• Après avoir regardé un Tintin-doudou avec le fils (chaque épisode vu 10000 fois), car pas long, pour qu’il se couche tôt… on s’est fait happer par les recommandations Youtube. De choses déjà écoutées, et des choses bien trouvées, accurate. Bé il s’est pas couché tôt.

    Des Beatles, car j’ai une copine qui n’écoute que ça sur mon adresse IP :p
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_MjCqQoLLA

    Stevie à 24 ans, 1974
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqKCx0T--GU

    Prince PAS années 80 :p, jazz funk tout seul à 19 ans, 1977
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xV7kV0F41y4

    Du coup cet album jazz funk 1972 du trompettiste Donald Byrd, avec Bobby Hutcherson au vibraphone (jamais écouté mais parfait pour moi)
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEXF7w7KOQ4

    Un guitariste jazz rock japonais, Masayoshi Takanaka, 1979
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNig6xG36i4

    Et Bill Withers
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtT_8pEjHgo

    #musique #années_70 #soul #funk #jazz #Beatles #Stevie_Wonder #Prince #Donald_Byrd #Bill_Withers #sérendipité

  • Byebye 3G - AG Taxi Berlin
    http://www.ag-taxi.de/byebye3g.html

    Ab Juli geht nichts mehr über 3G in der Berliner Taxivermittlung. Nur noch Internet, Android-Smartphone und neue Mobilfunkstandards werden vom Vermittlungsmonopolisten Taxi-Berlin unterstützt.

    Die Vermittlungskunden werden sehr kurzfristig auf die neuen Bedingungen hingewiesen. Tschüß Compaq Handheld, seit 2001 warst Du mein treuer Beschützer, jetzt kriegt Google meine Daten !

    Zitat:

    Informationen zu den Auswirkungen auf unsere Vermittlungstechnik
    ...
    Um ein weiteres zuverlässiges Funktionieren der Vermittlungstechnik zu gewährleisten, sehen wir uns gezwungen, uns von der veralteten PDA-Technik vollständig zu trennen. Ab dem 01.07.2021 wird daher keine Vermittlung mehr über PDA Technik abgewickelt.
    ...
    Um weiterhin an der Vermittlung teilnehmen zu können, legen wir den letzten verbliebenen PDA-Nutzern ans Herz, ebenfalls auf die Fahrerapp zu wechseln. Sie benötigen ein Android Smartphone mit einer relativ aktuellen Android-Version und dem Google Play Store. Das Smartphone benötigt für die Vermittlung eine Datenverbindung. Diese kann mit einer SIM-Karte oder über einen vorhandenen Hotspot hergestellt werden.
    ...
    Wer bisher die Fahrerapp mit einer SIM-Karte der Zentrale betreibt, muss sich eine eigene SIM-Karte zulegen. Die Nutzer von Touchanlagen wenden sich bitte wegen der technischen Umstellung an die Firma Heedfeld Elektronik in der Persiusstraße.
    ...

    „Hintergrundinfos“ gibt es auch:

    https://www.focus.de/digital/internet/3g-abschaltung-millionen-deutsche-haben-bald-kein-netz-mehr_id_10900644.html
    und
    https://www.telekom.de/hilfe/3g-abschaltung?samChecked=true

    Hätten wir Euch früher sagen können, dass so etwas kommt:

    24.01.2017 Die Deutsche Telekom und die UMTS-Abschaltung https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Die-Deutsche-Telekom-und-die-UMTS-Abschaltung-3606384.html

    18.09.2020 Deutsche Telekom: UMTS wird im Sommer 2021 abgeschaltet https://www.heise.de/news/Deutsche-Telekom-UMTS-wird-im-Sommer-2021-abgeschaltet-4905633.html

    18.11.2020 Telefónica: UMTS-Netz wird 2021 abgeschaltet https://www.heise.de/news/Telefonica-UMTS-Netz-wird-2021-abgeschaltet-4964454.html

    Die Sache war spätestens seit Anfang 2017 bekannt. Tja, wer nicht lesen will, muss fühlen, was ihm sein Fahrgastvermittler so andreht. So wie es aussieht, hat der kaum aktuelle Infos für seine Fahreinnen und Fahrer. Schade eigentlich. Wird das mit Uber, FreeNow & Co. besser? Vermutlich wird es schlechter, zeichnen sich diese Konzerne doch vor allem durch undurchsichtige AGBs und reichlich Geheimniskrämerei aus.

    #Taxi #Funkvermittlung #Taxifunk

  • In the Sonoran Desert, #GIS Helps to Map Migrant Deaths

    GIS technology lends insight into why some undocumented migrants perish while crossing international borders.

    Last year geographer #Sam_Chambers published an unusual map of the Sonoran Desert. He wasn’t interested in marking roads, mountains, and cities. Instead, the University of Arizona researcher wanted to show the distance a young male can walk in various regions of the desert before the high temperature and physical exertion put him at risk of dying from heat exposure or hyperthermia.

    On the resulting map, red and purple correspond with cooler, mountainous terrain. Yellow and white, which dominate the image, indicate a remote, hot valley. It’s here where migrants seeking to cross between Mexico and the United States are at greatest risk of dying from the desert’s relentless sun.

    Chambers’ map relies on geographical information system (GIS) modeling, a digital technology that allows geographers to perform spatial, data-driven analysis of landscapes. Chambers’ chosen topic represents a burgeoning effort to use GIS to understand the risk undocumented migrants face while crossing international borders, according to Jonathan Cinnamon, a geographer at Ryerson University in Toronto. According to Chambers’ analysis, migrants began crossing through hotter, more rugged parts of the desert after the U.S. government increased the number of Border Patrol agents and installed new surveillance technologies, including underground motion sensors and radar-equipped watchtowers.

    The Sonoran covers roughly 100,000 square miles in Arizona, California, and Mexico, and includes major cities such as Phoenix and Tucson, as well as vast swathes of empty public and private lands. The effort to funnel migrants into this desert began in 1994 under the Clinton administration. That’s when the wave of increased migration that had started in the 1980s prompted the U.S. government to embrace the policy of “prevention through deterrence.” The idea was that would-be migrants from Mexico and Central America would be deterred from illegally crossing the U.S. border if their routes were too treacherous. With this goal in mind, Border Patrol erected new infrastructure and stepped up enforcement in border cities like Tijuana and El Paso, leaving the harsh unpopulated borderlands as the only option.

    In an email to Undark, John Mennell, a public affairs specialist with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) — the agency that oversees Border Patrol — in Arizona, said that people crossing the border illegally are at risk from the predations of smugglers and criminal organizations, who, he says, encourage migrants to ride on train tops or to shelter in packed houses with limited food and water. Mennell says the agency has installed rescue beacons in the desert, which migrants can use to call for help. According to CBP, Border Patrol rescued roughly 5,000 migrants on the Southwest border from October 2019 through September 2020.

    Yet according to data compiled by the nonprofit group Humane Borders, the prevention through deterrence approach has failed to stop migrants from attempting the border crossing. “There continues to be a shift in migration into more remote and difficult areas,” said Geoff Boyce, a geographer at Earlham College in Indiana, and one of Chambers’ collaborators. Migrants have a much higher chance of dying in the desert today than they did 15 years ago, he said, and the numbers continue to rise, from 220 deaths per 100,000 apprehensions in 2016 to 318 deaths per 100,000 apprehensions in 2020. Last year, 227 migrants died in the Pima County Medical Examiner’s jurisdiction, in southern Arizona, although activists say that the number is likely much higher because of the way bodies disappear in the desert.

    Chambers and Boyce source mortality data from the Pima County Medical Examiner’s Office. They have gotten information on migrant activity from No More Deaths, one of many humanitarian groups in the Tucson area that maintains desert water and supply stations for migrants. No More Deaths, which supports the decriminalization of undocumented migration, has set up supplies in the mountains and other hard-to-reach areas. Humane Borders also maintains stations in areas accessible by car. These organizations maintain meticulous records — the raw data that launched Chambers’ and Boyce’s first desert mapping collaboration.

    On a cool November morning, Rebecca Fowler, administrative manager with Humane Borders, climbed into a truck armed with a list of 53 water stations. She was joined by two volunteers who chatted on the street next to a truck bed bearing yards of hoses and 55-gallon blue barrels that the organization purchases at a discount from soda companies.

    Fowler was leading the Friday morning water run to seven stations off State Route 286, which runs south from Tucson to an isolated border town called Sasabe. Each week, Fowler and her volunteers check to be sure that the water is potable and plentiful. They change out dirty barrels and make notes of any vandalism. (In the past, some of the group’s barrels have been found with bullet holes or with the spigots ripped off.)

    Among other data points, Fowler and her team gather data on water usage, footprints, and clothes found near their sites. Using the county’s medical examiner data, they have also created an interactive map of migrant deaths. A search of their website reveals a spread of red dots on the Southwestern United States, so many between Phoenix and Tucson that the map turns black. The organization has charted more than 3,000 deaths in the past two decades.

    In her years in the desert, Fowler has noticed the same kind of changes pointed to in Boyce’s and Chambers’ research. “Migrants have been increasingly funneled into more desolate, unforgiving areas,” she said.

    GIS modeling, which is broadly defined as any technique that allows cartographers to spatially analyze data and landscapes, has evolved alongside computers. The U.S. military was an early developer and adopter of this technology, using it to understand terrain and plan operations. In those early days, few activists or academics possessed the skills or the access needed to use GIS, said Cinnamon. But in the last decade, more universities have embraced GIS as part of their curricula and the technology has become more readily available.

    Now, the kind of GIS modeling employed by Chambers, who uses ArcGIS and QGIS software, is commonplace in archaeology and landscape design. It allows modelers to understand how factors like terrain, weather, and manmade features influence the way people move through a given physical environment.

    An architect might employ GIS technology to decide where to put sidewalks on a college campus, for example. Chambers used these techniques to study elk migration during his doctoral studies at the University of Arizona. But after Boyce connected him to No More Deaths, he started using his skills to study human migration.

    No More Deaths tracks data at their water stations, too — including acts of vandalism, which they asked Boyce and Chambers to assist in analyzing via GIS. That report, released in 2018, spatially examines the time of year and location of the vandalism and uses its results to postulate that Border Patrol agents are primarily responsible, while acknowledging that rogue actors, such as hunters and members of militia groups, may contribute as well. (CBP did not respond to Undark’s questions on water station vandalism.)

    When Boyce and Chambers finished analyzing the information, they asked themselves: What else could this data reveal? Previous attempts to understand the desert’s hostility had relied on the prevalence of human remains or statistics on capture by Border Patrol agents, but both of those are imperfect measures.

    “It’s very hard to get any type of reliable, robust information about undocumented migration, particularly in remote desert areas,” said Boyce. “The people who are involved, their behavior is not being methodically recorded by any state actor.”

    Most of the water stations on Fowler’s route were set back from the highway, off bumpy roads where mesquite scraped the truck. By 11 a.m., heavy-bellied clouds had rolled in and the temperature was in the 80s and rising. The fingers of saguaro cacti pointed at the sky and at the Quinlan Mountains jutting over the horizon; on the other side lay the Tohono O’odham Nation. Fowler says Border Patrol’s policies increasingly shunt migrants into treacherous lands within the reservation.

    Humane Borders’ water barrels are marked by long poles capped by tattered blue flags, fluttering above the brush. Each barrel features a combination lock, preventing vandals from opening the barrel and pouring anything inside. Each is also marked by a Virgin of Guadalupe sticker, a symbol for migrants passing through the desert.

    At each stop, Fowler and that day’s volunteers, Lauren Kilpatrick and Isaiah Ortiz, pulled off the lock and checked the water for particulates and pH levels. They picked up nearby trash and kept an eye out for footprints. At the third station, the water harbored visible black dots — an early sign of algae — so the group dumped all 55 gallons and set up a new barrel. At a later station, Fowler found a spigot that had been wrenched off and flung among the mesquite. Later still, the group came upon a barrel full of decaying, abandoned backpacks.

    This was the third water run for Kilpatrick and Ortiz, a couple from Nevada now living in Arizona. Kilpatrick had read books and listened to podcasts about the borderlands, and Ortiz had wanted to get involved because the crisis felt personal to him — some of his family are immigrants, some of his friends and their relatives undocumented.

    “I just think about their journey — some of them are from Central America and Mexico,” he said. “Their lives were in real danger coming through areas like this.”

    GIS modeling simplifies this complex landscape into a grid. To analyze the grid, Chambers uses a standard modeling software; so far, he has published five papers with Boyce about the desert. For the first they worked on together, the team took No More Deaths’ data on visits to water sites from 2012 to 2015 and looked at changes in water usage at each site. Once they’d determined which routes had fallen out of favor and which had risen in popularity, they looked at whether those newer routes were more treacherous, using a ruggedness index that Chambers developed with his colleagues by looking at the slope and jaggedness of terrain, along with vegetation cover and temperature. They concluded that official United States policy is increasingly shunting migrants into more rugged areas.

    From CBP’s perspective, “Walking through remote inhospitable terrain is only one of many dangers illegal immigrants face during their dangerous journey into the United States,” said Mennell. And installing new technology and increased patrol on popular migration routes is actually a good thing, he says, because it contributes to the goal of securing the border against smugglers shepherding in so-called “illegal immigrants.”

    In another paper, Chambers studied whether migrants took new routes to avoid increased surveillance, and whether those new routes put them at higher risk of heat exposure and hyperthermia. To map out which areas were toughest to cross — as measured by caloric expenditure — Chambers factored in such variables as slope, terrain, and average human weight and walking speed, borrowing both military and archaeological formulas to measure the energy expenditures of different routes. He used viewshed analysis, which tells a mapmaker which areas are visible from a certain point — say, from a surveillance tower — and, using his slope calculations and the formulae, compared the energy costs of walking within sight of the towers versus staying out of sight.

    Chambers tested his findings against the maps of recovered human remains in the area before and after increased surveillance. To map risk of heat exposure, Chambers used formulae from sports medicine professionals, military physicians, and physiologists, and charted them onto the desert. And he found, just as with the ruggedness index, that people are taking longer, more intense routes to avoid the towers. Now they need more calories to survive the desert, and they’re at higher risk of dying from heat.

    Caloric expenditure studies had been done before in other contexts, said Chambers. But until this map, no one had ever created a detailed spatial representation of locations where the landscape and high temperatures are deadliest for the human body.

    GIS mapping is also being used to track migration into Europe. Lorenzo Pezzani, a lecturer in forensic architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London, works with artists, scientists, NGOs, and politicians to map what they see as human rights violations in the Mediterranean Sea.

    Compared with the group conducting research in Arizona, Pezzani and his team are at a distinct disadvantage. If a body drops into the sea, it’s unlikely to be recovered. There’s just not as much data to study, says Pezzani. So he and his team study discrete disasters, and then they extrapolate from there.

    Pezzani disseminates his group’s work through a project called Forensic Oceanography, a collaborative research effort consisting of maps, visualizations, and reports, which has appeared in art museums. In 2018, information gathered through their visualizations was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights as evidence showing the Italian government’s role in migrant drowning deaths.

    The goal is to make migrant deaths in the Mediterranean more visible and to challenge the governmental narrative that, like the deaths in the Sonoran, these deaths are unavoidable and faultless. Deaths from shipwrecks, for example, are generally blamed on the criminal networks of human traffickers, said Pezzani. He wants to show that the conditions that draw migrants into dangerous waters are the result of “specific political decisions that have been taken by southern European states and by the European Union.”

    Pezzani, Chambers, and Boyce all intend for their work to foster discussion about government policy on immigration and borderlands. Boyce, for one, wants the U.S. government to rethink its policy of “prevention through deterrence” and to demilitarize the border. He believes the current policy is doomed to fail and is inhumane because it does not tackle the underlying issues that cause people to try to migrate in the first place. Ryan Burns, a visiting scholar at University of California, Berkeley, said he wants to see more research like this. “We need more scientists who are saying, ‘We can produce knowledge that is sound, that is actionable, that has a very well-established rigor to it, but is also politically motivated,’” Burns said.

    Cinnamon said that GIS, by its nature, tends to involve approaching a project with a viewpoint already in mind. “If the U.S. government decided to do the same study, they might approach it from a very different perspective,” he said. As long as the authors are overt about their viewpoints, Cinnamon sees no issue.

    Burns, however, did sound one cautionary note. By drawing attention to illegal crossings, he said, researchers “could be endangering people who are taking these paths.” In other words, making a crisis more visible can be politically powerful, but it can also have unintended consequences.

    Before their last water station visit, the group from Humane Borders drove into Sasabe. A helicopter chopped overhead, probably surveilling for migrants, Fowler said. Border Patrol vehicles roamed the streets, as they do throughout this part of the country.

    Once, Fowler said, a 12-foot wall spread for miles across the mountains here. In recent months, it’s been replaced by the U.S. government’s latest effort to stop migrants from venturing into the desert: a 30-footer, made of steel slats, undulating through the town and across the mountains in either direction. It’s yet another factor to consider when mapping the Sonoran and envisioning how its natural and manmade obstacles will shape its migration routes.

    “There’s so much speculation” about what will happen to migrants because of this wall, said Fowler. She suspects they will cross through the Tohono O’odham Nation, where there’s no wall. But they won’t have access to water dropped by Humane Borders. “What I worry about, obviously, is more people dying,” said Fowler. She’s certain the migrants “will continue to come.”

    Chambers and Boyce plan to keep making maps. They recently published a paper showing the stress that internal border checkpoints place on migrants crossing the desert, the latest step in their quest to create empirical evidence for the increasing treacherousness of the border.

    “It’s an important thing for people to know,” said Boyce.

    https://undark.org/2021/03/31/mapping-migrant-deaths-sonoran-desert
    #SIG #désert_du_Sonora #asile #migrations #frontières #morts_aux_frontières #décès #morts #USA #Mexique #Etats-Unis #cartographie #visualisation #contre-cartographie

    ping @reka

    • Developing a geospatial measure of change in core temperature for migrating persons in the Mexico-U.S. border region

      Although heat exposure is the leading cause of mortality for undocumented immigrants attempting to traverse the Mexico-U.S. border, there has been little work in quantifying risk. Therefore, our study aims to develop a methodology projecting increase in core temperature over time and space for migrants in Southern #Arizona using spatial analysis and remote sensing in combination with the heat balance equation—adapting physiological formulae to a multi-step geospatial model using local climate conditions, terrain, and body specifics. We sought to quantitatively compare the results by demographic categories of age and sex and qualitatively compare them to known terrestrial conditions and prior studies of those conditions. We demonstrated a more detailed measure of risk for migrants than those used most recently: energy expenditure and terrain ruggedness. Our study not only gives a better understanding of the ‘#funnel_effect’ mechanisms, but also provides an opportunity for relief and rescue operations.

      https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1877584520300411
      #risques #risque #analyse_spatiale

  • Bruno Mars, Anderson .Paak, Silk Sonic - Leave the Door Open [Official Video]
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adLGHcj_fmA

    T’as quand même entendu dire que Anderson Paak et Bruno Mars ont enregistré un album entier ensemble hein ? Et ça va sauver l’année pourrie. :)

    Intro
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odRWSkWTT6E

    #musique #funk #soul #R&B #groove #Anderson_Paak #Bruno_Mars #Silk_Sonic #feel_good #Californie #love et yora du #Bootsie_Collins aussi

  • L’#enseignement_numérique ou le supplice des Danaïdes. Austérité, surveillance, désincarnation et auto-exploitation

    Où l’on apprend comment les étudiants en #STAPS de #Grenoble et #Saint-Étienne ont fait les frais de la #numérisation - #déshumanisation de l’#enseignement bien avant l’apparition du coronavirus. Et comment ce dernier pourrait bien avoir été une aubaine dans ce processus de #destruction programmé – via notamment la plate-forme #FUN (sic).

    Les #plateformes_numériques d’enseignement ne datent pas de la série quasiment continue de confinements imposés aux universités depuis mars 2020. Enseignante en géographie à l’Université Grenoble Alpes, je constate le développement croissant d’« outils numériques d’enseignement » dans mon cadre de travail depuis plus d’une dizaine d’années. En 2014, une « #licence_hybride », en grande majorité numérique, est devenue la norme à Grenoble et à Saint-Étienne dans les études de STAPS, sciences et techniques des activités physiques et sportives. En 2020, tous mes enseignements sont désormais numériques à la faveur de l’épidémie. Preuves à l’appui, ce texte montre que le passage total au numérique n’est pas une exceptionnalité de crise mais une #aubaine inédite d’accélération du mouvement de numérisation global de l’#enseignement_supérieur en France. La #souffrance et les dégâts considérables que provoque cette #numérisation_de_l’enseignement étaient aussi déjà en cours, ainsi que les #résistances.

    Une politique structurelle de #transformation_numérique de l’enseignement supérieur

    La licence hybride de l’UFR STAPS à Grenoble, lancée en 2014 et en majorité numérique, autrement dit « à distance », est une des applications « pionnières » et « innovantes » des grandes lignes stratégiques du ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur en matière d’enseignement numérique définies dès 2013. C’est à cette date que la plateforme FUN - #France_Université_Numérique [1] -, financée par le Ministère, a été ouverte, regroupant des #MOOC - Massive Open Online Courses - ayant pour but d’« inciter à placer le numérique au cœur du parcours étudiant et des métiers de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche [2] » sous couvert de « #démocratisation » des connaissances et « #ouverture au plus grand nombre ». De fait, la plateforme FUN, gérée depuis 2015 par un #GIP - #Groupe_d’Intérêt_Public [3] -, est organisée autour de cours gratuits et en ligne, mais aussi de #SPOC -#Small_Private_Online_Course- diffusés par deux sous-plateformes : #FUN-Campus (où l’accès est limité aux seuls étudiant·e·s inscrit·e·s dans les établissements d’enseignement qui financent et diffusent les cours et doivent payer un droit d’accès à la plateforme) et #FUN-Corporate (plate-forme destinée aux entreprises, avec un accès et des certifications payants). En 2015, le ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur présentait le nouveau « #GIP-FUN » et sa stratégie pour « mettre en place un modèle économique viable en développant de nouveaux usages de cours en ligne » avec :

    - une utilisation des MOOC en complément de cours sur les campus, voire en substitution d’un #cours_magistral, selon le dispositif de la #classe_inversée ;
    - une proposition de ces #cours_en_ligne aux salariés, aux demandeurs d’emploi, aux entreprises dans une perspective de #formation_continue ;
    – un déploiement des plateformes en marques blanches [4]

    Autrement dit, il s’agit de produire de la sur-valeur à partir des MOOC, notamment en les commercialisant via des #marques_blanches [5] et des #certifications_payantes (auprès des demandeurs d’emploi et des entreprises dans le cadre de la formation continue) et de les diffuser à large échelle dans l’enseignement supérieur comme facteur de diminution des #coûts_du_travail liés à l’#encadrement. Les MOOC, dont on comprend combien ils relèvent moins de l’Open Source que de la marchandise, sont voués aussi à devenir des produits commerciaux d’exportation, notamment dans les réseaux postcoloniaux de la « #francophonie [6] ». En 2015, alors que la plateforme FUN était désormais gérée par un GIP, vers une #marchandisation de ses « produits », était créé un nouveau « portail de l’enseignement numérique », vitrine de la politique du ministère pour « déployer le numérique dans l’enseignement supérieur [7] ». Sur ce site a été publié en mars 2016 un rapport intitulé « MOOC : À la recherche d’un #business model », écrit par Yves Epelboin [8]. Dans ce rapport, l’auteur compare en particulier le #coût d’un cours classique, à un cours hybride (en présence et via le numérique) à un cours uniquement numérique et dresse le graphique suivant de rentabilité :

    Le #coût fixe du MOOC, à la différence du coût croissant du cours classique en fonction du nombre d’étudiants, suffit à prouver la « #rentabilité » de l’enseignement numérique. La suite du document montre comment « diversifier » (depuis des partenariats publics-privés) les sources de financement pour rentabiliser au maximum les MOOC et notamment financer leur coût de départ : « la coopération entre les universités, les donateurs, des fonds spéciaux et d’autres sources de revenus est indispensable ». Enfin, en octobre 2019, était publié sur le site du ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur un rapport intitulé « #Modèle_économique de la transformation numérique des formations dans les établissements d’enseignement supérieur [9] », écrit par Éric Pimmel, Maryelle Girardey-Maillard et Émilie‐Pauline Gallie, inspecteurs généraux de l’éducation, du sport et de la recherche. Le rapport commence par le même invariable constat néolibéral d’#austérité : « croissance et diversité des effectifs étudiants, concurrence nationale et internationale, égalité d’accès à l’enseignement supérieur dans les territoires et augmentation des coûts, dans un contexte budgétaire contraint », qui nécessitent donc un développement généralisé de l’enseignement numérique. La préconisation principale des autrices·teurs du rapport tient dans une « réorganisation des moyens » des universités qui :

    « consiste notamment à réduire le volume horaire des cours magistraux, à modifier les manières d’enseigner (hybridation, classes inversées...) et à répartir différemment les heures de cours, voire d’autres ressources, comme les locaux par exemple. Les économies potentielles doivent être chiffrées par les établissements qui devront, pour ne pas se voir reprocher de dégrader les conditions d’enseignement, redéployer ces montants dans les équipements ou le développement de contenus pédagogiques. »

    Autrement dit encore, pour financer le numérique, il s’agit de « redéployer » les moyens en encadrement humain et en locaux, soit les moyens relatifs aux cours « classiques », en insistant sur la dimension « pédagogique » du « redéploiement » pour « ne pas se voir reprocher de dégrader les conditions d’enseignement ». Le financement du numérique dans l’enseignement universitaire par la marchandisation des MOOC est aussi envisagé, même si cette dernière est jugée pour l’instant insuffisante, avec la nécessité d’accélérer les sources de financement qu’ils peuvent générer : « Le développement de nouvelles ressources propres, tirées notamment de l’activité de formation continue ou liées aux certificats délivrés dans le cadre des MOOCs pourrait constituer une voie de développement de ressources nouvelles. » Un programme « ambitieux » d’appel à « #flexibilisation des licences » a d’ailleurs été lancé en 2019 :

    Au‐delà de la mutualisation des ressources, c’est sur la mutualisation des formations qu’est fondé le projet « #Parcours_Flexibles_en_Licence » présenté par la mission de la pédagogie et du numérique pour l’enseignement supérieur (#MIPNES / #DGESIP) au deuxième appel à projets du #fonds_pour_la_transformation_de_l’action_publique (#FTAP) et financé à hauteur de 12,4 M€ sur trois ans. La mission a retenu quatre scénarios qui peuvent se combiner :

    - l’#hybridation d’une année de licence ou le passage au #tout_numérique ;

    - la transformation numérique partielle de la pédagogie de l’établissement ;

    - la #co‐modalité pour répondre aux contraintes ponctuelles des étudiants ;

    - les MOOCS comme enjeu de visibilité et de transformation.

    Le ministère a pour ambition, depuis 2013 et jusqu’à aujourd’hui, « la transformation numérique partielle de la pédagogie des établissements ». Les universités sont fermées depuis quasiment mars 2020, avec une courte réouverture de septembre à octobre 2020. L’expérience du passage au numérique, non plus partiel, mais total, est en marche dans la start-up nation.

    Nous avons déjà un peu de recul sur ce que l’enseignement numérique produit comme dégâts sur les relations d’enseignement, outre la marchandisation des connaissances qui remet en cause profondément ce qui est enseigné.

    A Grenoble, la licence « pionnière » de STAPS- Sciences et Techniques des Activités Physiques et Sportives

    En 2014 et dans le cadre des politiques financières décrites précédemment, était lancée à Grenoble une licence « unique en son genre » de STAPS- Sciences et Techniques des Activités Physiques et Sportives dont voici le fonctionnement :

    Les universités Grenoble-Alpes et Jean-Monnet-Saint-Étienne proposent une licence STAPS, parcours « entraînement sportif », unique en son genre : la scolarité est asynchrone, essentiellement à distance, et personnalisée.

    Cette licence s’appuie sur un dispositif de formation hybride : les étudiant·e·s s’approprient les connaissances chez eux, à leur rythme avant de les manipuler lors de cours en présentiel massés.

    Le travail personnel à distance s’appuie sur de nouvelles pédagogies dans l’enseignement numérique : les cours #vidéos, les #screencasts, #quizz et informations complémentaires s’articulent autour de #parcours_pédagogiques ; des sessions de #classe_virtuelle sont également organisées à distance [10].

    Dès 2017, des enseignant·e·s de STAPS faisaient paraître un texte avec la section grenobloise du syndicat FSU - Fédération Syndicale Unitaire - intitulé « Les STAPS de Grenoble sont-ils un modèle à suivre ? ». Les auteur·trice·s expliquaient que, en 2014, la présidence de l’université avait instrumentalisé un « dilemme impossible : “la pédagogie numérique ou la limitation d’accueil” ». Il s’agit ici d’un exemple significatif de technique néolibérale de capture de l’intérêt liée à la rhétorique de l’#austérité. Ce même non-choix a été appliqué dans l’organisation de la #PACES à Grenoble, première année de préparation aux études de médecine : numérique ou limitation drastique des étudiant·e·s accueilli·e·s. La tierce voie, toujours écartée, est évidemment celle de recruter plus d’enseignant·e·s, de personnels administratifs, de réduire les groupes d’amphithéâtres, de construire des locaux qui permettent à des relations d’enseignement d’exister. En 2017, les enseignant·e·s de STAPS constataient, effectivement, que « l’enseignement numérique permet(tait) d’accueillir beaucoup de monde avec des moyens constants en locaux et personnels enseignants titulaires (postes) ; et même avec une diminution des #coûts_d’encadrement ». Elles et ils soulignaient dans le même temps que le niveau d’#épuisement et d’#isolement des enseignant·e·s et des étudiant·e·s était inédit, assorti d’inquiétudes qui résonnent fortement avec la situation que nous traversons aujourd’hui collectivement :

    —Nous craignons que le système des cours numérisés s’accompagne d’une plus grande difficulté à faire évoluer les contenus d’enseignements compte tenu du temps pour les réaliser.
    — Nous redoutons que progressivement les cours de L1 soient conçus par un seul groupe d’enseignants au niveau national et diffusé dans tous les UFR de France, l’enseignant local perdant ainsi la main sur les contenus et ceux-ci risquant de se rigidifier.
    — Un certain nombre de travaux insistent sur le temps considérable des jeunes générations accrochées à leur smartphone, de 4 à 6 heures par jour et signalent le danger de cette pratique pour la #santé physique et psychique. Si s’ajoutent à ces 4 à 6 heures de passe-temps les 3 ou 4 heures par jour de travail des cours numériques sur écran, n’y a-t-il pas à s’inquiéter ?
    — Si les étudiants de L1 ne sont plus qu’une douzaine d’heures par semaine à l’université pour leurs cours, qu’en est-il du rôle de #socialisation de l’université ?

    (…)

    Il est tout de même très fâcheux de faire croire qu’à Grenoble en STAPS en L1, avec moins de moyens humains nous faisons aussi bien, voire mieux, et que nous ayons trouvé la solution au problème du nombre. Il serait plus scrupuleux d’exposer que :

    — nous sommes en difficulté pour défendre la qualité de nos apprentissages, que sans doute il y a une perte quant aux compétences formées en L1 et que nous devrons compenser en L2, L3, celles-ci. Ce qui semble très difficile, voire impossible ;
    — le taux de réussite légèrement croissant en L1 se fait sans doute à ce prix et qu’il est toujours faible ;
    — nous nous interrogeons sur la faible participation de nos étudiants au cours de soutien (7 % ) ;
    — nous observons que les cours numériques n’ont pas fait croître sensiblement la motivation des étudiants [11].

    Ces inquiétudes, exprimées en 2017, sont désormais transposables à large échelle. Les conditions actuelles, en période de #confinement et de passage au tout numérique sur fond de #crise_sanitaire, ne sont en effet ni « exceptionnelles », ni « dérogatoires ». Ladite « #exceptionnalité de crise » est bien plus l’exacerbation de ce qui existe déjà. Dans ce contexte, il semble tout à fait légitime de s’interroger sur le très probable maintien de l’imposition des fonctionnements généralisés par temps de pandémie, aux temps « d’après », en particulier dans le contexte d’une politique très claire de transformation massive de l’#enseignement_universitaire en enseignement numérique. Ici encore, l’analyse des collègues de STAPS publiée en 2017 sur les modalités d’imposition normative et obligatoire de mesures présentées initialement comme relevant du « volontariat » est éloquente :

    Alors qu’initialement le passage au numérique devait se faire sur la base du #volontariat, celui-ci est devenu obligatoire. Il reste à l’enseignant ne souhaitant pas adopter le numérique la possibilité d’arrêter l’enseignement qui était le sien auparavant, de démissionner en quelque sorte. C’est sans doute la première fois, pour bon nombre d’entre nous, qu’il nous est imposé la manière d’enseigner [12].

    Depuis 2020, l’utopie réalisée. Passage total à l’enseignement numérique dans les Universités

    Depuis mars et surtout octobre 2020, comme toutes les travailleur·se·s et étudiant·e·s des universités en France, mes pratiques d’enseignement sont uniquement numériques. J’avais jusqu’alors résisté à leurs usages, depuis l’analyse des conditions contemporaines du capitalisme de plateforme lié aux connaissances : principalement (1) refuser l’enclosure et la #privatisation des connaissances par des plateformes privées ou publiques-privées, au service des politiques d’austérité néolibérale destructrices des usages liés à l’enseignement en présence, (2) refuser de participer aux techniques de surveillance autorisées par ces outils numériques. Je précise ici que ne pas vouloir déposer mes cours sur ces plateformes ne signifiait pas me replier sur mon droit de propriété intellectuelle en tant qu’enseignante-propriétaire exclusive des cours. Au contraire, un cours est toujours co-élaboré depuis les échanges singuliers entre enseignant·e·s et étudiant·e·s ; il n’est pas donc ma propriété exclusive, mais ressemble bien plus à un commun élaboré depuis les relations avec les étudiant·e·s, et pourrait devoir s’ouvrir à des usages et des usager·ère·s hors de l’université, sans aucune limite d’accès. Sans défendre donc une propriété exclusive, il s’agit dans le même temps de refuser que les cours deviennent des marchandises via des opérateurs privés ou publics-privés, déterminés par le marché mondial du capitalisme cognitif et cybernétique, et facilité par l’État néolibéral, comme nous l’avons vu avec l’exposé de la politique numérique du ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur.

    Par ailleurs, les plateformes d’enseignement numérique, en particulier de dépôt et diffusion de documents, enregistrent les dates, heures et nombres de clics ou non-clics de toutes celles et ceux qui les utilisent. Pendant le printemps 2020, sous les lois du premier confinement, les débats ont été nombreux dans mon université pour savoir si l’ « #assiduité », comme facteur d’ « #évaluation » des étudiant·e·s, pouvait être déterminée par les statistiques individuelles et collectives générées par les plateformes : valoriser celles et ceux qui seraient les plus connectées, et pénaliser les autres, autrement dit « les déconnecté·e·s », les dilettantes. Les éléments relatifs à la #fracture_numérique, l’inégal accès matériel des étudiant·e·s à un ordinateur et à un réseau internet, ont permis de faire taire pendant un temps celles et ceux qui défendaient ces techniques de #surveillance (en oubliant au passage qu’elles et eux-mêmes, en tant qu’enseignant·e·s, étaient aussi possiblement surveillé·e·s par les hiérarchies depuis leurs fréquences de clics, tandis qu’elles et ils pouvaient s’entre-surveiller depuis les mêmes techniques).

    Or depuis la fermeture des universités, ne pas enseigner numériquement signifie ne pas enseigner du tout. Refuser les plateformes est devenu synonyme de refuser de faire cours. L’épidémie a créé les conditions d’un apparent #consentement collectif, d’une #sidération aussi dont il est difficile de sortir. Tous les outils que je refusais d’utiliser sont devenus mon quotidien. Progressivement, ils sont même devenus des outils dont je me suis rendue compte dépendre affectivement, depuis un rapport destructeur de liens. Je me suis même mise à regarder les statistiques de fréquentation des sites de mes cours, les nombres de clics, pour me rassurer d’une présence, là où la distance commençait à creuser un vide. J’ai eu tendance à surcharger mes sites de cours de « ressources », pour tenter de me rassurer sur la possibilité de resserrer des liens, par ailleurs de plus en plus ténus, avec les étudiant·e·s, elles-mêmes et eux-mêmes confronté·e·s à un isolement et une #précarisation grandissantes. Là où la fonction transitionnelle d’objets intermédiaires, de « médias », permet de symboliser, élaborer l’absence, j’ai fait l’expérience du vide creusé par le numérique. Tout en étant convaincue que l’enseignement n’est jamais une affaire de « véhicule de communication », de « pédagogie », de « contenus » à « communiquer », mais bien une pratique relationnelle, réciproque, chargée d’affect, de transfert, de contre-transfert, que « les choses ne commencent à vivre qu’au milieu [13] », je n’avais jamais éprouvé combien la « communication de contenus » sans corps, sans adresse, créait de souffrance individuelle, collective et d’auto-exploitation. Nombreuses sont les analyses sur la difficulté de « #concentration », de captation d’une #attention réduite, derrière l’#écran. Avec Yves Citton et ses travaux sur l’#écologie_de_l’attention, il m’apparaît que la difficulté est moins celle d’un défaut de concentration et d’attention, que l’absence d’un milieu relationnel commun incarné :
    Une autre réduction revient à dire que c’est bien de se concentrer et que c’est mal d’être distrait. Il s’agit d’une évidence qui est trompeuse car la concentration n’est pas un bien en soi. Le vrai problème se situe dans le fait qu’il existe toujours plusieurs niveaux attentionnels. (…) La distraction en soi n’existe pas. Un élève que l’on dit distrait est en fait attentif à autre chose qu’à ce à quoi l’autorité veut qu’il soit attentif [14].

    La souffrance ressentie en tant que désormais « enseignante numérique » n’est pas relative à ce que serait un manque d’attention des étudiant·e·s généré par les écrans, mais bien à l’absence de #relation incarnée.

    Beaucoup d’enseignant·e·s disent leur malaise de parler à des « cases noires » silencieuses, où figurent les noms des étudiant·e·s connecté·e·s au cours. Ici encore, il ne s’agit pas de blâmer des étudiant·e·s qui ne « joueraient pas le jeu », et n’ouvriraient pas leurs caméras pour mieux dissimuler leur distraction. Outre les questions matérielles et techniques d’accès à un matériel doté d’une caméra et d’un réseau internet suffisamment puissant pour pouvoir suivre un cours et être filmé·e en même temps, comment reprocher à des étudiant·e·s de ne pas allumer la caméra, qui leur fait éprouver une #intrusion dans l’#espace_intime de leur habitation. Dans l’amphithéâtre, dans la salle de classe, on peut rêver, regarder les autres, regarder par la fenêtre, regarder par-dessus le tableau, à côté, revenir à sa feuille ou son écran…pas de gros plan sur le visage, pas d’intrusion dans l’espace de sa chambre ou de son salon. Dans une salle de classe, la mise en lien est celle d’une #co-présence dans un milieu commun indéterminé, sans que celui-ci n’expose à une intrusion de l’espace intime. Sans compter que des pratiques d’enregistrement sont possibles : où voyagent les images, et donc les images des visages ?

    Pour l’enseignant·e : parler à des cases noires, pour l’étudiant·e : entendre une voix, un visage en gros plan qui ne le·la regarde pas directement, qui invente une forme d’adresse désincarnée ; pour tou·te·s, faire l’expérience de l’#annihilation des #corps. Même en prenant des notes sur un ordinateur dans un amphithéâtre, avec un accès à internet et maintes possibilités de « s’évader » du cours, le corps pris dans le commun d’une salle engage des #liens. Quand la relation ne peut pas prendre corps, elle flotte dans le vide. Selon les termes de Gisèle Bastrenta, psychanalyste, l’écran, ici dans la relation d’enseignement, crée l’« aplatissement d’un ailleurs sans au-delà [15] ».

    Le #vide de cet aplatissement est synonyme d’#angoisse et de symptômes, notamment, celui d’une #auto-exploitation accrue. Le récit de plusieurs étudiant.e.s fait écho à l’expérience d’auto-exploitation et angoisse que je vis, depuis l’autre côté de l’écran. Mes conditions matérielles sont par ailleurs très souvent nettement meilleures aux leurs, jouissant notamment de mon salaire. La précarisation sociale et économique des étudiant·e·s creuse encore le vide des cases noires. Plusieurs d’entre elles et eux, celles et ceux qui peuvent encore se connecter, expliquent qu’ils n’ont jamais autant passé d’heures à écrire pour leurs essais, leurs dissertations…, depuis leur espace intime, en face-à-face avec les plateformes numériques qui débordent de fichiers de cours, de documents… D’abord, ce temps très long de travail a souvent été entrecoupé de crises de #panique. Ensuite, ce temps a été particulièrement angoissant parce que, comme l’explique une étudiante, « tout étant soi-disant sur les plateformes et tout étant accessible, tous les cours, tous les “contenus”, on s’est dit qu’on n’avait pas le droit à l’erreur, qu’il fallait qu’on puisse tout dire, tout écrire, tout ressortir ». Plutôt qu’un « contenu » élaborable, digérable, limité, la plateforme est surtout un contenant sans fond qui empêche d’élaborer une #réflexion. Plusieurs étudiant·e·s, dans des échanges que nous avons eus hors numérique, lors de la manifestation du 26 janvier 2021 à l’appel de syndicats d’enseignant·e·s du secondaire, ont également exprimé cet apparent #paradoxe : -le besoin de plus de « #contenu », notamment entièrement rédigé à télécharger sur les plateformes pour « mieux suivre » le cours, -puis, quand ce « contenu » était disponible, l’impression de complètement s’y noyer et de ne pas savoir quoi en faire, sur fond de #culpabilisation d’« avoir accès à tout et donc de n’avoir pas le droit à l’erreur », sans pour autant parvenir à élaborer une réflexion qui puisse étancher cette soif sans fin.

    Face à l’absence, la privatisation et l’interdiction de milieu commun, face à l’expression de la souffrance des étudiant·e·s en demande de présence, traduite par une demande sans fin de « contenu » jamais satisfaite, car annulée par un cadre désincarné, je me suis de plus en plus auto-exploitée en me rendant sur les plateformes d’abord tout le jour, puis à des heures où je n’aurais pas dû travailler. Rappelons que les plateformes sont constamment accessibles, 24h/24, 7j/7. Poster toujours plus de « contenu » sur les plateformes, multiplier les heures de cours via les écrans, devoir remplir d’eau un tonneau troué, supplice des Danaïdes. Jusqu’à l’#épuisement et la nécessité - politique, médicale aussi - d’arrêter. Alors que je n’utilisais pas les plateformes d’enseignement numérique, déjà très développées avant 2020, et tout en ayant connaissance de la politique très offensive du Ministère en matière de déshumanisation de l’enseignement, je suis devenue, en quelque mois, happée et écrasée par la fréquentation compulsive des plateformes. J’ai interiorisé très rapidement les conditions d’une auto-exploitation, ne sachant comment répondre, autrement que par une surenchère destructrice, à la souffrance généralisée, jusqu’à la décision d’un arrêt nécessaire.

    L’enjeu ici n’est pas seulement d’essayer de traverser au moins pire la « crise » mais de lutter contre une politique structurelle de #destruction radicale de l’enseignement.

    Créer les milieux communs de relations réciproques et indéterminées d’enseignement, depuis des corps présents, et donc des présences et des absences qui peuvent s’élaborer depuis la #parole, veut dire aujourd’hui en grande partie braconner : organiser des cours sur les pelouses des campus…L’hiver est encore là, le printemps est toujours déjà en germe.

    https://lundi.am/L-enseignement-numerique-ou-le-supplice-des-Danaides

    #numérique #distanciel #Grenoble #université #facs #France #enseignement_à_distance #enseignement_distanciel

    • Le #coût fixe du MOOC, à la différence du coût croissant du cours classique en fonction du nombre d’étudiants, suffit à prouver la « #rentabilité » de l’enseignement numérique.

      mais non ! Si la création du MOOC est effectivement un coût fixe, son fonctionnement ne devrait pas l’être : à priori un cours en ligne décemment conçu nécessite des interactions de l’enseignant avec ses étudiants...

  • «Mano d’Oro», le groove arabo-sicilien de Crimi
    https://www.fip.fr/musiques-du-monde/mano-d-oro-le-groove-arabo-sicilien-de-crimi-18674

    Le saxophoniste et chanteur Julien Lesuisse annonce la sortie du premier album de son projet "Crimi" avec cette reprise raï soul d’une vieille chanson sicilienne.

    Toujours le cœur entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, le Lyonnais Julien Lesuisse en explore depuis deux décennies les indissociables traditions musicales populaires. Après le raï oranais avec Sofiane Saidi & Mazalda ou les chansons des campagnes d’Italie du Sud avec La Squadra Zeus, le saxophoniste et chanteur perpétue avec modernité ce riche métissage sur son nouveau projet nommé Crimi dont le premier album Luci e guai (« Lumière et embrouilles ») est attendu en mars sur le label Airfono.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1cLR6oYNt0


    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbOeQR7QxsQ

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TSNq0YMlYHU

    #musique #Julien_Lesuisse #Crimi #Sicile #funk #raï

  • « Just Dropped In », l’album de reprises de Sharon Jones en écoute
    https://www.fip.fr/groove/soul/just-dropped-l-album-de-reprises-de-sharon-jones-en-ecoute-18705

    Le label Daptone a sélectionné les meilleures reprises de la diva soul et de son groupe The Dap-Kings, de Prince à Bob Marley, Stevie Wonder, Aretha Franklin, Shuggie Otis ou Dusty Springfield.

    https://sharonjonesandthedapkings.bandcamp.com/album/just-dropped-in-to-see-what-condition-my-renditi

    #musique #Sharon_Jones #soul #reprises

  • L’embrasement du #Roforofo_Jazz sur un nouvel EP

    Avec la sortie d’un EP 5 titres Fire Eater, le combo parisien marque son goût prononcé pour les mélanges aventureux, mixant #hip_hop, #afrobeat et #jazz dans un style unique.

    Afro Latin Vintage Orchestra, Oghene Kologbo, les Frères Smith, Los Tres Puntos, No Water Please, ou encore Sax Machine, chacun de ces groupes cache dans son line-up un ou plusieurs des membres de Roforofo Jazz. Le live band composé de sept musiciens et du MC originaire de Chicago Days (alias RacecaR) se retrouve aujourd’hui a remué sédiments et limons musicaux dans un marécage de radicalité hip hop, de groove #funk, de puissance afro, de liberté jazz avec un goût prononcé pour les mélanges aventureux.

    https://pan-african-music.com/roforofo-jazz-fire-eater

    https://officehomerecords.bandcamp.com/album/fire-eater

    #musique

  • Cours « 18.S097: Programming with Categories / IAP 2020 » MIT,
    Brendan Fong, Bartosz Milewski, and David Spivak

    « In this course we explain how category theory—a branch of mathematics known for its ability to organize the key abstractions that structure much of the mathematical universe—has become useful for writing elegant and maintainable code. In particular, we’ll use examples from the Haskell programming language to motivate category-theoretic constructs, and then explain these constructs from a more abstract and inclusive viewpoint. Hands-on programming exercises will be used to demonstrate categorical ideas like “the universal property of products” in working Haskell code. A rough list of topics includes:

    · Sets, types, categories, functors, natural transformations
    · Universal constructions and associated data types
    · Adjunctions and cartesian closed categories
    · Algebras, catamorphisms, anamorphisms
    · Monads, comonads, Kleisli arrows
    · Monoids, monoidal categories, lax monoidal functors,
    applicatives
    · Profunctors, (co)ends, optics »

    #category #theory #course #functionalProgramming

  • Privatisierung im Asylbereich - Das Geschäft mit den Flüchtlingen

    Die Tendenz zur Privatisierung im Asylbereich scheint sich auszuweiten: Was in München im Gespräch ist, gehört in vielen Bundesländern bereits zur gängigen Praxis. Doch sind gewinnorientierte Unternehmen in einem so empfindlichen Bereich wirklich tolerierbar?

    Outsourcing der besonderen Art: Privatfirmen übernehmen vermehrt in Flüchtlingsheimen die Betreuung von Asylbewerbern. So versorgt in München neuerdings ein Schweizer Unternehmen die 350 Bewohner eines Aufnahmelagers. In anderen Bundesländern ist die gewinnorientierte Versorgung längst Alltag. Sachsen gilt als Spitzenreiter: Hier werden nach Zeitungsrecherchen 64 Prozent der Heime von Privatfirmen betrieben.

    Seit Anfang September ist das Schweizer Unternehmen ORS in Deutschland tätig. Die private Firma ist einer der größten Player im internationalen Geschäft der Betreuung und Unterbringung von Asylsuchenden. Über eine neu gegründete deutsche Tochtergesellschaft betreibt ORS seit kurzem das Flüchtlingsheim in der ehemaligen Funkkaserne in München. Dort ist sie für die komplette Versorgung vom Wachdienst über die Küche bis hin zum Sprachunterricht und Freizeitangeboten zuständig.

    Neu sei nur, sagt ein Sprecher des zuständigen Ministeriums, dass die Dienstleistungen aus einer Hand erbracht würden. Eine Ausschreibung habe es nicht gegeben. Das „Pilotprojekt“ ist zunächst auf ein Jahr befristet.

    ORS erklärt auf seiner Website: „Wir treten Asylsuchenden und Flüchtlingen respektvoll und unvoreingenommen gegenüber.“ Dabei spiele weder das Geschlecht noch das Alter, die Herkunft, Ethnie, Religion oder der Stand des Asylverfahrens eine Rolle. Man arbeite kostenbewusst und effizient: „Der Qualitäts- und Dienstleistungsgedanke ist wichtig.“ Das komme den Asylsuchenden zugute, ist man überzeugt.

    Für Alexander Thal vom Bayerischen Flüchtlingsrat ist nicht die Trägerschaft einer Flüchtlingsunterkunft das Entscheidende, sondern wie die Betreiber mit den Asylsuchenden umgehen. „Es bleibt abzuwarten, wie das bei der Funkkaserne gehandhabt wird“, sagte er dem Evangelischen Pressedienst.

    In der Kaserne sollen 350 Asylsuchende untergebracht werden. Neu in Bayern ist, dass die Behörden den Betrieb der Flüchtlingsunterkunft an ein Privatunternehmen vergeben haben. In anderen Bundesländern ist das dagegen längst an der Tagesordnung: Außer in Sachsen gibt es etwa auch in Thüringen und Brandenburg private Betreiber.

    In der Schweiz gängige Praxis

    In der Schweiz ist das Unternehmen ORS, das mit 450 Mitarbeitern einen jährlichen Umsatz von 70 Millionen Franken (umgerechnet 58 Millionen Euro) aufweist, gut im Geschäft. Dort werden in sieben Bundeszentren und über 50 regionalen Unterkünften mehr als 4.500 Asylsuchende betreut. Seit 2012 ist die Firma auch in Österreich tätig und betreibt dort acht Aufnahmeeinrichtungen. Die ORS Deutschland GmbH existiert erst seit Ende August 2014.

    In der Schweiz erhebt sich immer wieder Kritik an der gewinnorientierten Aktiengesellschaft und ihrem Geschäft mit Flüchtlingen. Im Mai 2012 organisierte das „Schweizer Komitee gegen Fremdenhetze und Asylbusiness“ eine Demonstration in Bern und kritisierte dabei die Bedingungen in der örtlichen Asylunterkunft und die Tendenz zur Privatisierung im Asylbereich. Gewinnorientierte Unternehmen seien in einem so sensiblen Bereich nicht wünschenswert, hieß es.

    Baden-Württemberg setzt dagegen auf die alleinige Betreuung der Flüchtlinge unter staatlicher Regie. „Das halten wir prinzipiell für richtig“, sagt der Geschäftsführer des Landesflüchtlingsrates, Andreas Linder. Der Vorteil: Bei Problemen habe man in den kommunalen Ämtern kompetente Ansprechpartner, die für den Betrieb und den Zustand der Häuser verantwortlich seien. Bei privat geführten Unterkünften bestehe immer die Gefahr, dass sie „nur im Mindeststandard verbleiben“. Und: Bei Schwierigkeiten habe man oft „schlechte Karten“, denn nötige Verbesserungen in der Unterbringung „kosten dann auch mehr Geld“.

    #München #Munich #Funkkaserne #Bavaria #Germany #ORS

    https://www.migazin.de/2014/09/26/das-geschaeft-mit-den-fluechtlingen

  • Gystere sort « Strange Breathin » sous forme de série Z afrofuturiste
    https://pan-african-music.com/gystere-strange-breathin

    Excellent court-métrage ZZZ en plus de la musique funky.

    Avec son clip « Strange Breathin », fidèle à son univers série Z complètement kitsch, l’artiste Gystere alias Adrien Peskine annonce la sortie de son premier album A Little Story : 10 épisodes psych-funk porteurs de messages anti-racistes et anti-sexistes.

    Sous un thème afrofuturiste renvoyant au jazz-funk vaudou des années 70 autant qu’à l’activisme anti-raciste et anti-sexiste de notre époque, Gystère compose un groove subtil dans une écriture à tiroirs composée de nombreuses références : série Z, pastiche SF, dénonciation du harcèlement policier, vaisseau fabriqué à la main, etc. Dans son clip cosmique réalisé avec son frère, « Strange Breathin », on retrouve tout ce qui caractérise l’univers du projet : la vidéo inaugure les aventures de Jane Dark, héroïne afro-féministe qui combat l’oppression dominante – une façon ludique d’aborder les luttes minoritaires qui agitent les textes de Gystere. L’artiste s’inspire de son vécu pour dénoncer le racisme policier qu’il connaît depuis ses jeunes années, et converge vers la lutte féministe dans un même objectif, défendre les opprimés.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meR-NGfZ-RU

    #musique #Gystere #Adrien_Peskine #funk #série_z #violences_policières #racisme #politique #musique_et_politique #afrofuturisme @sinehebdo

  • Stranded Indian expats weigh China return amid Covid-19, border backlash | South China Morning Post
    https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/people/article/3099802/stranded-indian-expats-weigh-china-return-amid-covid-19-border

    Indian businessman Tapan Gadodia has been unable to return to China, where his import-export company is based, since late January, when he left for his native country to escape what was then the epicentre of the coronavirus pandemic. Like thousands of other expatriate Indians
    returning for the Lunar New Year holiday, fleeing the disease – or both – he found himself stranded in his home country in late March, as India closed its borders and China suspended the entry of foreign workers and residents to prevent the pandemic’s spread. Eight months later, the tables have turned. China has largely brought the outbreak under control; it is now India that is recording more daily cases, at up to 80,000, than anywhere else. Indeed, while India has a similar population to China, about 1.3 billion, it has now registered more than 3.6 million cases and over 65,000 deaths, compared to 85,000 cases and just over 4,600 deaths in China. Even so, as China takes further steps towards opening up – sources say about 60 people with diplomatic visas were scheduled to leave Delhi for Shanghai on Wednesday – Gadodia, like many others, is not certain if he wants to return just yet. Indian businessman Tapan Gadodia with his mother Kanta and son Karan in Shanghai during Diwali 2019. “A few of my Indian friends in Shanghai lost their parents and could not even attend their funeral,” recalls Gadodia, 50, of compatriots who had chosen to stay in China when the coronavirus first emerged.Now at home at Kolkata, Gadodia is concerned that were he to return to his business – based in Shanghai, where he has lived for around 20 years – he may find himself stranded once more, this time thousands of miles away from an elderly mother in the middle of a pandemic.“I wouldn’t be free to travel back to India at will,” Gadodia says.
    There are several thousand Indians like Gadodia who, for various reasons, now face a tough decision about whether to return to their old lives in China or forge new ones on home soil.

    #Covid-19#migrant#migration#inde#chine#economie#circulation#sante#retour#funreraille

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • ’Building Fun House’ by Iggy Pop | Iggy and the Stooges
    https://www.iggyandthestoogesmusic.com/news/building-fun-house-by-iggy-pop
    https://twitter.com/Iggy_Stooges/status/1288869661988327424

    I was laying on my back on the floor of the Stooges rehearsal room, stoked on LSD and reefer, staring at the lovely amplifiers and egg cartons on the walls, when I thought I saw the word “Funhouse” hovering above me in the air, just below the ceiling. We were about half way through writing and preparation for our sophomore album, and it needed a title this time. I remember thinking “this is it; we’re going with it.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1OedEgzDl_I


    The Stooges - Funhouse 1970

    #rock'n'roll_garage #stooges #fun_house