• Laminé par les marées noires, le delta du Niger est menacé de famine | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/studio/portfolios/lamine-par-les-marees-noires-le-delta-du-niger-est-menace-de-famine

    Laminé par les marées noires, le delta du Niger est menacé de famine
    20 photos

    Au Nigeria, dans la principale région pétrolifère d’Afrique, les fuites d’hydrocarbures se multiplient et ruinent des milliers de pêcheurs et d’agriculteurs. Le pétrole assure 10 % du PIB du pays, le plus peuplé d’Afrique avec 219 millions d’habitants. Sur place, certains ont assigné en justice des entreprises pétrolières, mais les indemnités et le nettoyage n’ont pas permis de retrouver la prospérité perdue. Au point que la famine menace.
    Sadak Souici (photos) et Théophile Simon (texte)

    2 novembre 2022

    © Sadak Souici
    Nigeria, janvier 2022. Vue aérienne de Bolo, un village de pêcheurs sur les bords d’un bras du delta du Niger, l’un des plus longs fleuves d’Afrique. Autrefois prospère, le village est aujourd’hui fantomatique, ruiné par la pollution. Le Nigeria est le principal pays producteur de pétrole en Afrique subsaharienne, et injecte chaque jour près de 2 millions de barils dans les veines de l’économie mondiale.


  • Grano : una guerra globale

    Secondo molti osservatori internazionali, la guerra in corso in Ucraina si esprimerebbe non solo mediante l’uso dell’artiglieria pesante e di milizie ufficiali o clandestine, responsabili di migliaia di morti, stupri e deportazioni. Esisterebbero, infatti, anche altri campi sui quali il conflitto, da tempo, si sarebbe spostato e che ne presuppongono un allargamento a livello globale. Uno di questi ha mandato in fibrillazione gli equilibri mondiali, con effetti diretti sulle economie di numerosi paesi e sulla vita, a volte sulla sopravvivenza, di milioni di persone. Si tratta della cosiddetta “battaglia globale del grano”, i cui effetti sono evidenti, anche in Occidente, con riferimento all’aumento dei prezzi di beni essenziali come il pane, la pasta o la farina, a cui si aggiungono quelli dei carburanti, oli vari, energia elettrica e legno.
    La questione del grano negli Stati Uniti: il pericolo di generare un tifone sociale

    Negli Stati Uniti, ad esempio, il prezzo del grano tenero, dal 24 febbraio del 2022, ossia dall’inizio dell’invasione russa dell’Ucraina, al Chicago Mercantile Exchange, uno dei maggiori mercati di riferimento per i contratti cerealicoli mondiali, è passato da 275 euro a tonnellata ai circa 400 euro dell’aprile scorso. Un aumento esponenziale che ha mandato in tensione non solo il sistema produttivo e distributivo globale, ma anche molti governi, legittimamente preoccupati per le conseguenze che tali aumenti potrebbero comportare sulle loro finanze e sulla popolazione. In epoca di globalizzazione, infatti, l’aumento del prezzo del grano tenero negli Stati Uniti potrebbe generare un “tifone sociale”, ad esempio, in Medio Oriente, in Africa, in Asia e anche in Europa. I relativi indici di volatilità, infatti, sono ai massimi storici, rendendo difficili previsioni di sviluppo che si fondano, invece, sulla prevedibilità dei mercati e non sulla loro instabilità. Queste fibrillazioni, peraltro, seguono, in modo pedissequo, le notizie che derivano dal fronte ucraino. Ciò significa che i mercati guardano non solo agli andamenti macroeconomici o agli indici di produzione e stoccaggio, ma anche a quelli derivanti direttamente dal fronte bellico e dalle conseguenze che esso determinerebbe sugli equilibri geopolitici globali.
    I processi inflattivi e la produzione di grano

    Anche secondo la Fao, per via dell’inflazione che ha colpito la produzione di cereali e oli vegetali, l’indice alimentare dei prezzi avrebbe raggiunto il livello più alto dal 1990, ossia dall’anno della sua creazione.

    Le origini della corsa a questo pericoloso rialzo sono molteplici e non tutte direttamente riconducibili, a ben guardare, alla sola crisi di produzione e distribuzione derivante dalla guerra in Ucraina. I mercati non sono strutture lineari, dal pensiero algoritmico neutrale. Al contrario, essi rispondono ad una serie molto ampia di variabili, anche incidentali, alcune delle quali derivano direttamente dalle ambizioni e dalle strategie di profitto di diversi speculatori finanziari. I dati possono chiarire i termini di questa riflessione.

    Il Pianeta, nel corso degli ultimi anni, ha prodotto tra 780 e 800 milioni di tonnellate di grano. Una cifra nettamente superiore rispetto ai 600 milioni di tonnellate prodotte nel 2000. Ciò si deve, in primis, alla crescita demografica mondiale e poi all’entrata di alcuni paesi asiatici e africani nel gotha del capitalismo globale e, conseguentemente, nel sistema produttivistico e consumistico generale. Se questo per un verso ha sollevato gran parte della popolazione di quei paesi dalla fame e dalla miseria, ha nel contempo determinato un impegno produttivo, in alcuni casi monocolturale, che ha avuto conseguenze dirette sul piano ambientale, sociale e politico.
    Il grano e l’Africa

    L’area dell’Africa centrale, ad esempio, ha visto aumentare la produzione agricola in alcuni casi anche del 70%. Eppure, nel contempo, si è registrato un aumento di circa il 30% di malnutrizione nella sua popolazione. Ciò è dovuto ad un’azione produttiva privata, incentivata da fondi finanziari internazionali e governativi, che ha aumentato la produzione senza redistribuzione. Questa produzione d’eccedenza è andata a vantaggio dei fondi speculativi, dell’agrobusiness o è risultata utile per la produzione occidentale, ma non ha sfamato la popolazione locale, in particolare di quella tradizionalmente esposta alla malnutrizione e alla fame. Un esempio emblematico riguarda l’Etiopia e i suoi 5 milioni circa di cittadini malnutriti. Questo paese dipende ormai interamente dagli aiuti alimentari e umanitari. Allo stesso tempo, migliaia di tonnellate di grano e di riso etiope sono esportate ogni anno in Arabia Saudita per via del land grabbing e degli accordi economici e finanziari sottoscritti. In Sudan si registra il medesimo fenomeno. Il locale governo ha infatti ceduto 1,5 milioni di ettari di terra di prima qualità agli Stati del Golfo, all’Egitto e alla Corea del Sud per 99 anni, mentre risulta contemporaneamente il paese al mondo che riceve la maggiore quantità di aiuti alimentari, con 6 milioni di suoi cittadini che dipendono dalla distribuzione di cibo. Basterebbe controllare i piani di volo degli aeroporti di questi paesi per rendersi conto di quanti aerei cargo decollano giornalmente carichi di verdura fresca e rose, con destinazione finale gli alberghi degli Emirati Arabi e i mercati di fiori olandesi. Come ha affermato l’ex direttore dell’ILC (International Land Coalition), Madiodio Niasse: «La mancanza di trasparenza rappresenta un notevole ostacolo all’attuazione di un sistema di controllo e implementazione delle decisioni riguardo alla terra e agli investimenti ad essa inerenti».

    L’Angola ha varato un piano di investimenti così ambizioso da attrarre sei miliardi di dollari esteri nel solo 2013. Prima dello scoppio del conflitto civile, durato trent’anni, questo paese riusciva a nutrire tutti i suoi abitanti ed esportava caffè, banane e zucchero. Oggi, è costretto a comprare all’estero metà del cibo destinato al consumo interno, mentre solo il 10% della sua superficie arabile è utilizzata. Ciò nonostante, ha ritenuto legittimo incentivare l’accaparramento dei propri terreni agricoli da parte di multinazionali dell’agrobusiness e fondi finanziari di investimento. Ragioni analoghe guidano Khartoum a negoziare migliaia di ettari con i paesi del Golfo. Tra il 2004 e il 2009, in soli cinque paesi, Mali, Etiopia, Sudan, Ghana e Madagascar circa due milioni e mezzo di ettari coltivabili sono finiti nel portafoglio finanziario di multinazionali e dei fondi sovrani.
    Non solo Ucraina

    Quanto descritto serve per superare un’ottica monofocale che tende a concentrarsi, per ciò che riguarda il tema della terra e del grano, esclusivamente sull’Ucraina. Nello scacchiere globale della produzione e dell’approvvigionamento rientrano, infatti, numerosi paesi, molti dei quali per anni predati o raggirati mediante accordi capestro e obblighi internazionali che hanno fatto del loro territorio un grande campo coltivato per i bisogni e i consumi occidentali.
    Il ruolo della Russia

    Anche la Russia, in quest’ambito, svolge un ruolo fondamentale. Mosca, infatti, ha deciso di conservare per sé e in parte per i suoi alleati, a fini strategici, la propria produzione cerealicola, contribuendo a generare gravi fibrillazioni sui mercati finanziari di tutto il mondo. Nel 2021, ad esempio, il paese governato da Putin era il primo esportatore di grano a livello mondiale (18%), piazzandosi sopra anche agli Stati Uniti. Questa enorme quantità di grano esportato non risulta vincolata come quello occidentale, ma riconducibile al consumo interno e al bilanciamento dei relativi prezzi per il consumatore russo che in questo modo paga meno il pane o la carne rispetto ad un occidentale. Non è però tutto “rose e fiori”. Sulla Russia incidono due fattori fondamentali. In primis, le sanzioni occidentali che limitano i suoi rapporti commerciali e impediscono a numerose merci e attrezzature di entrare, almeno in modo legale, per chiudere la filiera produttiva e commerciale in modo controllato. Secondo, l’esclusione della Russia dai mercati finanziari comporta gravi conseguenze per il paese con riferimento alla situazione dei pagamenti con una tensione crescente per il sistema finanziario, bancario e del credito. Non a caso recentemente essa è stata dichiarata in default sui circa 100 milioni di dollari di obbligazioni che non è riuscita a pagare. In realtà, il default non avrà un peso straordinario almeno per due ragioni. In primo luogo perché il paese è da molto tempo economicamente, finanziariamente e politicamente emarginato. Secondo poi, il fallimento sarebbe dovuto non alla mancanza di denaro da parte della Russia, ma alla chiusura dei canali di trasferimento da parte dei creditori. A completare il quadro, c’è una strategica limitazione delle esportazioni di grano da parte ancora della Russia nei riguardi dei paesi satelliti, come ad esempio l’Armenia o la Bielorussia. Ciò indica la volontà, da parte di Putin, di rafforzare le scorte per via di un conflitto che si considera di lungo periodo.
    Il grano “bloccato”

    A caratterizzare questa “battaglie globale del grano” ci sono anche altri fattori. Da febbraio 2020, ad esempio, circa 6 milioni di tonnellate di grano ucraino sono bloccati nel porto di Mikolaiv, Odessa e Mariupol. È una quantità di grano enorme che rischia di deperire nonostante lo stato di crisi alimentare in cui versano decine di paesi, soprattutto africani. Sotto questo profilo, i paesi occidentali e vicini all’Ucraina dovrebbero trovare corridoi speciali, militarmente difesi, per consentire l’esportazione del cereale e successivamente la sua trasformazione a tutela della vita di milioni di persone. D’altra parte, sui prezzi intervengo fattori non direttamente riconducibili all’andamento della guerra ma a quelli del mercato. Ad esempio, l’aumento del costo delle derrate cerealicole si deve anche all’aumento esponenziale (20-30%) dei premi assicurativi sulle navi incaricate di trasportarlo, attualmente ferme nei porti ucraini. Su questo aspetto i governi nazionali potrebbero intervenire direttamente, calmierando i premi assicurativi, anche obtorto collo, contribuendo a calmierai i prezzi delle preziose derrate alimentati. Si consideri che molti industriali italiani del grano variamente lavorato stanno cambiando la loro bilancia di riferimento e relativi prezzi, passando ad esempio dal quintale al chilo e aumentando anche del 30-40% il costo per allevatori e trasformatori vari (fornai e catene dell’alimentare italiano).
    Le ricadute di una guerra di lungo periodo

    Una guerra di lungo periodo, come molti analisti internazionali ritengono quella in corso, obbligherà i paesi contendenti e i relativi alleati, a una profonda revisione della produzione di grano. L’Ucraina, ad esempio, avendo a disposizione circa 41,5 milioni di ettari di superficie agricola utile, attualmente in parte occupati dai carri armati russi e da un cannoneggiamento da artiglieria pesante e attività di sabotaggio, vende in genere il 74% della sua produzione cerealicola a livello globale. Non si tratta di una scelta politica occasionale ma strategica e di lungo periodo. L’Ucraina, infatti, ha visto aumentare, nel corso degli ultimi vent’anni, la sua produzione di grano e l’ esportazione. Si consideri che nel 2000, il grano ucraino destinato all’esportazione era il 60% di quello prodotto. La strategia ovviamente non è solo commerciale ma anche politica. Chi dispone del “potere del grano”, infatti, ha una leva fondamentale sulla popolazione dei paesi che importano questo prodotto, sul relativo sistema di trasformazione e commerciale e sull’intera filiera di prodotti derivati, come l’allevamento. Ed è proprio su questa filiera che ora fa leva la Russia, tentando di generare fibrillazioni sui mercati, azioni speculative e tensioni sociali per tentare di allentare il sostegno occidentale o internazionale dato all’Ucraina e la morsa, nel contempo, delle sanzioni.

    Esiste qualche alternativa alla morsa russa su campi agricoli ucraini? Il terreno ucraino seminato a grano e risparmiato dalla devastazione militare russa, soprattutto lungo la linea Sud-Ovest del paese, può forse rappresentare una speranza se messo a coltura e presidiato anche militarmente. Tutto questo però deve fare i conti con altri due problemi: la carenza di carburante e la carenza di manodopera necessaria per concludere la coltivazione, mietitura e commercializzazione del grano. Su questo punto molti paesi, Italia compresa, si sono detti pronti ad intervenire fornendo a Zelensky mezzi, camion, aerei cargo e navi ove vi fosse la possibilità di usare alcuni porti. Nel frattempo, il grano sta crescendo e la paura di vederlo marcire nei magazzini o di non poterlo raccogliere nei campi resta alta. Ovviamente queste sono considerazioni fatte anche dai mercati che restano in fibrillazione. Circa il 70% dei carburanti usati in agricoltura in Ucraina, ad esempio, sono importanti da Russia e Bielorussia. Ciò significa che esiste una dipendenza energetica del paese di Zelensky dalla Russia, che deve essere superata quanto prima mediante l’intervento diretto dei paesi alleati a vantaggio dell’Ucraina. Altrimenti il rischio è di avere parte dei campi di grano ucraini pieni del prezioso cereale, ma i trattori e le mietitrici ferme perché prive di carburante, passando così dal danno globale alla beffa e alla catastrofe mondiale.

    Una catastrofe in realtà già prevista.
    Un uragano di fame

    Le Nazioni Unite, attraverso il suo Segretario generale, Antonio Guterres, già il 14 marzo scorso avevano messo in guardia il mondo contro la minaccia di un “uragano di fame” che avrebbe potuto generare conflitti e rivolte in aree già particolarmente delicate. Tra queste ultime, in particolare, il Sudan, l’Eritrea, lo Yemen, e anche il Medio Oriente.

    Gutierres ha parlato addirittura di circa 1,7 miliardi di persone che possono precipitare dalla sopravvivenza alla fame. Si tratta di circa un quinto della popolazione mondiale, con riferimento in particolare a quarantacinque paesi africani, diciotto dei quali dipendono per oltre il 50% dal grano ucraino e russo. Oltre a questi paesi, ve ne sono altri, la cui tenuta è in tensione da molti anni, che dipendono addirittura per il 100% dai due paesi in guerra. Si tratta, ad esempio, dell’Eritrea, della Mauritania, della Somalia, del Benin e della Tanzania.

    In definitiva, gli effetti di una nuova ondata di fame, che andrebbe a sommarsi alle crisi sociali, politiche, ambientali e terroristiche già in corso da molti anni, potrebbero causare il definitivo crollo di molti paesi con effetti umanitari e politici a catena devastanti.
    Il caso dell’Egitto

    Un paese particolarmente sensibile alla crisi in corso è l’Egitto, che è anche il più grande acquirente di grano al mondo con 12 milioni di tonnellate, di cui 6 acquistate direttamente dal governo di Al Si-si per soddisfare il programma di distribuzione del pane. Si tratta di un programma sociale di contenimento delle potenziali agitazioni, tensioni sociali e politiche, scontri, rivolte e migrazioni per fame che potrebbero indurre il Paese in uno stato di crisi permanente. Sarebbe, a ben osservare, un film già visto. Già con le note “Primavere arabe”, infatti, generate dal crollo della capacità di reperimento del grano nei mercati globali a causa dei mutamenti climatici che investirono direttamente le grandi economie del mondo e in particolare la Cina, Argentina, Russia e Australia, scoppiarono rivolte proprio in Egitto (e in Siria), represse nel sangue. L’Egitto, inoltre, dipende per il 61% dalla Russia e per il 23% dall’Ucraina per ciò che riguarda l’importazione del grano. Dunque, questi due soli paesi fanno insieme l’84% del grano importato dal paese dei faraoni. Nel contempo, l’Egitto fonda la sua bilancia dei pagamenti su un prezzo del prezioso cereale concordato a circa 255 dollari a tonnellata. L’aumento del prezzo sui mercati globali ha già obbligato l’Egitto ad annullare due contratti sottoscritti con la Russia, contribuendo a far salire la tensione della sua popolazione, considerando che i due terzi circa dei 103 milioni di egiziani si nutre in via quasi esclusiva di pane (chiamato aish, ossia “vita”). Secondo le dichiarazioni del governo egiziano, le riserve di grano saranno sufficienti per soddisfare i relativi bisogni per tutta l’estate in corso. Resta però una domanda: che cosa accadrà, considerando che la guerra in Ucraina è destinata ad essere ancora lunga, quando le scorte saranno terminate?

    Anche il Libano e vari altri paesi si trovano nella medesima situazione. Il paese dei cedri dipende per il 51% dal grano dalla Russia e dall’Ucraina. La Turchia di Erdogan, invece, dipende per il 100% dal grano dai due paesi coinvolti nel conflitto. Ovviamente tensioni sociali in Turchia potrebbero non solo essere pericolose per il regime di Erdogan, ma per la sua intera area di influenza, ormai allargatasi alla Libia, Siria, al Medio Oriente, ad alcuni paesi africani e soprattutto all’Europa che ha fatto di essa la porta di accesso “sbarrata” dei profughi in fuga dai loro paesi di origine.
    Anche l’Europa coinvolta nella guerra del grano

    Sono numerosi, dunque, i paesi che stanno cercando nuovi produttori di cereali cui fare riferimento. Tra le aree alle quali molti stanno guardando c’è proprio l’Unione europea che, non a caso, il 21 marzo scorso, ha deciso di derogare temporaneamente a una delle disposizioni della Pac (Politica Agricola Comune) che prevedeva di mettere a riposo il 4% dei terreni agricoli. Ovviamente, questa decisione è in funzione produttivistica e inseribile in uno scacchiere geopolitico mondiale di straordinaria delicatezza. Il problema di questa azione di messa a coltura di terreni che dovevano restare a riposo, mette in luce una delle contraddizioni più gravi della stessa Pac. Per anni, infatti, sono stati messi a riposo, o fatti risultare tali, terreni non coltivabili. In questo modo venivano messi a coltura terreni produttivi e fatti risultare a riposo quelli non produttivi. Ora, la deroga a questa azione non può produrre grandi vantaggi, in ragione del fatto che i terreni coltivabili in deroga restano non coltivabili di fatto e dunque poco o per nulla incideranno sull’aumento di produzione del grano. Se il conflitto ucraino dovesse continuare e l’Europa mancare l’obiettivo di aumentare la propria produzione di grano per calmierare i prezzi interni e nel contempo soddisfare parte della domanda a livello mondiale, si potrebbe decidere di diminuire le proprie esportazioni per aumentare le scorte. Le conseguenze sarebbero, in questo caso, dirette su molti paesi che storicamente acquistano grano europeo. Tra questi, in particolare, il Marocco e l’Algeria. Quest’ultimo paese, ad esempio, consuma ogni anno circa 11 milioni di tonnellate di grano, di cui il 60% importato direttamente dalla Francia. A causa delle tensioni politiche che nel corso degli ultimi tre anni si sono sviluppate tra Algeria e Francia, il paese Nord-africano ha cercato altre fonti di approvvigionamento, individuandole nell’Ucraina e nella Russia. Una scelta poco oculata, peraltro effettuata abbassando gli standard di qualità del grano, inferiori rispetto a quello francese.
    L’India può fare la differenza?

    Un nuovo attore mondiale sta però facendo il suo ingresso in modo prepotente. Si tratta dell’India, un paese che da solo produce il 14% circa del grano mondiale, ossia circa 90 milioni di tonnellate di grano. Questi numeri consentono al subcontinente indiano di piazzarsi al secondo posto come produttore mondiale dopo la Cina, che ne produce invece 130 milioni. L’India del Presidente Modhi ha usato gran parte della sua produzione per il mercato interno, anch’esso particolarmente sensibile alle oscillazione dei prezzi del bene essenziale. Nel contempo, grazie a una produzione che, secondo Nuova Delhi e la Fao, è superiore alle attese, sta pensando di vendere grano a prezzi vantaggiosi sul mercato globale. Sotto questo profilo già alcuni paesi hanno mostrato interesse. Tra questi, ad esempio, Iran, Indonesia, Tunisia e Nigeria. Anche l’Egitto ha iniziato ad acquistare grano dall’India, nonostante non sia di eccellente qualità per via dell’uso intensivo di pesticidi. Il protagonismo dell’India in questa direzione, ha fatto alzare la tensione con gli Stati Uniti. I membri del Congresso statunitense, infatti, hanno più volte sollevato interrogativi e critiche rispetto alle pratiche di sostegno economico, lesive, a loro dire, della libera concorrenza internazionale, che Nuova Delhi riconosce da anni ai suoi agricoltori, tanto da aver chiesto l’avvio di una procedura di infrazione presso l’Organizzazione mondiale per il Commercio (Omc). Insomma, le tensioni determinate dal conflitto in corso si intersecano e toccano aspetti e interessi plurimi, e tutti di straordinaria rilevanza per la tenuta degli equilibri politici e sociali globali.

    https://www.leurispes.it/grano-una-guerra-globale

    #blé #prix #Ukraine #Russie #guerre_en_Ukraine #guerre_globale_du_blé #produits_essentiels #ressources_pédagogiques #Etats-Unis #USA #Inde #instabilité #marché #inflation #céréales #indice_alimentaire #spéculation #globalisation #mondialisation #production #Afrique #production_agricole #malnutrition #excédent #industrie_agro-alimentaire #agrobusiness #faim #famine #Ethiopie #Arabie_Saoudite #land_grabbing #accaparemment_des_terres #Soudan #Egypte #Corée_du_Sud #exportation #aide_alimentaire #Angola #alimentation #multinationales #pays_du_Golfe #Mali #Madagascar #Ghana #fonds_souverains #sanctions #marchés_financiers #ports #Odessa #Mikolaiv #Mariupol #assurance #élevage #sanctions #dépendance_énergétique #énergie #ouragan_de_faim #dépendance #Turquie #Liban #pac #politique_agricole_commune #EU #UE #Europe #France #Maroc #Algérie

  • Batailles de la #faim

    La faim est un phénomène construit, inhérent aux sociétés humaines, quels que soient le niveau de #ressources disponibles, les #régimes_politiques ou de #gouvernance. Les relations entre faim et #politique sont étroites : la faim cristallise des #rapports_de_force et de pouvoir, donnant lieu à des batailles plurielles, tant matérielles que symboliques. Dans ce numéro, les textes soulignent les expériences vécues, les pratiques et les normes des acteurs, individuels, collectifs et institutionnels, et leurs multiples conflits et intérêts en jeu. Le double prisme politique et empirique retenu ici apparaît généralement comme un angle mort, voire un impensé, pour de nombreuses institutions (appareils d’État, acteurs de l’aide et du développement, etc.), qui déclinent la lutte contre la faim en objectifs normés, selon un processus souvent présenté comme consensuel. Or, la nature des pouvoirs et des visions antagoniques de la faim contredit les lectures technocratiques : les batailles naissent et se cristallisent du fait de #rapports_de_domination, de logiques et d’intérêts opposables. Le dossier aborde ainsi les controverses autour de la #définition et de la délimitation de la faim ; la faim comme source de revendication de #droits et de ressources, ou comme outil de #protestation et d’#actions_collectives ; l’utilisation de la faim à des fins de #contrôle_social et politique des populations. Ce faisant, nous espérons apporter des connaissances et des pistes de réflexion qui contribueront à faire de la faim un #problème_public et de l’#alimentation un #bien_commun.

    https://journals.openedition.org/traces/12520

    #revue #famine

    • Après trois heures de voyage depuis Fort-Dauphin à travers les monts Anosy sur une piste cabossée faisant office de route nationale, le Grand Sud malgache apparaît, immense et isolé. Brutalement vert après deux longues années de sécheresse. En redescendant vers le plateau du Mandrare défilent champs de maïs et de mil, bordés de haies de cactus aux épaisses feuilles hérissées d’épines. Des enfants jouent dans des flaques disputées à de nonchalants zébus.

      Il a suffi de quelques jours consécutifs de pluies, mi-janvier, puis des averses apportées dans le sillage du cyclone Batsiraï début février, pour que la vie reprenne à nouveau sa place. Là où elle semblait condamnée.

      La route trace, cap à l’ouest, traverse Amboasary, gros bourg au débouché de vastes plantations de sisal, puis rejoint Ambovombe, capitale de la région de l’Androy et centre humanitaire où sont installés les bureaux régionaux des agences onusiennes et des ONG d’urgence chargées d’assurer les distributions de vivres jusqu’à la fin de la période de soudure et l’arrivée des récoltes. Le pire a été évité. « Nous avons mis le paquet pour qu’une crise alimentaire très sévère ne dégénère pas. Et jusqu’à présent, grâce à l’augmentation des rations dans les zones les plus critiques, nous considérons que nous avons réussi », assure Jean-Benoît Manhes, représentant adjoint de l’Unicef.

      Dans les trois provinces d’Androy, d’Anosy et d’Atsimo-Andrefana, qui composent le Grand Sud malgache – cette région semi-aride, abandonnée depuis des décennies aux cycles récurrents des sécheresses et de la faim, le « kéré » dans le dialecte local –, environ 1,4 million de personnes – soit près de 40 % de la population − ont toujours besoin d’assistance.

      Vulnérabilité

      Ce chiffre reste aussi important qu’en mai 2021, lorsque les indicateurs s’étaient soudainement assombris avec l’annonce de 28 000 personnes menacées de famine. Quelques semaines plus tard, le directeur exécutif du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), David Beasley, y avait vu, depuis Ambovombe, la « première famine climatique », fustigeant l’injustice imposée à un pays « qui n’a en rien contribué au réchauffement, mais qui en paie aujourd’hui le prix » . La formule avait fait mouche, reprise en boucle par les médias du monde entier. Jusqu’à être récupérée en novembre 2021 à la tribune de la 26e conférence des Nations unies sur le climat par le président malgache, Andry Rajoelina, pour exhorter les pays pollueurs à financer des mesures d’adaptation au nom de ses « compatriotes [qui] endurent le tribut d’une crise climatique à laquelle ils n’ont pas participé » .

      A la terrasse du Taliako, où se retrouvent les expatriés après leur journée sur le terrain, un employé du PAM, familier des théâtres humanitaires, ne peut garder ce qu’il a sur le cœur : « C’est la plus grande opération de marketing que j’aie vue depuis longtemps pour lever des fonds. Il y a des mots qu’il faut manier avec prudence », lâche-t-il en s’interrogeant sur l’ignorance réelle ou feinte de son patron, ex-gouverneur républicain de Caroline du Sud et proche de Donald Trump, nommé à la tête de l’institution en 2017.

      Les rapports du Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat (GIEC) anticipent une diminution des précipitations et une multiplication des épisodes de sécheresse en Afrique australe d’ici à la fin du siècle. Une plus grande irrégularité des pluies et la multiplication des événements extrêmes y sont déjà des phénomènes observés.

      Mais, selon une étude publiée en décembre 2021 par l’initiative World Weather Attribution, le dérèglement climatique ne peut être rendu directement responsable de la sécheresse exceptionnelle enregistrée depuis 2019 dans le sud de la Grande Ile de l’océan Indien. Cette équipe scientifique internationale qui travaille sur les liens entre les événements climatiques extrêmes et le réchauffement estime que le déficit pluviométrique de 40 % par rapport à la normale, subi au cours des deux dernières années, ne s’est produit qu’une fois en cent trente-cinq ans. Trop peu, selon eux, pour conclure autrement qu’à « une manifestation de la variation naturelle du climat » . Ils rappellent en revanche la vulnérabilité d’une population rurale dont plus de 90 % vivent dans l’extrême pauvreté.

      Région laissée pour compte

      Depuis la première crise documentée pendant la période coloniale, en 1895, une quinzaine de kéré ont été recensés sans que les multiples promesses de plans de développement n’aient permis de changer le destin d’une région laissée pour compte, plus que les autres, par le pouvoir central. Trente ans après la famine de 1990, dont la gravité avait provoqué un sursaut de mobilisation, tout apparaît − ou presque − à recommencer.

      A Ambovombe, comme si l’urgence humanitaire était devenue une fatalité, le PAM s’est installé dans les locaux de l’ancien Commissariat général pour le développement intégré du Sud, institution défunte parmi d’autres.

      Il n’y a toujours pas de routes asphaltées. Pour se procurer de l’eau, les villageois doivent parcourir des distances qui peuvent se compter en dizaines de kilomètres. Dans le meilleur des cas, en charrette à zébu, et souvent, pour les femmes qui en ont la charge, à pied, un bidon sur la tête. Même le précieux périmètre irrigué de Behara, aménagé sur les alluvions fertiles des rives du Mandrare, a été délaissé. En mai 2021, c’est de cette zone rizicole jadis prospère qu’est venue l’alerte à la famine.

      « C’est moins dur aujourd’hui. Nous avons reçu de l’aide », témoigne Alphonse Monja, chef de l’un des fokontany (division administrative) de la commune, devant la file des ménages venus recevoir leur distribution mensuelle de vivres. Près d’un tiers d’entre eux bénéficie également d’une allocation monétaire financée par la Banque mondiale. Il préférerait cependant que soit réparé le canal d’irrigation qui lui permettait d’arroser son champ : « De nombreux experts sont venus. Ils ont fait des études puis je ne les ai jamais revus. Le canal est cassé depuis trente ans. Comment pouvons-nous assurer des récoltes avec des pluies de plus en plus irrégulières ? »

      Village après village, l’histoire se répète. Derrière son petit bureau en Formica, Fenolily, maire d’Ambazoa, énumère sans peine la liste des projets reçus par sa commune. Celle-ci, à moins d’une heure d’Ambovombe et proche de l’océan, présente les maux propres au Sud, avec ses paysages déboisés, ses vents forts qui érodent les sols, l’absence de sources d’eau et une population qui ne cesse de croître.

      Il n’est pas question pour l’élu de se plaindre des pirogues reçues pour s’initier à la pêche, même si l’activité a longtemps été considérée comme celle des parias, ni de l’introduction de semences plus résistantes à la sécheresse ou de la « formation en vie associative » dispensée aux agriculteurs. Mais il s’interroge : « On ne nous demande jamais de quoi nous avons besoin, des projets arrivent un beau jour de l’extérieur, durent quelques années, et puis on passe à autre chose. »

      « Une rente éphémère qu’il faut capter »

      A la sortie du village composé de petites cases en bois ou en tôles qui éblouissent sous le soleil, un bâtiment en ciment peint en blanc abrite une « unité de transformation de cactus » censée produire « un complément alimentaire pour les petits ruminants », porté par le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement. Il n’a jamais servi. Personne ici n’aurait l’idée ni les moyens de payer pour de la farine de cactus dont les animaux sont nourris gratuitement après avoir brûlé les épines.

      La chambre froide offerte pour faciliter le stockage des poissons est également à l’arrêt : pas d’argent pour le carburant qui permettrait de la faire tourner. La coopération allemande envisagerait de la doter de panneaux à énergie solaire.

      Au fil des ans, les populations, qui n’ont jamais attendu beaucoup de l’Etat, ont aussi perdu l’espoir que l’aide extérieure puisse transformer leur vie. « Elle n’est plus perçue que comme une rente éphémère qu’il faut capter, constate un économiste malgache fin connaisseur de la région. Chaque village possède sa stratégie. Mais l’argent est loin de toujours aller à ceux qui en ont le plus besoin et, finalement, le système censé secourir les plus fragiles a plutôt tendance à conforter les inégalités » , affirme-t-il, conscient du malaise suscité par ses propos.

      A côté des critères de « vulnérabilité » retenus par les agences pour établir les listes officielles des bénéficiaires de vivres ou de dons monétaires − et souvent perçus comme peu lisibles par les villageois − prévalent d’autres règles. Fixées cette fois au sein des communautés, par les individus qui ont du pouvoir sur le reste du groupe : chefs de lignage, riche usurier, etc. « Quand le PAM ou les ONG ont terminé leurs distributions officielles, chacun doit redonner ce qu’il a reçu et un nouveau partage est réalisé. Ce n’est pas un secret. Mais personne n’ira l’ébruiter, pour éviter les représailles », poursuit-il.

      « L’aide nous tue aussi à petit feu »

      Au marché hebdomadaire de Sampona, Nirina (elle n’a donné que son prénom) semble ignorer ces arrangements. Assise par terre, devant un carré de tissu sur lequel sont disposés des petits tas de figues, la jeune mère de cinq enfants sait seulement que « son nom a été effacé de l’ordinateur et qu’elle n’a jamais reçu d’aide » . Son village se trouve à quatre heures de marche. Les cactus restent sa seule nourriture, avec les quelques vivres qu’elle pourra s’acheter si la vente est bonne.

      Face à la « plus grave sécheresse depuis quarante ans », l’heure est à nouveau à un grand plan pour le Sud. Le président Rajoelina a organisé en juin 2021, à Fort-Dauphin, une conférence pour « l’émergence », dont il est ressorti une liste de projets plus ou moins ambitieux qu’il reste encore à financer.

      De son côté, la Banque mondiale a annoncé une enveloppe de 200 millions de dollars (182 millions d’euros) pour un programme baptisé Mionjo, ce qui signifie « se lever » en langue antandroy. « Depuis toutes ces années, des milliards de dollars ont été dépensés pour le Sud. Nous pouvons déplorer le manque de volonté politique des gouvernements successifs, mais nous devons aussi faire notre autocritique », soupire un bailleur.

      A Ambovombe, le jeune gouverneur de l’Androy n’attend que cela : « Cette région est qualifiée de manière infamante de cimetière de projets. Cela nous fait honte, mais que chacun prenne sa part. Nous ne sommes pas les seuls responsables de la pauvreté ici, blâme Lahimaro Soja, juriste de formation et originaire de la région. L’aide humanitaire sauve des vies lorsque frappe le kéré, mais elle nous tue aussi à petit feu. La population a fini par croire que c’est un droit, au point d’en devenir dépendante. Rien n’est facile dans le sud de Madagascar, mais nos enfants méritent un autre avenir. »

      Par Laurence Caramel (Ambovombe, Madagascar, envoyée spéciale)

      #Madagascar #kéré #sécheresse #famine #alimentation #aide_alimentaire #pauvreté

  • Historic drought looms for 20 million living in Horn of Africa
    https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/historic-drought-looms-for-20-million-living-in-horn-of-africa?c

    As many as 20 million people in four African countries are facing extreme hardship and food shortages as an exceptionally long and severe drought grips the eastern Horn of Africa. Three rainy seasons in a row have failed to materialize. Now scientists and relief agencies fear that the next forecast one—scheduled to bring rain to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia this month—will follow suit.


    #famine #climat

  • La #Grande_Famine de #Mao

    Entre 1958 et 1962, le « #Grand_bond_en_avant », conçu par Mao pour que la #Chine dépasse la production de la Grande-Bretagne et gagne son autonomie face à l’URSS, a entraîné une #famine dramatique et provoqué la mort de 30 à 50 millions de personnes. « Catastrophes naturelles », c’est ainsi qu’aujourd’hui encore le Parti justifie ce terrible bilan. Témoignages, archives et interviews des principaux historiens ayant enquêté sur cette catastrophe viennent divulguer l’incroyable secret qui a entouré cette tragédie.

    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/35437_1

    #faim #histoire #réforme_agraire #violence_de_classe #paysans #redistribution_des_terres #terres #collectivisation_agricole #cents_fleurs #répression #camps_de_travaux_forcés #camps_de_rééducation #communes_populaires
    #points_de_travail #pénurie_alimentaire #corruption #violence #cantines_collectives #acier #prélèvement_de_céréales #déplacés_internes #cannibalisme #collectivisation_radicale

    • Stèles. La Grande Famine en Chine (1958-1961)

      Ce récit unique, œuvre d’un intellectuel chinois, est le premier compte-rendu historique complet de la Grande Famine provoquée par le régime communiste en Chine entre 1958 et 1961. Fruit d’une douzaine d’années de recherches sur le terrain, appuyé sur des milliers de pages de sources locales et de nombreux témoignages de première main, Stèles constitue un document exceptionnel.

      A la fin des années 1950, Mao Zedong lança le « Grand Bond en avant » dans le but d’accélérer la transition vers le communisme. Cela provoqua un gigantesque désastre économique dans les campagnes chinoises. La folie de la collectivisation à outrance détruit toute la société rurale, jusqu’à la famille. Pour nourrir les villes, on en est réduit à affamer les paysans. La ferveur révolutionnaire des cadres locaux se mêle à la terreur qu’inspire la hiérarchie et aggrave la situation ; la transmission de fausses informations (exagération des récoltes, occultation des morts de faim) donne lieu à des instructions insensées (achat forcé de quantités basées sur les résultats exagérés) auxquelles l’administration n’ose s’opposer. Dès la fin 1958 s’abat l’horreur : des villages entiers sont effacés par la famine, les cas de cannibalisme se multiplient, les survivants perdent la raison ; en sus des morts de faim, beaucoup sont battus à mort, ou poussés au suicide, des milliers d’enfants sont abandonnés...

      https://www.seuil.com/ouvrage/steles-jisheng-yang/9782021030150
      #livre #Jisheng_Yang #communisme #régime_communistes

  • Ethiopie : « Ce qui se passe au Tigré est sans aucun doute une catastrophe humanitaire »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/02/04/ethiopie-ce-qui-se-passe-au-tigre-est-sans-aucun-doute-une-catastrophe-human

    La guerre civile qui se déroule depuis novembre 2020 dans le nord de l’Ethiopie est à l’origine d’une catastrophe humanitaire concernant d’abord le Tigré mais aussi, désormais, les régions voisines Afar et Amhara. Le gouvernement d’Addis-Abeba, en guerre contre les rebelles des Forces de défense du Tigré (TDF), est accusé d’exercer un blocus sur la province et ses 6 millions d’habitants. Aucun convoi humanitaire n’a pu y entrer depuis près de deux mois. Michael Dunford, directeur Afrique de l’Est du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), tire la sonnette d’alarme alors que, selon une étude publiée le 28 janvier par l’agence onusienne, près de 40 % de la population tigréenne souffre de pénurie alimentaire extrême.

  • #Sri_Lanka
    Les #prix des denrées alimentaires atteignent des sommets https://www.lapresse.ca/international/asie-et-oceanie/2022-01-01/sri-lanka/les-prix-des-denrees-alimentaires-atteignent-des-sommets.php

    L’#économie de l’île, qui dépend du #tourisme, a été frappée de plein fouet par la #pandémie de coronavirus et le gouvernement a été contraint d’imposer une large interdiction d’importer afin de maintenir les réserves de devises étrangères.

    Depuis des mois, les supermarchés rationnent le lait en poudre, le sucre, les lentilles et d’autres produits essentiels, les banques étant à court de dollars pour payer les #importations.

    Cette semaine, le gouvernement a augmenté le prix du lait en poudre de 12,5 %, après une hausse similaire des prix du carburant le mois dernier.

    Le mois dernier, un haut responsable de l’agriculture a mis en garde contre une famine imminente et a demandé au gouvernement de mettre en place un système de rationnement alimentaire ordonné pour éviter un tel scénario. Il a été licencié quelques heures après avoir lancé cet appel.

    Les pénuries alimentaires ont été aggravées par l’interdiction des importations de produits agrochimiques, qui a finalement été levée en novembre après de mauvaises récoltes et d’intenses protestations des agriculteurs.

    #agriculture #pesticides

  • Madagascar, un pays rongé par la sécheresse et affamé par la pauvreté | L’Humanité
    https://www.humanite.fr/madagascar-un-pays-ronge-par-la-secheresse-et-affame-par-la-pauvrete-713384

    À moins de 1 000 kilomètres de La Réunion, le sud de l’île africaine est en prise avec les méfaits du réchauffement climatique. Mais le temps n’explique pas tout d’une insécurité alimentaire qui ne cesse de s’aggraver et touche, aujourd’hui, 1,5 million de personnes.

    Certains records sont moins bruyants que d’autres. La semaine dernière, à Ambovombe, dans le sud de Madagascar, le thermomètre affichait 39 °C à l’ombre. En janvier, déjà, il pointait à 46 °C dans la vaste région de l’Androy. Un pic parmi d’autres : depuis 2019, sans grand remue-ménage, la sécheresse y a pris ses quartiers. Loin de tout, le kéré, que l’on nomme famine en français, l’accompagne, rongeant une population en passe d’agoniser.

    27 % des enfants de moins de 5 ans sont atteints de malnutrition aiguë.

    « Dans le district d’Ambovombe, le taux de prévalence de la malnutrition aiguë sera de 27 % chez les enfants de moins de 5 ans (à la fin de l’année) », alertaient, en octobre, les experts de la Banque alimentaire mondiale.

    Gérer l’urgence
    Un mois plus tard, rapportait alors ​​​​​​​ le Monde Afrique, le général Elak Olivier Andriakaja, directeur du bureau national de gestion des risques et des catastrophes (BNGRC), débarquait à Ampanihy à la tête d’un convoi de camions remplis de vivres. Elles n’auront permis que de gérer l’urgence.
    « Je reviens de l’Androy et la situation s’est encore détériorée depuis janvier », raconte aujourd’hui à l’Humanité Claire Kaboré, représentante du Gret à Madagascar, ONG de développement qui a pris en charge des distributions d’aide alimentaire dans 15 villages de la région de Tsihombe. « Les familles n’ont pour la plupart plus rien pour se nourrir. » Au total, près de 1,5 million de personnes sont à cours de vivres.

    Un territoire en paix
    La semaine dernière, David Beasley, directeur exécutif du Programme alimentaire mondial des Nations unies (PAM), a gagné l’attention générale grâce à une déclaration choc. Madagascar, affirme-t-il, est le premier pays au monde à expérimenter la faim due au réchauffement climatique.
    Contrairement à d’autres, aucun conflit n’entre en jeu dans la situation que subit le sud de l’île, argumente le responsable du PAM. Le fait est que Madagascar est un pays en paix. Le fait est, aussi, que si le kéré n’y est pas chose nouvelle, sa récurrence, depuis le siècle dernier, est éloquente.

    Destruction des forêts
    De mémoire d’habitants, la première famine s’est produite en 1932, vécue comme un incident grave mais passager, rappellent les médias locaux. Depuis, les émissions de gaz à effet de serre ont suivi leur cours sans ambages, épaulées par une déforestation qui n’a pas épargné le sud de l’île.
    « L’administration coloniale d’antan a initié la destruction des forêts dans cette zone », détruisant du même coup la continuité d’un cycle de l’eau déjà fragile, rappelait le 2 juillet Baomiavotse Vahinala Raharinirina, ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement durable, dans les colonnes de l’Express de Madagascar. De naturellement chaud, le climat, dans l’Androy, est devenu clairement aride. Les sécheresses n’ont plus cessé de s’y répéter, parfois violemment.

    « La pluie a été quasiment inexistante en 2020 »
    En 2015, alors que le pays enregistrait une hausse moyenne de sa température de 0,5 °C au cours des vingt dernières années, les autorités malgaches indiquaient, auprès de la convention-cadre des Nations unies sur le changement climatique (CCNUCC), que « 30 à 60 % de la population du sud du pays souffrent d’insécurité alimentaire due aux épisodes de sécheresse ». Depuis 2019, on ne peut plus même parler d’épisodes : l’austérité climatique s’est installée au sud pour ne plus disparaître, et se renforce depuis l’automne.
    « La pluie a été quasiment inexistante en 2020 », reprend Claire Kaboré . Quelques averses sont tombées au tout début 2021, « mais elles se sont accompagnées de forts vents de sable, qui ont enseveli une grande partie des semis ».

    Invasion de ravageurs
    Plus tard, les cultures ont été assaillies par les ravageurs – criquets ou autres chenilles. Au final, « les récoltes de 2021 affichent un rendement 40 % moins élevé qu’une année ordinaire ». Même les cactus raketa, dont les fruits servent à nourrir la population pendant les périodes de soudure, n’en donnent pas cette année. « Tout cela est clairement un effet du changement climatique », admet la responsable du Gret.
    Mais parler du temps ne suffit pas, insiste-t-elle : d’autres facteurs contribuent à installer le kéré. Structurels, ils sont aussi plus politiques.

    Un PIB de 520 dollars par habitant
    « Le manque de nourriture commence par le fait de ne pas y avoir accès, physiquement ou financièrement », rappelle Matthieu Brun, chercheur associé à Sciences-Po Bordeaux et au laboratoire des Afriques dans le monde du CNRS. « Madagascar n’échappe pas à la règle. »
    Avec un PIB d’à peine plus de 520 dollars par habitant en 2019 (la même année, il était de plus de 40 490 dollars en France), l’île affiche un taux de pauvreté croissant, singulièrement dans le sud, où elle frappe près de 80 % de la population. Alors qu’elle dure, voire se renforce depuis les années 1960 et la fin de la colonisation, les élites du pays se voient accusées de monopoliser les rentes, au détriment, entre autres, d’infrastructures vitales.

    Les infrastructures liées à l’eau font défaut
    « Les villages du sud sont éloignés de tout, qu’il s’agisse des centres de soins ou des écoles », reprend Matthieu Brun. Les voies de circulation et de communication y sont inexistantes, rendant quasiment impossible l’acheminement régulier de denrées depuis le nord. « Pendant la saison des pluies, rejoindre la capitale ne se fait pas en moins de 80 heures », illustre le chercheur. Les infrastructures liées à l’eau, en outre, font cruellement défaut.
    « Le service d’eau pose un souci majeur », confirme Liana Rajaonary, chargée de mission à PS-Eau (Programme solidarité eau), réseau français de collectivités locales et d’experts intervenant dans les pays en développement. « Dans le nord, sur les hauts plateaux, il suffit de capter les sources descendantes, explique la spécialiste. Dans le sud, il faut les pomper en profondeur. »
     Parfois, les maires des villages ne savent même pas que la gestion de l’eau relève de leurs compétences. Liana Rajaonary Chargée de mission à PS-Eau
    Plus coûteux, les systèmes exigent aussi plus de compétences et de formation. Trop chers pour être pris en charge par les fermiers ou les petites entreprises, les réseaux d’assainissement et d’irrigation s’avèrent par ailleurs trop peu rentables pour les multinationales de l’eau. À l’exclusion de quelques interventions ponctuelles sous le chapeau de fondations, les firmes du secteur négligent le territoire.
    L’éloignement de l’État, enfin, n’arrange rien. « Parfois, les maires des villages ne savent même pas que la gestion de l’eau relève de leurs compétences », conclut Liana Rajaonary. L’ensemble laisse les Malgaches du sud livrés à eux-mêmes. Dans les faits, « beaucoup de familles vivent à plus de 20 kilomètres d’un point d’eau », complète Claire Kaboré.

    Le Covid est tombé au pire moment
    Le tableau ne serait pas complet sans l’épidémie de Covid-19. Tombée au pire moment, elle a entraîné une « baisse de l’activité économique liée au tourisme et la fermeture des écoles et des centres de soins », reprend Matthieu Brun, qui, entre autres choses, copilote les études Demeter, lesquelles décryptent cycliquement l’état de l’alimentation dans le monde, et dont l’édition 2020 est consacrée aux impacts de la crise sanitaire. « Or, les écoles, précise-t-il, étaient aussi des lieux où les enfants bénéficiaient d’une ration alimentaire… »

    La crainte d’un cataclysme
    Plus globalement, la pauvreté s’est encore généralisée : en un an, 1,4 million de Malgaches sont venus grossir les rangs de ceux vivant avec moins de 1,90 dollar par jour, chiffre la Banque mondiale dans un rapport publié en décembre.
    De plus en plus pauvre et sans infrastructures, Madagascar compte comme jamais au rang des pays les plus vulnérables au dérèglement climatique. À moins d’actions fortes en tous sens, celui-ci promet d’y être cataclysmique : certains scénarios du Giec établissent que, à suivre la trajectoire actuelle des émissions de CO2, les températures moyennes pourraient augmenter, d’ici la fin du siècle, de 6,5 °C dans le sud de l’île.

    Vidéo polémique
    Des femmes et des enfants, à genoux dans la poussière, faisant bouillir des lanières en cuir de zébu afin de les manger : ces images ont été rapportées du sud de Madagascar par la journaliste Gaëlle Borgia, lauréate du prix Pulitzer pour une enquête sur l’ingérence russe dans la présidentielle malgache de 2018. Publiée le 21 juin sur Facebook, sa vidéo est aujourd’hui l’objet d’une polémique qui pourrait virer au scandale. Les autorités locales accusent la journaliste de « colporter de fausses informations ». La radio télévision nationale (TVM) a diffusé une séquence montrant les mêmes témoins, expliquant que la journaliste les avait payés. Gaëlle Borgia dément. Face à sa caméra à elle, ces personnes, en outre, assurent avoir été menacées par des hommes armés pour témoigner contre elle. Reporters sans frontières dénonce « les tentatives grossières et mensongères de discréditer le travail de cette journaliste ». L’ONG s’inquiète également de sa mise en danger.

    #Madagascar #déforestation #changement_climatique #famine
    (déterminants politiques de la) #pauvreté

  • #Madagascar, au bout de l’espoir - Reporters
    https://www.france24.com/fr/%C3%A9missions/reporters/20210514-madagascar-au-bout-de-l-espoir

    C’est l’une des catastrophes les moins médiatisées au monde. À Madagascar, 1,5 million de personnes sont frappées par une grave crise alimentaire et ont besoin d’une aide d’urgence. Plusieurs dizaines de personnes sont déjà mortes de faim. En cause, la #sécheresse sans précédent qui s’est abattue sur le sud de l’île ces dernières années et a détruit la quasi-totalité des cultures. Alors que le Programme alimentaire mondial demande une aide d’urgence de 62,45 millions d’euros, notre correspondante Gaëlle Borgia s’est rendue dans la région d’Anosy, la plus durement frappée par la crise.

    À Madagascar, depuis six mois, hommes, femmes, personnes âgées et enfants meurent de faim dans l’indifférence générale. Des villages reculés de l’extrême sud, difficilement accessibles, sont devenus des mouroirs. Les images d’enfants squelettiques sont choquantes.

    Selon le Programme alimentaire mondial (Pam), 1,5 million de Malgaches ont actuellement besoin d’une aide alimentaire d’urgence, sans quoi ils ne survivront pas. En cause : une sécheresse inédite et galopante, due au dérèglement climatique mondial.

    Pluies inexistantes

    Ces dernières années, les pluies se sont faites de plus en plus rares dans le sud du pays, voire sont devenues inexistantes, à tel point que la quasi-totalité des cultures de la région ont été détruites et les terres sont devenues infertiles. La majorité des habitants dépend pourtant de l’agriculture pour survivre.

    Tandis que le gouvernement malgache refuse toujours de déclarer l’état d’urgence, le Pam a demandé 62,45 millions d’euros aux pays donateurs pour sauver les populations de la #famine.

    Dans ce reportage, nous nous sommes employés à faire témoigner ces victimes de la faim et à expliquer les causes multiples de cette catastrophe : entre criminalité, corruption, pauvreté et politique, les crises alimentaires malgaches sont récurrentes et complexes. Selon l’ONG Care, elles font partie des dix crises les moins médiatisées au monde.

    Villages mouroirs

    Le tournage s’est principalement déroulé dans la région d’Anosy, à l’extrême sud de Madagascar, une des zones les plus reculées et les plus dangereuses de l’île.

    Le chauffeur qui nous a accompagnés, ainsi que le gérant de la société de location de véhicules par laquelle nous sommes passées, craignaient pour notre sécurité, car le district d’Amboasary Atsimo, où nous nous sommes rendus, est régulièrement le théâtre d’attaques de Dahalo, ces bandits ruraux qui font des razzias dans les villages et tuent.

    Nous avons eu l’impression de tourner dans des villages mouroirs, où les rares personnes visibles attendent l’aide alimentaire pour survivre, en se cachant des Dahalo, tandis que la majorité a déserté cette zone dévastée par la sécheresse.

    La situation est si dramatique que nous avons transporté de grosses quantités de riz, d’huile et de sel à l’attention des habitants des villages où nous avons tourné.

    Le sourire des enfants, nos larmes sur le tournage

    La plupart des enfants, adolescents et personnes âgées que nous avons rencontrés n’avaient plus que la peau sur les os et semblaient anesthésiés, sidérés par la faim. Parce qu’ils sont plus vulnérables que les adultes, ce sont eux qui dépérissent en premier.

    Nous avons eu l’impression, au milieu de ces silhouettes squelettiques et silencieuses, de nous trouver dans des villages de zombies errants. Mais dès lors que le Programme alimentaire distribuait les fameux petits sachets de farine enrichie appelés « Plumpy’Doz », le sourire et l’énergie des enfants revenaient aussitôt. Le changement soudain était assez frappant. « Plumpy, Plumpy ! » est devenu leur cri de joie préféré.

    Il est rare de pleurer sur un tournage. Cette fois, nous avons versé des larmes.

  • « Dans la première édition de son livre `` Origine du #sida ’’, publiée en 2011, le Dr Pepin concluait que le #VIH avait probablement infecté un chasseur au Cameroun au début du XXe siècle, avant de se propager à Léopoldville, maintenant connue sous le nom de Kinshasa au Congo.
    Dans une version révisée de cette hypothèse il précise que le patient zéro n’était pas un chasseur indigène, mais un soldat affamé de la Première Guerre mondiale obligé de chasser les chimpanzés pour se nourrir, coincé dans la forêt de Moloundou au Cameroun en 1916.
    Dans une interview exclusive avec MailOnline, le professeur Pepin révèle comment le #colonialisme, la #famine et la #prostitution ont contribué à créer l’épidémie de sida en cours. »

    First ever #HIV case was a soldier in World War One who caught the virus while hunting chimps | Daily Mail Online
    https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-9202531/First-HIV-case-soldier-World-War-One-caught-virus-hunting-chimps.html

    In the acclaimed first edition of his book ’Origin of AIDS’, published in 2011, Dr Pepin concluded HIV likely infected a hunter in Cameroon at the start of the 20th century, before spreading to Léopoldville, now known as Kinshasa in the Congo.

    Now, a revised version of this ’cut hunter’ hypothesis has been published which states the original ’Patient Zero’ was not a native hunter, but instead a starving World War One soldier forced to hunt chimps for food when stuck in the remote forest around Moloundou, Cameroon in 1916 — giving rise to the ’cut soldier’ theory.

    In an exclusive interview with MailOnline, Professor Pepin reveals how colonialism, starvation and prostitution helped create the ongoing AIDS epidemic.

  • Au #Tigré_éthiopien, la #guerre « sans pitié » du prix Nobel de la paix

    Le premier ministre éthiopien #Abyi_Ahmed oppose une fin de non-recevoir aux offres de médiation de ses pairs africains, alors que les combats entre l’armée fédérale et les forces de la province du Tigré ne cessent de prendre de l’ampleur.

    Le gouvernement d’Addis Abéba continue de parler d’une simple opération de police contre une province récalcitrante ; mais c’est une véritable guerre, avec blindés, aviation, et des dizaines de milliers de combattants, qui oppose l’armée fédérale éthiopienne aux forces de la province du Tigré, dans le nord du pays.

    Trois semaines de combats ont déjà provoqué l’afflux de 30 000 #réfugiés au #Soudan voisin, et ce nombre pourrait rapidement grimper après l’ultimatum lancé hier soir par le gouvernement aux rebelles : 72 heures pour se rendre. L’#armée demande aussi à la population de la capitale tigréenne, #Makelle, de se « libérer » des dirigeants du #Front_de_libération_du_peuple_du_Tigré, au pouvoir dans la province ; en cas contraire, a-t-elle prévenu, « il n’y aura aucune pitié ».

    Cette escalade rapide et, en effet, sans pitié, s’accompagne d’une position inflexible du premier ministre éthiopien, Abyi Ahmed, vis-à-vis de toute médiation, y compris celle de ses pairs africains. Addis Abéba a opposé une fin de non-recevoir aux tentatives de médiation, celle des voisins de l’Éthiopie, ou celle du Président en exercice de l’Union africaine, le sud-africain Cyril Ramaphosa. Ils seront poliment reçus à Addis Abéba, mais pas question de les laisser aller au Tigré ou de rencontrer les leaders du #TPLF, le front tigréen considéré comme des « bandits ».

    Pourquoi cette position inflexible ? La réponse se trouve à la fois dans l’histoire particulièrement violente de l’Éthiopie depuis des décennies, et dans la personnalité ambivalente d’Abyi Ahmed, le chef du gouvernement et, ne l’oublions pas, prix Nobel de la paix l’an dernier.

    L’histoire nous donne des clés. Le Tigré ne représente que 6% des 100 millions d’habitants de l’Éthiopie, mais il a joué un rôle historique déterminant. C’est du Tigré qu’est partie la résistance à la sanglante dictature de Mengistu Haile Mariam, qui avait renversé l’empire d’Haile Selassie en 1974. Victorieux en 1991, le TPLF a été au pouvoir pendant 17 ans, avec à sa tête un homme fort, Meles Zenawi, réformateur d’une main de fer, qui introduira notamment le fédéralisme en Éthiopie. Sa mort subite en 2012 a marqué le début des problèmes pour les Tigréens, marginalisés après l’élection d’Abyi Ahmed en 2018, et qui l’ont très mal vécu.

    La personnalité d’Abyi Ahmed est aussi au cœur de la crise actuelle. Encensé pour ses mesures libérales, le premier ministre éthiopien est également un ancien militaire inflexible, déterminé à s’opposer aux forces centrifuges qui menacent l’unité de l’ex-empire.

    Ce contexte laisse envisager un #conflit prolongé, car le pouvoir fédéral ne renoncera pas à son offensive jusqu’à ce qu’il ait, au minimum, repris Mekelle, la capitale du Tigré. Or cette ville est à 2500 mètres d’altitude, dans une région montagneuse où les avancées d’une armée régulière sont difficiles.

    Quant au front tigréen, il a vraisemblablement envisagé une position de repli dans la guerrilla, avec des forces aguerries, dans une région qui lui est acquise.

    Reste l’attitude des pays de la région, qui risquent d’être entrainés dans cette #guerre_civile, à commencer par l’Érythrée voisine, déjà touchée par les hostilités.

    C’est une tragédie pour l’Éthiopie, mais aussi pour l’Afrique, car c’est le deuxième pays le plus peuplé du continent, siège de l’Union africaine, l’une des locomotives d’une introuvable renaissance africaine. L’Afrique doit tout faire pour mettre fin à cette guerre fratricide, aux conséquences dévastatrices.

    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/geopolitique/geopolitique-23-novembre-2020

    #Ethiopie #Tigré #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Tigray

    • Conflict between Tigray and Eritrea – the long standing faultline in Ethiopian politics

      The missile attack by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front on Eritrea in mid-November transformed an internal Ethiopian crisis into a transnational one. In the midst of escalating internal conflict between Ethiopia’s northernmost province, Tigray, and the federal government, it was a stark reminder of a historical rivalry that continues to shape and reshape Ethiopia.

      The rivalry between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the movement which has governed Eritrea in all but name for the past 30 years – the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front – goes back several decades.

      The histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia have long been closely intertwined. This is especially true of Tigray and central Eritrea. These territories occupy the central massif of the Horn of Africa. Tigrinya-speakers are the predominant ethnic group in both Tigray and in the adjacent Eritrean highlands.

      The enmity between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dates to the mid-1970s, when the Tigrayan front was founded in the midst of political turmoil in Ethiopia. The authoritarian Marxist regime – known as the Derg (Amharic for ‘committee’) – inflicted violence upon millions of its own citizens. It was soon confronted with a range of armed insurgencies and socio-political movements. These included Tigray and Eritrea, where the resistance was most ferocious.

      The Tigrayan front was at first close to the Eritrean front, which had been founded in 1970 to fight for independence from Ethiopia. Indeed, the Eritreans helped train some of the first Tigrayan recruits in 1975-6, in their shared struggle against Ethiopian government forces for social revolution and the right to self-determination.

      But in the midst of the war against the Derg regime, the relationship quickly soured over ethnic and national identity. There were also differences over the demarcation of borders, military tactics and ideology. The Tigrayan front eventually recognised the Eritreans’ right to self-determination, if grudgingly, and resolved to fight for the liberation of all Ethiopian peoples from the tyranny of the Derg regime.

      Each achieved seminal victories in the late 1980s. Together the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Eritrean front overthrew the Derg in May 1991. The Tigrayan-led front formed government in Addis Ababa while the Eritrean front liberated Eritrea which became an independent state.

      But this was just the start of a new phase of a deep-rooted rivalry. This continued between the governments until the recent entry of prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

      If there’s any lesson to be learnt from years of military and political manoeuvrings, it is that conflict in Tigray is unavoidably a matter of intense interest to the Eritrean leadership. And Abiy would do well to remember that conflict between Eritrea and Tigray has long represented a destabilising fault line for Ethiopia as well as for the wider region.
      Reconciliation and new beginnings

      In the early 1990s, there was much talk of reconciliation and new beginnings between Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea. The two governments signed a range of agreements on economic cooperation, defence and citizenship. It seemed as though the enmity of the liberation war was behind them.

      Meles declared as much at the 1993 Eritrean independence celebrations, at which he was a notable guest.

      But deep-rooted tensions soon resurfaced. In the course of 1997, unresolved border disputes were exacerbated by Eritrea’s introduction of a new currency. This had been anticipated in a 1993 economic agreement. But in the event Tigrayan traders often refused to recognise it, and it caused a collapse in commerce.

      Full-scale war erupted over the contested border hamlet of Badme in May 1998. The fighting swiftly spread to other stretches of the shared, 1,000 km long frontier. Air strikes were launched on both sides.

      It was quickly clear, too, that this was only superficially about borders. It was more substantively about regional power and long standing antagonisms that ran along ethnic lines.

      The Eritrean government’s indignant anti-Tigray front rhetoric had its echo in the popular contempt for so-called Agame, the term Eritreans used for Tigrayan migrant labourers.

      For the Tigray front, the Eritrean front was the clearest expression of perceived Eritrean arrogance.

      As for Isaias himself, regarded as a crazed warlord who had led Eritrea down a path which defied economic and political logic, it was hubris personified.

      Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent.

      Ethiopia’s decisive final offensive in May 2000 forced the Eritrean army to fall back deep into their own territory. Although the Ethiopians were halted, and a ceasefire put in place after bitter fighting on a number of fronts, Eritrea had been devastated by the conflict.

      The Algiers Agreement of December 2000 was followed by years of standoff, occasional skirmishes, and the periodic exchange of insults.

      During this period Ethiopia consolidated its position as a dominant power in the region. And Meles as one of the continent’s representatives on the global stage.

      For its part Eritrea retreated into a militaristic, authoritarian solipsism. Its domestic policy centred on open-ended national service for the young. Its foreign policy was largely concerned with undermining the Ethiopian government across the region. This was most obvious in Somalia, where its alleged support for al-Shabaab led to the imposition of sanctions on Asmara.

      The ‘no war-no peace’ scenario continued even after Meles’s sudden death in 2012. The situation only began to shift with the resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn against a backdrop of mounting protest across Ethiopia, especially among the Oromo and the Amhara, and the rise to power of Abiy.

      What followed was the effective overthrow of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front which had been the dominant force in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition since 1991.

      This provided Isaias with a clear incentive to respond to Abiy’s overtures.
      Tigray’s loss, Eritrea’s gain

      A peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, was signed in July 2018 by Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki. It formally ended their 1998-2000 war. It also sealed the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Many in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front were unenthusiastic about allowing Isaias in from the cold.

      Since the 1998-2000 war, in large part thanks to the astute manoeuvres of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Eritrea had been exactly where the Tigray People’s Liberation Front wanted it: an isolated pariah state with little diplomatic clout. Indeed, it is unlikely that Isaias would have been as receptive to the deal had it not involved the further sidelining of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, something which Abiy presumably understood.

      Isaias had eschewed the possibility of talks with Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. But Abiy was a different matter. A political reformer, and a member of the largest but long-subjugated ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromo, he was determined to end the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s domination of Ethiopian politics.

      This was effectively achieved in December 2019 when he abolished the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and replaced it with the Prosperity Party.

      The Tigray People’s Liberation Front declined to join with the visible results of the current conflict.

      À lire aussi : Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict in Ethiopia

      Every effort to engage with the Tigrayan leadership – including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – in pursuit of a peaceful resolution must also mean keeping Eritrea out of the conflict.

      Unless Isaias is willing to play a constructive role – he does not have a good track record anywhere in the region in this regard – he must be kept at arm’s length, not least to protect the 2018 peace agreement itself.

      https://theconversation.com/conflict-between-tigray-and-eritrea-the-long-standing-faultline-in-

      #Derg #histoire #frontières #démarcation_des_frontières #monnaie #Badme #Agame #travailleurs_étrangers #Oromo #Ethiopian_People’s_Revolutionary_Democratic_Front #Prosperity_Party

      –—

      #Agame , the term Eritreans used for Tigrayan migrant labourers.

      –-> #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots
      ping @sinehebdo

    • Satellite Images Show Ethiopia Carnage as Conflict Continues
      – United Nations facility, school, clinic and homes burned down
      – UN refugee agency has had no access to the two camps

      Satellite images show the destruction of United Nations’ facilities, a health-care unit, a high school and houses at two camps sheltering Eritrean refugees in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, belying government claims that the conflict in the dissident region is largely over.

      The eight Planet Labs Inc images are of Hitsats and the Shimelba camps. The camps hosted about 25,000 and 8,000 refugees respectively before a conflict broke out in the region two months ago, according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

      “Recent satellite imagery indicates that structures in both camps are being intentionally targeted,” said Isaac Baker, an analyst at DX Open Network, a U.K. based human security research and analysis non-profit. “The systematic and widespread fires are consistent with an intentional campaign to deny the use of the camp.”

      DX Open Network has been following the conflict and analyzing satellite image data since Nov. 7, three days after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared war against a dissident group in the Tigray region, which dominated Ethiopian politics before Abiy came to power.

      Ethiopia’s government announced victory against the dissidents on Nov. 28 after federal forces captured the regional capital of Mekelle. Abiy spoke of the need to rebuild and return normalcy to Tigray at the time.

      Calls and messages to Redwan Hussein, spokesman for the government’s emergency task force on Tigray and the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Spokeswoman Billene Seyoum were not answered.

      In #Shimelba, images show scorched earth from apparent attacks in January. A World Food Programme storage facility and a secondary school run by the Development and Inter-Aid Church Commission have also been burned down, according to DX Open Network’s analysis. In addition, a health facility run by the Ethiopian Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs situated next to the WFP compound was also attacked between Jan. 5 and Jan. 8.

      In #Hitsats camp, about 30 kilometers (19 miles) away, there were at least 14 actively burning structures and 55 others were damaged or destroyed by Jan. 5. There were new fires by Jan. 8, according to DX Open Network’s analysis.

      The UN refugee agency has not had access to the camps since fighting started in early November, according to Chris Melzer, a communications officer for the agency. UNHCR has been able to reach its two other camps, Mai-Aini and Adi Harush, which are to the south, he said.

      “We also have no reliable, first-hand information about the situation in the camps or the wellbeing of the refugees,” Melzer said in reference to Hitsats and Shimelba.

      Eritrean troops have also been involved in the fighting and are accused of looting businesses and abducting refugees, according to aid workers and diplomats briefed on the situation. The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea have denied that Eritrean troops are involved in the conflict.

      The UN says fighting is still going on in several Tigray areas and 2.2 million people have been displaced in the past two months. Access to the region for journalists and independent analysts remains constrained, making it difficult to verify events.

      https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-09/satellite-images-show-destruction-of-refugee-camps-in-ethiopia?srnd=premi

      #images_satellitaires #camps_de_réfugiés #réfugiés

    • Ethiopia’s government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon

      A rebel region is being starved into submission

      ETHIOPIA HAS suffered famines in the past. Many foreigners know this; in 1985 about one-third of the world’s population watched a pop concert to raise money for starving Ethiopians. What is less well understood is that poor harvests lead to famine only when malign rulers allow it. It was not the weather that killed perhaps 1m people in 1983-85. It was the policies of a Marxist dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who forced peasants at gunpoint onto collective farms. Mengistu also tried to crush an insurgency in the northern region of Tigray by burning crops, destroying grain stores and slaughtering livestock. When the head of his own government’s humanitarian agency begged him for cash to feed the starving, he dismissed him with a memorably callous phrase: “Don’t let these petty human problems...consume you.”

      https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/01/23/ethiopias-government-appears-to-be-wielding-hunger-as-a-weapon

      #famine #faim
      #paywall

    • Amnesty International accuses Eritrean troops of killing hundreds of civilians in the holy city of #Axum

      Amnesty International has released a comprehensive, compelling report detailing the killing of hundreds of civilians in the Tigrayan city of Axum.

      This story has been carried several times by Eritrea Hub, most recently on 20th February. On 12 January this year the Axum massacre was raised in the British Parliament, by Lord David Alton.

      Gradually the picture emerging has been clarified and is now unambiguous.

      The Amnesty report makes grim reading: the details are horrifying.

      Human Rights Watch are finalising their own report, which will be published next week. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is also publishing a report on the Axum massacre.

      The Ethiopian government appointed interim administration of Tigray is attempting to distance itself from the actions of Eritrean troops. Alula Habteab, who heads the interim administration’s construction, road and transport department, appeared to openly criticise soldiers from Eritrea, as well as the neighbouring Amhara region, for their actions during the conflict.

      “There were armies from a neighbouring country and a neighbouring region who wanted to take advantage of the war’s objective of law enforcement,” he told state media. “These forces have inflicted more damage than the war itself.”

      The full report can be found here: The Massacre in Axum – AFR 25.3730.2021. Below is the summary (https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-Massacre-in-Axum-AFR-25.3730.2021.pdf)

      https://eritreahub.org/amnesty-international-accuses-eritrean-troops-of-killing-hundreds-of-civ

      #rapport #massacre

    • Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: How a massacre in the sacred city of #Aksum unfolded

      Eritrean troops fighting in Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray killed hundreds of people in Aksum mainly over two days in November, witnesses say.

      The mass killings on 28 and 29 November may amount to a crime against humanity, Amnesty International says in a report.

      An eyewitness told the BBC how bodies remained unburied on the streets for days, with many being eaten by hyenas.

      Ethiopia and Eritrea, which both officially deny Eritrean soldiers are in Tigray, have not commented.

      The Ethiopian Human Rights commission says it is investigating the allegations.

      The conflict erupted on 4 November 2020 when Ethiopia’s government launched an offensive to oust the region’s ruling TPLF party after its fighters captured federal military bases in Tigray.

      Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, told parliament on 30 November that “not a single civilian was killed” during the operation.

      But witnesses have recounted how on that day they began burying some of the bodies of unarmed civilians killed by Eritrean soldiers - many of them boys and men shot on the streets or during house-to-house raids.

      Amnesty’s report has high-resolution satellite imagery from 13 December showing disturbed earth consistent with recent graves at two churches in Aksum, an ancient city considered sacred by Ethiopia’s Orthodox Christians.

      A communications blackout and restricted access to Tigray has meant reports of what has gone on in the conflict have been slow to emerge.

      In Aksum, electricity and phone networks reportedly stopped working on the first day of the conflict.
      How was Aksum captured?

      Shelling by Ethiopian and Eritrea forces to the west of Aksum began on Thursday 19 November, according to people in the city.

      “This attack continued for five hours, and was non-stop. People who were at churches, cafes, hotels and their residence died. There was no retaliation from any armed force in the city - it literally targeted civilians,” a civil servant in Aksum told the BBC.
      1px transparent line

      Amnesty has gathered similar and multiple testimonies describing the continuous shelling that evening of civilians.

      Once in control of the city, soldiers, generally identified as Eritrean, searched for TPLF soldiers and militias or “anyone with a gun”, Amnesty said.

      “There were a lot of... house-to-house killings,” one woman told the rights group.

      There is compelling evidence that Ethiopian and Eritrean troops carried out “multiple war crimes in their offensive to take control of Aksum”, Amnesty’s Deprose Muchena says.
      What sparked the killings?

      For the next week, the testimonies say Ethiopia troops were mainly in Aksum - the Eritreans had pushed on east to the town of Adwa.

      A witness told the BBC how the Ethiopian military looted banks in the city in that time.

      he Eritrean forces reportedly returned a week later. The fighting on Sunday 28 November was triggered by an assault of poorly armed pro-TPLF fighters, according to Amnesty’s report.

      Between 50 and 80 men from Aksum targeted an Eritrean position on a hill overlooking the city in the morning.

      A 26-year-old man who participated in the attack told Amnesty: “We wanted to protect our city so we attempted to defend it especially from Eritrean soldiers... They knew how to shoot and they had radios, communications... I didn’t have a gun, just a stick.”
      How did Eritrean troops react?

      It is unclear how long the fighting lasted, but that afternoon Eritrean trucks and tanks drove into Aksum, Amnesty reports.

      Witnesses say Eritrean soldiers went on a rampage, shooting at unarmed civilian men and boys who were out on the streets - continuing until the evening.

      A man in his 20s told Amnesty about the killings on the city’s main street: “I was on the second floor of a building and I watched, through the window, the Eritreans killing the youth on the street.”

      The soldiers, identified as Eritrean not just because of their uniform and vehicle number plates but because of the languages they spoke (Arabic and an Eritrean dialect of Tigrinya), started house-to-house searches.

      “I would say it was in retaliation,” a young man told the BBC. “They killed every man they found. If you opened your door and they found a man they killed him, if you didn’t open, they shoot your gate by force.”

      He was hiding in a nightclub and witnessed a man who was found and killed by Eritrean soldiers begging for his life: “He was telling them: ’I am a civilian, I am a banker.’”

      Another man told Amnesty that he saw six men killed, execution-style, outside his house near the Abnet Hotel the following day on 29 November.

      “They lined them up and shot them in the back from behind. Two of them I knew. They’re from my neighbourhood… They asked: ’Where is your gun’ and they answered: ’We have no guns, we are civilians.’”
      How many people were killed?

      Witnesses say at first the Eritrean soldiers would not let anyone approach the bodies on the streets - and would shoot anyone who did so.

      One woman, whose nephews aged 29 and 14 had been killed, said the roads “were full of dead bodies”.

      Amnesty says after the intervention of elders and Ethiopian soldiers, burials began over several days, with most funerals taking place on 30 November after people brought the bodies to the churches - often 10 at a time loaded on horse- or donkey-drawn carts.

      At Abnet Hotel, the civil servant who spoke to the BBC said some bodies were not removed for four days.

      "The bodies that were lying around Abnet Hotel and Seattle Cinema were eaten by hyenas. We found only bones. We buried bones.

      “I can say around 800 civilians were killed in Aksum.”

      This account is echoed by a church deacon who told the Associated Press that many bodies had been fed on by hyenas.

      He gathered victims’ identity cards and assisted with burials in mass graves and also believes about 800 people were killed that weekend.

      The 41 survivors and witnesses Amnesty interviewed provided the names of more than 200 people they knew who were killed.
      What happened after the burials?

      Witnesses say the Eritrean soldiers participated in looting, which after the massacre and as many people fled the city, became widespread and systematic.

      The university, private houses, hotels, hospitals, grain stores, garages, banks, DIY stores, supermarkets, bakeries and other shops were reportedly targeted.

      One man told Amnesty how Ethiopian soldiers failed to stop Eritreans looting his brother’s house.

      “They took the TV, a jeep, the fridge, six mattresses, all the groceries and cooking oil, butter, teff flour [Ethiopia’s staple food], the kitchen cabinets, clothes, the beers in the fridge, the water pump, and the laptop.”

      The young man who spoke to the BBC said he knew of 15 vehicles that had been stolen belonging to businessmen in the city.

      This has had a devastating impact on those left in Aksum, leaving them with little food and medicine to survive, Amnesty says.

      Witnesses say the theft of water pumps left residents having to drink from the river.
      Why is Aksum sacred?

      It is said to be the birthplace of the biblical Queen of Sheba, who travelled to Jerusalem to visit King Solomon.

      They had a son - Menelik I - who is said to have brought to Aksum the Ark of the Covenant, believed to contain the 10 commandments handed down to Moses by God.

      It is constantly under guard at the city’s Our Lady Mary of Zion Church and no-one is allowed to see it.

      A major religious celebration is usually held at the church on 30 November, drawing pilgrims from across Ethiopia and around the world, but it was cancelled last year amid the conflict.

      The civil servant interviewed by the BBC said that Eritrean troops came to the church on 3 December “terrorising the priests and forcing them to give them the gold and silver cross”.

      But he said the deacons and other young people went to protect the ark.

      “It was a huge riot. Every man and woman fought them. They fired guns and killed some, but we are happy as we did not fail to protect our treasures.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56198469

  • Chine : la menace d’une crise alimentaire, symptôme du « virage à gauche » de Xi Jinping - Asialyst
    https://asialyst.com/fr/2020/09/18/chine-menace-crise-alimentaire-symptome-virage-gauche-xi-jinping

    C’est l’un des enseignements de la dernière rencontre estivale de l’élite du Parti à Beidaihe : le problème est conjoncturel. La pandémie de Covid-19 démobilise la main-d’œuvre en Chine du Centre et du Sud, ce qui rend par la suite le retour au travail problématique. Par ailleurs, les pluies torrentielles de juin-juillet ont mis à mal le système de citernes et de barrages partout dans ces deux régions, qui n’ont été que très peu prises en charge par les autorités. Résultat, les inondations ont laissé un grand nombre de récoltes détruites ou à l’abandon. Sans oublier l’arrivée des locustes dans le sud de la Chine, qui a ainsi achevé une partie des récoltes restantes. IL faut mentionner aussi la sécheresse dans le bastion du soja au Nord-Est. Les visites de Xi Jinping se voulaient rassurantes, en « montrant » les grains – le maïs en l’occurrence. Mais elles n’ont aidé en rien à changer la réalité du terrain. Si bien que même les téléphones portables ont été interdits près des greniers suite à la publication de photos montrant du maïs en train de pourrir.

    #Chine #pénurie #pandémie #famine (menace de) #autarcie #auto-suffisance

  • Coronavirus : en Inde, Narendra Modi reste populaire dans la tempête
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/05/26/en-inde-narendra-modi-reste-populaire-dans-la-tempete_6040763_3210.html

    Mardi 26 mai, l’Inde est passée devant l’Iran sur la liste des pays les plus touchés par la pandémie, avec plus de 145 000 cas de contamination. Le nombre de morts du Covid-19 a franchi la barre des 4 000 et, dans les jours qui viennent, il va dépasser le bilan de la Chine, anéantissant l’espoir nourri jusqu’ici par Delhi de compter moins de victimes que l’autre géant d’Asie. Alors que le confinement du sous-continent, qui compte 1,3 milliard d’habitants, doit prendre fin dimanche 31 mai, le nombre de nouveaux cas détectés quotidiennement, qui tournait autour de 2 000 début mai, approche maintenant les 7 000, du fait notamment de la multiplication des tests de dépistage, près de 110 000 par jour – contre 30 000 à la mi-avril. Cette tendance à la hausse pourrait aussi être due à l’assouplissement des règles de confinement dans certaines régions et, surtout, aux trains qui ont fini par être affrétés, à partir du 4 mai, pour ramener chez eux des millions de migrants bloqués dans les grandes métropoles. Aussi modeste soit-elle, la reprise du trafic aérien domestique, lundi, risque d’aggraver encore la situation. Les experts sont unanimes : le pic de la contagion est encore à venir. Malgré cette situation inquiétante, la popularité de M. Modi semble demeurer extrêmement élevée, en apparence. En avril, un sondage de l’institut Gallup a estimé que les Indiens étaient 91 % à être « satisfaits » de la façon dont leur gouvernement gère l’épidémie. Selon le site Indo-Asian News Service, la popularité du premier ministre serait passée en deux mois de 77 % à 93 %. « Ces scores sont exagérés. Les enquêtes d’opinion sont réalisées auprès de la classe moyenne en milieu urbain, on ne demande pas leur avis aux migrants qui ont perdu leur emploi et meurent de faim le long des routes », analyse Sanjay Kumar, directeur du Centre for the Study of Developing Societies de Delhi. Si le dirigeant nationaliste n’en demeure pas moins populaire, c’est qu’« à l’instigation du BJP, les médias répètent à longueur de temps que l’Inde est moins frappée que les pays riches comme les Etats-Unis ou la France », fait remarquer cet expert reconnu des sciences sociales.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#travailleurs-migrants#Inde#santé#mortalité#tests#islamophobie#nationalisme#stigmatisation#famine#pauvreté

  • S’il n’y avait qu’un seul article à lire pour apercevoir le monde qui vient et s’y préparer...

    Du Covid-19 à la crise de 2020 https://mensuel.lutte-ouvriere.org//2020/05/17/du-covid-19-la-crise-de-2020_147702.html

    Ce texte est daté du 8 mai 2020, mais seules les citations choisies dans la presse auraient pu être actualisées, pas le fond du constat. La crise sanitaire est loin d’être terminée, et l’économie et la société s’enfoncent de plus en plus dans la crise du capitalisme, avec toutes ses conséquences pour les classes laborieuses. L’humanité a largement les moyens scientifiques et techniques de maîtriser la pandémie, même si ceux qui font autorité en matière scientifique répètent qu’il faut du temps pour cela et qu’il faut « apprendre à vivre avec le coronavirus ». Mais la société est enfermée dans le carcan de l’organisation capitaliste, avec la propriété privée des moyens de production et des États nationaux rivaux, et dont les dégâts directs ou indirects sont incommensurablement plus grands que ceux dus au coronavirus...

    Lutte de Classe n°208 - juin 2020 :
    #pdf https://mensuel.lutte-ouvriere.org/sites/default/files/ldc/files/ldc208_0.pdf
    #epub https://mensuel.lutte-ouvriere.org/sites/default/files/ldc/files/ldc208_0.epub
    #mobi https://mensuel.lutte-ouvriere.org/sites/default/files/ldc/files/ldc208_0.mobi

    #capitalisme #crise #pandémie #coronavirus #covid_19 #impérialisme #crise_économique #étatisme #union_européenne #nationalisme #souverainisme #internationalisme #lutte_de_classe #réformisme #CFDT #CGT #révolution_sociale #dette #PCF #gafam #medef #bce #Deuxième_Guerre_mondiale #Etats_unis #chine #concurrence #concentration_du_capital #profit #loi_du_marché #allemagne #dépression #prolétariat #classe_ouvrière #afrique #famine #CNR #Conseil_national_de_la_résistance #Marx #Lénine #Trotsky

  • VIDEO. Une frégate saoudienne dont la maintenance est assurée par la #France participe bien au blocus du Yémen
    https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/proche-orient/yemen/video-une-fregate-saoudienne-entretenue-par-la-france-identifiee-au-lar

    Le Yémen est en proie à un conflit sanglant dans lequel des milliers de #civils sont morts au cours de frappes de missiles ou de faim. L’état de #famine est aggravé en partie par le #blocus naval imposé par la coalition internationale menée par l’#Arabie_saoudite.

    #crimes ##Yemen #victimes_civiles

  • Ethiopians Abused on Gulf Migration Route

    Ethiopians undertaking the perilous journey by boat across the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden face exploitation and torture in Yemen by a network of trafficking groups, Human Rights Watch said today. They also encounter abusive prison conditions in Saudi Arabia before being summarily forcibly deported back to Addis Ababa. Authorities in Ethiopia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia have taken few if any measures to curb the violence migrants face, to put in place asylum procedures, or to check abuses perpetrated by their own security forces.


    A combination of factors, including unemployment and other economic difficulties, drought, and human rights abuses have driven hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to migrate over the past decade, traveling by boat over the Red Sea and then by land through Yemen to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf states are favored destinations because of the availability of employment. Most travel irregularly and do not have legal status once they reach Saudi Arabia.

    “Many Ethiopians who hoped for a better life in Saudi Arabia face unspeakable dangers along the journey, including death at sea, torture, and all manners of abuses,” said Felix Horne, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Ethiopian government, with the support of its international partners, should support people who arrive back in Ethiopia with nothing but the clothes on their back and nowhere to turn for help.”

    Human Rights Watch interviewed 12 Ethiopians in Addis Ababa who had been deported from Saudi Arabia between December 2018 and May 2019. Human Rights Watch also interviewed humanitarian workers and diplomats working on Ethiopia migration-related issues.

    The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates as many as 500,000 Ethiopians were in Saudi Arabia when the Saudi government began a deportation campaign in November 2017. The Saudi authorities have arrested, prosecuted, or deported foreigners who violate labor or residency laws or those who crossed the border irregularly. About 260,000 Ethiopians, an average of 10,000 per month, were deported from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia between May 2017 and March 2019, according to the IOM, and deportations have continued.

    An August 2 Twitter update by Saudi Arabia’s Interior Ministry said that police had arrested 3.6 million people, including 2.8 million for violations of residency rules, 557,000 for labor law violations, and 237,000 for border violations. In addition, authorities detained 61,125 people for crossing the border into Saudi Arabia illegally, 51 percent of them Ethiopians, and referred more than 895,000 people for deportation. Apart from illegal border crossing, these figures are not disaggregated by nationality.

    Eleven of the 12 people interviewed who had been deported had engaged with smuggling and trafficking networks that are regionally linked across Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland state, the self-declared autonomous state of Somaliland, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Traffickers outside of Ethiopia, particularly in Yemen, often used violence or threats to extort ransom money from migrants’ family members or contacts, those interviewed told Human Rights Watch. The 12th person was working in Saudi Arabia legally but was deported after trying to help his sister when she arrived illegally.

    Those interviewed described life-threatening journeys as long as 24 hours across the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea to reach Yemen, in most cases in overcrowded boats, with no food or water, and prevented from moving around by armed smugglers.

    “There were 180 people on the boat, but 25 died,” one man said. “The boat was in trouble and the waves were hitting it. It was overloaded and about to sink so the dallalas [an adaptation of the Arabic word for “middleman” or “broker”] picked some out and threw them into the sea, around 25.”

    Interviewees said they were met and captured by traffickers upon arrival in Yemen. Five said the traffickers physically assaulted them to extort payments from family members or contacts in Ethiopia or Somalia. While camps where migrants were held capture were run by Yemenis, Ethiopians often carried out the abuse. In many cases, relatives said they sold assets such as homes or land to obtain the ransom money.

    After paying the traffickers or escaping, the migrants eventually made their way north to the Saudi-Yemen border, crossing in rural, mountainous areas. Interviewees said Saudi border guards fired at them, killing and injuring others crossing at the same time, and that they saw dead bodies along the crossing routes. Human Rights Watch has previously documented Saudi border guards shooting and killing migrants crossing the border.

    “At the border there are many bodies rotting, decomposing,” a 26-year-old man said: “It is like a graveyard.”

    Six interviewees said they were apprehended by Saudi border police, while five successfully crossed the border but were later arrested. They described abusive prison conditions in several facilities in southern Saudi Arabia, including inadequate food, toilet facilities, and medical care; lack of sanitation; overcrowding; and beatings by guards.

    Planes returning people deported from Saudi Arabia typically arrive in Addis Ababa either at the domestic terminal or the cargo terminal of Bole International Airport. Several humanitarian groups conduct an initial screening to identify the most vulnerable cases, with the rest left to their own devices. Aid workers in Ethiopia said that deportees often arrive with no belongings and no money for food, transportation, or shelter. Upon arrival, they are offered little assistance to help them deal with injuries or psychological trauma, or to support transportation to their home communities, in some cases hundreds of kilometers from Addis Ababa.

    Human Rights Watch learned that much of the migration funding from Ethiopia’s development partners is specifically earmarked to manage migration along the routes from the Horn of Africa to Europe and to assist Ethiopians being returned from Europe, with very little left to support returnees from Saudi Arabia.

    “Saudi Arabia has summarily returned hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to Addis Ababa who have little to show for their journey except debts and trauma,” Horne said. “Saudi Arabia should protect migrants on its territory and under its control from traffickers, ensure there is no collusion between its agents and these criminals, and provide them with the opportunity to legally challenge their detention and deportation.”

    All interviews were conducted in Amharic, Tigrayan, or Afan Oromo with translation into English. The interviewees were from the four regions of SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region), Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray. These regions have historically produced the bulk of Ethiopians migrating abroad. To protect interviewees from possible reprisals, pseudonyms are being used in place of their real names. Human Rights Watch wrote to the Ethiopian and Saudi governments seeking comment on abuses described by Ethiopian migrants along the Gulf migration route, but at the time of writing neither had responded.

    Dangerous Boat Journey

    Most of the 11 people interviewed who entered Saudi Arabia without documents described life-threatening boat journeys across the Red Sea from Djibouti, Somaliland, or Puntland to Yemen. They described severely overcrowded boats, beatings, and inadequate food or water on journeys that ranged from 4 to 24 hours. These problems were compounded by dangerous weather conditions or encounters with Saudi/Emirati-led coalition naval vessels patrolling the Yemeni coast.

    “Berhanu” said that Somali smugglers beat people on his boat crossing from Puntland: “They have a setup they use where they place people in spots by weight to keep the boat balanced. If you moved, they beat you.” He said that his trip was lengthened when smugglers were forced to turn the boat around after spotting a light from a naval vessel along the Yemeni coast and wait several hours for it to pass.

    Since March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia has led a coalition of countries in a military campaign against the Houthi armed group in Yemen. As part of its campaign the Saudi/Emirati-led coalition has imposed a naval blockade on Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports, purportedly to prevent Houthi rebels from importing weapons by sea, but which has also restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine to civilians in the country, and included attacks on civilians at sea. Human Rights Watch previously documented a helicopter attack in March 2017 by coalition forces on a boat carrying Somali migrants and refugees returning from Yemen, killing at least 32 of the 145 Somali migrants and refugees on board and one Yemeni civilian.

    Exploitation and Abuses in Yemen

    Once in war-torn Yemen, Ethiopian migrants said they faced kidnappings, beatings, and other abuses by traffickers trying to extort ransom money from them or their family members back home.

    This is not new. Human Rights Watch, in a 2014 report, documented abuses, including torture, of migrants in detention camps in Yemen run by traffickers attempting to extort payments. In 2018, Human Rights Watch documented how Yemeni guards tortured and raped Ethiopian and other Horn of Africa migrants at a detention center in Aden and worked in collaboration with smugglers to send them back to their countries of origin. Recent interviews by Human Rights Watch indicate that the war in Yemen has not significantly affected the abuses against Ethiopians migrating through Yemen to Saudi Arabia. If anything, the conflict, which escalated in 2015, has made the journey more dangerous for migrants who cross into an area of active fighting.

    Seven of the 11 irregular migrants interviewed said they faced detention and extortion by traffickers in Yemen. This occurred in many cases as soon as they reached shore, as smugglers on boats coordinated with the Yemeni traffickers. Migrants said that Yemeni smuggling and trafficking groups always included Ethiopians, often one from each of Oromo, Tigrayan, and Amhara ethnic groups, who generally were responsible for beating and torturing migrants to extort payments. Migrants were generally held in camps for days or weeks until they could provide ransom money, or escape. Ransom payments were usually made by bank transfers from relatives and contacts back in Ethiopia.

    “Abebe” described his experience:

    When we landed… [the traffickers] took us to a place off the road with a tent. Everyone there was armed with guns and they threw us around like garbage. The traffickers were one Yemeni and three Ethiopians – one Tigrayan, one Amhara, and one Oromo…. They started to beat us after we refused to pay, then we had to call our families…. My sister [in Ethiopia] has a house, and the traffickers called her, and they fired a bullet near me that she could hear. They sold the house and sent the money [40,000 Birr, US $1,396].

    “Tesfalem”, said that he was beaten by Yemenis and Ethiopians at a camp he believes was near the port city of Aden:

    They demanded money, but I said I don’t have any. They told me to make a call, but I said I don’t have relatives. They beat me and hung me on the wall by one hand while standing on a chair, then they kicked the chair away and I was swinging by my arm. They beat me on my head with a stick and it was swollen and bled.

    He escaped after three months, was detained in another camp for three months more, and finally escaped again.

    “Biniam” said the men would take turns beating the captured migrants: “The [Ethiopian] who speaks your language beats you, those doing the beating were all Ethiopians. We didn’t think of fighting back against them because we were so tired, and they would kill you if you tried.”

    Two people said that when they landed, the traffickers offered them the opportunity to pay immediately to travel by car to the Saudi border, thereby avoiding the detention camps. One of them, “Getachew,” said that he paid 1,500 Birr (US $52) for the car and escaped mistreatment.

    Others avoided capture when they landed, but then faced the difficult 500 kilometer journey on foot with few resources while trying to avoid capture.

    Dangers faced by Yemeni migrants traveling north were compounded for those who ran into areas of active fighting between Houthi forces and groups aligned with the Saudi/Emirati-led coalition. Two migrants said that their journey was delayed, one by a week, the other by two months, to avoid conflict areas.

    Migrants had no recourse to local authorities and did not report abuses or seek assistance from them. Forces aligned with the Yemeni government and the Houthis have also detained migrants in poor conditions, refused access to protection and asylum procedures, deported migrants en masse in dangerous conditions, and exposed them to abuse. In April 2018, Human Rights Watch reported that Yemeni government officials had tortured, raped, and executed migrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa in a detention center in the southern port city of Aden. The detention center was later shut down.

    The International Organization for Migration (IOM) announced in May that it had initiated a program of voluntary humanitarian returns for irregular Ethiopian migrants held by Yemeni authorities at detention sites in southern Yemen. IOM said that about 5,000 migrants at three sites were held in “unsustainable conditions,” and that the flights from Aden to Ethiopia had stalled because the Saudi/Emirati-led coalition had failed to provide the flights the necessary clearances. The coalition controls Yemen’s airspace.

    Crossing the Border; Abusive Detention inside Saudi Arabia

    Migrants faced new challenges attempting to cross the Saudi-Yemen border. The people interviewed said that the crossing points used by smugglers are in rural, mountainous areas where the border separates Yemen’s Saada Governorate and Saudi Arabia’s Jizan Province. Two said that smugglers separated Ethiopians by their ethnic group and assigned different groups to cross at different border points.

    Ethiopian migrants interviewed were not all able to identify the locations where they crossed. Most indicated points near the Yemeni mountain villages Souq al-Ragu and ‘Izlat Al Thabit, which they called Ragu and Al Thabit. Saudi-aligned media have regularly characterized Souq al-Ragu as a dangerous town from which drug smugglers and irregular migrants cross into Saudi Arabia.

    Migrants recounted pressures to pay for the crossing by smuggling drugs into Saudi Arabia. “Abdi” said he stayed in Souq al-Ragu for 15 days and finally agreed to carry across a 25 kilogram sack of khat in exchange for 500 Saudi Riyals (US$133). Khat is a mild stimulant grown in the Ethiopian highlands and Yemen; it is popular among Yemenis and Saudis, but illegal in Saudi Arabia.

    “Badessa” described Souq al-Ragu as “the crime city:”

    You don’t know who is a trafficker, who is a drug person, but everybody has an angle of some sort. Even Yemenis are afraid of the place, it is run by Ethiopians. It is also a burial place; bodies are gathered of people who had been shot along the border and then they’re buried there. There is no police presence.

    Four of the eleven migrants who crossed the border on foot said Saudi border guards shot at them during their crossings, sometimes after ordering them to stop and other times without warning. Some said they encountered dead bodies along the way. Six said they were apprehended by Saudi border guards or drug police at the border, while five were arrested later.

    “Abebe” said that Saudi border guards shot at his group as they crossed from Izlat Al Thabit:

    They fired bullets, and everyone scattered. People fleeing were shot, my friend was shot in the leg…. One person was shot in the chest and killed and [the Saudi border guards] made us carry him to a place where there was a big excavator. They didn’t let us bury him; the excavator dug a hole and they buried him.

    Berhanu described the scene in the border area: “There were many dead people at the border. You could walk on the corpses. No one comes to bury them.”

    Getachew added: “It is like a graveyard. There are no dogs or hyenas there to eat the bodies, just dead bodies everywhere.”

    Two of the five interviewees who crossed the border without being detained said that Saudi and Ethiopian smugglers and traffickers took them to informal detention camps in southern Saudi towns and held them for ransom. “Yonas” said they took him and 14 others to a camp in the Fayfa area of Jizan Province: “They beat me daily until I called my family. They wanted 10,000 Birr ($349). My father sold his farmland and sent the 10,000 Birr, but then they told me this isn’t enough, we need 20,000 ($698). I had nothing left and decided to escape or die.” He escaped.

    Following their capture, the migrants described abusive conditions in Saudi governmental detention centers and prisons, including overcrowding and inadequate food, water, and medical care. Migrants also described beatings by Saudi guards.

    Nine migrants who were captured while crossing the border illegally or living in Saudi Arabia without documentation spent up to five months in detention before authorities deported them back to Ethiopia. The three others were convicted of criminal offenses that included human trafficking and drug smuggling, resulting in longer periods in detention before being deported.

    The migrants identified about 10 prisons and detention centers where they were held for various periods. The most frequently cited were a center near the town of al-Dayer in Jizan Province along the border, Jizan Central Prison in Jizan city, and the Shmeisi Detention Center east of Jeddah, where migrants are processed for deportation.

    Al-Dayer had the worst conditions, they said, citing overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, food and water, and medical care. Yonas said:

    They tied our feet with chains and they beat us while chained, sometimes you can’t get to the food because you are chained. If you get chained by the toilet it will overflow and flow under you. If you are aggressive you get chained by the toilet. If you are good [behave well], they chain you to another person and you can move around.

    Abraham had a similar description:

    The people there beat us. Ethnic groups [from Ethiopia] fought with each other. The toilet was overflowing. It was like a graveyard and not a place to live. Urine was everywhere and people were defecating. The smell was terrible.

    Other migrants described similarly bad conditions in Jizan Central Prison. “Ibrahim” said that he was a legal migrant working in Saudi Arabia, but that he travelled to Jizan to help his sister, whom Saudi authorities had detained after she crossed from Yemen illegally. Once in Jizan, authorities suspected him of human trafficking and arrested him, put him on trial, and sentenced him to two years in prison, a sentenced he partially served in Jizan Central Prison:

    Jizan prison is so very tough…. You can be sleeping with [beside] someone who has tuberculosis, and if you ask an official to move you, they don’t care. They will beat you. You can’t change clothes, you have one set and that is it, sometimes the guards will illegally bring clothes and sell to you at night.

    He also complained of overcrowding: “When you want to sleep you tell people and they all jostle to make some room, then you sleep for a bit but you wake up because everyone is jostling against each other.”

    Most of the migrants said food was inadequate. Yonas described the situation in al-Dayer: “When they gave food 10 people would gather and fight over it. If you don’t have energy you won’t eat. The fight is over rice and bread.”

    Detainees also said medical care was inadequate and that detainees with symptoms of tuberculosis (such as cough, fever, night sweats, or weight loss) were not isolated from other prisoners. Human Rights Watch interviewed three former detainees who were being treated for tuberculosis after being deported, two of whom said they were held with other detainees despite having symptoms of active tuberculosis.

    Detainees described being beaten by Saudi prison guards when they requested medical care. Abdi said:

    I was beaten once with a stick in Jizan that was like a piece of rebar covered in plastic. I was sick in prison and I used to vomit. They said, ‘why do you do that when people are eating?’ and then they beat me harshly and I told him [the guard], ‘Please kill me.’ He eventually stopped.

    Ibrahim said he was also beaten when he requested medical care for tuberculosis:

    [Prison guards] have a rule that you aren’t supposed to knock on the door [and disturb the guards]. When I got sick in the first six months and asked to go to the clinic, they just beat me with electric wires on the bottom of my feet. I kept asking so they kept beating.

    Detainees said that the other primary impetus for beatings by guards was fighting between different ethnic groups of Ethiopians in detention, largely between ethnic Oromos, Amharas, and Tigrayans. Ethnic tensions are increasingly common back in Ethiopia.

    Detainees said that conditions generally improved once they were transferred to Shmeisi Detention Center, near Jeddah, where they stayed only a few days before receiving temporary travel documents from Ethiopian consular authorities and deported to Ethiopia. The migrants charged with and convicted of crimes had no opportunity to consult legal counsel.

    None of the migrants said they were given the opportunity to legally challenge their deportations, and Saudi Arabia has not established an asylum system under which migrants could apply for protection from deportation where there was a risk of persecution if they were sent back. Saudi Arabia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

    Deportation and Future Prospects

    Humanitarian workers and diplomats told Human Rights Watch that since the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s deportation campaign, large numbers of Ethiopian deportees have been transported via special flights by Saudia Airlines to Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa and unloaded in a cargo area away from the main international terminal or at the domestic terminal. When Human Rights Watch visited in May, it appeared that the Saudi flights were suspended during the month of Ramadan, during which strict sunrise-to-sunset fasting is observed by Muslims. All interviewees who were deported in May said they had returned on regular Ethiopian Airlines commercial flights and disembarked at the main terminal with other passengers.

    All of those deported said that they returned to Ethiopia with nothing but the clothes they were wearing, and that Saudi authorities had confiscated their mobile phones and in some cases shoes and belts. “After staying in Jeddah … they had us make a line and take off our shoes,” Abraham said. “Anything that could tie like a belt we had to leave, they wouldn’t let us take it. We were barefoot when we went to the airport.”

    Deportees often have critical needs for assistance, including medical care, some for gunshot wounds. One returnee recovering from tuberculosis said that he did not have enough money to buy food and was going hungry. Abdi said that when he left for Saudi Arabia he weighed 64 kilograms but returned weighing only 47 or 48 kilograms.

    Aid workers and diplomats familiar with migration issues in Ethiopia said that very little international assistance is earmarked for helping deportees from Saudi Arabia for medical care and shelter or money to return and reintegrate in their home villages.

    Over 8 million people are in need of food assistance in Ethiopia, a country of over 100 million. It hosts over 920,000 refugees from neighboring countries and violence along ethnic lines produced over 2.4 internally displaced people in 2018, many of whom have now been returned.

    The IOM registers migrants upon arrival in Ethiopia and to facilitate their return from Saudi Arabia. Several hours after their arrival and once registered, they leave the airport and must fend for themselves. Some said they had never been to Addis before.

    In 2013 and 2014, Saudi Arabia conducted an expulsion campaign similar to the one that began in November 2017. The earlier campaign expelled about 163,000 Ethiopians, according to the IOM. A 2015 Human Rights Watch report found that migrants experienced serious abuses during detention and deportation, including attacks by security forces and private citizens in Saudi Arabia, and inadequate and abusive detention conditions. Human Rights Watch has also previously documented mistreatment of Ethiopian migrants by traffickers and government detention centers in Yemen.

    Aid workers and diplomats said that inadequate funding to assist returning migrants is as a result of several factors, including a focus of many of the European funders on stemming migration to and facilitating returns from Europe, along with competing priorities and the low visibility of the issue compared with migration to Europe.

    During previous mass returns from Saudi Arabia, there was more funding for reintegration and more international media attention in part because there was such a large influx in a short time, aid workers said.

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/15/ethiopians-abused-gulf-migration-route
    #migrations #asile #violence #réfugiés #réfugiés_éthiopiens #Ethiopie #pays_du_Golfe #route_du_Golfe #mer_Rouge #Golfe_d'Aden #Yémen #Arabie_Saoudite #frontières #violent_borders #torture #trafic_d'êtres_humains #exploitation #routes_migratoires

    signalé par @isskein

    • Migrants endure sea crossing to Yemen and disembark in hell

      Zahra struggled in the blue waters of the Gulf of Aden, grasping for the hands of fellow migrants.

      Hundreds of men, women and teenagers clambered out of a boat and through the surf emerging, exhausted, on the shores of Yemen.

      The 20-year-old Ethiopian saw men armed with automatic rifles waiting for them on the beach and she clenched in terror. She had heard migrants’ stories of brutal traffickers, lurking like monsters in a nightmare. They are known by the Arabic nickname Abdul-Qawi — which means Worshipper of the Strong.

      “What will they do to us?” Zahra thought.

      She and 300 other Africans had just endured six hours crammed in a wooden smuggling boat to cross the narrow strait between the Red Sea and the gulf. When they landed, the traffickers loaded them into trucks and drove them to ramshackle compounds in the desert outside the coastal village of Ras al-Ara.

      There was Zahra’s answer. She was imprisoned for a month in a tin-roofed hut, broiling and hungry, ordered to call home each day to beseech her family to wire $2,000. She said she did not have family to ask for money and pleaded for her freedom.
      Instead, her captors raped her. And they raped the 20 other women with her — for weeks, different men all the time.

      “They used each of the girls,” she told The Associated Press. “Every night there was rape.”

      With its systematic torture, Ras al-Ara is a particular hell on the arduous, 900-mile (1,400 kilometer) journey from the Horn of Africa to oil-rich Saudi Arabia. Migrants leave home on sandaled feet with dreams of escaping poverty. They trek through mountains and deserts, sandstorms and 113-degree temperatures, surviving on crumbs of bread and salty water from ancient wells.

      In Djibouti, long lines of migrants descend single file down mountain slopes to the rocky coastal plain, where many lay eyes on the sea for first time and eventually board the boats. Some find their way safely across war-torn Yemen to Saudi Arabia, only to be caught and tossed back over the border. The lucky ones make it into the kingdom to earn their livings as a servant and laborers.


      But others are stranded in Yemen’s nightmare — in some measure because Europe has been shutting its doors, outsourcing migrants to other countries.

      The European Union began paying Libyan coast guards and militias to stop migrants there, blocking the other main route out of East Africa, through Libya and across the Mediterranean to Europe. The number of Mediterranean crossings plummeted — from 370,000 in 2016 to just over 56,000 so far this year.

      Meanwhile, more than 150,000 migrants landed in Yemen in 2018, a 50% increase from the year before, according to the International Organization for Migration.

      This year, more than 107,000 had arrived by the end of September, along with perhaps tens of thousands more the organization was unable to track — or who were buried in graves along the trail.

      And European policies may be making the Yemen route more dangerous. Funded by the EU, Ethiopia has cracked down on migrant smugglers and intensified border controls. Arrests of known brokers have prompted migrants to turn to unreliable traffickers, taking more dangerous paths and increasing the risk of abuses.

      Many of those migrants end up in Ras al-Ara.

      Nearly every migrant who lands here is imprisoned in hidden compounds while their families are shaken down for money. Like Zahra, they are subjected to daily torments ranging from beatings and rapes to starvation, their screams drowned out by the noise of generators or cars or simply lost in the desert.
      “Out of every thousand, 800 disappear in the lockups,” said a humanitarian worker monitoring the flow of migrants.

      Traffickers who torture are a mix of Yemenis and Ethiopians of different ethnic groups. So victims cannot appeal to tribal loyalties, they are tortured by men from other groups: If the migrants are Oromia, the torturers are Tigrinya.

      At the same time, because the three main ethnic groups don’t speak each others’ languages, Yemeni smugglers need translators to convey orders to the migrants and monitor their phone conversations with their families.

      The AP spoke to more than two dozen Ethiopians who survived torture at Ras al-Ara. Nearly all of them reported witnessing deaths, and one man died of starvation hours after the AP saw him.
      The imprisonment and torture are largely ignored by Yemeni authorities.

      The AP saw trucks full of migrants passing unhindered through military checkpoints as they went from the beaches to drop their human cargo at each desert compound, known in Arabic as a “hosh.”

      “The traffickers move freely, in public, giving bribes at the checkpoints,” said Mohammed Said, a former coast guard officer who now runs a gas station in the center of town.

      From Ras al-Ara, it’s nearly 50 miles in any direction to the next town. Around 8,000 families live in a collection of decaying, one-story stone houses beside dirt roads, a lone hotel and two eateries. The fish market is the center of activity when the daily catch is brought in.

      Nearly the entire population profits from the human trade. Some rent land to traffickers for the holding cells, or work as guards, drivers or translators. For others, traffickers flush with cash are a lucrative market for their food, fuel or the mildly stimulant leaves of qat, which Yemenis and Ethiopians chew daily.

      Locals can rattle off the traffickers’ names. One of them, a Yemeni named Mohammed al-Usili, runs more than 20 hosh. He’s famous for the red Nissan SUV he drives through town.

      Others belong to Sabaha, one of the biggest tribes in southern Yemen, some of whom are famous for their involvement in illicit businesses. Yemenis call the Sabaha “bandits” who have no political loyalties to any of the warring parties.
      Many traffickers speak openly of their activities, but deny they torture, blaming others.

      Yemeni smuggler Ali Hawash was a farmer who went into the human smuggling business a year ago. He disparaged smugglers who prey on poor migrants, torturing them and holding them hostage until relatives pay ransom.

      “I thought we need to have a different way,” he said, “I will help you go to Saudi, you just pay the transit and the transportation. Deal.”

      The flow of migrants to the beach is unending. On a single day, July 24, the AP witnessed seven boats pull into Ras al-Ara, one after the other, starting at 3 a.m., each carrying more than 100 people.

      The migrants climbed out of the boats into the turquoise water. One young man collapsed on the beach, his feet swollen. A woman stepped on something sharp in the water and fell screeching in pain. Others washed their clothes in the waves to get out the vomit, urine and feces from the rugged journey.

      The migrants were lined up and loaded onto trucks. They gripped the iron bars in the truck bed as they were driven along the highway. At each compound, the truck unloaded a group of migrants, like a school bus dropping off students. The migrants disappeared inside.

      From time to time, Ethiopians escape their imprisonment or are released and stagger out of the desert into town.
      Eman Idrees, 27, and her husband were held for eight months by an Ethiopian smuggler.

      She recalled the savage beatings they endured, which left a scar on her shoulder; the smuggler received $700 to take her to Saudi Arabia, but wouldn’t let her go, because “he wanted me.”

      Said, the gas station owner, is horrified by the evidence of torture he has seen, so he has made his station and a nearby mosque into a refuge for migrants. But locals say Said, too, profits from the trafficking, selling fuel for the smugglers’ boats and trucks. But that means the traffickers need him and leave him alone.

      On a day when the AP team was visiting, several young men just out of a compound arrived at the gas station. They showed deep gashes in their arms from ropes that had bound them. One who had bruises from being lashed with a cable said the women imprisoned with him were all raped and that three men had died.

      Another, Ibrahim Hassan, trembled as he showed how he was tied up in a ball, arms behind his back, knees bound against his chest. The 24-year-old said he was bound like that for 11 days and frequently beaten. His torturer, he said, was a fellow Ethiopian but from a rival ethnic group, Tigray, while he is Oromo.

      Hassan said he was freed after his father went door to door in their hometown to borrow money and gather the $2,600 that the smugglers demanded.
      “My family is extremely poor,” Hassan said, breaking down in tears. “My father is a farmer and I have five siblings.”

      Starvation is another punishment used by the traffickers to wear down their victims.

      At Ras al-Ara hospital, four men who looked like living skeletons sat on the floor, picking rice from a bowl with their thin fingers. Their bones protruded from their backs, their rib cages stood out sharply. With no fat on their bodies, they sat on rolled-up cloth because it was too painful to sit directly on bone. They had been imprisoned by traffickers for months, fed once a day with scraps of bread and a sip of water, they said.

      One of them, 23-year-old Abdu Yassin, said he had agreed with smugglers in Ethiopia to pay around $600 for the trip through Yemen to the Saudi border. But when he landed at Ras al-Ara, he was brought to a compound with 71 others, and the traffickers demanded $1,600.

      He cried as he described how he was held for five months and beaten constantly in different positions. He showed the marks from lashings on his back, the scars on his legs where they pressed hot steel into his skin. His finger was crooked after they smashed it with a rock, he said. One day, they tied his legs and dangled him upside down, “like a slaughtered sheep.”
      But the worst was starvation.

      “From hunger, my knees can’t carry my body,” he said. “I haven’t changed my clothes for six months. I haven’t washed. I have nothing.”

      Near the four men, another emaciated man lay on a gurney, his stomach concave, his eyes open but unseeing. Nurses gave him fluids but he died several hours later.

      The torment that leaves the young men and women physically and mentally shattered also leaves them stranded.

      Zahra said she traveled to Yemen “because I wanted to change my life.”

      She came from a broken home. She was a child when her parents divorced. Her mother disappeared, and her father — an engineer — remarried and wanted little to do with Zahra or her sisters. Zahra dropped out of school after the third grade. She worked for years in Djibouti as a servant, sending most of her earnings to her youngest sister back in Ethiopia.

      Unable to save any money, she decided to try her luck elsewhere.

      She spoke in a quiet voice as she described the torments she suffered at the compound.

      “I couldn’t sleep at all throughout these days,” as she suffered from headaches, she said.

      She and the other women were locked in three rooms of the hut, sleeping on the dirt floor, suffocating in the summer heat. They were constantly famished. Zahra suffered from rashes, diarrhea and vomiting.

      One group tried to flee when they were allowed to wash at a well outside. The traffickers used dogs to hunt them down, brought them back and beat them.
      “You can’t imagine,” Zahra said. “We could hear the screams.” After that, they could only wash at gunpoint.

      Finally, early one morning, their captors opened the gates and told Zahra and some of the other women to leave. Apparently, the traffickers gave up on getting money out of them and wanted to make room for others.

      Now Zahra lives in Basateen, a slum on the outskirts of southern Yemen’s main city, Aden, where she shares a room with three other women who also were tortured. .

      Among them is a 17-year-old who fidgets with her hands and avoiding eye contact. She said she had been raped more times than she can count.

      The first time was during the boat crossing from Djibouti, where she was packed in with more than 150 other migrants. Fearing the smugglers, no one dared raise a word of protest as the captain and his crew raped her and the other nine women on board during the eight-hour journey.
      “I am speechless about what happened in the boat,” the 17-year-old said.

      Upon landing, she and the others were taken to a compound, where again she was raped — every day for the next two weeks.

      “We lived 15 days in pain,” she said.

      Zahra said she’s worried she could be pregnant, and the 17-year old said she has pains in her abdomen and back she believes were caused by the rapes — but neither has money to go to a doctor.

      Nor do they have money to continue their travels.

      “I have nothing but the clothes on me,” the 17-year old said. She lost everything, including her only photos of her family.

      Now, she is too afraid to even leave her room in Basateen.
      “If we get out of here,” she said, “we don’t know what would happen to us.”

      Basateen is filled with migrants living in squalid shacks. Some work, trying to earn enough to continue their journey.

      Others, like Abdul-Rahman Taha, languish without hope.

      The son of a dirt-poor farmer, Taha had heard stories of Ethiopians returning from Saudi Arabia with enough money to buy a car or build a house. So he sneaked away from home and began walking. When he reached Djibouti, he called home asking for $400 for smugglers to arrange his trip across Yemen. His father was angry but sold a bull and some goats and sent the money.

      When Taha landed at Ras al-Ara, traffickers took him and 50 other migrants to a holding cell, lined them up and demanded phone numbers. Taha couldn’t ask his father for more money so he told them he didn’t have a number. Over the next days and weeks, he was beaten and left without food and water.

      One night, he gave them a wrong number. The traffickers flew into a rage. One, a beefy, bearded Yemeni, beat Taha’s right leg to a bloody pulp with a steel rod. Taha passed out.

      When he opened his eyes, he saw the sky. He was outdoors, lying on the ground. The traffickers had dumped him and three other migrants in the desert. Taha tried to jostle the others, but they didn’t move — they were dead.
      A passing driver took him to a hospital. There, his leg was amputated.

      Now 17, Taha is stranded. His father died in a car crash a few months ago, leaving Taha’s sister and four younger brothers to fend for themselves back home.

      Taha choked back tears. In one of their phone calls, he remembered, his father had asked him: “Why did you leave?”

      “Without work or money,” Taha told him, “life is unbearable.”

      And so it is still.

      https://apimagesblog.com/blog/migrants-endure-sea-crossing-to-yemen-and-disembark-in-hell
      #réfugiés_éthiopiens #famine #mourir_de_faim #Oromo

    • Sbarcare all’inferno. Per i migranti diretti in Europa la tappa in Yemen vuol dire stupro e tortura

      Il durissimo reportage fotografico di Associated Press in viaggio con i migranti etiopi lungo la rotta che dal Corno d’Africa porta verso la penisola arabica racconta l’orrore perpetrato negli ’#hosh' di #Ras al-Ara che la comunità internazionale non vuole vedere. Le terribili storie di Zahra, Ibrahim, Abdul e gli altri.


      http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/media/Sbarcare-all-inferno-Per-i-migranti-diretti-in-Europa-la-tappa-in-Yemen-vuol
      #viol #viols #torture #violences_sexuelles #photographie

  • #Africa_Rising documentary

    From Clover films and film maker #Jamie_Doran, comes a documentary examining the failure of western policies towards Africa and rethinking the role of western aid workers on the continent.

    Narrated by Tilda Swinton, Africa Rising takes a look at the benefits of ’Self Help’ in Ethiopia, a country potentially rich in resources, looking to find its own way out of poverty.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYS7T9UMrsA


    #film #documentaire #Afrique #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Ethiopie #self-help #pauvreté #Afrique #famine #sécheresse #monoculture #agriculture #seasonal_hunger #malnutrition #cash_crops #semences #femmes #genre #micro-crédit #Sodo_region #syndrome_de_la_dépendance #dépendance_de_l'aide_internationale #santé #self-aid #désertification #self-help_Sodo #coopérative #coopérative_agricole #éducation

  • Le Zimbabwe au bord de la famine, l’ONU et le PAM tirent la sonnette d’alarme - RFI
    http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190808-zimbabwe-famine-onu-pam-sonnette-alarme?ref=tw

    Anciennement considéré comme le grenier à céréales de l’Afrique australe, le #Zimbabwe est aujourd’hui dans une situation d’#urgence_alimentaire absolue.

    La faute d’abord à une crise économique majeure qui touche le pays depuis une vingtaine d’années. Celle-ci s’est traduite par des #pénuries de denrées de première nécessité comme le pain, l’huile ou encore la farine. Mais la rareté de ces denrées a une autre conséquence : l’augmentation de leurs tarifs. Avec l’inflation, certains aliments ont vu leur prix doubler, voire tripler. Ils sont donc moins accessibles notamment pour les plus pauvres.

    #faim #famine #climat

  • Je pense que la phrase, niveau café-du-commerce-de-droite, que j’ai la plus entendue, et ça depuis que je suis gamin, c’est : « Le problème, en France, c’est qu’on n’y aime pas les riches ». Un temps, ça c’est vaguement affiné pour devenir « c’est qu’on n’y aime pas ceux qui réussissent ». Le moindre crétin de droite, avec un verre dans le pif, va te la sortir (et comme tu sais, ça sert de fondement philosophique à la longue complainte, qui va suivre, sur les impôts).

    Et donc on avait bien besoin du quotidien de révérence pour aborder ce sujet tabou : Les riches, ces mal-aimés
    https://www.lemonde.fr/m-perso/article/2019/04/19/les-riches-ces-mal-aimes_5452586_4497916.html

    On les jalouse, on les envie, surtout on ne les aime pas. Même quand ils donnent leur argent pour la bonne cause. L’historien allemand Rainer Zitelmann a étudié dans plusieurs pays, dont la France, les mécanismes de cette détestation.

  • En #Corée du Nord, les pires récoltes agricoles en plus de dix ans
    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/03/06/en-coree-du-nord-les-pires-recoltes-agricoles-en-plus-de-dix-ans_5431911_321

    Les récoltes de l’an passé se sont élevées à 4,95 millions de tonnes, en baisse de 500 000 tonnes, indiquent mercredi 6 mars les Nations unies dans leur rapport sur les « Besoins et priorités » de 2019. […] Le résultat est que 10,9 millions de personnes en Corée du Nord, soit 43 % de la population totale, ont besoin d’une #aide_humanitaire, soit 600 000 de plus que l’an passé, d’où un risque accru de malnutrition et de maladies. Mais alors que le nombre de personnes ayant besoin d’aide augmente, l’ONU a dû réduire son objectif de personnes à aider de six à 3,8 millions, car l’organisation cherche à toucher les personnes les plus dans le besoin.

    #agriculture #disette