• Interior expulsa a otros 36 malienses a Mauritania desde Canarias

    Un nuevo vuelo de #Frontex partió desde Tenerife Norte el pasado 17 de febrero con 51 personas a bordo, de las cuales ninguna era mauritana.

    El Ministerio del Interior continúa expulsando a migrantes desde Canarias hacia un país que no es el suyo. El pasado lunes 17 de febrero febrero, un nuevo vuelo de la Agencia Europea de Fronteras (Frontex), el tercero en lo que va de año, partió desde el aeropuerto de Tenerife Norte hacia Mauritania con 51 personas a bordo. Tal y como ha reconocido el Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención de la Tortura, ninguna de ellas tenía nacionalidad mauritana. En concreto, la mayoría de ellas procedía de Malí (36), 13 eran senegalesas, una de Gabón y otra de Costa de Marfil.

    Durante el operativo de deportación los técnicos examinaron las condiciones del embarque, la documentación relativa a las devoluciones y, además, se realizaron tres entrevistas durante el vuelo. No ha sido hasta este miércoles 19 cuando se han notificado en el Defensor del Pueblo los detalles de la deportación, a pesar de que Televisión Española ya había adelantado este martes que un vuelo de Frontex con medio centenar de migrantes había salido desde Tenerife.

    A pesar de las denuncias sociales que han recibido estas expulsiones ejecutadas por el Gobierno de España, ya son 139 los migrantes deportados por el Ejecutivo, aprovechando el acuerdo bilateral que firmó en 2003 con Mauritania. De esta cifra, 106 son malienses, de los cuales al menos 14 expresaron su voluntad de solicitar protección internacional por la situación de conflicto que atraviesa su país de origen, donde, según Acnur, a diario se detectan secuestros, ataques a escuelas y hospitales, asesinatos, vulnerabilidad infantil y agresiones sexuales. Aún así, este grupo fue internado en el CIE de Hoya Fría y enviado a Mauritania el 20 de enero.

    Interior justifica estas devoluciones asegurando que el acuerdo con Mauritania se aplica también a quienes, a pesar de no tener nacionalidad mauritana, hayan pisado el país durante su itinerario. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con los autos de internamiento a los que tuvo acceso Canarias Ahora, estas 14 personas coincidieron en que habían partido desde Senegal hacia el Archipiélago de forma directa.

    Distintas ONG como la Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado (CEAR) o el Servicio Jesuíta a Migrantes así como la Unión Progresista de Fiscales han denunciado estas expulsiones exprés. Además, CEAR ha asegurado que, una vez en manos de las autoridades mauritanas, los malienses son trasladados hasta la frontera con Malí, quedando de nuevo expuestos ante la guerra.

    https://www.eldiario.es/canariasahora/365diasmigraciones/Interior-expulsa-malienses-Mauritania-Canarias_6_997460253.html

    #expulsions_sud-sud #asile #migrations #réfugiés #expulsions #renvois #déportation #réfugiés_maliens #Mauritanie #Espagne #Canaries #îles_canaries

    ping @karine

  • « Lesbos, la honte de l’Europe » : l’UE face aux camps des îles grecques
    Jean Ziegler s’est rendu à Lesbos en mai 2019 et il en a fait un livre sur ce qu’il nomme « la honte de l’Europe ». Un texte court en forme d’indignation contre les campements insalubres des cinq îles de la mer Egée où s’entassent aujourd’hui plus de 40 000 demandeurs d’asile, la plupart originaire d’Afghanistan, de Syrie, d’Irak, d’Iran et du Soudan.

    Lorsqu’ils ont été mis sur pied, à partir de la fin 2015, les « hot spots » devaient permettre de confiner les gens afin d’examiner rapidement leur demande d’asile. Ils devaient être associés, notamment, à un mécanisme de relocalisation des réfugiés dans les autres Etats d’Europe, mécanisme qui, pour des raisons techniques autant que politiques, n’a pas été respecté.

    Le camp de Moria, sur l’île de Lesbos, est aujourd’hui le plus grand camp d’Europe et le symbole de l’échec de cette solidarité. Conseiller du Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations unies, Jean Ziegler semble avoir écrit dans l’emportement qui l’a saisi lorsqu’il s’y est déplacé.

    « Stratégie précise de la dissuasion et de la terreur »
    Il décrit l’attente des gens, des années durant, au milieu des rats, des immondices. Il rappelle que « plus de 35 % des réfugiés emprisonnés » sont des enfants et que les tentatives de suicide ne les épargnent pas. « Alors que j’exerçais comme rapporteur spécial des Nations unies pour le droit à l’alimentation, j’ai parcouru la Rocinha, la plus grande favela de Rio de Janeiro, les slums des Smokey Mountains de Manille et les puantes shantytowns de Dacca, au Bangladesh. Mais jamais je n’ai été confronté à des habitations aussi sordides, à des familles aussi désespérées que dans les Oliveraies de Moria », constate M. Ziegler.

    Il fustige les « fonctionnaires de l’UE qui font la loi » et qui ont créé ces lieux, au service d’une « stratégie précise de la dissuasion et de la terreur » vis-à-vis des migrants en quête d’Europe. L’auteur va jusqu’à comparer ces centres au ghetto de Varsovie, dans l’effroi qu’ils suscitent et parce que, écrit-il, comme d’autres ont pu le ressentir par le passé, « j’avais contribué à la conspiration du silence qui rend possible ces abominations ». Il épingle sans le ménager le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies pour les réfugiés, Filippo Grandi, coupable à ses yeux de ne pas affronter la bureaucratie bruxelloise.

    Mots durs, violents, accusatoires
    Mais son courroux le plus violent s’abat sur l’Union européenne qui, écrit-il, coordonne et ordonne les refoulements illégaux et violents de migrants lorsqu’ils tentent de traverser les 7 kilomètres qui séparent la Turquie du rivage européen, à bord de canots pneumatiques et au péril de leur vie. Ils citent les cas de « policiers de Frontex [qui] remettent aux gardes turcs les embarcations surchargées de passagers paniqués » mais aussi le « financement massif de la marine de guerre turque ».

    Au-delà du cas grec, M. Ziegler décrie plus généralement l’explosion des fonds européens alloués à la surveillance des frontières et à l’acquisition toujours plus nombreuse de satellites géostationnaires, radars et autres scanners aux rayons X au frais du contribuable.

    Les mots de Jean Ziegler sont durs, violents, accusatoires. Face à la tragédie en cours sur les îles grecques, en fallait-il moins ?

    Lesbos, la honte de l’Europe, de Jean Ziegler, éd. Seuil, 144 p., 14 euros.

    Julia Pascual

    https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/01/28/lesbos-la-honte-de-l-europe-l-ue-face-aux-camps-des-iles-grecques_6027460_32

    #camps #lesbos #ghetto #UE #Europe #Grèce #frontex

  • Un tiers des rapatriements par Frontex provenait de la Belgique en 2019

    Environ un tiers de l’ensemble des rapatriements via Frontex provenait de Belgique.

    De tous les pays membres de l’Union européenne, la Belgique est celui qui a fait le plus appel l’an dernier au soutien de l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes Frontex pour renvoyer dans leur pays d’origine des personnes en séjour illégal, ressort-il de chiffres livrés mercredi par le cabinet de la ministre en charge de l’Asile et de la Migration, Maggie De Block (Open Vld).

    Selon le cabinet de la ministre libérale flamande, en 2019, la Belgique a pu compter sur environ 2,5 millions d’euros de l’Union européenne pour les vols de 1.540 personnes qui devaient quitter le territoire. 233 ont été accompagnées jusqu’à leur pays d’origine et 1.279 ont pu monter à bord sans escorte. 28 sont parties volontairement. L’an dernier, Frontex a été utilisé dans le cadre du #retour_volontaire, tant en Belgique que dans l’Union européenne.

    Retour forcé, la clé de voûte

    « Le #retour_forcé reste la clé de voûte de notre politique de l’asile et de la migration ferme et humaine », a commenté Mme De Block dans ce contexte. Selon la ministre, en 2020, l’Office des Étrangers continue à miser de manière ciblée sur le retour forcé des #criminels_illégaux, des demandeurs d’asile déboutés et des #transmigrants. Il produira encore des efforts supplémentaires. Cette semaine, quarante places en centres fermés ont rouvert pour la détention de groupes cibles prioritaires, comme des criminels illégaux, des récidivistes causant des troubles et des illégaux en transit via la Belgique. Dans les centres fermés, leur expulsion continue à être préparée.

    Les quarante places avaient été libérées à la suite de la décision en décembre de la ministre De Block et de son collègue Pieter De Crem, ministre de l’Intérieur, d’"optimaliser l’approche de la transmigration". Pour les #illégaux_en_transit, 160 places restent prévues dans les centres fermés.

    En outre, la Belgique continue à miser sur des #accords avec les pays d’origine pour collaborer au retour. Ainsi, un accord de retour a été conclu en 2019 avec le Rwanda et des discussions sont en cours avec la Turquie (avec l’UE), l’Angola, le Kirghizistan, le Tadjikistan et le Vietnam (via le Benelux) et avec l’Algérie, le Niger et le Sénégal.

    https://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/un-tiers-des-rapatriements-par-frontex-provenait-de-la-belgique-en-2019/article-news-1239993.html
    #renvois #expulsions #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Frontex #Belgique #statistiques #chiffres #2019 #machine_à_expulser

    @sinehebdo
    Trois mots en plus ? ça foisonne dans cet article où le choix des mots est fort discutable...
    #criminels_illégaux #transmigrants #illégaux_en_transit
    #mots #terminologie #vocabulaire

  • Irregular migration into EU at lowest level since 2013

    The number of irregular border crossings detected on the European Union’s external borders last year fell to the lowest level since 2013 due to a drop in the number of people reaching European shores via the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

    Preliminary 2019 data collected by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, showed a 6% fall in illegal border crossings along the EU’s external borders to just over 139 000. This is 92% below the record number set in 2015.

    The number of irregular migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean fell roughly 41% to around 14 000. Nationals of Tunisia and Sudan accounted for the largest share of detections on this route.

    The total number of irregular migrants detected in the Western Mediterranean dropped approximately 58% to around 24 000, with Moroccans and Algerians making up the largest percentage.

    Eeastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans

    Despite the general downward trend, the Eastern Mediterranean saw growing migratory pressure starting in the spring. It peaked in September and then started falling in accordance with the seasonal trend. In all of 2019, there were more than 82 000 irregular migrants detected on this route, roughly 46% more than in the previous year.

    In the second half of 2019, irregular arrivals in the region were at the highest since the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, although still well below the figures recorded in 2015 and early 2016 with the situation before the Statement.

    Some persons transferred from the Greek islands to the mainland appear to have continued on the Western Balkan migratory route. There has been an increase in detections on the Greek-Albanian border after the start of the Frontex joint operation in May. In the second half of the year, a significant number of detections was reported on the EU borders with Serbia.

    In total, around 14 000 irregular crossings were detected at the EU’s borders on the Western Balkan route last year – more than double the 2018 figure.

    On the Eastern Mediterranean route and the related Western Balkan route, nationals of Afghanistan and Syria accounted for over half of all registered irregular arrivals.

    Top nationality

    Overall, Afghans were the main nationality of newly arrived irregular migrants in 2019, representing almost a quarter of all arrivals. The number of Afghan migrants was nearly three times (+167%) the figure from the previous year. Roughly four out of five were registered on the Eastern Mediterranean route, while nearly all the rest on the Western Balkan route.

    The most recent available data also suggest a higher percentage of women among the newly arrived migrants in 2019. In the first ten months of last year, around 23% of migrants were women compared with 19% in 2018. EU countries counted approximately 14 600 migrant children younger than 14 in the January-October period, almost one thousand more than in all of 2018.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/flash-report-irregular-migration-into-eu-at-lowest-level-since-2013-n

    ......

    Et comme dit Catherine Teule via la mailing-list Migreurop, qui a signalé cette info :

    Bravo Frontex !!!! ( et ses partenaires des pays tiers).
    Enfin, pas tout à fait puisque certaines « routes » ont enregistré des augmentations de flux à la fin de l’année 2019...

    #statistiques #chiffres #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Europe #2019 #frontières_extérieures #Frontex #Méditerranée #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #réfugiés_afghans

    • Parallèlement...
      Migrants : l’Europe va doubler ses opérations d’aide en matière d’asile

      Le bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile « va voir ses déploiements opérationnels doubler en 2020 » pour atteindre 2000 personnes sur le terrain.

      L’agence européenne de l’asile a annoncé ce mardi le doublement de ses opérations en 2020, en particulier pour renforcer sa présence en #Grèce, à #Chypre et à #Malte, où l’afflux de migrants a explosé en 2019.

      Le #bureau_européen_d'appui_en_matière_d'asile (#EASO) « va voir ses déploiements opérationnels doubler en 2020 » pour atteindre 2000 personnes sur le terrain, fruit d’un #accord signé en décembre avec ces pays ainsi que l’#Italie, a souligné l’agence dans un communiqué.

      « Chypre, la Grèce et Malte verront un doublement du #personnel_EASO tandis que les déploiements en Italie seront réduits à la lumière des changements de besoins de la part des autorités » de ce pays où, à l’inverse, les arrivées par la Méditerranée ont été divisées par deux entre 2018 et 2019.

      Très loin des flux migratoires au plus fort de la crise en 2015, 110 669 migrants et réfugiés ont rallié l’Europe après avoir traversé la mer en 2019 selon les chiffres publiés par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) de l’ONU. Soit dix fois moins que le million de personnes arrivées en 2015.

      L’an dernier, la Grèce a accueilli 62 445 de ces exilés, contre 32 742 l’année précédente. Le petit État insulaire de Malte a vu débarquer 3405 personnes, soit deux fois plus que les 1445 de 2018, tandis que 7647 migrants sont arrivés à Chypre (4307 en 2018).

      Avec quelque 550 agents en Grèce, EASO prévoit donc « trois fois plus d’assistants sociaux » et une aide plus ciblée « pour aider à la réception dans les #hotspots » comme celui de #Lesbos, où plus de 37 000 personnes s’entassent dans des conditions souvent indignes. À Chypre, les 120 personnels européens auront surtout pour mission d’aider les autorités à enregistrer et traiter les demandes d’asile.

      « Le corridor le plus meurtrier »

      La réduction du soutien européen en Italie s’explique par la chute des arrivées dans ce pays (11 471 en 2019, 23 370 en 2018, 181 000 en 2016) qui avait un temps fermé ses ports aux bateaux secourant les migrants en mer en 2019.

      Cette route de Méditerranée centrale entre l’Afrique du Nord et l’Italie « reste le corridor le plus meurtrier », a encore précisé l’OIM, qui a recensé 1283 décès connus en Méditerranée (centrale, orientale et occidentale) l’an dernier, contre près de 2.300 l’année précédente. « Comme pour Malte, EASO restera fortement impliqué dans (le processus de) #débarquement ad hoc » des bateaux portant secours aux migrants sur cette route, a ajouté le bureau européen.

      https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/migrants-l-europe-va-doubler-ses-operations-d-aide-en-matiere-d-asile_21136

  • Monitoring « secondary movements » and « hotspots » : Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “#situational_awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/dec/eu-frontex-int-surv.htm
    #surveillance #mouvements_secondaires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #Frontex #hotspot #hotspots #risques #analyse_de_risques

    –---------

    Dans ce rapport de Statewatch, on peut lire :

    Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”2 New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU.

    Ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler la carte de @reka sur les 3 frontières européennes :
    #pré-frontière
    #frontière
    #post-frontière


    https://visionscarto.net/la-mediterranee-plus-loin

    Pour une version plus récente de cette carte...


    https://asile.ch/2016/12/13/regard-dune-geographe-murs-frontieres-fantasme-controle-migratoire

    ping @etraces @karine4 @reka @isskein

  • EU-Asylbehörde beschattete Flüchtende in sozialen Medien

    Die EU-Agentur EASO überwachte jahrelang soziale Netzwerke, um Flüchtende auf dem Weg nach Europa zu stoppen. Der oberste Datenschützer der EU setzte dem Projekt nun ein Ende.

    Das EU-Asylunterstützungsbüro EASO hat jahrelang in sozialen Medien Informationen über Flüchtende, Migrationsrouten und Schleuser gesammelt. Ihre Erkenntnisse meldete die Behörde mit Sitz in Malta an EU-Staaten, die Kommission und andere EU-Agenturen. Die Ermittlungen auf eigene Faust sorgen nun für Ärger mit EU-Datenschützern.

    Mitarbeiter von EASO durchforsteten soziale Medien seit Januar 2017. Ihr Hauptziel waren Hinweise auf neue Migrationsbewegungen nach Europa. Die EU-Behörde übernahm das Projekt von der UN-Organisation UNHCR, berichtete EASO damals in einem Newsletter.

    Die Agentur durchsuchte einschlägige Seiten, Kanäle und Gruppen mit der Hilfe von Stichwortlisten. Im Fokus standen Fluchtrouten, aber auch die Angebote von Schleusern, gefälschte Dokumente und die Stimmung unter den Geflüchteten, schrieb ein EASO-Sprecher an netzpolitik.org.

    Das Vorläuferprojekt untersuchte ab März 2016 Falschinformationen, mit denen Schleuser Menschen nach Europa locken. Es entstand als Folge der Flüchtlingsbewegung 2015, im Fokus der UN-Mitarbeiter standen Geflüchtete aus Syrien, dem Irak und Afghanistan.

    Flüchtende informierten sich auf dem Weg nach Europa über soziale Netzwerke, heißt es im Abschlussbericht des UNHCR. In Facebook-Gruppen und Youtube-Kanälen bewerben demnach Schleuser offen ihr Angebot. Sie veröffentlichten auf Facebook-Seiten sogar Rezensionen von zufriedenen „Kunden“, sagten Projektmitarbeiter damals den Medien.
    Fluchtrouten und Fälschungen

    Die wöchentlichen Berichte von EASO landeten bei den EU-Staaten und Institutionen, außerdem bei UNHCR und der Weltpolizeiorganisation Interpol. Die EU-Staaten forderten EASO bereits 2018 auf, Hinweise auf Schleuser an Europol zu übermitteln.

    Die EU-Agentur überwachte Menschen aus zahlreichen Ländern. Beobachtet wurden Sprecher des Arabischen und von afghanischen Sprachen wie Paschtunisch und Dari, aber auch von in Äthiopien und Eritrea verbreiteten Sprachen wie Tigrinya und Amharisch, das in Nigeria gesprochene Edo sowie etwa des Türkischen und Kurdischen.

    „Das Ziel der Aktivitäten war es, die Mitgliedsstaaten zu informieren und den Missbrauch von Schutzbedürftigen zu verhindern“, schrieb der EASO-Sprecher Anis Cassar.
    Als Beispiel nannte der Sprecher den „Konvoi der Hoffnung“. So nannte sich eine Gruppe von hunderte Menschen aus Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan, die im Frühjahr 2019 an der griechisch-bulgarischen Grenze auf Weiterreise nach Europa hofften.

    Die griechische Polizei hinderte den „Konvoi“ mit Tränengasgranaten am Grenzübertritt. Die „sehr frühe Entdeckung“ der Gruppe sei ein Erfolg des Einsatzes, sagte der EASO-Sprecher.
    Kein Schutzschirm gegen Gräueltaten

    Gräueltaten gegen Flüchtende standen hingegen nicht im Fokus von EASO. In Libyen werden tausende Flüchtende unter „KZ-ähnlichen Zuständen“ in Lagern festgehalten, befand ein interner Bericht der Auswärtigen Amtes bereits Ende 2017.

    Über die Lage in Libyen dringen über soziale Medien und Messengerdienste immer wieder erschreckende Details nach außen.

    Die EU-Agentur antwortete ausweichend auf unsere Frage, ob ihre Mitarbeiter bei ihrem Monitoring Hinweise auf Menschenrechtsverletzungen gefunden hätten.

    „Ich bin nicht in der Lage, Details über die Inhalte der tatsächlichen Berichte zu geben“, schrieb der EASO-Sprecher. „Die Berichte haben aber sicherlich dazu beigetragen, den zuständigen nationalen Behörden zu helfen, Schleuser ins Visier zu nehmen und Menschen zu retten.“

    Der Sprecher betonte, das EU-Asylunterstützungsbüro sei keine Strafverfolgungsbehörde oder Küstenwache. Der Einsatz habe bloß zur Information der Partnerbehörden gedient.
    Datenschützer: Rechtsgrundlage fehlt

    Der oberste EU-Datenschützer übte heftige Kritik an dem Projekt. Die Behörde kritisiert, die EU-Agentur habe sensible persönliche Daten von Flüchtenden gesammelt, etwa über deren Religion, ohne dass diese informiert worden seien oder zugestimmt hätten.

    Die Asylbehörde habe für solche Datensammelei keinerlei Rechtsgrundlage, urteilte der EU-Datenschutzbeauftragte Wojciech Wiewiórowski in einem Brief an EASO im November.

    Die Datenschutzbehörde prüfte die Asylagentur nach neuen, strengeren Regeln für die EU-Institutionen, die etwa zeitgleich mit der Datenschutzgrundverordnung zu gelten begannen.

    In dem Schreiben warnt der EU-Datenschutzbeauftragte, einzelne Sprachen und Schlüsselwörter zu überwachen, könne zu falschen Annahmen über Gruppen führen. Dies wirke unter Umständen diskriminierend.

    Die Datenschutzbehörde ordnete die sofortigen Suspendierung des Projektes an. Es gebe vorerst keine Pläne, die Überwachung sozialer Medien wieder aufzunehmen, schrieb der EASO-Sprecher an netzpolitik.org.

    Die Asylbehörde widersprach indes den Vorwürfen. EASO habe großen Aufwand betrieben, damit keinerlei persönliche Daten in ihren Berichten landeten, schrieb der Sprecher.

    Anders sieht das der EU-Datenschutzbeauftragte. In einem einzigen Bericht, der den Datenschützern als Beispiel übermittelt wurde, fanden sie mehrere E-Mailadressen und die Telefonnummer eines Betroffenen, schrieben sie in dem Brief an EASO.

    EASO klagte indes gegenüber netzpolitik.org über die „negativen Konsequenzen“ des Projekt-Stopps. Dies schade den EU-Staaten in der Effektivität ihrer Asylsysteme und habe womöglich schädliche Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit von Migranten und Asylsuchenden.
    Frontex stoppte Monitoring-Projekt

    Die EU-Asylagentur geriet bereits zuvor mit Aufsehern in Konflikt. Im Vorjahr ermittelte die Antikorruptionsbehörde OLAF wegen Mobbing-Vorwürfen, Verfehlungen bei Großeinkäufen und Datenschutzverstößen.

    Auf Anfrage von netzpolitik.org bestätigte OLAF, dass „Unregelmäßigkeiten“ in den genannten Bereichen gefunden wurden. Die Behörde wollte aber keine näheren Details nennen.

    EASO ist nicht die einzige EU-Behörde, die soziale Netzwerke überwachen möchte. Die Grenzagentur Frontex schrieb im September einen Auftrag über 400.000 Euro aus. Ziel sei die Überwachung von sozialen Netzwerken auf „irreguläre Migrationsbewegungen“.

    Kritische Nachfragen bremsten das Projekt aber schon vor dem Start. Nach kritischen Nachfragen der NGO Privacy International blies Frontex das Projekt ab. Frontex habe nicht erklären können, wie sich die Überwachung mit dem Datenschutz und dem rechtlichen Mandat der Organisation vereinen lässt, kritisierte die NGO.

    https://netzpolitik.org/2019/eu-asylbehoerde-beschattete-fluechtende-in-sozialen-medien#spendenleist
    #EASO #asile #migrations #réfugiés #surveillance #réseaux_sociaux #protection_des_données #Frontex #données

    –->

    « Les rapports hebdomadaires de l’EASO ont été envoyés aux pays et institutions de l’UE, au #HCR et à l’Organisation mondiale de la police d’#Interpol. Les États de l’UE ont demandé à l’EASO en 2018 de fournir à #Europol des informations sur les passeurs »

    ping @etraces

  • Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes

    How much money exactly does Europe spend trying to curb migration from Nigeria? And what’s it used for? We tried to find out, but Europe certainly doesn’t make it easy. These flashy graphics show you just how complicated the funding is.
    In a shiny new factory in the Benin forest, a woman named Blessing slices pineapples into rings. Hundreds of miles away, at a remote border post in the Sahara, Abubakar scans travellers’ fingerprints. And in village squares across Nigeria, Usman performs his theatre show about the dangers of travelling to Europe.

    What do all these people have in common?

    All their lives are touched by the billions of euros European governments spend in an effort to curb migration from Africa.

    Since the summer of 2015,
    Read more about the influx of refugees to Europe in 2015 on the UNHCR website.
    when countless boats full of migrants began arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy, Europe has increased migration spending by billions.
    Read my guide to EU migration policy here.
    And much of this money is being spent in Africa.

    Within Europe, the political left and right have very different ways of framing the potential benefits of that funding. Those on the left say migration spending not only provides Africans with better opportunities in their home countries but also reduces migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Those on the right say migration spending discourages Africans from making the perilous journey to Europe.

    However they spin it, the end result is the same: both left and right have embraced funding designed to reduce migration from Africa. In fact, the European Union (EU) plans to double migration spending under the new 2021-2027 budget, while quadrupling spending on border control.

    The three of us – journalists from Nigeria, Italy and the Netherlands – began asking ourselves: just how much money are we talking here?

    At first glance, it seems like a perfectly straightforward question. Just add up the migration budgets of the EU and the individual member states and you’ve got your answer, right? But after months of research, it turns out that things are nowhere near that simple.

    In fact, we discovered that European migration spending resembles nothing so much as a gigantic plate of spaghetti.

    If you try to tease out a single strand, at least three more will cling to it. Try to find where one strand begins, and you’ll find yourself tangled up in dozens of others.

    This is deeply concerning. Though Europe maintains a pretence of transparency, in practice it’s virtually impossible to hold the EU and its member states accountable for their migration expenditures, let alone assess how effective they are. If a team of journalists who have devoted months to the issue can’t manage it, then how could EU parliament members juggling multiple portfolios ever hope to?

    This lack of oversight is particularly problematic in the case of migration, an issue that ranks high on European political agendas. The subject of migration fuels a great deal of political grandstanding, populist opportunism, and social unrest. And the debate surrounding the issue is rife with misinformation.

    For an issue of this magnitude, it’s crucial to have a clear view of existing policies and to examine whether these policies make sense. But to be able to do that, we need to understand the funding streams: how much money is being spent and what is it being spent on?

    While working on this article, we spoke to researchers and officials who characterised EU migration spending as “opaque”, “unclear” and “chaotic”. We combed through countless websites, official documents, annual reports and budgets, and we submitted freedom of information requests
    in a number of European countries, in Nigeria, and to the European commission. And we discovered that the subject of migration, while not exactly cloak-and-dagger stuff, is apparently sensitive enough that most people preferred to speak off the record.

    Above all, we were troubled by the fact that no one seems to have a clear overview of European migration budgets – and by how painfully characteristic this is of European migration policy as a whole.
    Nigeria – ‘a tough cookie’

    It wasn’t long before we realised that mapping out all European cash flows to all African countries would take us years. Instead, we decided to focus on Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and the continent’s strongest economy, as well as the country of origin of the largest group of African asylum seekers in the EU. “A tough cookie” in the words of one senior EU official, but also “our most important migration partner in the coming years”.

    But Nigeria wasn’t exactly eager to embrace the role of “most important migration partner”. After all, migration has been a lifeline for Nigeria’s economy: last year, Nigerian migrants living abroad sent home $25bn – roughly 6% of the country’s GNP.

    It took a major European charm offensive to get Nigeria on board – a “long saga” with “more than one tense meeting”, according to a high-ranking EU diplomat we spoke to.

    The European parliament invited Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, to Strasbourg in 2016. Over the next several years, one European dignitary after another visited Nigeria: from Angela Merkel,
    the German chancellor, to Matteo Renzi,
    the Italian prime minister, to Emmanuel Macron,
    the French president, to Mark Rutte,

    the Dutch prime minister.

    Three guesses as to what they all wanted to talk about.
    ‘No data available’

    But let’s get back to those funding streams.

    The EU would have you believe that everything fits neatly into a flowchart. When asked to respond to this article, the European commission told us: “We take transparency very seriously.” One spokesperson after another, all from various EU agencies, informed us that the information was “freely available online”.

    But as Wilma Haan, director of the Open State Foundation, notes: “Just throwing a bunch of stuff online doesn’t make you transparent. People have to be able to find the information and verify it.”

    Yet that’s exactly what the EU did. The EU foundations and agencies we contacted referred us to dozens of different websites. In some cases, the information was relatively easy to find,
    but in others the data was fragmented or missing entirely. All too often, our searches turned up results such as “data soon available”
    or “no data available”.

    The website of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) – worth around €3.1bn – is typical of the problems we faced. While we were able to find a list of projects funded by AMIF online,

    the list only contains the names of the projects – not the countries in which they’re carried out. As a result, there’s only one way to find out what’s going on where: by Googling each of the project names individually.

    This lack of a clear overview has major consequences for the democratic process, says Tineke Strik, member of the European parliament (Green party). Under the guise of “flexibility”, the European parliament has “no oversight over the funds whatsoever”. Strik says: “In the best-case scenario, we’ll discover them listed on the European commission’s website.”

    At the EU’s Nigerian headquarters, one official explained that she does try to keep track of European countries’ migration-related projects to identify “gaps and overlaps”. When asked why this information wasn’t published online, she responded: “It’s something I do alongside my daily work.”
    Getting a feel for Europe’s migration spaghetti

    “There’s no way you’re going to get anywhere with this.”

    This was the response from a Correspondent member who researches government funding when we announced this project several months ago. Not exactly the most encouraging words to start our journey. Still, over the past few months, we’ve done our best to make as much progress as we could.

    Let’s start in the Netherlands, Maite’s home country. When we tried to find out how much Dutch tax money is spent in Nigeria on migration-related issues, we soon found ourselves down yet another rabbit hole.

    The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, which controls all funding for Dutch foreign policy, seemed like a good starting point. The ministry divides its budget into centralised and decentralised funds. The centralised funds are managed in the Netherlands administrative capital, The Hague, while the decentralised funds are distributed by Dutch embassies abroad.

    Exactly how much money goes to the Dutch embassy in the Nigerian capital Abuja is unclear – no information is available online. When we contacted the embassy, they weren’t able to provide us with any figures, either. According to their press officer, these budgets are “fragmented”, and the total can only be determined at the end of the year.

    The ministry of foreign affairs distributes centralised funds through its departments. But migration is a topic that spans a number of different departments: the department for stabilisation and humanitarian aid (DSH), the security policy department (DVB), the sub-Saharan Africa department (DAF), and the migration policy bureau (BMB), to name just a few. There’s no way of knowing whether each department spends money on migration, let alone how much of it goes to Nigeria.

    Not to mention the fact that other ministries, such as the ministry of economic affairs and the ministry of justice and security, also deal with migration-related issues.

    Next, we decided to check out the Dutch development aid budget
    in the hope it would clear things up a bit. Unfortunately, the budget isn’t organised by country, but by theme. And since migration isn’t one of the main themes, it’s scattered over several different sections. Luckily, the document does contain an annex (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/begrotingen/2019/09/17/hgis---nota-homogene-groep-internationale-samenwerking-rijksbegroting-) that goes into more detail about migration.

    In this annex, we found that the Netherlands spends a substantial chunk of money on “migration cooperation”, “reception in the region” and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    And then there’s the ministry of foreign affairs’ Stability Fund,
    the ministry of justice and security’s budget for the processing and repatriation of asylum seekers, and the ministry of education, culture and science’s budget for providing asylum seekers with an education.

    But again, it’s impossible to determine just how much of this funding finds its way to Nigeria. This is partly due to the fact that many migration projects operate in multiple countries simultaneously (in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for example). Regional projects such as this generally don’t share details of how funding is divided up among the participating countries.

    Using data from the Dutch embassy and an NGO that monitors Dutch projects in Nigeria, we found that €6m in aid goes specifically to Nigeria, with another €19m for the region as a whole. Dutch law enforcement also provides in-kind support to help strengthen Nigeria’s border control.

    But hold on, there’s more. We need to factor in the money that the Netherlands spends on migration through its contributions to the EU.

    The Netherlands pays hundreds of millions into the European Development Fund (EDF), which is partly used to finance migration projects. Part of that money also gets transferred to another EU migration fund: the EUTF for Africa.
    The Netherlands also contributes directly to this fund.

    But that’s not all. The Netherlands also gives (either directly or through the EU) to a variety of other EU funds and agencies that finance migration projects in Nigeria. And just as in the Netherlands, these EU funds and agencies are scattered over many different offices. There’s no single “EU ministry of migration”.

    To give you a taste of just how convoluted things can get: the AMIF falls under the EU’s home affairs “ministry”

    (DG HOME), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) falls under the “ministry” for international cooperation and development (DG DEVCO), and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) falls under the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EU border agency, Frontex, is its own separate entity, and there’s also a “ministry” for humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

    Still with me?

    Because this was just the Netherlands.

    Now let’s take a look at Giacomo’s country of origin, Italy, which is also home to one of Europe’s largest Nigerian communities (surpassed only by the UK).

    Italy’s ministry of foreign affairs funds the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), which provides humanitarian aid in north-eastern Nigeria, where tens of thousands of people have been displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. AICS also finances a wide range of projects aimed at raising awareness of the risks of illegal migration. It’s impossible to say how much of this money ends up in Nigeria, though, since the awareness campaigns target multiple countries at once.

    This data is all available online – though you’ll have to do some digging to find it. But when it comes to the funds managed by Italy’s ministry of the interior, things start to get a bit murkier. Despite the ministry having signed numerous agreements on migration with African countries in recent years, there’s little trace of the money online. Reference to a €92,000 donation for new computers for Nigeria’s law enforcement and immigration services was all we could find.

    Things get even more complicated when we look at Italy’s “Africa Fund”, which was launched in 2017 to foster cooperation with “priority countries along major migration routes”. The fund is jointly managed by the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of the interior.

    Part of the money goes to the EUTF for Africa, but the fund also contributes to United Nations (UN) organisations, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as to the Italian ministry of defence and the ministry of economy and finance.

    Like most European governments, Italy also contributes to EU funds and agencies concerned with migration, such as Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

    And then there are the contributions to UN agencies that deal with migration: UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), IOM, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to name just a few.

    Now multiply all of this by the number of European countries currently active in Nigeria. Oh, and let’s not forget the World Bank,

    which has only recently waded into the waters of the migration industry.

    And then there are the European development banks. And the EU’s External Investment Plan, which was launched in 2016 with the ambitious goal of generating €44bn in private investments in developing countries, with a particular focus on migrants’ countries of origin. Not to mention the regional “migration dialogues”
    organised in west Africa under the Rabat Process and the Cotonou Agreement.

    This is the European migration spaghetti.
    How we managed to compile a list nonetheless

    By now, one thing should be clear: there are a staggering number of ministries, funds and departments involved in European migration spending. It’s no wonder that no one in Europe seems to have a clear overview of the situation. But we thought that maybe, just maybe, there was one party that might have the overview we seek: Nigeria. After all, the Nigerian government has to be involved in all the projects that take place there, right?

    We decided to ask around in Nigeria’s corridors of power. Was anyone keeping track of European migration funding? The Ministry of Finance? Or maybe the Ministry of the Interior, or the Ministry of Labour and Employment?

    Nope.

    We then tried asking Nigeria’s anti-trafficking agency (NAPTIP), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerians in Diaspora Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI).

    No luck there, either. When it comes to migration, things are just as fragmented under the Nigerian government as they are in Europe.

    In the meantime, we contacted each of the European embassies in Nigeria.
    This proved to be the most fruitful approach and yielded the most complete lists of projects. The database of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)
    was particularly useful in fleshing out our overview.

    So does that mean our list is now complete? Probably not.

    More to the point: the whole undertaking is highly subjective, since there’s no official definition of what qualifies as a migration project and what doesn’t.

    For example, consider initiatives to create jobs for young people in Nigeria. Would those be development projects or trade projects? Or are they actually migration projects (the idea being that young people wouldn’t migrate if they could find work)?

    What about efforts to improve border control in northern Nigeria? Would they fall under counterterrorism? Security? Institutional development? Or is this actually a migration-related issue?

    Each country has its own way of categorising projects.

    There’s no single, unified standard within the EU.

    When choosing what to include in our own overview, we limited ourselves to projects that European countries themselves designated as being migration related.

    While it’s certainly not perfect, this overview allows us to draw at least some meaningful conclusions about three key issues: where the money is going, where it isn’t going, and what this means for Nigeria.
    1) Where is the money going?

    In Nigeria, we found

    If you’d like to work with the data yourself, feel free to download the full overview here.
    50 migration projects being funded by 11 different European countries, as well as 32 migration projects that rely on EU funding. Together, they amount to more than €770m in funding.

    Most of the money from Brussels is spent on improving Nigerian border control:
    more than €378m. For example, the European Investment Bank has launched a €250m initiative

    to provide all Nigerians with biometric identity cards.

    The funding provided by individual countries largely goes to projects aimed at creating employment opportunities

    in Nigeria: at least €92m.

    Significantly, only €300,000 is spent on creating more legal opportunities to migrate – less than 0.09% of all funding.

    We also found 47 “regional” projects that are not limited to Nigeria, but also include other countries.
    Together, they amount to more than €775m in funding.
    Regional migration spending is mainly focused on migrants who have become stranded in transit and is used to return them home and help them to reintegrate when they get there. Campaigns designed to raise awareness of the dangers of travelling to Europe also receive a relatively large proportion of funding in the region.

    2) Where isn’t the money going?

    When we look at the list of institutions – or “implementing agencies”, as they’re known in policy speak – that receive money from Europe, one thing immediately stands out: virtually none of them are Nigerian organisations.

    “The EU funds projects in Nigeria, but that money doesn’t go directly to Nigerian organisations,” says Charles Nwanelo, head of migration at the NCFRMI.

    See their website here.
    “Instead, it goes to international organisations, such as the IOM, which use the money to carry out projects here. This means we actually have no idea how much money the EU is spending in Nigeria.”

    We hear the same story again and again from Nigerian government officials: they never see a cent of European funding, as it’s controlled by EU and UN organisations. This is partially a response to corruption within Nigerian institutions – Europe feels it can keep closer tabs on its money by channelling it through international organisations. As a result, these organisations are growing rapidly in Nigeria. To get an idea of just how rapidly: the number of people working for the IOM in Nigeria has more than quadrupled over the past two years.

    Of course, this doesn’t mean that Nigerian organisations are going unfunded. Implementing agencies are free to pass funding along to Nigerian groups. For example, the IOM hires Nigerian NGOs to provide training for returning migrants and sponsors a project that provides training and new software to the Nigerian immigration service.

    Nevertheless, the system has inevitably led to the emergence of a parallel aid universe in which the Nigerian government plays only a supporting role. “The Nigerian parliament should demand to see an overview of all current and upcoming projects being carried out in their country every three months,” says Bob van Dillen, migration expert at development organisation Cordaid.

    But that would be “difficult”, according to one German official we spoke to, because “this isn’t a priority for the Nigerian government. This is at the top of Europe’s agenda, not Nigeria’s.”

    Most Nigerian migrants to Europe come from Edo state, where the governor has been doing his absolute best to compile an overview of all migration projects. He set up a task force that aims to coordinate migration activities in his state. The task force has been largely unsuccessful because the EU doesn’t provide it with any direct funding and doesn’t require member states to cooperate with it.

    3) What are the real-world consequences for Nigeria?

    We’ve established that the Nigerian government isn’t involved in allocating migration spending and that local officials are struggling to keep tabs on things. So who is coordinating all those billions in funding?

    Each month, the European donors and implementing agencies mentioned above meet at the EU delegation to discuss their migration projects. However, diplomats from multiple European countries have told us that no real coordination takes place at these meetings. No one checks to see whether projects conflict or overlap. Instead, the meetings are “more on the basis of letting each other know”, as one diplomat put it.

    One German official noted: “What we should do is look together at what works, what doesn’t, and which lessons we can learn from each other. Not to mention how to prevent people from shopping around from project to project.”

    Other diplomats consider this too utopian and feel that there are far too many players to make that level of coordination feasible. In practice, then, it seems that chaotic funding streams inevitably lead to one thing: more chaos.
    And we’ve only looked at one country ...

    That giant plate of spaghetti we just sifted through only represents a single serving – other countries have their own versions of Nigeria’s migration spaghetti. Alongside Nigeria, the EU has also designated Mali, Senegal, Ethiopia and Niger as “priority countries”. The EU’s largest migration fund, the EUTF, finances projects in 26 different African countries. And the sums of money involved are only going to increase.

    When we first started this project, our aim was to chart a path through the new European zeal for funding. We wanted to track the flow of migration money to find answers to some crucial questions: will this funding help Nigerians make better lives for themselves in their own country? Will it help reduce the trafficking of women? Will it provide more safe, legal ways for Nigerians to travel to Europe?

    Or will it primarily go towards maintaining the international aid industry? Does it encourage corruption? Does it make migrants even more vulnerable to exploitation along the way?

    But we’re still far from answering these questions. Recently, a new study by the UNDP

    called into question “the notion that migration can be prevented or significantly reduced through programmatic and policy responses”.

    Nevertheless, European programming and policy responses will only increase in scope in the coming years.

    But the more Europe spends on migration, the more tangled the spaghetti becomes and the harder it gets to check whether funds are being spent wisely. With the erosion of transparency comes the erosion of democratic oversight.

    So to anyone who can figure out how to untangle the spaghetti, we say: be our guest.

    https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/171168048128-fac42704
    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Nigeria #EU #EU #Union_européenne #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Frontex #Trust_fund #Pays-Bas #argent #transparence (manque de - ) #budget #remittances #AMIF #développement #aide_au_développement #European_Development_Fund (#EDF) #EUTF_for_Africa #European_Neighbourhood_Instrument (#ENI) #Development_Cooperation_Instrument (#DCI) #Italie #Banque_mondiale #External_Investment_Plan #processus_de_rabat #accords_de_Cotonou #biométrie #carte_d'identité_biométrique #travail #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #emploi #réintégration #campagnes #IOM #OIM

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749
    Et ajouté à la métaliste développement/migrations :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358

    ping @isskein @isskein @pascaline @_kg_

    • Résumé en français par Jasmine Caye (@forumasile) :

      Pour freiner la migration en provenance d’Afrique les dépenses européennes explosent

      Maite Vermeulen est une journaliste hollandaise, cofondatrice du site d’information The Correspondent et spécialisée dans les questions migratoires. Avec deux autres journalistes, l’italien Giacomo Zandonini (Italie) et le nigérian Ajibola Amzat, elle a tenté de comprendre les raisons derrières la flambée des dépenses européennes sensées freiner la migration en provenance du continent africain.

      Depuis le Nigéria, Maite Vermeulen s’est intéressée aux causes de la migration nigériane vers l’Europe et sur les milliards d’euros déversés dans les programmes humanitaires et sécuritaires dans ce pays. Selon elle, la politique sécuritaire européenne n’empêchera pas les personnes motivées de tenter leur chance pour rejoindre l’Europe. Elle constate que les fonds destinés à freiner la migration sont toujours attribués aux mêmes grandes organisations gouvernementales ou non-gouvernementales. Les financements européens échappent aussi aux évaluations d’impact permettant de mesurer les effets des aides sur le terrain.

      Le travail de recherche des journalistes a duré six mois et se poursuit. Il est financé par Money Trail un projet qui soutient des journalistes africains, asiatiques et européens pour enquêter en réseau sur les flux financiers illicites et la corruption en Afrique, en Asie et en Europe.

      Les Nigérians ne viennent pas en Europe pour obtenir l’asile

      L’équipe a d’abord tenté d’élucider cette énigme : pourquoi tant de nigérians choisissent de migrer vers l’Europe alors qu’ils n’obtiennent quasiment jamais l’asile. Le Nigéria est un pays de plus de 190 millions d’habitants et l’économie la plus riche d’Afrique. Sa population représente le plus grand groupe de migrants africains qui arrivent en Europe de manière irrégulière. Sur les 180 000 migrants qui ont atteint les côtes italiennes en 2016, 21% étaient nigérians. Le Nigéria figure aussi régulièrement parmi les cinq premiers pays d’origine des demandeurs d’asile de l’Union européenne. Près de 60% des requérants nigérians proviennent de l’Etat d’Edo dont la capitale est Bénin City. Pourtant leurs chance d’obtenir un statut de protection sont minimes. En effet, seuls 9% des demandeurs d’asile nigérians reçoivent l’asile dans l’UE. Les 91% restants sont renvoyés chez eux ou disparaissent dans la nature.

      Dans l’article Want to make sense of migration ? Ask the people who stayed behind, Maite Vermeulen explique que Bénin City a été construite grâce aux nigérians travaillant illégalement en Italie. Et les femmes sont peut-être bien à l’origine d’un immense trafic de prostituées. Elle nous explique ceci :

      “Pour comprendre le présent, il faut revenir aux années 80. À cette époque, des entreprises italiennes étaient établies dans l’État d’Edo. Certains hommes d’affaires italiens ont épousé des femmes de Benin City, qui sont retournées en Italie avec leur conjoint. Ils ont commencé à exercer des activités commerciales, à commercialiser des textiles, de la dentelle et du cuir, de l’or et des bijoux. Ces femmes ont été les premières à faire venir d’autres femmes de leur famille en Italie – souvent légalement, car l’agriculture italienne avait cruellement besoin de travailleurs pour cueillir des tomates et des raisins. Mais lorsque, à la fin des années 80, la chute des prix du pétrole a plongé l’économie nigériane à l’arrêt, beaucoup de ces femmes d’affaires ont fait faillite. Les femmes travaillant dans l’agriculture ont également connu une période difficile : leur emploi est allé à des ouvriers d’Europe de l’Est. Ainsi, de nombreuses femmes Edo en Italie n’avaient qu’une seule alternative : la prostitution. Ce dernier recours s’est avéré être lucratif. En peu de temps, les femmes ont gagné plus que jamais auparavant. Elles sont donc retournées à Benin City dans les années 1990 avec beaucoup de devises européennes – avec plus d’argent, en fait, que beaucoup de gens de leur ville n’en avaient jamais vu. Elles ont construit des appartements pour gagner des revenus locatifs. Ces femmes étaient appelées « talos », ou mammas italiennes. Tout le monde les admirait. Les jeunes femmes les considéraient comme des modèles et voulaient également aller en Europe. Certains chercheurs appellent ce phénomène la « théorie de la causalité cumulative » : chaque migrant qui réussit entraîne plus de personnes de sa communauté à vouloir migrer. A cette époque, presque personne à Benin City ne savait d’où venait exactement l’argent. Les talos ont commencé à prêter de l’argent aux filles de leur famille afin qu’elles puissent également se rendre en Italie. Ce n’est que lorsque ces femmes sont arrivées qu’on leur a dit comment elles devaient rembourser le prêt. Certaines ont accepté, d’autres ont été forcées. Toutes gagnaient de l’argent. Dans les premières années, le secret des mammas italiennes était gardé au sein de la famille. Mais de plus en plus de femmes ont payé leurs dettes – à cette époque, cela prenait environ un an ou deux – et elles ont ensuite décidé d’aller chercher de l’argent elles-mêmes. En tant que « Mamas », elles ont commencé à recruter d’autres femmes dans leur ville natale. Puis, lentement, l’argent a commencé à manquer à Benin City : un grand nombre de leurs femmes travaillaient dans l’industrie du sexe en Italie.”

      Aujourd’hui, l’Union européenne considère le Nigéria comme son plus important “partenaire migratoire”et depuis quelques années les euros s’y déversent à flots afin de financer des programmes des sécurisation des frontières, de création d’emploi, de lutte contre la traite d’être humains et des programmes de sensibilisation sur les dangers de la migration vers l’Europe.
      Le “cartel migratoire” ou comment peu d’organisation monopolisent les projets sur le terrain

      Dans un autre article intitulé A breakdown of Europe’s € 1.5 billion migration spending in Nigeria, les journalistes se demandent comment les fonds européens sont alloués au Nigéria. Encore une fois on parle ici des projets destinés à freiner la migration. En tout ce sont 770 millions d’euros investis dans ces “projets migration”. En plus, le Nigéria bénéficie d’autres fonds supplémentaires à travers les “projets régionaux” qui s’élèvent à 775 millions d’euros destinés principalement à coordonner et organiser les retours vers les pays d’origines. Mais contrairement aux engagements de l’Union européenne les fonds alloués aux projets en faveur de la migration légale sont très inférieurs aux promesses et représentent 0.09% des aides allouées au Nigéria.

      A qui profitent ces fonds ? Au “cartel migratoire” constitué du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), de l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM), de l’UNICEF, de l’Organisation internationale du travail (OIL), de l’Organisation internationale des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (UNODC). Ces organisations récoltent près de 60% des fonds alloués par l’Union européenne aux “projets migration” au Nigéria et dans la région. Les ONG et les consultants privés récupèrent 13% du total des fonds alloués, soit 89 millions d’euros, le double de ce qu’elles reçoivent en Europe.
      Les montants explosent, la transparence diminue

      Où va vraiment l’argent et comment mesurer les effets réels sur les populations ciblées. Quels sont les impacts de ces projets ? Depuis 2015, l’Europe a augmenté ses dépenses allouées à la migration qui s’élèvent désormais à plusieurs milliards.

      La plus grande partie de ces fonds est attribuée à l’Afrique. Dans l’article Europe spends billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes, Maite Vermeulen, Ajibola Amzat et Giacomo Zandonini expliquent que l’UE prévoit de doubler ces dépenses dans le budget 2021-2027 et quadrupler les dépenses sur le contrôle des frontières.

      Des mois de recherche n’ont pas permis de comprendre comment étaient alloués les fonds pour la migration. Les sites internet sont flous et de nombreux bureaucrates européens se disent incapables concilier les dépenses car la transparence fait défaut. Difficile de comprendre l’allocation précise des fonds de l’Union européenne et celle des fonds des Etats européens. Le tout ressemble, selon les chercheurs, à un immense plat de spaghettis. Ils se posent une question importante : si eux n’y arrivent pas après des mois de recherche comment les députés européens pourraient s’y retrouver ? D’autres chercheurs et fonctionnaires européens qualifient les dépenses de migration de l’UE d’opaques. La consultation de nombreux sites internet, documents officiels, rapports annuels et budgets, et les nombreuses demandes d’accès à l’information auprès de plusieurs pays européens actifs au Nigéria ainsi que les demandes d’explications adressées à la Commission européenne n’ont pas permis d’arriver à une vision globale et précise des budgets attribués à la politique migratoire européenne. Selon Tineke Strik, député vert au parlement européen, ce manque de clarté a des conséquences importantes sur le processus démocratique, car sans vision globale précise, il n’y a pas vraiment de surveillance possible sur les dépenses réelles ni sur l’impact réel des programmes sur le terrain.

      https://thecorrespondent.com/154/europe-spends-billions-stopping-migration-good-luck-figuring-out-where-the-money-actually-goes/102663569008-2e2c2159

  • The General Court of the European Union ruled that Frontex does not have to disclose information regarding their border operations (https://fragdenstaat.de/en/blog/2019/11/27/frontex-judgement-luxemburg-transparency). A joint lawsuit by two freedom of information activists specifically addressed the names, flags and types of ships used by Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) in operation #Triton in the central Mediterranean. One of the lawyers in the process commented that the verdict takes for granted Frontex’s speculations about the disadvantages of even the most simple public knowledge about its missions, and noted that European law requires a critical examination of Frontex’s arguments, which was unfortunately missing. Prosecutors are considering an appeal to the Court of Justice.

    Reçu via Inicijativa dobrodosli, mail du 04.11.2019.

    #Frontex #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #transparence (well...) #Méditerranée #justice
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Migration : et si on laissait les demandeurs d’asile choisir leur pays d’accueil ?

    Des chercheurs belges ont planché pendant des mois sur une réforme de la politique d’asile et de migration en Europe. Leurs propositions viennent d’être présentées devant les députés européens.

    En prenant la présidence du Conseil, il y a six mois, la Fin-lande se fixait pour objectif no-table de paver le terrain pour permettre une réforme de la politique migratoire et d’asile européenne jusque-là totale-ment bloquée. C’est à Helsinki que la France et l’Allemagne ont posé les premières pierres d’un mécanisme de ré-partition des migrants. A Tampere, que des spécialistes du droit européen de la migration ont été rassemblés pour tes-ter une série de propositions de ré-forme, emmenés par une équipe de chercheurs belges. En ressort un pro-gramme présenté lundi devant un public épars de députés européens, « De Tampere 20 à Tampere 2.0 » (une référence au Conseil européen de 1999 de Tampere, un des textes fondateurs des principes de la politique migratoire européenne). La Commission von der Leyen, fraîchement installée, souhaite présenter début 2020 un « nouveau pacte européen sur la migration » qui inclurait une réforme du règlement de #Dublin, un système d’asile européen « réellement commun » et un renforcement de #Frontex. Des pistes trouvant écho dans les propositions de Tampere. « Il fautun consensus entre la Commission, le Parlement et le Conseil », souligne le rapport des chercheurs, qui propose une « task team » qui ferait le tour des capitales européennes pour évaluer la situation et mesurer les attentes. Quitte à prendre le temps, dans un contexte politique où la question migratoire est extrêmement clivante. « Des conversations en profondeur seront nécessaires pour restaurer la confiance et faciliter une réflexion innovante. »

    https://plus.lesoir.be/264352/article/2019-12-02/migration-et-si-laissait-les-demandeurs-dasile-choisir-leur-pays-daccuei
    #répartition #choix #liberté #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    #paywall

    Si quelqu’un trouve le rapport...

    ping @simplicissimus @karine4 @isskein

  • #PrivacyWins : EU Border Guards Cancel Plans to Spy on Social Media (for now)
    https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3288/privacywins-eu-border-guards-cancel-plans-spy-social-media-now

    As any data protection lawyer and privacy activist will attest, there’s nothing like a well-designed and enforced data protection law to keep the totalitarian tendencies of modern Big Brother in check. While the EU’s data protection rules aren’t perfect, they at least provide some limits over how far EU bodies, governments and corporations can go when they decide to spy on people. This is something the bloc’s border control agency, Frontex, learned recently after coming up with a plan to (...)

    #Frontex #migration #frontières #SocialNetwork #surveillance #web #PrivacyInternational

  • Corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes : le Conseil adopte un règlement révisé.

    Le Conseil a adopté ce jour un nouveau règlement relatif au corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes, qui constitue un élément important de l’approche globale de l’UE en matière de gestion des migrations et des frontières.

    L’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) est renforcée en termes de #personnel et d’#équipements_techniques. En outre, son #mandat est élargi en vue de soutenir l’action des États membres, notamment en matière de #contrôle_des_frontières, de #retour et de #coopération avec les #pays_tiers. Le nouveau règlement intégrera dans le cadre du corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes le système européen de surveillance des frontières (#Eurosur), afin d’améliorer son fonctionnement.

    Le bon fonctionnement de la gestion des #frontières_extérieures est essentiel au maintien d’un #espace_Schengen pleinement fonctionnel et à une gestion des migrations efficace et humaine. Les nouvelles règles permettront à Frontex de jouer un rôle plus important dans le soutien aux États membres pour le contrôle aux frontières, les retours et la coopération avec les pays tiers.
    Maria Ohisalo, ministre finlandaise de l’intérieur

    #Contingent permanent de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes et experts en matière de retour

    Pour assurer une gestion cohérente des frontières extérieures de l’UE et être en mesure de répondre aux crises, Frontex aura à sa disposition un #contingent_permanent. Ce contingent, qui sera mis en place progressivement, comprendra jusqu’à 10 000 agents opérationnels d’ici 2027. Il sera notamment composé de membres du #personnel_opérationnel de Frontex, ainsi que de #personnes_détachées par les États membres pour une longue durée ou déployées pour une courte durée, et d’une réserve de réaction rapide qui sera maintenue jusqu’à la fin de 2024.

    #Retours

    Les règles envisagées permettront à Frontex d’apporter un soutien technique et opérationnel aux États membres dans le cadre des opérations de retour. L’Agence apportera un soutien soit à la demande de l’État membre concerné soit de sa propre initiative et en accord avec l’État membre concerné. Ce soutien portera sur toutes les phases du retour, des activités préparatoires au retour aux activités consécutives au retour et consécutives à l’arrivée.

    Coopération avec les pays tiers

    Les règles envisagées contribueront à renforcer la coopération avec les pays tiers, en élargissant le champ d’action de l’Agence, sans limiter les possibilités d’opérations conjointes aux seuls pays voisins.

    https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/?amp;utm_medium=email
    #Frontex #règlement #frontières #EU #UE #contrôles_frontaliers #renvois #expulsions

    Pour télécharger le règlement :
    https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

    ping @isskein

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

  • Frontex renonce à surveiller les réseaux sociaux
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/021119/frontex-renonce-surveiller-les-reseaux-sociaux

    L’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières voulait pister en ligne les migrants afin de faciliter ses opérations. Les postulants avaient jusqu’au mardi 5 novembre pour répondre à l’appel d’offres « pour la fourniture de services d’analyse des réseaux sociaux concernant les tendances et les prévisions en matière de migration irrégulière » lancé fin septembre par Frontex, l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières (lire notre article). Mais celle-ci a préféré annuler l’opération. Pour combien (...)

    #Frontex #SocialNetwork #surveillance #migration #web

  • #OSCE Secretariat and #Frontex strengthen co-operation to combat cross-border crime

    The OSCE Secretariat and Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, agreed to strengthen their co-operation in combating cross-border crime, trafficking in human beings and addressing migratory challenges in a Working Arrangement document last week.
    The document, signed by OSCE Secretary General #Thomas_Greminger and Frontex Executive Director #Fabrice_Leggeri, covers different areas of mutual interest, including promoting and enhancing #good_practices in #border_management, ensuring fundamental rights protection of people at the borders, and continuing to develop capacities to address emerging forms of cross-border crime.

    https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/osce-secretariat-and-frontex-strengthen-co-operation-to-combat-cross-
    #coopération #migrations #frontières #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

    –-----------

    Pour rappel... la page « migrations » de l’OCSE...

    Migrations

    Les grands flux migratoires, s’ils ne sont pas gérés de manière globale et coordonnée et dans le respect des droits de l’homme, sont susceptibles de constituer une menace pour la coopération, la stabilité et la sécurité. Comme le montrent les crises de réfugiés, les personnes en déplacement sont les premières et le plus directement touchées.

    L’OSCE est déterminée à aborder le phénomène migratoire dans toutes ses dimensions en capitalisant sur la valeur ajoutée qu’elle peut apporter aux solutions régionales et mondiales. Parmi les principaux atouts de l’Organisation figurent sa vaste couverture géographique, l’étendue et la diversité de sa composition, sa fonction normative et son engagement transdimensionnel, ses relations avec les partenaires méditerranéens et asiatiques pour la coopération, ainsi que sa présence étendue sur le terrain.

    L’OSCE fournit un appui au renforcement des capacités, donne des avis en matière de politique, sensibilise, mobilise et contribue au dialogue. Les principaux domaines d’action en matière de migrations sont les suivants :

    Régulation desmigrations : gestion des frontières, sécurité des documents de voyage et lutte contre les menaces transnationales, y compris la traite des êtres humains le long des itinéraires de migration ;
    Facilitation de la migration légale : gouvernance et recherche, collecte de données et harmonisation en matière de migration de main-d’œuvre ; et
    Octroi d’un soutien aux individus et aux communautés : liberté de circulation, tolérance et non-discrimination, intégration et orientation des réfugiés.

    L’OSCE est par ailleurs en mesure de soutenir les efforts internationaux relatifs aux questions de migration grâce à sa longue expérience dans le domaine de la dimension humaine et à son rôle reconnu en ce qui concerne le suivi des droits de l’homme. En outre, elle joue un rôle important dans la promotion de l’intégration, de la tolérance et de la non-discrimination ainsi que de l’éducation. Les activités menées dans ces domaines par les institutions de l’OSCE peuvent également s’appliquer aux problèmes de migration. Afin d’éviter les duplications et de renforcer les synergies sur les questions de migration, l’OSCE collabore avec d’autres organisations régionales et internationales au travers d’un dialogue et d’une coopération de haut niveau.

    https://www.osce.org/fr/migration

    Et aussi le passage sur les #contrôles_frontaliers dans le #manuel de l’OCSE : « Manuel pour l’établissement de politiques de migration de main-d’œuvre efficaces »

    VIII.4.2 Contrôles aux frontières et politique de #visas

    Lors de l’examen des mesures extérieures à prendre pour prévenir ou réduire la migration irrégulière, les dispositions les plus courantes mentionnées sont celles qui consistent à prévenir l’entrée des migrants irréguliers. Les contrôles aux frontières doivent être efficaces et justes, car la propension à tenter des méthodes irrégulières tend à augmenter parce que les migrants ne sont pas sûrs si ungarde-frontière corrompu demandera de verser un pot-de-vin ou leur rendra la vie difficile. L’efficacité aux frontières ne s’améliore que si la confiance repose sur la coopération entre les agents de la police des frontières de tous les pays concernés par le processus de migration, et en particulier entre pays voisins. Malheureusement, dans certaines régions, il n’est pas rare que les garde-frontières tentent de faire porter la responsabilité pour les travailleurs migrants irréguliers (en particulier ceux qui transitent par leur pays) aux agents de l’autre pays, plutôt que de coopérer pour trouver une solution au problème. L’UE a adopté des mesures globales pour s’assurer que desrègles communes sont appliquées aux frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, qui ont fait l’objet d’une refonte dans un Règlement établissant un code communautaire relatif au régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes (code frontières Schengen) (UE, 2006b). Elle a également mis en place une agence européenne (FRONTEX) pour renforcer la coopération entre les États membres de l’UE à ses frontières (UE, 2004e), qui a récemment coordonné un certain nombre d’activités communes en vue de lutter contre la migration clandestine dans la Méditerranée et l’Atlantique Est (EUobserver.com 2007).Une politique de visas viable et équitablement appliquée qui permette au migrant d’entrer dans le pays pour y prendre un emploi, avec un minimum d’obstacles bureaucratiques, est également essentielle pour s’assurer que moins de migrants entrent dans le pays sans autorisation. Malheureusement, les visas délivrés pour l’admission dans un pays pour d’autres motifs (tourisme ou études) sont mis à profit dans de nombreux pays ainsi que dans les États membres de l’UE appliquant le visa UE/Schengen pour de courtes visites (séjour de maximum trois mois), même si cet abus est souvent exacerbé par l’absence de possibilités juridiques suffisantes pour prendre un emploi.

    (p.187)

    https://www.osce.org/fr/secretariat/29632?download=true
    #politique_migratoire

    ping @isskein @reka

  • New Frontex Regulation : corrected version of the text

    The European Parliament is due to approve a corrected version of the new Frontex Regulation, which was originally agreed between the Council and Parliament in April but has been undergoing revision by legal and linguistic specialists.

    See: REGULATION (EU) 2019/... OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of ... on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-frontex-regulation-ep-approved-corrected-version-2-10-19.pdf)

    And: the version initially agreed between the Parliament and Council in April (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/apr/eu-frontex-final-tAnnex%20to%20LIBE%20letter-EBCG-text.pdf)

    The Regulation was proposed in September 2018 and agreement was reached between the Parliament and Council in April 2019. The speed of the legislative process may explain why the text has to be corrected and approved in accordance with Rule 241 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RULES-9-2019-07-02-RULE-241_EN.html).

    The headline change introduced by the new Regulation is a “standing corps” of 10,000 border guards. The official intention is to introduce the standing corps by 2027, but incoming Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has committed to doing so by 2024 - although an article in DW commented (https://www.dw.com/en/can-the-eus-ursula-von-der-leyen-fulfill-her-promises/a-49625188) that this “looks extremely unlikely, as the member states have repeatedly rejected the move.”

    The new Regulation will also give the agency expanded surveillance powers, an extended mandate in the field of deportations and new possibilities for cooperation with non-EU states. Under its current mandate, Frontex has already begun to operate outside the EU, with an operation launched in Albania in May.

    http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/oct/eu-new-frontex-reg.htm
    #frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-frontières_européens #gardes-frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Albanie #surveillance #renvois #expulsions

    –---

    Sur la coopération avec l’Albanie, voir :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/782260

  • Migrants : Frontex veut détecter la « menace » grâce aux réseaux sociaux
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/181019/migrants-frontex-veut-detecter-la-menace-grace-aux-reseaux-sociaux

    L’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières, forte d’un budget multiplié par trois, se lance dans la surveillance généralisée des réseaux sociaux. Au risque de mettre en danger les populations les plus vulnérables. C’est une police prédictive qui pourrait se déployer non plus à l’échelle d’une ville, d’une région, ni même d’un pays, mais sur tous les continents… Frontex, l’agence européenne de surveillance des frontières, vient en effet de lancer un appel d’offres « pour la fourniture de services (...)

    #Frontex #SocialNetwork #criminalité #migration #surveillance

    ##criminalité

  • Une journée avec les hommes et les femmes de Frontex

    Chaque jour ils surveillent, contrôlent, lisent avec attention vos documents. Les employés de Frontex sont au taquet. L’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes a pour mission principale d’aider les Etats membres de l’Union européenne et de l’espace Schengen à sécuriser leurs frontières extérieures. Elle dispose d’une réserve de réaction rapide de 1500 agents et sera dotée, progressivement jusqu’à 2027, d’un corps permanent de 10.000 agents.

    Les hommes et les femmes qui la composent traquent la moindre anomalie, le moindre document frauduleux. Au moindre doute, tout votre véhicule est fouillé.

    Frontex dirige des opérations maritimes, aériennes et terrestres (en Méditerranée et dans les pays de l’Est notamment). Elles sont menées par des garde-frontières mis à la disposition de l’agence par les Etats membres. Ils sont reconnaissables à leur brassard ou leur dossard bleu clair et sont toujours accompagnés par des agents de l’Etat membre dans lequel a lieu l’opération.

    A l’été 2018 par exemple, dans le cadre de l’opération opération Minerva, Frontex a aidé les autorités espagnoles à contrôler les passagers arrivant du Maroc par ferry. L’agence avait également déployé des experts en documents contrefaits et des agents formés pour repérer les véhicules volés.

    https://ds1.static.rtbf.be/article/image/770xAuto/5/b/b/b8d4c4953a1d60bd9cf28d042fa96f59-1568391909.pngCertains week-ends jusqu’à 100.000 voyageurs et 20.000 véhicules différents sont contrôlés au poste frontière de Medika. D’un côté c’est l’Europe. De l’autre, l’Ukraine. Un point de passage idéal pour a trafiquants en tout genre, drogue, contrebande, contrefaçon. Pour les affronter, une coopération internationale est tout simplement indispensable.

    En matière de lutte contre l’immigration illégale, Frontex coordonne aussi des opérations de renvoi de migrants irréguliers vers leurs pays d’origine (chaque Etat membre restant libre de déterminer quelle personne doit être renvoyée). Elle peut aider les États membres à financer les opérations de retour et à coopérer avec les pays tiers chargés des procédures de réadmission.

    L’Agence européenne assure également une veille permanente de la situation aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et de l’espace Schengen : elle analyse les tendances et collecte des données sur les personnes liées aux filières d’immigration clandestine ou aux activités criminelles transfrontalières (trafics, terrorisme, pêches illégales…). Elle transmet ces informations aux Etats membres et à l’office européen de police Europol.

    Une vocation familiale

    Piotr Wiciejowski a toujours voulu être soldat, il faut dire que c’est une tradition dans la famille. Sauf qu’il a choisi la protection des frontières comme terrain de chasse. Aujourd’hui il coordonne l’agence européenne Frontex à Medyka.

    Dans le même bureau travaillent un Polonais, un Autrichien, un Portugais, un Letton et un Moldave. Tous ont des expériences différentes mais un même objectif : agir rapidement et compter les uns sur les autres.

    « On contrôle les polices d’assurance, les documents de voiture, les passeports, les papiers de voyage, les visas et même les cartes de pêche. » Explique Piotr Wiciejowski.

    La détection des faux documents est une priorité dans la profession et un succès face aux criminels.

    « Notre groupe s’entraîne constamment. Nous avons des spécialistes de la contrefaçon de documents, de la détection des documents de voitures volées, nous partageons les expériences de nos collègues des services de police et des services des frontières d’autres pays de l’Union européenne. » ajoute le garde-frontière.

    En 2018, 1500 faux documents d’identité ont été saisis à la frontière orientale de l’Union européenne. La contrebande est un aussi un défi aux postes frontières. Drogues, alcool sans accise, cigarettes permettent aux organisations criminelles de gagner beaucoup d’argent.

    Un agent témoigne anonymement. « Il s’agit d’un secteur très lucratif pour les groupes criminels, c’est de l’argent facile à gagner, il n’est pas étonnant que des personnes peu scrupuleuses tentent leur chance. Mais nous sommes là pour l’éviter. »

    Les passeurs rivalisent d’imagination pour cacher leur marchandise. Mais les hommes de Frontex ne sont pas dupes et les chiens détecteurs de drogue par exemple, sont très utiles pour dénicher les cargaisons frauduleuses.

    « L’innovation et la créativité de ces groupes criminels n’ont pas de limite » explique le garde.

    Piotr Wiciejowski sait que toutes les voitures doivent être soigneusement contrôlées à la frontière de Medyka. C’est le dernier point de passage pour qu’un véhicule volé ne disparaît complètement des radars. La lutte contre les voleurs de voitures est possible grâce à la coopération internationale. En 2018, près de 1000 voitures volées ont été interceptées aux frontières de l’Union européenne. « Nous venons de saisir une voiture Jaguar en version limitée, d’une valeur marchande supérieure à 400.000 PLN. (Soit 92.313 euros) Lors des contrôles frontaliers en Pologne, il s’est avéré que les numéros d’identification et les papiers de la voiture étaient contrefaits », explique une responsable du bureau polonais.

    Lorsqu’un agent doit vérifier un document ou obtenir des informations rapidement, les employés de Frontex peuvent immédiatement contacter leurs collègues européens. Le temps et la rapidité de réaction sont au détriment des criminels." Si quelqu’un franchit la frontière de notre côté, il peut ensuite arriver facilement à Lisbonne, au Portugal. Nous sommes donc tenus de travailler d’une façon précise et la plus professionnelle possible. Nous sentons la pression sur nous, mais nous la gérons très bien. "

    Lorsqu’ils rentrent dans leur pays, les employés de Frontex ont acquis de nouvelles expériences tout en contribuant à protéger la frontière orientale de l’Union européenne. Une coopération qui joue aussi sur la dissuasion. Les hommes de Frontex veulent aussi donner l’impression aux trafiquants qu’ils ne peuvent leur échapper.

    https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_ces-heros-du-quotidien-les-hommes-et-les-femmes-de-frontex?id=10313604
    #Frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #témoignage #gardes-frontière #travail #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    • Frontex, rempart de l’Europe forteresse !

      À la lecture de l’article paru sur le site de la RTBF du 21 septembre dernier[1], initialement titré “Ces héros du quotidien : les hommes et les femmes de Frontex” et rebaptisé quelques heures plus tard “Une journée avec les hommes et les femmes de Frontex”, nous aurions pu croire qu’il s’agissait d’une campagne de recrutement pour cet organisme européen. “Travailler pour Frontex, c’est agir pour la collectivité” ; “travailler pour Frontex, c’est se réaliser” ; “travailler pour Frontex, c’est faire partie de la grande Europe” semble affirmer ce papier. Mais sous des faux-semblants d’objectivité, cet article nous apparaît clairement partial étant donné l’omission de nombreuses informations.

      Melting-pot nauséabond

      Non, Frontex n’a pas un rôle émancipateur mais est un outil de répression et de blocage des arrivant.e.s et migrant.e.s avant qu’ils.elles ne touchent le sol de l’Union européenne ou de l’Espace Schengen.

      Or, les raisons d’être de Frontex – en réalité, celles que l’autrice a choisi de présenter – s’égrènent tout au long de l’article sous un jour positif. Nous y apprenons que les employé.e.s se dévouent pour nous protéger de la drogue, de la criminalité, des trafics en tout genre… mais aussi de l’immigration “illégale”. Il s’agirait donc de nuisances multiples agrégeables en un tout homogène. Autrement dit, les Européen.ne.s, honnêtes citoyen.ne.s, seraient menacé.e.s et l’objet du malheur viendrait, forcément, de l’extérieur. Cette idée prend appui sur une sémantique très orientée : “sécurité”, “protection”, “affrontement”, “terrain de chasse” (l’Europe serait-elle un terrain de chasse ?!)...

      Paresse intellectuelle et alimentation des peurs constituent donc le ton de cet article. À l’heure où l’extrême droite, véritable menace, gangrène toute l’Europe, nous ne pouvons nous y résoudre. Dès lors, nous formulons une série d’interrogations.

      Quels sont les effets possibles de ce type d’article ? A titre d’illustration, de la perception de menaces à l’armement des agents[2], il n’y a qu’un pas… que la Commission européenne a déjà franchi… et que l’article de la RTBF ne mentionne pas.

      Faut-il, une fois de plus, assimiler l’immigration à une menace ? Faut-il associer l’immigration au trafic de drogue ? À la criminalité ? Faut-il rappeler que les migrant.e.s sont en danger et que les politiques migratoires européennes tuent ? L’Europe, érigée en terre isolée, a déjà laissé périr 30 000 personnes depuis l’année 2000, rien qu’en Méditerranée (selon The Migrants files). Pourtant elles tentaient seulement de fuir des guerres, des traitements iniques et des conditions de vie indignes. Leurs espoirs se heurtent aux murs d’une Europe érigée en forteresse. Cela, l’article ne le mentionne pas non plus. Ne nous y trompons pas : ce ne sont pas “seulement” des personnes qui nous sont étrangères qui décèdent. Nous affirmons que chaque corps qui se noie, chaque vie arrachée s’accompagne de l’amenuisement de notre conscience et de nos valeurs. Voilà bien une menace réelle.

      Angles-morts de l’article

      Le fait que Frontex soit très fort critiqué par des associations ne figure pas non plus dans l’article. Les actions de ces “héros” (comme le titrait au départ la journaliste rédactrice) sont dénoncées par de nombreuses associations (Agir pour la Paix, CNCD, Migreurop, à titre d’illustrations). Beaucoup de critiques venant du monde journalistique ont été faites concernant le manque de transparence de l’agence de contrôle des frontières. Le Guardian, notamment, avait déclaré que Frontex se rendait coupable de violations des droits fondamentaux. Par ailleurs, le journaliste allemand Arne Semsrott et l’espagnole Luisa Izuzquiza, une militante du droit à l’information avaient déposé plainte contre Frontex pour manque de transparence. Nous aurions aimé a minima une solidarité journalistique de la part de la RTBF[3]

      L’article omet également de mentionner ce que Frontex nous coûte. Cette agence, garante de l’Europe forteresse, a investi, depuis l’an 2000… 15 milliards d’euros pour barricader ses frontières qui n’ont pour effet que de garder les personnes migrantes prisonnières à l’intérieur de nos murs physiques et numériques (fichages et contrôles) en complément d’une politique de l’externalisation (Turquie, Maghreb, Libye, collaborant ainsi avec des régimes autoritaires sinon des dictatures) qui représentent un marché lucratif, impossible à mener sans des politiques sécuritaires (et corollaires, racistes).

      Frontex et ses dérives

      Ce sont bien les mesures de nos gouvernements démocratiques qui ont préféré investir des milliards d’euros dans des moyens issus de la haute technologie sécuritaire prônée par Frontex, distillant le principe de la libre circulation des capitaux, au détriment de la sécurité des personnes qui sont forcées de fuir la misère, les changements climatiques ou les dictatures.

      Ainsi, durant la récente période des “vacances”, des centaines de personnes sont mortes en mer, contraintes de fuir dans des embarcations de fortune, faute d’obtenir des moyens légaux de quitter des terres hostiles. Les avions et bateaux de Frontex ont empêché les missions de sauvetage des ONG en criminalisant leurs actions, en les poursuivant pour délit de solidarité ou en les accusant de trafic d’êtres humains. Notons que cette épée de Damoclès poursuit également les hébergeur.se.s aujourd’hui.

      Questionner la déontologie journalistique

      Cet article s’avère donc problématique, et ce, à bien des égards. En plus des questions soulevées précédemment, nous questionnons l’aspect déontologique. La mission du journalisme est d’informer et non de faire du publi-reportage. Faut-il le rappeler ?

      Certes, protéger un territoire des trafics en tout genre, comme la criminalité, est indispensable. Néanmoins, Frontex, comme nous l’avons démontré, c’est avant tout le rempart de l’Europe forteresse.

      Ce reportage unilatéral, partiel et partial est-il digne de l’ambition de la RTBF qui est d’offrir à ses auditeur.trice.s une information de qualité et de référence ? On attend mieux du service public.

      Aucun des médias principaux de la presse écrite de Belgique francophone n’a accepté positivement notre carte blanche selon nos conditions, à savoir qu’elle soit l’objet d’un article à part entière.

      Conclusion

      Le contrôle des murs aux frontières de l’Europe est le problème et non la solution. La hiérarchisation entre les personnes, la catégorisation entre celles et ceux qui ont le droit d’avoir des droits ou non sur le sol européen doit cesser. Les personnes qui risquent leur vie aux frontières doivent être sauvées et accueillies dignement. La solidarité est la seule solution pour faire face aux défis climatiques, démocratiques et économiques à venir.

      https://blogs.mediapart.fr/collectif-citoyen-belge/blog/270919/frontex-rempart-de-l-europe-forteresse
      #journalisme #presse #fact-checking
      ping @karine4

    • Le #Maroc et Frontex renforcent leur coopération

      La capitale polonaise a abrité, jeudi, une séance de travail entre le Maroc et l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) axée sur les moyens de renforcer la coopération et la coordination entre les deux parties afin de relever les défis de la migration clandestine et de la criminalité transfrontalière.
      Lors de cette réunion dirigée par le wali, directeur de la migration et de la surveillance des frontières au ministère de l’Intérieur, Khalid Zerouali, et le directeur exécutif de l’Agence Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, les débats ont porté sur le rôle central du Maroc dans la lutte contre la migration clandestine et la criminalité transfrontalière, l’évaluation des mécanismes de coordination et les différents aspects de la coopération.
      Dans une déclaration à la MAP, Khalid Zerouali a indiqué que la séance de travail, à laquelle ont participé une importante délégation marocaine et l’ambassadeur du Maroc en Pologne, Abderrahim Atmoun, a été l’occasion de jeter la lumière sur le rôle important et les grands efforts déployés par le Royaume en matière de lutte contre l’immigration clandestine et les autres phénomènes transfrontaliers, et sur la contribution importante du Maroc à la stabilité et à la sécurité régionale et internationale.
      Il a également souligné que les responsables de l’Agence Frontex ont salué les approches pratiques, efficaces et pluridimensionnelles adoptées par le Maroc pour faire face aux flux migratoires sur Hautes orientations de Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, et le souci du Royaume à consacrer ces efforts non seulement pour lutter contre ce phénomène mais également pour le traiter dans ses dimensions humaines et suivant des méthodes proactives dont l’efficacité a été prouvée.
      Le Maroc a exprimé sa disposition permanente à contribuer à la lutte contre ces phénomènes négatifs, a affirmé Khalid Zerouali, appelant à concevoir de nouvelles solutions pour accompagner le développement de ces phénomènes qui se compliquent de plus en plus à cause des conditions sociales et sécuritaires prévalant dans certaines régions du continent africain.
      Il a, en outre, rappelé que le Maroc ne s’est pas limité à traiter la question de l’immigration illégale en se basant seulement sur une approche purement sécuritaire mais il a également contribué dans sa position de leader à mettre en place une institution chargée d’évaluer, d’analyser et d’étudier les causes de ce genre de migration suivant des approches pratiques afin de trouver les solutions appropriées, et ce rôle a été confié à l’Observatoire africain de la migration basé à Rabat, soulignant l’importance de la Conférence intergouvernementale sur le Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières, tenue à Marrakech et qui a constitué un espace pour innover des solutions concrètes pour l’établissement de partenariats à tous les niveaux.
      Pour leur part, les responsables de l’agence européenne, dont le siège est à Varsovie, ont relevé que la coordination et la coopération institutionnelle entre Frontex et le Maroc constituent un modèle et une référence dans la coopération entre les pays du Nord et du Sud pour lutter contre la migration irrégulière et mettre à profit les expériences accumulées par le Maroc pour traiter les questions sécuritaires et faire face aux défis posés par les flux migratoires, la criminalité transfrontalière et le terrorisme.
      Ils ont également souligné que la feuille de route claire et les approches du Maroc ont prouvé leur efficacité et leur efficience pour transcender les entraves en rapport avec la migration clandestine.
      La délégation marocaine a participé à Varsovie à la 24ème Conférence internationale sur la sécurité des frontières, organisée cette semaine par Frontex en présence des représentants de plus de 100 pays et 300 experts internationaux, dont les représentants de plusieurs organisations et institutions internationales œuvrant dans le domaine de la sécurité des frontières.
      La conférence a examiné plusieurs questions portant notamment sur les mécanismes permettant de prévenir, de faire respecter et de lutter contre les problèmes mondiaux liés à la sécurité des frontières, tels le trafic des êtres humains et la falsification des documents et des pièces d’identité.

      Fabrice Leggeri : Le Royaume, un partenaire clé dans la lutte contre la migration clandestine

      Le Maroc est « un partenaire clé, modèle et fiable » dans la coopération avec l’Union européenne et les différents pays du monde dans la lutte contre la migration clandestine et d’autres phénomènes connexes, a affirmé jeudi à Varsovie en Pologne le directeur exécutif de l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex), Fabrice Leggeri.
      Le partenariat avec le Maroc a toujours permis de trouver de nombreuses solutions pour lutter contre le phénomène de la migration illégale et ce grâce aux « bonnes expériences » accumulées par le Maroc en matière de lutte contre les phénomènes négatifs, notamment la migration clandestine, la criminalité organisée transfrontalière et le terrorisme, a-t-il souligné dans une déclaration à la MAP en marge d’une séance de travail tenue à Varsovie entre le Maroc et l’Agence Frontex axée sur les questions de migration et de coopération bilatérale.
      Fabrice Leggeri a, par ailleurs, indiqué que cette réunion a été « fructueuse et riche » au niveau des débats constructifs et francs entre les deux parties, et aussi au niveau des propositions avancées par le Maroc en vue de renforcer davantage la coopération bilatérale, ajoutant que la séance de travail a aussi permis d’aborder d’autres questions d’intérêt commun notamment la technologie d’analyse des risques et d’innovation, la coopération entre les garde-côtes et les institutions de sécurité compétentes.
      Le responsable européen a, en outre, souligné que le dialogue et la coopération avec le Maroc ont été toujours une priorité pour l’Union européenne et l’Agence Frontex.

      https://www.libe.ma/Le-Maroc-et-Frontex-renforcent-leur-cooperation_a113092.html

  • ’Inhumane’ Frontex forced returns going unreported

    On a late evening August flight last year from Munich to Afghanistan, an Afghan man seated in the back of the plane struggled to breath as a German escort officer repeatedly squeezed his testicles.

    The man, along with another Afghan who had tried to kill himself, was being forcibly removed from Germany and sent back to a country engulfed in war.

    The EU’s border agency Frontex coordinated and helped pay for the forced return operation, as part of a broader bid to remove from Europe unwanted migrants and others whose applications for international protection had been rejected.

    By then, almost 20 years of war and civil conflict had already ravaged Afghanistan - with 2018 registering its worst-ever civilian death rate since counting had started.

    Also seated on the plane for the 14 August flight were independent observers of the anti-torture committee (CPT) of the human rights watchdog, the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.

    In a report, they describe in detail how six escort officers had surrounded the terrified man in an effort to calm him.

    The ’calming’ techniques involved an officer pulling the man’s neck from behind while yanking his nose upwards.

    His hands and legs had been cuffed and a helmet placed on him. Another knelt on the man’s knees and upper legs, using his full weight to keep him seated.

    After 15 minutes, the kneeling officer “then gripped the returnee’s genitals with his left hand and repeatedly squeezed them for prolonged periods.”

    Another 503 have been sent to Afghanistan in flights coordinated by Frontex since the start of this year.

    Vicki Aken, the International Rescue Committee’s Afghanistan country director, says those returned are invariably put in harm’s way.

    “You cannot say that Kabul is ’conflict-free’. Kabul is actually one of the most dangerous places in Afghanistan,” she said, noting Afghanistan has the highest number of child casualties in the world.

    The day after the Munich flight landed on 14 August 2018, a blast ripped through a high school in the capital city, Kabul, killing 48 people, including over 30 students.
    Accountability

    The flight journey from Munich highlights a stunning omission from Frontex responsibilities - adding to concerns the EU agency is failing to maintain standards when it comes to coordinating forced-returns in a humane manner.

    For one, all return operations must be monitored in accordance with EU law, and a forced-return monitor is required to deliver a report to Frontex and to all the member states involved.

    Such reports, handed over to Frontex’s executive director, are supposed to act as an internal check and balance to stem alleged abuse by escort guards in a system that has been in place since the start of 2017.

    These monitors come from a “pool of forced-return monitors”, as required under the 2016 European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and the 2008 Return Directive, and are broadly sourced from the member states themselves.

    The CPT in their report noted that the flight on 14 August 2018 had also been monitored by Frontex staff itself, and concluded that its “current arrangements cannot be considered as an independent external monitoring mechanism”.

    When the agency compiled its own internal report spanning the latter half of 2018, which included the 14 August flight, no mention was made of the Afghan man who had been manhandled by six officers.

    Asked to explain, the Warsaw-based agency whose annual budget for 2020 is set to increase to €420.6m, has yet to respond to Euobserver.

    Instead, the report, which had been written up by Frontex’s fundamental rights officer, highlighted other issues.

    It demanded escorts not place restraints on children. It said minors who are alone cannot be sent back on a forced-return flight, which is exactly what had happened on two other operations.

    No one on the 14 August flight had issued a “serious incident report” label, used by Frontex whenever a particularly bad incident has been deemed to have transpired.

    During 2018 Frontex coordinated and helped fund 345 such return operations, by charter flights during which only one “serious incident report” was filed - posing questions on the reliability and independence of the monitors and return escorts, as well as the sincerity of internal Frontex efforts to stem any abuse.

    The accountability gap was highlighted by the outgoing head of the Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, who in his farewell speech earlier this month, deliberately singled out Frontex.

    “Frontex is bound by EU laws that prohibit torture and any form of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” he said, in reference to reports of alleged human rights violations that occurred during Frontex support operations observed since mid-2018.
    Monitoring the monitors

    For Markus Jaeger, a Council of Europe official who advises the Frontex management board, the agency’s monitoring system for forced return is meaningless.

    “The internal system of Frontex produces close to nil reports on serious incidents, in other words, the internal system of Frontex, says there is never a human rights incident,” he told EUobserver, earlier this month.

    He said Frontex’s pool of 71 monitors is overstretched and that in some cases, only one is available for a flight that might have 150 people being returned.

    “One monitor doesn’t suffice,” he said, noting Frontex has been able to delegate any blame onto member states, by positioning itself merely as a coordinator.

    But as Frontex expands - with the ability to lease planes, pilots and staff - its direct involvement with the returns also increases and so does its accountability, says Jaeger.

    “The [return] figures are supposedly going up, the capacity is supposedly going up, the procedures are being shortened, and deportations are going to happen by deployed guest officers and or by Frontex officers and so the independence of the monitors is crucial,” he pointed out.

    For its part, the European Commission says Frontex’s pool of monitors is set to expand.
    Nafplion Group

    Jaeger, along with other national authorities from a handful of member states, which already contribute to Frontex’s pool of monitors, are now putting together a new group to keep the forced-returns organised by Frontex better in check.

    Known as the Nafplion Group, and set up as a pilot project last October by the Greek ombudsman, it describes itself as a “remedy to the absence of an external, independent governance of the pool of forced-return monitors” in Frontex forced-return flights.

    The plan is to get it up and running before the end of the year, despite having no guarantee they will ever be selected by Frontex to help monitor a forced-return flight.

    “This is how de facto the Nafplion Group can be avoided,” said Jaeger, noting that they plan to go public should they not be picked.

    Asked to comment, the European Commission says it is not in discussions with any institutions on the establishment of a new, parallel monitoring system.

    https://euobserver.com/migration/146090
    #renvois #expulsions #Frontex #Allemagne #réfugiés #réfugiés_afghans #asile #migrations #violence #responsabilité #retours_forcés #renvois #expulsions #déboutés #Kaboul #directive_retour #Nafplion_Group #monitoring #monitorage

    • Germany: Visit 2018 (return flight)

      CPT/Inf (2019) 14 | Section: 12/18 | Date: 03/12/2018

      A. The removal operation: preparation, execution and handover / 5. Use of force and means of restraint

      50.The use of force and means of restraint in the context of pick-up and transport of irregular migrants by the different Länder police authorities is regulated in the respective Länder police legislation.[1] In the context of the transfer to the airport, most of the returnees were not subjected to any means of restraint. However, a number of returnees were restrained (handcuffed, hand- and foot-cuffed, or even body-cuffed) during their transfer and upon arrival at Terminal F. The use of means of restraint was based on an individual risk assessment.

      51.During the different stages in the preparation of the removal operation by air from a German airport as well as on board a stationary aircraft on German territory, the use of force and means of restraint falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal Police. In-flight, the aircraft commander[2] is – with the assistance of the Federal Police[3] – entitled to apply the necessary preventive and coercive measures to ensure flight security. In particular, means of restraint can be applied if there is a risk that the returnee might attack law enforcement officers or a third party, or if he/she resists.[4]

      The internal instruction of the Federal Police contains detailed provisions on the use of force and means of restraint. In particular, coercive measures are only applied based both on an individual risk assessment and on the returnee’s conduct. Further, the principle of proportionality must be observed. During removal operations, the following means of restraint may be applied: steel, plastic or Velcro hand- and foot-cuffs as well as body-cuffs and head- (i.e. a helmet) and bite-protective devices; the last three means of restraint may only be applied by specially trained police officers and precise instructions have to be followed. Every application of use of force or means of restraint is documented. Further, according to another internal instruction and the operational instructions for this return operation, other weapons (i.e. firearms, tear gas, batons) are prohibited.

      This approach is in line with the means of restraint agreed upon with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), as specified in the implementation plan and its Annex I (operational overview). The implementation plan also underlines that the “use of force is always a last resort and must be the minimum level required to achieve the legitimate objective”.

      Moreover, the internal instruction explicitly mentions by way of clear guidelines the risks related to the use of force and/or means of restraint capable of causing positional asphyxia, including a detailed list of possible related symptoms, and prohibits the use of means likely to obstruct the airways as well as “techniques directed against the person’s neck or mouth”. Further, the forced administration of medication (i.e. sedatives or tranquilisers) as a means of chemical restraint to facilitate removal is strictly forbidden. Such an approach fully reflects the Committee’s position on this issue.

      52.According to information provided by letter of 18 October 2018, the German authorities, in the context of return operations, applied means of restraint 1,098 times for a total of 21,904 foreign nationals returned in 2017, and 673 times for a total of 14,465 persons returned in the period between January and August 2018.

      53.In the course of the return flight on 14 August 2018, coercive measures were applied by the Federal Police to two returnees who attempted to forcefully resist their return.

      One returnee, who had previously attempted to commit suicide and to resist his transfer by the Länder police authorities (see paragraph 28), became agitated during the full-body search in the airport terminal, when Federal Police officers attempted to remove his body-cuff in order to replace it with a more appropriate model (i.e. with Velcro straps rather than metal handcuffs). Further, the wounds on his left forearm had re-opened, requiring the medical doctor to dress them. The returnee was temporarily segregated from other returnees and embarked separately, during which resort to physical force was required to take him inside the aircraft.

      Once seated in the rear of the aircraft (surrounded by five escort officers seated on either side of him, in front and behind), he continued resisting, including by banging his head against the seat, and two of the escorts had to stand up to contain him manually during take-off. Apart from two further minor episodes of agitation, he calmed down as the flight progressed. However, at the moment of handover, he resisted being removed from the aircraft. Consequently, he was immobilised and carried out of the aircraft by a team of up to seven escort officers. Once on the tarmac, he was placed in a separate police vehicle, his body-cuff was removed, and he was handed over to three Afghan police officers, one of whom filmed his handover.

      54.The second returnee complied with the embarkation procedure until the moment when he was seated in the aircraft, at which point he became agitated, started shouting and hitting out in all directions, and attempted to stand up. The two escorts seated on either side of him attempted to keep him seated by holding his arms; they were supported by a back-up team of four escorts, three of whom took up positions behind his seat. One of these escort officers put his arm around the returnee’s neck from behind and used his other hand to pull the returnee’s nose upwards thus enabling his colleague to insert a bite protection into the returnee’s mouth.

      The reaction of the returnee was to increase his resistance, and a second escort officer from the back-up team intervened pulling the returnee’s head down onto an adjacent seat and placing his knee on the returnee’s head in order to exert pressure and gain compliance while the returnee’s hands were tied behind his back with a Velcro strap. Another escort officer applied pressure with his thumb to the returnee’s temple. A second Velcro strap was applied below the returnee’s knees to tie his legs. A helmet was placed on the returnee’s head, additional Velcro straps were applied to his arms and legs, and force was used in order to contain him manually. At this stage, three escorts were holding the returnee from behind his seat and an escort officer was seated either side of him. A sixth escort officer knelt on the returnee’s knees and upper legs, using his weight to keep the returnee seated. After some 15 minutes, this sixth escort officer gripped the returnee’s genitals with his left hand and repeatedly squeezed them for prolonged periods to gain the returnee’s compliance to calm down. When the aircraft took off some ten minutes later, two escorts were still standing upright behind the returnee’s seat to ensure that he remained seated. Shortly thereafter, the returnee calmed down when told that, if he remained compliant, most means of restraint would be removed. He remained cuffed, with his hands tied behind his back, for about one hour. As he remained calm, he was untied.

      55.In the course of this intervention, the delegation observed that, when the first escort officer from the back-up team put his arm around the returnee’s neck, the returnee started struggling to breath and became even more agitated, given that the pressure applied around his throat obstructed his respiratory tract momentarily. The CPT considers that any use of force must avoid inducing a sensation of asphyxia on the person concerned. As is reflected in the relevant internal instructions of the Federal Police, no control technique which impedes a person’s capacity to breath is authorised for use by escort officers.

      Moreover, the delegation observed that, each time the sixth escort officer applied pressure to squeeze the returnee’s genitals, he physically reacted by becoming more agitated. The CPT acknowledges that it will often be a difficult task to enforce a removal order in respect of a foreign national who is determined to stay on a State’s territory. Escorts may on occasion have to use force and apply means of restraint in order to effectively carry out the removal; however, the force used should be no more than is absolutely necessary. To ill-treat a person by squeezing the genitals, a technique which is clearly aimed at inflicting severe pain to gain compliance, is both excessive and inappropriate; this is all the more so given that the person was being restrained by six escorts.

      The CPT recommends that the German authorities take immediate action to end the application of these two techniques by Federal Police escort officers.

      56.The wearing of identification tags by staff involved in removal operations is also an important safeguard against possible abuse. The delegation noted that escort police officers from the Bavarian State Police and from the Federal Police did not wear any identification tag. The CPT recommends that all police escorts from the Federal Police as well as from all Länder police authorities wear a visible identification tag to make them easily identifiable (either by their name or an identification number).

      https://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng#{%22sort%22:[%22CPTDocumentDate%20Descending,CPTDocumentID%20Ascending,CPTSectionNumber%20Ascending%22],%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22CPTSectionID%22:[%22p-deu-20180813-en-12%22]}
      #rapport

  • #Frontex va (aussi) surveiller les #réseaux_sociaux

    L’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’UE veut pouvoir surveiller les réseaux sociaux utilisés par les migrants, réfugiés et leurs passeurs, mais également par « la société civile et les communautés de la diaspora » de leurs pays de destination, afin d’anticiper les « migrations irrégulières », qualifiées de « menace potentielle ».

    Après Bercy, qui veut pouvoir scruter les réseaux sociaux afin d’y débusquer les fraudeurs, Frontex, l’agence européenne chargée du contrôle et de la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’espace Schengen, veut elle aussi les surveiller afin d’anticiper les tendances et prévisions en matière de « migration irrégulière ».

    Faute de pouvoir obtenir de visas humanitaires délivrés dans les ambassades et les consulats des États membres dans les pays tiers, la majeure partie des demandeurs d’asile n’ont en effet d’autre choix que de tenter de franchir illégalement les frontières. « L’Europe organise sa propre crise de l’accueil des exilés », déplorent ainsi les ONG.

    « Au moins 30 000 personnes ont perdu la vie en tentant d’atteindre l’Europe depuis 2000 », déplorait le Parlement européen. Il réclamait, en décembre dernier, l’octroi de ces visas, pour « réduire le nombre de morts parmi les réfugiés, lutter contre les passeurs et améliorer l’utilisation des fonds pour la migration ».

    Il soulignait, en appui de sa proposition, que « 90% des personnes bénéficiant d’une protection internationale dans l’UE sont arrivées par des moyens irréguliers ». Et donc, in fine, qu’ils auraient dû avoir la possibilité de demander l’asile sans avoir à risquer leur vie pour l’obtenir.

    En attendant, Frontex se retrouve à devoir lutter contre ces « migrations irrégulières ». Il vient à ce titre de lancer un appel d’offres pour « saisir les opportunités qui découlent de la croissance rapide des plates-formes de médias sociaux qui permettent à leurs utilisateurs d’interagir les uns avec les autres d’une manière inimaginable auparavant ».

    « Cela a de profondes implications pour les mouvements migratoires de personnes, souligne l’agence, car leurs interactions dans les médias sociaux modifient radicalement la manière dont les personnes acquièrent des informations sur l’itinéraire ou tout autre élément important pour leur décision de migrer ».

    « Ces interactions sur les réseaux sociaux ont souvent lieu avant le départ ou pendant leur transit et donc bien avant que des personnes n’atteignent les frontières extérieures de l’UE ». Elle cherche donc à mettre en place une forme de police prédictive visant à analyser et surveiller les médias sociaux « aux fins de la planification stratégique et d’une image améliorée du renseignement sur la situation et les informations préalables aux frontières concernant les franchissements illégaux des frontières, le volume des franchissements (ou la planification de la traversée) dans des zones spécifiques, des itinéraires et des activités criminelles axées sur les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne au-delà de ces frontières ».

    L’objectif est double : améliorer l’analyse des risques concernant les futurs mouvements migratoires « irréguliers », et soutenir la « planification, la conduite et l’évaluation des opérations conjointes coordonnées par Frontex (frontières maritimes, terrestres et aériennes et comprenant des opérations de retour) », grâce au recueil et à l’analyse d’« un vaste volume de données et d’informations ».

    De plus, et parce que « le paysage des médias sociaux est également très fluide et susceptible de changements rapides », le prestataire devra également faire face à un « défi clé : maintenir les connaissances et l’expertise actuelles au fur et à mesure que la technologie évolue et que les utilisateurs des médias sociaux développent leur utilisation du média », et donc identifier les nouvelles plateformes utilisées par les migrants, réfugiés et leurs passeurs, mais également par « la société civile et les communautés de la diaspora » dans les pays européens de destination.

    https://www.nextinpact.com/news/108254-frontex-va-aussi-surveiller-reseaux-sociaux.htm
    #surveillance #migrations #asile #réfugiés
    #paywall
    ping @isskein @karine4 @etraces

  • A #Split, l’Europe tente de former les #gardes-côtes_libyens

    La mission militaire européenne #Sophia a accepté, pour la première fois et dans des conditions strictes, d’ouvrir à un journaliste l’une des formations qu’elle dispense depuis 2016.

    « Vous ne pourrez pas rester au-delà d’une matinée » ; « Tout sujet politique doit être évité » ; « Vous ne pourrez pas interviewer les élèves »… Après plusieurs demandes, la mission militaire européenne Sophia a accepté, pour la première fois et dans des conditions strictes, d’ouvrir à un journaliste l’une des formations qu’elle dispense depuis 2016 à des gardes-côtes et d’autres membres de la #marine_libyenne.

    En ce mois de septembre, sur la base navale de Split (#Croatie), onze militaires libyens participent à un cours avancé de #plongée_sous-marine, dispensé par d’anciens membres des forces spéciales croates. Dans une salle de classe, on les retrouve en tenue, chemises bleues, pantalons marine, mocassins noirs et casquettes neuves sur lesquelles a été brodé au fil jaune, en anglais, « #Libyan_Navy ». Ils s’appellent Saïd, Aymen, Tabal… La plupart sont sous-officiers et ont entre 20 et 35 ans. Au tableau, un instructeur, traduit en arabe par un interprète, déroule le programme de la journée.

    Volet controversé de l’aide apportée par l’Union européenne (UE) à la Libye pour lutter contre l’immigration clandestine, le soutien aux gardes-côtes a accompagné le désengagement des secours venus des Etats membres en Méditerranée centrale et le transfert à la Libye de la coordination des sauvetages au large de ses côtes, autrefois assumée par l’Italie. L’opération Sophia avait été lancée en 2015 après une série de naufrages afin de « démanteler les modèles économiques des passeurs ». A la demande de Rome, elle a, par la suite, été privée de ses navires pour se concentrer sur la surveillance aérienne.


    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/09/24/a-split-l-europe-tente-de-former-les-gardes-cotes-libyens_6012777_3210.html
    #formation #Frontex #asile #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #opération_Sophia #operation_Sophia

    ping @karine4

  • Le fichage. Note d’analyse ANAFE
    Un outil sans limites au service du contrôle des frontières ?

    La traversée des frontières par des personnes étrangères est un « outil » politique et médiatique, utilisé pour faire accepter à la population toutes les mesures toujours plus attentatoires aux libertés individuelles, au nom par exemple de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le prétexte sécuritaire est érigé en étendard et il est systématiquement brandi dans les discours politiques, assimilant ainsi migration et criminalité, non seulement pour des effets d’annonce mais de plus en plus dans les législations.
    Les personnes étrangères font depuis longtemps l’objet de mesures de contrôle et de surveillance. Pourtant, un changement de perspective s’est opéré pour s’adapter aux grands changements des politiques européennes vers une criminalisation croissante de ces personnes, en lien avec le développement constant des nouvelles technologies. L’utilisation exponentielle des fichiers est destinée à identifier, catégoriser, contrôler, éloigner et exclure. Et si le fichage est utilisé pour bloquer les personnes sur leurs parcours migratoires, il est aussi de plus en plus utilisé pour entraver les déplacements à l’intérieur de l’Union et l’action de militants européens qui entendent apporter leur soutien aux personnes exilées.
    Quelles sont les limites à ce développement ? Les possibilités techniques et numériques semblent illimitées et favorisent alors un véritable « business » du fichage.

    Concrètement, il existe pléthore de fichiers. Leur complexité tient au fait qu’ils sont nombreux, mais également à leur superposition. De ce maillage opaque naît une certaine insécurité juridique pour les personnes visées.
    Parallèlement à la multiplication des fichiers de tout type et de toute nature, ce sont désormais des questions liées à leur interconnexion[1], à leurs failles qui sont soulevées et aux abus dans leur utilisation, notamment aux risques d’atteintes aux droits fondamentaux et aux libertés publiques.

    Le 5 février 2019, un accord provisoire a été signé entre la présidence du Conseil européen et le Parlement européen sur l’interopérabilité[2] des systèmes d’information au niveau du continent pour renforcer les contrôles aux frontières de l’Union.

    http://www.anafe.org/IMG/pdf/note_-_le_fichage_un_outil_sans_limites_au_service_du_controle_des_frontieres

    #frontières #contrôle #surveillance #migration #réfugiés #fichage #interconnexion #interopérabilité

  • J’apprends par ce tweet...


    https://twitter.com/LouisMRImbert/status/1173646846415257601

    ... qu’il y a des #actes du #colloque "#De_Frontex_à_Frontex" qui sont sortis...

    « L’agence Frontex au prisme du concept polysémique de frontière » , in Actes du colloque des 22-23 mars 2018 sur Frontex, Bruylant, à paraître en 2019.

    https://www.sciencespo.fr/ecole-de-droit/fr/profile/imbert-louis.html

    Pour rappel, à ce colloque, auquel j’ai participé dans le public... il y a eu des étudiant·es qui ont été blessés (notamment à la tête) par l’intervention musclée des #CRS sur le #campus de l’#Université_Grenoble_Alpes.

    C’était mars 2018 :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/678989

    voir aussi cet article de #Jon_Solomon #Sarah_Mekdjian :
    De #Frontex à Frontex. À propos de la “continuité” entre l’#université logistique et les processus de #militarisation
    https://seenthis.net/messages/697112

    ping @karine4 @cede @isskein

  • #Frontex : A harder border, sooner

    European leaders have already agreed to a massive boost for the border protection agency, Frontex. The incoming head of the European Commission, #Ursula_von_der_Leyen, wants to bring forward the expansion.

    Europe needs more people guarding its borders and sooner rather than later. Soon after she was elected in July, the European Commission’s next president, Ursula von der Leyen, declared that the reform of Europe’s border and coast guard agency should be brought forward three years, to 2024. The former German defense minister repeated the call during a visit this week to Bulgaria which shares a border with Turkey and counts Frontex as an ally.

    Expansion plans

    The European Commission announced in September 2018, two years after Frontex came into being as a functioning border and coast guard agency, that the organization would be expanded. Then president, Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed that 8,400 more border guards be recruited, in addition to the existing 1,500. “External borders must be protected more effectively,” Juncker said.

    In May this year, the European Commissioner for Migration, Dimitiris Avramopoulos, confirmed that 10,000 armed guards would be deployed by 2027 to patrol the EU’s land and sea borders and significantly strengthen the existing force.

    The EU guards would intercept new arrivals, stop unauthorized travel and accelerate the return of people whose asylum claim had failed, according to the IPS news agency. The guards would also be able to operate outside Europe, with the consent of the third country governments.

    “The agency will better and more actively support member states in the area of return in order to improve the European Union’s response to persisting migratory challenges,” Avramopoulos said.

    What does Frontex do?

    Frontex was set up in 2004 to support the EU control its external land, air and sea borders. In 2016 it was overhauled and in 2018 received a budget of 320 million euros. The agency coordinates the deployment of border guards, boats and helicopters where they are needed to tackle “migratory pressure.”

    Frontex assesses how ready each EU member state is to face challenges at its external borders. It coordinates a pool of border guards, provided by member states, to be deployed quickly at the external borders.

    The agency’s other main functions are to help with forced returns of migrants and organize voluntary departures from Europe. It also collects and shares information related to migrant smuggling, trafficking and terrorism.

    Misguided approach

    While the Frontex approach of strengthening border controls has been welcomed by many of Europe’s leaders, some say this law-and-order solution does not work. Instead, civil society, human rights groups and other critics say hardening borders simply forces migrants to switch to new and often more dangerous routes.

    As Frontex itself said earlier this year, there is no longer a “burning crisis” of migration in Europe (https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/18486/improved-chances-of-asylum-seekers-in-germany-entering-job-market?ref=), as the number of migrants and refugees reaching the continent has dropped dramatically. Yet the risks of dying in the attempt to reach Europe, especially in the Mediterranean, have risen for the past four consecutive years. Part of Frontex’ mandate is to save lives at sea, but critics (https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_back_to_frontex_europes_misguided_migration_policy) say its raison d’etre is the protection of borders, not the protection of lives.

    Abuse claims

    In August, media reports claimed that Frontex border guards had tolerated violence against migrants and were themselves responsible for inhumane treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. Frontex denied that any of its officers had violated human rights (https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/18676/frontex-denies-involvement-in-human-rights-violations). A spokesperson for the European Commission, Mina Andreeva, said the allegations would be followed up.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/19415/frontex-a-harder-border-sooner
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #UE #EU #fermeture_des_frontières #renvois #expulsions #machine_à_expulser #déboutés #externalisation #externalisation_des_frontières #frontières_extérieures #retours_volontaires

    ping @karine4 @isskein @reka

  • Border Violence Monitoring Network - Report July 2019

    The Border Violence Monitoring Network just published a common report summarizing current developments in pushbacks and police violence in the Western Balkans, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and along the Serbian borders with Croatia and Hungary.

    Due tu a new cooperation with the Thessaloniki-based organisation Mobile Info Team, we were also able to touch on the Status quo of pushbacks from and to Greece.

    This report analyzes, among other things:

    – BiH politicians’ rhetoric on Croatian push-backs
    – Whistleblowers increasing pressure on Croatian authorities
    – Frontex presence in Hungarian push-backs to Serbia
    – The use of k9 units in the apprehension of transit groups in Slovenia
    – The spatial dispersion of push-backs in the Una-Sana Canton

    Competing narratives around the legality of pushbacks have emerged, muddying the waters. This has become especially clear as Croatian president Grabar-Kitarovic admitted that pushbacks were carried out legally, which is contradictory to begin with, and that “of course […] a little violence is used.” Croatia’s tactic of de facto condoning illegal pushbacks is similar to Hungary’s strategy to legalize these operations domestically, even though they violate international and EU law. On the other side of the debate, a whistleblower from the Croatian police described a culture of secrecy and institutional hurdles, which prevent legal and organizational challenges to the practice. The role of the EU in this debate remains critical. However, despite paying lip service to the EU’s value, Brussels’ continues to shoulder the bill for a substantial part of the frontier states’ border operations.

    https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/July-2019-Final-Report.pdf

    #frontières #violence #push-back #refoulement #route_des_Balkans #Frontex #Subotica #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Croatie #Italie #Serbie #Hongrie #rapport

    • Croatia Is Abusing Migrants While the EU Turns a Blind Eye

      The evidence of Croatian police violence toward migrants is overwhelming, but Brussels continues to praise and fund Zagreb for patrolling the European Union’s longest external land border.

      BIHAC, Bosnia and Herzegovina—Cocooned in a mud-spattered blanket, thousands of euros in debt, and with a body battered and bruised, Faisal Abas has reached the end of the line, geographically and spiritually. A year after leaving Pakistan to seek greener pastures in Europe, his dreams have died in a rain-sodden landfill site in northern Bosnia. His latest violent expulsion from Croatia was the final straw.

      “We were just a few kilometers over the border when we were caught on the mountainside. They wore black uniforms and balaclavas and beat us one by one with steel sticks,” he recalled. “I dropped to the ground and they kicked me in the belly. Now, I can’t walk.”

      Faisal rolled up his trousers to reveal several purple bruises snaking up his shins and thighs. He has begun seeking information on how to repatriate himself. “If I die here, then who will help my family back home?” he said.

      The tented wasteland outside the Bosnian city of Bihac has become a dumping ground for single male migrants that the struggling authorities have no room to accommodate and don’t want hanging around the city. Bhangra music blasts out of a tinny speaker, putrid smoke billows from fires lit inside moldy tents, and men traipse in flip-flops into the surrounding woods to defecate, cut off from any running water or sanitation.

      A former landfill, ringed by land mines from the Yugoslav wars, the hamlet of Vucjak has become the latest squalid purgatory for Europe’s largely forgotten migrant crisis as thousands escaping war and poverty use it as a base camp to cross over the Croatian border—a process wryly nicknamed “the game.”

      The game’s unsuccessful players have dark stories to tell. A young Pakistani named Ajaz recently expelled from Croatia sips soup from a plastic bowl and picks at his split eyebrow. “They told us to undress and we were without shoes, socks, or jackets. They took our money, mobiles and bags with everything inside it, made a fire and burnt them all in front of us. Then they hit me in the eye with a steel stick,” he said. “They beat everyone, they didn’t see us as humans.”

      Mohammad, sitting beside his compatriot, pipes up: “Last week we were with two Arabic girls when the Croatian police caught us. The girls shouted to them ‘sorry, we won’t come back,’ but they didn’t listen, they beat them on their back and chest with sticks.”

      Down the hill in Bihac, in a drafty former refrigerator factory turned refugee facility, a metal container serves as a quarantine area for the infectious and infirm. Mohammad Bilal, a scrawny 16-year-old, lies on a lower bunk with his entire leg draped in flimsy bandage. Three weeks ago, at the cusp of winning the game and crossing into Italy, he was seized in Slovenia and then handed back to Croatia. That’s when the violence began.

      “They drove us in a van to the Bosnian border and took us out one at a time,” he said, describing the Croatian police. “There were eight police, and one by one they beat us, punching, kicking, hitting with steel sticks. They broke my leg.”

      A nearby Bosnian camp guard grimaced and wondered out loud: “Imagine how hard you have to hit someone to break a bone.”

      Among the fluctuating migrant population of 7,000 thought to be in the area, vivid descriptions of violent episodes are being retold every day. The allegations have been mounting over the last two years, since Bosnia became a new branch in the treacherous Balkan migratory route into Europe. Denunciations of Croatian border policy have come from Amnesty International, the Council of Europe, Human Rights Watch, and a United Nations special rapporteur. Officials in Serbia have even alleged “physical and psychological torture” by Croatia’s police forces.

      In November 2018, the Guardian published a video shot by a migrant in which haunting screams can be heard before a group of migrants emerge from the darkness wild-eyed and bloodied. A month later, activists secretly filmed Croatian police marching lines of migrants back into Bosnian territory.

      Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic even appeared to let the cat out of the bag in an interview with the Swiss broadcaster Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen, during which she remarked that “a little bit of force is needed when doing pushbacks.” Despite the videos showing injured migrants, explicit video evidence of Croatian officials carrying out actual beatings has never been seen, and migrants report that one of the first commands by border guards is to surrender mobile phones, which are then either taken or destroyed before a thorough search is performed.

      The abuse appears to be rampant. Both the violence and humiliation—migrants are often forced to undress and walk back across the border to Bosnia half-naked for several hours in freezing temperatures—seem to be used as a deterrent to stop them from returning. And yet the European Union is arguably not only facilitating but rewarding brute force by a member state in the name of protecting its longest land border.

      In December 2018, the European Commission announced that it was awarding 6.8 million euros to Croatia to “strengthen border surveillance and law enforcement capacity,” including a “monitoring mechanism” to ensure that border measures are “proportionate and are in full compliance with fundamental rights and EU asylum laws.”

      According to European Commission sources, a sum of 300,000 euros was earmarked for the mechanism, but they could not assess its outcome until Croatia files a report due in early 2020. Details of oversight remain vague. A spokesperson for the United Nations refugee agency in Croatia told Foreign Policy that the agency has no involvement. The Croatian Law Center, another major nongovernmental organization, also confirmed it has no role in the mechanism. It appears to be little more than a fig leaf.

      https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/croatia-is-abusing-migrants-while-the-eu-turns-a-blind-eye
      #Slovénie

    • AYS Special 2019/2020: A Year of Violence — Monitoring Pushbacks on the Balkan Route

      In 2019, The Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) shared the voices of thousands of people pushed back from borders on the Balkan Route. Each tells their own tale of illegal, and regularly violent, police actions. Each represents a person denied their fundamental rights, eyewitnesses to EU led reborderization. This article shares just some of the more startling trends which define border management on the eve of 2020, such as the denial of asylum rights, systemic firearms use, water immersion, and dog attacks.

      With a shared database of 648 reports, BVMN is a collaborative project of organisations with the common goal of challenging the illegal pushback regime and holding relevant institutions to account.

      “Pushback” describes the unlegislated expulsion of groups or individuals from one national territory to another, and lies outside the legal framework of “deportations”. On a daily basis, people-on-the-move are subject to these unlawful removals; a violent process championed by EU member states along the Balkan Route. In 2019, BVMN continued to shine a spotlight on these actions, perpetrated in the main part by states such as Croatia, Hungary, and Greece. Supporting actors also included Slovenia and Italy, and non-member states with the aid of Frontex which has seen its remit and funding widened heading into 2020.

      Volunteers and activists worked across the route in 2019 to listen to the voice of people facing these violations, taking interviews in the field and amplifying their calls for justice. Just some of the regular abuses that constitute pushbacks are listed below.
      Guns and Firearm Abuse

      The highest volume of BVMN reported pushbacks were from Croatia, a state which has been acting as a fulcrum of the EU’s external border policy in the West Balkans. It’s approximately 1300 kilometer long border with the non-member states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro have been a flashpoint for extremely violent pushbacks. Even in the challenging winter conditions, people make daily attempts to cross through the mountainous landscape of Croatia and are pushed back from the territory by a web of police actors who deny them the proper procedure and use crude physical abuse as a deterrent.

      Of major concern is the huge rise in gun use by Croatian officials against transit populations. In the first ten months of 2019 BVMN recorded 770 people who were pushed back by police officers who used guns to shoot or threaten. In November, shots were fired directly at transit groups, resulting in the near fatal wounding of one man, and causing a puncture wound in the shoulder of another. AYS reported on the shooting of two minors in 2017, showing this isn’t the first time guns were turned on unarmed transit people in Croatia.
      Dog Attacks and K9 Units

      The use of canine units in the apprehension and expulsion of transit groups is also a telling marker of the extreme violence that characterises pushbacks. Since the summer of 2019, a spike in the level of brutal dog attacks, and the presence of K9 units during pushbacks has been noted by BVMN. In a recent case, one man was mauled by a Croatian police dog for ten minutes under the direct guidance of the animals police handlers who laughed and shouted, “good, good”, as it almost severed a major blood vessel in the victim’s leg.

      Fortunately, the man survived, but with permanent injuries that he nurses still today in Bosnia-Herzegovina where he was illegally pushed back, in spite of his request for asylum and urgent physical condition. Sadly this is not an unfamiliar story. Across the route canine units remain a severe threat within pushbacks, as seen in cases recorded from North Macedonia to Greece where a man was severely bitten, or in chain a pushback from Slovenia where 12 unmuzzled police dogs traumatised a large transit group. Dogs as weapons are a timely reminder of the weighting of border policy towards violent aggression, and away from due legal access to asylum and regulated procedure.
      Gatekeeping Asylum Access

      K9 units and guns are ultra-violent policing methods that contribute directly to the blocking of asylum access. In the first eleven months of 2019, over 60% of Croatian pushbacks to Bosnia-Herzegovina saw groups make a verbal request for asylum. Yet in these cases, group members were pushed back from the territory without having their case heard, in direct contravention of European asylum law.

      Croatian authorities, along with a host of other states, have effectively mobilised pushbacks to remove people from their territories irrespective of claims for international protection. A host of actors, such as police officers and translators have warped the conditions for claiming asylum, regularly coercing people to sign removal documents, doctoring the ages of minors, or avoid any processing at all by delivering them to the green border immediately where they are pushed back with violence. Slovenia are also participants in this chain of asylum violation, seen most brutally in a case from July when pepper spray was used to target specifically the people who spoke out asking for asylum.
      Wet Borders: River Pushbacks

      Most pushbacks occur at remote areas of the green border, especially at night, where violence can be applied with effective impunity. A particular feature of police violence on the border is the weaponisation of rivers to abuse groups. Monitoring work from September revealed 50% of direct pushbacks from Croatia involved respondents being forced into rivers or immersed in water. This is accompanied regularly by the stripping of people (often to their underwear) and burning of their possessions. Then, police officer push them into the rivers that mark the boundary with Bosnia-Herzegovina (often the Glina and Korana), putting people at a high risk of drowning and hypothermia.

      A recent case from November combined the use of firearms with this dangerous use of wet borders. A group of Algerians were pushed into a river by Croatian officers who were returning them to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

      The respondent recalled how: “They pushed me into the river and said, ‘Good luck.’”, while the officers fired guns into the air.

      Meanwhile in the Evros region of Greece, the river border is used regularly to pushback people-on-the-move into Turkey. As in Croatia, the incidents often occur at night, and are carried out by officials wearing ski masks/balaclavas. Taken by force, transit groups report being loaded violently onto small boats and ferried across to the Turkish side. This regular and informal system of removal stands out as a common violation across Greece and the Balkan area, and raises major concerns about the associated risks of water immersion given the high levels of drowning which occur in the regions rivers.
      2019 at the EU’s Doorstep

      Border management on the Balkan Route has systematised a level of unacceptable, illegal and near fatal violence.

      The trends noted in 2019 are an astonishing reminder that such boundaries are no longer governed by the rule of law, but characterised almost entirely by the informal use of pushback violations.

      Gun use stands out as the most extreme marker of violence within pushbacks. But the shooting of weapons sits within a whole arsenal of policing methods that also include blunt physical assault, unlawful detention, abuse during transportation, taser misuse and stripping. Though Croatia emerged as a primary actor within BVMN’s dataset, common practive between EU member states were also clear, as across the region: Hungary, Slovenia and Greece continued to target people-on-the-move with a shared set of illegal and violent methods. The new interventions of Frontex outside of EU territory also look to compliment this reborderisation effort, as non-member states in the Western Balkans become integrated into the pushback regime.

      The Border Violence Monitoring Network will continue to elevate the brave voices of those willing to expose these violent institutions. Their stories are a testament to the dire situation at Europe’s borders on the eve of 2020, and accountability will continue to be sought.

      https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-special-2019-2020-a-year-of-violence-monitoring-pushbacks-on-the-balkan-
      #2019 #chiens #armes #armes_à_feu