Protéger la propriété intellectuelle américaine sur les médicaments au Brésil. #Sida #médicaments
►http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/08/09BRASILIA1017.html
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In July, the Brazilian National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) rejected a patent application by California-based Gilead Sciences for its HIV drug Viread (scientific name: tenofovir). During a trip to Brazil to discuss the case with GOB officials, senior Gilead representatives briefed Econ and Commercial officers on August 6 in Brasilia. The patent rejection (which INPI told Gilead was “purely technical” but accompanied by “lots of pressure” from the Ministry of Health) could be the final step in allowing generic production of tenofovir, since the Ministry of Health (MOH) has already declared tenofovir to be a drug of public interest (April 2008) and established an inter-ministerial group to oversee the development of domestic production capacity (May 2009). More broadly, the decision carries troubling indications for the protection of innovative pharmaceutical products in Brazil. END SUMMARY.
¶9. (SBU) The Viread decision (and the signs of political pressure applied by MOH) raises new questions about the protection of intellectual property in the pharmaceutical sector in Brazil, where the Health Ministry’s apparent “industrial policy” approach to the health care sector has not been countered by other, more pro-IP/pro-innovation voices within GOB. Based on decisions from patent authorities around the world, Viread’s scientific case seems strong. INPI’s admission of MOH pressure calls into question the “purely technical” nature of this decision and, more broadly, the strength and independence of Brazil’s patent regime.
¶10. (SBU) Compulsory licensing has been a topic of much discussion since Brazil’s 2007 decision to issue a compulsory license for Merck’s HIV drug Stocrin (scientific name: efavirenz) and will continue to be so. However, Brazil’s current stance against patents for incremental innovation in pharmaceuticals could have equally damaging results. Political pressure to reject patent applications for legitimately innovative drugs could be a new front in Brazil’s push to cut health costs and bolster its generic drug industry, but will ultimately damage innovation and competitiveness. The USG has opportunities to engage on these issues with MRE (through the Economic Partnership Dialogue, the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, and the Joint Consultative Mechanism[JCM]), MDIC (through the Commercial Dialogue), the Ministry of Science and Technology (which will lead the delegation to the next JCM), and through direct dialogue with the Brazilian Congress. Continuing to press innovation/competitiveness themes and raise their profile within the spectrum of stake-holder agencies will remain an important part of the strategy to affect progress on intellectual property protection in Brazil. END COMMENT. KUBISKE
