• Mer interrompue

    En cette journée mondiale des réfugié.e.s, la société civile transnationale se mobilise pour dénoncer les politiques meurtrières et racistes en Méditerranée !

    Se basant sur des témoignages recueillis par divers acteurs et actrices de la société civile tunisienne et transnationale, le présent rapport documente les pratiques d’interceptions de la #Garde_Nationale tunisienne en #Méditerranée centrale. Les données collectées, qui s’appuient sur 14 entretiens approfondis réalisés entre 2021 et 2023 auprès de personnes exilées qui ont survécu à des attaques en mer, mettent en lumière des pratiques violentes et illégales, qui vont de la #non-assistance, aux manœuvres visant intentionnellement à faire chavirer les bateaux en détresse, provoquant des #naufrages et coûtant la vie à de nombreuses personnes en exil.

    Cette #brutalisation des autorités frontalières tunisiennes qui est documentée maintenant depuis plusieurs années s’inscrit dans un contexte de renforcement des politiques d’externalisation des frontières de l’Union européenne et de ses Etats membres. Face à l’augmentation de la fréquentation de la route maritime tunisienne à partir de l’année 2021 et dans l’espoir de parvenir à limiter le nombre de traversées, celle-ci a considérablement augmenté son soutien aux forces de sécurité tunisiennes, mettant en place, à l’instar de sa coopération avec les milices libyennes, un « régime de refoulement par procuration ».

    Fruit d’un travail collectif impliquant Alarm Phone et de nombreuses actrices et acteurs de la société civile tunisienne, pour des raisons de sécurité dans le contexte actuel de criminalisation et d’attaques répétées à l’encontre des personnes et organisations solidaires des personnes migrantes en Tunisie, il a été jugé préférable de ne pas mentionner ces dernier.ère.s.

    A l’encontre de la répression, la publication de ce rapport sonne ainsi comme une promesse – la promesse que, peu importe les tentatives d’intimidation, la solidarité continuera à s’exprimer sans relâche.

    Ensemble, nous continuerons à documenter les pratiques violentes des gardes-côtes tunisiens comme de toute autre autorité impliquée dans les interceptions et les refoulements en Méditerranée et les violations de droits en mer.

    Ensemble, nous dénonçons ce régime de contrôle répressif de la mobilité ainsi que les politiques d’externalisation qui les rendent possibles et les encouragent.

    Ensemble, nous défendons une Méditerranée ouverte, solidaire et respectueuse de la liberté de mouvement de toutes et tous !

    https://alarmphone.org/fr/2024/06/20/mer-interrompue
    #témoignages #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #alarm_phone #violence #gardes-côtes_tunisiens
    ping @_kg_

  • Challenging the Complicity of Frontex’s Aerial Surveillance Activities in Crimes Against Humanity

    #front-LEX and #Refugees_in_Libya filed a legal notice pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU requesting Frontex’s Executive Director, Mr. Hans Leijtens, to partially terminate the Agency’s aerial surveillance activities in the ‘pre-frontier area’ in the Central Mediterranean.

    To prevent asylum seekers fleeing crimes against humanity in Libya from reaching the EU, Frontex systematically and unlawfully transmits the geolocalisation of refugee boats at high seas to the Libyan Coast Guard/Libyan Militia. Every day, Frontex allows for the systematic interception and ’pulling back’ of refugees to Libya, from where they have managed to escape by the skin of their teeth, and where they are subjected once more to crimes against humanity. Now, front-LEX, on behalf of X.Y. a refugee trapped in Libya, brings an unprecedented legal challenge against Frontex’s airborne complicity.

    Between 2021 and 2023, Frontex has shared 2,200 emails communicating the exact geolocalisation data of refugee boats with Libyan actors to enable their unlawful interception and forcible return back to Libya. There, the ‘pulled back’ refugees are arbitrarily detained and subjected to crimes against humanity of, inter alia, murder, enforced disappearance, torture, enslavement, sexual violence, rape, and other inhumane acts. It is Frontex’s sharing of geolocalisation data which enables the commission of these crimes – making the Agency complicit in the ongoing and systematic attack directed against refugees and asylum seekers in the Central Mediterranean.

    Frontex’s complicity in these ‘pullbacks’ and ensuing crimes against humanity committed against refugees has been well-documented by leading human rights organisations, UN organs, and investigative journalists. Now, based on this clear-cut evidence, front-LEX and Refugees in Libya filed an unprecedented legal notice challenging the Agency’s airborne complicity in crimes against humanity committed against people on the move.

    https://www.front-lex.eu/frontex-complicity-crimes-against-humanity

    #Frontex #complicité #justice #surveillance_aérienne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #géolocalisation #gardes-côtes_libyens #crimes_contre_l'humanité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #pull-back #pullbacks #poursuite_judiciaire

    • Profugo sudanese intrappolato in Libia fa causa a Frontex: “L’agenzia europea è complice di crimini contro l’umanità”

      Per la prima volta, un richiedente asilo ancora intrappolato in Libia ha potuto presentare una sfida legale contro Frontex – l’agenzia europea per la sorveglianza dei confini terrestri e marini dell’Unione – relativamente alla sorveglianza aerea sul Mediterraneo centrale. Il profugo sudanese ha potuto denunciare “l’esercito” dei pattugliatori europei grazie a Front- Lex, Ong umanitaria olandese, in partnership con l’organizzazione “Rifugiati in Libia”. L’avvocato di Front-Lex, Iftach Cohen, ha presentato una comunicazione legale a Frontex ai sensi dell’articolo 265 TFUE, invitandola a sospendere e interrompere immediatamente tutte le comunicazioni con entità libiche in relazione alle cosiddette “situazioni di pericolo” nel Mediterraneo. Inoltre l’Ong intima che Frontex proibisca all’Italia e a Malta di condividere con i libici i dati di sorveglianza raccolti dagli aerei dell’agenzia europea.

      Si tratta di un’azione legale senza precedenti innanzitutto perchè basata sulla presunta complicità dell’Ue riguardo ai crimini contro l’umanità verificatisi in Libia. In secondo luogo, è la prima volta che un rifugiato ancora intrappolato in Libia senza protezione riesce ad avviare un procedimento per vedere riconosciuti i propri diritti. Il team di Front-Lex ha raccolto prove che evidenziano peraltro come tutti i precedenti direttori – incluso il penultimo, Fabrice Leggeri, oggi candidato alle Europee per il partito di Marine Le Pen – e altre entità di Frontex abbiano ammesso che consegnare la posizione delle imbarcazioni dei rifugiati a entità libiche sia illegale secondo il diritto europeo.

      Dal rapporto della Missione d’inchiesta indipendente sulla Libia del Consiglio per i diritti umani Ue del 23 marzo, i richiedenti asilo intercettati e rimpatriati forzatamente in Libia, una volta risbarcati in Libia, vengono detenuti e diventano “vittime di crimini contro l’umanità“. Frontex giustifica la condivisione con Tripoli del tracciamento delle imbarcazioni di profughi con il proprio obbligo, “ai sensi del quadro giuridico internazionale della Sar”, di trasmettere tutte le informazioni sull’”imbarcazione in pericolo” all’RCC competente della zona di ricerca e salvataggio, che è Tripoli nella maggioranza dei casi.

      Cohen non è d’accordo perchè l’obbligo legale di Frontex di trasmettere informazioni al competente RCC in caso di pericolo ai sensi del diritto marittimo internazionale è solo uno dei tanti obblighi legali dell’Agenzia, come il divieto dei respingimenti collettivi dei richiedenti asilo intercettati in mare in rotta verso Paesi dove si rischiano persecuzioni. “Questi obblighi derivano dalla Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea che è di natura costituzionale. Abbiamo a questo punto raccolto prove sufficienti per dimostrare che nella zona Sar libica praticamente tutte le imbarcazioni di rifugiati rilevate da Frontex vengono automaticamente classificate come in ‘situazione di pericolo’ in modo tale che Frontex possa trasmettere immediatamente la posizione a Tripoli e astenersi dall’ingaggiare le navi di soccorso delle Ong nelle vicinanze”, spiega Cohen. Le imbarcazioni dei profughi di conseguenza non vengono contattate dagli aerei Frontex come richiede la legislazione dell’Ue per verificare se abbiano bisogno di assistenza.

      “D’altra parte, quando Frontex rileva un’imbarcazione di rifugiati nella zona Sar o nelle acque territoriali di uno Stato membro, come nei casi di Pylos (Grecia) o in Italia a Cutro non classifica i casi che sono chiaramente ‘situazioni di pericolo’ in modo che possa astenersi dall’allertare l’RCC dello Stato membro lasciandogli sufficiente potere e tempo per coinvolgere i libici anche nelle proprie acque territoriali e impedire così lo sbarco in Europa. È una vera e propria strumentalizzazione della ‘situazione di disagio’. Queste non sono persone che hanno telefonino e scarpe alla moda come dice il vostro vice premier Salvini nel descrivere i richiedenti asilo ma persone che subiscono i peggiori abusi contro l’umanità”.

      https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/05/30/profugo-sudanese-intrappolato-in-libia-fa-causa-a-frontex-lagenzia-ue-e-complice-di-crimini-contro-lumanita/7568712

      #plainte

  • Comment des migrants sont abandonnés en plein désert en #Afrique

    Une enquête de plusieurs mois menée par « Le Monde », le média à but non lucratif « Lighthouse Reports » et sept médias internationaux montre comment des dizaines de milliers de migrants en route vers l’Europe sont arrêtés et abandonnés en plein désert au Maroc, Tunisie et Mauritanie.

    https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8yrqiy

    #vidéo #migrations #désert #abandon #Mauritanie #Maroc #Tunisie #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #rafles #racisme_anti-Noirs #Fès #déportations #Rabat #forces_auxiliaires #refoulements #arrestations_arbitraires #enlèvements #centres_de_détention #Ksar #détention_administrative #Espagne #bus #Algérie #marche #torture #Gogui #Mali #accords #financements #expulsions_collectives #Nouakchott #forces_de_l'ordre #Sfax #Italie #équipement #aide_financière #UE #EU #Union_européenne #forces_de_sécurité #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

    ping @_kg_

  • Face à la hausse des arrivées irrégulières, Chypre annonce la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens

    Les autorités chypriotes ont annoncé dimanche la suspension du traitement des demandes d’asile des Syriens. Le président #Nikos_Christodoulides a évoqué « une mesure d’urgence » face à la forte hausse des arrivées irrégulières sur l’île, principalement depuis le Liban voisin.

    « Il s’agit d’une mesure d’urgence, d’une décision difficile à prendre pour protéger les intérêts de Chypre », a déclaré dimanche 14 avril le président chypriote Nikos Christodoulides lors de l’annonce de la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens dans le pays.

    Le gouvernement chypriote a pris cette décision en réaction à une forte augmentation des arrivées irrégulières ce mois-ci sur l’île. Plus de 1 000 personnes sont arrivées à Chypre sur des bateaux en provenance du Liban depuis le début du mois d’avril, dans un contexte d’aggravation des tensions au Moyen-Orient.

    Nicosie a donc demandé à ses partenaires de l’Union européenne (UE) de faire davantage pour aider le Liban et de reconsidérer le statut de la #Syrie - jusqu’à aujourd’hui déchirée par la guerre et considérée trop dangereuse pour y rapatrier les demandeurs d’asile.

    Nikos Christodoulides et la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ont discuté de la possibilité de renforcer l’aide économique attribuée à Beyrouth, a indiqué un porte-parole du gouvernement chypriote dans un communiqué. À cette fin, il a été convenu qu’ils se rendraient ensemble au Liban après une visite préparatoire de la Commission.

    Le #Liban, en proie à une grave crise financière, accueille des centaines de milliers de réfugiés syriens. Et les arrivées ne cessent de se poursuivre, les Syriens continuant à quitter leur pays désormais en proie à une très grave crise économique.

    Chypre, l’État le plus à l’est de l’UE et le plus proche du Moyen-Orient, se trouve à environ 160 km à l’ouest des côtes libanaises ou syriennes. L’île a enregistré plus de 2 000 arrivées par voie maritime au cours des trois premiers mois de l’année, contre seulement 78 au cours de la même période en 2023.

    Une mise en application encore floue

    Dans la pratique, la suspension du traitement des demandes signifie que les demandeurs d’asile pourront déposer un dossier mais qu’il ne sera pas traité.

    Ils seront confinés dans deux camps d’accueil qui fournissent un abri, de la nourriture, et réglementent les sorties, sans autre avantage.

    Ceux qui choisissent de quitter ces installations perdront automatiquement toute forme d’aide et ne seront pas autorisés à travailler, ont indiqué des sources gouvernementales.

    Pour Corinna Drousiotou, coordinatrice de l’ONG Cyprus Refugee Council interrogée par InfoMigrants, la décision du gouvernement chypriote concernant les demandeurs d’asile syriens ne repose sur aucune base légale. Par ailleurs, « il n’est pas encore clair de savoir comment les autorités vont appliquer cette décision […] Mais, nous ne pensons pas qu’elle parvienne à réduire les arrivées de réfugiés car ils ne sont généralement pas au courant de ce type de décision et les passeurs ne les en informent pas », souligne-t-elle.

    La responsable met également en garde : la mesure risque au contraire d’aggraver la crise de l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile, les deux seuls centres d’hébergement de l’île n’ayant que des capacités d’accueil limitées. Or, de plus en plus de demandeurs d’asile syriens risquent de se retrouver bloqués dans ces centres si leurs demandes d’asile ne sont pas examinées.

    En 2022, une décision similaire avait déjà été prise pour tenter de limiter les arrivées de Syriens à Chypre. Mais, selon Corinna Drousiotou, elle n’avait eu aucun effet sur le nombre d’arrivées.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/56463/face-a-la-hausse-des-arrivees-irregulieres-chypre-annonce-la-suspensio

    #Chypre #asile #migrations #réfugiés #statistiques #chiffres #2024 #réfugiés_syriens

    • Des centaines de migrants syriens refoulés par Chypre et renvoyés au Liban

      Plusieurs bateaux de migrants syriens ont été bloqués par les #gardes-côtes et la police chypriotes, selon des sources concordantes. Certains ont été renvoyés au Liban, d’autres dérivent en mer dans le plus grand dénuement.

      Les Libanais ne veulent pas de nous et les Chypriotes nous renvoient ici, alors que faire ? » s’exclame Bassem*, frère d’un passager de l’un des bateaux partis du Liban-Nord vers Chypre depuis plusieurs jours et renvoyé à son point de départ après une traversée infernale en Méditerranée.

      Plusieurs centaines de personnes, en majorité syriennes, ayant tenté de rejoindre Chypre de manière irrégulière depuis le Liban ont été interceptées dans les eaux territoriales chypriotes en début de semaine par la police et les gardes-côtes, selon des sources concordantes. Une partie d’entre elles ont été renvoyées mercredi vers le Liban, dans un contexte de raidissement de la politique migratoire et de montée du racisme antisyrien dans les deux pays.

      Raflé au Liban, refoulé à Chypre

      Il est pour l’instant difficile de quantifier avec certitude le nombre de ces candidats malheureux à l’exil. Mais une chose est sûre, ils sont nombreux. Un média chypriote évoque cinq embarcations transportant 500 migrants, tandis que l’ONG Alarm Phone, qui soutient les personnes traversant la mer Méditerranée, assure sur son compte X (anciennement Twitter) être en contact avec les passagers de quatre bateaux et dénonce le refus du Centre commun de coordination des opérations de sauvetage chypriote (JRCC) de lancer une opération de sauvetage.

      Dérivant dans les eaux territoriales chypriotes depuis le 12 avril, « d’aucuns sont malades, ils n’ont plus de nourriture, d’eau et d’essence pour poursuivre leur voyage », écrit Alarm Phone mardi. Parmi eux, des passagers affirment que la police chypriote les a menacés avec des armes à feu en leur disant de rentrer en Syrie. « Les derniers jours ont été un cauchemar pour eux. Nous sommes accablés par le refus des autorités de leur venir en aide », témoigne Anja, membre d’Alarm Phone.

      Bassem, lui, assure que huit embarcations sont parties du Liban : cinq continueraient de dériver en mer tandis que trois auraient fait le chemin inverse vers le Liban. Parti lundi, son frère Ziad* a fait cet aller-retour cauchemardesque pour la somme de 2 650 dollars. Vivant depuis plus de dix ans au Liban où il travaille à Jounieh comme réparateur de climatiseurs, le jeune homme de 28 ans a subitement décidé de remettre son destin dans les mains des passeurs après avoir été victime d’une rafle raciste. « Après la mort de Pascal Sleiman (responsable des Forces libanaises pour la région de Jbeil), mon frère raccompagnait notre soeur à Ghazir, avec son époux et un cousin, quand ils se sont fait tabasser par les
      autoproclamés “Gardiens de Ghazir”. Ils n’ont même pas pu aller à l’hôpital car il était interdit aux Syriens de se déplacer. C’est la goutte d’eau qui l’a décidé à partir pour Chypre », relate-t-il.

      Peur de « mourir de faim »

      Mais son rêve d’exil échoue à quelques milles des côtes chypriotes. « Ils sont arrivés hier à 10h du matin dans les eaux territoriales chypriotes, mais les gardes-côtes les ont bloqués pendant deux jours. Puis ils leur ont donné de l’essence, de l’eau et de la nourriture et les ont renvoyés vers le Liban », dit-il. Mercredi, plusieurs photos et vidéos circulent sur les réseaux sociaux montrant des femmes, des hommes et des enfants débarquant d’un bateau de pêche en bois à Mina, la ville portuaire accolée à Tripoli. Sur ces images, ils expliquent avoir été refoulés par les gardes-côtes chypriotes.

      Selon Mohammad Sablouh, avocat membre de l’ONG Cedar Center for Legal Studies, l’un des trois bateaux arrivés au Liban est détenu par l’armée, avec le risque que ses passagers soient déportés en Syrie. Interrogé, le porte-parole de l’armée n’a pas apporté d’éléments sur ce sujet. Or, selon Bassem, « beaucoup sont recherchés par le régime, soit pour être enrôlés dans l’armée, soit parce qu’ils font partie de l’opposition ».

      Le sort des passagers qui ne sont pas retournés au Liban inquiète aussi Alarm Phone. Sur le réseau X, l’ONG affirme que certains lui « disent craindre de mourir de faim ». D’autres rapportent que le JRCC « leur a dit qu’ils n’atteindraient jamais Chypre et qu’ils devaient retourner en Syrie ». « Cela constitue une violation de la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés et met leur vie en danger », poursuit l’ONG, qui dénonce « un jeu cruel entre le Liban et Chypre », aux dépens du droit d’asile des personnes tentant la traversée irrégulière. « C’est du refoulement et cela est prohibé quoi qu’il arrive. Chypre, comme l’ensemble des États membres de l’UE, doit respecter le principe de non-refoulement qui est la pierre angulaire du droit d’asile », réagit Brigitte Espuche, co-coordinatrice du réseau Migreurop.

      Confrontées à un pic d’arrivées de demandeurs d’asile syriens depuis le Liban, les autorités de l’État insulaire ont exhorté début avril le Liban à ne pas « exporter » son problème migratoire. Le 15 avril, Nicosie a décidé de suspendre tout traitement des demandes d’asile de Syriens. « Nous l’avons appris tandis que mon frère était déjà avec les passeurs. Sinon, il ne serait jamais parti », soupire Bassem. Selon Brigitte Espuche, « le nombre de demandeurs d’asile ne peut justifier une réduction de l’accueil et de la protection, c’est absolument illégal ».

      Après avoir signé en 2020 un protocole d’accord secret avec le Liban visant à freiner les départs et faciliter les retours des candidats à la migration, Chypre cherche désormais à obtenir un accord officiel sur les migrants entre l’Union européenne et le Liban. L’objectif du lobbying de Nicosie ? Convaincre les Européens qu’il existe des « zones sécurisées » à l’intérieur de la Syrie où les réfugiés pourraient être transférés. Les organisations internationales soulignent toutefois de nombreux cas de disparition forcée ou d’arrestation de réfugiés lors de leur retour en Syrie.

      *Les prénoms ont été modifiés pour des raisons de sécurité.

      https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1410738/des-centaines-de-migrants-syriens-refoules-par-chypre-et-renvoyes-au-
      #refoulements #renvois #expulsions

  • Border security with drones and databases

    The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

    Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

    The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

    Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

    The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

    The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

    The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

    This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

    Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

    This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

    Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

    In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

    The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

    While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

    While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

    This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

    Notes

    [1] https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

    [2] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

    [3] https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

    [4] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

    [5] https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

    [6] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [7] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [8] https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

    [9] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

    [10] https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

    [11] https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

    [12] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    [13] https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

    [14] https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

    [15] https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

    https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
    #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

  • 2,200 #Frontex #emails to #Libya

    Frontex has shared locations of migrant boats with Libya’s coast guard more than 2,000 times in three years – despite watching them whip, beat and shoot at passengers

    It has long been known that European countries provide support and funding to the Libyan Coast Guard to carry out a controversial mission: intercepting Europe-bound migrants whom EU member states and agencies cannot apprehend directly without breaching international laws.

    Numerous media and NGO reports have detailed the abuse and violence practised by the Libyan Coast Guard against migrants during sea interception and inside the detention centres they are taken to after being brought back to Libya.

    Lighthouse Reports has previously established suspicious patterns of collaboration between EU border agency Frontex and the Libyan Coast Guard, including direct links between Frontex aerial assets spotting boats and their subsequent interception by the coast guard.

    Despite the reports of abuse and torture, Frontex has withheld public criticism of the Libyan Coast Guard. And until now, the extent to which Frontex has shared information with the coast guard, and its internal knowledge of the abuse migrants face after they are intercepted, was unknown.
    METHODS

    Following the publication of Lighthouse investigation Frontex and the Pirate Ship in December, the EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) sent a letter to Frontex Executive Director Hans Leijtens questioning the agency’s collaboration with Libyan actors, including militia, in eastern and western Libya.

    Lighthouse Reports and Der Spiegel gained access to the director’s response to the LIBE Committee’s questions. The email included all Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) relating to the Libyan Coast Guard.
    STORYLINES

    The SIRs reveal three incidents of Frontex aerial surveillance assets witnessing Libyan Coast Guard officers beating people in overcrowded boats at sea. In a separate incident, the agency’s surveillance drone recorded a Libyan officer shooting at a wooden boat to force it to stop.

    The letter from Leitjens meanwhile reveals that Frontex gave away the location of migrant boats to the Libyan Coast Guard approximately 2,200 times, usually via email, in the last three years – despite being aware of the regular instances of violence they commit.

    When confronted with these facts by our team, Frontex said: “The decision to share information about vessels in distress with the Libyan rescue coordination centre, alongside other national centres, is taken with a heavy heart”

    The SIRs contain parts of Frontex’s human rights officer’s recommendations for the agency. The measures proposed range from increasing the sharing of coordinates with NGO rescue ships to involving UN agencies in following the fates of those returned to Libya. Frontex did not comment on whether these recommendations were implemented.

    https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/2200-frontex-emails-to-libya

    #partage #localisation #migrations #asile #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-côtes_libyens #géolocalisation #SIRs #surveillance_aérienne #drones

  • Cassazione, dare i migranti ai guardiacoste di Tripoli è reato

    La consegna di migranti alla guardia costiera libica è reato perché la Libia «non è porto sicuro».

    E’ quanto sancisce una sentenza della Corte di Cassazione che ha reso definitiva la condanna del comandante del rimorchiatore #Asso_28 che il 30 luglio del 2018 soccorse 101 persone nel Mediterraneo centrale e li riportò in Libia consegnandoli alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli. Della sentenza scrive Repubblica.

    Per i supremi giudici favorire le intercettazioni dei guardiacoste di Tripoli rientra nella fattispecie illecita «dell’abbandono in stato di pericolo di persone minori o incapaci e di sbarco e abbandono arbitrario di persone». Nella sentenza viene sostanzialmente sancito che l’episodio del 2018 fu un respingimento collettivo verso un Paese non ritenuto sicuro vietato dalla Convenzione europea per i diritti umani.

    Casarini, dopo Cassazione su migranti pronti a #class_action

    "Con la sentenza della Corte di Cassazione, che ha chiarito in maniera definitiva che la cosiddetta «guardia costiera libica» non può «coordinare» nessun soccorso, perché non è in grado di garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani dei naufraghi, diventa un reato grave anche ordinarci di farlo, come succede adesso. Ora metteremo a punto non solo i ricorsi contro il decreto Piantedosi, che blocca per questo le navi del soccorso civile, ma anche una grande class action contro il governo e il ministro dell’Interno e il memorandum Italia-Libia". E’ quanto afferma Luca Casarini della ong Mediterranea Saving Humans.

    "Dovranno rispondere in tribunale delle loro azioni di finanziamento e complicità nelle catture e deportazioni che avvengono in mare ad opera di una «sedicente» guardia costiera - aggiunge Casarini -, che altro non è che una formazione militare che ha come compito quello di catturare e deportare, non di «mettere in salvo» le donne, gli uomini e i bambini che cercano aiuto. La suprema corte definisce giustamente una gravissima violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra, la deportazione in Libia di migranti e profughi che sono in mare per tentare di fuggire da quell’inferno". Casarini ricorda, inoltre, che di recente la nave Mare Jonio di Mediterranea "di recente è stata colpita dal fermo amministrativo del governo per non aver chiesto alla Libia il porto sicuro. Proporremo a migliaia di cittadini italiani, ad associazioni e ong, di sottoscrivere la «class action», e chiederemo ad un tribunale della Repubblica di portare in giudizio i responsabili politici di questi gravi crimini. Stiamo parlando di decine di migliaia di esseri umani catturati in mare e deportati in Libia, ogni anno, coordinati di fatto da Roma e dall’agenzia europea Frontex.

    E il ministro Piantedosi, proprio ieri, l’ha rivendicato testimoniando al processo a Palermo contro l’allora ministro Salvini. Lui si è costruito un alibi, con la distinzione tra centri di detenzione legali e illegali in Libia, dichiarando che «l’Italia si coordina con le istituzioni libiche che gestiscono campi di detenzione legalmente. Finalmente questo alibi, che è servito fino ad ora a coprire i crimini, è crollato grazie al pronunciamento della Cassazione. Adesso questo ministro deve essere messo sotto processo, perché ha ammesso di avere sistematicamente commesso un reato, gravissimo, che ha causato morte e sofferenze a migliaia di innocenti».

    https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2024/02/17/cassazione-dare-i-migranti-a-guardiacoste-di-tripoli-e-reato_cfcb3461-c654-4f3c

    #justice #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye #jurisprudence #condamnation #externalisation #pull-backs #refoulements #push-backs #cour_de_cassation #cassation #port_sûr

    • Sentenza Cassazione: Consegnare gli immigranti alla guardia costiera libica è reato

      La Libia è un paese canaglia: bocciati Minniti, Conte e Meloni. Dice la sentenza della Cassazione, è noto che in Libia i migranti subiscono vessazioni, violenze e tortura. Quindi è un reato violare la legge internazionale e il codice di navigazione che impongono di portare i naufraghi in un porto sicuro

      Il governo italiano (sia questo in carica sia quelli di centrosinistra che avevano Marco Minniti come ministro dell’interno) potrebbe addirittura finire sotto processo sulla base di una sentenza emessa dalla Corte di Cassazione.

      Dice questa sentenza che la Libia non è un porto sicuro, e che dunque non si possono consegnare alla Libia (o favorire la cattura da parte delle motovedette libiche) le persone salvate da un naufragio.

      Dice la sentenza, è noto che in Libia i migranti subiscono vessazioni, violenze e tortura. Quindi è un reato violare la legge internazionale e il codice di navigazione che impongono di portare i naufraghi in un porto sicuro.

      Che la Libia non fosse un porto sicuro era stranoto. Bastava non leggere i giornali italiani per saperlo. La novità è che questa evidente verità viene ora formalmente affermata con una sentenza della Cassazione che fa giurisprudenza. E che, come è del tutto evidente, mette in discussione gli accordi con la Libia firmati dai governi di centrosinistra e poi confermati dai governi Conte e infine dai governi di centrodestra.

      Accordi che si basarono persino sul finanziamento italiano e sulla consegna di motovedette – realizzate a spese del governo italiano – alle autorità di Tripoli. Ora quegli accordi devono essere immediatamente cancellati e in linea di principio si potrebbe persino ipotizzare l’apertura di processi (se non è scattata la prescrizione) ai responsabili di quegli accordi.

      I reati per i quali la Cassazione con questa sentenza ha confermato la condanna al comandante di una nave che nel luglio del 2018 (governo gialloverde, Salvini ministro dell’Interno) consegnò alla guardia costiera libica 101 naufraghi salvati in mezzo al Mediterraneo sono “abbandono in stato di pericolo di persone minori o incapaci, e di sbarco e abbandono arbitrario di persone”. La Cassazione ha dichiarato formalmente che la Libia non è un porto sicuro.

      Tutta la politica dei respingimenti a questo punto, se dio vuole, salta in aria. La Cassazione ha stabilito che bisogna tornare allo Stato di diritto, a scapito della propaganda politica. E saltano in aria anche i provvedimenti recentemente adottati dalle autorità italiane sulla base del decreto Spazza-naufraghi varato circa un anno fa dal governo Meloni.

      Ancora in queste ore c’è una nave della Ocean Viking che è sotto fermo amministrativo perché accusata di non aver seguito le direttive impartite dalle autorità libiche. Ovviamente dovrà immediatamente essere dissequestrata e forse c’è anche il rischio che chi ha deciso il sequestro finisca sotto processo. Inoltre bisognerà restituire la multa e probabilmente risarcire il danno.

      E quello della Ocean Viking è solo uno di numerosissimi casi. Certo, perché ciò avvenga sarebbe necessaria una assunzione di responsabilità sia da parte del Parlamento sia da parte della magistratura. E le due cose non sono probabilissime.

      https://www.osservatoriorepressione.info/sentenza-cassazione-consegnare-gli-immigranti-alla-guardia

    • Italy’s top court: Handing over migrants to Libyan coast guards is illegal

      Italy’s highest court, the Cassation Court, has ruled that handing over migrants to Libyan coast guards is unlawful because Libya does not represent a safe port. The sentence could have major repercussions.

      Handing over migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean to Tripoli’s coast guards is unlawful because Libya is not a safe port and it is conduct which goes against the navigation code, the Cassation Court ruled on February 17. The decision upheld the conviction of the captain of the Italian private vessel Asso 28, which, on July 30, 2018, rescued 101 individuals in the central Mediterranean and then handed them over to the Libyan coast guards to be returned to Libya.

      The supreme court judges ruled in sentence number 4557 that facilitating the interception of migrants and refugees by the Libyan coast guards falls under the crime of “abandonment in a state of danger of minors or incapacitated people and arbitrary disembarkation and abandonment of people.” This ruling effectively characterizes the 2018 incident as collective refoulement to a country not considered safe, contravening the European Convention on Human Rights.

      NGOs announce class action lawsuit

      Beyond its political implications, the Cassation’s decision could significantly impact ongoing legal proceedings, including administrative actions. NGOs have announced a class action lawsuit against the government, the interior minister, and the Italy-Libya memorandum.

      The case, which was first examined by the tribunal of Naples, focuses on the intervention of a trawler, a support ship for a platform, to rescue 101 migrants who were on a boat that had departed from Africa’s coast.

      According to investigators, the ship’s commander was asked by personnel on the rig to take on board a Libyan citizen, described as a “Libyan customs official”, who suggested sailing to Libya and disembarking the rescued migrants.

      The supreme court judges said the defendant “omitted to immediately communicate, before starting rescue operations and after completing them, to the centres of coordination and rescue services of Tripoli and to the IMRCC (Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre) of Rome, in the absence of a reply by the first,” that the migrants had been rescued and were under his charge.

      The Cassation ruled that, by operating in this way, the commander violated “procedures provided for by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and by the directives of the International Maritime Organization,” thus carrying out a “collective refoulement to a port deemed unsafe like Libya.”

      Furthermore, the Cassation emphasized the commander’s obligation to ascertain whether the migrants wanted to apply for asylum and conduct necessary checks on accompanying minors.
      ’Cassation should not be interpreted ideologically on Libya’, Piantedosi

      “Italy has never coordinated and handed over to Libya migrants rescued in operations coordinated or directly carried out by Italy,” Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi said on February 19, when asked to comment the Cassation’s ruling. “That sentence must be read well — sentences should never be interpreted in a political or ideological manner,” he said.

      Piantedosi contextualized the ruling within the circumstances prevailing in Libya at the time, citing efforts to assist Libya with EU cooperation. He highlighted the government’s adherence to principles governing repatriation activities and concluded by saying “there can be no spontaneity” and that “coordination” is essential.

      https://twitter.com/InfoMigrants/status/1759901204501438649?t=ZlLRzR3-jQ0e6-y0Q2GPJA

  • Eight #AFIC risk analysis cells set a benchmark in Africa

    This week, Frontex together with the European Commission and representatives from eight African countries forming part of the #Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community (AFIC) met in Dakar, Senegal, to wrap up the European Union-funded project on “Strengthening of AFIC as an instrument to fight serious cross-border crimes affecting Africa and the EU”.

    Launched in 2017 and funded by the European Commission, the project aimed to enhance the capacity and capability of AFIC countries to work jointly on identifying key threats impacting border management in Africa.

    After years of hard work and despite the challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Frontex has completed its latest project and is proud to announce the handover of equipment to trained border police analysts who are carrying out their tasks in the risk analysis cells of eight AFIC countries: Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

    The role of the cells, which are run by local analysts trained by Frontex, is to collect and analyse data on cross-border crime and support authorities involved in border management.

    Frontex delivered a comprehensive risk analysis solution that meets the needs of the eight African border management authorities and enhances the safety and security of borders.

    The handover of the equipment marks the end of the project and the beginning of an intensive cooperation between the AFIC countries. Frontex stays committed and ready to continue to support the RACs by organising joint activities - such as workshops, trainings, plenary meetings – together with the AFIC partner countries, aiming at further developing AFIC risk analysis capacities.

    The AFIC project in numbers:

    – Establishment of eight risk analysis cells in Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and Mauritania;
    - 14 training sessions for analysts from African countries;
    - 10 regional workshops in Gambia, Ghana, Italy, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Poland and Ivory Coast;
    - 17 joint analytical field visits in the EU and Africa.

    About AFIC

    The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was launched in 2010 to promote regular exchanges on migrant smuggling and other border security threats affecting African countries and the EU. It brings together Frontex analysts with those of partner African border authorities. A central element of the network are risk analysis cells, run by local analysts trained by Frontex. There are currently eight cells operating in Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

    https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eight-afic-risk-analysis-cells-set-a-benchmark-in-africa-uwxHJU

    #Frontex #Afrique #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #coopération #équipement #risk_analysis #Côte_d'Ivoire #Gambie #Ghana #Mauritanie #Niger #Nigeria #Sénégal #Togo #données #border_management #contrôles_frontaliers #RACs #training #risk_analysis_cells #formation #gardes-côtes

  • FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

    On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

    This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

    One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

    This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
    A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
    Providing equipment

    For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

    Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

    Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

    Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

    In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
    Trainings the authorities

    In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

    Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

    In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

    Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

    On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
    B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

    In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
    An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

    The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

    The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
    Data exchange with the EU

    The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

    What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

    In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

    While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

    However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

    This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

    To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
    C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
    Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

    In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

    The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

    The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

    This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

    In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

    According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

    The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
    The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

    Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

    Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

    A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
    Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

    In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

    *This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

    As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

    During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

    Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
    Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

    While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

    While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

    https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

    #push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

    ping @_kg_

  • Così l’Italia ha svuotato il diritto alla trasparenza sulle frontiere

    Il Consiglio di Stato ha ribadito la inaccessibilità “assoluta” degli atti che riguardano genericamente la “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”. Intanto le forniture milionarie del governo a Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto continuano.

    L’Italia fa un gigantesco e preoccupante passo indietro in tema di trasparenza sulle frontiere e di controllo democratico dell’esercizio del potere esecutivo. Su parte delle nostre forniture milionarie alla Libia, anche di natura militare, per bloccare le persone rischia infatti di calare un velo nero. A fine 2023 il Consiglio di Stato ha pronunciato una sentenza che riconosce come non illegittima la “assoluta” inaccessibilità di quegli atti della Pubblica amministrazione che ricadono genericamente nel settore di interesse della “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, svuotando così di fatto l’istituto dell’accesso civico generalizzato che è a disposizione di tutti i cittadini (e non solo dei giornalisti). Non è un passaggio banale dal momento che la conoscenza dei documenti, dei dati e delle informazioni amministrative consente, o meglio, dovrebbe consentire la partecipazione alla vita di una comunità, la vicinanza tra governanti e governati, il consapevole processo di responsabilizzazione della classe politica e dirigente del Paese. Ma la teoria traballa. E ne siamo testimoni.

    Breve riepilogo dei fatti. Il 21 ottobre 2021 l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid) -ente di diritto pubblico controllato dal ministero della Difesa- stipula un “Accordo di collaborazione” con la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere in seno al ministero dell’Interno. Fu il Viminale -allora guidato dalla prefetta Luciana Lamorgese, che come capo di gabinetto ebbe l’attuale ministro, Matteo Piantedosi- a rivolgersi all’Agenzia, chiedendole “la disponibilità a fornire collaborazione per iniziative a favore dei Paesi non appartenenti all’Unione europea finalizzate al rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. L’accordo dell’ottobre di tre anni fa riguardava una cooperazione “da attuarsi anche tramite la fornitura di mezzi e materiali” per dare impulso alla seconda fase del progetto “Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya”.

    Il Sibmmil è legato finanziariamente al Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa, istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 al dichiarato scopo di “affrontare le cause profonde dell’instabilità, degli spostamenti forzati e della migrazione irregolare e per contribuire a una migliore gestione della migrazione”. La prima “fase” del progetto è dotata di un budget di 46,3 milioni di euro, la seconda, quella al centro dell’accordo tra Aid e ministero dell’Interno, di 15 milioni. A beneficiare di queste forniture (navi, formazione, equipaggiamenti, tecnologie), come abbiamo ricostruito in questi anni, sono state soprattutto le milizie costiere libiche, che si sono rese responsabili di gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani. Nel 2022, pochi mesi dopo la stipula dell’accordo, abbiamo inoltrato come Altreconomia un’istanza di accesso civico alla Aid -allora guidata dall’ex senatore Nicola Latorre, sostituito dal dicembre scorso dall’accademica Fiammetta Salmoni- per avere la copia del testo e degli allegati.

    La richiesta fu negata richiamando a mo’ di “sostegno normativo” un decreto del ministero dell’Interno datato 16 marzo 2022 (ancora a guida Lamorgese). L’oggetto di quel provvedimento era l’aggiornamento della “Disciplina delle categorie di documenti sottratti al diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi”. Un’apparente formalità. Il Viminale, però, agì di sostanza, includendo tra i documenti ritenuti “inaccessibili per motivi attinenti alla sicurezza, alla difesa nazionale ed alle relazioni internazionali” anche quelli “relativi agli accordi intergovernativi di cooperazione e alle intese tecniche stipulati per la realizzazione di programmi militari di sviluppo, di approvvigionamento e/o supporto comune o di programmi per la collaborazione internazionale di polizia, nonché quelli relativi ad intese tecnico-operative per la cooperazione internazionale di polizia inclusa la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”.

    Il 16 gennaio 2023 Roma e Ankara hanno firmato un memorandum per “procedure operative standard” per il distacco in Italia di “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”

    Non solo. In quel decreto si schermava poi un altro soggetto sensibile: Frontex. Vengono infatti classificati come inaccessibili anche i “documenti relativi alla cooperazione con l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera (appunto Frontex, ndr), per la sorveglianza delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea coincidenti con quelle italiane e che non siano già sottratti all’accesso dall’applicazione di classifiche di riservatezza Ue”. Così come le “relazioni, rapporti ed ogni altro documento relativo a problemi concernenti le zone di confine […] la cui conoscenza possa pregiudicare la sicurezza, la difesa nazionale o le relazioni internazionali”.

    È per questo motivo che lo definimmo il “decreto che azzera la trasparenza sulle frontiere”, promuovendo di lì a poco un ricorso al Tar -grazie agli avvocati Giulia Crescini, Nicola Datena, Salvatore Fachile e Ginevra Maccarone dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione e membri del progetto Sciabaca&Oruka- contro i ministeri dell’Interno, della Difesa, della Pubblicazione amministrazione, oltreché l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid), proprio per vedere riconosciuto il diritto all’accesso civico generalizzato. In primo grado, però, il Tar del Lazio ci ha dato torto.

    Ed eccoci arrivati al Consiglio di Stato, il cui pronunciamento, pubblicato a metà novembre 2023, ha ritenuto infondato il nostro appello, riconoscendo come “fonte di un divieto assoluto all’accesso civico generalizzato”, non sorretto perciò da alcuna motivazione, proprio quel decreto ministeriale firmato Luciana Lamorgese del marzo 2022. “All’ampliamento della platea dei soggetti che possono avvalersi dell’accesso civico generalizzato corrisponde un maggior rigore normativo nella previsione delle eccezioni poste a tutela dei contro-interessi pubblici e privati”, hanno scritto i giudici della quarta sezione.

    I legali che ci hanno accompagnato in questo percorso non la pensano allo stesso modo. “Il Consiglio di Stato ha affermato che il decreto ministeriale del 16 marzo 2022, una fonte secondaria, non legislativa, adottata in attuazione della disciplina del diverso istituto dell’accesso documentale, abbia introdotto nell’ordinamento un limite assoluto all’accesso civico, che può essere invocato dalla Pubblica amministrazione senza che questa sia tenuta a fornire alcuna motivazione in merito alla sua ricorrenza.

    Si tratta di un’evidente elusione del dettato normativo, che prevede in materia una riserva assoluta di legge”, osservano le avvocate Crescini e Maccarone. Che aggiungono: “I giudici hanno respinto anche la censura relativa all’assoluta genericità del limite introdotto con il decreto ministeriale, che non individua precisamente le categorie di atti sottratti all’accesso, ma al contrario solo il settore di interesse, cioè la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, essendo idoneo a ricomprendere qualunque tipologia di atto, documento o dato, di fatto svuotando di contenuto l’istituto”. Questa sentenza del Consiglio di Stato rischia di rappresentare un precedente preoccupante. “L’accesso civico è uno strumento moderno che avrebbe potuto garantire la trasparenza degli atti della Pubblica amministrazione secondo canoni condivisibili che rispecchiano le esigenze che si sono cristallizzate in tutta Europa nel corso degli ultimi anni -riflettono le avvocate-. Tuttavia con questa interpretazione l’istituto viene totalmente svuotato di significato, costringendoci a fare un passo indietro di notevole importanza in tema di trasparenza, che è chiamata ad assicurare l’effettivo andamento democratico di un ordinamento giuridico”.

    I mezzi guardacoste che l’Italia si appresta a cedere quest’anno alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno tunisino sono sei

    Le forniture italiane per ostacolare i transiti, intanto, continuano. Negli ultimi mesi la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere del Viminale -retta da Claudio Galzerano, già a capo di Europol- ha ripreso con forza a bandire gare o pubblicare, a cose fatte, affidamenti diretti. Anche per trasferte o distacchi in Italia di “ufficiali” libici, tunisini, ivoriani o “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”. La delegazione della Libyan coast guard and port security, ad esempio, è stata portata dal 15 al 18 gennaio di quest’anno alla base navale della Guardia di Finanza a Capo Miseno (NA) per una “visita tecnica”. Nei mesi prima altre “autorità libiche” erano state formate alle basi di Gaeta (LT) o Capo Miseno. Gli ufficiali della Costa d’Avorio sono stati in missione dal 30 ottobre scorso al 20 gennaio 2024 “in materia di rimpatri”. Sono stati portati nei punti caldi di Lampedusa e Ventimiglia.

    Al dicembre 2023 risale invece la firma dell’accordo tra la Direzione centrale e il Comando generale della Gdf per la fornitura di navi, assistenza, manutenzione, supporto tecnico-logistico a beneficio di Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto. Obiettivo: il “rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. Proprio alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno di Tunisi finiranno sei guardacoste litoranei della classe “G.L. 1.400”, con servizi annessi del tipo “consulenza, assistenza e tutoraggio”, per un valore di 4,8 milioni di euro (i soldi li mette il Viminale, i mezzi e la competenza la Guardia di Finanza). Navi ma anche carburante. A inizio gennaio di quest’anno il direttore Galzerano, dietro presunta richiesta di non ben precisate “autorità tunisine”, ha approvato la spesa di “nove milioni di euro circa” (testualmente) per “il pagamento del carburante delle unità navali impegnate nella lotta all’immigrazione clandestina e nelle operazioni di ricerca e di soccorso” nelle acque tunisine. Dove hanno recuperato le risorse? Da un fondo ministeriale dedicato a “misure volte alla prevenzione e al contrasto della criminalità e al potenziamento della sicurezza nelle strutture aeroportuali e nelle principali stazioni ferroviarie anche attraverso imprescindibili misure di cooperazione internazionale”. Chissà quale sarà la prossima fermata.

    https://altreconomia.it/cosi-litalia-ha-svuotato-il-diritto-alla-trasparenza-sulle-frontiere
    #Tunisie #Egypte #transparence #Agenzia_industrie_difesa (#Aid) #Support_to_integrated_border_and_migration_management_in_Libya (#Sibmmil) #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique #gardes-côtes_libyens #Frontex

  • #Frontex, Cutro è un ricordo sbiadito: sorvegliare dall’alto resta la priorità

    Un anno dopo la strage, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera investe ancora su velivoli per sorvolare il Mediterraneo. Dal 2016 a oggi la spesa supera mezzo miliardo di euro. Una strategia dagli esiti noti: più respinti e più morti

    Frontex è pronta a investire altri 158 milioni di euro per sorvegliare dall’alto il Mediterraneo. A un anno dal naufragio di Steccato di Cutro (KR), costato la vita a 94 persone, la strategia dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee non cambia. Anzi, si affina con “occhi” sempre più efficaci per rintracciare e osservare dall’alto le imbarcazioni in difficoltà. “Si continua a pensare che Frontex sia un’innocua gregaria degli Stati, senza responsabilità -spiega Laura Salzano, docente di diritto dell’Ue presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Ma in mare, sempre di più, le sue attività hanno conseguenze dirette sulla vita delle persone”.

    Lo racconta, in parte, anche la strage di Cutro del 26 febbraio 2023. Alle 22.26 della sera prima infatti fu l’Agenzia, attraverso il velivolo “Eagle 1”, a individuare per prima la “Summer love” e a segnalarla, quand’era a circa 40 miglia delle coste crotonesi, al Frontex coordination centre. Da Varsavia le coordinate della nave furono girate alle autorità competenti: tra queste anche l’International coordination centre (ICC) di Pratica di mare (RM) in cui, allo stesso tavolo, siedono le autorità italiane e la stessa Agenzia che ha il dovere di monitorare quello che succede. “Nonostante fosse noto che c’erano persone nella ‘pancia della nave’ e il meteo stesse peggiorando, si è deciso di attivare un’operazione di polizia e non di ‘ricerca e soccorso’ -spiega Salzano-. Questa classificazione a mio avviso errata è responsabilità anche dell’Agenzia”. Un errore che potrebbe aver inciso anche sul ritardo nei soccorsi.

    Lo stabilirà la Procura di Crotone che, a metà gennaio 2024, non ha ancora chiuso le indagini sulla strage. Qualcosa di quanto successo quella sera, però, si sa già, perché il processo contro i presunti manovratori dell’imbarcazione è già in fase di dibattimento. “La prima barca della Guardia costiera -spiega Francesco Verri, avvocato di decine di familiari delle vittime- arriva sul luogo del naufragio alle 6.50, quasi tre ore dopo il naufragio: salva due persone ma recupera anche il cadavere di un bambino morto di freddo. Perché ci hanno impiegato così tanto tempo per percorrere poche miglia nautiche? Sulla spiaggia la pattuglia è arrivata un’ora e 35 minuti dopo il naufragio. Da Crotone a Cutro ci vogliono dieci minuti di macchina”. Domande a cui dovranno rispondere le autorità italiane.

    Al di là delle responsabilità penali, però, quanto successo quella notte mostra l’inadeguatezza del sistema dei soccorsi di cui la sorveglianza aerea è un tassello fondamentale su cui Frontex continua a investire. Con importi senza precedenti.

    Quando Altreconomia va in stampa, a metà gennaio, l’Agenzia sta ancora valutando le offerte arrivate per il nuovo bando da 158 milioni di euro per due servizi di monitoraggio aereo: uno a medio raggio, entro le 151 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza (budget di 100 milioni), l’altro a lungo raggio che può superare le 401 miglia di distanza (48 milioni).

    https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/i/web/post/658926323750966119

    Documenti di gara alla mano, una delle novità più rilevanti riguarda i cosiddetti “Paesi ospitanti” delle attività di monitoraggio: si prevede infatti espressamente che possano essere anche Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea. In sostanza: il velivolo potrebbe partire da una base in Tunisia o Libia; e, addirittura, si prevede che un host country liaison officer, ovvero un agente di “contatto” delle autorità di quel Paese, possa salire a bordo dell’aeromobile. “Bisogna capire se sarà fattibile operativamente -sottolinea Salzano-. Ma non escludere questa possibilità nel bando è grave: sono Paesi che non sono tenuti a rispettare gli standard europei”.

    Mentre lavora per dispiegare la sua flotta anche sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo, Frontex investe sulla “qualità” dei servizi richiesti. Nel bando si richiede infatti che il radar installato sopra il velivolo sia in grado di individuare (per poi poter fotografare) un oggetto di piccole dimensioni a quasi dieci chilometri di distanza e uno “medio” a quasi 19. Prendendo ad esempio il caso delle coste libiche, più la “potenza di fuoco” è elevata più il velivolo potrà essere distante dalle coste del Nordafrica ma comunque individuare le imbarcazioni appena partite.

    La distanza, in miglia nautiche, che l’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex nel novembre 2023 prevede tra l’aeroporto di partenza del velivolo e l’area di interesse da sorvolare è di 401 miglia. Nella prima gara riguardante questi servizi, pubblicata dall’agenzia nell’agosto 2016, la distanza massima prevista era di 200 miglia

    Frontex sa che, oltre alla componente meccanica, l’efficienza “tecnica” dei suoi droni è fondamentale. Per questo il 6 e 7 settembre 2023 ha riunito a Varsavia 16 aziende del settore per discutere delle nuove frontiere tecnologiche dei “velivoli a pilotaggio remoto”. A presentare i propri prodotti c’era anche l’italiana Leonardo Spa, leader europeo nel settore aerospaziale e militare, che già nel 2018 aveva siglato un accordo da 1,6 milioni di euro per fornire droni all’Agenzia.

    L’ex Finmeccanica è tra le 15 aziende che hanno vinto i bandi pubblicati da Frontex per la sorveglianza aerea. Se si guarda al numero di commesse aggiudicate, il trio formato da DEA Aviation (Regno Unito), CAE Aviation (Stati Uniti) ed EASP Air (Spagna) primeggia con oltre otto contratti siglati. Valutando l’importo delle singole gare, a farla da padrone sono invece due colossi del settore militare: la tedesca Airbus DS e la Elbit System, principale azienda che rifornisce l’esercito israeliano, che si sono aggiudicate in cordata due gare (2020 e 2022) per 125 milioni di euro. Dal 2016 a oggi, il totale investito per questi servizi supera i cinquecento milioni di euro.

    “La sorveglianza è una delle principali voci di spesa dell’Agenzia -spiega Ana Valdivia, professoressa all’Oxford internet institute che da anni analizza i bandi di Frontex- insieme a tutte le tecnologie che trasformano gli ‘eventi reali’ in dati”. E la cosiddetta “datificazione” ha un ruolo di primo piano anche nel Mediterraneo. “La fotografia di una barca in distress ha un duplice scopo: intercettarla ma anche avere un’evidenza digitale, una prova, che una determinata persona era a bordo -aggiunge Valdivia-. Questa è la ‘sorveglianza’: non un occhio che ci guarda giorno e notte, ma una memoria digitale capace di ricostruire in futuro la nostra vita. Anche per i migranti”. E per chi è su un’imbarcazione diretta verso l’Europa è vitale a chi finiscono le informazioni.

    Nell’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex, si prevede che “il contraente trasferirà i dati a sistemi situati in un Paese terzo se è garantito un livello adeguato di protezione”. “Fanno finta di non sapere che non possono farlo -aggiunge Salzano- non potendo controllare che Paesi come la Tunisia e la Libia non utilizzino quei dati, per esempio, per arrestare le persone in viaggio una volta respinte”. Quello che si sa, invece, è che quei dati -nello specifico le coordinate delle navi- vengono utilizzate per far intervenire le milizie costiere libiche. Per questo motivo i droni si avvicinano sempre di più alla Libia. Se nel 2016 l’Agenzia, nella prima gara pubblicata per questa tipologia di servizi, parlava di area operativa nelle “vicinanze” con le coste italiane e greche, fino a 200 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza, dal 2020 in avanti questa distanza ha superato le 401 miglia.

    Lorenzo Pezzani, professore associato di Geografia all’università di Bologna, ha esaminato giorno per giorno i tracciati di “Heron”, il più importante drone della flotta di Frontex: nel 2021 l’attività di volo si è concentrata tra Zuara e Tripoli, il tratto di costa libica da cui partiva la maggior parte delle barche.

    “Il numero di respingimenti delle milizie libiche -spiega Pezzani autore dello studio “Airborne complicity” pubblicato a inizio dicembre 2022- cresce all’aumentare delle ore di volo del drone e allo stesso tempo la mortalità non diminuisce, a differenza di quanto dichiarato dall’Agenzia”. Che tramite il suo direttore Hans Leijtens, entrato in carica a pochi giorni dal naufragio di Cutro, nega di avere accordi o rapporti diretti con la Libia. “Se è così, com’è possibile che un drone voli così vicino alle coste di uno Stato sovrano?”, si chiede Salzano. Chi fornirà il “nuovo” servizio per Frontex dovrà cancellare le registrazioni video entro 72 ore. Meglio non lasciare troppe tracce in giro.

    https://altreconomia.it/frontex-cutro-e-un-ricordo-sbiadito-sorvegliare-dallalto-resta-la-prior
    #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Cutro #surveillance_aérienne #Leonardo #Elbit_System #Airbus #host_country_liaison_officer #radar #technologie #DEA_Aviation #CAE_Aviation #EASP_Air #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens

  • La #Grèce condamnée par la #Cour_européenne_des_droits_de_l’homme après les tirs de gardes-côtes sur des embarcations de migrants

    La CEDH a condamné le pays à verser 80 000 euros aux proches d’un migrant syrien mort après avoir été blessé par balle par les gardes-côtes grecs, en 2014.

    Le #22_septembre_2014, à l’aube, non loin des côtes turques et près de l’îlot grec de #Psérimos, un bateau à moteur transportant quatorze migrants est repéré par les #gardes-côtes_grecs. Le commandant du navire militaire demande au conducteur d’arrêter l’embarcation. Ce dernier refuse. Les gardes-côtes tirent alors vingt balles pour immobiliser la vedette – sept coups de semonce et treize tirs ciblés sur le moteur. Deux ressortissants syriens sont blessés. L’un d’eux, Belal Tello est touché à la tête et conduit par hélicoptère à l’hôpital de Rhodes, une île grecque voisine. En août 215, il est transféré en Suède où habitent sa femme et ses enfants (les requérants). Il est pris en charge à l’hôpital universitaire Karolinska, à Stockholm. Mais il meurt quatre mois plus tard.

    Les proches de #Belal_Tello ont attendu près de dix ans pour obtenir le verdict de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH), qui a finalement condamné la Grèce à leur verser 80 000 euros. D’après la cour, Athènes n’a pas prouvé « que l’usage de la force était absolument nécessaire » pour arrêter le bateau qui s’approchait des côtes grecques. « Les treize coups de feu tirés exposaient forcément les passagers de la vedette à un risque », ont estimé les sept juges européens.

    « La condamnation concerne également l’enquête inefficace menée par les autorités grecques sur l’incident », souligne, dans un communiqué, l’ONG Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), qui représentait, avec l’association Pro Asyl, la famille de la victime. Le parquet grec avait ouvert une enquête préliminaire sur cet incident, mais la justice avait rapidement classé l’affaire en 2015. D’après la CEDH, l’enquête menée par les autorités nationales comportait « de nombreuses lacunes qui ont conduit notamment à la perte d’éléments de preuve ». « Au cours de la procédure pénale, les deux réfugiés blessés par balle n’ont jamais été appelés à témoigner. Les déclarations des témoins recueillies lors des interrogatoires préliminaires semblent identiques », souligne RSA. La CEDH s’est aussi étonnée que plusieurs mesures pouvant faire avancer l’enquête n’aient pas été prises : une expertise médico-légale sur la blessure à la tête du réfugié syrien ; un rapport balistique établissant les trajectoires des tirs…
    « Impunité généralisée »

    Ce n’est pas la première fois que les agissements des gardes-côtes grecs sont condamnés ou mis en cause. En juillet 2022, la CEDH avait accordé 330 000 euros à seize requérants dont le bateau avait coulé en mer Egée, près de l’île de Farmakonisi, en janvier 2014. Onze personnes, dont huit enfants, avaient trouvé la mort dans ce naufrage provoqué par un navire garde-côtes grec, qui aurait navigué à grande vitesse à proximité de l’embarcation, entraînant le chavirement de celle-ci.
    La CEDH avait déjà noté que les autorités grecques n’avaient pas mené une « enquête approfondie et effective permettant de faire la lumière sur les circonstances du naufrage ». L’une des avocates des requérants, Maria Papamina, du Conseil pour les réfugiés grec, avait déclaré, lors du rendu de cette décision de justice : « Nous avions l’impression que l’intention [des autorités grecques] était de clore rapidement l’affaire. »

    Et c’est justement ce que les défenseurs des droits de l’homme souhaitent éviter, que le cas d’un autre naufrage survenu il y a quelques mois, au large du Péloponnèse, à Pylos, ne soit classé, lui aussi, sans suite. Le 14 juin 2023, un chalutier, l’Adriana, parti de Libye, a coulé avec près de 750 migrants à son bord, dans les eaux territoriales grecques. Seules 104 personnes ont survécu et 82 corps ont été retrouvés.

    Les témoignages des survivants suggèrent qu’un patrouilleur garde-côtes grec a attaché une corde à l’Adriana et tiré dessus, ce qui aurait conduit à faire chavirer le bateau surchargé de migrants. D’après plusieurs enquêtes journalistiques, les opérations de sauvetage ont été également tardivement mises en place.
    Dans un rapport publié en décembre 2023, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch déploraient, six mois après le drame, le « peu de progrès » dans les investigations menées par les autorités grecques. Selon les deux ONG, « les échecs historiques des enquêtes grecques sur les naufrages (…) et l’impunité généralisée pour les violations systémiques des droits humains à ses frontières suscitent des inquiétudes quant à l’adéquation des enquêtes judiciaires en cours sur la tragédie de Pylos ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/01/17/la-grece-condamnee-par-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-apres-les-ti
    #CEDH #justice #condamnation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #décès #naufrage #tir

  • Beyond borders, beyond boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya

    In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have intensified their effort to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching their borders. One strategy to reach this goal consists of funding programs for third countries’ coast guards and border police, as currently happens in Libya and Tunisia.

    These programs - funded by the #EUTF_for_Africa and the #NDICI-Global_Europe - allocate funding to train and equip authorities, including the delivery and maintenance of assets. NGOs, activists, and International Organizations have amassed substantial evidence implicating Libyan and Tunisian authorities in severe human rights violations.

    The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament commissioned a study carried out by Profundo, ARCI, EuroMed Rights and Action Aid, on how EU funding is linked to human rights violations in neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Libya.

    The study answers the following questions:

    - What is the state of EU funding for programs aimed at enhancing border control capacities in Libya and Tunisia?
    - What is the human rights impact of these initiatives?
    - What is the framework for human rights compliance?
    - How do the NDICI-Global Europe decision-making processes work?

    The report highlights that the shortcomings in human rights compliance within border control programs, coupled with the lack of proper transparency clearly contradicts EU and international law. Moreover, this results in the insufficient consideration of the risk of human rights violations when allocating funding for both ongoing and new programs.

    This is particularly concerning in the cases of Tunisia and Libya, where this report collects evidence that the ongoing strategies, regardless of achieving or not the questionable goals of reducing migration flows, have a very severe human rights impact on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

    Pour télécharger l’étude:
    https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

    https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

    #Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #aide_financières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #rapport #trust_fund #profundo #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument #droits_humains #gestion_des_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #IVCDCI #IVCDCI-EM #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #EUTFA #coût #violence #crimes_contre_l'humanité #impunité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #naufrages

  • Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

    Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

    In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

    Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

    However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

    Successes at the working level

    Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

    In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

    The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

    Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

    Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

    State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

    Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

    Reception from the Frontex Director

    In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

    Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

    However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

    Model for migration defence with Egypt

    Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

    Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

    #Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

    –—
    ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

    • Épisode 1/4 : Des #bénévoles dans les airs face à l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et garde-côtes, #Frontex

      Depuis 2018, l’ONG #Pilotes_Volontaires survole le large des côtes libyennes pour localiser les bateaux de fortune en détresse qu’empruntent les migrants pour tenter de rejoindre l’Europe.

      #José_Benavente fait ce triste constat : « les agences européennes comme Frontex espéraient que mettre un terme à l’opération "#Mare_Nostrum" rendraient les traversées plus difficiles et opéreraient un effet de dissuasion pour les migrants qui tentent de traverser la mer ». Or depuis leur petit avion d’observation, le Colibri 2, ils aident les bateaux qui sont évidemment toujours présents dans la zone à opérer des sauvetages plus rapidement.

      D’autres avions, ceux de Frontex notamment, transitent aussi par là pour permettre aux gardes côtes libyens d’opérer toujours plus d’interceptions synonymes d’un retour en enfer pour les migrants qui tentent justement de fuir coûte que coûte ce pays en proie à la guerre civile. Comme le regrette #Charles_Heller « les migrants fuient la Libye, où ils sont réduits à l’esclavage, aux travaux forcés, à la torture. Les migrants sont devenus un objet qui circule de main en main, que ce soit les milices ou les centres de détention de l’Etat. Aucune opération de secours en mer dans la zone libyenne ne peut effectivement être terminée de manière adéquate et respectueuse du droit international, dès lors que les passagers sont ramenés dans un pays où leur vie est en danger ».

      Surveillance et interception d’un côté, contre surveillance et sauvetage de l’autre, ce documentaire retrace l’histoire récente de ce qui se trame dans les airs et en mer depuis l’arrêt en 2014 de l’opération "Mare Nostrum" initiée par la marine italienne et qui avait permis de sauver des dizaines de milliers de vies car comme le rappelle Charles Heller : « l’Union européenne a sciemment créé ce vide de secours d’abord, et ce système de refoulement indirect ensuite. Et les avions de surveillance européens sont au cœur de ce dispositif » et José Benavente ajoute « lorsqu’on survole la Méditerranée, on n’est pas au-dessus d’un cimetière. On est littéralement au-dessus d’une fosse commune ».

      Avec :

      – Jose Benavente, fondateur de l’ONG Pilotes Volontaires ONG Pilotes Volontaires
      - Charles Heller, chercheur et cinéaste, co-fondateur du projet Forensic Oceanography

      https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/lsd-la-serie-documentaire/des-benevoles-dans-les-airs-face-a-l-agence-europeenne-de-garde-frontier
      #frontières #sauvetage_en_mer #sauvetage #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes_libyens #pull-backs #solidarité

    • Épisode 2/4 : De l’#apprentissage à l’#expulsion

      Les initiatives pour alerter sur la condition des jeunes majeurs étrangers en passe d’être expulsés se multiplient partout en France.

      La très médiatique grève de la faim de Stéphane Ravacley, boulanger à Besançon, tentant d’empêcher l’expulsion vers la Guinée de son apprenti Laye Fodé Traoré, a fait des émules : “j’ai reçu énormément d’appels de patrons qui étaient dans la même problématique que moi et ça m’a posé question. Je savais qu’il y avait des milliers de Laye en France, mais que je ne m’étais jamais posé la question. Et là, je me suis dit il faut faire quelque chose.”

      Dans la Marne, les militants épuisés, par l’aberration du système, comme l’explique Marie-Pierre Barrière : “il faut une autorisation de travail pour aller au CFA et il faut un titre de séjour. Donc ils ne peuvent pas travailler avec un patron parce qu’ils ne l’ont pas. C’est le serpent qui se mord la queue”.

      Pourtant quelques chefs d’entreprise commencent à timidement à protester contre les mesures d’expulsion de leurs apprentis étrangers. C’est le cas de Ricardo Agnesina : _“_je suis furax parce que quand on a justement des éléments comme Souleyman, on se dit il ne faut pas le louper parce que c’est réellement quelqu’un à qui il faut donner sa chance. Qu’il vienne de Guinée, de Pologne, de Normandie ou du sud de la France, peu importe, c’est quelqu’un qui a envie de travailler et qui a envie d’apprendre un métier donc on n’a pas le droit de lui dire non.”

      Ces patrons et artisans de secteurs dits "en tension" comme la restauration et le bâtiment se trouvent, par le biais de la défense de leurs intérêts, nouvellement sensibilisés à la question migratoire sont interdits face à l’arbitraire des décisions préfectorales qu’ils découvrent alors qu’ils peinent à embaucher des jeunes compétents. Bruno Forget, président de la foire de Châlons-en-Champagne s’indigne : “aujourd’hui, on vit une véritable hérésie. J’ai un cas précis d’une personne qui ne peut pas avoir de boulot parce qu’elle n’a pas de papiers. Et cette personne n’a pas de papiers parce qu’on ne peut pas fournir un certificat d’employeur. On se pince ! Il faut s’indigner ! ”

      Avec :

      – Mamadou, jeune apprenti guinéen
      - Souleimane, jeune apprenti guinéen
      - Laye Fodé Traoré, jeune apprenti guinéen
      - Marie-Pierre Barrière, militante Réseau Education Sans Frontières (RESF)
      – Stéphane Ravacley, boulanger, fondateur de l’association Patrons solidaires
      – Riccardo Agnesina, chef d’entreprise
      – Bruno Forget, directeur de la foire de Châlons-en-Champagne
      – M. et Mme Ansel, restaurateurs à Reims
      – Alexandrine Boia, avocate au barreau de Reims

      https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/lsd-la-serie-documentaire/de-l-apprentissage-a-l-expulsion-4412030
      #travail #sans-papiers

    • Épisode 3/4 : #Femmes migrantes invisibles

      Statistiquement plus nombreuses que les hommes sur les chemins de l’exil, les femmes sont pourtant les grandes absentes du récit médiatique et de la recherche scientifique dans le domaine des migrations.

      Pour comprendre l’invisibilité Camille Schmoll constate : “il y a aussi un peu d’auto-invisibilité de la part des femmes qui ne souhaitent pas forcément attirer l’attention sur leur sort, leur trajectoire. La migration reste une transgression” et remarque que cette absence peut servir un certain discours “ or, quand on veut construire la migration comme une menace, c’est probablement plus efficace de se concentrer sur les hommes.”

      Depuis plus d’un demi-siècle, les bénévoles de l’Association meusienne d’accompagnement des trajets de vie des migrants (AMATRAMI) viennent en aide aux personnes migrantes présentes sur leur territoire, aux femmes notamment. Camille Schmoll rappelle cette situation : “il y a toujours eu des femmes en migration. On les a simplement occultés pour différentes raisons. En fait, ce sont à l’initiative de femmes, de chercheuses féministes que depuis les années 60-70, on redécouvre la part des femmes dans ces migrations. On sait qu’elles étaient très nombreuses dans les grandes migrations transatlantiques de la fin du 19ème siècle et du début du 20ème siècle. "

      Confrontées tout au long de leurs parcours migratoires mais également dans leur pays de destination à des violences de genre, ces femmes ne sont que trop rarement prises en compte et considérées selon leur sexe par les pouvoirs publics. Majoritairement des femmes, les bénévoles de l’AMATRAMI tentent, avec le peu de moyens à leur disposition de leur apporter un soutien spécifique et adapté.  Lucette Lamousse se souvient “elles étaient perdues en arrivant, leur première demande c’était de parler le français”. Camille Schmoll observe un changement dans cette migration : “les femmes qui partent, partent aussi parce qu’elles ont pu conquérir au départ une certaine forme d’autonomie. Ces changements du point de vue du positionnement social des femmes dans les sociétés de départ qui font qu’on va partir, ne sont pas uniquement des changements négatifs”.

      Avec

      - Aïcha, citoyenne algérienne réfugiée en France
      - Mire, citoyenne albanaise réfugiée en France
      - Salimata, citoyenne ivoirienne réfugiée en France
      - Lucette Lamousse, co-fondatrice de l’Association meusienne d’accompagnement des trajets de vie des migrants (AMATRAMI)
      - Colette Nordemann, présidente de l’AMATRAMI
      - Camille Georges, médiatrice socioculturelle à l’AMATRAMI
      – Khadija, employée à l’AMATRAMI
      – Camille Schmoll, géographe, autrice de Les damnées de la mer (éd. La Découverte)
      - Élise Buliard, animatrice famille à l’AMATRAMI

      https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/lsd-la-serie-documentaire/femmes-migrantes-invisibles-6230660
      #femmes_migrantes #invisibilisation

    • Épisode 4/4 : Une famille afghane en #Touraine

      Comment Aziz et les siens négocient-ils leur exil en Touraine ? 

      Après des années d’une attente angoissée que la France veuille bien lui fournir un sauf conduit pour fuir la menace des Talibans en Afghanistan, Aziz, ancien Personnel Civil de Recrutement local (PCRL) de l’armée française est en sécurité dans le village d’#Avoine (Indre-et-Loire) avec son épouse et leurs six enfants. Mais comme le précise le maire de la commune d’Avoine : “une petite commune comme nous de 1900 habitants quand vous avez 10 réfugiés sur le terrain de la commune, ils sont acceptés, les gens sont très généreux avec eux et ils sont très acceptés. Si demain vous m’en mettez 200 sur un terrain de la commune, là vous risquez d’avoir des problèmes”.

      Quoique libéral car il a créé un lycée pour filles, Aziz est originaire d’une petite ville de province, patriarcale, religieuse et conservatrice qu’il a laissée derrière lui pour découvrir le monde jusque-là inconnu d’une société sécularisée. Ancien notable de cette petite ville qui l’a vu naître, il doit désormais vivre l’expérience du déclassement et de l’anonymat : “j’ai tout laissé derrière et j’ai le sentiment de ne plus avoir de valeur” . Mais il doit aussi faire face et tenter d’accepter la transformation de ses plus jeunes enfants qu’il a confiés aux bons soins de l’école de la République. Et l’adaptation n’est pas toujours évidente, ainsi son épouse qui à la nostalgie du pays, se sent mise à nue depuis le jour où elle a dû quitter sa burka : “c’était la première fois que je n’avais pas le visage caché. Nous portions toujours le voile avant. Je me sentais très bizarre. Je ne pouvais pas regarder les gens. C’était étrange, difficile”

      Le couple est vigilant et craint que leurs enfants perdent peu à peu l’usage de leur langue, le pashto : "j’espère que mes filles et mes fils n’oublieront pas l’islam, leur langue maternelle et leur éducation. Les quatre plus grands sont âgés et nous devons faire attention aux deux petites filles parce qu’elles sont petites. Elles oublient facilement la culture.”

      Avec :

      - Aziz Rahman Rawan, citoyen afghan réfugié en France, son épouse Bibi Hadia Azizi et leurs enfants
      - Julie Vérin, artiste
      – Françoise Roufignac, enseignante à la retraite
      – Didier Godoy, maire d’Avoine (Indre-et-Loire)
      – Christelle Simonaire, parente d’élève
      – M. Galet, directeur de l’école primaire d’Avoine
      – Mme Camard, enseignante à l’école primaire d’Avoine
      – Pauline Miginiac, coordinatrice régionale en Formation professionnelle à l’Union française des centres de vacances (UFCV)

      https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/lsd-la-serie-documentaire/une-famille-afghane-en-touraine-6456038
      #réfugiés_syriens

  • EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa

    In a letter (https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.

    The letter (pdf) states:

    “…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”

    What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.

    Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.

    According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:

    “…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.

    The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”

    Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.

    [voir: https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]

    The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.

    It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”

    More surveillance, new law

    Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”

    The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”

    It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”

    Deportation cooperation

    Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:

    “…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”

    Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”

    More funds

    For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.

    Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex

    ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

    • *Crise migratoire : le bilan mitigé des accords passés par l’Union européenne pour limiter les entrées sur son sol*

      Réunis en conseil jeudi et vendredi, les Vingt-Sept devaient faire le point sur la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’UE. Mardi, la présidente de la Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, a proposé de conclure de nouveaux partenariats « sur mesure » avec le #Sénégal, la #Mauritanie et l’Egypte.

      Malgré la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, qui s’est imposée à leur ordre du jour, le sujet de la migration demeure au menu des Vingt-Sept, qui se réunissent en Conseil européen jeudi 26 et vendredi 27 octobre à Bruxelles. Les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement doivent faire un point sur la dimension externe de cette migration et la sécurisation des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne (UE). Depuis janvier, le nombre d’arrivées irrégulières, selon l’agence Frontex, a atteint 270 000, en progression de 17 % par rapport à 2022. Sur certaines routes, la croissance est bien plus importante, notamment entre la Tunisie et l’Italie, avec une augmentation de 83 % des arrivées sur les neuf premiers mois de 2023.

      Si le #pacte_asile_et_migration, un ensemble de réglementations censé améliorer la gestion intra européenne de la migration, est en passe d’être adopté, le contrôle des frontières externes de l’Europe est au cœur des discussions politiques. A moins de huit mois des élections européennes, « les questions de migration seront décisives », prévient Manfred Weber, le patron du groupe conservateur PPE au Parlement européen.

      Nouveaux « #partenariats sur mesure »

      Mardi, dans une lettre aux dirigeants européens, Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, a rappelé sa volonté de « combattre la migration irrégulière à la racine et travailler mieux avec des #pays_partenaires », c’est-à-dire ceux où les migrants s’embarquent ou prennent la route pour l’UE, en établissant avec ces pays des « #partenariats_stratégiques_mutuellement_bénéficiaires ». Elle propose de conclure avec le Sénégal, la Mauritanie et l’Egypte de nouveaux « #partenariats_sur_mesure » sur le modèle de celui qui a été passé avec la Tunisie. Sans oublier la Jordanie et le Liban, fortement déstabilisés par le conflit en cours entre Israël et Gaza.

      L’UE souhaite que ces pays bloquent l’arrivée de migrants vers ses côtes et réadmettent leurs citoyens en situation irrégulière sur le Vieux Continent contre des investissements pour renforcer leurs infrastructures et développer leur économie. « L’idée n’est pas nécessairement mauvaise, glisse un diplomate européen, mais il faut voir comment c’est mené et négocié. Le partenariat avec la Tunisie a été bâclé et cela a été fiasco. »

      Depuis vingt ans, l’Europe n’a eu de cesse d’intégrer cette dimension migratoire dans ses accords avec les pays tiers et cette préoccupation s’est accentuée en 2015 avec l’arrivée massive de réfugiés syriens. Les moyens consacrés à cet aspect migratoire ont augmenté de façon exponentielle. Au moins 8 milliards d’euros sont programmés pour la période 2021-2027, soit environ 10 % des fonds de la coopération, pour des politiques de sécurisation et d’équipements des gardes-côtes. Ces moyens manquent au développement des pays aidés, critique l’ONG Oxfam. Et la Commission a demandé une rallonge de 15 milliards d’euros aux Vingt-Sept.

      Mettre l’accent sur les retours

      Tant de moyens, pour quels résultats ? Il est impossible de chiffrer le nombre d’entrées évitées par les accords passés, exception faite de l’arrangement avec la Turquie. Après la signature le 18 mars 2016, par les Vingt-Sept et la Commission, de la déclaration UE-Turquie, les arrivées de Syriens ont chuté de 98 % dès 2017, mais cela n’a pas fonctionné pour les retours, la Turquie ayant refusé de réadmettre la majorité des Syriens refoulés d’Europe. Cet engagement a coûté 6 milliards d’euros, financés à la fois par les Etats et l’UE.

      « Pour les autres accords, le bilan est modeste, indique Florian Trauner, spécialiste des migrations à la Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgique). Nous avons étudié l’ensemble des accords passés par l’UE avec les pays tiers sur la période 2008-2018 pour mesurer leurs effets sur les retours et réadmissions. Si les pays des Balkans, plus proches de l’Europe, ont joué le jeu, avec les pays africains, cela ne fonctionne pas. »

      Depuis le début de l’année, la Commission assure malgré tout mettre l’accent sur les retours. Selon Ylva Johansson, la commissaire chargée de la politique migratoire, sur près de 300 000 obligations de quitter le territoire européen, environ 65 000 ont été exécutées, en progression de 22 % en 2023. Ces chiffres modestes « sont liés à des questions de procédures internes en Europe, mais également à nos relations avec les Etats tiers. Nous avons fait beaucoup de pédagogie avec ces Etats en mettant en balance l’accès aux visas européens et cela commence à porter ses fruits. »

      « Généralement, explique Florian Trauner, les Etats tiers acceptent les premiers temps les retours, puis la pression de l’opinion publique locale se retourne contre eux et les taux de réadmissions baissent. Les accords qui conditionnent l’aide au développement à des réadmissions créent davantage de problèmes qu’ils n’en résolvent. La diplomatie des petits pas, plus discrète, est bien plus efficace. »

      L’alternative, juge le chercheur, serait une meilleure gestion par les Européens des migrations, en ménageant des voies légales identifiées pour le travail, par exemple. Dans ce cas, affirme-t-il, les pays concernés accepteraient de reprendre plus simplement leurs citoyens. « Mais en Europe, on ne veut pas entendre cela », observe M. Trauner.
      Statut juridique obscur

      Le développement de ces accords donnant-donnant pose un autre problème à l’UE : leur statut juridique. « Quel que soit leur nom – partenariat, déclaration…–, ce ne sont pas des accords internationaux en bonne et due forme, négociés de manière transparente avec consultation de la société civile, sous le contrôle du Parlement européen puis des tribunaux, rappelle Eleonora Frasca, juriste à l’Université catholique de Louvain (Belgique). Ce sont des objets juridiques plus obscurs. »

      En outre, les arrangements avec la Turquie ou la Libye ont conduit des migrants à des situations dramatiques. Qu’il s’agisse des camps aux conditions déplorables des îles grecques où étaient parqués des milliers de Syriens refoulés d’Europe mais non repris en Turquie, ou des refoulements en mer, souvent avec des moyens européens, au large de la Grèce et de la Libye, ou enfin du sort des migrants renvoyés en Libye où de multiples abus et de crimes ont été documentés.

      Concernant la Tunisie, « l’Union européenne a signé l’accord sans inclure de clause de respect de l’Etat de droit ou des droits de l’homme au moment même où cette dernière chassait des migrants subsahariens vers les frontières libyenne et algérienne, relève Sara Prestianni, de l’ONG EuroMed Droit. Du coup, aucune condamnation n’a été formulée par l’UE contre ces abus. » L’Europe a été réduite au silence.

      Sous la pression d’Ursula von der Leyen, de Giorgia Melloni, la présidente du conseil italien, et de Mark Rutte, le premier ministre néerlandais, ce partenariat global doté d’un milliard d’euros « a été négocié au forceps et sans consultation », juge une source européenne. La conséquence a été une condamnation en Europe et une incompréhension de la part des Tunisiens, qui ont décidé de renvoyer 60 millions d’euros versés en septembre, estimant que c’était loin du milliard annoncé. « Aujourd’hui, le dialogue avec la Tunisie est exécrable, déplore un diplomate. La méthode n’a pas été la bonne », déplore la même source.
      Exposition à un chantage aux migrants

      « L’Union européenne a déjà été confrontée à ce risque réputationnel et semble disposée à l’accepter dans une certaine mesure, nuance Helena Hahn, de l’European Policy Center. Il est important qu’elle s’engage avec les pays tiers sur cette question des migrations. Toutefois, elle doit veiller à ce que ses objectifs ne l’emportent pas sur ses intérêts dans d’autres domaines, tels que la politique commerciale ou le développement. »

      Dernier risque pour l’UE : en multipliant ces accords avec des régimes autoritaires, elle s’expose à un chantage aux migrants. Depuis 2020, elle en a déjà été l’objet de la part de la Turquie et du Maroc, de loin le premier bénéficiaire d’aides financières au titre du contrôle des migrations. « Ce n’est pas juste le beau temps qui a exposé Lampedusa à l’arrivée de 12 000 migrants en quelques jours en juin, juge Mme Prestianni. Les autorités tunisiennes étaient derrière. La solution est de rester fermes sur nos valeurs. Et dans notre négociation avec la Tunisie, nous ne l’avons pas été. »

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/10/26/crise-migratoire-le-bilan-mitige-des-accords-passes-par-l-union-europeenne-p

    • EU planning new anti-migration deals with Egypt and Tunisia, unrepentant in support for Libya

      The European Commission wants to agree “new anti-smuggling operational partnerships” with Tunisia and Egypt before the end of the year, despite longstanding reports of abuse against migrants and refugees in Egypt and recent racist violence endorsed by the Tunisian state. Material and financial support is already being stepped up to the two North African countries, along with support for Libya.

      The plan for new “partnerships” is referred to in a newly-revealed annex (pdf) of a letter from European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, that was sent to the European Council prior to its meeting in October and published by Statewatch.

      In April, the Commission announced “willingness” from the EU and Tunisia “to establish a stronger operational partnership on anti-smuggling,” which would cover stronger border controls, more police and judicial cooperation, increased cooperation with EU agencies, and anti-migration advertising campaigns.

      The annex includes little further detail on the issue, but says that the agreements with Tunisia and Egypt should build on the anti-smuggling partnerships “in place with Morocco, Niger and the Western Balkans, with the support of Europol and Eurojust,” and that they should include “joint operational teams with prosecutors and law enforcement authorities of Member States and partners.”

      Abuse and impunity

      Last year, Human Rights Watch investigations found that “Egyptian authorities have failed to protect vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers from pervasive sexual violence, including by failing to investigate rape and sexual assault,” and that the police had subjected Sudanese refugee activists to “forced physical labor [sic] and beatings.” Eritrean asylum-seekers have also been detained and deported by the Egyptian authorities.

      The EU’s own report on human rights in Egypt in 2022 (pdf) says the authorities continue to impose “constraints” on “freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and media freedom,” while “concerns remained about broad application of the Terrorism Law against peaceful critics and individuals, and extensive and indiscriminate use of pre-trial detention.”

      Amr Magdi, Human Rights Watch’s Senior Researcher on the Middle East and North Africa, has said more bluntly that “there can be no light at the end of the tunnel without addressing rampant security force abuses and lawlessness.” The Cairo Institute for Human Rights said in August that the country’s “security apparatus continues to surveil and repress Egyptians with impunity. There is little to no access to participatory democracy.”

      The situation in Tunisia for migrants and refugees has worsened substantially since the beginning of the year, when president Kais Said declared a crackdown against sub-Saharan Africans in speeches that appeared to draw heavily from the far-right great replacement theory.

      It is unclear whether the EU will attempt to address this violence, abuse and discrimination as it seeks to strengthen the powers of the countries’ security authorities. The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that cooperation with Tunisia is already underway, even if an anti-smuggling deal has not been finalised:

      “Three mentorship pairs on migrant smuggling TU [Tunisia] with Member States (AT, ES, IT [Austria, Spain and Italy]) to start cooperation in the framework of Euromed Police, in the last quarter of 2023 (implemented by CEPOL [the European Police College] with Europol)”

      Anti-smuggling conference

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter indicates that the Egyptian foreign minister, Sameh Shoukry, “confirmed interest in a comprehensive partnership on migration, including anti-smuggling and promoting legal pathways,” at a meeting with European Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, at the UN General Assembly.

      This month the fourth EU-Egypt High Level Dialogue on Migration and the second Senior Officials Meeting on Security and Law Enforcement would be used to discuss the partnership, the annex notes – “including on the involvement of CEPOL, Europol and Frontex” – but it is unclear when exactly the Commission plans to sign the new agreements. An “International Conference on strengthening international cooperation on countering migrant smuggling” that will take place in Brussels on 28 November would provide an opportune moment to do so.

      The conference will be used to announce a proposal “to reinforce the EU legal framework on migrant smuggling, including elements related to: sanctions, governance, information flows and the role of JHA agencies,” said a Council document published by Statewatch in October.

      Other sources indicate that the proposal will include amendments to the EU’s Facilitation Directive and the Europol Regulation, with measures to boost the role of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre hosted at Europol; step up the exchange of information between member states, EU agencies and third countries; and step up Europol’s support to operations.

      Additional support

      The proposed “partnerships” with Egypt and Tunisia come on top of ongoing support provided by the EU to control migration.

      In July the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Tunisia covering “macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy, people-to-people contacts and migration and mobility.”

      Despite the Tunisian government returning €67 million provided by the EU, the number of refugee boat departures from Tunisia has decreased significantly, following an increase in patrols at sea and the increased destruction of intercepted vessels.

      Violent coercion is also playing a role, as noted by Matthias Monroy:

      “State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.”

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes that the EU has provided “fuel to support anti-smuggling operations,” and that Tunisian officials were shown around Frontex’s headquarters in mid-September for a “familiarisation visit”.

      Egypt, meanwhile, is expected to receive the first of three new patrol boats from the EU in December, €87 million as part of the second phase of a border management project will be disbursed “in the coming months,” and Frontex will pursue a working arrangement with the Egyptian authorities, who visited the agency’s HQ in Warsaw in October.

      Ongoing support to Libya

      Meanwhile, the EU’s support for migration control by actors in Libya continues, despite a UN investigation earlier this year accusing that support of contributing to crimes against humanity in the country.

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter notes with approval that five search and rescue vessels have been provided to the Libyan Coast Guard this year, and that by 21 September, “more than 10,900 individuals reported as rescued or intercepted by the Libyan authorities in more than 100 operations… Of those disembarked, the largest groups were from Bangladesh, Egypt and Syria”.

      The letter does not clarify what distinguishes “rescue” and “interception” in this context. The organisation Forensic Oceanography has previously described them as “conflicting imperatives” in an analysis of a disaster at sea in which some survivors were taken to Libya, and some to EU territory.

      In a letter (pdf) sent last week to the chairs of three European Parliament committees, three Commissioners – Margaritas Schinas, Ylva Johansson and Oliver Várhelyi – said the Commission remained “convinced that halting EU assistance in the country or disengagement would not improve the situation of those most in need.”

      While evidence that EU support provided to Libya has facilitated the commission of crimes against humanity is not enough to put that policy to a halt, it remains to be seen whether the Egyptian authorities’ violent repression, or state racism in Tunisia, will be deemed worthy of mention in public by Commission officials.

      The annex to von der Leyen’s letter also details EU action in a host of other areas, including the “pilot projects” launched in Bulgaria and Romania to step up border surveillance and speed up asylum proceedings and returns, support for the Moroccan authorities, and cooperation with Western Balkans states, amongst other things.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

      en italien:
      Statewatch. Mentre continua il sostegno alla Libia, l’UE sta pianificando nuovi accordi anti-migrazione con Egitto e Tunisia
      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/11/statewatch-mentre-continua-il-sostegno-alla-libia-lue-sta-pianificando-n

    • Accord migratoire avec l’Égypte. Des #navires français en eaux troubles

      Les entreprises françaises #Civipol, #Défense_Conseil_International et #Couach vont fournir à la marine du Caire trois navires de recherche et sauvetage dont elles formeront également les équipages, révèle Orient XXI dans une enquête exclusive. Cette livraison, dans le cadre d’un accord migratoire avec l’Égypte, risque de rendre l’Union européenne complice d’exactions perpétrées par les gardes-côtes égyptiens et libyens.

      La France est chaque année un peu plus en première ligne de l’externalisation des frontières de l’Europe. Selon nos informations, Civipol, l’opérateur de coopération internationale du ministère de l’intérieur, ainsi que son sous-traitant Défense Conseil International (DCI), prestataire attitré du ministère des armées pour la formation des militaires étrangers, ont sélectionné le chantier naval girondin Couach pour fournir trois navires de recherche et sauvetage (SAR) aux gardes-côtes égyptiens, dont la formation sera assurée par DCI sur des financements européens de 23 millions d’euros comprenant des outils civils de surveillance des frontières.

      Toujours selon nos sources, d’autres appels d’offres de Civipol et DCI destinés à la surveillance migratoire en Égypte devraient suivre, notamment pour la fourniture de caméras thermiques et de systèmes de positionnement satellite.

      Ces contrats sont directement liés à l’accord migratoire passé en octobre 2022 entre l’Union européenne (UE) et l’Égypte : en échange d’une assistance matérielle de 110 millions d’euros au total, Le Caire est chargé de bloquer, sur son territoire ainsi que dans ses eaux territoriales, le passage des migrants et réfugiés en partance pour l’Europe. Ce projet a pour architecte le commissaire européen à l’élargissement et à la politique de voisinage, Olivér Várhelyi. Diplomate affilié au parti Fidesz de l’illibéral premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orbán, il s’est récemment fait remarquer en annonçant unilatéralement la suspension de l’aide européenne à la Palestine au lendemain du 7 octobre — avant d’être recadré.

      La mise en œuvre de ce pacte a été conjointement confiée à Civipol et à l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) de l’ONU, comme déjà indiqué par le média Africa Intelligence. Depuis, la présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen a déjà plaidé pour un nouvel accord migratoire avec le régime du maréchal Sissi. Selon l’UE, il s’agirait d’aider les gardes-côtes égyptiens à venir en aide aux migrants naufragés, via une approche « basée sur les droits, orientée vers la protection et sensible au genre ».
      Circulez, il n’y a rien à voir

      Des éléments de langage qui ne convainquent guère l’ONG Refugees Platform in Egypt (REP), qui a alerté sur cet accord il y a un an. « Depuis 2016, le gouvernement égyptien a durci la répression des migrants et des personnes qui leur viennent en aide, dénonce-t-elle auprès d’Orient XXI. De plus en plus d’Égyptiens émigrent en Europe parce que la jeunesse n’a aucun avenir ici. Ce phénomène va justement être accentué par le soutien de l’UE au gouvernement égyptien. L’immigration est instrumentalisée par les dictatures de la région comme un levier pour obtenir un appui politique et financier de l’Europe. »

      En Égypte, des migrants sont arrêtés et brutalisés après avoir manifesté. Des femmes réfugiées sont agressées sexuellement dans l’impunité. Des demandeurs d’asile sont expulsés vers des pays dangereux comme l’Érythrée ou empêchés d’entrer sur le territoire égyptien. Par ailleurs, les gardes-côtes égyptiens collaborent avec leurs homologues libyens qui, également soutenus par l’UE, rejettent des migrants en mer ou les arrêtent pour les placer en détention dans des conditions inhumaines, et entretiennent des liens avec des milices qui jouent aussi le rôle de passeurs.

      Autant d’informations peu compatibles avec la promesse européenne d’un contrôle des frontières « basé sur les droits, orienté vers la protection et sensible au genre ». Sachant que l’agence européenne de gardes-frontières et de gardes-côtes Frontex s’est elle-même rendue coupable de refoulements illégaux de migrants (pushbacks) et a été accusée de tolérer de mauvais traitements sur ces derniers.

      Contactés à ce sujet, les ministères français de l’intérieur, des affaires étrangères et des armées, l’OIM, Civipol, DCI et Couach n’ont pas répondu à nos questions. Dans le cadre de cette enquête, Orient XXI a aussi effectué le 1er juin une demande de droit à l’information auprès de la Direction générale du voisinage et des négociations d’élargissement (DG NEAR) de la Commission européenne, afin d’accéder aux différents documents liés à l’accord migratoire passé entre l’UE et l’Égypte. Celle-ci a identifié douze documents susceptibles de nous intéresser, mais a décidé de nous refuser l’accès à onze d’entre eux, le douzième ne comprenant aucune information intéressante. La DG NEAR a invoqué une série de motifs allant du cohérent (caractère confidentiel des informations touchant à la politique de sécurité et la politique étrangère de l’UE) au plus surprenant (protection des données personnelles — alors qu’il aurait suffi de masquer lesdites données —, et même secret des affaires). Un premier recours interne a été déposé le 18 juillet, mais en l’absence de réponse de la DG NEAR dans les délais impartis, Orient XXI a saisi fin septembre la Médiatrice européenne, qui a demandé à la Commission de nous répondre avant le 13 octobre. Sans succès.

      Dans un courrier parvenu le 15 novembre, un porte-parole de la DG NEAR indique :

      "L’Égypte reste un partenaire fiable et prévisible pour l’Europe, et la migration constitue un domaine clé de coopération. Le projet ne cible pas seulement le matériel, mais également la formation pour améliorer les connaissances et les compétences [des gardes-côtes et gardes-frontières égyptiens] en matière de gestion humanitaire des frontières (…) Le plein respect des droits de l’homme sera un élément essentiel et intégré de cette action [grâce] à un contrôle rigoureux et régulier de l’utilisation des équipements."

      Paris-Le Caire, une relation particulière

      Cette livraison de navires s’inscrit dans une longue histoire de coopération sécuritaire entre la France et la dictature militaire égyptienne, arrivée au pouvoir après le coup d’État du 3 juillet 2013 et au lendemain du massacre de centaines de partisans du président renversé Mohamed Morsi. Paris a depuis multiplié les ventes d’armes et de logiciels d’espionnage à destination du régime du maréchal Sissi, caractérisé par la mainmise des militaires sur la vie politique et économique du pays et d’effroyables atteintes aux droits humains.

      La mise sous surveillance, la perquisition par la Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI) et le placement en garde à vue de la journaliste indépendante Ariane Lavrilleux fin septembre étaient notamment liés à ses révélations dans le média Disclose sur Sirli, une opération secrète associant les renseignements militaires français et égyptien, dont la finalité antiterroriste a été détournée par Le Caire vers la répression intérieure. Une enquête pour « compromission du secret de la défense nationale » avait ensuite été ouverte en raison de la publication de documents (faiblement) classifiés par Disclose.

      La mise en œuvre de l’accord migratoire UE-Égypte a donc été indirectement confiée à la France via Civipol. Société dirigée par le préfet Yann Jounot, codétenue par l’État français et des acteurs privés de la sécurité — l’électronicien de défense Thales, le spécialiste de l’identité numérique Idemia, Airbus Defence & Space —, Civipol met en œuvre des projets de coopération internationale visant à renforcer les capacités d’États étrangers en matière de sécurité, notamment en Afrique. Ceux-ci peuvent être portés par la France, notamment via la Direction de la coopération internationale de sécurité (DCIS) du ministère de l’intérieur. Mais l’entreprise travaille aussi pour l’UE.

      Civipol a appelé en renfort DCI, société pilotée par un ancien chef adjoint de cabinet de Nicolas Sarkozy passé dans le privé, le gendarme Samuel Fringant. DCI était jusqu’à récemment contrôlée par l’État, aux côtés de l’ancien office d’armement Eurotradia soupçonné de corruption et du vendeur de matériel militaire français reconditionné Sofema. Mais l’entreprise devrait prochainement passer aux mains du groupe français d’intelligence économique ADIT de Philippe Caduc, dont l’actionnaire principal est le fonds Sagard de la famille canadienne Desmarais, au capital duquel figure désormais le fonds souverain émirati.

      DCI assure principalement la formation des armées étrangères à l’utilisation des équipements militaires vendus par la France, surtout au Proche-Orient et notamment en Égypte. Mais à l’image de Civipol, l’entreprise collabore de plus en plus avec l’UE, notamment via la mal nommée « Facilité européenne pour la paix » (FEP).
      Pacte (migratoire) avec le diable

      Plus largement, ce partenariat avec l’Égypte s’inscrit dans une tendance généralisée d’externalisation du contrôle des frontières de l’Europe, qui voit l’UE passer des accords avec les pays situés le long des routes migratoires afin que ceux-ci bloquent les départs de migrants et réfugiés, et que ces derniers déposent leurs demandes d’asile depuis l’Afrique, avant d’arriver sur le territoire européen. Après la Libye, pionnière en la matière, l’UE a notamment signé des partenariats avec l’Égypte, la Tunisie — dont le président Kaïs Saïed a récemment encouragé des émeutes racistes —, le Maroc, et en tout 26 pays africains, selon une enquête du journaliste Andrei Popoviciu pour le magazine américain In These Times.

      Via ces accords, l’UE n’hésite pas à apporter une assistance financière, humaine et matérielle à des acteurs peu soucieux du respect des droits fondamentaux, de la bonne gestion financière et parfois eux-mêmes impliqués dans le trafic d’êtres humains. L’UE peine par ailleurs à tracer l’utilisation de ces centaines de millions d’euros et à évaluer l’efficacité de ces politiques, qui se sont déjà retournées contre elles sous la forme de chantage migratoire, par exemple en Turquie.

      D’autres approches existent pourtant. Mais face à des opinions publiques de plus en plus hostiles à l’immigration, sur fond de banalisation des idées d’extrême droite en politique et dans les médias, les 27 pays membres et les institutions européennes apparaissent enfermés dans une spirale répressive.

      https://orientxxi.info/magazine/accord-migratoire-avec-l-egypte-des-navires-francais-en-eaux-troubles,68

  • Libia. Il Consiglio di sicurezza Onu conferma le sanzioni ai guardacoste-trafficanti

    Approvato all’unanimità l’inasprimento delle sanzioni per i boss del traffico di esseri umani, petrolio e armi. Dal guardacoste «#Bija» ai capi della «polizia petrolifera» fino al direttore dei «#lager»

    La Libia non è un porto sicuro di sbarco, e le connessioni dirette tra guardia costiera libica e trafficanti di esseri umani, petrolio e armi, sono il motore della filiera dello sfruttamento e dell’arricchimento. All’unanimità il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu, che hanno proposto l’inasprimento delle sanzioni contro i principali boss di un sistema criminale che tiene insieme politica, milizie e clan.

    La decisione mette in difficoltà il governo italiano e le direttive Piantedosi, secondo cui le organizzazioni del soccorso umanitario dovrebbero prima coordinarsi con la cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, che invece l’Onu indica tra i principali ingranaggi del sistema criminale. Dopo una lunga discussione interna il Consiglio di sicurezza ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu in Libia a cui è stato rinnovato il mandato fino al 2025. Gli esponenti per i quali è richiesto il blocco dei beni e il divieto assoluto di viaggio sono cinque, ma uno risulta deceduto il 16 marzo di quest’anno in Egitto. Gli altri componenti del «poker libico» sono nomi pesanti, a cominciare da #Saadi_Gheddafi, il figlio ex calciatore del colonnello Gheddafi, che sta tentando di vendere una proprietà in Canada aggirando le sanzioni anche attraverso il consolato libico in Turchia. Il cinquantenne Gheddafi avrebbe viaggiato indisturbato e il 27 giugno 2023, gli esperti Onu hanno scritto al governo turco «in merito all’attuazione delle misure di congelamento dei beni e di divieto di viaggio. Non è stata ricevuta alcuna risposta». Secondo gli investigatori la firma di Gheddafi su una procura depositata in Turchia, costituisce «una prova della mancata osservanza da parte della Turchia della misura di divieto di viaggio».

    Se i Gheddafi rappresentano il passato che continua a incombere sulla Libia, soprattutto per lo smisurato patrimonio lasciato dal patriarca dittatore e mai realmente quantificato, nella lista dei sanzionati ci sono i nuovi boss della Libia di oggi. Come #Mohammed_Al_Amin_Al-Arabi_Kashlaf. «Il Gruppo di esperti ha stabilito che la #Petroleum_Facilities_Guard di Zawiyah è un’entità che è nominalmente sotto il controllo del Governo di unità nazionale», dunque non una polizia privata in senso stretto ma un gruppo armato affiliato alle autorità centrali e incaricato di sorvegliare i principali stabilimenti petroliferi, da cui tuttavia viene fatta sparire illegalmente un certa quantità di idrocarburi che poi vengono immessi nel mercato europeo grazie a una fitta rete di contrabbandieri. «Il gruppo di esperti - si legge ancora - ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di questo individuo, compresi i dettagli sullo status attuale e sulla catena di comando della Petroleum Facilities Guard a Zawiyah, nonché sulle sue attività finanziarie e risorse economiche personali». Anche in questo caso le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

    Collegato a Kashlaf è #Abd_al-Rahman_al-Milad, forse il più noto del clan. Noto anche come “Bija”, ha utilizzato «documenti delle Nazioni Unite contraffatti nel tentativo di revocare il divieto di viaggio - si legge - e il congelamento dei beni imposti nei suoi confronti». Bija si è però mosso trovando appoggi sia «nel governo libico che in interlocutori privati all’interno della Libia», con l’obiettivo di ottenere il sostegno «alla sua richiesta di cancellazione» delle sanzioni. In particolare, gli investigatori Onu sono in possesso «di un documento ufficiale libico, emesso il 28 settembre 2022 dall’Ufficio del Procuratore Generale, in cui si ordina alle autorità responsabili - denunciano gli esperti - di rimuovere il nome di #Al-Milad dal sistema nazionale di monitoraggio degli arrivi e delle partenze». Una copertura al massimo livello della magistratura, che lo aveva già assolto dalle accuse di traffico di petrolio, e che «consentirebbe ad Al-Milad di lasciare la Libia con i beni in suo possesso, in violazione della misura di congelamento dei beni». Il 25 gennaio 2023 «il Gruppo di esperti ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’effettiva attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di Al-Milad. La richiesta è stata fatta a seguito della ripresa delle sue funzioni professionali nelle forze armate libiche, compresa la nomina a ufficiale presso l’Accademia navale di Janzour dopo il suo rilascio dalla custodia cautelare l’11 aprile 2021». A nove mesi di distanza, le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

    La risoluzione approvata dal Consiglio di sicurezza si basa anche su un’altra accusa del «Panel of Expert» i quali hanno «hanno stabilito che il comandante della Petroleum Facilities Guard di Zawiyah, Mohamed Al Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf , e il comandante della Guardia costiera libica di #Zawiyah, Abd al-Rahman al-Milad (Bija), insieme a #Osama_Al-Kuni_Ibrahim, continuano a gestire una vasta rete di traffico e contrabbando a Zawiyah». Le sanzioni non li hanno danneggiati. «Da quando i due comandanti sono stati inseriti nell’elenco nel 2018, hanno ulteriormente ampliato la rete includendo entità armate che operano nelle aree di Warshafanah, Sabratha e Zuara». Tutto ruota intorno alle prigioni per i profughi. «La rete di Zawiyah continua a essere centralizzata nella struttura di detenzione per migranti di Al-Nasr a Zawiyah, gestita da Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim», il cugino di Bija identificato grazie ad alcune immagini pubblicate da Avvenire nel settembre del 2019. Il suo nome ricorre in diverse indagini. Sulla base «di ampie prove di un modello coerente di violazioni dei diritti umani, il Gruppo di esperti ha rilevato - rincara il “panel” - che Abd al-Rahman al-Milad e Osama al-Kuni Ibrahim, hanno continuano a essere responsabili di atti di tortura, lavori forzati e altri maltrattamenti nei confronti di persone illegalmente confinate nel centro di detenzione di Al-Nasr», allo scopo di estorcere «ingenti somme di denaro e come punizione».

    Il modello di #business criminale è proprio quello che Roma non vuole riconoscere, ma che gli investigatori Onu e il Consiglio di sicurezza ribadiscono: «La rete allargata di Zawiyah - si legge nel rapporto - comprende ora elementi della 55esima Brigata, il comando dell’Apparato di Supporto alla Stabilità a Zawiyah, in particolare le sue unità marittime, e singoli membri della Guardia Costiera libica, tutti operanti al fine di eseguire il piano comune della rete di ottenere ingenti risorse finanziarie e di altro tipo dalle attività di traffico di esseri umani e migranti».

    Al Consiglio di Sicurezza è stato mostrato lo schema che comprende «quattro fasi operative: (a) la ricerca e il ritorno a terra dei migranti in mare; (b) il trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; (c) l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; (d) il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi». Una volta rimessi in libertà i migranti, rientrano nel ciclo dello sfruttamento: rimessi in mare, lasciando che una percentuale venga catturata dai guardacoste per giustificare il sostegno italiano ed europeo alla cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, e di nuovo «trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi».

    Il rapporto Onu e il voto unanime dei 15 Paesi che siedono nel Consiglio di sicurezza sono uno schiaffo. «Per quanto riguarda il divieto di viaggio e il congelamento dei beni - si legge in una nota riassuntiva della seduta al Palazzo di Vetro -, gli Stati membri, in particolare quelli in cui hanno sede le persone e le entità designate, sono stati invitati a riferire» al Comitato delle sanzioni circa «le rispettive azioni per attuare efficacemente entrambe le misure in relazione a tutte le persone incluse nell’elenco delle sanzioni». Tutte gli esponenti indicati dal «Panel of expert» sono inclusi nell’elenco degli «alert» dell’Interpol. La risoluzione approvata ieri riguarda anche il contrabbando di petrolio e di armi. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha prorogato «l’autorizzazione delle misure per fermare l’esportazione illecita di prodotti petroliferi dalla Libia e il mandato del gruppo di esperti che aiuta a supervisionare questo processo».

    https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/libia-il-consiglio-di-sicurezza-conferma-le-sanzioni-ai-guardacoste-traffic
    #gardes-côtes_libyens #sanctions #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Libye #externalisation #sanctions #conseil_de_sécurité_de_l'ONU #conseil_de_sécurité #ONU #détention #prisons

  • Leaked letter on intended Cyprus-Lebanon joint border controls: increased deaths and human rights violations

    In an increasingly worrying context for migrants and refugees in Cyprus, with the recent escalation of violent racist attacks and discrimination against refugees on the island and the continued pushback policy, civil society organisations raise the alarm concerning Cyprus’ increased support to the Lebanese Army to harden border control and prevent departures.

    A letter leaked on 26 September 2023 (https://www.philenews.com/kipros/koinonia/article/1389120/exi-metra-protini-ston-livano-i-kipros), from the Cypriot Interior Minister to his Lebanese counterpart, reveals that Cyprus will provide Lebanon with 6 vessels and speedboats by the end of 2024, trainings for the Lebanese Armed Forces, will carry out joint patrol operations from Lebanese shores, and will finance the salaries of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces “who actively contribute to the interception of vessels carrying irregular migrants to Cyprus”. In this way, by providing equipment, funding and training to the Lebanese Army, Cyprus will have a determining influence, if not effective control, on the interceptions of migrants’ boats in Lebanese territorial waters and forced returns (the so-called “pullbacks”), to Lebanon. This in violation of EU and international law, which is likely to trigger legal liability issues. As seen in numerous cases, refugees, especially Syrians, who are pulled back to Lebanon are at risk of detention, ill-treatment and deportations to Syria where they are subject to violence, arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance. The worsening situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who face increasing violence and deportations, confirms that Lebanon is not a “safe” third country.

    As seen in the past with several examples from other examples at the EU’s external borders, (e.g. Turkey, Libya and most recently Tunisia), striking deals with EU neighboring countries of departure in order to increase border controls and contain migratory movements has several catastrophic consequences. Despite officially aiming at decreasing the number of lost lives, they actually increase border violence and deaths, leading to serious human rights abuses and violations of EU and international laws. They also foster a blackmail approach as third countries use their borders as leverage against European countries to get additional funds or negotiate on other sensitive issues, at the expense of people’s lives. All these contribute to having a negative impact on the EU and Member States’ foreign policy.

    As demonstrated by a recent article from the Mixed Migration Centre (https://mixedmigration.org/articles/how-to-break-the-business-model-of-smugglers), the most effective way to “disrupt the business model of smugglers” and reduce irregular departures, migrants’ dangerous journeys and the consequent losses of lives, is to expand legal migratory routes.

    By going in the complete opposite direction, Cyprus, for many years now, has prevented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from reaching the island in a legal way and from leaving the island for other EU countries1. Cyprus has resorted to systematic practices of pushbacks sending refugees back to countries where they are at risk of torture, persecution and arbitrary detention, has intensified forced returns, has dismantled the reception and asylum system, and has fueled a toxic anti-refugee narrative that has led to indiscriminate violent attacks that were initially against Syrian refugees and their properties in #Chloraka (https://kisa.org.cy/sundays-pogrom-in-chloraka) and a few days later to against migrants and their properties in #Limassol (https://cde.news/racism-fuelled-violence-spreads-in-cyprus). More recently, Cyprus has also announced its willingness to push the EU and Member States to re-evaluate Syria’s status and consider the country as “safe” in order to forcibly return Syrian refugees to Syria – despite on-going clashes, structural human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

    These deadly externalisation policies and unlawful practices have and continue to kill individuals and prevent them from accessing their rights. A complete change in migration and asylum policies is urgently needed, based on the respect of human rights and people’s lives, and on legal channels for migration and protection. Cyprus, as well as the EU and its Member States, must protect the human rights of migrants at international borders, ensure access to international protection and proper reception conditions in line with EU and international human rights law. They must open effective legal migratory pathways, including resettlement, humanitarian visas and labour migration opportunities; and they must respect their obligations of saving lives at sea and set up proper Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean.

    https://euromedrights.org/publication/leaked-letter-on-intended-cyprus-lebanon-joint-border-controls-increa

    #mourir_aux_frontières #frontières #droits_humains #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Chypre #Liban #racisme #attaques_racistes #refoulements #push-backs #militarisation_des_frontières #joint_operations #opérations_conjointes #aide #formation #gardes-côtes_libanaises #pull-backs #réfugiés_syriens #externalisation

  • EU Commission gifts Egypt patrol boats to become a gatekeeper for migration, following Tunisian model

    The EU Commission wants to conclude a migration defense agreement with Egypt and is upgrading the country’s land and sea borders. However, hardly any refugee boats leave from Egyptian shores for Europe.

    The government in Cairo is to receive two new ships for its coast guard. A corresponding tender worth €23 million was published by the EU Commission in May. This was confirmed by Neighborhood Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi in a response to a question from MEP Özlem Demirel. Accordingly, the funds come from the NDICI fund, which is intended to provide financial support for the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. As a purpose, the Commission states border management and search and rescue operations. Egypt will also receive thermal imaging cameras, satellite tracking systems and other surveillance equipment.

    With the donations, the Commission wants to build Egypt into a new partner in migration defense. In 2021, the government had sent a “list” of border protection equipment to Brussels for this purpose. EU Migration Commissioner Ylva Johansson then traveled to the Egyptian capital to negotiate them, followed by a visit by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2022.

    Before the end of this year, the Commission intends to conclude an “Operational Partnership to Combat People Smuggling” with Egypt. Tunisia recently became the first African country to sign such a deal with the EU. However, this “partnership” violates EU treaties. This is because the Commission should actually have obtained the approval of the 27 member states before concluding the contract with Tunisia.

    Egypt is also upgrading its land borders with EU funds. To this end, the Commission has promised the country a further €87 million – a significant increase on plans from last year, which still envisaged €57 million. For the “protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants,” the government in Cairo will receive an extra €23 million.

    In addition, 20 million will be used to take in people who have fled Sudan because of the civil war. Two months ago, however, the Egyptian government drastically tightened conditions for displaced Sudanese, who must now apply for a visa to cross the border. Since then, thousands have been stranded at the border in dire humanitarian conditions, writes the organization Human Rights Watch.

    The Egyptian government continues to oppose the stationing of Frontex in Egypt. As early as 2007, the EU states had commissioned their border agency to negotiate a working agreement with Cairo, but this has not yet come to pass. However, Frontex coordinates “Joint Return Operations” of rejected asylum seekers to Egypt.

    With about 108 million inhabitants, Egypt is one of the EU’s neighbors with the largest population. A third of them are under 24 years old. Many of them seek a better future in Europe and cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat to do so. According to the Commission, the number of these irregular entries into the EU increased sixfold in 2021 compared to the previous year.

    Most border crossings by Egyptian nationals take place in Italy. However, these depart mainly from Libya, the Commission confirms: not even one percent of the crossings started from Egyptian shores, according to the figures. This also applies to refugees from other countries after they have passed through Egypt as a transit country.

    However, the refugee route via Libya is also becoming increasingly closed: In recent years, Egypt has significantly strengthened its military border surveillance to the neighboring country. Refugees are therefore increasingly reliant on aid workers, who are also facing more persecution. The “Law No. 82 on Combating Illegal Migration and Smuggling of Migrants,” enacted in 2016 and strengthened in 2022, allows authorities to take tougher action against any kind of aid to escape.

    Refugees are also criminalized in this way, confirms human rights lawyer Muhammad Al Kashef, who is active in the Alarmphone project and the Abolish Frontex campaign: “Thousands of people have been arrested under Law No. 82 for trying to enter or leave the country irregularly.” Egypt’s poor human rights record is compounded by its new partnership with the EU, Al Kashef told “nd.”

    Not all migration from Egypt is unwanted in Europe. EU states want to benefit from skilled workers from Egypt and facilitate their entry. Egypt is therefore one of the priority countries to be won over for a so-called “Talent Partnership”. The Commission began negotiations on this in June.

    https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/08/eu-commission-gifts-egypt-patrol-boats-to-become-a-gatekeeper-for-migr

    #externalisation #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #Egypte #accord #gardes-côtes #aide_financière #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance #matériel #Operational_Partnership_to_Combat_People_Smuggling #partenariat

    #modèle_tunisien

  • The Migration Managers

    How a little-known organization far from public scrutiny is helping to shape Europe’s migration policy.

    “Making Migration Better” is what the #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) promises its members. ICMPD advises countries in the background, creates international networks and also becomes active itself in border regions of the EU. ICMPD is an organization that is known to only a few, but at the same time has become an important player in EU migration policy.

    Together with a team of international journalists, we investigated what exactly ICMPD does. We filed numerous requests under the EU and German Freedom of Information laws and received hundreds of documents in response. Additionally, we were able to view internal ICMPD documents, some of which we are also publishing today after thorough examination and careful consideration. We shared our findings in advance with ZDF Magazin Royale and the Austrian daily DerStandard, and jointly coordinated articles.

    Our investigation led to the EU’s external borders in the Western Balkans and to North Africa; to training camps for border guards and “dead body management”, and the roleplayed not only by ministries and governments, but also by the German Federal Police, a former Austrian Vice Chancellor, and the now internationally wanted white-collar criminal Jan Marsalek.
    Our research shows:

    – As an international organization, ICMPD is subject to few transparency obligations. This allows ICMPD to create and host spaces where member states like Germany can discuss migration policy out of the public eye.
    - ICMPD directly and indirectly influences European migration policy. Strengthening of asylum law, which is publicly proposed by politicians, was partly worked out beforehand in informal meetings or outlined in documents of ICMPD.
    – ICMPD directly and indirectly supports border and coast guards in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia - authorities that are accused of grave human rights violations. In doing so, ICMPD is helping to push the EU’s external border towards North Africa. Currently, the EU is also discussing border procedures at the EU’s external borders as part of the asylum system reform.
    - ICMPD co-developed ideas for a dubious asylum project - including for Germany. In the process, ICMPD also worked closely with Jan Marsalek, a white-collar criminal who has since gone underground.

    ICMPD was founded in 1993. The organization’s purpose was to make it possible to exchanges views on migration policy. Due to the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia,, the focus was mainly on the Balkans. Nearly two decades later, ICMPD’s focus would radically shift.

    Michael Spindelegger was appointed as he ICMPD’s Director General in 2016. He is a former Austrian vice chancellor, former Secretary General of ÖVP, the countrys’ biggest governing party, and the political foster father of Austria’s former chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Commenting on his arrival at ICMPD, Spindelegger said in an interview, “I want to give the organization more political weight and visibility.”

    Since Spindelegger took office, ICMPD’s projects, staff and annual budget have steadily increased. While the budget was 16.8 million euros in 2015, it was already 74.5 million in 2022. 56 percent of the money ICMPD received in 2022 came from the EU Commission. The rest came from EU member states, transit countries and countries of origin: the members of the ICMPD.

    Technocratic terms to disguise the true essence

    ICMPD describes its main business as a three-pillar model of “migration management”: research, dialogue and capacity building. The organization writes studies on migration, it brings states to the table for negotiations, and then implements what governments have decided. But what sounds mundane in theory has far-reaching consequences in practice.

    “I think the notion of migration management appeals to a lot of people because it makes migration more of a technocratic issue,” explains Jeff Crisp. Crisp was a senior staff member of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and is an expert on migration. The term migration management, according to him, is so popular among governments and organizations because it obscures the true nature of their actions and there is no need to talk openly about restriction and deterrence.

    In 2020, ICMPD’s chief Spindelegger described how he envisions successful “migration management” in several interviews. EU states should enter into more partnerships with countries of origin for a “more efficient return policy,” i.e., deport more people. Asylum applications should be processed in a few days near the border, which human rights organizations criticize as insufficient time for a fair process. Similarly, the ICMPD chief argued that migrants should be selected according to the needs of companies in the destination countries.

    These ideas have been widely criticized by human rights activists and lawyers, but they fit into the political line of many European governments, especially in view of the current debate about reforming the EU asylum system.

    In early 2023, the need for deportations and cooperation with third countries is now publicly the dogma of EU migration policy. In Germany, the governing coalition came to conclusions after a summit which are in fact contrary to the coalition agreements: the government wants more deportations, asylum procedures at the EU’s external borders, agreements with third countries, as shown by a document we recently published. To enforce more deportations, Germany has even created its own special envoy since the beginning of the year.

    This strategic orientation has been discussed for some time, but in an informal setting: at negotiation rounds, events and congresses such as those organized by ICMPD. So far, however, little of this has reached the outside world, because ICMPD has almost no transparency obligations.
    Backroom Talks and Racist Comments

    Legally, ICMPD is an “International Organization” - an intergovernmental association to carry out a supranational task. It has the same status as, for example, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As an international organization, ICMPD does not pay taxes, is difficult to prosecute in court, and cannot be summoned before any parliament for information.

    This special status seems to be welcomed, above all, by EU states whose migration policies are particularly controversial. For example, according to the minutes of a meeting with Spindelegger in July 2020, the then-deputy migration minister of Greece said, “ICMPD can provide a flexible and informal forum (for discussions) without the pressure of the media; A forum to solve problems.” One solution he may have wanted to discuss at the time was a heavily criticized asylum law which contemplated rejected asylum seekers to be detained on a blanket basis.

    In the informal setting provided by ICMPD, some seem to dare to formulate what would probably be strongly criticized publicly. A representative of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, in an informal exchange with representatives of EU states and EU institutions in May 2020 on “The Protection of Human and Public Security in the New Migration Agenda,” said that the “Refugee Treaty is not the issue”, but the European Convention on Human Rights is. According to the representative, “the right to request asylum makes migration management” very difficult”.

    Insights into the inner workings of ICMPD are provided by an internal diversity report from 2019, which we were able to view. Half of the respondents said they believe that not all employees have the same opportunities. More than one in three said they had been discriminated against or harassed while working at ICMPD. Similarly, the report found that employees regularly made racist and discriminatory comments about people from regions where ICMPD works - especially from the African continent.

    When asked, ICMPD said that “internal steps” have been taken since then and “will be subject to a new review soon.”
    Externalization of the EU’s external borders

    In 2015, the EU launched the Trust Fund for Africa with a funding budget of five billion euros. It was an indirect reaction to the increasing number of migrants coming to Europe. Since then, EU funds have been flowing to North African states and their border institutions for technological and personnel development, among other things - and ICMPD is helping with this.

    Exactly what that looks like is revealed at a meeting in January 2019 between Spindelegger and the EU Commission. It says that an agreement with Morocco for ICMPD “border management assistance operations” had been concluded. A previous investigation shows that, in the course of this project, surveillance technologies that allow access to secured phones had been delivered. According to a former ICMPD employee, there were no mechanisms to prevent abuses by Morocco, such as using this technology to target activists, academics and journalists.

    Furthermore, the meeting between ICMPD and the EU Commission relates to border security through “provide training and technical assistance” in Libya. The EU stresses that ICMPD’s involvement is “instrumental” to moving this forward quickly - for example, with regard to the “White Paper,” a strategy document that, while not binding on the parties involved, sets the political direction and next steps.

    For several years, journalists and human rights organizations have reported on how migrants are systematically pushed back along the central Mediterranean and the inhumane detention conditions that await them in Libya. The fact that the EU and some member states support Libya is also an issue. What is less known, however, is what mediating role ICMPD had in the elaboration of the strategy.

    Just a few months after the EU highlighted ICMPD’s mediating role in the process, representatives from the EU, UN, Libya, France, Italy, and ICMPD met in Tunis in June 2019. The aim of this meeting was to start the elaboration of a strategy paper for a “fully-fledged border security and management system”.
    Training and coordination with the so-called Libyan Coast Guard

    We had filed a request under the EU Freedom of Information law for the white paper from the EU Commission, but it was denied. The reason given was that, if the document became public, the relationship between the EU and Libya would be endangered. Nevertheless, we have obtained the document and publish it after a thorough examination. It is a version from December 2019, which is described as final.

    The document justifies why the preparation of such a strategy document is necessary: Libya would need to reform its structures in order to regain full control over its borders. The reason given is that the country faces “immense challenges” from “the flow of migrants, who, to a large extent, intend to use Libya as a transit route to Europe.” Migration “has complicated an already fragile political situation” and is “undermining the security, stability, and social wellbeing of the Libyan state and society.

    What should follow from this, with the participation of ICMPD among others, is shown in an EU document from 2021: A training center for the so-called Libyan coast guard is to be established. Likewise, mechanisms are to be created to forge cooperation between Libya, the EU and neighboring countries - for the Border Guard Training Academy and the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Center.

    Human rights organizations call this approach the “externalization of the EU’s external borders,” which means the outsourcing of border protection and migration management tasks to third countries. Likewise, cooperation with the Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Unit would lead to more pull-backs. This means that third countries, with the support of the EU, would prevent fleeing people from reaching Europe.

    “The support given by the EU to the Libyan coast guard in terms of pull-backs, pushbacks, (and) interceptions led to violations of certain human rights,” said Chaloka Beyani in late March 2023, who was a member of the Fact-Finding Mission to Libya of the U.N. Human Rights Council, which released its report in the process.

    “You can’t push back people to areas that are unsafe, and the Libyan waters are unsafe for the embarkation of migrants,” Beyani continued. He added that the EU and its member states are not found to be responsible for war crimes, but “the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”
    Atmosphere of hatred towards migrants

    ICMPD is not only active in Libya, but also in Tunisia - and since 2019, on a much larger scale.

    That same year, Tunisia elected a new president who is now not only pushing the state system towards dictatorship, but also creating an atmosphere of hatred towards migrants. At the end of February 2023, he called on Tunisian security forces to take urgent measures against migrants.

    Romdhane Ben Amor, spokesman for the Tunisian Forum for Social and Economic Rights, tells us exactly what that looks like. “There is a political pressure on the coast guard to prevent people from leaving, no matter what the cost, no matter what the damage. That’s how the violence started, and the Coast Guard is responsible for a lot of it.”

    Reports of human rights abuses by the Tunisian coast guard are mounting. Alarmphone writes about this, saying that the Tunisian coast guard beats migrants with sticks, demands money for rescues, and even steals the boat engines.

    And it is these security forces that continue to be supported and trained by ICMPD with the support of the EU, Germany, Austria and Denmark. In fact, this cooperation is even being expanded, as EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson reiterated at a meeting in Tunis in late April 2023.

    When asked about this, ICMPD says that it learned about the violence emanating from the Tunisian coast guard through the media and therefore cannot comment further.
    Active support of the German Federal Police

    Regarding EU support to the Tunisian coast guard, a dossier was prepared in 2019 jointly with ICMPD. “Preferred options in line with the National vision” had been identified, as well as “requests for equipment and capacity building measures.” Underwater drones, radars and even a dedicated IT system, the Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance, or ISMariS, were to be provided.

    Germany was presented with the plans for Tunisia at a meeting in January 2020 between the Federal Police and ICMPD. The goal: “Make migration and mobility of people orderly, safe and regular.” To this end, the coast guards of North African states are to be trained and provided with equipment. Two training centers are being built in Tunisia for this purpose, one in the south and one in the north of the country. The northern center is financed by Germany.

    The minutes of a meeting in January 2022 show how Germany is continuing to provide support: the Federal Police have equipped the Tunisian coast guard with 12 speedboats. Likewise, the Federal Police was “involved in SAR-connected trainings”. In an email written after the meeting, the Federal Police representative again advocates that Tunisia’s fleet be further expanded through “donor support.” For the following years, he proposed “boating training for Fast Control Boats” and “modernization of the boat fleet.”

    We were unable to find out in detail what curriculum ICMPD, the German Federal Police and other authorities of EU member states use to train the Tunisian coast guard. However, the minutes of various meetings provide an insight into the subject areas. French security authorities organized for example a “training course on the management of dead bodies at sea.”

    When asked, the German Federal Police confirmed that it was supporting the Tunisian coast guard with “training, advisory and procurement services.” In response to criticism of its involvement in Tunisia, the Federal Police pointed out that Tunisia was described as a “safe port” on the UNHCR website. However, this description can no longer be found on the UNHCR website.
    More deportations through migration diplomacy

    ICMPD is very active not only on the African continent, but also along the so-called Balkan route.

    In July 2020, the “Salzburg Forum”, a meeting of 18 EU interior ministers, EU commissioners, EU agencies such as Frontex and ICMPD took place in Vienna. The result was, among other things, the establishment of the “Joint Cooperation Platform on Irregular Migration”. This was chaired by the former deputy director of Frontex Berndt Körner.

    According to preparatory documents and an email, ICMPD elaborated on why such a platform was needed at a follow-up meeting in February 2021. “Irregular economic migration” is a shared problem, ICMPD said, and therefore there is a need to build capacity for “quick procedures, quick returns, and to coordination border closures again”.

    ICMPD will not only assist with training and capacity building, it said, but will also help with the “implementation of a regional returns mechanism” - meaning deportations. Through “migration diplomacy,” ICMPD would support the negotiation of agreements with third countries.

    Previous experience in supporting deportations has been gained by ICMPD in Turkey. The project, with the acronym FRMON, aims to “strengthen the capacity to conduct return operations in Turkey.” The duration was from 2021 to 2022, during which time Human Rights Watch wrote that deportations from Turkey to Afghanistan had increased by 150 percent. Many other states had suspended this after the Taliban took power.
    More money for migration management

    Those who try to enter the EU via the so-called Western Balkan route often arrive from Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to get to Croatia. In recent years, journalists and activists have documented how Croatian border officials use batons to push back migrants, preventing them from applying for asylum in an EU country.

    The Western Balkan states, where many of the migrants are then stranded, are therefore of great importance to the EU. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been an official candidate for EU membership since 2022 and must therefore fulfill certain conditions. For this purpose, a so-called Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) fund was set up years before. Part of the money goes to migration and border management.

    What this means exactly is revealed in documents from meetings between ICMPD and Bosnian authorities, which we have obtained and will publish following a detailed examination.

    In January 2021, shortly before the second meeting of the coordination platform, Spindelegger made a phone call on behalf of ICMPD to then-Bosnian Security Minister Selmo Cikotić. According to the minutes, the telephone call had been initiated by ICMPD. We have the preparatory documents.

    ICMPD criticized that EU funds “for the management of migration would be mainly provided for humanitarian needs." Ninety percent of the budget has been used on basic needs of migrants and only 10 percent for “migration management,” he said. Therefore, according to ICMPD, it “became evident that it is necessary to intensify the efforts aimed at strengthening the capacities of the migration management authorities in BiH”. For a good “migration management” ICMPD will provide equipment, training but also personnel.

    The Lipa camp, whose detention center had been reported on several times in the previous weeks, was also discussed. The security minister was pleased that ICMPD had sent a “project proposal” regarding Lipa.

    500,000 € had been paid by the EU Commission to ICMPD for the construction of the detention unit. According to the documents, the order was for “temporary detention facilities
    for migrants within the multi-purpose reception centre Lipa in line with European and international standards.”. When asked, ICMPD did not answer what was meant by this term. The detention unit would be built to “support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to further develope and implement capacity in the area of returns in order to adress irregular migration.”

    We publish the “Action Plan” prepared by ICMPD with the EU.
    Dialogue only

    Another point raised in the conversation between ICMPD and Bosnia’s minister is a “facilitation of dialogue between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and Slovenia regarding readmission and prevention of push-backs.” It is true that there has been a so-called “readmission” agreement between Bosnia and Croatia since 2007. This allows a state to send migrants back to another country. So far, however, this agreement has not been implemented, and Croatia was not yet a member of the EU at the time of the agreement.

    The Border Violence Monitoring Network reports that migrants who enter Croatia through Bosnia and Herzegovina are apprehended, imprisoned, and forced to sign a document in Croatian agreeing to be sent back to Bosnia. According to a conversation with representatives of the network and a report by Human Rights Watch, this is made possible by the revival of the readmission agreement – the dialogue that ICMPD wanted to promote.
    A dubious card project

    Even before Germany became a member of ICMPD, the organization had come up with something very special for German “migration management.” The now internationally wanted white-collar criminal Jan Marsalek and the now insolvent financial services provider Wirecard were a part of it.. Their plan: a “digital refugee card”. Asylum seekers were no longer to receive cash, but all financial support was to be paid out digitally.

    According to the project description, which we are now publishing, this card should not be limited to the payment function. The “usability of certain functions, such as payment transactions” should be limited to “certain geographies” and “deployment scenarios.” Similarly, the card “could be extended to include the possibility of direct retrieval of cardholder data with government/police terminals/equipment.”

    The project should not be limited to Bavaria, according to documents we received following a Freedom of Information Act request to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior. Bavarian State Secretary Joachim Herrmann wrote in a letter to then-Interior Minister Horst Seehofer in October 2020 that he planned to "implement this new payment system in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Spindelegger and ICMPD. He said it could “serve as a model for similar projects in Europe.” In his response, Seehofer called the project a “lighthouse project.”

    “If a German politician were to propose introducing an identity card that is also a bank card that all Germans use to pay for their purchases, and which could then be read by all authorities, including the police, one thing would be certain: he would be out of a job within hours,” said Matthias Spielkamp of AlgorithmWatch. “But the fact that Seehofer and others call it a lighthouse project to force people seeking protection to use such a card shows abundantly clear their contempt for the human rights of those who need protection the most.”

    What Herrmann and Seehofer’s emails do not mention, however, is who was originally intended to carry out the project alongside ICMPD. The project description comes from a mail in November 2019 for preparation of a meeting between state secretaries from Bavaria and Brandenburg, a CDU politician, ICMPD head Michael Spindelegger and Jan Marsalek, at that time still CFO of Wirecard. Another email we publish shows that Marsalek had already had a conversation with a company about the idea of a Digital Refugee Card in July 2019 and had helped develop the idea.

    As the report from Wirecard’s investigative committee shows, Marsalek had a very unique idea when it came to migrants. He wanted to pay for a border guard force of 15,000 to 20,000 “militiamen” to stop people trying to get to Europe via Libya and the central Mediterranean Sea as early as Libya’s southern border.

    Wirecard is now insolvent and is considered Germany’s biggest financial scandal. However, the “Digital Refugee Card” project is not completely on hold. In Bavaria, the legal framework for the project has already been adjusted accordingly. An email from the State Ministry to the BMI in March 2021 states that a “private sector payment service provider” will provide the cards. An “involvement of NGOs” is not planned.

    In response to a press inquiry, the Bavarian Ministry of Interior said that it was currently looking for an implementing company.

    https://fragdenstaat.de/en/blog/2023/05/19/the-migration-managers

    #lobby #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #lobbying #influence #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Afrique_du_Nord #Tunisie #route_des_Balkans #Jan_Marsalek #gardes-côtes_libyens #Maroc #Libye #Michael_Spindelegger #migration_management #Spindelegger

  • EU responds to Italy drownings with more support for Libya

    The European Commission wants to further shore up the Libyan coast guard and launch anti-smuggling partnerships with Tunisia and Egypt.

    The proposals were outlined in a letter sent earlier this week by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, and seen by EUobserver, to Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni.

    The letter came in response to Meloni, who had queried the European Commission over the recent drowning deaths of some 70 people, including small children, off the Calabrian coast.

    “First, we must coordinate our actions with key patterns to prevent irregular departures and save lives at sea,” said von der Leyen, in her letter.

    This includes priority funding with Tunisia and Egypt, as well as “further support to Libya’s maritime border management and search-and-rescue capacities,” she said.

    The boat which sank off the Italian coast late last month departed from Turkey and in an area not patrolled by NGO search-and-rescue boats.

    Those NGO boats are currently under intense pressure from Rome’s far-right government under Meloni’s leadership. Geo Barents, a rescue boat operated by Doctor’s without Borders, was recently detained and fined up to €10,000 by Italian authorities.

    Von der Leyen’s emphasis on North Africa, however, is part of a larger effort to stem irregular migration.

    The European Commission had in February, along with Italian authorities, already handed over new patrol boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and announced some €800m for North Africa up until 2024.

    But those intercepted at sea by the Libyans, including in search-and-rescue zones controlled by the Maltese , are returned to a country where they are often locked up in inhumane conditions.

    The Libyans intercepted and returned almost 31,000 people last year, up from around 12,000 in 2020.

    Over 330 have died or gone missing in the attempt across all Mediterranean routes, so far this year, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), a UN body.

    Meanwhile, the Egypt and Tunisia police plans will be part of a new north African multi-country program against smuggling in the region, she said.

    Von der Leyen also mentioned €500m to help resettle some 50,000 people up until 2025, noting the need to create humanitarian corridors.

    A first meeting had also taken place on how to best coordinate and cooperate on search and rescues among national authorities, she said.
    Interior ministers in Brussels

    The letter comes ahead of a crunch meeting in Brussels on Thursday (9 March) of interior ministers, where migration will be a key point of talks.

    Although no decisions are expected, the discussions will likely feed into an European summit later this month.

    Ministers on Thursday are set to discuss visa policy and how to best use it as leverage to get origin countries to take back their rejected nationals.

    But internal aspects are also on the table.

    Since December, the Dutch, along with other EU states, have been unable to return migrants to Italy under the so-called Dublin rules.

    “The reason, as far as we understand right now, is that the Italians have a lack of reception capacities,” an EU diplomat told reporters on Wednesday.

    The Swedish EU presidency is also hoping to get some in-house agreements on the outstanding overhaul of the EU’s asylum and migration policy.

    Key to that reform is the regulation on asylum and migration management.

    The rule is a core component of the overhaul first proposed by the European Commission in September 2020 and is set to replace the broken Dublin system currently in place.

    A second EU diplomat said the Council, representing member states, is on track to get an internal agreement on the regulation.

    But talks on politically sensitive issues, when it comes defining so-called mandatory solidarity, won’t likely start until the next EU presidency, under Spain, in July.

    “We need to have the legal framework in place first. I mean, there is there are a lot of opinions on this issue,” said the EU diplomat.

    That in-house agreement is needed before negotiations can start with the European Parliament amid a wider plan to get all the outstanding asylum files sorted before next year’s European elections.

    https://euobserver.com/migration/156808

    #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Libye #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Egypte #gardes-côtes_libyens #commission_européenne #UE #EU

    –—
    Fil de discussion sur le #naufrage de #Crotone:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/992511

  • Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

    « Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

    « Le patrouilleur Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens.

    La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de surveillance aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

    Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données ADS-B, un signal émis par les avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

    Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

    Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

    Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

    Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri.

    L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

    De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

    Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

    Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « centre régional de coordination des sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

    Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

    Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l
    #frontières #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Méditerranée #Libye #mer_Méditerranée #pull-backs #pull-back #push-backs

    • Airborne Complicity – Frontex Aerial Surveillance Enables Abuse

      Over the last year, we have partnered with Human Rights Watch to investigate the use by the EU’s border agency, Frontex, of aerial surveillance in the central Mediterranean. The aircraft, several planes and a drone operated by private companies, transmit video feeds and other information to a situation centre in Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, where operational decisions are taken about when and whom to alert about migrants’ boats. Frontex aerial surveillance is key in enabling the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept migrant boatsand return their passengers to Libya, knowing full well that they will face systematic and widespread abuse when forcibly returned there.

      To circumvent Frontex’s lack of transparency on these issues (in processing 27 of 30 freedom of information requests we submitted – the others are pending – Frontex identified thousands of relevant documents but released only 86 of them, most of which were heavily redacted) we cross-referenced official and open-source data, including drone and plane flight tracks, together with information collected by Sea-Watch (through its various search and rescue ships and planes operating in the area), the Alarm Phone, as well as the testimony of survivors who courageously shared their stories with us. 

      Overall, contrary to Frontex claim that its aerial surveillance saves lives, the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Border Forensics demonstrates it is in service of interceptions by Libyan forces, rather than rescue. While the presence of Frontex aircraft has not had a meaningful impact on the death rate at sea, we found a moderate and statistically significant correlation between its aerial assets flights and the number of interceptions performed by the Libyan Coast Guard. On days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels.

      Our reconstruction of the events of July 30, 2021, when several boats carrying migrants were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the area where the drone was patrolling, is a good demonstration of this. The evidence we collected strongly suggests that the droneplayed a key role in facilitating the interception of potentially hundreds of people. 

      The analysis of available data supports the conclusion that the Frontex aerial surveillance forms a central plank of the EU’s strategy to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching Europe by boat and to knowingly return them to unspeakable abuse in Libya. It should be understood in continuity with the progressive withdrawal of EU ships from the central Mediterranean, the handover of responsibility to Libyan forces, and the obstruction of nongovernmental rescue groups which we have been investigating in the frame of the Forensic Oceanography project since several years. 

      The retreat of rescue vessels from the central Mediterranean and the simultaneous increase of surveillance aircraft in the sky is yet another attempt by the EU to further remove itself spatially, physically, and legally from its responsibilities: it allows the EU to maintain a distance from boats in distress, while keeping a close eye from the sky that enables Libyan forces to carry out what we have previously referred to as “refoulement by proxy”. Our investigation seeks to re-establish the connection between Frontex aerial surveillance and the violence captured migrants face at sea and in Libya thereafter.
      Reconstructing 30 July 2021 

      Since the beginning of our research, we have been looking into a number of specific cases of interceptions that involved European aerial assets. Thanks to the relentless effort of documentation by civil society organisations active in the central Mediterranean, in particular the Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, we were able to put together an extensive list of such cases. 

      We eventually decided to focus on the events of July 30, 2021 as a case study. In order to reconstruct what happened on that day, we have combined witness testimonies, data and footage collected by Alarm Phone and Sea Watch, tracks of aerial and naval assets, open-source information and data about disembarkation in Libya as well as two separate databases of interceptions (Frontex’ own JORA database and information from two European Union External Action Service classified documents). 

      Frontex drone’s tracks that day indicate it most likely detected at least two boats later intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard. The rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 witnessed by chance the interception of one of them that took place within the Maltese Search and Rescue Area. The Sea-Watch 3 had not received any distress alert via Frontex despite being in the immediate vicinity of the boat and ready to assist its passengers. 

      Frontex’ own database admits that its aerial surveillance program detected a total of 5 boats on that day. While only further disclosure by Frontex would allow to ultimately assess its impact on each specific interception that took place on that day, the precise geographical coordinates for the five interceptions reported in the classified EEAS documents seem to match at least three peculiar flight patterns of the Frontex drone.
      Analysing Frontex aerial surveillance
      Flight tracking

      In parallel to case reconstructions, we have been tracking the overall activities of Frontex aircraft in the central Mediterranean. Since these planes and drone are chartered from private companies such as DEA Aviation and ADAS, a subsidiary of Airbus, there is no publicly available official list of such assets. The first task was to understand which were the aerial assets patrolling the central Mediterranean on behalf of Frontex. Cross-referencing various identification information (hexcodes, callsigns, etc.) of these planes with those that had been already identified by Sea Watch airborne team and various journalists allowed us to establish a dependable list of Frontex aerial assets operating in the area. 

      Once that was established, we acquired from ADS-B Exchange (the only flight tracking platform that does not block any aircraft for which data is received by their feeders) a large dataset of flight tracking data covering a period of several months (May 2020 to September 2022) for all these aircraft. While the low number of data feeders near our area of interest means that coverage of the recorded data is at times inconsistent, ADS-B flight tracking data (which include latitude, longitude, altitude, and several other parameters) provide an exceptional insight into aerial activities performed by these assets and became a key element in our investigation.

      Thanks to these data, we were able to visualize the extend of each assets operational area over time. Each of these aircraft monitors a specific area of the central Mediterranean. What emerged were also a series of clearly identifiable and consistent search patters that Frontex aircraft are flying off the coast of Libya. More generally, these visualisations have allowed to grasp the extensive, yet tightly knit web of surveillance that results from aerial operations. 

      Pattern analysis

      When observed closely, flight tracks can provide further precious insights into Frontex surveillance activities. Several loops, U-turns, perfect circles, and sharp corners starts to emerge against the strict geometry of standard search patterns. These deviations indicate an aircraft is taking a closer look at something, thus testifying to potential sightings of migrant boats. Inspired by similar projects by John Wiseman, Emmanuel Freundenthal and others, we then started to isolate and taxonomise such search patterns and then wrote code to automatically identify similar patterns across the whole flight tracking dataset we had acquired. While this aspect of the research is still ongoing, it was already very useful in reconstructing the events of July 30, 2021, as detailed in the following section.

      Statistical analysis

      In order to assess the overall impact of aerial surveillance, we also conducted statistical analysis exploring the relation between interceptions carried out by Libyan forces and the presence of Frontex’s aerial assets in the 2021-2022 timeframe. 

      We first compiled several statistical data sources (data from the IOM, the UNHCR, the Maltese government as well as Frontex’ JORA database and a classified report by the European External Action Service) which, despite inconsistencies, have allowed us to measure migrant crossings and deaths, Libyan Coast Guard interceptions, and Frontex aerial presence. 

      The data gathered shows that Frontex aerial surveillance activities have intensified over time, and that they have been increasingly related to interception events. Our analysis reveals that almost one third of the 32,400 people Libyan forces captured at sea and forced back to Libya in 2021 were intercepted thanks to intelligence gathered by Frontex through aerial surveillance. Frontex incident database also shows that while Frontex’s role is very significant in enabling interception to Libya, it has very little impact on detecting boats whose passengers are eventually disembarked in Italy and Malta. 

      We then tested the correlation between Frontex aerial presence and Libyan Coast Guard interceptions over time and in space. The results show a moderate-to-strong and statistically significant correlation between the number of interceptions and the hours of flight flown by Frontex aerial assets. Said otherwise, on days when the assets fly more hours over its area of operation, the Libyan Coast Guard tends to intercept more vessels. A spatial approach showed that interceptions and flight tracks are autocorrelated in space. At the same time, contrary to Frontex claims that aerial surveillance saves lives at sea, the analysis shows that there is no correlation between death rate and the flight time.

      Read the full statistical analysis here
      Conclusion

      Ultimately these different methods have allowed us to demonstrate how Frontex aerial surveillance (and in particular, because of its wider operational range, its drone) has become a key cog in the “pushback machine” that forces thousands of people back to abuse in Libya. 

      The publication of our findings with Human Rights Watch is the first stage of our ongoing investigation into the impact of European aerial surveillance on the lives and rights of migrants. We plan to continue deepening this investigation over the coming months.

       

      https://www.borderforensics.org/investigations/airborne-complicity
      #surveillance_aérienne #drones

  • Des appareils de #surveillance de #Frontex sont utilisés par les #gardes-côtes_libyens pour intercepter illégalement des migrants

    « Le Monde » a identifié l’origine de sept images aériennes publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens sur leurs pages Facebook. Elles ont été réalisées par des appareils de surveillance de Frontex, et démontrent comment les activités de l’agence européenne facilitent des #interceptions illicites par les Libyens en Méditerranée. Frontex a toujours soutenu ne pas collaborer avec les garde-côtes libyens.

    « Le patrouilleur #Fezzan a porté secours à un chalutier en feu et a sauvé son équipage de huit personnes. » Le 24 août 2021, la page Facebook « Gardes-côtes et sécurité portuaire » publie le bilan d’une opération de sauvetage menée au cours de la journée par les gardes-côtes libyens. Pour l’illustrer, la page publie une photo du chalutier en feu.


    La présence d’informations temporelles et de localisations sur l’image indique qu’il s’agit d’une prise de vue réalisée par un appareil de #surveillance_aérienne, et non par un simple appareil photo. Ce genre d’images, entre 2018 et 2022, les gardes-côtes libyens en ont publié une douzaine, sur différents comptes et réseaux. Sauf que la #Libye n’est pas dotée d’appareils capables de réaliser ces images. Qui en est à l’origine ?

    Pour identifier leur source, Le Monde a recoupé les informations qu’elles contiennent avec des données #ADS-B, un signal émis par les #avions en vol, ainsi qu’avec les journaux de bord de plusieurs ONG actives en Méditerranée, dans les airs ou en mer. Dans le cas du 24 août 2021, par exemple, les informations présentes sur l’image indiquent les coordonnées, l’altitude et l’heure précise à laquelle l’appareil se trouvait lorsqu’il a réalisé cette image. Elles donnent aussi la position approximative du chalutier observé par l’appareil.

    Nous avons reconstitué le trafic aérien au-dessus de la Méditerranée dans la matinée du 24 août 2021. En comparant les parcours des différents appareils avec les données disponibles sur l’image, nous avons ainsi pu identifier un appareil qui se trouvait précisément aux coordonnées et à l’altitude à laquelle la photo a été prise, lorsqu’elle a été réalisée : le #drone AS2132, opéré par Frontex.

    Pour d’autres images, nous avons eu accès aux observations d’ONG, comme SeaWatch ou SOS Méditerranée, consignées dans des journaux de bord. Ceux-ci sont librement accessibles ici. Au total, ce travail nous permet d’affirmer que sur cinq dates différentes les images publiées par les gardes-côtes libyens ont été réalisées par des appareils de Frontex. Au moins une autre l’a été par un appareil de l’#EunavforMed, la force navale européenne en Méditerranée, qui collabore avec Frontex.

    Des interceptions impossibles sans renseignements extérieurs

    Sollicitée, l’agence de garde-frontière l’assure : « il n’y a pas de collaboration entre Frontex et les gardes-côtes libyens », ce qu’affirmait déjà en mars 2021 son ex-directeur Fabrice Leggeri. L’agence précise, en revanche : « Chaque fois qu’un avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en détresse, une alerte – et une image, le cas échéant – est immédiatement envoyée au centre de coordination des sauvetages régional. L’information envoyée inclut notamment la position, la navigabilité du navire et la probabilité qu’il n’atteigne pas sa destination finale. »

    De fait, dans les cinq cas identifiés par Le Monde, les images de Frontex ont pourtant bien fini entre les mains des gardes-côtes libyens. Et certaines ont vraisemblablement rendu possible l’interception d’embarcations, autrement impossibles à localiser pour les Libyens. Dans le cas du 8 mai 2019, par exemple, l’avion de Frontex découvre une embarcation en route pour l’Europe en Méditerranée centrale. Un contact est établi entre les autorités libyennes et l’agence, mais il n’émet pas de Mayday. Ce message d’urgence aurait pu être capté par tous les avions et navires à proximité à ce moment-là, dont le Mare Jonio, de l’ONG Mediterranea Saving Humans, spécialisé dans le sauvetage. Frontex dit n’envoyer des Maydays que « lorsqu’il existe un danger imminent pour la vie des occupants ».

    Les gardes-côtes libyens retrouvent finalement sans difficulté l’embarcation, pourtant située à plus d’une centaine de kilomètres de leurs côtes. A 17 heures, ils font monter les migrants à bord de leur patrouilleur avant de les rapatrier en Libye. Une interception que les informations de Frontex ont vraisemblablement facilitée, voire rendue possible. Pendant toute la durée de l’opération, l’avion de Frontex continue de survoler la zone, et de filmer la scène. Des images auxquelles les gardes-côtes ont aussi eu accès.

    Frontex souligne que, conformément au règlement européen relatif à la surveillance des #frontières_maritimes_extérieures, ses alertes ne sont pas adressées aux gardes-côtes libyens, mais au « #centre_régional_de_coordination_des_sauvetages (#RCC) [libyen] (…) internationalement reconnu ». Une fois l’alerte envoyée, « Frontex ne coordonne pas les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage (...), c’est la responsabilité des centres de secours régionaux« . Reste à savoir si ce RCC existe réellement. Frontex s’en tient à la position de l’#Organisation_maritime_internationale (#OMI), qui a reconnu officiellement l’existence d’un RCC en 2018.

    Plusieurs enquêtes ont pourtant mis en doute l’existence d’un tel RCC libyen. Derrière les adresses e-mail et les numéros de téléphone du RCC se trouvent en réalité les gardes-côtes, selon les différentes ONG impliquées dans des opérations de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée. Et le 8 novembre 2022, le vice-président de la commission européenne, Josep Borrell, lui-même affirmait : « Le centre de coordination des secours maritime n’est pas encore opérationnel. »

    Parmi les règles européennes, que Frontex dit respecter, figure le principe du non-refoulement : « Nul ne peut être (…) débarqué, forcé à entrer, conduit dans un pays ou autrement remis aux autorités d’un pays où il existe (…) un risque sérieux qu’il soit soumis à la peine de mort, à la torture, à la persécution ou à d’autres peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants. » Des situations courantes en Libye, de sorte qu’en 2020 la Commission européenne affirmait que le pays n’était pas un « lieu sûr » vers lequel il serait possible de renvoyer des migrants. Dans un rapport de 2018, l’ONU constatait que « les migrants subissent des horreurs inimaginables en Libye (…). Ils s’exposent à des meurtres extrajudiciaires, à la torture et à des mauvais traitements, à la détention arbitraire (…), au viol (…), à l’esclavage et au travail forcé, à l’extorsion et à l’exploitation ».

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/11/23/enquete-comment-des-appareils-de-surveillance-de-frontex-sont-utilises-par-l

    #garde-côtes_libyens #frontières #asile #migrations #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée

  • EU funds border control deal in Egypt with migration via Libya on rise

    The European Union signed an agreement with Egypt on Sunday (30 October) for the first phase of a €80 million border management programme, a statement from the EU delegation in Cairo said, at a time when Egyptian migration to Europe has been rising.

    The project aims to help Egypt’s coast and border guards reduce irregular migration and human trafficking along its border, and provides for the procurement of surveillance equipment such as search and rescue vessels, thermal cameras, and satellite positioning systems, according to an EU Commission document published this month.

    Since late 2016, irregular migration to Europe from the Egypt’s northern coast has slowed sharply. However, migration of Egyptians across Egypt’s long desert border with Libya and from Libya’s Mediterranean coast to Europe has been on the rise, diplomats say.

    From1 January to 28 October this year 16,413 migrants arriving by boat in Italy declared themselves to be Egyptian, making them the second largest group behind Tunisians, according to data published by Italy’s interior ministry.

    In 2021 more than 26,500 Egyptians were stopped at the Libyan border, according to the EU Commission document.

    Egypt is likely to experience “intensified flows” of migrants in the medium to long term due to regional instability, climate change, demographic shifts and lack of economic opportunities, the document says.

    The agreement for the first 23 million-euro phase of the project was signed during a visit to Cairo by the EU’s commissioner for neighbourhood and enlargement, Oliver Varhelyi.

    It will be implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and CIVIPOL, a French interior ministry agency, and is expected to include the provision of four search and rescue vessels, Laurent de Boeck, head of IOM’s Egypt office, said.

    The EU Commission document says that to date, Egypt has addressed irregular migration “predominantly from a security perspective, sometimes at the expense of other dimensions of migration management, including the rights based protection migrants, refugees and asylum seekers”.

    The programme will seek to develop the capacity of the Egyptian ministry of defence and other government and civil society stakeholders to apply “rights-based, protection oriented and gender sensitive approaches” in their border management, it says.

    https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-funds-border-control-deal-in-egypt-with-migration-via-libya-on-rise

    #EU #UE #Union_européenne #migrations #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #externalisation #Egypte #accord #border_management #aide_financière #gardes-côtes #surveillance #complexe_militaro-industriel #réfugiés_égyptiens #CIVIPOL #IOM #OIM

    • EU funding for the Egyptian Coast Guard (Strengthening a Partnership That Violates Human Rights)

      The Refugees Platform in Egypt (RPE) issues a paper on the European Union’s decision, last June, to fund the Egyptian Coast Guard with 80 million euros, an amount that will be paid in two phases with the aim of “purchasing maritime border control equipment”, but there are no details about what the equipment is and how it is going to be used, and without setting clear indicators to ensure accountability for potential human rights violations and protect the rights of people on the move.

      The paper notes that the EU has previously provided funding to strengthen migration management in Egypt, but in fact, the funds and support of the EU have contributed to tightening restrictions on irregular migration in Egypt, by using law No. 82 of 2016, the law in which among several things, it criminalizes aiding irregular migrants and contradicts with other laws that expand the circle of human rights violations against people on the move. RPE paper also criticizes the EU’s demand to enhance cooperation between Egypt and Libya in the field of migration, especially since the two countries have a long record of violations of the rights of migrants and refugees.

      In the paper, incidents are tracked on the Egyptian side’s sea and land borders, and falsification of official figures related to the sinking of migrant boats, or the announcement of deaths of people who later turned out to be alive and being held in unknown places, and the violations that follow arbitrary arrest from medical negligence and forced deportation, and the paper also adds another monitoring of the refugee situation inside the country.

      Paper contents:

      – Ambiguous and worrying funds
      – EU cooperates with authoritarian regimes to suppress migration movements
      – Egypt’s successive failures in search and rescue operations and in providing the necessary protection to migrants and refugees, both at the borders and within the country
      – More funds without transparency, independent monitoring mechanisms, or prior assessments of their impact on migrants’ rights
      - Recommendations to (the EC, the EU and its Member States, and the Egyptian government)

      https://rpegy.org/en/editions/eu-funding-for-the-egyptian-coast-guard-strengthening-a-partnership-that-viol

  • EU to provide €80 million to Egyptian coast guard

    The European Commission has confirmed that €23 million will be allocated in 2022 and €57 million in 2023 to provide equipment and services to Egyptian authorities for “search and rescue and border surveillance at land and sea borders”.

    Following a Parliamentary question (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002428_EN.html) submitted by MEPs Erik Marquardt and Tineke Strike (of the Greens), the Commission stated that while it is “developing an action in support of border management… in close coordination with Egyptian authorities… no overview of equipment or services to be delivered to Egyptian authorities is available at this stage.” (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-002428-ASW_EN.html)

    Responding to Marquardt and Strik’s concern over the “dire human rights situation in Egypt,” and the fact that this funding will go towards preventing Egyptians, 3,500 of whom have fled the country to Italy since January last year, from being able to exercise their right to leave their country, the Commission states that it:

    “...stands ready to support Egypt in maintaining its capacity to prevent irregular migration by sea, as well as to strengthen the control of its border with Libya and Sudan. This is of particular importance in light of the six-fold increase of irregular arrivals of Egyptian nationals to the EU in 2021 (9 219), of which over 90% to Italy, mostly via Libya.

    An ex ante risk assessment will be conducted and monitoring will take place throughout the action to ensure that it does not pose any threats to the respect of international human rights standards and the protection of refugees and migrants."

    The two paragraphs would appear to directly contradict one another. No answer was given as to what indicators the Commission will use to ensure compliance with Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the European Union on upholding and promoting human rights.

    Commenting on this response, Erik Marquardt states:

    "The commission wants ’to prevent irregular migration by sea’. Therefore, they are willing to work together with the Egyptian military-regime. The European Union should not cooperate with the Egyptian Coast Guard in order to prevent people from fleeing. We should use the tax payers money to prevent suffering and to support people in need of international protection - not to build a fortress europe

    “The Commission needs to tell us what exactly the €80 million are going to be spend on. We need to know if the funds will be used to buy weapons and see how exactly they plan to prevent people from fleeing. In Libya, we saw how funds were used to arm militias, we cannot let something similar happen again.”

    The €80 million allocation for border control makes up part of a €300 million total in short and long-term EU funding for Egypt.

    Après les #gardes-côtes_libyens... les #gardes-côtes_égyptiens

    #EU #UE #union_européenne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #externalisation #Egypte #financement

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_