#gardes-côtes

EU doubles pullback system in Libya: Renegade Benghazi to receive control centre and coastguard equipment

Control centre and surveillance tower: the EU is copying its backdoor model from western Libya to the east. Notorious militias are to intercept refugees on a new route to Crete.

Following a landmark ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2012, EU member states are prohibited from pushing back to Libya people intercepted in boats in the central Mediterranean while on their way to Europe. To circumvent this obstacle, Italy and the European Commission have constructed a legal and operational backdoor: using funds from Brussels, the Italian Ministry of the Interior and the navy installed a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Libya from 2017 onwards, which can be contacted by the coastguards of European Mediterranean states to return boat refugees to Libya – something that, according to the official interpretation, does not violate the ECtHR ruling.

The EU border agency Frontex provides aerial surveillance, as Libya itself has neither aircraft nor helicopters. Critics describe this interplay as “pullbacks”, in reference to the term “pushback”, which denotes the unlawful direct return of people to Libya by Frontex or coastguards from EU states.

The EU now intends to establish the same system in eastern Libya as well – even though the two parts of the country, with their political centres in Tripoli and Benghazi, have been embroiled in a civil war since the fall of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011, which repeatedly flares up. The architect of this mirrored system is the military mission Irini, through which EU states have been operating off the eastern Libyan coast since 2021. However, as in Tripoli, the concrete establishment of a maritime control centre in Benghazi will be carried out by Italy, which has applied to Irini for a “quick impact project”. The possibility of such “quick impact projects” was provided for the first time in Irini’s mandate, renewed earlier this year. The advantage is that decisions and implementation of measures take place via shorter channels.

The European External Action Service in Brussels is now expected to conclude an agreement with Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the installation of an MRCC in Benghazi. Start-up funding of €3 million can then be drawn from the “European Peace Facility”. This was confirmed to “nd” by an EU official upon enquiry. This fund finances military and defence-related measures within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – such as the common costs of EU military operations or arms deliveries and training programmes for partner armed forces.

However, Italy is to bear the lion’s share of the costs, of an as yet unknown amount, for the 18-month implementation phase. This also includes the installation of a tower with radar and surveillance technology, which is to be erected in Tobruk in eastern Libya – a main point of departure. This and other equipment delivered is to be taken over by the responsible Libyan authorities after the end of the project.

The background to the Italian initiative is apparently the shift of the Libyan migration route from the west, where the coastguard is intercepting increasing numbers of people, to the more dangerous waters in the east. There, people from war-torn Sudan in particular are currently attempting to reach Crete – because in Libya, too, Black people are victims of hate crimes and abuse.

Arrivals from eastern Libya have increased by around 60 per cent compared with 2024, amounting to more than 5,000 people in total. Almost as many people on the Tobruk–Crete route come from Egypt, which has for years successfully prevented crossings to Europe. The third-largest group among those departing by boat from the region are Bangladeshis, followed by Pakistanis.

For Irini and its “lead nation” Italy, the shift of the migration route to eastern Libya is inconvenient. The EU military mission is primarily intended to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya at sea, monitor illegal oil exports from the country, collect information on smuggling networks, and support the build-up of the Libyan coastguard and navy.

The government in Rome, however, saw the small EU fleet and its reconnaissance aircraft off Libyan waters as an incentive (“pull factor”) for departures of boat refugees from Libya, and insisted on renaming the mission Sophia, which ran until 2021, to Irini and restricting the area of operations to waters off eastern Libya.

This Irini area is now being crossed by the increasing flight movements. The number of distress-at-sea incidents there is reportedly over 100 this year. Although this was supposed to be excluded as far as possible under the new mandate, Irini has also had to participate in rescue missions itself – and subsequently bring the boat occupants to the European Union.

Alarm Phone, which operates a hotline for refugees in distress at sea, does not believe that the EU’s new plans are about saving lives. “From a new control centre in Benghazi, as far as search and rescue is concerned, no more can be expected than from the one in Tripoli”, a spokesperson told “nd”. When it comes to urgent cases of distress at sea, help rarely comes from there. The structures in the west and east serve to organise pullbacks.

The most recent trip by a high-level EU delegation has fuelled these concerns: at the beginning of December, the EU ambassador to Libya, Nicholas Orlando, and the Italian Irini fleet admiral met in Benghazi with the notorious General Khalifa Haftar, who had once launched the civil war against the internationally recognised government in the west. The topic was the expansion of cooperation “including strengthening border security on land and at sea” as well as combating “transnational networks of migrant smuggling and trafficking”.

A Libyan newspaper reported that the EU delegation had lavishly praised the efforts of the military “to protect its land and sea borders”. Haftar’s sons Khaled and Saddam, who hold high military ranks, are also said to have attended the reception with Ambassador Orlando.

It remains unclear which eastern Libyan authorities are to benefit from the new “quick impact project” in terms of border surveillance and the operation of control centres. Neither the European Commission nor the Council provided concrete information in response to an enquiry from nd – Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond at all. An EU official did state, however, that an MRCC in Benghazi would have to be set up as a civilian centre. Presumably, however, it will be run by military structures and militias connected to them – as is also the case in western Libya in the EU-funded SIBMMIL project.

This would also mean that the eastern Libyan Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade (TBZ) would benefit from the new MRCC. Human rights organisations accuse it of war crimes, torture and violence against migrants. The militia is said to have been responsible in mid-October for an armed attack on a boat carrying refugees – at the time when a delegation from eastern and western Libya was visiting Frontex headquarters and subsequently the Commission in Brussels. Officially, the Commission declined to comment substantively on this “technical dialogue” – unofficially, however, “nd” learned that members of the coastguard, border troops and the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM) from the east took part.

As is customary with such projects, a feasibility study must first be carried out for the maritime control centre in Benghazi and the watchtower in Tobruk, after which the procurement procedure will be prepared. Implementation then requires a contract with the authorities in Benghazi, which would probably – as already in the SIBMMIL project in western Libya – be signed by Italy. Only then can equipment be delivered and training measures officially begin.

However, a first such training course for MRCC operators already took place at the end of September 2025 at an Italian naval base in Taranto in Apulia – initially with the location and date kept confidential. It presumably conveyed knowledge of maritime IT and navigation systems as well as the associated technical terminology in English.

The German Bundeswehr is with its navy also part of Irini – currently with soldiers at the command headquarters in Rome and a reconnaissance aircraft. Germany is not currently involved in the “support for capacity-building” or the training of the Libyan coastguard or navy, according to a response to an enquiry from “nd”. Whether this will also apply in future cannot be inferred from the reply: in any case, the Bundeswehr does not intend to conduct “training on site” or train Libyan military personnel in Germany – participation in courses in Italian Taranto, however, would not be ruled out.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2026/01/06/eu-doubles-pullback-system-in-libya-renegade-benghazi-also-to-receive-
#pull-backs #MRCC #Libye #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes_libyens #Frontex #surveillance_aérienne #Tripoli #Benghazi #Italie #European_Peace_Facility #technologie #Tobruk #Crète #Irini

The Libyan Coast Guard – explained

https://scd.infomigrants.net/media/resize/my_image_big/330b5a10f46a21a112c53e9998ff1a5f001fd1e4.jpg

The Libyan Coast Guard is often in the spotlight, in connection with the role it plays in irregular migration from Libya to Europe. This attention has sharpened in recent years as it is increasingly implicated in abuses against people on the move, and more recently direct attacks on NGO vessels.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/67224/the-libyan-coast-guard--explained

#Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #histoire #pacte_d'amitié #Italie #Méditerranée #Tripoli #Zawiya #Khoms #Bija #Abdelrahman_Milad #Reda_Issa #Emad_Trabelsi #General_Administration_for_Coastal_Security (#GACS) #Department_For_Combatting_Settlement_and_Illegal_Migration (#DCSIM) #Stability_Support_Apparatus (#SSA) #111th_Brigade #Directorate_for_Combatting_Illegal_Migration (#DCIM) #Tariq_Ben_Zeyad_Brigade #Haftar #General_Haftar

#Libye : « L’ensemble de l’appareil sécuritaire a compris que l’immigration rapporte beaucoup d’argent », rappelle un chercheur libyen

Les ONG estiment que 20 000 migrants sont aujourd’hui détenus dans des prisons en #Libye. Ces exilés y subissent toutes sortes d’#abus : #traite, #torture, #travail_forcé, #extorsion et conditions de détention intolérables. Malgré ces faits, le gouvernement libyen reçoit toujours l’#aide de l’#Union_européenne pour retenir les migrants et les empêcher de rallier l’Europe. Après avoir accumulés les preuves depuis des années, un militant et chercheur libyen brise le silence.

#Tarek_Lamloum a recueilli les témoignages de migrants interceptés en mer et dans le désert par les gardes-frontières. Il visite régulièrement les #centres_de_détention.

Ce chercheur qui préside le Centre d’études de Benghazi sur les migrants et les réfugiés dénonce une #corruption généralisée au sein des services sécuritaires : « L’ensemble des appareils sécuritaires a compris que l’immigration leur rapporte beaucoup d’argent. Ces appareils sont en concurrence entre eux. Qui, parmi eux, devrait gérer les migrants ? Et il y a au moins six appareils sécuritaires qui interviennent sur ce dossier. »

Tout le monde ferme les yeux

Tarek Lamloum raconte les confiscations des téléphones portables, les vols d’argent des migrants, parfois même le vol de leurs habits et chaussures dès qu’ils sont interceptés en mer par les gardes-côtes.

Les #exactions et les #vols des migrants sont devenus la norme, explique le chercheur, et les autorités libyennes et européennes ferment les yeux : « Le ministre de l’Intérieur à Tripoli est lui-même impliqué dans cette affaire, il sait très bien ce qui se passe dans les centres de détention qu’il est censé gérer. C’est lui le premier responsable des #gardes-côtes_libyens et des #gardes-frontières. C’est une première inédite : un ministère de l’intérieur qui intervient pour garder les frontières. Normalement, c’est du ressort de l’armée. »

Malgré ces exactions, le nombre de migrants en Libye a augmenté de 4% depuis le début de l’année, estime l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM). En 2024, 200 000 migrants avaient franchi la Méditerranée depuis les rivages d’Afrique du Nord.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/64932/libye--lensemble-de-lappareil-securitaire-a-compris-que-limmigration-r
#business #complexe_militaro-industriel

#Tunisie : des centaines de migrants interceptés en mer disparaissent des radars

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Des centaines de migrants ont été abandonnés dans le désert, à la frontière algérienne et libyenne, après avoir été interceptés en mer par les forces tunisiennes, le 17 mars. Ce genre d’expulsion est courante en Tunisie depuis l’été 2023, mais celle-ci impressionne par son ampleur. Certaines sources évoquent un nombre total de 600 exilés lâchés au même moment dans des zones désertiques.

Que s’est-il passé dans la nuit de dimanche 16 à lundi 17 mars à #Sfax, dans le centre-est de la Tunisie ? Cette nuit-là, 612 migrants subsahariens ont été interceptés en mer par les #gardes-côtes_tunisiens, avait déclaré la Garde nationale. Dix-huit corps ont également été retrouvés.

Mais depuis cette opération d’ampleur, ces exilés interceptés par les autorités ont disparu des radars. « Ils ne sont pas revenus dans le campement », assure à InfoMigrants Abdul*, un médecin Sierra-Léonais qui vit dans les champs d’oliviers de la périphérie de Sfax. C’est là que des milliers de Subsahariens ont érigé des abris de fortune, après avoir été chassés des centres-villes par les autorités tunisiennes à l’été 2023, en attendant de traverser la Méditerranée.

Comment Abdul peut-il en être si sûr ? « Un groupe de 600 personnes qui s’évapore dans la nature, ça ne passe pas inaperçu ici », signale celui qui sillonne les camps disséminés dans la région pour soigner les migrants malades ou blessés.

« Il y avait cinq bus, tous remplis de Noirs »

Alors, où sont-ils ? Après plusieurs jours de recherches, InfoMigrants est parvenu à entrer en contact avec certains de ces 612 Subsahariens. « On est à #Tébessa [ville algérienne proche de la frontière tunisienne, ndlr] », indique Lamine, un Gambien de 26 ans joint par InfoMigrants via un appel vidéo. « Après nous avoir récupérés en mer dans la nuit de dimanche 16 à lundi 17 mars, les gardes-côtes tunisiens nous ont envoyés dans le #désert », précise-t-il.

« Il y avait cinq bus, tous remplis de Noirs », renchérit Oumarou, un Sierra-Léonais de 31 ans, présent aux côtés de Lamine. Selon leurs estimations, environ 200 personnes auraient été expulsées dans le désert, près du parc national de #Chambi, à une trentaine de kilomètres de la frontière algérienne. Les exilés, dépouillés de leurs affaires, ont été lâchés au milieu de nulle part, en pleine nuit.

Après quatre jours de marche, une soixantaine d’entre eux a trouvé refuge dans une maison près de #Tébessa, tenue par un ressortissant Sierra-Léonais qui s’est installé là après son expulsion dans la région par les forces tunisiennes il y a un an. Dans ce groupe de migrants anglophones se trouvent des femmes, dont certaines enceintes, et des enfants. « Regardez ma tête », dit Aminata*, une Sierra-Léonaise enceinte de quatre mois, jointe par vidéo. « Je suis épuisée, j’ai mal partout », ajoute-t-elle en montrant ses pieds abîmés par ces longs jours de marche.

Plusieurs de ces Subsahariens présentent des blessures causées par le mélange d’eau salée et d’essence dans le bateau. Oumarou nous montre un enfant de 13 ans, l’air épuisé, avec des plaies au poignet. « Ils [les policiers tunisiens, ndlr] lui ont mis des menottes sur sa blessure, ce qui a aggravé les choses », explique Lamine.

Lorsque les exilés sont envoyés dans le désert, ils sont menottés par les agents de la #Garde_nationale. Généralement, les enfants en sont exemptés. Les témoignages évoquent aussi des #violences commises par les policiers dans les bus. « Ils nous ont frappés avec des bâtons. Certains ont été blessés aux jambes et aux bras », raconte Oumarou.

« Expulsion à grande échelle »

L’ONG italienne Mediterranea Saving Human affirme dans un communiqué, publié le 20 mars, que l’ensemble des 612 migrants interceptés dans la nuit du 16 au 17 mars ont été envoyés dans le désert. « De nos réseaux de solidarité présents en Tunisie, nous avons la confirmation d’un refoulement et d’une expulsion à grande échelle qui ont eu lieu depuis le port de Sfax, à l’issue d’opérations de ’sauvetage’ en mer, menées entre dimanche 16 et lundi 17 mars, pour plusieurs personnes qui tentaient de traverser vers l’Italie », écrit l’organisation. Mediterranea Saving Human rapporte que l’opération « a mobilisé 11 bus ».

InfoMigrants n’a pas été en mesure de vérifier toutes ces informations, notamment sur le nombre de bus mobilisés.

Où seraient les autres migrants interceptés en mer, s’ils ne sont pas à Tébessa ? D’après le groupe d’exilés anglophones, des personnes ont également été expulsées vers la frontière libyenne, « majoritairement des Soudanais ».

Quand les migrants sont transmis aux forces libyennes, ils sont ensuite transférés dans des prisons du pays. Pour en sortir, ils doivent débourser des centaines d’euros. « On aura plus d’informations d’ici quelques jours, voire quelques semaines, quand ils seront libérés et qu’ils retrouveront un téléphone », pense Salif*, un Guinéen installé en Tunisie depuis deux ans. Le jeune homme d’une vingtaine d’années est aussi sans nouvelles de plusieurs de ses amis interceptés en mer cette fameuse nuit du 16 au 17 mars.

Contactées par InfoMigrants, les autorités tunisiennes affirment ne pas « avoir de données » sur cette affaire. Tout comme l’Organisation internationale des migrations (OIM) qui « ne dispose pas d’informations ni de données précises à ce sujet ».

Accord avec l’Union européenne

Ce genre d’expulsion n’est pas rare en Tunisie, mais celle-ci impressionne par son ampleur. Depuis l’été 2023, les Subsahariens sont régulièrement raflés par la police tunisienne dans la rue, et interceptés en mer, puis envoyés par petits groupes dans des zones désertiques, aux frontières du pays. Les exilés doivent ensuite revenir par leurs propres moyens. InfoMigrants a reçu de nombreux témoignages de Subsahariens traumatisés par ces expulsions illégales.

« Plusieurs fois par semaine, on voit passer des bus, où s’entassent des migrants, faire route vers la frontière dans la nuit », confirme un habitant de Tozeur (ville tunisienne située à quelques kilomètres de l’Algérie), qui préfère rester anonyme.

Ces dernières années, les organisations de défense des droits n’ont eu de cesse de dénoncer les méthodes brutales des autorités tunisiennes à l’encontre des Noirs dans le pays. Elles accusent par ailleurs l’Union européenne (UE) de complicité dans ces violations des droits.

Sous l’impulsion de l’Italie, l’UE a conclu en juillet 2023 un « partenariat » avec la Tunisie prévoyant une aide budgétaire de 150 millions d’euros et l’octroi de 105 millions d’euros pour aider le pays à lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière. Ces aides ont débouché sur une hausse des interceptions de bateaux clandestins en 2024 et ont contribué à une nette réduction des arrivées en Italie (-80 % sur un an l’année dernière par rapport à 2023 avec 19 246 arrivées depuis la Tunisie).

►https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/63660/tunisie--des-centaines-de-migrants-interceptes-en-mer-disparaissent-de
#migrations #disparitions #disparus #réfugiés #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #rafles

Torna in Italia, con visto di ingresso, “A”, rifugiato sudanese respinto nel 2018

“A” arriva in Italia oggi, 25 dicembre, con un volo di linea e un regolare visto di ingresso ottenuto nell’ambito del procedimento giudiziale, dopo essere rimasto 6 anni privo di ogni forma di protezione. Così ha deciso il Tribunale Civile di Roma. Ecco la storia raccontata dai suoi avvocati e avvocate. Esiste infatti un diritto che non può essere bloccato dai “respingimenti collettivi”.

Era stato riportato in Libia insieme a più di 270 persone dal mercantile Asso 29 con il
sostegno dalle autorità italiane. Il Tribunale Civile di Roma ha riconosciuto la illegittimità di questa condotta, stabilendo il diritto di «A» a entrare in Italia.

Questo arrivo ha un eccezionale significato simbolico: rende effettivo il diritto di asilo sancito dalla Costituzione, sistematicamente violato dalle pratiche di respingimento nel Mediterraneo dove le autorità italiane, anche con la complicità di società private, ostacolano l’arrivo via mare di coloro che cercano protezione in Europa.

«A» faceva parte di un gruppo di oltre 270 persone respinte illegalmente in Libia tra il 30 giugno e il 2 luglio 2018 tramite il mercantile italiano Asso 29 di proprietà della Augusta Offshore, con sede a Napoli. L’episodio è stato eseguito su ordine e con il coordinamento delle autorità italiane operanti in Libia. Il Tribunale civile di Roma ha accertato la dinamica illecita del respingimento, avvenuto in violazione dei princìpi sanciti dalla giurisprudenza delle corti internazionali che avevano già condannato l’Italia per quanto accade nel Mediterraneo. L’intercettazione dei migranti e il successivo respingimento illegittimo – ha inoltre accertato il Tribunale – sono il risultato del contributo logistico, di supporto e coordinamento fornito delle autorità italiane. Questa condotta ha quindi violato le “obbligazioni positive” che impongono agli Stati di prevenire atti di tortura o trattamenti inumani.

Durante le operazioni di salvataggio, le autorità intervenute e i comandanti delle navi coinvolte devono sempre garantire che i naufraghi siano sbarcati in un luogo sicuro, indipendentemente da chi coordini effettivamente le attività di soccorso. Nel caso della Asso 29, infatti, questo principio non viene meno neppure se intervengono le autorità libiche o se la richiesta di soccorso proviene da esse, come già affermato dalla Corte di Cassazione nella sentenza sul caso della Asso 28 (della medesima società armatrice).

L’arrivo di «A» è il risultato di una battaglia legale che ha portato il Tribunale di Roma a ribadire un principio fondamentale: le persone respinte devono vedersi reintegrato il loro diritto all’asilo mediante la possibilità di entrare materialmente in Italia e presentare la domanda di protezione internazionale. Solo così si può evitare il prodursi di uno svuotamento degli obblighi di protezione. Il caso è stato seguito da un ampio collegio difensivo () dell’Asgi con il sostegno del progetto Oruka1 dell’associazione e del Josi&Loni Project. Insieme queste associazioni hanno ricostruito e documentato l’evento e sono riuscite a ottenere finalmente giustizia, seppure le sentenze siano state appellate. Ancora molte delle persone respinte si trovano fuori dall’Unione europea senza alcuna forma di protezione.
() Di cui fanno parte i seguenti avvocati: Giulia Crescini, Cristina Laura Cecchini, Lucia Gennari, Luca Saltalamacchia, Salvatore Fachile, Ginevra Maccarrone, Loredana Leo.

DICHIARAZIONI DELLE LEGALI E DELLE ASSOCIAZIONI

“Il Tribunale di Roma con le decisioni sul caso Asso 29 ha messo in luce la palese illegittimità di quello che è tutt’altro che un caso isolato. Ogni giorno nel Mediterraneo le autorità italiane realizzano un contributo fondamentale affinché le persone vengano intercettate e riportate in Libia spesso con la collaborazione di attori privati che realizzano la condotta materiale illecita di riconsegnare le persone in fuga alle autorità libiche”, hanno affermato Cristina Laura Cecchini e Lucia Gennari del progetto Sciabaca e Oruka di Asgi.

“Senza la fondamentale attività di ricostruzione e documentazione dei fatti del JL project e dei suoi attivisti non sarebbe stato possibile fare giustizia. Questo ci ricorda come i diritti delle persone, soprattutto nel Mediterraneo, necessitano di quella fondamentale attività di monitoraggio e documentazione che oggi le autorità italiane vorrebbero ostacolare anche attraverso la criminalizzazione delle organizzazioni umanitarie che operano i soccorsi in mare” aggiungono Giulia Crescini e Ginevra Maccarrone del collegio difensivo. “«A»è il primo ad ottenere giustizia. Il primo tra oltre seicento persone che il JL Project ha rintracciato e identificato come vittime di respingimenti illegali nei lager libici compiuti dal governo italiano. Il suo arrivo, oggi, è un meraviglioso inizio”, commenta Sarita Fratini del JL Project.

La condotta tenuta dallo Stato italiano, dall’armatore e dal capitano della nave ha determinato la violazione di numerose norme di diritto interno, internazionale e comunitario e dei diritti fondamentali dei cittadini stranieri sottoposti a rimpatrio. Come è emerso nell’ambito del procedimento le autorità italiane hanno determinato l’intercettazione di persone in fuga dalla Libia e hanno fornito un contributo essenziale che ha determinato il respingimento operato dal Comandante della nave Asso 29 che ha ricondotto i migranti nel porto di Tripoli. Le autorità italiane, attraverso una serie concatenata di comportamenti illegittimi, hanno reso possibile il respingimento. Tali condotte sono state realizzate nonostante la piena consapevolezza degli abusi e delle violazioni sistematiche che avvengono nei centri di detenzione libici e del rischio di refoulement nel Paese di origine a cui i migranti sono esposti in Libia.

Infatti tra il 30 giugno e il 2 luglio 2018 con il materiale sostegno delle autorità italiane, la “guardia costiera libica” per mezzo di una delle motovedette fornitegli dall’Italia ha effettuato una serie di intercettazioni in mare. Nel corso delle operazioni coordinate dalle autorità italiane era presente anche la Nave Duilio che, nonostante il sovraffollamento della motovedetta libica e le condizioni meteo in arrivo decideva di non effettuare il soccorso per non portare le persone in Italia. A seguito dell’avaria della motovedetta libica la nave Caprera della Marina Militare ordinava alla Asso 29 di intervenire. Tutte le persone salite a bordo della nave della società privata venivano ricondotte in Libia. Per tali motivi e per gli specifici diritti e obblighi violati, la situazione è stata dichiarata illegittima dal Tribunale di Roma e ha portato all’accertamento del diritto all’ingresso di «A».

Quanto avvenuto il 25 dicembre a Fiumicino è facilmente comparabile con quello che ha portato la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo a condannare l’Italia nel caso Hirsi Jamaa e altri. Si tratta di una situazione estremamente comune ed ancora oggi tristemente attuale nel Mediterraneo dove quotidianamente persone intercettate vengono respinte in Libia con il supporto fondamentale dell’Italia.

Il diritto di ingresso sul territorio come presupposto necessario per l’esercizio del diritto di asilo. Il respingimento ha in primo luogo determinato l’impossibilità per i cittadini stranieri di chiedere asilo, in violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra e dell’articolo 10 della Costituzione italiana. La limitazione della libertà di circolazione ha infatti come diretta conseguenza il mancato accesso alla protezione internazionale e all’asilo. Il presupposto necessario del diritto di asilo è evidentemente il diritto di accesso al territorio che è stato negato ai cittadini stranieri attraverso il respingimento in questione.

Il divieto di respingimenti collettivi. Per la dinamica del respingimento è evidente che in nessun momento le autorità italiane, seppur responsabili dell’operazione, hanno condotto un’analisi della situazione individuale dei cittadini stranieri per valutare l’esistenza di rischi connessi al rimpatrio. L’assenza di questa valutazione determina la violazione del divieto di respingimenti collettivi stabilito dall’articolo 4 del protocollo addizionale 4 alla Convenzione europea per i diritti umani e dell’articolo 19 del Testo unico sull’immigrazione che vieta il rimpatrio verso uno Stato in cui la persona rischia di subire torture o persecuzioni. Oltre ai rischi corsi in Libia, le autorità italiane avrebbero dovuto valutare anche i rischi connessi a un eventuale rimpatrio dalla Libia all’Eritrea, Paese di origine dei ricorrenti. Inoltre occorre tenere presente che il respingimento collettivo verso uno Stato come la Libia, impedisce alla radice qualunque accesso alla giustizia e qualunque diritto a vedere la propria posizione esaminata in maniera effettiva da un organo indipendente.

La violazione del divieto di tortura e trattamenti inumani e degradanti. Come dimostrato dalle vicende dei ricorrenti, il respingimento ha determinato la loro esposizione al rischio di tortura e trattamenti inumani e degradanti, vietati dall’articolo 3 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Nel momento in cui è avvenuto il respingimento, erano ben note le condizioni a cui sarebbero stati sottoposti i naufraghi al loro ritorno in Libia. In proposito, la Corte europea dei diritti umani ha chiarito, nella sentenza del caso Hirsi Jamaa, come la proibizione della tortura sia assoluta e inderogabile: le istanze di controllo della migrazione o le eventuali situazioni di emergenza non legittimano in alcun modo condotte che espongono le persone a tali rischi.

Il diritto a essere condotti in un luogo sicuro (POS). Le norme internazionali relative al diritto del mare (UNCLOS, Convenzione SAR, Convenzione SOLAS) stabiliscono che i soggetti coinvolti in un soccorso – in questo caso Stato italiano, armatore e capitano della nave – si liberano della loro responsabilità solo conducendo le persone soccorse in un “luogo sicuro”. A questo obbligo corrisponde lo speculare diritto delle persone soccorse. La nozione di luogo sicuro non è limitata alla sola protezione fisica delle persone, ma comprende anche il rispetto dei loro diritti fondamentali, come stabilito dalla Risoluzione 1821 del 2011 del Consiglio d’Europa. Il luogo è quindi da intendersi sicuro ove non sussista il rischio che la persona sia soggetta a tortura, trattamenti inumani e degradanti, dove non è a rischio la sua vita e la sua libertà. Alla luce di questa definizione, Tripoli non può in alcun modo essere considerato un posto sicuro per i cittadini stranieri: sono infatti note le dinamiche sistematiche e istituzionali di detenzione arbitraria, tortura ed estorsione.

I fatti del 2018. «A» era arrivato nel Paese dopo aver lasciato il Sudan, nel tentativo di trovare protezione. In Libia, tuttavia, ha subìto abusi e gravi violazioni dei propri diritti. Il 30 giugno 2018 aveva così deciso di partire, sperando di riuscire a giungere in Europa e ottenere finalmente protezione.
Dopo circa un giorno in mare, il gommone sul quale «A» era imbarcato aveva iniziato a mostrare segni di cedimento e la navigazione si era fatta estremamente difficoltosa. Una delle persone a bordo era riuscita a contattare via radio la Guardia costiera italiana e a chiedere soccorso. Le autorità italiane non erano intervenute direttamente nonostante fosse presente in mare anche la nave Duilio della Marina Militare che avrebbe potuto effettuare il soccorso. Al contrario, si erano messe in contatto con la motovedetta libica Zuwarah, che aveva raggiunto il gommone quando questo era già affondato. La Zuwarah aveva operato il salvataggio dellɜ 18 superstiti, tra lɜ quali «A», coadiuvata dall’elicottero della Marina militare italiana Eliduilio.

Con il supporto e il coordinamento delle autorità italiane la Zuwarah, donata ai libici dall’Italia, aveva portato a termine ulteriori intercettazioni con un conseguente incremento del numero di persone a bordo della motovedetta (262 secondo il resoconto della stessa Augusta Offshore nel corso del giudizio). La motovedetta libica, a causa del sovraffollamento e delle condizioni meteomarine avverse, non poteva proseguire la navigazione. Le autorità italiane a bordo della nave militare Caprera, di stanza nel porto di Tripoli, diedero istruzione al comandante della Asso 29 di prestare assistenza alla Zuwarah. L’imbarcazione privata era in quel momento sulla rotta che da Tripoli la conduceva alla piattaforma petrolifera Bouri Field, tra le più grandi del Mediterraneo.

La Asso Ventinove giunse sul posto, dove era presente anche la nave della Marina Militare italiana di stanza a Tripoli “Duilio”, che a sua volta agiva seguendo le indicazioni provenienti dalla Marina italiana. I passeggeri furono così trasferiti sull’imbarcazione privata. Quando le operazioni di trasbordo si conclusero, la Asso Ventinove si diresse verso Tripoli, trascinando a rimorchio anche la motovedetta libica. A bordo della Asso Ventinove salì anche un ufficiale libico, che, alla presenza del capitano della nave, comunicò ai naufraghi che se non avessero protestato sarebbero stati condotti in Italia. L’ufficiale, per tutta la traversata, si occupò dell’organizzazione dei naufraghi. Il 2 luglio la nave arrivò dinanzi al porto di Tripoli dove consegnò lɜ naufraghɜ alle autorità libiche che li condussero a terra su imbarcazioni più piccole. La Asso Ventinove, terminati i trasbordi, riprese la sua rotta originaria.

Dal procedimento giudiziale sono emerse le seguenti indiscutibili circostanze:

- Le intercettazioni dei naufraghi da parte dell’autorità libica sono il risultato dell’attività di supporto e coordinamento delle autorità italiane. Sono le stesse che hanno effettivamente rintracciato le imbarcazioni in distress e che, nonostante la vicinanza, hanno scientemente deciso di non intervenire facilitando l’arrivo della motovedetta libica per evitare di essere costrette a portare le persone in Italia.
- La #Asso_29 è intervenuta su richiesta delle autorità italiane che, come quotidianamente accade nel Mediterraneo, forniscono istruzioni dichiarando formalmente di agire “per conto” delle autorità libiche.
- Le autorità italiane avrebbero dovuto intervenire in adempimento alle obbligazioni positive imposte dalla legge ed evitare che le persone fossero riportate in Libia.

Cosa accadde ai naufraghi ricondotti in Libia? Dopo lo sbarco «A» e le altre persone respinte furono arbitrariamente detenute in diversi centri: Tarik Al Sikka, Zintan, Tarik Al Matar, Gharyan. Tutti – uomini e donne – furono sottopostɜ a condizioni di vita atroci: sovraffollamento, cibo e acqua insufficienti, condizioni igieniche drammatiche e scarse possibilità di uscire all’aria aperta. In queste condizioni furono maltrattatɜ, abusatɜ, fu loro estorto denaro, assistettero a omicidi e torture.

▻https://www.pressenza.com/it/2024/12/torna-in-italia-con-visto-di-ingresso-a-rifugiato-sudanese-respinto-nel-2

#justice #Italie #refoulement #Libye #pull-back #migrations #réfugiés #asile #Méditerranée #réfugiés_soudanais #refoulements_collectifs #illégalité #sauvetage #port_sûr #Asso_28 #gardes-côtes_libyens #Hirsi_Jamaa #droit_d'asile

#Frontex spends half a billion on aerial surveillance, new research shows more involvement in pullbacks

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On the 20th anniversary of the founding of Frontex, new details about its complicity with the Libyan Coast Guard have come to light. Activists and lawyers are protesting and taking legal action.

The European border agency Frontex has invested over €500 million in aerial surveillance in the Mediterranean region since 2017. This is reported by the Italian newspaper “Altreconomia” and complements new investigations by the Liminal research project. Its research shows that the surveillance equipment is not used to protect people at sea, but to force them back to Libya or Tunisia.

Liminal was founded two years ago at the University of Bologna for the forensic investigation of border violence. In an exhibition currently on display in Paris, Liminal documents at least 240 new cases in which Frontex reconnaissance flights specifically reported boats in the central Mediterranean to the Libyan or Tunisian Coast Guards, who then took the refugees back to the North African countries against their will. Between 2019 and 2023 alone, over 27,000 people were affected by such pullbacks.

Liminal’s research is based on 319,000 data records from the “Joint Operation Reporting Application” (JORA), Frontex’s internal database system. This is where the agency records all of its activities, including in the central Mediterranean. In a total of 473 cases, Frontex detected boats carrying refugees on their way to Europe before Libyan or Tunisian units intercepted them and forced them to return. The research shows that these routines are not random, but that the reconnaissance flights as part of the Frontex operation “Themis” are used strategically for migration defence.

A significant part of Frontex’s surveillance work is carried out by drone missions. Among others, the border agency uses two “Heron” drones, produced by the Israeli defence company Israel Aerospace Industries, which are also used for military purposes in the Gaza Strip. One of these drones is stationed in Malta and another in Crete. Frontex tested another drone from Israel in 2019, but this “‘Hermes”’ suffered a total loss after a few months.

Using JORA datasets from 2016 onwards, the Liminal researchers were able to reconstruct a significant number of cases in which the Frontex surveillance service recorded boats before they were turned back to Libya or Tunisia. These pullbacks are carried out in cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard, which has received financial and organisational support from the EU since 2017.

A new set of JORA data requested by Liminal via a Freedom of Information request shows that surveillance teams in Warsaw, where Frontex is based, analyse images in real time and make decisions on who to notify for pullbacks in North Africa. For Operation “Themis” alone, Liminal documented 473 previously unknown cases in which boats were discovered by Frontex and then pulled back to Libya or Tunisia.

“The chain of responsibility in these operations is extremely complex”, Giovanna Reder from Liminal emphasises to “nd”. The information gathered by aircraft and drones passes through several instances, from Warsaw to the operations control centres in Italy, Malta and Greece.

Liminal shows how Frontex conceals the pullbacks by systematically labelling the operations in the JORA datasets as “prevention of departures”. “Frontex is thus continuing a trend that we have been observing for a long time”, says Reder. Accordingly, the agency is also becoming increasingly non-transparent and is disclosing less and less data in response to requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Libyan Coast Guard has long been suspected of severely mistreating intercepted persons and detaining and abusing them in prisons under conditions that violate human rights. Despite ample evidence of the catastrophic conditions in Libyan camps, Frontex has so far shown no inclination to end its cooperation with the Coast Guard. On the contrary: Frontex’s monitoring capacities have been massively expanded in recent years.

However, Article 46 of the Frontex Regulation, which is relevant to human rights issues, requires the agency to stop such operations if they promote human rights violations, as in Libya or Tunisia, which encourages pogroms against refugees and abandons them in the desert.

In response to this practice, which violates international law, the legal organisation Front-Lex, together with the group Refugees in Libya, has taken legal action against Frontex before the European Court of Justice. A plaintiff from Sudan, who has been living in Libyan detention under dangerous conditions since 2019, accuses Frontex of having facilitated his forced repatriation and subsequent torture in Libya by sharing location data.

Front-Lex lawyer Ifatch Cohen demands on behalf of the plaintiff that Frontex take the protection of human rights seriously. In his argumentation, he refers to EU law, according to which the indirect promotion of human rights violations is not permitted. There is already sufficient evidence of Frontex’s co-responsibility for crimes against humanity in Libya, explains Cohen when asked by “nd”. What is needed is not more evidence, but a competent court that grants Frontex victims access to legal protection. “We hope that judge Maria José Costeira will finally allow our case to proceed”, said the lawyer.

The 24 October 2024 was the 20th anniversary of the founding of Frontex. There were demonstrations, events and actions in several cities in Europe and Africa, including Brussels, Berlin, Bregenz, Innsbruck, Calais and Dakar.

The Alarm Phone network, which consists of hundreds of volunteers and celebrated its tenth anniversary in October, also met in the Senegalese capital at the beginning of October. Refugees on the Mediterranean can use the emergency number to ask for help. The Alarm Phone forwards these messages to the relevant maritime rescue centres in the central Mediterranean.

For 3,650 days and nights, they have been on duty, the network explains. During this time, the activists have been alerted to over 8,000 boats “from all corners of the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic region or the English Channel”.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2024/10/31/frontex-spends-half-a-billion-on-aerial-surveillance-new-research-show
#pull-backs #Libye #migrations #réfugiés #complexe_militaro-industriel #surveillance_aérienne #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #Joint_Operation_Reporting_Application (#JORA) #Themis #opération_Themis #Heron #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #chaine_de_responsabilité #prévention_des_départs #gardes-côtes_libyens

Mer interrompue

https://alarmphone.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/image_WM_report.jpg

En cette journée mondiale des réfugié.e.s, la société civile transnationale se mobilise pour dénoncer les politiques meurtrières et racistes en Méditerranée !

Se basant sur des témoignages recueillis par divers acteurs et actrices de la société civile tunisienne et transnationale, le présent rapport documente les pratiques d’interceptions de la #Garde_Nationale tunisienne en #Méditerranée centrale. Les données collectées, qui s’appuient sur 14 entretiens approfondis réalisés entre 2021 et 2023 auprès de personnes exilées qui ont survécu à des attaques en mer, mettent en lumière des pratiques violentes et illégales, qui vont de la #non-assistance, aux manœuvres visant intentionnellement à faire chavirer les bateaux en détresse, provoquant des #naufrages et coûtant la vie à de nombreuses personnes en exil.

Cette #brutalisation des autorités frontalières tunisiennes qui est documentée maintenant depuis plusieurs années s’inscrit dans un contexte de renforcement des politiques d’externalisation des frontières de l’Union européenne et de ses Etats membres. Face à l’augmentation de la fréquentation de la route maritime tunisienne à partir de l’année 2021 et dans l’espoir de parvenir à limiter le nombre de traversées, celle-ci a considérablement augmenté son soutien aux forces de sécurité tunisiennes, mettant en place, à l’instar de sa coopération avec les milices libyennes, un « régime de refoulement par procuration ».

Fruit d’un travail collectif impliquant Alarm Phone et de nombreuses actrices et acteurs de la société civile tunisienne, pour des raisons de sécurité dans le contexte actuel de criminalisation et d’attaques répétées à l’encontre des personnes et organisations solidaires des personnes migrantes en Tunisie, il a été jugé préférable de ne pas mentionner ces dernier.ère.s.

A l’encontre de la répression, la publication de ce rapport sonne ainsi comme une promesse – la promesse que, peu importe les tentatives d’intimidation, la solidarité continuera à s’exprimer sans relâche.

Ensemble, nous continuerons à documenter les pratiques violentes des gardes-côtes tunisiens comme de toute autre autorité impliquée dans les interceptions et les refoulements en Méditerranée et les violations de droits en mer.

Ensemble, nous dénonçons ce régime de contrôle répressif de la mobilité ainsi que les politiques d’externalisation qui les rendent possibles et les encouragent.

Ensemble, nous défendons une Méditerranée ouverte, solidaire et respectueuse de la liberté de mouvement de toutes et tous !

▻https://alarmphone.org/fr/2024/06/20/mer-interrompue
#témoignages #migrations #réfugiés #rapport #alarm_phone #violence #gardes-côtes_tunisiens
ping @_kg_

Challenging the Complicity of Frontex’s Aerial Surveillance Activities in Crimes Against Humanity

#front-LEX and #Refugees_in_Libya filed a legal notice pursuant to Art. 265 TFEU requesting Frontex’s Executive Director, Mr. Hans Leijtens, to partially terminate the Agency’s aerial surveillance activities in the ‘pre-frontier area’ in the Central Mediterranean.

To prevent asylum seekers fleeing crimes against humanity in Libya from reaching the EU, Frontex systematically and unlawfully transmits the geolocalisation of refugee boats at high seas to the Libyan Coast Guard/Libyan Militia. Every day, Frontex allows for the systematic interception and ’pulling back’ of refugees to Libya, from where they have managed to escape by the skin of their teeth, and where they are subjected once more to crimes against humanity. Now, front-LEX, on behalf of X.Y. a refugee trapped in Libya, brings an unprecedented legal challenge against Frontex’s airborne complicity.

Between 2021 and 2023, Frontex has shared 2,200 emails communicating the exact geolocalisation data of refugee boats with Libyan actors to enable their unlawful interception and forcible return back to Libya. There, the ‘pulled back’ refugees are arbitrarily detained and subjected to crimes against humanity of, inter alia, murder, enforced disappearance, torture, enslavement, sexual violence, rape, and other inhumane acts. It is Frontex’s sharing of geolocalisation data which enables the commission of these crimes – making the Agency complicit in the ongoing and systematic attack directed against refugees and asylum seekers in the Central Mediterranean.

Frontex’s complicity in these ‘pullbacks’ and ensuing crimes against humanity committed against refugees has been well-documented by leading human rights organisations, UN organs, and investigative journalists. Now, based on this clear-cut evidence, front-LEX and Refugees in Libya filed an unprecedented legal notice challenging the Agency’s airborne complicity in crimes against humanity committed against people on the move.

▻https://www.front-lex.eu/frontex-complicity-crimes-against-humanity

#Frontex #complicité #justice #surveillance_aérienne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #géolocalisation #gardes-côtes_libyens #crimes_contre_l'humanité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #pull-back #pullbacks #poursuite_judiciaire

Comment des migrants sont abandonnés en plein désert en #Afrique

Une enquête de plusieurs mois menée par « Le Monde », le média à but non lucratif « Lighthouse Reports » et sept médias internationaux montre comment des dizaines de milliers de migrants en route vers l’Europe sont arrêtés et abandonnés en plein désert au Maroc, Tunisie et Mauritanie.

▻https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8yrqiy

#vidéo #migrations #désert #abandon #Mauritanie #Maroc #Tunisie #réfugiés #externalisation #frontières #rafles #racisme_anti-Noirs #Fès #déportations #Rabat #forces_auxiliaires #refoulements #arrestations_arbitraires #enlèvements #centres_de_détention #Ksar #détention_administrative #Espagne #bus #Algérie #marche #torture #Gogui #Mali #accords #financements #expulsions_collectives #Nouakchott #forces_de_l'ordre #Sfax #Italie #équipement #aide_financière #UE #EU #Union_européenne #forces_de_sécurité #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux

ping @_kg_

Face à la hausse des arrivées irrégulières, Chypre annonce la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens

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Les autorités chypriotes ont annoncé dimanche la suspension du traitement des demandes d’asile des Syriens. Le président #Nikos_Christodoulides a évoqué « une mesure d’urgence » face à la forte hausse des arrivées irrégulières sur l’île, principalement depuis le Liban voisin.

« Il s’agit d’une mesure d’urgence, d’une décision difficile à prendre pour protéger les intérêts de Chypre », a déclaré dimanche 14 avril le président chypriote Nikos Christodoulides lors de l’annonce de la suspension des demandes d’asile de Syriens dans le pays.

Le gouvernement chypriote a pris cette décision en réaction à une forte augmentation des arrivées irrégulières ce mois-ci sur l’île. Plus de 1 000 personnes sont arrivées à Chypre sur des bateaux en provenance du Liban depuis le début du mois d’avril, dans un contexte d’aggravation des tensions au Moyen-Orient.

Nicosie a donc demandé à ses partenaires de l’Union européenne (UE) de faire davantage pour aider le Liban et de reconsidérer le statut de la #Syrie - jusqu’à aujourd’hui déchirée par la guerre et considérée trop dangereuse pour y rapatrier les demandeurs d’asile.

Nikos Christodoulides et la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ont discuté de la possibilité de renforcer l’aide économique attribuée à Beyrouth, a indiqué un porte-parole du gouvernement chypriote dans un communiqué. À cette fin, il a été convenu qu’ils se rendraient ensemble au Liban après une visite préparatoire de la Commission.

Le #Liban, en proie à une grave crise financière, accueille des centaines de milliers de réfugiés syriens. Et les arrivées ne cessent de se poursuivre, les Syriens continuant à quitter leur pays désormais en proie à une très grave crise économique.

Chypre, l’État le plus à l’est de l’UE et le plus proche du Moyen-Orient, se trouve à environ 160 km à l’ouest des côtes libanaises ou syriennes. L’île a enregistré plus de 2 000 arrivées par voie maritime au cours des trois premiers mois de l’année, contre seulement 78 au cours de la même période en 2023.

Une mise en application encore floue

Dans la pratique, la suspension du traitement des demandes signifie que les demandeurs d’asile pourront déposer un dossier mais qu’il ne sera pas traité.

Ils seront confinés dans deux camps d’accueil qui fournissent un abri, de la nourriture, et réglementent les sorties, sans autre avantage.

Ceux qui choisissent de quitter ces installations perdront automatiquement toute forme d’aide et ne seront pas autorisés à travailler, ont indiqué des sources gouvernementales.

Pour Corinna Drousiotou, coordinatrice de l’ONG Cyprus Refugee Council interrogée par InfoMigrants, la décision du gouvernement chypriote concernant les demandeurs d’asile syriens ne repose sur aucune base légale. Par ailleurs, « il n’est pas encore clair de savoir comment les autorités vont appliquer cette décision […] Mais, nous ne pensons pas qu’elle parvienne à réduire les arrivées de réfugiés car ils ne sont généralement pas au courant de ce type de décision et les passeurs ne les en informent pas », souligne-t-elle.

La responsable met également en garde : la mesure risque au contraire d’aggraver la crise de l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile, les deux seuls centres d’hébergement de l’île n’ayant que des capacités d’accueil limitées. Or, de plus en plus de demandeurs d’asile syriens risquent de se retrouver bloqués dans ces centres si leurs demandes d’asile ne sont pas examinées.

En 2022, une décision similaire avait déjà été prise pour tenter de limiter les arrivées de Syriens à Chypre. Mais, selon Corinna Drousiotou, elle n’avait eu aucun effet sur le nombre d’arrivées.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/56463/face-a-la-hausse-des-arrivees-irregulieres-chypre-annonce-la-suspensio

#Chypre #asile #migrations #réfugiés #statistiques #chiffres #2024 #réfugiés_syriens

Border security with drones and databases

The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

Notes

[1] ►https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

[2] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

[3] ▻https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

[4] ►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

[5] ▻https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

[6] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[7] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[8] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[9] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

[10] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

[11] ►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

[12] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, ▻https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

[13] ▻https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

[14] ►https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

[15] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
#frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

2,200 #Frontex #emails to #Libya

Frontex has shared locations of migrant boats with Libya’s coast guard more than 2,000 times in three years – despite watching them whip, beat and shoot at passengers

It has long been known that European countries provide support and funding to the Libyan Coast Guard to carry out a controversial mission: intercepting Europe-bound migrants whom EU member states and agencies cannot apprehend directly without breaching international laws.

Numerous media and NGO reports have detailed the abuse and violence practised by the Libyan Coast Guard against migrants during sea interception and inside the detention centres they are taken to after being brought back to Libya.

Lighthouse Reports has previously established suspicious patterns of collaboration between EU border agency Frontex and the Libyan Coast Guard, including direct links between Frontex aerial assets spotting boats and their subsequent interception by the coast guard.

Despite the reports of abuse and torture, Frontex has withheld public criticism of the Libyan Coast Guard. And until now, the extent to which Frontex has shared information with the coast guard, and its internal knowledge of the abuse migrants face after they are intercepted, was unknown.
METHODS

Following the publication of Lighthouse investigation Frontex and the Pirate Ship in December, the EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) sent a letter to Frontex Executive Director Hans Leijtens questioning the agency’s collaboration with Libyan actors, including militia, in eastern and western Libya.

Lighthouse Reports and Der Spiegel gained access to the director’s response to the LIBE Committee’s questions. The email included all Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) relating to the Libyan Coast Guard.
STORYLINES

The SIRs reveal three incidents of Frontex aerial surveillance assets witnessing Libyan Coast Guard officers beating people in overcrowded boats at sea. In a separate incident, the agency’s surveillance drone recorded a Libyan officer shooting at a wooden boat to force it to stop.

The letter from Leitjens meanwhile reveals that Frontex gave away the location of migrant boats to the Libyan Coast Guard approximately 2,200 times, usually via email, in the last three years – despite being aware of the regular instances of violence they commit.

When confronted with these facts by our team, Frontex said: “The decision to share information about vessels in distress with the Libyan rescue coordination centre, alongside other national centres, is taken with a heavy heart”

The SIRs contain parts of Frontex’s human rights officer’s recommendations for the agency. The measures proposed range from increasing the sharing of coordinates with NGO rescue ships to involving UN agencies in following the fates of those returned to Libya. Frontex did not comment on whether these recommendations were implemented.

▻https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/2200-frontex-emails-to-libya

#partage #localisation #migrations #asile #externalisation #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #gardes-côtes_libyens #géolocalisation #SIRs #surveillance_aérienne #drones

Cassazione, dare i migranti ai guardiacoste di Tripoli è reato

La consegna di migranti alla guardia costiera libica è reato perché la Libia «non è porto sicuro».

E’ quanto sancisce una sentenza della Corte di Cassazione che ha reso definitiva la condanna del comandante del rimorchiatore #Asso_28 che il 30 luglio del 2018 soccorse 101 persone nel Mediterraneo centrale e li riportò in Libia consegnandoli alla Guardia costiera di Tripoli. Della sentenza scrive Repubblica.

Per i supremi giudici favorire le intercettazioni dei guardiacoste di Tripoli rientra nella fattispecie illecita «dell’abbandono in stato di pericolo di persone minori o incapaci e di sbarco e abbandono arbitrario di persone». Nella sentenza viene sostanzialmente sancito che l’episodio del 2018 fu un respingimento collettivo verso un Paese non ritenuto sicuro vietato dalla Convenzione europea per i diritti umani.

Casarini, dopo Cassazione su migranti pronti a #class_action

"Con la sentenza della Corte di Cassazione, che ha chiarito in maniera definitiva che la cosiddetta «guardia costiera libica» non può «coordinare» nessun soccorso, perché non è in grado di garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani dei naufraghi, diventa un reato grave anche ordinarci di farlo, come succede adesso. Ora metteremo a punto non solo i ricorsi contro il decreto Piantedosi, che blocca per questo le navi del soccorso civile, ma anche una grande class action contro il governo e il ministro dell’Interno e il memorandum Italia-Libia". E’ quanto afferma Luca Casarini della ong Mediterranea Saving Humans.

"Dovranno rispondere in tribunale delle loro azioni di finanziamento e complicità nelle catture e deportazioni che avvengono in mare ad opera di una «sedicente» guardia costiera - aggiunge Casarini -, che altro non è che una formazione militare che ha come compito quello di catturare e deportare, non di «mettere in salvo» le donne, gli uomini e i bambini che cercano aiuto. La suprema corte definisce giustamente una gravissima violazione della Convenzione di Ginevra, la deportazione in Libia di migranti e profughi che sono in mare per tentare di fuggire da quell’inferno". Casarini ricorda, inoltre, che di recente la nave Mare Jonio di Mediterranea "di recente è stata colpita dal fermo amministrativo del governo per non aver chiesto alla Libia il porto sicuro. Proporremo a migliaia di cittadini italiani, ad associazioni e ong, di sottoscrivere la «class action», e chiederemo ad un tribunale della Repubblica di portare in giudizio i responsabili politici di questi gravi crimini. Stiamo parlando di decine di migliaia di esseri umani catturati in mare e deportati in Libia, ogni anno, coordinati di fatto da Roma e dall’agenzia europea Frontex.

E il ministro Piantedosi, proprio ieri, l’ha rivendicato testimoniando al processo a Palermo contro l’allora ministro Salvini. Lui si è costruito un alibi, con la distinzione tra centri di detenzione legali e illegali in Libia, dichiarando che «l’Italia si coordina con le istituzioni libiche che gestiscono campi di detenzione legalmente. Finalmente questo alibi, che è servito fino ad ora a coprire i crimini, è crollato grazie al pronunciamento della Cassazione. Adesso questo ministro deve essere messo sotto processo, perché ha ammesso di avere sistematicamente commesso un reato, gravissimo, che ha causato morte e sofferenze a migliaia di innocenti».

▻https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2024/02/17/cassazione-dare-i-migranti-a-guardiacoste-di-tripoli-e-reato_cfcb3461-c654-4f3c

#justice #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontières #gardes-côtes_libyens #Libye #jurisprudence #condamnation #externalisation #pull-backs #refoulements #push-backs #cour_de_cassation #cassation #port_sûr

Eight #AFIC risk analysis cells set a benchmark in Africa

This week, Frontex together with the European Commission and representatives from eight African countries forming part of the #Africa-Frontex_Intelligence_Community (AFIC) met in Dakar, Senegal, to wrap up the European Union-funded project on “Strengthening of AFIC as an instrument to fight serious cross-border crimes affecting Africa and the EU”.

https://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Images_News/2023/Dakar_AFIC_project_closure.jpg

Launched in 2017 and funded by the European Commission, the project aimed to enhance the capacity and capability of AFIC countries to work jointly on identifying key threats impacting border management in Africa.

After years of hard work and despite the challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Frontex has completed its latest project and is proud to announce the handover of equipment to trained border police analysts who are carrying out their tasks in the risk analysis cells of eight AFIC countries: Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

The role of the cells, which are run by local analysts trained by Frontex, is to collect and analyse data on cross-border crime and support authorities involved in border management.

Frontex delivered a comprehensive risk analysis solution that meets the needs of the eight African border management authorities and enhances the safety and security of borders.

The handover of the equipment marks the end of the project and the beginning of an intensive cooperation between the AFIC countries. Frontex stays committed and ready to continue to support the RACs by organising joint activities - such as workshops, trainings, plenary meetings – together with the AFIC partner countries, aiming at further developing AFIC risk analysis capacities.

The AFIC project in numbers:

– Establishment of eight risk analysis cells in Niger, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo and Mauritania;
- 14 training sessions for analysts from African countries;
- 10 regional workshops in Gambia, Ghana, Italy, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Poland and Ivory Coast;
- 17 joint analytical field visits in the EU and Africa.

About AFIC

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was launched in 2010 to promote regular exchanges on migrant smuggling and other border security threats affecting African countries and the EU. It brings together Frontex analysts with those of partner African border authorities. A central element of the network are risk analysis cells, run by local analysts trained by Frontex. There are currently eight cells operating in Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

▻https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eight-afic-risk-analysis-cells-set-a-benchmark-in-africa-uwxHJU

#Frontex #Afrique #externalisation #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #coopération #équipement #risk_analysis #Côte_d'Ivoire #Gambie #Ghana #Mauritanie #Niger #Nigeria #Sénégal #Togo #données #border_management #contrôles_frontaliers #RACs #training #risk_analysis_cells #formation #gardes-côtes

FROM LIBYA TO TUNISIA : HOW THE EU IS EXTENDING THE PUSH-BACK REGIME BY PROXY IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

On August 21, 2023, the rescue ship Aurora from Sea Watch was detained by the Italian authorities after refusing to disembark survivors in Tunisia as ordered by the Rome MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center), a country which by no means can be considered a place of safety.

This episode is just one example of the efforts of European states to avoid arrivals on their shores at all costs, and to evade their responsibility for reception and #Search_and_Rescue (#SAR). Already in 2018, the European Commission, with its disembarkation platform project, attempted to force sea rescue NGOs to disembark survivors in North Africa. While this project was ultimately unsuccessful as it stood, European states have endeavored to increase the number of measures aimed at reducing crossings in the central Mediterranean.

One of the strategies employed was to set up a “push-back by proxy regime”, outsourcing interceptions at sea to the Libyan Coast guards, enabling the sending back of people on the move to a territory in which their lives are at risk, undertaken by Libyan border forces under the control of the EU authorities, in contravention of principle of non-refoulement, one of the cornerstones of international refugee law. Since 2016, the EU and its member states have equipped, financed, and trained the Libyan coastguard and supported the creation of a MRCC in Tripoli and the declaration of a Libyan SRR (search and rescue region).

This analysis details how the European Union and its member states are attempting to replicate in Tunisia the regime of refoulement by proxy set up in Libya just a few years earlier. Four elements are considered: strengthening the capacities of the Tunisian coastguard (equipment and training), setting up a coastal surveillance system, creating a functional MRCC and declaring a Tunisian SRR.
A. Building capacity of the Garde Nationale Maritime
Providing equipment

For several decades now, Tunisia has been receiving equipment to strengthen its coast guard capabilities. After the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Italy-Tunisia cooperation deepened. Under the informal agreement of April 5, 2011, 12 boats were delivered to the Tunisian authorities. In 2017, in a joint statement by the IItalian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Tunisian counterpart, the two parties committed to “closer cooperation in the fight against irregular migration and border management,” with a particular focus on the maritime border. In this context, the Italian Minister declared Italy’s support for the modernization and maintenance of the patrol vessels supplied to Tunisia (worth around 12 million euros) and the supply of new equipment for maritime border control. On March 13, 2019, Italy also supplied Tunisia with vehicles for maritime border surveillance, sending 50 4-wheelers designed to monitor the coasts.

Recently, Germany also started to support the coast guard more actively in Tunisia, providing it with equipment for a boat workshop designed to repair coast guard vessels in 2019. As revealed in an answer to a parliamentary question, in the last two years, the Federal Police also donated 12 inflatable boats and 27 boat motors. On the French side, after a visit in Tunis in June 2023, the Interior Minister Gérard Darmanin announced 25 million euros in aid enabling Tunisia to buy border policing equipment and train border guards. In August 2023, the Italian authorities also promised hastening the provision of patrol boats and other vehicles aimed at preventing sea departures.

Apart from EU member states, Tunisia has also received equipment from the USA. Between 2012 and 2019, the Tunisian Navy was equipped with 26 US-made patrol boats. In 2019, the Tunisian national guard was also reinforced with 3 American helicopters. Primarily designed to fight against terrorism, the US equipment is also used to monitor the Tunisian coast and to track “smugglers.”

Above all, the supply of equipment to the Tunisian coastguard is gaining more and more support by the European Union. Following the EU-Tunisia memorandum signed on July 16, 2023, for which €150 million was pledged towards the “fight against illegal migration”, in September 2023, Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million “to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment.”

In a letter to the European Council, leaked by Statewatch in October 2023, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to the Tunisian coast guards: “Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operation and others will be repaired by the end of the year.”
Trainings the authorities

In addition to supplying equipment, the European countries are also organizing training courses to enhance the skills of the Tunisian coastguard. In 2019, Italy’s Interior Ministry released €11 million to Tunisia’s government for use in efforts to stem the crossing of people on the move from Tunisia, and to provide training to local security forces involved in maritime border control.

Under the framework of Phase III of the EU-supported IBM project (Integrated Border Management), Germany is also organizing training for the Tunisian coast guards. As revealed in the answer to a parliamentary question mentioned before, the German Ministry of Interior admitted that 3.395 members of the Tunisian National Guard and border police had been trained, including within Germany. In addition, 14 training and advanced training measures were carried out for the National Guard, the border police, and the coast guard. These training sessions were also aimed at learning how to use “control boats.”

In a document presenting the “EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia” for the year 2021, the European Commission announced the creation of a “coast guard training academy.” In Tunisia, the project consists of implementing a training plan, rehabilitating the physical training environment of the Garde Nationale Maritime, and enhancing the cooperation between Tunisian authorities and all stakeholders, including EU agencies and neighboring countries. Implemented by the German Federal Police and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the project started in January 2023 and is supposed to run until June 2026, to the sum of 13,5 million EUR.

Although the European Commission underlines the objective that “the Training Academy Staff is fully aware and acting on the basis of human rights standards” the increase in dangerous maneuvers and attacks perpetrated by the Tunisian coast guard since the increase in European support leaves little doubt that respect for human rights is far from top priority.

On November 17, 2023, the ICMPD announced on its Linkedin account the inauguration of the Nefta inter-agency border management training center, as a benefit to the three agencies responsible for border management in Tunisia (Directorate General Directorate of Borders and Foreigners of the Ministry of the Interior, the General Directorate of Border Guard of the National Guard and the General Directorate of Customs).
B. Setting up a coastal surveillance system

In addition to supplying equipment, European countries also organize training courses to enhance the skills of European coastguards in the pursuit of an “early detection” strategy, which involves spotting boats as soon as they leave the Tunisian coast in order to outsource their interception to the Tunisian coastguard. As early as 2019, Italy expressed its willingness to install radar equipment in Tunisia and to establish “a shared information system that will promptly alert the Tunisian gendarmerie and Italian coast guard when migrant boats are at sea, in order to block them while they still are in Tunisian waters.” This ambition seems to have been achieved through the implementation of the system ISMaris in Tunisia.
An Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance (ISMaris)

The system ISMaris, or “Integrated System for Maritime Surveillance”, was first mentioned in the “Support Programme to Integrated Border Management in Tunisia” (IBM Tunisia, launched in 2015. Funded by the EU and Switzerland and implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the first phase of the program (2015-2018) supported the equipment of the Garde Nationale Maritime with this system, defined as “a maritime surveillance system that centralizes information coming from naval assets at sea and from coastal radars […] [aiming] to connect the sensors (radar, VHF, GPS position, surveillance cameras) on board of selected Tunisian Coast Guard vessels, control posts, and command centers within the Gulf of Tunis zone in order for them to better communicate between each other.”

The implementation of this data centralization system was then taken over by the “Border Management Programme for the Maghreb Region” (BMP-Maghreb), launched in 2018 and funded by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Tunisia component, funded with €24,5 million is implemented by ICMPD together with the Italian Ministry of Interior and designed to “strengthen the capacity of competent Tunisian authorities in the areas of maritime surveillance and migration management, including tackling migrant smuggling, search and rescue at sea, as well as in the coast guard sphere of competence.” With the BMP programme, the Tunisian Garde Maritime Nationale was equipped with navigational radars, thermal cameras, AIS and other IT equipment related to maritime surveillance.
Data exchange with the EU

The action document of the BMP program clearly states that one of the purposes of ISMaris is the reinforcement of “operational cooperation in the maritime domain between Tunisia and Italy (and other EU Member States, and possibly through EUROSUR and FRONTEX).” Established in 2013, the European Border Surveillance system (EUROSUR) is a framework for information exchange and cooperation between Member States and Frontex, to prevent the so-called irregular migration at external borders. Thanks to this system, Frontex already monitors the coast regions off Tunisia using aerial service and satellites.

What remains dubious is the connection between IS-Maris and the EU surveillance-database. In 2020, the European Commission claimed that ISMariS was still in development and not connected to any non-Tunisian entity such as Frontex, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) or the Italian border control authorities. But it is likely that in the meantime information exchange between the different entities was systematized.

In the absence of an official agreement, the cooperation between Frontex and Tunisia is unclear. As already mentioned in Echoes#3, “so far, it has not been possible to verify if Frontex has direct contact with the Tunisian Coast Guard as it is the case with the Libyan Coast Guard. Even if most of the interceptions happen close to Tunisian shores, some are carried out by the Tunisian Navy outside of territorial waters. […] Since May 2021 Frontex has been flying a drone, in addition to its different assets, monitoring the corridor between Tunisia and Lampedusa on a daily basis. While it is clear that Frontex is sharing data with the Italian authorities and that Italian authorities are sharing info on boats which are on the way from Tunisia to Italy with the Tunisian side, the communication and data exchanges between Frontex and Tunisian authorities remain uncertain.”

While in 2021, Frontex reported that “no direct border related activities have been carried out in Tunisia due to Tunisian authorities’ reluctance to cooperate with Frontex”, formalizing the cooperation between Tunisia and Frontex seems to remain one of the EU’s priorities. In September 2023, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Poland, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. During this visit, briefings were held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and where all threads from surveillance from ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together.

However, as emphasized by Mathias Monroy, an independent researcher working on border externalization and the expansion of surveillance systems, “Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex.”

This does not prevent the EU from continuing its efforts. In September 2023, in the wake of the thousands of arrivals on the island of Lampedusa, the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, reaffirmed, in a 10-point action plan, the need to have a “working arrangement between Tunisia and Frontex” and to “step up border surveillance at sea and aerial surveillance including through Frontex.” In a letter written by the European Commission in reply to the LIBE letter about the Tunisia deal sent on the Greens Party initiative in July 2023, the EU also openly admits that IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far and that more surveillance equipment is to come.

To be noted as well is that the EU4BorderSecurity program, which includes support to “inter-regional information sharing, utilizing tools provided by Frontex” has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.
C. Supporting the creation of a Tunisian MRCC and the declaration of a Search and rescue region (SRR)
Building a MRCC in Tunisia, a top priority for the EU

In 2021, the European Commission stated the creation of a functioning MRCC in Tunisia as a priority: “Currently there is no MRCC in Tunisia but the coordination of SAR events is conducted by Tunisian Navy Maritime Operations Centre. The official establishment of a MRCC is a necessary next step, together with the completion of the radar installations along the coast, and will contribute to implementing a Search and rescue region in Tunisia. The establishment of an MRCC would bring Tunisia’s institutional set-up in line with the requirements set in the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) of 1979 (as required by the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organisation IMO).”

The objective of creating a functioning Tunisian MRCC is also mentioned in a European Commission document presenting the “strategy for the regional, multi-country cooperation on migration with partner countries in North Africa” for the period 2021-2027. The related project is detailed in the “Action Document for EU Support to Border Management Institutions in Libya and Tunisia (2021),” whose overall objective is to “contribute to the improvement of respective state services through the institutional development of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres” in the North Africa region. The EU also promotes a “regional approach to a Maritime Rescue Coordination Center,” that “would improve the coordination in the Central Mediterranean in conducting SAR operations and support the fight against migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings networks in Libya and Tunisia.”

The Tunisia component of the programs announces the objective to “support the establishment of a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, [… ] operational 24/7 in a physical structure with functional equipment and trained staff,” establishing “cooperation of the Tunisian authorities with all national stakeholders, EU agencies and neighbouring countries on SAR.”

This project seems to be gradually taking shape. On the website of Civipol, the French Ministry of the Interior’s service and consultancy company, a new project entitled “Support for Search and Rescue Operations at Sea in Tunisia” is mentioned in a job advertisement. It states that this project, funded by the European Union, implemented together with the GIZ and starting in September 2023, aims to “support the Tunisian authorities in strengthening their operational capacities (fleet and other)” and “provide support to the Tunisian authorities in strengthening the Marine Nationale and the MRCC via functional equipment and staff training.”

In October 2023, the German development agency GIZ also published a job offer for a project manager in Tunisia, to implement the EU-funded project “Support to border management institution (MRCC)” in Tunisia (the job offer was deleted from the website in the meantime but screenshots can be shared on demand). The objective of the project is described as such: “improvement of the Tunisia’s Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity through reinforced border management institutions to conduct SAR operations at sea and the fight against migrant smuggling and human being trafficking by supporting increased collaboration between Tunisian actors via a Maritime RescueCoordination Centre (MRCC).”

According to Mathias Monroy, other steps have been taken in this direction: “[the Tunisian MRCC] has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.”

The establishment of a functional MRCC represents a major challenge for the EU, with the aim to allow Tunisia to engage actively in coordination of interceptions. Another step in the recognition of the Tunisian part as a valid SAR actor by the IMO is the declaration of a search and rescue region (SRR).
The unclear status of the current Tunisian area of responsibility

Adopted in 1979 in Hamburg, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR – Search & Rescue Convention) aimed to establish an international search and rescue plan to encourage cooperation and coordination between neighboring states in order to ensure better assistance to persons in distress at sea. The main idea of the convention is to divide seas and oceans into search and rescue zones in which states are responsible for providing adequate SAR services, by establishing rescue coordination centers and setting operating procedures to be followed in case of SAR operations.

Whereas Tunisia acceded to the treaty in 1998, this was not followed by the delimitation of the Tunisian SAR zone of responsibilities nor by regional agreements with neighboring states. It is only in 2013 that Tunisia declared the limits of its SRR, following the approval of the Maghreb Convention in the Field of Search and Rescue in 2013 and by virtue of Decree No. 2009-3333 of November 2, 2009, setting out the intervention plans and means to assist aircraft in distress. In application of this norm, Tunisian authorities are required to intervene immediately, following the first signal of help or emergency, in the limits of the Tunisia sovereign borders (12 nautical miles). This means that under national legislation, Tunisian authorities are obliged to intervene only in territorial waters. Outside this domain, the limits of SAR interventions are not clearly defined.

A point to underline is that the Tunisian territorial waters overlap with the Maltese SRR. The Tunisian Exclusive Economic Zone – which does not entail any specific duty connected to SAR – also overlaps with the Maltese SRR and this circumstance led in the past to attempts by the Maltese authorities to drop their SAR responsibilities claiming that distress cases were happening in this vast area. Another complex topic regards the presence, in international waters which is part of the Maltese SRR, of Tunisian oil platforms. Also, in these cases the coordination of SAR operations have been contested and were often subject to a “ping-pong” responsibility from the involved state authorities.
Towards the declaration of a huge Tunisian SRR?

In a research document published by the IMO Institute (International Maritime Organization), Akram Boubakri (Lieutenant Commander, Head, Maritime Affairs, Tunisian Coast Guard according to IMO Institute website) wrote that at the beginning of 2020, Tunisia officially submitted the coordinates of the Tunisian SRR to the IMO. According to this document, these new coordinates, still pending the notification of consideration by the IMO, would cover a large area, creating two overlapping areas with neighboring SAR zones – the first one with Libya, the second one with Malta* (see map below):

https://civilmrcc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/image-4.png

*This delimitation has to be confirmed (tbc). Nothing proves that the coordinates mentioned in the article were actually submitted to the IMO

As several media outlets have reported, the declaration of an official Tunisian SRR is a project supported by the European Union, which was notably put back on the table on the occasion of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2023 between the EU and Tunisia.

During the summer 2023, the Civil MRCC legal team initiated a freedom of information access request to the Tunisian authorities to clarify the current status of the Tunisian SRR. The Tunisian Ministry of Transport/the Office of the Merchant Navy and Ports replied that”[n]o legal text has yet been published defining the geographical marine limits of the search and rescue zone stipulated in the 1979 International Convention for Search and Rescue […]. We would like to inform you that the National Committee for the Law of the Sea, chaired by the Ministry of National Defence, has submitted a draft on this subject, which has been sent in 2019 to the International Maritime Organisation through the Ministry of Transport.” A recourse to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Interior was sent but no reply was received yet.

Replying in December 2023 to a freedom of information access request initiated by the Civil MRCC, the IMO stated that “Tunisia has not communicated their established search and rescue region to the IMO Secretariat.” However, on November 3, 2023, the Tunisian Ministerial Council adopted a “draft law on the regulation of search and rescue at sea in Tunisia’s area of responsibility.” A text which, according to FTDES, provides for the creation of a Tunisian SAR zone, although it has not yet been published. While the text still has to be ratified by the parliament, it is quite clear that the Tunisian authorities are currently making concrete steps to align on the IMO standards and, by doing so, on the EU agenda.
Conclusion: A EU strategy to escape from its SAR responsibilities

While some analysts have seen the drop in arrivals in Italy from Tunisia in recent months as a sign of the “success” of the European Union’s strategy to close its borders (in November, a drop of over 80% compared to the summer months), in reality, the evolution of these policies proves that reinforcing a border only shifts migratory routes. From autumn onwards, the Libyan route has seen an increase in traffic, with many departing from the east of the country. These analyses fail to consider the agency of people on the move, and the constant reinvention of strategies for transgressing borders.

While condemning the generalization of a regime of refoulement by proxy in the central Mediterranean and the continued brutalization of the border regime, the Civil MRCC aims to give visibility to the autonomy of migration and non-stop solidarity struggles for freedom of movement!

▻https://civilmrcc.eu/from-libya-to-tunisia-how-the-eu-is-extending-the-push-back-regime-by-prox

#push-backs #refoulements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #externalisation #Tunisie #Libye #EU #UE #Union_européenne #gardes-côtes_libyens #push-back_by_proxy_regime #financement #training #formation #gardes-côtes #MRCC #Méditerranée #Mer_Méditerranée #Libyan_SRR #technologie #matériel #Integrated_Border_Management #surveillance #Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance (#ISMaris) #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (#ICMPD) #Border_Management_Programme_for_the_Maghreb_Region #Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUROSUR #Frontex #ISMariS #Search_and_rescue_region (#SRR)

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Così l’Italia ha svuotato il diritto alla trasparenza sulle frontiere

Il Consiglio di Stato ha ribadito la inaccessibilità “assoluta” degli atti che riguardano genericamente la “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”. Intanto le forniture milionarie del governo a Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto continuano.

L’Italia fa un gigantesco e preoccupante passo indietro in tema di trasparenza sulle frontiere e di controllo democratico dell’esercizio del potere esecutivo. Su parte delle nostre forniture milionarie alla Libia, anche di natura militare, per bloccare le persone rischia infatti di calare un velo nero. A fine 2023 il Consiglio di Stato ha pronunciato una sentenza che riconosce come non illegittima la “assoluta” inaccessibilità di quegli atti della Pubblica amministrazione che ricadono genericamente nel settore di interesse della “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”, svuotando così di fatto l’istituto dell’accesso civico generalizzato che è a disposizione di tutti i cittadini (e non solo dei giornalisti). Non è un passaggio banale dal momento che la conoscenza dei documenti, dei dati e delle informazioni amministrative consente, o meglio, dovrebbe consentire la partecipazione alla vita di una comunità, la vicinanza tra governanti e governati, il consapevole processo di responsabilizzazione della classe politica e dirigente del Paese. Ma la teoria traballa. E ne siamo testimoni.

Breve riepilogo dei fatti. Il 21 ottobre 2021 l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid) -ente di diritto pubblico controllato dal ministero della Difesa- stipula un “Accordo di collaborazione” con la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere in seno al ministero dell’Interno. Fu il Viminale -allora guidato dalla prefetta Luciana Lamorgese, che come capo di gabinetto ebbe l’attuale ministro, Matteo Piantedosi- a rivolgersi all’Agenzia, chiedendole “la disponibilità a fornire collaborazione per iniziative a favore dei Paesi non appartenenti all’Unione europea finalizzate al rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. L’accordo dell’ottobre di tre anni fa riguardava una cooperazione “da attuarsi anche tramite la fornitura di mezzi e materiali” per dare impulso alla seconda fase del progetto “Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya”.

Il Sibmmil è legato finanziariamente al Fondo fiduciario per l’Africa, istituito dalla Commissione europea a fine 2015 al dichiarato scopo di “affrontare le cause profonde dell’instabilità, degli spostamenti forzati e della migrazione irregolare e per contribuire a una migliore gestione della migrazione”. La prima “fase” del progetto è dotata di un budget di 46,3 milioni di euro, la seconda, quella al centro dell’accordo tra Aid e ministero dell’Interno, di 15 milioni. A beneficiare di queste forniture (navi, formazione, equipaggiamenti, tecnologie), come abbiamo ricostruito in questi anni, sono state soprattutto le milizie costiere libiche, che si sono rese responsabili di gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani. Nel 2022, pochi mesi dopo la stipula dell’accordo, abbiamo inoltrato come Altreconomia un’istanza di accesso civico alla Aid -allora guidata dall’ex senatore Nicola Latorre, sostituito dal dicembre scorso dall’accademica Fiammetta Salmoni- per avere la copia del testo e degli allegati.

La richiesta fu negata richiamando a mo’ di “sostegno normativo” un decreto del ministero dell’Interno datato 16 marzo 2022 (ancora a guida Lamorgese). L’oggetto di quel provvedimento era l’aggiornamento della “Disciplina delle categorie di documenti sottratti al diritto di accesso ai documenti amministrativi”. Un’apparente formalità. Il Viminale, però, agì di sostanza, includendo tra i documenti ritenuti “inaccessibili per motivi attinenti alla sicurezza, alla difesa nazionale ed alle relazioni internazionali” anche quelli “relativi agli accordi intergovernativi di cooperazione e alle intese tecniche stipulati per la realizzazione di programmi militari di sviluppo, di approvvigionamento e/o supporto comune o di programmi per la collaborazione internazionale di polizia, nonché quelli relativi ad intese tecnico-operative per la cooperazione internazionale di polizia inclusa la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”.

Il 16 gennaio 2023 Roma e Ankara hanno firmato un memorandum per “procedure operative standard” per il distacco in Italia di “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”

Non solo. In quel decreto si schermava poi un altro soggetto sensibile: Frontex. Vengono infatti classificati come inaccessibili anche i “documenti relativi alla cooperazione con l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera e costiera (appunto Frontex, ndr), per la sorveglianza delle frontiere esterne dell’Unione europea coincidenti con quelle italiane e che non siano già sottratti all’accesso dall’applicazione di classifiche di riservatezza Ue”. Così come le “relazioni, rapporti ed ogni altro documento relativo a problemi concernenti le zone di confine […] la cui conoscenza possa pregiudicare la sicurezza, la difesa nazionale o le relazioni internazionali”.

È per questo motivo che lo definimmo il “decreto che azzera la trasparenza sulle frontiere”, promuovendo di lì a poco un ricorso al Tar -grazie agli avvocati Giulia Crescini, Nicola Datena, Salvatore Fachile e Ginevra Maccarone dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione e membri del progetto Sciabaca&Oruka- contro i ministeri dell’Interno, della Difesa, della Pubblicazione amministrazione, oltreché l’Agenzia industrie difesa (Aid), proprio per vedere riconosciuto il diritto all’accesso civico generalizzato. In primo grado, però, il Tar del Lazio ci ha dato torto.

Ed eccoci arrivati al Consiglio di Stato, il cui pronunciamento, pubblicato a metà novembre 2023, ha ritenuto infondato il nostro appello, riconoscendo come “fonte di un divieto assoluto all’accesso civico generalizzato”, non sorretto perciò da alcuna motivazione, proprio quel decreto ministeriale firmato Luciana Lamorgese del marzo 2022. “All’ampliamento della platea dei soggetti che possono avvalersi dell’accesso civico generalizzato corrisponde un maggior rigore normativo nella previsione delle eccezioni poste a tutela dei contro-interessi pubblici e privati”, hanno scritto i giudici della quarta sezione.

I legali che ci hanno accompagnato in questo percorso non la pensano allo stesso modo. “Il Consiglio di Stato ha affermato che il decreto ministeriale del 16 marzo 2022, una fonte secondaria, non legislativa, adottata in attuazione della disciplina del diverso istituto dell’accesso documentale, abbia introdotto nell’ordinamento un limite assoluto all’accesso civico, che può essere invocato dalla Pubblica amministrazione senza che questa sia tenuta a fornire alcuna motivazione in merito alla sua ricorrenza.

Si tratta di un’evidente elusione del dettato normativo, che prevede in materia una riserva assoluta di legge”, osservano le avvocate Crescini e Maccarone. Che aggiungono: “I giudici hanno respinto anche la censura relativa all’assoluta genericità del limite introdotto con il decreto ministeriale, che non individua precisamente le categorie di atti sottratti all’accesso, ma al contrario solo il settore di interesse, cioè la gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione, essendo idoneo a ricomprendere qualunque tipologia di atto, documento o dato, di fatto svuotando di contenuto l’istituto”. Questa sentenza del Consiglio di Stato rischia di rappresentare un precedente preoccupante. “L’accesso civico è uno strumento moderno che avrebbe potuto garantire la trasparenza degli atti della Pubblica amministrazione secondo canoni condivisibili che rispecchiano le esigenze che si sono cristallizzate in tutta Europa nel corso degli ultimi anni -riflettono le avvocate-. Tuttavia con questa interpretazione l’istituto viene totalmente svuotato di significato, costringendoci a fare un passo indietro di notevole importanza in tema di trasparenza, che è chiamata ad assicurare l’effettivo andamento democratico di un ordinamento giuridico”.

I mezzi guardacoste che l’Italia si appresta a cedere quest’anno alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno tunisino sono sei

Le forniture italiane per ostacolare i transiti, intanto, continuano. Negli ultimi mesi la Direzione centrale dell’Immigrazione e della polizia delle frontiere del Viminale -retta da Claudio Galzerano, già a capo di Europol- ha ripreso con forza a bandire gare o pubblicare, a cose fatte, affidamenti diretti. Anche per trasferte o distacchi in Italia di “ufficiali” libici, tunisini, ivoriani o “esperti della polizia nazionale turca”. La delegazione della Libyan coast guard and port security, ad esempio, è stata portata dal 15 al 18 gennaio di quest’anno alla base navale della Guardia di Finanza a Capo Miseno (NA) per una “visita tecnica”. Nei mesi prima altre “autorità libiche” erano state formate alle basi di Gaeta (LT) o Capo Miseno. Gli ufficiali della Costa d’Avorio sono stati in missione dal 30 ottobre scorso al 20 gennaio 2024 “in materia di rimpatri”. Sono stati portati nei punti caldi di Lampedusa e Ventimiglia.

Al dicembre 2023 risale invece la firma dell’accordo tra la Direzione centrale e il Comando generale della Gdf per la fornitura di navi, assistenza, manutenzione, supporto tecnico-logistico a beneficio di Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto. Obiettivo: il “rafforzamento delle capacità nella gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione e in materia di ricerca e soccorso in mare”. Proprio alla Guardia nazionale del ministero dell’Interno di Tunisi finiranno sei guardacoste litoranei della classe “G.L. 1.400”, con servizi annessi del tipo “consulenza, assistenza e tutoraggio”, per un valore di 4,8 milioni di euro (i soldi li mette il Viminale, i mezzi e la competenza la Guardia di Finanza). Navi ma anche carburante. A inizio gennaio di quest’anno il direttore Galzerano, dietro presunta richiesta di non ben precisate “autorità tunisine”, ha approvato la spesa di “nove milioni di euro circa” (testualmente) per “il pagamento del carburante delle unità navali impegnate nella lotta all’immigrazione clandestina e nelle operazioni di ricerca e di soccorso” nelle acque tunisine. Dove hanno recuperato le risorse? Da un fondo ministeriale dedicato a “misure volte alla prevenzione e al contrasto della criminalità e al potenziamento della sicurezza nelle strutture aeroportuali e nelle principali stazioni ferroviarie anche attraverso imprescindibili misure di cooperazione internazionale”. Chissà quale sarà la prossima fermata.

▻https://altreconomia.it/cosi-litalia-ha-svuotato-il-diritto-alla-trasparenza-sulle-frontiere
#Tunisie #Egypte #transparence #Agenzia_industrie_difesa (#Aid) #Support_to_integrated_border_and_migration_management_in_Libya (#Sibmmil) #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l'Afrique #gardes-côtes_libyens #Frontex

#Frontex, Cutro è un ricordo sbiadito: sorvegliare dall’alto resta la priorità

Un anno dopo la strage, l’Agenzia europea della guardia di frontiera investe ancora su velivoli per sorvolare il Mediterraneo. Dal 2016 a oggi la spesa supera mezzo miliardo di euro. Una strategia dagli esiti noti: più respinti e più morti

Frontex è pronta a investire altri 158 milioni di euro per sorvegliare dall’alto il Mediterraneo. A un anno dal naufragio di Steccato di Cutro (KR), costato la vita a 94 persone, la strategia dell’Agenzia che sorveglia le frontiere esterne europee non cambia. Anzi, si affina con “occhi” sempre più efficaci per rintracciare e osservare dall’alto le imbarcazioni in difficoltà. “Si continua a pensare che Frontex sia un’innocua gregaria degli Stati, senza responsabilità -spiega Laura Salzano, docente di diritto dell’Ue presso l’Università di Barcellona-. Ma in mare, sempre di più, le sue attività hanno conseguenze dirette sulla vita delle persone”.

Lo racconta, in parte, anche la strage di Cutro del 26 febbraio 2023. Alle 22.26 della sera prima infatti fu l’Agenzia, attraverso il velivolo “Eagle 1”, a individuare per prima la “Summer love” e a segnalarla, quand’era a circa 40 miglia delle coste crotonesi, al Frontex coordination centre. Da Varsavia le coordinate della nave furono girate alle autorità competenti: tra queste anche l’International coordination centre (ICC) di Pratica di mare (RM) in cui, allo stesso tavolo, siedono le autorità italiane e la stessa Agenzia che ha il dovere di monitorare quello che succede. “Nonostante fosse noto che c’erano persone nella ‘pancia della nave’ e il meteo stesse peggiorando, si è deciso di attivare un’operazione di polizia e non di ‘ricerca e soccorso’ -spiega Salzano-. Questa classificazione a mio avviso errata è responsabilità anche dell’Agenzia”. Un errore che potrebbe aver inciso anche sul ritardo nei soccorsi.

Lo stabilirà la Procura di Crotone che, a metà gennaio 2024, non ha ancora chiuso le indagini sulla strage. Qualcosa di quanto successo quella sera, però, si sa già, perché il processo contro i presunti manovratori dell’imbarcazione è già in fase di dibattimento. “La prima barca della Guardia costiera -spiega Francesco Verri, avvocato di decine di familiari delle vittime- arriva sul luogo del naufragio alle 6.50, quasi tre ore dopo il naufragio: salva due persone ma recupera anche il cadavere di un bambino morto di freddo. Perché ci hanno impiegato così tanto tempo per percorrere poche miglia nautiche? Sulla spiaggia la pattuglia è arrivata un’ora e 35 minuti dopo il naufragio. Da Crotone a Cutro ci vogliono dieci minuti di macchina”. Domande a cui dovranno rispondere le autorità italiane.

Al di là delle responsabilità penali, però, quanto successo quella notte mostra l’inadeguatezza del sistema dei soccorsi di cui la sorveglianza aerea è un tassello fondamentale su cui Frontex continua a investire. Con importi senza precedenti.

Quando Altreconomia va in stampa, a metà gennaio, l’Agenzia sta ancora valutando le offerte arrivate per il nuovo bando da 158 milioni di euro per due servizi di monitoraggio aereo: uno a medio raggio, entro le 151 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza (budget di 100 milioni), l’altro a lungo raggio che può superare le 401 miglia di distanza (48 milioni).

▻https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/i/web/post/658926323750966119

Documenti di gara alla mano, una delle novità più rilevanti riguarda i cosiddetti “Paesi ospitanti” delle attività di monitoraggio: si prevede infatti espressamente che possano essere anche Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea. In sostanza: il velivolo potrebbe partire da una base in Tunisia o Libia; e, addirittura, si prevede che un host country liaison officer, ovvero un agente di “contatto” delle autorità di quel Paese, possa salire a bordo dell’aeromobile. “Bisogna capire se sarà fattibile operativamente -sottolinea Salzano-. Ma non escludere questa possibilità nel bando è grave: sono Paesi che non sono tenuti a rispettare gli standard europei”.

Mentre lavora per dispiegare la sua flotta anche sull’altra sponda del Mediterraneo, Frontex investe sulla “qualità” dei servizi richiesti. Nel bando si richiede infatti che il radar installato sopra il velivolo sia in grado di individuare (per poi poter fotografare) un oggetto di piccole dimensioni a quasi dieci chilometri di distanza e uno “medio” a quasi 19. Prendendo ad esempio il caso delle coste libiche, più la “potenza di fuoco” è elevata più il velivolo potrà essere distante dalle coste del Nordafrica ma comunque individuare le imbarcazioni appena partite.

La distanza, in miglia nautiche, che l’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex nel novembre 2023 prevede tra l’aeroporto di partenza del velivolo e l’area di interesse da sorvolare è di 401 miglia. Nella prima gara riguardante questi servizi, pubblicata dall’agenzia nell’agosto 2016, la distanza massima prevista era di 200 miglia

Frontex sa che, oltre alla componente meccanica, l’efficienza “tecnica” dei suoi droni è fondamentale. Per questo il 6 e 7 settembre 2023 ha riunito a Varsavia 16 aziende del settore per discutere delle nuove frontiere tecnologiche dei “velivoli a pilotaggio remoto”. A presentare i propri prodotti c’era anche l’italiana Leonardo Spa, leader europeo nel settore aerospaziale e militare, che già nel 2018 aveva siglato un accordo da 1,6 milioni di euro per fornire droni all’Agenzia.

L’ex Finmeccanica è tra le 15 aziende che hanno vinto i bandi pubblicati da Frontex per la sorveglianza aerea. Se si guarda al numero di commesse aggiudicate, il trio formato da DEA Aviation (Regno Unito), CAE Aviation (Stati Uniti) ed EASP Air (Spagna) primeggia con oltre otto contratti siglati. Valutando l’importo delle singole gare, a farla da padrone sono invece due colossi del settore militare: la tedesca Airbus DS e la Elbit System, principale azienda che rifornisce l’esercito israeliano, che si sono aggiudicate in cordata due gare (2020 e 2022) per 125 milioni di euro. Dal 2016 a oggi, il totale investito per questi servizi supera i cinquecento milioni di euro.

“La sorveglianza è una delle principali voci di spesa dell’Agenzia -spiega Ana Valdivia, professoressa all’Oxford internet institute che da anni analizza i bandi di Frontex- insieme a tutte le tecnologie che trasformano gli ‘eventi reali’ in dati”. E la cosiddetta “datificazione” ha un ruolo di primo piano anche nel Mediterraneo. “La fotografia di una barca in distress ha un duplice scopo: intercettarla ma anche avere un’evidenza digitale, una prova, che una determinata persona era a bordo -aggiunge Valdivia-. Questa è la ‘sorveglianza’: non un occhio che ci guarda giorno e notte, ma una memoria digitale capace di ricostruire in futuro la nostra vita. Anche per i migranti”. E per chi è su un’imbarcazione diretta verso l’Europa è vitale a chi finiscono le informazioni.

Nell’ultimo bando pubblicato da Frontex, si prevede che “il contraente trasferirà i dati a sistemi situati in un Paese terzo se è garantito un livello adeguato di protezione”. “Fanno finta di non sapere che non possono farlo -aggiunge Salzano- non potendo controllare che Paesi come la Tunisia e la Libia non utilizzino quei dati, per esempio, per arrestare le persone in viaggio una volta respinte”. Quello che si sa, invece, è che quei dati -nello specifico le coordinate delle navi- vengono utilizzate per far intervenire le milizie costiere libiche. Per questo motivo i droni si avvicinano sempre di più alla Libia. Se nel 2016 l’Agenzia, nella prima gara pubblicata per questa tipologia di servizi, parlava di area operativa nelle “vicinanze” con le coste italiane e greche, fino a 200 miglia nautiche dall’aeroporto di partenza, dal 2020 in avanti questa distanza ha superato le 401 miglia.

Lorenzo Pezzani, professore associato di Geografia all’università di Bologna, ha esaminato giorno per giorno i tracciati di “Heron”, il più importante drone della flotta di Frontex: nel 2021 l’attività di volo si è concentrata tra Zuara e Tripoli, il tratto di costa libica da cui partiva la maggior parte delle barche.

“Il numero di respingimenti delle milizie libiche -spiega Pezzani autore dello studio “Airborne complicity” pubblicato a inizio dicembre 2022- cresce all’aumentare delle ore di volo del drone e allo stesso tempo la mortalità non diminuisce, a differenza di quanto dichiarato dall’Agenzia”. Che tramite il suo direttore Hans Leijtens, entrato in carica a pochi giorni dal naufragio di Cutro, nega di avere accordi o rapporti diretti con la Libia. “Se è così, com’è possibile che un drone voli così vicino alle coste di uno Stato sovrano?”, si chiede Salzano. Chi fornirà il “nuovo” servizio per Frontex dovrà cancellare le registrazioni video entro 72 ore. Meglio non lasciare troppe tracce in giro.

▻https://altreconomia.it/frontex-cutro-e-un-ricordo-sbiadito-sorvegliare-dallalto-resta-la-prior
#migrations #réfugiés #frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #complexe_militaro-industriel #business #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Cutro #surveillance_aérienne #Leonardo #Elbit_System #Airbus #host_country_liaison_officer #radar #technologie #DEA_Aviation #CAE_Aviation #EASP_Air #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens

La #Grèce condamnée par la #Cour_européenne_des_droits_de_l’homme après les tirs de gardes-côtes sur des embarcations de migrants

La CEDH a condamné le pays à verser 80 000 euros aux proches d’un migrant syrien mort après avoir été blessé par balle par les gardes-côtes grecs, en 2014.

Le #22_septembre_2014, à l’aube, non loin des côtes turques et près de l’îlot grec de #Psérimos, un bateau à moteur transportant quatorze migrants est repéré par les #gardes-côtes_grecs. Le commandant du navire militaire demande au conducteur d’arrêter l’embarcation. Ce dernier refuse. Les gardes-côtes tirent alors vingt balles pour immobiliser la vedette – sept coups de semonce et treize tirs ciblés sur le moteur. Deux ressortissants syriens sont blessés. L’un d’eux, Belal Tello est touché à la tête et conduit par hélicoptère à l’hôpital de Rhodes, une île grecque voisine. En août 215, il est transféré en Suède où habitent sa femme et ses enfants (les requérants). Il est pris en charge à l’hôpital universitaire Karolinska, à Stockholm. Mais il meurt quatre mois plus tard.

Les proches de #Belal_Tello ont attendu près de dix ans pour obtenir le verdict de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH), qui a finalement condamné la Grèce à leur verser 80 000 euros. D’après la cour, Athènes n’a pas prouvé « que l’usage de la force était absolument nécessaire » pour arrêter le bateau qui s’approchait des côtes grecques. « Les treize coups de feu tirés exposaient forcément les passagers de la vedette à un risque », ont estimé les sept juges européens.

« La condamnation concerne également l’enquête inefficace menée par les autorités grecques sur l’incident », souligne, dans un communiqué, l’ONG Refugee Support Aegean (RSA), qui représentait, avec l’association Pro Asyl, la famille de la victime. Le parquet grec avait ouvert une enquête préliminaire sur cet incident, mais la justice avait rapidement classé l’affaire en 2015. D’après la CEDH, l’enquête menée par les autorités nationales comportait « de nombreuses lacunes qui ont conduit notamment à la perte d’éléments de preuve ». « Au cours de la procédure pénale, les deux réfugiés blessés par balle n’ont jamais été appelés à témoigner. Les déclarations des témoins recueillies lors des interrogatoires préliminaires semblent identiques », souligne RSA. La CEDH s’est aussi étonnée que plusieurs mesures pouvant faire avancer l’enquête n’aient pas été prises : une expertise médico-légale sur la blessure à la tête du réfugié syrien ; un rapport balistique établissant les trajectoires des tirs…
« Impunité généralisée »

Ce n’est pas la première fois que les agissements des gardes-côtes grecs sont condamnés ou mis en cause. En juillet 2022, la CEDH avait accordé 330 000 euros à seize requérants dont le bateau avait coulé en mer Egée, près de l’île de Farmakonisi, en janvier 2014. Onze personnes, dont huit enfants, avaient trouvé la mort dans ce naufrage provoqué par un navire garde-côtes grec, qui aurait navigué à grande vitesse à proximité de l’embarcation, entraînant le chavirement de celle-ci.
La CEDH avait déjà noté que les autorités grecques n’avaient pas mené une « enquête approfondie et effective permettant de faire la lumière sur les circonstances du naufrage ». L’une des avocates des requérants, Maria Papamina, du Conseil pour les réfugiés grec, avait déclaré, lors du rendu de cette décision de justice : « Nous avions l’impression que l’intention [des autorités grecques] était de clore rapidement l’affaire. »

Et c’est justement ce que les défenseurs des droits de l’homme souhaitent éviter, que le cas d’un autre naufrage survenu il y a quelques mois, au large du Péloponnèse, à Pylos, ne soit classé, lui aussi, sans suite. Le 14 juin 2023, un chalutier, l’Adriana, parti de Libye, a coulé avec près de 750 migrants à son bord, dans les eaux territoriales grecques. Seules 104 personnes ont survécu et 82 corps ont été retrouvés.

Les témoignages des survivants suggèrent qu’un patrouilleur garde-côtes grec a attaché une corde à l’Adriana et tiré dessus, ce qui aurait conduit à faire chavirer le bateau surchargé de migrants. D’après plusieurs enquêtes journalistiques, les opérations de sauvetage ont été également tardivement mises en place.
Dans un rapport publié en décembre 2023, Amnesty International et Human Rights Watch déploraient, six mois après le drame, le « peu de progrès » dans les investigations menées par les autorités grecques. Selon les deux ONG, « les échecs historiques des enquêtes grecques sur les naufrages (…) et l’impunité généralisée pour les violations systémiques des droits humains à ses frontières suscitent des inquiétudes quant à l’adéquation des enquêtes judiciaires en cours sur la tragédie de Pylos ».

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/01/17/la-grece-condamnee-par-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-l-homme-apres-les-ti
#CEDH #justice #condamnation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #décès #naufrage #tir

Beyond borders, beyond boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bc40e5d2a-3c51e6/pw1GsGJt4170/01Ns0KgPV4Pl91rFF5IrvPERJoIpRNbDGOllF5gV.png

In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have intensified their effort to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching their borders. One strategy to reach this goal consists of funding programs for third countries’ coast guards and border police, as currently happens in Libya and Tunisia.

These programs - funded by the #EUTF_for_Africa and the #NDICI-Global_Europe - allocate funding to train and equip authorities, including the delivery and maintenance of assets. NGOs, activists, and International Organizations have amassed substantial evidence implicating Libyan and Tunisian authorities in severe human rights violations.

The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament commissioned a study carried out by Profundo, ARCI, EuroMed Rights and Action Aid, on how EU funding is linked to human rights violations in neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Libya.

The study answers the following questions:

- What is the state of EU funding for programs aimed at enhancing border control capacities in Libya and Tunisia?
- What is the human rights impact of these initiatives?
- What is the framework for human rights compliance?
- How do the NDICI-Global Europe decision-making processes work?

The report highlights that the shortcomings in human rights compliance within border control programs, coupled with the lack of proper transparency clearly contradicts EU and international law. Moreover, this results in the insufficient consideration of the risk of human rights violations when allocating funding for both ongoing and new programs.

This is particularly concerning in the cases of Tunisia and Libya, where this report collects evidence that the ongoing strategies, regardless of achieving or not the questionable goals of reducing migration flows, have a very severe human rights impact on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Pour télécharger l’étude:
►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

#Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #aide_financières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #rapport #trust_fund #profundo #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument #droits_humains #gestion_des_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #IVCDCI #IVCDCI-EM #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #EUTFA #coût #violence #crimes_contre_l'humanité #impunité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #naufrages

Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

Successes at the working level

Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

Reception from the Frontex Director

In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

Model for migration defence with Egypt

Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

–—
ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

Les #impasses de la migration

Pour LSD, #Raphaël_Krafft constate que la situation des exilés aux portes ou sur le sol européen a été rendue intenable, malgré les bonnes volontés.

▻https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/serie-les-impasses-de-la-migration

#podcast #audio

EU to step up support for human rights abuses in North Africa

In a letter (▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4088/eu-com-migration-letter-eur-council-10-23.pdf) to the European Council trumpeting the EU’s efforts to control migration, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen highlighted the provision of vessels and support to coast guards in Libya and Tunisia, where refugee and migrant rights are routinely violated.

The letter (pdf) states:

“…we need to build up the capacity of our partners to conduct effective border surveillance and search and rescue operations. We are providing support to many key partners with equipment and training to help prevent unauthorised border crossings. All five vessels promised to Libya have been delivered and we see the impact of increased patrols. Under the Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia, we have delivered spare parts for Tunisian coast guards that are keeping 6 boats operational, and others will be repaired by the end of the year. More is expected to be delivered to countries in North Africa in the coming months.”

What it does not mention is that vessels delivered to the so-called Libyan coast guard are used to conduct “pullbacks” of refugees to brutal detention conditions and human rights violations.

Meanwhile in Tunisia, the coast guard has been conducting pullbacks of people who have subsequently been dumped in remote regions near the Tunisian-Algerian border.

According to testimony provided to Human Rights Watch (HRW)¸ a group of people who were intercepted at sea and brought back to shore were then detained by the National Guard, who:

“…loaded the group onto buses and drove them for 6 hours to somewhere near the city of Le Kef, about 40 kilometers from the Algerian border. There, officers divided them into groups of about 10, loaded them onto pickup trucks, and drove toward a mountainous area. The four interviewees, who were on the same truck, said that another truck with armed agents escorted their truck.

The officers dropped their group in the mountains near the Tunisia-Algeria border, they said. The Guinean boy [interviewed by HRW) said that one officer had threatened, “If you return again [to Tunisia], we will kill you.” One of the Senegalese children [interviewed by HRW] said an officer had pointed his gun at the group.”

Von der Leyen does not mention the fact that the Tunisian authorities refused an initial disbursement of €67 million offered by the Commission as part of its more than €1 billion package for Tunisia, which the country’s president has called “small” and said it “lacks respect.” (▻https://apnews.com/article/tunisia-europe-migration-851cf35271d2c52aea067287066ef247) The EU’s ambassador to Tunisia has said that the refusal “speaks to Tunisia’s impatience and desire to speed up implementation” of the deal.

[voir: ▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1020596]

The letter also emphasises the need to “establish a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership with Egypt,” as well as providing more support to Türkiye, Jordan and Lebanon. The letter hints at the reason why – Israel’s bombing of the Gaza strip and a potential exodus of refugees – but does not mention the issue directly, merely saying that “the pressures on partners in our immediate vicinity risk being exacerbated”.

It appears that the consequences rather than the causes of any movements of Palestinian refugees are the main concern. Conclusions on the Middle East agreed by the European Council last night demand “rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and aid to reach those in need” in Gaza, but do not call for a ceasefire. The European Council instead “strongly emphasises Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law and international humanitarian law.”

More surveillance, new law

Other plans mentioned in the letter include “increased aerial surveillance” for “combatting human smuggling and trafficking” by Operation IRINI, the EU’s military mission in the Mediterranean, and increased support for strengthening controls at points of departure in North African states as well as “points of entry by migrants at land borders.”

The Commission also wants increased action against migrant smuggling, with a proposal to revise the 2002 Facilitation Directive “to ensure that criminal offences are harmonised, assets are frozen, and coordination strengthened,” so that “those who engage in illegal acts exploiting migrants pay a heavy price.”

It appears the proposal will come at the same time as a migrant smuggling conference organised by the Commission on 28 November “to create a Global Alliance with a Call to Action, launching a process of regular international exchange on this constantly evolving crime.”

Deportation cooperation

Plans are in the works for more coordinated action on deportations, with the Commission proposing to:

“…work in teams with Member States on targeted return actions, with a lead Member State or Agency for each action. We will develop a roadmap that could focus on (1) ensuring that return decisions are issued at the same time as a negative asylum decisions (2) systematically ensuring the mutual recognition of return decisions and follow-up enforcement action; (3) carrying out joint identification actions including through a liaison officers’ network in countries of origin; (4) supporting policy dialogue on readmission with third countries and facilitating the issuance of travel documents, as well as acceptance of the EU laissez passer; and (5) organising assisted voluntary return and joint return operations with the support of Frontex.”

Cooperation on legal migration, meanwhile, will be done by member states “on a voluntary basis,” with the letter noting that any offers made should be conditional on increased cooperation with EU deportation efforts: “local investment and opportunities for legal migration must go hand in hand with strengthened cooperation on readmission.”

More funds

For all this to happen, the letter calls on the European Council to make sure that “migration priorities - both on the internal and external dimension - are reflected in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework,” the EU’s 2021-27 budget.

Mid-term revision of the budget was discussed at the European Council meeting yesterday, though the conclusions on that point merely state that there was an “in-depth exchange of views,” with the European Council calling on the Council of the EU “to take work forward, with a view to reaching an overall agreement by the end of the year.”

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/october/eu-to-step-up-support-for-human-rights-abuses-in-north-africa

#migrations #asile #réfugiés #Afrique_du_Nord #externalisation #Ursula_von_der_Leyen #lettre #contrôles_frontaliers #Tunisie #Libye #bateaux #aide #gardes-côtes_libyens #surveillance_frontalière #surveillance_frontalière_effective #frontières #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #Memorandum_of_Understanding #MoU #pull-backs #Egypte #Turquie #Jourdanie #Liban #réfugiés_palestiniens #Palestine #7_octobre_2023 #Operation_IRINI #IRINI #surveillance_aérienne #passeurs #directive_facilitation #renvois #déportation #officiers_de_liaison #réadmissions #laissez-passer #Frontex

ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4

Libia. Il Consiglio di sicurezza Onu conferma le sanzioni ai guardacoste-trafficanti

Approvato all’unanimità l’inasprimento delle sanzioni per i boss del traffico di esseri umani, petrolio e armi. Dal guardacoste «#Bija» ai capi della «polizia petrolifera» fino al direttore dei «#lager»

https://www.avvenire.it/c/2023/PublishingImages/d3b4d8bec6c543d1b039a4a9b703495d/bija.jpg?width=1024#.jpg

La Libia non è un porto sicuro di sbarco, e le connessioni dirette tra guardia costiera libica e trafficanti di esseri umani, petrolio e armi, sono il motore della filiera dello sfruttamento e dell’arricchimento. All’unanimità il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu, che hanno proposto l’inasprimento delle sanzioni contro i principali boss di un sistema criminale che tiene insieme politica, milizie e clan.

La decisione mette in difficoltà il governo italiano e le direttive Piantedosi, secondo cui le organizzazioni del soccorso umanitario dovrebbero prima coordinarsi con la cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, che invece l’Onu indica tra i principali ingranaggi del sistema criminale. Dopo una lunga discussione interna il Consiglio di sicurezza ha accolto le richieste degli investigatori Onu in Libia a cui è stato rinnovato il mandato fino al 2025. Gli esponenti per i quali è richiesto il blocco dei beni e il divieto assoluto di viaggio sono cinque, ma uno risulta deceduto il 16 marzo di quest’anno in Egitto. Gli altri componenti del «poker libico» sono nomi pesanti, a cominciare da #Saadi_Gheddafi, il figlio ex calciatore del colonnello Gheddafi, che sta tentando di vendere una proprietà in Canada aggirando le sanzioni anche attraverso il consolato libico in Turchia. Il cinquantenne Gheddafi avrebbe viaggiato indisturbato e il 27 giugno 2023, gli esperti Onu hanno scritto al governo turco «in merito all’attuazione delle misure di congelamento dei beni e di divieto di viaggio. Non è stata ricevuta alcuna risposta». Secondo gli investigatori la firma di Gheddafi su una procura depositata in Turchia, costituisce «una prova della mancata osservanza da parte della Turchia della misura di divieto di viaggio».

Se i Gheddafi rappresentano il passato che continua a incombere sulla Libia, soprattutto per lo smisurato patrimonio lasciato dal patriarca dittatore e mai realmente quantificato, nella lista dei sanzionati ci sono i nuovi boss della Libia di oggi. Come #Mohammed_Al_Amin_Al-Arabi_Kashlaf. «Il Gruppo di esperti ha stabilito che la #Petroleum_Facilities_Guard di Zawiyah è un’entità che è nominalmente sotto il controllo del Governo di unità nazionale», dunque non una polizia privata in senso stretto ma un gruppo armato affiliato alle autorità centrali e incaricato di sorvegliare i principali stabilimenti petroliferi, da cui tuttavia viene fatta sparire illegalmente un certa quantità di idrocarburi che poi vengono immessi nel mercato europeo grazie a una fitta rete di contrabbandieri. «Il gruppo di esperti - si legge ancora - ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di questo individuo, compresi i dettagli sullo status attuale e sulla catena di comando della Petroleum Facilities Guard a Zawiyah, nonché sulle sue attività finanziarie e risorse economiche personali». Anche in questo caso le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

Collegato a Kashlaf è #Abd_al-Rahman_al-Milad, forse il più noto del clan. Noto anche come “Bija”, ha utilizzato «documenti delle Nazioni Unite contraffatti nel tentativo di revocare il divieto di viaggio - si legge - e il congelamento dei beni imposti nei suoi confronti». Bija si è però mosso trovando appoggi sia «nel governo libico che in interlocutori privati all’interno della Libia», con l’obiettivo di ottenere il sostegno «alla sua richiesta di cancellazione» delle sanzioni. In particolare, gli investigatori Onu sono in possesso «di un documento ufficiale libico, emesso il 28 settembre 2022 dall’Ufficio del Procuratore Generale, in cui si ordina alle autorità responsabili - denunciano gli esperti - di rimuovere il nome di #Al-Milad dal sistema nazionale di monitoraggio degli arrivi e delle partenze». Una copertura al massimo livello della magistratura, che lo aveva già assolto dalle accuse di traffico di petrolio, e che «consentirebbe ad Al-Milad di lasciare la Libia con i beni in suo possesso, in violazione della misura di congelamento dei beni». Il 25 gennaio 2023 «il Gruppo di esperti ha chiesto alle autorità libiche di fornire informazioni aggiornate sull’effettiva attuazione del congelamento dei beni e del divieto di viaggio nei confronti di Al-Milad. La richiesta è stata fatta a seguito della ripresa delle sue funzioni professionali nelle forze armate libiche, compresa la nomina a ufficiale presso l’Accademia navale di Janzour dopo il suo rilascio dalla custodia cautelare l’11 aprile 2021». A nove mesi di distanza, le autorità libiche «non hanno ancora risposto».

La risoluzione approvata dal Consiglio di sicurezza si basa anche su un’altra accusa del «Panel of Expert» i quali hanno «hanno stabilito che il comandante della Petroleum Facilities Guard di Zawiyah, Mohamed Al Amin Al-Arabi Kashlaf , e il comandante della Guardia costiera libica di #Zawiyah, Abd al-Rahman al-Milad (Bija), insieme a #Osama_Al-Kuni_Ibrahim, continuano a gestire una vasta rete di traffico e contrabbando a Zawiyah». Le sanzioni non li hanno danneggiati. «Da quando i due comandanti sono stati inseriti nell’elenco nel 2018, hanno ulteriormente ampliato la rete includendo entità armate che operano nelle aree di Warshafanah, Sabratha e Zuara». Tutto ruota intorno alle prigioni per i profughi. «La rete di Zawiyah continua a essere centralizzata nella struttura di detenzione per migranti di Al-Nasr a Zawiyah, gestita da Osama Al-Kuni Ibrahim», il cugino di Bija identificato grazie ad alcune immagini pubblicate da Avvenire nel settembre del 2019. Il suo nome ricorre in diverse indagini. Sulla base «di ampie prove di un modello coerente di violazioni dei diritti umani, il Gruppo di esperti ha rilevato - rincara il “panel” - che Abd al-Rahman al-Milad e Osama al-Kuni Ibrahim, hanno continuano a essere responsabili di atti di tortura, lavori forzati e altri maltrattamenti nei confronti di persone illegalmente confinate nel centro di detenzione di Al-Nasr», allo scopo di estorcere «ingenti somme di denaro e come punizione».

Il modello di #business criminale è proprio quello che Roma non vuole riconoscere, ma che gli investigatori Onu e il Consiglio di sicurezza ribadiscono: «La rete allargata di Zawiyah - si legge nel rapporto - comprende ora elementi della 55esima Brigata, il comando dell’Apparato di Supporto alla Stabilità a Zawiyah, in particolare le sue unità marittime, e singoli membri della Guardia Costiera libica, tutti operanti al fine di eseguire il piano comune della rete di ottenere ingenti risorse finanziarie e di altro tipo dalle attività di traffico di esseri umani e migranti».

https://www.avvenire.it/c//2023/PublishingImages/d3b4d8bec6c543d1b039a4a9b703495d/Libya-modus-operandi.jpg

Al Consiglio di Sicurezza è stato mostrato lo schema che comprende «quattro fasi operative: (a) la ricerca e il ritorno a terra dei migranti in mare; (b) il trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; (c) l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; (d) il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi». Una volta rimessi in libertà i migranti, rientrano nel ciclo dello sfruttamento: rimessi in mare, lasciando che una percentuale venga catturata dai guardacoste per giustificare il sostegno italiano ed europeo alla cosiddetta guardia costiera libica, e di nuovo «trasferimento dai punti di sbarco ai centri di detenzione della Direzione per la lotta alla migrazione illegale; l’abuso dei detenuti nei centri di detenzione; il rilascio dei detenuti vittime di abusi».

Il rapporto Onu e il voto unanime dei 15 Paesi che siedono nel Consiglio di sicurezza sono uno schiaffo. «Per quanto riguarda il divieto di viaggio e il congelamento dei beni - si legge in una nota riassuntiva della seduta al Palazzo di Vetro -, gli Stati membri, in particolare quelli in cui hanno sede le persone e le entità designate, sono stati invitati a riferire» al Comitato delle sanzioni circa «le rispettive azioni per attuare efficacemente entrambe le misure in relazione a tutte le persone incluse nell’elenco delle sanzioni». Tutte gli esponenti indicati dal «Panel of expert» sono inclusi nell’elenco degli «alert» dell’Interpol. La risoluzione approvata ieri riguarda anche il contrabbando di petrolio e di armi. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha prorogato «l’autorizzazione delle misure per fermare l’esportazione illecita di prodotti petroliferi dalla Libia e il mandato del gruppo di esperti che aiuta a supervisionare questo processo».

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/libia-il-consiglio-di-sicurezza-conferma-le-sanzioni-ai-guardacoste-traffic
#gardes-côtes_libyens #sanctions #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Libye #externalisation #sanctions #conseil_de_sécurité_de_l'ONU #conseil_de_sécurité #ONU #détention #prisons

Leaked letter on intended Cyprus-Lebanon joint border controls: increased deaths and human rights violations

In an increasingly worrying context for migrants and refugees in Cyprus, with the recent escalation of violent racist attacks and discrimination against refugees on the island and the continued pushback policy, civil society organisations raise the alarm concerning Cyprus’ increased support to the Lebanese Army to harden border control and prevent departures.

A letter leaked on 26 September 2023 (▻https://www.philenews.com/kipros/koinonia/article/1389120/exi-metra-protini-ston-livano-i-kipros), from the Cypriot Interior Minister to his Lebanese counterpart, reveals that Cyprus will provide Lebanon with 6 vessels and speedboats by the end of 2024, trainings for the Lebanese Armed Forces, will carry out joint patrol operations from Lebanese shores, and will finance the salaries of members of the Lebanese Armed Forces “who actively contribute to the interception of vessels carrying irregular migrants to Cyprus”. In this way, by providing equipment, funding and training to the Lebanese Army, Cyprus will have a determining influence, if not effective control, on the interceptions of migrants’ boats in Lebanese territorial waters and forced returns (the so-called “pullbacks”), to Lebanon. This in violation of EU and international law, which is likely to trigger legal liability issues. As seen in numerous cases, refugees, especially Syrians, who are pulled back to Lebanon are at risk of detention, ill-treatment and deportations to Syria where they are subject to violence, arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance. The worsening situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, who face increasing violence and deportations, confirms that Lebanon is not a “safe” third country.

As seen in the past with several examples from other examples at the EU’s external borders, (e.g. Turkey, Libya and most recently Tunisia), striking deals with EU neighboring countries of departure in order to increase border controls and contain migratory movements has several catastrophic consequences. Despite officially aiming at decreasing the number of lost lives, they actually increase border violence and deaths, leading to serious human rights abuses and violations of EU and international laws. They also foster a blackmail approach as third countries use their borders as leverage against European countries to get additional funds or negotiate on other sensitive issues, at the expense of people’s lives. All these contribute to having a negative impact on the EU and Member States’ foreign policy.

As demonstrated by a recent article from the Mixed Migration Centre (▻https://mixedmigration.org/articles/how-to-break-the-business-model-of-smugglers), the most effective way to “disrupt the business model of smugglers” and reduce irregular departures, migrants’ dangerous journeys and the consequent losses of lives, is to expand legal migratory routes.

By going in the complete opposite direction, Cyprus, for many years now, has prevented migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from reaching the island in a legal way and from leaving the island for other EU countries1. Cyprus has resorted to systematic practices of pushbacks sending refugees back to countries where they are at risk of torture, persecution and arbitrary detention, has intensified forced returns, has dismantled the reception and asylum system, and has fueled a toxic anti-refugee narrative that has led to indiscriminate violent attacks that were initially against Syrian refugees and their properties in #Chloraka (▻https://kisa.org.cy/sundays-pogrom-in-chloraka) and a few days later to against migrants and their properties in #Limassol (▻https://cde.news/racism-fuelled-violence-spreads-in-cyprus). More recently, Cyprus has also announced its willingness to push the EU and Member States to re-evaluate Syria’s status and consider the country as “safe” in order to forcibly return Syrian refugees to Syria – despite on-going clashes, structural human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

These deadly externalisation policies and unlawful practices have and continue to kill individuals and prevent them from accessing their rights. A complete change in migration and asylum policies is urgently needed, based on the respect of human rights and people’s lives, and on legal channels for migration and protection. Cyprus, as well as the EU and its Member States, must protect the human rights of migrants at international borders, ensure access to international protection and proper reception conditions in line with EU and international human rights law. They must open effective legal migratory pathways, including resettlement, humanitarian visas and labour migration opportunities; and they must respect their obligations of saving lives at sea and set up proper Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean.

▻https://euromedrights.org/publication/leaked-letter-on-intended-cyprus-lebanon-joint-border-controls-increa

#mourir_aux_frontières #frontières #droits_humains #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Chypre #Liban #racisme #attaques_racistes #refoulements #push-backs #militarisation_des_frontières #joint_operations #opérations_conjointes #aide #formation #gardes-côtes_libanaises #pull-backs #réfugiés_syriens #externalisation

EU Commission gifts Egypt patrol boats to become a gatekeeper for migration, following Tunisian model

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The EU Commission wants to conclude a migration defense agreement with Egypt and is upgrading the country’s land and sea borders. However, hardly any refugee boats leave from Egyptian shores for Europe.

The government in Cairo is to receive two new ships for its coast guard. A corresponding tender worth €23 million was published by the EU Commission in May. This was confirmed by Neighborhood Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi in a response to a question from MEP Özlem Demirel. Accordingly, the funds come from the NDICI fund, which is intended to provide financial support for the EU’s Neighborhood Policy. As a purpose, the Commission states border management and search and rescue operations. Egypt will also receive thermal imaging cameras, satellite tracking systems and other surveillance equipment.

With the donations, the Commission wants to build Egypt into a new partner in migration defense. In 2021, the government had sent a “list” of border protection equipment to Brussels for this purpose. EU Migration Commissioner Ylva Johansson then traveled to the Egyptian capital to negotiate them, followed by a visit by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in 2022.

Before the end of this year, the Commission intends to conclude an “Operational Partnership to Combat People Smuggling” with Egypt. Tunisia recently became the first African country to sign such a deal with the EU. However, this “partnership” violates EU treaties. This is because the Commission should actually have obtained the approval of the 27 member states before concluding the contract with Tunisia.

Egypt is also upgrading its land borders with EU funds. To this end, the Commission has promised the country a further €87 million – a significant increase on plans from last year, which still envisaged €57 million. For the “protection of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants,” the government in Cairo will receive an extra €23 million.

In addition, 20 million will be used to take in people who have fled Sudan because of the civil war. Two months ago, however, the Egyptian government drastically tightened conditions for displaced Sudanese, who must now apply for a visa to cross the border. Since then, thousands have been stranded at the border in dire humanitarian conditions, writes the organization Human Rights Watch.

The Egyptian government continues to oppose the stationing of Frontex in Egypt. As early as 2007, the EU states had commissioned their border agency to negotiate a working agreement with Cairo, but this has not yet come to pass. However, Frontex coordinates “Joint Return Operations” of rejected asylum seekers to Egypt.

With about 108 million inhabitants, Egypt is one of the EU’s neighbors with the largest population. A third of them are under 24 years old. Many of them seek a better future in Europe and cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat to do so. According to the Commission, the number of these irregular entries into the EU increased sixfold in 2021 compared to the previous year.

Most border crossings by Egyptian nationals take place in Italy. However, these depart mainly from Libya, the Commission confirms: not even one percent of the crossings started from Egyptian shores, according to the figures. This also applies to refugees from other countries after they have passed through Egypt as a transit country.

However, the refugee route via Libya is also becoming increasingly closed: In recent years, Egypt has significantly strengthened its military border surveillance to the neighboring country. Refugees are therefore increasingly reliant on aid workers, who are also facing more persecution. The “Law No. 82 on Combating Illegal Migration and Smuggling of Migrants,” enacted in 2016 and strengthened in 2022, allows authorities to take tougher action against any kind of aid to escape.

Refugees are also criminalized in this way, confirms human rights lawyer Muhammad Al Kashef, who is active in the Alarmphone project and the Abolish Frontex campaign: “Thousands of people have been arrested under Law No. 82 for trying to enter or leave the country irregularly.” Egypt’s poor human rights record is compounded by its new partnership with the EU, Al Kashef told “nd.”

Not all migration from Egypt is unwanted in Europe. EU states want to benefit from skilled workers from Egypt and facilitate their entry. Egypt is therefore one of the priority countries to be won over for a so-called “Talent Partnership”. The Commission began negotiations on this in June.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/08/08/eu-commission-gifts-egypt-patrol-boats-to-become-a-gatekeeper-for-migr

#externalisation #asile #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #Egypte #accord #gardes-côtes #aide_financière #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance #matériel #Operational_Partnership_to_Combat_People_Smuggling #partenariat

#modèle_tunisien