IBM, they have reduced avenues for holding decision-makers to account for the harmful contributions made by such actions.

The complaint before the European Court of Auditors

On 27 April 2020, GLAN, ASGI, and ARCI submitted a complaint before the European Court of Auditors, the EU body responsible for auditing the use and management of the EU budget.

The complaint was drafted based on an expert opinion by academic experts on EU budget and development laws, Prof Dr Phillip Dann and Dr Michael Riegner of Humboldt University and Ms Lena Zagst of Hamburg University, published alongside the complaint. Following close to a year’s efforts to obtain information from various EU institutions about the use of EU funds, the complaint argues that EU funds used to implement the EU’s migration policy have been mismanaged, in breach of EU laws governing the EU budget, and with consequences for the EU and its Member States under international law. The complaint claims that the European Commission has failed to uphold its obligations under EU law to ensure that it is not acquiescing or contributing to serious human rights violations. In particular, it argues that provision of financial means to implement projects resulting in return to and containment in Libya of people at risk of human rights abuse, with knowledge of these consequences and in the absence of any legally required measures to mitigate such risks, engages the responsibility of the EU institutions. The complaint is unique insofar as it specifically addresses the responsibilities of EU institutions relevant to the use of EU funds in such projects, linking their financial disbursements and human rights obligations. Crucially, it is filed in the context of several previous and ongoing litigation efforts before domestic and regional courts and international bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee.

The complaint calls on the ECA to launch an audit into the IBM programme for the misuse of EU funds and for its harmful impacts on human rights. The complaint argues, based on EU financial legislation, the illegality of the IBM programme due to inconsistency with the permissible funding objectives for development and other underlying funds disbursed by the EUTFA. Specifically, the use of EU funds in the IBM programme contravenes the obligation to follow legal requirements for the use of such funds, to ensure that use ‘does no harm’, and is compliant with EU law regarding sound financial management principles of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. The arguments are based on the appended legal opinion and supported by information specific to the IBM programme researched and analysed by the groups.

The human rights impact of the funding is particularly severe due to the fact that the IBM programme, now in its second phase, which is set to last until late 2021, is being implemented without any conditionality or restriction on the use of funding or review of funded activities, and without a human rights review or monitoring of the human rights impact. EU and international law, the complaint argues, requires that the EU and its Member States make the implementation of the programme conditional on the closure of detention centres and the enactment of asylum laws by Libyan authorities, amongst other concrete and verifiable steps.
The programme should also provide for robust and effective review mechanisms that could result in its suspension if conditions are not respected.

There is no doubt that EU institutions have been long aware of the risks involved in cooperating with Libyan authorities on border control and management. A recent investigation by The Guardian revealed how in early 2019 the Director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, wrote to Paraskevi Michou, the Director-General of the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs in the European Commission, outlining issues arising from sharing information about the position of boats in distress with Libyan authorities, highlighting how “the Commission and in general institutions may face questions of a political nature as a consequence of the SAR related operational exchanges of information.” [11] Indeed, questions about the lawfulness of the cooperation have previously been asked, not only by members of civil society. As early as March 2017, a review by the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact noted that the UK and EU work efforts to build the capacity of the LCGPS aimed at increasing the likelihood that refugees and other irregular migrants were intercepted by the LCGPS, and that those intercepted were placed in detention. The body, which reports its findings to the British Parliament, expressed concern that “the programme delivers migrants back to a system that leads to indiscriminate and indefinite detention and denies refugees their right to asylum”, and concluded that the risk of UK aid causing unintended harm to vulnerable migrants, or preventing refugees from reaching a place of safety, had been inadequately assessed. [12] Subsequently, both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe expressed deep concern about the consequences of European cooperation with Libya on border control. [13]

In 2018, the ECA opened a first, general audit on the EUTFA, leading to the Special Report “European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa : Flexible but lacking focus”. [14] In its conclusions, the ECA found that the fund’s more general established objectives were too broad to efficiently steer action and measure impact ; that the Commission did not comprehensively analyse needs nor the means at its disposal to address them ; that the selection of projects had been fast but not fully consistent and clear ; and that, while projects have started to deliver outputs, their monitoring was deficient. Among other weaknesses, the report highlighted the lack of a specific risk assessment framework, or – in the case of projects for the North of Africa – of any documented criteria for selecting project proposals. The funding of the IBM programme reveals that these concerns have now materialised.

The “action fiche” for the first phase of the IBM programme – i.e. the document summarizing its objectives and relevant plans and activities – acknowledges that “Under the existing Libyan legislation, once rescued, irregular migrants generally end up in detention centres which generate international concerns.” [15] The action fiche for the second phase of the programme expands on this : “The treatment of migrants in Libyan detention centres is of great concern : there is a lack of food, hygiene is abhorrent and there is a situation of total despair. Equally important is the absence of a clear and verifiable system of the rule of law, which meets the international and human rights standards. Migrants in detention centres have often no access to legal process and cannot address any misuse of power. This situation has led to criticism on the current programs financed by the EU in Libya and influenced the design of this action.” [16]

Despite such references to human rights and international law, the programme has not provided for any measure adequate to address the role of such funding in contributing to the dire situation of refugees and migrants trapped in Libya. Other measures supposedly adopted to mitigate the human rights impact of the programme, such as trainings and political demarches, either depend on the good will of Libyan authorities, or are tokenistic. While EU officials express concern that the continuation of abuse against refugees and migrants in Libya may “further damage the narrative and reputation of the EU”, the risk of actively facilitating this abuse is not considered in the brief risk analysis provided in the action fiche for the second phase . Notably, most of the project’s impact monitoring is outsourced to the Italian Ministry of Interior, which is also in charge of implementing many of the planned actions and has repeatedly refused to disclose information or even discuss related concerns.

As the IBM project is set to last until end 2021, it is high time to reassess this project, as well as the implications of the wider strategy adopted by the EU and its Member States to stop irregular crossings in the central Mediterranean. Human rights violations should be stopped and remedied, not encouraged and enabled. At a time when refugees and migrants stuck in Libya, as a result of EU decisions and projects, are exposed not only to serious abuse but also to the risks emerging from intensifying conflict and spreading disease, Europe should ensure the accountability of its own institutions and that any migration cooperation programmes are devised in line with its international obligations, not least in terms of their financial dimension.

▻http://www.migreurop.org/article2987

#business #xenophobie_business

#cartographie_animée #cartographie #sémiologie #design_cartographique

ping @deka

Résumé en français par Jasmine Caye (@forumasile) :

Pour freiner la migration en provenance d’Afrique les dépenses européennes explosent

Maite Vermeulen est une journaliste hollandaise, cofondatrice du site d’information The Correspondent et spécialisée dans les questions migratoires. Avec deux autres journalistes, l’italien Giacomo Zandonini (Italie) et le nigérian Ajibola Amzat, elle a tenté de comprendre les raisons derrières la flambée des dépenses européennes sensées freiner la migration en provenance du continent africain.

Depuis le Nigéria, Maite Vermeulen s’est intéressée aux causes de la migration nigériane vers l’Europe et sur les milliards d’euros déversés dans les programmes humanitaires et sécuritaires dans ce pays. Selon elle, la politique sécuritaire européenne n’empêchera pas les personnes motivées de tenter leur chance pour rejoindre l’Europe. Elle constate que les fonds destinés à freiner la migration sont toujours attribués aux mêmes grandes organisations gouvernementales ou non-gouvernementales. Les financements européens échappent aussi aux évaluations d’impact permettant de mesurer les effets des aides sur le terrain.

Le travail de recherche des journalistes a duré six mois et se poursuit. Il est financé par Money Trail un projet qui soutient des journalistes africains, asiatiques et européens pour enquêter en réseau sur les flux financiers illicites et la corruption en Afrique, en Asie et en Europe.

Les Nigérians ne viennent pas en Europe pour obtenir l’asile

L’équipe a d’abord tenté d’élucider cette énigme : pourquoi tant de nigérians choisissent de migrer vers l’Europe alors qu’ils n’obtiennent quasiment jamais l’asile. Le Nigéria est un pays de plus de 190 millions d’habitants et l’économie la plus riche d’Afrique. Sa population représente le plus grand groupe de migrants africains qui arrivent en Europe de manière irrégulière. Sur les 180 000 migrants qui ont atteint les côtes italiennes en 2016, 21% étaient nigérians. Le Nigéria figure aussi régulièrement parmi les cinq premiers pays d’origine des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Près de 60% des requérants nigérians proviennent de l’Etat d’Edo dont la capitale est Bénin City. Pourtant leurs chance d’obtenir un statut de protection sont minimes. En effet, seuls 9% des demandeurs d’asile nigérians reçoivent l’asile dans l’UE. Les 91% restants sont renvoyés chez eux ou disparaissent dans la nature.

Dans l’article Want to make sense of migration ? Ask the people who stayed behind, Maite Vermeulen explique que Bénin City a été construite grâce aux nigérians travaillant illégalement en Italie. Et les femmes sont peut-être bien à l’origine d’un immense trafic de prostituées. Elle nous explique ceci :

“Pour comprendre le présent, il faut revenir aux années 80. À cette époque, des entreprises italiennes étaient établies dans l’État d’Edo. Certains hommes d’affaires italiens ont épousé des femmes de Benin City, qui sont retournées en Italie avec leur conjoint. Ils ont commencé à exercer des activités commerciales, à commercialiser des textiles, de la dentelle et du cuir, de l’or et des bijoux. Ces femmes ont été les premières à faire venir d’autres femmes de leur famille en Italie – souvent légalement, car l’agriculture italienne avait cruellement besoin de travailleurs pour cueillir des tomates et des raisins. Mais lorsque, à la fin des années 80, la chute des prix du pétrole a plongé l’économie nigériane à l’arrêt, beaucoup de ces femmes d’affaires ont fait faillite. Les femmes travaillant dans l’agriculture ont également connu une période difficile : leur emploi est allé à des ouvriers d’Europe de l’Est. Ainsi, de nombreuses femmes Edo en Italie n’avaient qu’une seule alternative : la prostitution. Ce dernier recours s’est avéré être lucratif. En peu de temps, les femmes ont gagné plus que jamais auparavant. Elles sont donc retournées à Benin City dans les années 1990 avec beaucoup de devises européennes – avec plus d’argent, en fait, que beaucoup de gens de leur ville n’en avaient jamais vu. Elles ont construit des appartements pour gagner des revenus locatifs. Ces femmes étaient appelées « talos », ou mammas italiennes. Tout le monde les admirait. Les jeunes femmes les considéraient comme des modèles et voulaient également aller en Europe. Certains chercheurs appellent ce phénomène la « théorie de la causalité cumulative » : chaque migrant qui réussit entraîne plus de personnes de sa communauté à vouloir migrer. A cette époque, presque personne à Benin City ne savait d’où venait exactement l’argent. Les talos ont commencé à prêter de l’argent aux filles de leur famille afin qu’elles puissent également se rendre en Italie. Ce n’est que lorsque ces femmes sont arrivées qu’on leur a dit comment elles devaient rembourser le prêt. Certaines ont accepté, d’autres ont été forcées. Toutes gagnaient de l’argent. Dans les premières années, le secret des mammas italiennes était gardé au sein de la famille. Mais de plus en plus de femmes ont payé leurs dettes – à cette époque, cela prenait environ un an ou deux – et elles ont ensuite décidé d’aller chercher de l’argent elles-mêmes. En tant que « Mamas », elles ont commencé à recruter d’autres femmes dans leur ville natale. Puis, lentement, l’argent a commencé à manquer à Benin City : un grand nombre de leurs femmes travaillaient dans l’industrie du sexe en Italie.”

Aujourd’hui, l’Union européenne considère le Nigéria comme son plus important “partenaire migratoire”et depuis quelques années les euros s’y déversent à flots afin de financer des programmes des sécurisation des frontières, de création d’emploi, de lutte contre la traite d’être humains et des programmes de sensibilisation sur les dangers de la migration vers l’Europe.
Le “cartel migratoire” ou comment peu d’organisation monopolisent les projets sur le terrain

Dans un autre article intitulé A breakdown of Europe’s € 1.5 billion migration spending in Nigeria, les journalistes se demandent comment les fonds européens sont alloués au Nigéria. Encore une fois on parle ici des projets destinés à freiner la migration. En tout ce sont 770 millions d’euros investis dans ces “projets migration”. En plus, le Nigéria bénéficie d’autres fonds supplémentaires à travers les “projets régionaux” qui s’élèvent à 775 millions d’euros destinés principalement à coordonner et organiser les retours vers les pays d’origines. Mais contrairement aux engagements de l’Union européenne les fonds alloués aux projets en faveur de la migration légale sont très inférieurs aux promesses et représentent 0.09% des aides allouées au Nigéria.

A qui profitent ces fonds ? Au “cartel migratoire” constitué du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), de l’UNICEF, de l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIL), de l’Organisation internationale des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (UNODC). Ces organisations récoltent près de 60% des fonds alloués par l’Union européenne aux “projets migration” au Nigéria et dans la région. Les ONG et les consultants privés récupèrent 13% du total des fonds alloués, soit 89 millions d’euros, le double de ce qu’elles reçoivent en Europe.
Les montants explosent, la transparence diminue

Où va vraiment l’argent et comment mesurer les effets réels sur les populations ciblées. Quels sont les impacts de ces projets ? Depuis 2015, l’Europe a augmenté ses dépenses allouées à la migration qui s’élèvent désormais à plusieurs milliards.

La plus grande partie de ces fonds est attribuée à l’Afrique. Dans l’article Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes, Maite Vermeulen, Ajibola Amzat et Giacomo Zandonini expliquent que l’UE prévoit de doubler ces dépenses dans le budget 2021-2027 et quadrupler les dépenses sur le contrôle des frontières.

Des mois de recherche n’ont pas permis de comprendre comment étaient alloués les fonds pour la migration. Les sites internet sont flous et de nombreux bureaucrates européens se disent incapables concilier les dépenses car la transparence fait défaut. Difficile de comprendre l’allocation précise des fonds de l’Union européenne et celle des fonds des Etats européens. Le tout ressemble, selon les chercheurs, à un immense plat de spaghettis. Ils se posent une question importante : si eux n’y arrivent pas après des mois de recherche comment les députés européens pourraient s’y retrouver ? D’autres chercheurs et fonctionnaires européens qualifient les dépenses de migration de l’UE d’opaques. La consultation de nombreux sites internet, documents officiels, rapports annuels et budgets, et les nombreuses demandes d’accès à l’information auprès de plusieurs pays européens actifs au Nigéria ainsi que les demandes d’explications adressées à la Commission européenne n’ont pas permis d’arriver à une vision globale et précise des budgets attribués à la politique migratoire européenne. Selon Tineke Strik, député vert au parlement européen, ce manque de clarté a des conséquences importantes sur le processus démocratique, car sans vision globale précise, il n’y a pas vraiment de surveillance possible sur les dépenses réelles ni sur l’impact réel des programmes sur le terrain.

▻https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/102663569008-2e2c2159

#recension #inventaire #énumération #vérification #ressources

Déconstruction de l’idée : augmentation du #développement pour freiner la migration (et notamment l’émigration), en lien aussi avec la question du #codéveloppement :
Does Development Reduce Migration ?
►https://seenthis.net/messages/526083

Think Development in Poor Countries Will Reduce Migration ? The Numbers Say Otherwise
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/448596
#co-développement

Des guides/manuels/rapports qui déconstruisent les #mythes et #préjugés en lien avec migrations & développement :

5 idées reçues à déconstruire sur les liens entre migrations & développement
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/733048

Un texte de #Hein_de_Haas :
Why Development Will Not Stop Migration
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/813007

Ici des liens sur aide au développement comme moyen de freiner l’immigration, mais sans pour autant être critiques sur ce sujet (#root_causes) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/743909
#paix #promotion_de_la_paix

Une brève déconstruction du slogan « Aiutiamoli a casa loro » :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/758076

Autres liens sur le même sujet :
Casa
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/614952

Le Conseil fédéral teste les capacités d’un renforcement limité de la coopération avec l’#Erythrée
►https://seenthis.net/messages/538851

L’UE annonce une nouvelle aide pour s’attaquer aux causes profondes de la migration au #Sénégal
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/536665

L’UE va annoncer une enveloppe de 100 millions d’euros d’aide au développement en faveur du #Soudan afin de remédier aux causes profondes de la migration irrégulière et des déplacements forcés
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/487453

En pleine crise migratoire, l’#aide_au_développement divise
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/461710

Changement de politique de la #Suisse : l’aide au développement comme instrument de lutte contre la pauvreté à instrument de gestion de la migration :
L’#aide_au_développement peut-elle réguler l’immigration ?
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/772981

Sénégal :

Parmi les leviers dont dispose la France, l’aide publique au développement, dont le budget total doit atteindre 0,55% du PIB en 2022. Environ 2 milliards d’euros de cette aide ont été distribués au Sénégal depuis 2007 : des « efforts » qui doivent « produire des résultats sur l’immigration irrégulière », souligne Matignon.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/811609

De manière plus générale, non ciblée sur le Sénégal...
#France : L’APD, un levier au service de la politique migratoire
►https://seenthis.net/messages/822578

La question des #remittances :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/remittances
v. notamment:
Accelerated remittances growth to low- and middle-income countries in 2018
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/742235

Il faudra faire une longue liste du lien toujours plus étroit entre #aide_au_développement et migrations (#conditionnalité de l’aide)...

Warum es schwierig ist, Entwicklungshilfe und Migrationspolitik zu verknüpfen
►https://seenthis.net/messages/719752

« Il faut renforcer le lien entre coopération internationale et politique migratoire »
►https://seenthis.net/messages/564720

Principales conclusions Conseil européen 25/26 juin 2015 en matière de migration :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/385634

v. aussi, même si je n’ai pas encore lu dans les détails les conditions liées à cette nouvelle enveloppe d’aide :
L’Union européenne renforce son soutien au développement du #Sahel
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/741869

Dans le documentaire (produit par Arte) "Etats africains, portiers de l’Europe" on parle aussi de conditionnalité de l’aide :
►https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hu7VvY5fs7Y

#Nasser_Bourita sur la migration : « Les pays africains ne sont pas des gardes-frontières »
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/691948

Il budget oscuro tra cooperazione e migrazione
►https://seenthis.net/messages/660235

Fonds européens : donner envie de rester et réussir en Afrique
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/647177

La migration n’est pas une crise
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/641888

Migranti : Mogherini, Ue cambiato approccio, ora Africa partner
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/633324

EU’s secret ultimatum to Afghanistan : accept 80,000 deportees or lose aid
►https://seenthis.net/messages/528689
#Afghanistan

Le cas du #Niger où les les cartes entre enjeux sécuritaires et enjeux humanitaires sont brouillées :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/801799

Dictators as 
Gatekeepers for Europe : 
Outsourcing EU border 
controls to Africa

Increasingly, the billions Europe pays for migration control are described as official development assistance (ODA), more widely known as development aid, supposedly for poverty relief and humanitarian assistance. The EU is spending billions buying African leaders as gatekeepers, including dictators and suspected war criminals. And the real beneficiaries are the military and technology corporations involved in the implementation.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/805117

#Gambie :

Jammeh’s ousting ended years of severe repression and corruption that had discouraged donor countries from cooperating with The Gambia. When he left, the country quickly established positive relations with the EU which has become its most important development partner (▻https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/gambia_en/58850/A%20comprehensive%20overview%20of%20the%20new%20chapter%20of%20The%20Gam). It provides €55 million in budgetary support and runs three projects (▻https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/gambia_en) to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration. But the moratorium was a stress test for this new relationship.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/812067

Comment l’Europe contrôle ses frontières en #Tunisie ?
►https://seenthis.net/messages/833041
voir aussi le projet #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMariS) : ►https://seenthis.net/messages/866952

Politiques du non-accueil en #Tunisie : des acteurs humanitaires au service des politiques sécuritaires européennes :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/859823

#Mauritanie. Un partenariat européen au goût amer

La Mauritanie a reçu entre 2007 et 2013 huit millions d’euros dans le cadre du #Fonds_européen_de_développement afin d’« appuyer et de renforcer les capacités de gestion, de suivi et de planification des flux migratoires » à travers notamment la révision du dispositif pénal relatif aux migrations.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/858930

La mise en œuvre du fonds fiduciaire d’urgence au #Niger :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/889596#message889597

La mise en œuvre du fonds fiduciaire d’urgence au #Mali :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/889596#message889598

Rapport :
#EU #Development #Cooperation with #Sub-Saharan #Africa 2013-2018 : Policies, funding, results
–-> une des thématiques prioritaires = adressing #root_causes of irregular migration
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/859599

Budget européen pour la migration : plus de contrôles aux frontières, moins de respect pour les droits humains :

Le budget 2014 ne comprenait pas de dimension extérieure. Cette variable n’a été introduite qu’en 2015 avec la création du Fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique (4,7 milliards d’euros) et une enveloppe financière destinée à soutenir la mise en œuvre de la déclaration UE-Turquie de mars 2016 (6 milliards d’euros), qui a été tant décriée. Ces deux lignes budgétaires s’inscrivent dans la dangereuse logique de conditionnalité entre migration et développement : l’aide au développement est liée à l’acceptation, par les pays tiers concernés, de contrôles migratoires ou d’autres tâches liées aux migrations. En outre, au moins 10% du budget prévu pour l’Instrument de voisinage, de développement et de coopération internationale (#NDICI) est réservé pour des projets de gestion des migrations dans les pays d’origine et de transit. Ces projets ont rarement un rapport avec les activités de développement.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/867813
#Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument

Sur la #conditionnalité_négative_migrations-développement :

#condizionalità_negativa_migrazione-sviluppo con il blocco dei fondi per la cooperazione allo sviluppo qualora la Tunisia non si impegnasse nel blocco delle partenze

–-> ici appliquée par l’#Italie à la Tunisie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/871980

Novembre 2020 :
Le #Parlement_européen vote pour conditionner son aide au développement au contrôle des migrations
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893256

L’#UE et le #Niger signent un nouvel accord pour lutter contre les trafiquants d’êtres humains
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/967929

Et l’opacité des fonds pour le développement, qui, en réalité, sont utilisés en grande mesure pour fermer les frontières :

$2bn EU-Africa ’anti-migration’ fund too opaque, say critics
►https://seenthis.net/messages/641297

La logica di esternalizzazione come pilastro della politica d’immigrazione
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/580567
The #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa. Trapped between aid policy and migration politics
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/823503
#fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence #trust_fund #fonds_pour_l'afrique

–-> Fil de discussion sur le financement de l’#Ethiopie et de l’#Erythrée, notamment via le Trust Fund for Africa :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765340

#Civipol, la multinazionale francese che vende sicurezza in Africa
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/601336

Durchsichtige Afrikaner
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/550025

Quand l’#aide_au_développement finance des #barbelés
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/423516

Au #Soudan notamment, où des fonds pour le développement (et versé par les agences de développement, notamment la #GIZ allemande) sont détournés et utilisés par des #milices pour arrêter les migrants (voire pour alimenter le juteux business du trafic d’êtres humains) :
Sudan does not benefit from any direct EU financial support. No EU funding is decentralized or channeled through the Sudanese government.

“All EU-funded activities in Sudan are implemented by EU member states development agencies, the UN, international organizations and NGOs, who are closely scrutinized through strict and regular monitoring during projects’ implementation,” the spokesperson added.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/804166#message804170

EU aid and development funding has provided €215 million for border security in Morocco since 2001
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/812633
#Maroc

Et les fonds vers le #Nigeria, avec cette question posée...

For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

►https://seenthis.net/messages/815068

–—

Plainte déposée à la #cour_des_comptes_européenne contre l’Europe complice des horreurs perpétrées en #Libye :
L’UE a alloué, en juillet 2017, 91,3 millions d’euros au programme « #Gestion_intégrée_des_frontières_et_des_migrations_en_Libye » (#GIF) qui doit durer jusqu’à la fin de 2021. Ce programme a pour objectif « d’améliorer la capacité de la Libye à contrôler ses frontières et à assurer le sauvetage en mer, d’une manière pleinement conforme aux obligations et aux normes internationales en matière de droits de l’homme. » Ces #fonds ont été engagés par le biais du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’Union_européenne_pour_la stabilité_et_la_lutte_contre_les_causes_profondes_des-migrations_irrégulières_et_des personnes_déplacées_en_Afrique (#EUTFA), lui-même principalement financé par le #Fonds_européen_de_développement.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/848481

Migrants : les échecs d’un programme de retour volontaire financé par l’UE
►https://seenthis.net/messages/862586

Rapport ASGI :
Profili critici delle attività delle ONG italiane nei centri di detenzione in Libia con fondi A.I.C.S.
–-> Tra queste troviamo : #Emergenza_Sorrisi, #Helpcode (già #CCS), #CEFA, #CESVI, #Terre_des_Hommes_Italia, #Fondation_Suisse_de_Deminage, #GVC (già #We_World), #Istituto_di_Cooperazione_Universitaria, #Consorzio_Italiano_Rifugiati (#CIR), #Fondazione_Albero_della_Vita.
I progetti, alcuni dei quali sono ancora in corso di realizzazione, sono stati finanziati con 6 milioni di euro dall’Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo (AICS).
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/871507

Et sur la part croissante du budget des Etats consacrée aux dépenses en matière de #contrôles_frontaliers au détriment des fonds pour le développement
►https://seenthis.net/messages/608653

Liens sur les budgets nationaux (européens) de la #coopération_internationale au développement et le fait que dans ce budget les frais d’#accueil des #réfugiés et #demandeurs_d'asile sur le territoire y est inclus :

La crise des #réfugiés chamboule l’#aide_au_développement
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/480592

IRIN | Les budgets d’aide étrangère amputés par la crise des réfugiés
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/430853

Les frais de l’#asile sont intégrés à l’#aide_au_développement
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/388606
#coopération_au_développement

Quand les Etats financent, via l’aide au développement aussi, des dictateurs...
#Erythrée :
Eritrea, l’UE finanzia il regime di Afewerki mentre ogni giorno fuggono migliaia di persone
►https://seenthis.net/messages/405308

Migranti, Italia e Ue dialogano con l’Africa delle dittature
►https://seenthis.net/messages/318425

Le Trust fund pour construire des #routes en Erythrée, routes construites via du #travail_forcé (les routes seraient en effet construites par des personnes enrôlées dans le #national_service) :
Gli attivisti eritrei denunciano la Ue : “Finanzia il lavoro forzato”
►https://seenthis.net/messages/772509

Mais il y a aussi du matériel sur cette métaliste en lien avec l’#externalisation :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749

Une synthèse graphique de @reka :

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH598/remittancesjb7e7-22414.jpg

Deux articles sur les affaires de l’Italie (notamment via l’entreprise #Cantieri_navali_Vittoria ) avec #Egypte , Niger, Tunisie et Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/759608
#business

Le rapport « Expanding the fortress » et des liens associés à la sortie de ce rapport :

Dans le rapport sont abordées à la fois les conséquences de l’externalisation (notamment en termes de #droits_humains) et les profiteurs (#complexe_militaro-industriel).
Cas d’étude : #Libye #Turquie #Niger #Egypte #Soudan #Mauritanie #Mali
►https://seenthis.net/messages/694887

–-

Le rapport « #Financement des frontières : #fonds et stratégies pour arrêter l’immigration » (2020) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893191
#Mali #Soudan

–—

Le droit d’asile à l’épreuve de l’externalisation des politiques migratoires
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893452

Le lien entre #fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique et externalisation :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/707133

Avril 2019 : enveloppe de 115,5 millions pour le Fonds fiduciaire :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/773289
#fonds_fiduciaire

v. aussi plus de détail sur la métaliste migrations et développement :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

Dans le cadre du fonds fiduciaire pour l’Afrique —> privatisation du business des cartes d’identité biométriques :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764850
#biométrique

v. aussi le communiqué de presse de la commission européenne, mars 2019 :

Grâce au #fonds_fiduciaire d’urgence de l’UE pour l’Afrique, plus de 5,3 millions de personnes vulnérables bénéficient actuellement d’une aide de première nécessité et plus de 60 000 personnes ont reçu une aide à la réintégration après leur retour dans leur pays d’origine.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

–—

Plainte déposée à la #cour_des_comptes_européenne contre l’Europe complice des horreurs perpétrées en #Libye :
L’UE a alloué, en juillet 2017, 91,3 millions d’euros au programme « #Gestion_intégrée_des_frontières_et_des_migrations_en_Libye » (#GIF) qui doit durer jusqu’à la fin de 2021. Ce programme a pour objectif « d’améliorer la capacité de la Libye à contrôler ses frontières et à assurer le sauvetage en mer, d’une manière pleinement conforme aux obligations et aux normes internationales en matière de droits de l’homme. » Ces #fonds ont été engagés par le biais du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’Union_européenne_pour_la stabilité_et_la_lutte_contre_les_causes_profondes_des-migrations_irrégulières_et_des personnes_déplacées_en_Afrique (#EUTFA), lui-même principalement financé par le #Fonds_européen_de_développement.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/848481

Budget européen pour la migration : plus de contrôles aux frontières, moins de respect pour les droits humains :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/867813

Report to the EU Parliament on #Frontex cooperation with third countries in 2017 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/760914

#Frontex_plus :
►https://seenthis.net/tag/frontex_plus

Frontex, version 2019 : + d’hommes, + de pouvoirs opérationnels + de coopérations avec des pays non-EU, + de retours, + de matériel + + + +
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/771558

Autour de #EUROSUR et du #complexe_militaro-industriel

Rôle du #Portugal et de la #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/764491

Plus en général avec le tag Eurosur :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/eurosur

Et avec le tag complexe militaro-industriel :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/complexe_militaro-industriel

Voir notamment le livre de #Claire_Rodier, #Xénophobie_business :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/305703
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/187137
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/135750
►https://seenthis.net/messages/115086

Le #post-Cotonou :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/681114
#accord_de_Cotonou

Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers en #Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/705401
(lien avec #droits_humains)
►https://seenthis.net/messages/623809
Commissaire aux droits humains Conseil Europe :

EU member states to show urgently that the support to the Libyan Coast Guard is not contributing to human rights violations, and to suspend this support if they cannot do so.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770463#message770466

–----

"Dossier Libia" —> un site d’information et dénonciation de ce qui se passe en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/742662

–-----

Reportage en allemand :
Das Geschäft mit den Flüchtlingen - Endstation Libyen
►https://seenthis.net/messages/744384

–----

#Statistiques et #chiffres du nombre de personnes migrantes présentes en Libye (chiffres OIM) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/751596
Et de celles rapatriées par l’#OIM :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763151
#organisation_contre_la_migration

–------

Sur les #centres_de_détention en Libye, voulus, soutenus et financés par l’UE ou des pays de l’UE :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/772984
►https://seenthis.net/messages/621902
►https://seenthis.net/messages/615857
#torture #viols #abus_sexuels #détention
Marché aux esclaves en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/598508
#esclavage #néo-esclavage

–-------

Rapport sur les viols contre hommes et garçons en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/771994
–-> et ce chiffres de 90% qui apparaît 2 fois :

Il 90% dei migranti visitati nelle cliniche del Medu ha parlato di violenza estrema e torture

►https://seenthis.net/messages/598508#message599359

A UN officer estimated that 90% of male refugees and migrants being hosted in the Italian reception system had experienced sexual violence during their journey.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/615857#message770193

–--------

Les migrants présents dans les camps enrôlés dans les #milices du général Haftar pour combattre à Tripoli (avril 2019) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/773233

–-----------

Février 2019 : #retours_volontaires de "migrants" (c’est le mot employé) érythréens vers l’#Erythrée, avec l’aide de l’#OIM (#IOM) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763088
#retour_volontaire

–--------

Le rôle de l’#HCR (un piège) dans un dessin :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770785
#UNHCR

–--------

Un analyse intéressante des centres de détention en Libye, avec #chronologie (et #cartographie) depuis les années 1980 :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/752742

Ici en #dessins :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/747869
#dessin
►https://seenthis.net/messages/612089
Et des mesures-sparadrap en lien avec l’#OMS cette fois-ci —> projet “Enhancing Diagnosis and Treatment for Migrants in detention centers in Libya” :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737102

D’autres liens où l’on parle aussi des centres de détention en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/689187
►https://seenthis.net/messages/612089

Des #témoignages audio depuis la Libye, un projet audio-documentaire de #Michelangelo_Severgnini :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/772503
Michelangelo Severgnini est aussi le réalisateur du #film "Schiavi di riserva"

–-------

#Poursuites_judiciaires —> "Un demandeur d’asile va poursuivre le Royaume-Uni pour le financement de centres de détention libyens"
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/746025

–---------

Et l’excellent film de #Andrea_Segre "L’ordine delle cose" , qui montre les manoeuvres de l’Italie pour créer ces centres en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/677462

–--------

Autour des #gardes-côtes_libyens et les #refoulements (#push-back, #pull-back) en Libye :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/719759

Migrants : des #enregistrements attestent de la #collaboration entre #UE et #gardes-côtes_libyens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/830340

–---------

Les pull-back vers la Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/730613
–-> et centres de détention
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/651505
Le reconstruction d’un naufrage et d’un pull-back vers la Libye effectué par les gardes-côtes libyen. Reconstruction #vidéo par #Charles_Heller et #Lorenzo_Pezzani :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/747918

11.04.2019 : #Minniti déclare que laisser les gardes-côtes libyen coordonner les sauvetages en mer a été une #dramatique_erreur :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/774010

Avril 2019 : les gardes-côtes libyens ont arrêtés de faire des secours :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/776098

–-> #Operation_Sophia et... "L’UE sait que certaines de ses politiques ont rendu la traversée plus dangereuse pour les migrants, toutefois, elle a décidé de continuer cette stratégie" :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763871
D’ailleurs, depuis juillet 2018, aucune personne n’a été sauvée par l’#opération_Sophia :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/770463#message770472

–----------

Résistance de migrants sauvetés en Méditerranée, qui refusent d’être ramenés en Libye en refusant de descendre du navire ( #Nivin ) qui les a secourus :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/735627

–--------

#évacuation de migrants/réfugiés depuis la Libye vers le #Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/737065
#réinstallation
Un #rapport sur les #returnees #returning_migrants :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/765311
–-> attention, il y a peut-être d’autres articles sur ce sujet dans les longs fils de discussions sur le Niger et/ou la Libye (à contrôler)

... et évacuation vers le #Rwanda :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/796723

–-----------

L’aide de la #Suisse aux gardes-côtes libyens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/623935

Et la #France...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/760908

Et de l’UE à travers le #Trust_Fund :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/763529

Et l’#Italie :
Italy strengthens Libya accord, another four patrol boats :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763660
Aerei da pattugliamento e #radar. Ecco il piano segreto anti-sbarchi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/794614
(attention : ce n’est pas la première "livraison" italienne, il y en a eu par le passé, il faudrait voir dans les autres listes)
#Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa

En 2013 :
Italia-Libia, al via accordo di cooperazione su controllo frontiere :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/201853
Le 2 novembre 2019, l’#accord de #2017 entre #Italie et #Libye se renouvellera automatiquement :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/808872

–----------

Et quelques lignes sur le #traité_de_Benghazi , le fameux #pacte_d'amitié entre l’#Italie et la #Libye (2009)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/717799
J’en parle aussi dans ce billet que j’ai écrit pour Visionscarto sur les films #Mare_chiuso et #Mare_deserto :
Vaincre une mer déserte et fermée
►https://visionscarto.net/vaincre-une-mer-deserte-et-fermee
–-> il y a certainement plus sur seenthis, mais je ne trouve pas pour l’instant... j’ajouterai au fur et à mesure

–---------------

Communiqué de presse Commission européenne, mars 2019 :

améliorer les conditions d’accueil déplorables en #Libye : les efforts déployés par l’intermédiaire du groupe de travail trilatéral UA-UE-NU doivent se poursuivre pour contribuer à libérer les migrants se trouvant en #rétention, faciliter le #retour_volontaire (37 000 retours jusqu’à présent) et évacuer les personnes les plus vulnérables (près de 2 500 personnes évacuées).

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

–----------

Plainte contre le gouvernement anglais pour participation au #Trust_Fund_for_Africa par lequel l’UE finance des centres de détention en Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/768134

–--------

Des #timbres produits par la poste libyenne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/745453

–--------

Rapport Arci 2019 :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/783060

–----------

Accord / pacte entre la Libye et #Malte :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/827362
►https://seenthis.net/messages/810329

Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers au #Niger (+ implication de l’#OIM (#IOM) et #Agadez ) :

Mission #Eucap_Sahel et financement et création de #Compagnies_mobiles_de_contrôle_des_frontières (#CMCF), financé par #Pays-Bas et Allemagne financés par l’Allemagne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/733601
Financement de la #police_locale au Niger :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/763890

Le Niger, #nouvelle frontière de l’Europe et #laboratoire de l’asile :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/801799

Et des #camps_militaires :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/736433

Autres liens sur le Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/696283
–-> plein de choses, il faudra un jour faire un meilleur archivage !

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/586729
–-> rapport de #Frontex sur les #routes_migratoires empruntées par les migrants dans le #désert (avec #images_satellitaires)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/370536
–-> sujet inclus dans ce fil de discussion : #loi anti-passeurs au Niger ; création de #camps (appelé #centres)... but : convaincre les migrants de ne pas partir... faire un premier #tri...

Le Niger et l’Italie se félicitent de la chute des flux migratoires... (sic)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/752551
–-> v. aussi : « Baisse des demandes d’asile. Pas de quoi se réjouir » :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/693203
L’impact de la diminution des flux migratoires via Agadez, dans ce rapport :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/853585

Conséquences de l’externalisation des politiques migratoires sur le #Niger, mais aussi le #Soudan et le #Tchad :
▻https://asile.ch/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/multilateral-damage.pdf
signalé ici :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/741956

v. aussi le communiqué de presse de la commission européenne, mars 2019 :

La lutte contre les réseaux de passeurs et de trafiquants a encore été renforcée. En 2018, le centre européen chargé de lutter contre le trafic de migrants, établi au sein d’#Europol, a joué un rôle majeur dans plus d’une centaine de cas de trafic prioritaires et des équipes communes d’enquête participent activement à la lutte contre ce trafic dans des pays comme le #Niger.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

Note de Migreurop sur l’#OIM :
L’#OIM, une organisation au service des #frontières… fermées.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/779989

Rapport Arci 2019 sur le Niger :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/783060

Juin 2019 : #Italie et #OIM financent le renforcement des frontières à #Assamaka (à la frontière entre le Niger et l’#Algérie) et à la frontière avec le #Nigeria :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/788517
... et en octobre 2019, l’OIM organise des « charters humanitaires » de l’Algérie au Niger. Programme financé par l’#Italie et le #UK (#Angleterre) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/806477

v. aussi ce rapport sur l’externalisation des frontières au Niger, mais aussi Soudan et Tchad :
Multilateral DamageThe impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes
►https://seenthis.net/messages/804173

Une belle synthèse de Alizée Dauchy en 3 pages de la situation au Niger :
–-> « Des trajectoires immobilisées : #protection et #criminalisation des migrations au #Niger » :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/844250

2021 :
Deux décisions qui donnent pouvoir à #Frontex pour négocier des #accords_de_travail avec le #Niger (parmi d’autres pays hors UE) et avec #Eucap_Sahel au Niger (ainsi qu’en Libye)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/927299

Et implication de l’#OIM dans le contrôle des frontières en #Guinée (#campagne de #dissuasion financée par l’UE) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/757474

Il y a d’autres campagnes qui ont été mise en place notamment par la #Suisse pour convaincre les migrants à rentrer au pays :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/385940
#retour_au_pays #Nigeria #Cameroun #Balkans #Afrique_de_l'Ouest #Kosovo #Serbie #Macédoine, #Albanie #Monténégro #Bosnie-Herzégovine

Et le #Danemark, même politique :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/385940#message397757

Evidemment l’#Australie aussi :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/474986
►https://seenthis.net/messages/305573
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/302153

Et l’#Allemagne :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/432534

Autres types de dissuasion... un projet de formation à la #photographie en #Côte_d'Ivoire :

The aim of this pilot project was to offer returned migrants an opportunity to become visual storytellers of their daily life back home and help local journalists change the narrative on migration in the country.
This training is the first of a series that will be organized by IOM across West Africa in 2020. It was organized in the frame of an EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/819414

Externalisation des frontières au #Sénégal et en #Mauritanie :

Chronique Monde | #Mauritanie. Un partenariat européen au goût amer
►https://seenthis.net/messages/858930

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/740468
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/668973
►https://seenthis.net/messages/608653
►https://seenthis.net/messages/320101

Status agreement with Senegal : #Frontex might operate in Africa for the first time :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/948918

Italie, Allemagne, France, Espagne

Les efforts de l’ #Italie d’externaliser les contrôles frontaliers :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/600874
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/595057

L’Italie avec l’ #Allemagne :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/566194

The big wall. An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/905345

–-------------

#France et ses tentatives d’externalisation les frontières (proposition de Macron notamment de créer des #hub, de faire du #tri et de la #catégorisation de migrants) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/704970
►https://seenthis.net/messages/618133
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/677172

La #France et « sa » #CIVIPOL (programmes de coopération technique et de contrôles migratoires au #Soudan, et en #Erythrée) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/795208
Plus sur CIVIPOL : ▻https://seenthis.net/tag/civipol

–-------------

L’#Espagne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737099
#modèle_espagnol
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737095
v. aussi plus bas la partie consacrée au Maroc...

L’externalisation des politiques migratoires espagnoles : cadre légal (Migreurop, 2019) :
▻http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/fiche_3_fr-def.pdf

L’externalisation en #Tunisie (accords avec l’Italie notamment) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/511895
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/573526

Livraison d’avions et radar à la Tunisie de la part de l’Italie (juillet 2019) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/794614

Et avec l’UE :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737477

Comment l’Europe contrôle ses frontières en #Tunisie ?
►https://seenthis.net/messages/833041

The new installation is entitled „#Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance“ (#ISMariS), an EU projet for Gulf of Tunis’ surveillance :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/866952

Les #accords_de_réadmission , autre panel de l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/accords_de_r%C3%A9admission

Cet inventaire des accords en lien avec les réadmissions (2015) avec visualisation :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/413779

Et cette carte de Reka pour Vivre Ensemble concernant les accords signés par les pays européens :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/443738
Voir aussi cette liste « de travail » autour de la question :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/736091

Europe et #Afghanistan :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/528689

Négociations #France-#Mali :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/765027
Et l’Europe avec le Mali :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/550612

Les accords de réadmissions signés par la #Suisse :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/444316

Et les tentatives de la Suisse de signer des accords de réadmission avec l’#Erythrée (sic) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/685650
►https://seenthis.net/messages/538851

Et la Suisse avec la #Turquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/567121
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/563101

L’#Italie et le #Soudan :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/518543

Accord de l’Europe avec l’#Ethiopie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/684082

Accord entre #Allemagne et #Algérie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/723089

Accord signé entre le #Kenya et la #Somalie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/194871

European Commission Publishes Findings of the First Annual Assessment of Third Countries’ Cooperation on Readmission (February 2021)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/901672

Ci-dessous, le fameux accord UE-Turquie.

L’ #accord_UE-Turquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/accord_ue-turquie
Et plus en général sur l’externalisation vers la #Tuquie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/427270
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/419432
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/679603
EU concludes €6 billion contract for refugees in Turkey :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/892499

Erdogan accuse les Européens de ne pas tenir leurs promesses d’aide financière...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/512196

Et le #monitoring de l’accord (#observatoire) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/478621

Sur la « #facilité » en faveur des réfugiés en Turquie, le rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/737085
#aide_financière

Un lien sur comment l’aide a été utilisée en faveur des #réfugiés_syriens à #Gaziantep :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/667241

Accord de réadmission signé par la Turquie avec l’#Irak et l’#Iran :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/483667

Tag #réintégration dans les pays d’origine après #renvois (#expulsions) :
▻https://seenthis.net/tag/r%C3%A9int%C3%A9gration

La question des #regional_disembarkation_platforms :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/703288
#plateformes_de_désembarquement #disembarkation_paltforms #plateformes_de_débarquement

Février 2019, Le sauvetage maritime espagnol, le #Salvamento_Marítimo, est désormais autorisé à débarquer une partie des migrants sauvés dans la Méditerranée au Maroc :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/761993
–-> info démentie par le gouvernement marocain : ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/761993#message761998

En 2004, on parlait plutôt de #centres_off-shore en #Afrique_du_Nord ...
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/607615

Au #Sénégal ...
#Frontex wants to disembark refugees in Senegal :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/828755

Au Niger :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/749456
#externalisation_de_l'asile #délocalisation

Et avec le projet #Emergency_Transit_Mechanism (#ETM), évacuation des réfugiés de #Libye via le #Niger... où l’on fait une sélection entre réfugiés et migrants... c’est déjà externaliser une partie de la procédure... (c’est HCR et OIM qui décide qui est réfugié et qui pas) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/799353

Les efforts d’externalisation au #Maroc :

Une nouvelle aide européenne de 101,7 millions d’euros pour lutter contre l’immigration clandestine
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/815925

L’Espagne appelle l’UE à récompenser les efforts du Maroc
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/696321

Fabrice Leggeri : Le #Maroc, un partenaire de premier plan de #Frontex
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/643905

#Espagne et #Maroc : les exemples polémiques de #Frontex pour illustrer comment stopper les flux d’immigrés
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/458929

Au #Maroc, la #chasse aux #étrangers tue et pendant ce temps, l’UE négocie et se tait
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/162299

#Fonds_fiduciaire de l’#UE à utiliser pour les décisions du comité de gestion au Maroc :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/763541

Communiqué de presse Commission européenne, mars 2019 :

L’aide au #Maroc doit encore être intensifiée, compte tenu de l’augmentation importante des arrivées par la route de la Méditerranée occidentale. Elle doit comprendre la poursuite de la mise en œuvre du programme de 140 millions d’euros visant à soutenir la gestion des frontières ainsi que la reprise des négociations avec le Maroc sur la réadmission et l’assouplissement du régime de délivrance des visas.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/765959

Lien #coopération_au_développement, #aide_au_développement et #contrôles_migratoires :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/660235

Pour la Suisse :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/564720
►https://seenthis.net/messages/719752
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/721921
–-> il y a certainement plus de liens sur seenthis, mais il faudrait faire une recherche plus approfondie...
#développement #conditionnalité
Sur cette question, il y a aussi des rapports, dont notamment celui-ci :
Aid and Migration : externalisation of Europe’s responsibilities
▻https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CONCORD_AidWatchPaper_Aid_Migration_2018_online.pdf?1dcbb3&1dcbb3

La rhétorique sur la #nouvelle_frontière_européenne , qui serait le #désert du #Sahara (et petit amusement cartographique de ma part) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/604039
#cartographie #visualisation
►https://seenthis.net/messages/548137
–-> dans ce lien il y a aussi des articles qui parlent de l’externalisation des frontières au #Soudan