facility:american university

  • The Egyptian Egg Ovens Considered More Wondrous Than the Pyramids - Gastro Obscura
    https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/egypt-egg-ovens

    Many aspects of Egyptian culture impressed the ancient Greeks, including their mathematics, papyrus-making, art, and egg-hatching. Aristotle was the first to mention that last innovation, writing that in Egypt, eggs “are hatched spontaneously in the ground, by being buried in dung heaps.” But 200 years later, the historian Diodorus Siculus cast Egyptian egg-hatching as wondrous. In his forty-book-long historical compendium Library of History, he wrote:

    The most astonishing fact is that, by reason of their unusual application to such matters, the men [in Egypt] who have charge of poultry and geese, in addition to producing them in the natural way known to all mankind, raise them by their own hands, by virtue of a skill peculiar to them, in numbers beyond telling.

    Aristotle and Diodorus were referring to Egyptian egg incubators, an ingenious system of mud ovens designed to replicate the conditions under a broody hen. With lots of heat, moisture, and periodical egg-turning, an egg oven could hatch as many as 4,500 fertilized eggs in two to three weeks, a volume that impressed foreigners for centuries. Western travelers mentioned the wondrous structures constantly in their writings about Egypt. In 1750, French entomologist René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur visited an egg incubator and declared that “Egypt ought to be prouder of them than her pyramids.”
    Ancient Egyptian mural depicting food offerings (1422-1411 B.C.). Chicken did not become a feature of Egyptian diets until the fourth century B.C.
    Ancient Egyptian mural depicting food offerings (1422-1411 B.C.). Chicken did not become a feature of Egyptian diets until the fourth century B.C. Public Domain

    Egg incubators were quite a late invention, considering Egypt’s long history. According to Salima Ikram, a professor of Egyptology at the American University in Cairo, chickens were not a native bird of the Nile valley. They probably came from Asia—where they were domesticated from wild fowls 10,000 years ago—through Mesopotamia, or perhaps via trade ships that sailed to East Africa. It was only during the Ptolemaic dynasty, which lasted from 323 to 30 B.C., that chicken became a staple feature of Egyptian diets, says Ikram. In order to have a regular supply of chicken meat, Egyptians developed the first egg incubators.

    From the outside, many incubators looked like smaller, more rounded versions of the pyramids. They sat upon rectangular brick foundations, and had conic-shaped chimneys with a circular opening at the top. That thousands of eggs could be hatched in a single oven was an impressive feat, considering that a broody hen can only hatch up to 15 eggs at a time. Incubator hatching also meant that hens could spend more time laying eggs.

  • AUB - Events - In-Transit - Displacement and Seeking Refuge, as Seen Through Comics
    https://www.aub.edu.lb/msfea/Events/Pages/Details.aspx?ItemId=42

    #comics #bd #migrants #arabes

    Voir aussi : Comics expo draws crowds in Beirut (https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/drawing-a-bigger-picture-at-beirut-comic-exhibition.html)

    Dozens of artists from the Middle East came to Beirut on March 11 to be part of the exhibition at the Beit Beirut cultural space, held in tandem with the Mahmoud Kahil Award ceremony. The winners will receive $36,000 in several categories such as editorial cartoons, graphic novels, comic strips, graphic illustrations and children’s book illustrations.

    Organized by the Mu’taz and Rada Sawwaf Arab Comics Initiative at the American University of Beirut, the exhibition explored the role of comics as documentation on issues of displacement, exile and homeland. It was preceded by a March 9 symposium in which experts and artists discussed displacement.

  • Russian state TV shows map of potential US nuclear targets | World news | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/25/russian-state-tv-map-potential-us-nuclear-targets-hypersonic-missile

    Russian state television has broadcast a map of the US showing military facilities Moscow would target in the event of a nuclear strike, in a report that was unusual even by its own bellicose standards.

    The targets included the Pentagon and the presidential retreat in Camp David, Maryland. A hypersonic missile Russia is developing would be able to hit them in less than five minutes, it said.

    #nucleaire #russie #etats-unis

  • Vous avez peut-être suivi ça, Steve Salaita (américain d’origine Nicaraguayenne et Palestinienne), spécialiste entre autres du racisme anti-arabe aux USA, avait été embauché comme professeur de Science Politique à l’University of Illinois en 2013. Sa permanence avait été révoquée en 2015 à cause de quelques tweets critiques d’israel.
    https://seenthis.net/messages/381282

    Le processus avait été entaché d’irrégularités, mais Salaita avait négocié son départ contre une somme d’argent, ayant entre temps obtenu un poste à la American University of Beirut. Un an après, ce poste aussi n’avait pas été renouvelé et, black listé, aucune autre offre ne lui fut offerte.

    Aujourd’hui, il est chauffeur de bus, et il raconte cette expérience dans ce très beau texte (que je trouve quand même très triste) :

    An Honest Living
    Steve Salaita, le 17 février 2019
    https://stevesalaita.com/an-honest-living

    You hear ex-professors say it all the time and I’ll add to the chorus: despite nagging precariousness, there’s something profoundly liberating about leaving academe, whereupon you are no longer obliged to give a shit about fashionable thinkers, network at the planet’s most boring parties, or quantify self-worth for scurrilous committees (and whereupon you are free to ignore the latest same-old controversy), for even when you know at the time that the place is toxic, only after you exit (spiritually, not physically) and write an essay or read a novel or complete some other task without considering its relevance to the fascist gods of assessment, or its irrelevance to a gang of cynical senior colleagues, do you realize exactly how insidious and pervasive is the industry’s culture of social control.

    There are tragic elements to this adventure, sure. A political symbolism informs my academic career. After months without work, my family suffered financial hardship. And I didn’t matriculate through 22nd grade in order to land a job that requires no college. Then again, neither did I attend so many years of college in order to be disabused of the notion that education is noble.

    I pitched honest living to my parents when I told them about the new job. Despite being aware of academe’s ruthless memory, they hoped that I’d one day be a professor again. They probably still do. In a better world, my redemption would happen in the United States. I wanted to quell that expectation. “Even if Harvard offered me a job I’d say no,” I proclaimed with earnest hyperbole.

    They feigned support but didn’t believe me. I understand why. It’s hard to imagine coming of age in reverse. Hollywood doesn’t make inspirational movies about struggling to overcome material comfort. We don’t aspire to the working class. Personal fulfillment occurs through economic uplift. We go from the outdoors to the office, from the ghetto to the high-rise, from the bar rail to the capital. That’s the dream, to become a celebrity or a tycoon or, in humbler fantasies, a bureaucrat. But forward progress as material comfort is cultivated through the ubiquitous lie that upward mobility equals righteousness. Honest living is a nice story we tell ourselves to rationalize privation, but in the real world money procures all the honesty we need.

    For immigrants, these myths can be acute. I could see my parents struggling between a filial instinct to nurture and an abrupt recognition of their failure. My mom, a retired high school teacher, seemed interested in the logistics of transporting students, but my dad, the original professor, clenched his hands and stared across the table. It’s the only time I’ve seen him avoid eye contact.

    #Steve_Salaita #USA #Palestine #université #criminalisation_des_militants #censure

  • Le projet nucléaire jordanien abandonné, ou du moins reconfiguré à la baisse sans certitude que la nouvelle solution sera plus réaliste financièrement.
    Auteurs: Ali Ahmad is director of the Energy Policy and Security in the Middle East Programme at the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. M. V. Ramana is the Simons Chair for Disarmament, Global and Human Security at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia in Canada and author of “The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India” (Penguin Books, 2012).
    HTRs will not help establish nuclear power in Jordan | Jordan Times
    http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/ali-ahmad-and-m-v-ramana/htrs-will-not-help-establish-nuclear-power-jordan

    Chairman of Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC), Khaled Toukan, has announced that the organisation is in “serious and advanced” talks with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to build a 220 megawatt High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTR) in the Kingdom. Viewed in light of earlier announcements by JAEC and its failure to realise any of its proposed plans since 2007, this pronouncement suggests that the Kingdom is downsizing its nuclear plans in a desperate bid to keep alive the possibility of building a nuclear plant in the country. But this effort is as misguided as prior ones and the best option is to stop investing any more effort, or money, into developing nuclear power.

    Perhaps the most important earlier announcement worth recalling is from three years ago, when, amid much fanfare, Jordan signed an inter-governmental agreement with Russia to build two 1,000-megawatt reactors, at a total cost of $10 billion. The two reactors were “expected to be operational by 2022”. Reports suggested that Russia was to finance 50.1 per cent of the project and Jordan would find financing for the other half. But Jordan struggled to come up with its share.

    Although there has been no official announcement to that effect, the project is likely dead. This is presumably why there is now talk of a smaller reactor.

    #énergie #nucléaire #jordanie #électricité

  • The biography of the founder of the Palestinian Popular Front makes it clear: The leftist leader was right -

    Israelis considered George Habash a cruel airline hijacker, but Eli Galia’s new Hebrew-language book shows that the PFLP chief’s views would have been better for the Palestinians than Arafat’s compromises

    Gideon Levy Apr 13, 2018

    https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-biography-makes-it-clear-this-palestinian-leftist-leader-was-right

    George Habash was Israel’s absolute enemy for decades, the embodiment of evil, the devil incarnate. Even the title “Dr.” before his name — he was a pediatrician — was considered blasphemous.
    Habash was plane hijackings, Habash was terror and terror alone. In a country that doesn’t recognize the existence of Palestinian political parties (have you ever heard of a Palestinian political party? — there are only terror groups) knowledge about the man who headed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was close to zero.
    What’s there to know about him? A terrorist. Subhuman. Should be killed. Enemy. The fact that he was an ideologue and a revolutionary, that his life was shaped by the expulsion from Lod, changed nothing. He remains the plane hijacker from Damascus, the man from the Rejectionist Front who was no different from all the rest of the “terrorists” from Yasser Arafat to Wadie Haddad to Nayef Hawatmeh.
    Now along comes Eli Galia’s Hebrew-language book “George Habash: A Political Biography." It outlines the reality, far from the noise of propaganda, ignorance and brainwashing, for the Israeli reader who agrees to read a biography of the enemy.
    Presumably only few will read it, but this work by Galia, a Middle East affairs expert, is very deserving of praise. It’s a political biography, as noted in its subtitle, so it almost entirely lacks the personal, spiritual and psychological dimension; there’s not even any gossip. So reading it requires a lot of stamina and specialized tastes. Still, it’s fascinating.
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    Galia has written a nonjudgmental and certainly non-propagandistic biography. Taking into consideration the Israeli mind today, this isn’t to be taken for granted.
    Galia presents a wealth of information, with nearly a thousand footnotes, about the political path of Habash, a man who was considered dogmatic even though he underwent a number of ideological reversals in his life. If that’s dogmatism, what’s pragmatism? The dogmatic Habash went through more ideological changes than any Israeli who sticks to the Zionist narrative and doesn’t budge an inch — and who of course isn’t considered dogmatic.

    The exodus from Lod following an operation by the Palmach, 1948.Palmach Archive / Yitzhak Sadeh Estate
    In the book, Habash is revealed as a person of many contradictions: a member of the Christian minority who was active in the midst of a large Muslim majority, a bourgeois who became a Marxist, a tough and inflexible leader who was once seen weeping in his room as he wrote an article about Israel’s crimes against his people. He had to wander and flee for his life from place to place, sometimes more for fear of Arab regimes than of Israel.

    He was imprisoned in Syria and fled Jordan, he devoted his life to a revolution that never happened. It’s impossible not to admire a person who devoted his life to his ideas, just as you have to admire the scholar who has devoted so much research for so few readers who will take an interest in the dead Habash, in an Israel that has lost any interest in the occupation and the Palestinian struggle.
    The book gives rise to the bleak conclusion that Habash was right. For most of his life he was a bitter enemy of compromises, and Arafat, the man of compromise, won the fascinating historical struggle between the two. They had a love-hate relationship, alternately admiring and scorning each other, and never completely breaking off their connection until Arafat won his Pyrrhic victory.
    What good have all of Arafat’s compromises done for the Palestinian people? What came out of the recognition of Israel, of the settling for a Palestinian state on 22 percent of the territory, of the negotiations with Zionism and the United States? Nothing but the entrenchment of the Israeli occupation and the strengthening and massive development of the settlement project.
    In retrospect, it makes sense to think that if that’s how things were, maybe it would have been better to follow the uncompromising path taken by Habash, who for most of his life didn’t agree to any negotiations with Israel, who believed that with Israel it was only possible to negotiate by force, who thought Israel would only change its positions if it paid a price, who dreamed of a single, democratic and secular state of equal rights and refused to discuss anything but that.
    Unfortunately, Habash was right. It’s hard to know what would have happened had the Palestinians followed his path, but it’s impossible not to admit that the alternative has been a resounding failure.

    Members of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers, 1987, including Yasser Arafat, left, and George Habash, second from right. Mike Nelson-Nabil Ismail / AFP
    The Palestinian Che Guevara
    Habash, who was born in 1926, wrote about his childhood: “Our enemies are not the Jews but rather the British .... The Jews’ relations with the Palestinians were natural and sometimes even good” (p. 16). He went to study medicine at the American University in Beirut; his worried mother and father wrote him that he should stay there; a war was on.
    But Habash returned to volunteer at a clinic in Lod; he returned and he saw. The sight of the Israeli soldiers who invaded the clinic in 1948 ignited in him the flame of violent resistance: “I was gripped by an urge to shoot them with a pistol and kill them, and in the situation of having no weapons I used mute words. I watched them from the sidelines and said to myself: This is our land, you dogs, this is our land and not your land. We will stay here to kill you. You will not win this battle” (p.22).
    On July 14 he was expelled from his home with the rest of his family. He never returned to the city he loved. He never forgot the scenes of Lod in 1948, nor did he forget the idea of violent resistance. Can the Israeli reader understand how he felt?
    Now based in Beirut, he took part in terror operations against Jewish and Western targets in Beirut, Amman and Damascus: “I personally lobbed grenades and I participated in assassination attempts. I had endless enthusiasm when I was doing that. At the time, I considered my life worthless relative to what was happening in Palestine.”
    “The Palestinian Che Guevara” — both of them were doctors — made up his mind to wreak vengeance for the Nakba upon the West and the leaders of the Arab regimes that had abandoned his people, even before taking vengeance on the Jews. He even planned to assassinate King Abdullah of Jordan. He founded a new student organization in Beirut called the Commune, completed his specialization in pediatrics and wrote: “I took the diploma and said: Congratulations, Mother, your son is a doctor, so now let me do what I really want to do. And indeed, that’s what happened” (p. 41).
    Habash was once asked whether he was the Che Guevara of the Middle East and he replied that he would prefer to be the Mao Zedong of the Arab masses. He was the first to raise the banner of return and in the meantime he opened clinics for Palestinian refugees in Amman. For him, the road back to Lod passed through Amman, Beirut and Damascus. The idea of Pan-Arabism stayed with him for many years, until he despaired of that as well.
    He also had to leave medicine: “I am a pediatrician, I have enjoyed this greatly. I believed that I had the best job in the world but I had to make the decision I have taken and I don’t regret it .... A person cannot split his emotions in that way: to heal on the one hand and kill on the other. This is the time when he must say to himself: one or the other.”

    Militants from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Jordan, 1969.1969Thomas R. Koeniges / Look Magazine Photograph Collection / Library of Congress
    The only remaining weapon
    This book isn’t arrogant and it isn’t Orientalist; it is respectful of the Palestinian national ideology and those who articulated and lived it, even if the author doesn’t necessarily agree with that ideology or identify with it. This is something quite rare in the Israeli landscape when it comes to Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular. Nor does the author venerate what’s not worthy of veneration, and he doesn’t have any erroneous romantic or other illusions. Galia presents a bitter, tough, uncompromising, very much failed and sometimes exceedingly cruel struggle for freedom, self-respect and liberation.
    And this is what is said in the founding document of the PFLP, which Habash established in December 1967 after having despaired of Palestinian unity: “The only weapon left to the masses in order to restore history and progress and truly defeat enemies and potential enemies in the long run is revolutionary violence .... The only language that the enemy understands is the language of revolutionary violence” (p.125).
    But this path too met with failure. “The essential aim of hijacking airplanes,” wrote Habash, “was to bring the Palestinian question out of anonymity and expose it to Western public opinion, because at that time it was unknown in Europe and in the United States. We wanted to undertake actions that would make an impression on the senses of the entire world .... There was international ignorance regarding our suffering, in part due to the Zionist movement’s monopoly on the mass media in the West” (p. 151).
    The PFLP plane hijackings in the early 1970s indeed achieved international recognition of the existence of the Palestinian problem, but so far this recognition hasn’t led anywhere. The only practical outcome has been the security screenings at airports everywhere around the world — and thank you, George Habash. I read Galia’s book on a number of flights, even though this isn’t an airplane book, and I kept thinking that were it not for Habash my wanderings at airports would have been a lot shorter. In my heart I forgave him for that, for what other path was open to him and his defeated, humiliated and bleeding people?
    Not much is left of his ideas. What has come of the scientific idealism and the politicization of the masses, the class struggle and the anti-imperialism, the Maoism and of course the transformation of the struggle against Israel into an armed struggle, which according to the plans was supposed to develop from guerrilla warfare into a national war of liberation? Fifty years after the founding of the PFLP and 10 years after the death of its founder, what remains?
    Habash’s successor, Abu Ali Mustafa, was assassinated by Israel in 2001; his successor’s successor, Ahmad Saadat, has been in an Israeli prison since 2006 and very little remains of the PFLP.
    During all my decades covering the Israeli occupation, the most impressive figures I met belonged to the PFLP, but now not much remains except fragments of dreams. The PFLP is a negligible minority in intra-Palestinian politics, a movement that once thought to demand equal power with Fatah and its leader, Arafat. And the occupation? It’s strong and thriving and its end looks further off than ever. If that isn’t failure, what is?

    A mourning procession for George Habash, Nablus, January 2008. Nasser Ishtayeh / AP
    To where is Israel galloping?
    Yet Habash always knew how to draw lessons from failure after failure. How resonant today is his conclusion following the Naksa, the defeat in 1967 that broke his spirit, to the effect that “the enemy of the Palestinians is colonialism, capitalism and the global monopolies .... This is the enemy that gave rise to the Zionist movement, made a covenant with it, nurtured it, protected it and accompanied it until it brought about the establishment of the aggressive and fascistic State of Israel” (p. 179).
    From the Palestinian perspective, not much has changed. It used to be that this was read in Israel as hostile and shallow propaganda. Today it could be read otherwise.
    After the failure of 1967, Habash redefined the goal: the establishment of a democratic state in Palestine in which Arabs and Jews would live as citizens with equal rights. Today this idea, too, sounds a bit less strange and threatening than it did when Habash articulated it.
    On the 40th anniversary of Israel’s founding, Habash wrote that Israel was galloping toward the Greater Land of Israel and that the differences between the right and left in the country were becoming meaningless. How right he was about that, too. At the same time, he acknowledged Israel’s success and the failure of the Palestinian national movement. And he was right about that, too.
    And one last correct prophecy, though a bitter one, that he made in 1981: “The combination of a loss of lives and economic damage has considerable influence on Israeli society, and when that happens there will be a political, social and ideological schism on the Israeli street and in the Zionist establishment between the moderate side that demands withdrawal from the occupied territories and the extremist side that continues to cling to Talmudic ideas and dreams. Given the hostility between these two sides, the Zionist entity will experience a real internal split” (p. 329).
    This has yet to happen.
    Imad Saba, a dear friend who was active in the PFLP and is in exile in Europe, urged me for years to try to meet with Habash and interview him for Haaretz. As far as is known, Habash never met with Israelis, except during the days of the Nakba.
    Many years ago in Amman I interviewed Hawatmeh, Habash’s partner at the start and the leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which split off from the PFLP in 1969. At the time of the interview, Habash was also living in Amman and was old and sick. I kept postponing my approach — until he died. When reading the book, I felt very sorry that I had not met this man.

  • The Angry Arab News Service/وكالة أنباء العربي الغاضب: Western media cover-up of the #repression and #corruption of #Kurdistan
    http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2017/12/western-media-cover-up-of-repression.html

    This has been one of the biggest propaganda stories in recent years in the Middle East. Just because the US government sponsored the Barzzani-Talbani tribal corrupt autocracy, and just because Israeli maintained relations with that traditional-feudal junta, Western media participated in one of the biggest schemes in media history. The story of Kurdistan was always surrounded with tons of claims of prosperity and freedom without attention to what is happening in those areas. Thomas Friedman and others would go and give a lecture at the American University of Sulaymaniyyah and comes back and tell readers how wonderful things are and that the son of Bargain (or the son of Talbani) is fluent in English. This picture is a scene of a protest in Sulaymaniyyah where people protested corruption and repression. Of course, stolen oil money paid for fancy lobbyists on K street in DC.

  • Le premier ministre libanais, Saad Hariri, annonce sa démission
    http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2017/11/04/le-premier-ministre-libanais-saad-hariri-annonce-sa-demission_5210238_3218.h

    Le premier ministre libanais, Saad Hariri, a annoncé sa démission, samedi 4 novembre, à la surprise générale. Il a accusé le Hezbollah chiite et son allié iranien de « mainmise » sur le Liban et a affirmé avoir peur d’être assassiné.

    « J’annonce ma démission du poste de premier ministre », a ainsi déclaré M. Hariri, qui se trouve actuellement en Arabie saoudite, dans un discours retransmis par la chaîne satellitaire Al-Arabiya. Selon les informations du Monde, un des conseillers de M. Hariri lui avait déjà suggéré de démissionner il y a quelques semaines, mais l’idée avait alors été écartée.

    « L’Iran a une mainmise sur le destin des pays de la région (…). Le Hezbollah est le bras de l’Iran non seulement au Liban mais également dans les autres pays arabes », a dénoncé le premier ministre démissionnaire. Et « ces dernières décennies, le Hezbollah a imposé une situation de fait accompli par la force de ses armes », a-t-il ajouté.

    Bien entendu, le Monde-avec-AFP (ainsi que l’ensemble des médias francophones) qualifie la démission de Hariri de « totalement inattendue »… Si ces gens faisaient un tout petit peu leurs devoirs, ils sauraient que le renversement du gouvernement et la mise en accusation du Hezbollah ont été très clairement annoncés lundi par les Séoudiens :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/641376
    que Hariri s’était déjà rendu en Arabie séoudite ce même lundi, et y et retourné hier :
    https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1081985/hariri-se-rend-a-nouveau-en-arabie-saoudite.html

    Le chef du gouvernement libanais se rend à Riyad pour une visite de travail. Lors de son dernier déplacement, il avait été reçu par le prince héritier saoudien, Mohammad Ben Salmane. M. Hariri avait affirmé être totalement en phase avec Riyad pour ce qui a trait à la stabilité du Liban.

    • L’aspect évidemment ridicule de l’événement, c’est que Saad se rend deux fois en Arabie séoudite en quelques jours, applique ce qui a été annoncé par un ministre séoudien en début de semaine, rencontre le nouveau Séoud-en-chef ben Salmane et dans la foulée annonce sa démission depuis l’Arabie séoudite, tout ça paraît-il pour dénoncer la « mainmise » de l’Iran sur le Liban.

    • Malgré cet aspect ridicule, on peut être particulièrement inquiet. Que l’Arabie séoudite décide de porter (à nouveau) son affrontement régional sur la scène libanaise ne présage d’absolument rien de bon pour le pays (tu as vu l’état des pays où l’Arabie a prétendu « contrer » l’influence iranienne ?).

    • http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=772730
      Commentaire des Iraniens : "La démission de Hariri a été arrangée par Trump et Muhammad ben Salmane, en fionction d’une décision manifeste des Saoudiens de s’en prendre au Hezbollah."
      طهران : استقالة الحريري جاءت بترتيب من ترامب ومحمد بن سلمان وبقرار سعودي واضح لمواجهة “حزب الله”

    • November 2, 2017
      Targeting Lebanon Again
      Edito d’ABA. Cela date du 2 novembre mais, comme c’est en anglais, je suppose que cela a dû être publié un peu avant.
      http://www.raialyoum.com/?p=771836

      We do not know what instructions Hariri was given when he met Saudi strongman Crown Prince Muhammad bin-Salman. But it would not come as a surprise to learn that he was told either to withdraw from the government or sack its Hezbollah ministers in order to create another government crisis in Lebanon. Hariri would have no option but to comply. That would mean the collapse of the hard-won political accommodation that enabled him to return to office and Gen. Michel Aoun to be elected president.

    • Angry Arab: Hariri resignation in Beirut
      http://angryarab.blogspot.fr/2017/11/hariri-assassination-in-beirut.html

      It is funny: people of the Saudi and Israeli lobbies on social media are jubilant about Saad Hariri’s resignation (from Riyadh, no less and through Saudi regime media) and treating the matter as if it was a purely Lebanese matter. The resignation was days in the making. Saudi minister (for Gulf affairs but he also seems to be in charge of Lebanese affairs as well) has been threatening the Lebanese people and government for many days and warning of an impending action. In fact, he threatened hours before Hariri resignation that Saudi Arabia will “cut off” the hands of Iran—which was the same expression used by Hariri in the speech which was prepared for him. Hariri was sitting with Hizbullah ministers and defending the political arrangement in which all parties were represented against critics in his quarters. He also met with a senior Iranian delegation HOURS before his resignation (above) (the delegated was headed by Ali Akbar Welayeti, who said after the meeting that it was “constructive”). Just after the meeting, Hariri was summoned to Riyadh and he took a selfti with Minister Sabhan (the latter posted it on Twitter (above) and said it was after a long meeting), and then the speech of resignation was aired on Saudi media. Its text was counter to all the speeches that Hariri has been giving for many months. The best part is that Saudi regime media announced that there was an assassination attempt on Hariri’s life just before he departed for Saudi Arabia. The pro-Saudi branch of the Lebanese security services promptly told Lebanese media that they never heard of any of that and that they were not sources for this fable.

    • Au sujet de la prétendue tentative d’assassinat contre Hariri, le démenti des FSI (généralement pro-séoudienne et proches du camp Hariri) :
      http://nna-leb.gov.lb/fr/show-news/83957/Les-FSI-mentent-les-rumeurs-sur-la-tentative-39-assassinat-jou-contre-Sa

      La direction générale des FSI a démenti, ce samedi dans un communiqué, les informations qui circulent dans les médias, réseaux sociaux et sites électroniques, selon lesquelles son service de renseignements aurait déjoué une tentative d’assassinat contre le Premier ministre démissionnaire Saad Hariri.

      « La direction des FSI précise que ces informations sont erronées, qu’elle n’a fourni aucun détail et qu’elle ne dispose d’aucune donnée à cet égard », précise le communiqué.

    • Saad Hariri Quits as Lebanon Prime Minister, Blaming Iran - The New York Times
      https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/world/middleeast/saad-hariri-lebanon-iran.html

      On en est là, il faut lire un article du NYT pour se rendre compte combien les articles des MSM français et les reportages de France 24 sur le sujet sont lamentables.

      The surprise announcement — which shocked even his own staff — was an ominous sign of the escalating regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, analysts said, indicating the growing dominance of Iran and Hezbollah as well as the Saudis’ increasingly assertive response.

      Lebanese and regional analysts, whether supporters or opponents of Hezbollah, said it appeared that Mr. Hariri had been pressured to resign by his patrons, the Saudis , as they and the United States ratchet up efforts to counter Iranian influence. The resignation came after weeks of sharp American and Saudi condemnations of Iran, including from President Trump, and new American sanctions against Hezbollah.

      By pushing out Mr. Hariri, analysts said, Saudi Arabia could deny Hezbollah a credible Sunni governing partner — an attempt to isolate it and deny it the fig leaf of a national unity government.

      “They concluded that Hariri was serving as more of a cover for Iranian and Hezbollah influence than as a counterweight to them,” said Rob Malley, a former special Middle East adviser to President Barack Obama and the vice president of the International Crisis Group.

      Yet the resignation also shows how few options Iran’s opponents have. Without Mr. Hariri in power, the United States and Saudi Arabia lose their main partner in the Lebanese government.

      Across the political spectrum, analysts and officials said the resignation ushered in new dangers. If the next government is more pro-Hezbollah, they said, that could lead to devastating sanctions. It could even increase the chances of a new war with Israel, which would see added justification for its argument that there is little distinction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state.

      Mr. Hariri even raised the specter of internal violence. [si jamais des attentats contre le camp du 14 mars reprennent on aura été averti] He compared the atmosphere in Lebanon now to the days before the 2005 assassination of his father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, saying he believed his own life was in danger. “I sensed what’s being woven in secret to target my life,” he said.

      Mr. Hariri’s father was killed when his motorcade was bombed on Beirut’s seafront. Several Hezbollah members are being tried in absentia in a special United Nations-backed tribunal in The Hague, although the militant group has denied involvement in the assassination.

      [...]

      Mr. Hariri headed a 30-member national unity cabinet that was crafted to protect the country from any spillover from the multisided war in neighboring Syria, where Iran backed the government and Saudi Arabia backed the insurgents.

      That mission has largely been successful , even though Hezbollah has sided with the Syrian government, Lebanese Sunni militants have joined insurgents there, and well over one million refugees flooded this small Mediterranean country.

      In Lebanon’s political system, power is divided between a prime minister, who must be Sunni; a president, who must be Maronite Christian; and a speaker of Parliament, who must be Shiite.

      The exercise of real power in the country is a more complicated affair of alliances, rivalries and division of spoils between the leaders of sectarian groups, including former warlords from Lebanon’s civil war.

      Hezbollah, which rose to prominence fighting the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, is the strongest because of its powerful militia, which can act independently of the state and in recent years has served as an expeditionary force across Syria.

      In recent years Lebanon’s rival blocs have essentially agreed to confine their fight to Syria. But tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have only increased.

      In addition to Hezbollah’s decisive role in helping President Bashar al-Assad of Syria hold on to power, Iran has supported several militias in Iraq that have managed to defeat Islamic State forces in that country and remain a fighting force.

      Iranian leaders say their interference is needed to stop terrorism, and to create a security zone for their country. The country’s influence started to rise after the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq in 2011, leaving behind an incomplete army and a pro-Iranian government.

      Iran’s filling of the vacuum created by the departure of the United States military has been an extremely worrying development for Saudi Arabia and some other Arab states, who have seen their efforts to fight proxy wars with Iran largely fail.

      And now that the Syrian war seems to be entering a new phase, with Mr. Assad still ruling a devastated country, there are fears that tensions that had been pushed to the back burner — inside Lebanon, between Hezbollah and Israel, and elsewhere — could re-emerge.

      The United States has stepped up sanctions on Hezbollah in recent weeks after President Trump criticized Iran and the landmark nuclear deal it reached under Mr. Obama.

      “It signals a new phase of escalation,” said Ali Rizk, a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese analyst, adding that the imminent defeat of Islamic State by the United States would put new pressure on what it sees as Shiite extremists. “Lebanon is in for a hard time,” Mr. Rizk said.

      The resignation brought sharp words from Israel and Iran. Bahram Ghasemi, a spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry, said Mr. Hariri’s speech was driven by a Saudi, American and Israeli effort aimed at “creating tension in Lebanon and the region.”

      And in Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the resignation “a wake-up call for the international community to take action against the Iranian aggression.”

      The pressure now is on the Lebanese president, Mr. Aoun, who will hold consultations with Parliament about appointing a caretaker government, said Imad Salamey, an analyst at the American University of Beirut.

      “If he indeed is going to bring in a pro-Hezbollah government, then he has to face the consequences,” such as new sanctions, Mr. Salamey said. “It will be a massive U.S. and Saudi response. The economy will collapse for sure.”

      In his speech, Mr. Hariri said he wanted to unite Lebanon and free it from outside influence. He pronounced himself “full of optimism and hope that Lebanon will be stronger, free, independent, with no authority over it except that of its own great people.”

      But in the streets of Tariq al-Jdeedeh, a mostly Sunni neighborhood of Beirut that is part of Mr. Hariri’s political base, anger and confusion contrasted with the posters of Mr. Hariri that festooned the buildings.

      “Hariri didn’t do this for Lebanon, he did this for Saudi against Iran,” said Nabil Idriss, who was tending his son’s fabric shop. “Now with this move, the picture is more transparent than ever. Saad Hariri was never in control.”

      #Liban #Hezbollah #Israel #Etats-Unis #Arabie_saoudite

  • France / Syrie / Lafarge : Arrestation de Firas Tlass aux Émirats Arabes Unis
    http://www.renenaba.com/france-syrie-lafarge-arrestation-de-firas-tlass-aux-emirats-arabes-unis

    L’arrestation de Firas Tlass apparaît rétrospectivement comme un dommage collatéral de la guerre médiatique que se livrent 3 pétromonarchies contre le Qatar, en ce que la révélation de son lieu d’arrestation, les Émirats Arabes Unis, viserait à contrario à désigner Abou Dhabi comme un complice du financement du terrorisme international et à dédouaner en conséquence le Qatar de cette accusation.

    […]

    Officiellement son interpellation a été présentée comme étant liée à des problèmes concernant son passeport syrien à des questions financières : Lafarge Syrie, dont Firas Tlass était membre de son conseil d’administration, lui versait près de 100.000 dollars par mois en vue d’assurer la protection du site et de ses employés, dont l’homme d’affaires syrien en reversait le quart, soit 20.000 dollars, au groupement terroriste Daech.

    Détail savoureux, c’est le même Firas Tlass qui servait à expliquer (oui, encore en janvier dernier) que c’était Bachar Assad qui « sponsorise des jihadistes » : Quand Bachar al-Assad "favorisait l’idée du jihad en Syrie" pour faire revenir l’Occident vers lui
    http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2017/01/22/quand-bachar-al-assad-favorisait-lidee-du-jihad-en-syrie-pour_a_21659

    Dans ce reportage, le réalisateur donne la parole à Firas Tlass, ex-proche du dictateur syrien, et aujourd’hui en exil. Ce dernier rappelle une chose utile : c’est Bachar al-Assad qui a favorisé l’émergence des jihadistes en Syrie pour ensuite, s’ériger en rempart contre le péril islamiste qui tétanise les occidentaux. Mieux, il explique comment le dictateur syrien sponsorise des jihadistes depuis 2003.

    (M’enfin avec la Syrie, ça fait bien longtemps qu’on a passé toutes les bornes du n’importe quoi…)

  • The Mathematics of Inequality | Tufts Now
    https://now.tufts.edu/articles/mathematics-inequality

    Using a mathematical model devised to mimic a simplified version of the free market, he [Bruce Boghosian] and colleagues are finding that, without redistribution, wealth becomes increasingly more concentrated, and inequality grows until almost all assets are held by an extremely small percent of people.

    “Our work refutes the idea that free markets, by virtually leaving people up to their own devices, will be fair,” he said. “Our model, which is able to explain the form of the actual wealth distribution with remarkable accuracy, also shows that free markets cannot be stable without redistribution mechanisms. The reality is precisely the opposite of what so-called ‘market fundamentalists’ would have us believe.”

    [...]

    Boghosian was first intrigued by this question when he spent four years living in Armenia, starting in 2010, as president of the American University of Armenia. With an unfettered free market after the fall of Soviet rule, he saw Armenia increasingly become a country with a very small number of rich people, and a great number of poor people, he said.

    #économie

  • Why Was an Italian Graduate Student Tortured and Murdered in Egypt? - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/magazine/giulio-regeni-italian-graduate-student-tortured-murdered-egypt.html?_r=0

    The target of the Egyptian police, that day in November 2015, was the street vendors selling socks, $2 sunglasses and fake jewelry, who clustered under the arcades of the elegant century-old buildings of Heliopolis, a Cairo suburb. Such raids were routine, but these vendors occupied an especially sensitive location. Just 100 yards away is the ornate palace where Egypt’s president, the military strongman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, welcomes foreign dignitaries. As the men hurriedly gathered their goods from mats and doorways, preparing to flee, they had an unlikely assistant: an Italian graduate student named Giulio Regeni.

    He arrived in Cairo a few months earlier to conduct research for his doctorate at Cambridge. Raised in a small village near Trieste by a sales manager father and a schoolteacher mother, Regeni, a 28-year-old leftist, was enthralled by the revolutionary spirit of the Arab Spring. In 2011, when demonstrations erupted in Tahrir Square, leading to the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, he was finishing a degree in Arabic and politics at Leeds University. He was in Cairo in 2013, working as an intern at a United Nations agency, when a second wave of protests led the military to oust Egypt’s newly elected president, the Islamist Mohamed Morsi, and put Sisi in charge. Like many Egyptians who had grown hostile to Morsi’s overreaching government, Regeni approved of this development. ‘‘It’s part of the revolutionary process,’’ he wrote an English friend, Bernard Goyder, in early August. Then, less than two weeks later, Sisi’s security forces killed 800 Morsi supporters in a single day, the worst state-sponsored massacre in Egypt’s history. It was the beginning of a long spiral of repression. Regeni soon left for England, where he started work for Oxford Analytica, a business-research firm.

    From afar, Regeni followed Sisi’s government closely. He wrote reports on North Africa, analyzing political and economic trends, and after a year had saved enough money to start on his doctorate in development studies at Cambridge. He decided to focus on Egypt’s independent unions, whose series of unprecedented strikes, starting in 2006, had primed the public for the revolt against Mubarak; now, with the Arab Spring in tatters, Regeni saw the unions as a fragile hope for Egypt’s battered democracy. After 2011 their numbers exploded, multiplying from four to thousands. There were unions for everything: butchers and theater attendants, well diggers and miners, gas-bill collectors and extras in the trashy TV soap operas that played during the holy month of Ramadan. There was even an Independent Trade Union for Dwarfs. Guided by his supervisor, a noted Egyptian academic at Cambridge who had written critically of Sisi, Regeni chose to study the street vendors — young men from distant villages who scratched out a living on the sidewalks of Cairo. Regeni plunged into their world, hoping to assess their union’s potential to drive political and social change.

    But by 2015 that kind of cultural immersion, long favored by budding Arabists, was no longer easy. A pall of suspicion had fallen over Cairo. The press had been muzzled, lawyers and journalists were regularly harassed and informants filled Cairo’s downtown cafes. The police raided the office where Regeni conducted interviews; wild tales of foreign conspiracies regularly aired on government TV channels.

    Continue reading the main story
    RECENT COMMENTS

    Manon 31 minutes ago
    Thank you for shedding light on the horrible death of my compatriot and the responsibilities of the Egyptian authorities.
    Emanuele Cerizza 31 minutes ago
    Great reporting. Thank you Mr. Declan Walsh for this solid view on Giulio Regeni’s ill fated death. More and more we Italians have to...
    oxerio 32 minutes ago
    If a foreign person come in NY or Palermo or Shanghai or Mexico City and became to investigate about local gang, or local mafia’s...
    SEE ALL COMMENTS WRITE A COMMENT
    Regeni was undeterred. Proficient in five languages, he was insatiably curious and exuded a low-intensity charm that attracted a wide circle of friends. From 12 to 14, he served as youth mayor of his hometown, Fiumicello. He prided himself on his ability to navigate different cultures, and he relished Cairo’s unruly street life: the smoky cafes, the endless hustle, the candy-colored party boats that plied the Nile at night. He registered as a visiting scholar at American University in Cairo and found a room in Dokki, a traffic-choked neighborhood between the Pyramids and the Nile, where he shared an apartment with two young professionals: Juliane Schoki, who taught German, and Mohamed El Sayad, a lawyer at one of Cairo’s oldest law firms. Dokki was an unfashionable address, but it was just two subway stops from downtown Cairo with its maze of cheap hotels, dive bars and crumbling apartment blocks encircling Tahrir Square. Regeni soon befriended writers and artists and practiced his Arabic at Abou Tarek, a four-story neon-lit emporium that is Cairo’s most famous spot for koshary, the traditional Egyptian dish of rice, lentils and pasta.

    Photo

  • The Rumor Bomb: On Convergence Culture and Politics Jayson Harsin / American University of Paris – Flow
    http://www.flowjournal.org/2008/12/the-rumor-bomb-on-convergence-culture-and-politics-jayson-harsin-americ

    In February 2006, the Democratic Party of Japan admitted that one of its politicians used a hoax email producing a scandal that implicated a senior official of the governing Liberal Democratic Party, who allegedly received large sums of money from a publicly disgraced Internet startup. In 2005, a political consultant in South Africa was paid to fabricate emails to sow divisions and contribute to the succession battle in the ANC. In Nigeria in September 2008, an entire TV station was closed after it repeated an internet claim that Nigeria’s president would resign due to illness.

    New photo-editing technologies led to visual rumors. Recall the doctored photo of John Kerry with “Hanoi” Jane Fonda which made its way into the New York Times, and countless war journalism examples.

    Perhaps the most common American political rumor recently concerned Barack Obama. When it was clear Obama would be a contender, the Muslim rumor was launched, landing on mainstream news when a Clinton campaign volunteer was caught re-emailing it. Videoed McCain supporters also announced dread of an “Arab” President Obama, again frequenting news agendas, pressuring McCain to respond that Obama was a “decent family man” (not an Arab). Meanwhile, these rumors have complements that imply Obama was/is a terrorist because he allegedly “pals around with terrorists,” referring to acquaintance Bill Ayers.

    Rumor then is a keyword of contemporary politics and culture. But is it useful as a scholarly concept?

    I proposed the concept of “rumor bomb” (RB) to distinguish a particular use of rumor from other related notions.1 I begin with the widespread definition of rumor as a claim whose truthfulness is in doubt and which often has no clear source even if its ideological or partisan origins and intents are clear. I then treat it as a particular rhetorical strategy in current contexts of media and politics in many societies. The “RB” extends the definition of rumor into a media/politics concept with the following features:

    1. A crisis of verification: perhaps the most salient and politically dangerous aspect of rumor. [...]

    2. A context of public uncertainty or anxiety about a political group, figure, or cause, which the RB overcomes or transfers onto an opponent. ....

    3. A clearly partisan even if anonymous source (eg. “an unnamed advisor to the president”), which seeks political profit from the RB’s diffusion. [...]

    4. A rapid electronic diffusion: i.e. a “convergence culture” where news travels fast.

    #fake_news #post_truth #rumeurs

  • Fake News Sprint < Dmi < digitalmethods.net
    https://wiki.digitalmethods.net/Dmi/FakeNewsSprint

    à Amsterdam, les 6 au 10 mars 2017

    The Public Data Lab in collaboration with the Digital Methods Initiative is holding a data sprint on fake news in the age of social media. The sprint consists of hands-on work to research the making, circulation, responses and controversies associated with fake news, together with a day of talks by prominent researchers in the area. The data sprint is part of a Public Data Lab project to develop a field guide to fake news in US and European politics. Research developed during this sprint will contribute towards the field guide, as well as an edited volume on the topic.

    The Fake News Data Sprint is pleased to have Jayson Harsin (The American University of Paris) give the opening keynote. His work over the past ten years addresses “central questions of truth, belief, attention and control, especially the strategic role of rumor in contemporary political practices on a global plane revolutionized by historically recent digital communication technologies.

    He is author ( among other works) of “The Rumour Bomb: Theorising the Convergence of New and Old Trends in Mediated US Politics” and “Diffusing the Rumor Bomb: ‘John Kerry Is French’ (ie, Haughty, Foppish, Elitist, Socialist, Cowardly, and Gay)”. He is joined as speaker by Marc Tuters (University of Amsterdam), Ida Eklund-Lindwall (East Stratcom Task Force) and Richard Rogers (University of Amsterdam). Additionally, attendees are invited on Wednesday afternoon to the talk by Elizabeth Losh, “I Did Not Have Text with that Server: Gender, Technology, and Digital Literacy in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign.

    mentionné lors des journées Sciences XXL de l’Ined, mais je ne trouve pas de compte-rendu ou de présentation des travaux en ligne.

  • Egypt: Informants at American University of Cairo? | MadaMasr

    http://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/12/21/feature/politics/informants-at-auc

    As an institution championing the American model of liberal arts education, the American University in Cairo (AUC) is known for allowing a margin of academic freedom which is largely absent in other Egyptian universities. This leniency appears particularly evident in regards to security intervention in student activities and academic freedom.

  • Today could have been Palestine’s 65th birthday
    The State of Palestine could have been 65 years old today if the UN partition plan of 1947 had been accepted by the Arab world. A just and lasting peace between two sovereign states is still prejudiced by the false narrative that Palestinians were the only refugees created in 1947.

    Irwin Cotler Nov 29, 2012
    read more: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/today-could-have-been-palestine-s-65th-birthday.premium-1.481326
    http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/today-could-have-been-palestine-s-65th-birthday.premium-1.481326

    Today, the Palestinian Authority is seeking Observer Status at the UN General Assembly with a view to securing a UN General Assembly vote later in the day. The November 29 is no random date – it marks the 65th anniversary of the UN Partition Resolution of 1947. It is sometimes forgotten – and often not even known – that this was the first-ever blueprint for an Israeli-Palestinian “two states for two peoples” solution. Regrettably, while Jewish leaders accepted the resolution, Arab and Palestinian leaders did not – which they had a right to do if they felt it did not comport with their objectives or interests.
    However, what they did not have a right to do was to launch a war of aggression against the nascent Jewish state. Nor did they have a right to launch a war against their own Jewish nationals – a documented pattern of state-sanctioned repression and persecution – disenfranchising them, dispossessing them of their – detaining, murdering and expelling them. This double aggression resulted in two sets of refugees: Palestinian refugees resulting from the Arab war against the Jewish State, and Jewish refugees resulting from the Arab war against their own Jewish nationals.
    Yet the false Middle East narrative – prejudicial to authentic reconciliation and peace between peoples as well as between states – continues to hold that there was only one victim population, Palestinian refugees; that Israel was responsible for the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe) of 1947-8; and that, as Prof. Rami Khouri of the American University of Beirut recently wrote – during the Israel-Hamas hostilities – “As long as the crime of dispossession and refugeehood that was committed against the Palestinian people in 1947-48 is not redressed through a peaceful and just negotiation that satisfies the legitimate rights of both sides, we will continue to see enhancements in both the determination and the capabilities of Palestinian fighters.” In his words, “Only stupid or ideologically maniacal Zionists fail to come to terms with this fact”.
    But his revisionist view of history ignores the fundamental fact that had the UN Partition Resolution been accepted, there would have been no 1948 Arab- Israeli war, no refugees, and none of the pain and suffering of these past 65 years. Indeed, another event falling on today’s date - the annual UN-organized International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People – could this year have been a day commemorating the 65th anniversary of the establishment of both the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.

  • AUB and UNRWA launch survey on the socioeconomic status of Palestine refugees in Lebanon

    Today, the American University of Beirut (AUB), together with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), launched a “Survey on the Socioeconomic Status of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon, 2015”. This publication updates the original flagship report from 2010, with leading academic research and analysis by the AUB.

    http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/aub-and-unrwa-launch-survey-socioeconomic-status-palestine-refugees-lebanon
    #réfugiés_palestiniens #Liban #réfugiés #asile #migrations

  • « WITH OR WITHOUT THE BROTHERS » un colloque à ne pas rater, aujourd’hui et demain à Sciences Po Paris.

    http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/evenements/#/?lang=fr&id=4225

    Organisé par Laurent Bonnefoy, François Burgat et Stéphane Lacroix, il réunit des chercheur-e-s français, arabes, etc dont les travaux sont des références.

    WITH OR WITHOUT THE BROTHERS. DOMESTIC, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN ISLAMISM (2013-2015)
    du 29/10 | 09h30 au 30/10 | 18h00

    Dans le cadre du projet ERC When Authoritarianism Fails in the Arab World

    En partenariat avec l’IREMAM, l’IFPO, et l’Université d’Oslo


    Thursday 29th of October, 2015

    9:30-9:45 Opening address by Alain Dieckhoff, Sciences Po-CERI, CNRS

    9:45-10:30 Keynote address by François Burgat, WAFAW, IREMAM
    From Ghannouchi to al-Baghdadi: The ubiquitous diversity of the Islamic lexicon

    Panel 1: Linking political exclusion to violence?

    10:30-13:15

    Chair: Loulouwa Al-Rachid, WAFAW, Sciences Po-CERI

    Sari Hanafi, WAFAW, American University of Beirut
    Transnational movement of Islamic reform: New configurations

    Bjorn Olav Utvik, Oslo University
    Myths of Ikhwan disaster: Anatomy of the 2011-1013 power struggle in Egypt

    Amal-Fatiha Abbassi, IREMAM, Sciences Po Aix
    The Muslim Brotherhood and political disengagement. The consequences of an authoritarian situation

    11:45-12:00 Coffee break

    Monica Marks, WAFAW, Oxford University
    Survivalist club or dynamic movement? Generational politics in Ennahda today

    Joas Wagemakers, Utrecht University
    With or without the others: Consolidating divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (2013-2015)

    Amel Boubekeur, SWP, Berlin
    Algerian Islamists and Salafis after the Arab Spring: Eroding or reloading the regime?

    Panel 2: A Resilient Muslim Brotherhood?

    14:30-16:45

    Chair: Stéphane Lacroix, WAFAW, CERI-Sciences Po

    Rory McCarthy, Oxford University
    When Islamists lose an election

    Marc Lynch, George Washington University
    Evolving transnational networks and media strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood

    Marie Vannetzel, WAFAW, CURAPP
    #R4bia: The dynamics of the pro-Mursi mobilizations in Turkey

    Dilek Yankaya, WAFAW, IREMAM
    A “transnational Islamic business network”? Rethinking the connections between Turkish, Egyptian and Tunisian “Islamic businessmen” after the Arab Springs

    16:45-17:00 Coffee break

    17:00-17:45 Open discussion on contemporary Muslim Brotherhood dynamics

    *

    Friday 30th of October, 2015

    Panel 3: The Iraqi/Syrian matrix of violence

    9:30-11:30

    Chair: Bjorn Olav Utvik, Oslo University

    Loulouwa Al-Rachid, WAFAW, CERI-Sciences Po
    The Disarray of Iraqi Sunnis

    Truls Tonnesen, FFI, Oslo
    The Iraqi origins of the “Islamic State”

    Yahya Michot, Hartford Seminary
    Ibn Taymiyya in ’Dabiq’

    Thomas Pierret, Edinburgh University
    Farewell to the vanguard: Syria’s Ahrar al-Sham Islamic movement and wartime de-radicalisation

    Tine Gade, Oslo University
    Sunnism in Lebanon after the Syrian war

    11:30-11:45 Coffee break

    Panel 4: Al-Qaeda vs. the Islamic State

    11:45-13:30
    Chair: François Burgat, WAFAW, IREMAM

    Hasan Abu Hanieh, Independent researcher
    New Jihadism: From harassment to empowerment (In Arabic)

    Brynjar Lia, Oslo University
    The jihadi movement and rebel governance: A reassertion of a patriarchal order?

    Stéphane Lacroix, WAFAW, CERI-Sciences Po
    Saudi Arabia, the Brothers and the others: the ambiguities of a complex relationship

    Abdulsalam al-Rubaidi, Al-Baidha University
    Ansar al-Sharia in South Yemen: configuration, expansion and discourse (In Arabic)

    Ismail Alexandrani, Independent researcher
    Sinai with and without the Brothers: did it matter?

    Panel 5: Muslim Brothers and their Islamist competitors

    14:30-16:45
    Chair: Sari Hanafi, WAFAW, American University of Beirut

    Muhammad Abu Rumman, Jordanian University
    Dilemmas in Salafi dynamics in the wake of the Arab democratic revolutions (In Arabic)

    Stéphane Lacroix, WAFAW, CERI-Sciences Po
    Being Salafi under Sisi: Examining the post-coup strategy of the al-Nour party

    Ahmed Zaghlul, CEDEJ, Cairo
    The nationalization of the religious sphere in Egypt (In Arabic)

    Myriam Benraad, IREMAM
    Iraqi Muslim Brothers: Between the Islamic State and a hard place

    Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, WAFAW, IFPO
    Hizbullah and Muslims Brothers: A political rupture or a contract renegotiation?

    Laurent Bonnefoy, WAFAW, Sciences Po-CERI, CNRS)
    Islahis, Salafis, Huthis: reconfigurations of the Islamist field in war torn Yemen


    16:45-17:00 Coffee break

    17:00-18:00 Concluding remarks and discussion with François Burgat (WAFAW, IREMAM) and Bernard Rougier (Paris III University).

    Conference in English and Arabic (with translation)

    Responsables scientifiques: Laurent Bonnefoy (Sciences Po-CERI, CNRS), Stéphane Lacroix (Sciences Po-CERI),François Burgat (IREMAM), Bjorn Olav Utvik (Oslo University)

    Sciences Po-CERI: 56, rue Jacob 75006 Paris (salle de conférences)

    INSCRIPTION OBLIGATOIRE auprès de nathalie.tenenbaum@sciencespo.fr

    langueAnglaislieuSalle des conférences, Bâtiment SorganisateurCERI

  • Committee for the Liberation of Iraq Members on Iran Deal « LobeLog
    http://www.lobelog.com/committee-for-the-liberation-of-iraq-members-on-iran-deal

    “Many of the same people who argued for the war in Iraq are now making the case against the Iran nuclear deal,” President Obama observed August 5 at American University in perhaps his most forceful and aggressive speech in favor of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

    There really is no question regarding the fundamental truth of that assertion. Virtually all of the political appointees who held foreign-policy posts under George W. Bush—from Elliott Abrams to Dov Zakheim, not to mention such leading lights as Dick Cheney, John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, Eric Edelman, and “Scooter” Libby—have all assailed the agreement as a sell-out and/or appeasement with varying degrees of vehemence, if not vituperation.

    #assassins

  • Why is #AUB’s #rector selection process shrouded in mystery?
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/23061

    The process of choosing a new rector for the #American_University_of_Beirut (AUB) has reached the final stages. So who will be the new rector? Who are the nominees for the post? Why are the AUB administration and board of trustees keeping a tight lid on the names, and what role do local Lebanese politics play in the making of the next rector?

    #Articles #AUBMC #Corruption #education #Lebanon #Lisa_Anderson #Marwan_Muasher #Mohammed_al-Sayegh #private_university

  • In Cold War, U.S. Spy Agencies Used 1,000 Nazis
    http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/us/in-cold-war-us-spy-agencies-used-1000-nazis.html

    In all, the American military, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and other agencies used at least 1,000 ex-Nazis and collaborators as spies and informants after the war, according to Richard Breitman, a Holocaust scholar at American University who was on a government-appointed team that declassified war-crime records.

    The full tally of Nazis-turned-spies is probably much higher, said Norman Goda, a University of Florida historian on the declassification team, but many records remain classified even today, making a complete count impossible.

    “U.S. agencies directly or indirectly hired numerous ex-Nazi police officials and East European collaborators who were manifestly guilty of war crimes,” he said. “Information was readily available that these were compromised men.”

    None of the spies are known to be alive today.

    The wide use of Nazi spies grew out of a Cold War mentality shared by two titans of intelligence in the 1950s: Mr. Hoover, the longtime F.B.I. director, and Mr. Dulles, the C.I.A. director.

    Mr. Dulles believed “moderate” Nazis might “be useful” to America, records show. Mr. Hoover, for his part, personally approved some ex-Nazis as informants and dismissed accusations of their wartime atrocities as Soviet propaganda.

    (via Angry Arab)

  • Si Ashraf Rifi accepte de relâcher des islamistes détenus par ISIS et Nusra en échange des soldats capturés à Ersal, est-ce qu’on aura le droit de soutenir la théorie selon laquelle il devient ainsi responsable du développement d’ISIS au Liban ? (Ou bien ce genre de logique ne fonctionne qu’avec Bachar Assad ?)

    Islamic state : Stalemate in Lebanon over soldiers taken by Islamists
    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/stalemate-in-lebanon-over-soldiers-taken-by-islamists-9716602.html

    According to Hilal Khashan, political science professor at the American University of Beirut, the government will have to acquiesce eventually. “Once all the rhetoric is consumed they will have to face reality,” he said, dismissing the feasibility of a military solution. Professor Khashan predicts that non-Lebanese prisoners will be released first, under the stipulation that they will return to their country of origin. “Although I don’t condone it,” he added, “it doesn’t seem that they have any other options.”

    A surprise visit to the protesters on the Tripoli road by Lebanon’s justice minister Ashraf Rifi yesterday indicates the professor might be right. Family members said they were promised in private that their loved ones would be released, and alluded to the militants’ demands being met to achieve this. “I feel better, more relaxed,” said Samir Moghait as the minister’s motorcade took off. “But the only thing I trust in is God, not the government.”

  • #AUB confirms resignation of university’s president
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/aub-confirms-resignation-universitys-president

    AUB President #Peter_Dorman speaks at a conference on the university’s campus on April 9, 2013 in Beirut, #Lebanon. (Photo: Haitham Moussawi)

    Updated at 3:00 pm: The American University of Beirut confirmed on Friday afternoon that its president, Peter Dorman, will be stepping down, in an e-mail sent to the AUB community. “The Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut (“AUB”) announced today that its fifteenth president, Peter F. Dorman, an eminent scholar with deep and strong personal roots in Lebanon, will be stepping down as the University’s President after a successor is identified,” the e-mail read.

    Chloé Benoist

    read (...)

  • #AUB president resigns : sources
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/aub-president-resigns-sources

    The controversial president of one of the Middle East’s most prestigious universities has resigned, sources told Al-Akhbar Thursday. Peter #Dorman, president of the #American_University_of_Beirut (AUB), submitted his resignation to the Board of Trustees earlier this week. The sources did not explain the reasons behind the resignation. An official at AUB denied the “rumors” of Dorman’s resignation when contacted by Al-Akhbar for comment. When asked to speak with Dorman, the official said “he had travelled.” read more

    #Peter_Dorman

  • Corruption at the American University of Beirut, Part II: The #BMH report
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/corruption-american-university-beirut-part-ii-bmh-report

    Students walk through the main gate of the American University of Beirut. (Photo: AFP-Joseph Barrack ) Students walk through the main gate of the American University of Beirut. (Photo: AFP-Joseph Barrack )

    A detailed report by Blue Mark Holdings (BMH) on purchasing and supply chain processes within the American University of Beirut Medical Center (AUBMC) highlighted stunning cases of funds being mismanaged and that #AUBMC could save $12 million annually if it put an end to corruption within its institutions. Interestingly enough, BMH, which was paid $300 thousand, revealed in a message to #Mark_Cliff, who oversaw the work of the Ad Hoc Review Committee (AHRC), that #Mohammed_Sayegh, vice president for medical affairs at (...)

    #Economy #Ahmed_Dalal #AUB #Features #Lebanon #Peter_Dorman

  • Corruption at the American University of Beirut: Irregularities and anomalies, Part I
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/corruption-american-university-beirut-irregularities-and-anomalie

    A student walks past posters calling on #AUB students to occupy College Hall as part of ongoing protests against proposed tuition hikes. (Photo: Marwan Bou Haidar) A student walks past posters calling on AUB students to occupy College Hall as part of ongoing protests against proposed tuition hikes. (Photo: Marwan Bou Haidar)

    Protests by American University of Beirut (AUB) students this year did not target only tuition fee hikes, but also voiced demands related to transparency, participation in running the university, and tackling corruption. Al-Akhbar is publishing a two-part report summarizing the contents of documents and reports that AUB students were able to obtain, backing their claim about rampant misappropriation (...)

    #Economy #Adnan_Tahir #AUBMC #Features #Lebanon #Mohammed_Sayegh #Nabil_Shartouni