#gardes-côtes_tunisiens

Border security with drones and databases

The EU’s borders are increasingly militarised, with hundreds of millions of euros paid to state agencies and military, security and IT companies for surveillance, patrols and apprehension and detention. This process has massive human cost, and politicians are planning to intensify it.

Europe is ringed by steel fences topped by barbed wire; patrolled by border agents equipped with thermal vision systems, heartbeat detectors, guns and batons; and watched from the skies by drones, helicopters and planes. Anyone who enters is supposed to have their fingerprints and photograph taken for inclusion in an enormous biometric database. Constant additions to this technological arsenal are under development, backed by generous amounts of public funding. Three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are more walls than ever at Europe’s borders,[1] and those borders stretch ever further in and out of its territory. This situation is the result of long-term political and corporate efforts to toughen up border surveillance and controls.

The implications for those travelling to the EU depend on whether they belong to the majority entering in a “regular” manner, with the necessary paperwork and permissions, or are unable to obtain that paperwork, and cross borders irregularly. Those with permission must hand over increasing amounts of personal data. The increasing automation of borders is reliant on the collection of sensitive personal data and the use of algorithms, machine learning and other forms of so-called artificial intelligence to determine whether or not an individual poses a threat.

Those without permission to enter the EU – a category that includes almost any refugee, with the notable exception of those who hold a Ukrainian passport – are faced with technology, personnel and policies designed to make journeys increasingly difficult, and thus increasingly dangerous. The reliance on smugglers is a result of the insistence on keeping people in need out at any cost – and the cost is substantial. Thousands of people die at Europe’s borders every year, families are separated, and people suffer serious physical and psychological harm as a result of those journeys and subsequent administrative detention and social marginalisation. Yet parties of all political stripes remain committed to the same harmful and dangerous policies – many of which are being worsened through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum.[2]

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, based in Warsaw, was first set up in 2004 with the aim of providing technical coordination between EU member states’ border guards. Its remit has been gradually expanded. Following the “migration crisis” of 2015 and 2016, extensive new powers were granted to the agency. As the Max Planck Institute has noted, the 2016 law shifted the agency from a playing “support role” to acting as “a player in its own right that fulfils a regulatory, supervisory, and operational role.”[3] New tasks granted to the agency included coordinating deportations of rejected refugees and migrants, data analysis and exchange, border surveillance, and technology research and development. A further legal upgrade in 2019 introduced even more extensive powers, in particular in relation to deportations, and cooperation with and operations in third countries.

The uniforms, guns and batons wielded by Frontex’s border guards are self-evidently militaristic in nature, as are other aspects of its work: surveillance drones have been acquired from Israeli military companies, and the agency deploys “mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.”[4] One investigation described the companies that have held lobbying meetings or attended events with Frontex as “a Who’s Who of the weapons industry,” with guests including Airbus, BAE Systems, Leonardo and Thales.[5] The information acquired from the agency’s surveillance and field operations is combined with data provided by EU and third country agencies, and fed into the European Border Surveillance System, EUROSUR. This offers a God’s-eye overview of the situation at Europe’s borders and beyond – the system also claims to provide “pre-frontier situational awareness.”

The EU and its member states also fund research and development on these technologies. From 2014 to 2022, 49 research projects were provided with a total of almost €275 million to investigate new border technologies, including swarms of autonomous drones for border surveillance, and systems that aim to use artificial intelligence to integrate and analyse data from drones, satellites, cameras, sensors and elsewhere for “analysis of potential threats” and “detection of illegal activities.”[6] Amongst the top recipients of funding have been large research institutes – for example, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute – but companies such as Leonardo, Smiths Detection, Engineering – Ingegneria Informatica and Veridos have also been significant beneficiaries.[7]

This is only a tiny fraction of the funds available for strengthening the EU’s border regime. A 2022 study found that between 2015 and 2020, €7.7 billion had been spent on the EU’s borders and “the biggest parts of this budget come from European funding” – that is, the EU’s own budget. The total value of the budgets that provide funds for asylum, migration and border control between 2021-27 comes to over €113 billion[8]. Proposals for the next round of budgets from 2028 until 2035 are likely to be even larger.

Cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries on migration control comes in a variety of forms: diplomacy, short and long-term projects, formal agreements and operational deployments. Whatever form it takes, it is frequently extremely harmful. For example, to try to reduce the number of people arriving across the Mediterranean, member states have withdrawn national sea rescue assets (as deployed, for example, in Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation) whilst increasing aerial surveillance, such as that provided by the Israel-produced drones operated by Frontex. This makes it possible to observe refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean, whilst outsourcing their interception to authorities from countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt.

This is part of an ongoing plan “to strengthen coordination of search and rescue capacities and border surveillance at sea and land borders” of those countries. [9] Cooperation with Tunisia includes refitting search and rescue vessels and providing vehicles and equipment to the Tunisian coastguard and navy, along with substantial amounts of funding. The agreement with Egypt appears to be structured along similar lines, and five vessels have been provided to the so-called Libyan Coast Guard in 2023.[10]

Frontex also plays a key role in the EU’s externalised border controls. The 2016 reform allowed Frontex deployments at countries bordering the EU, and the 2019 reform allowed deployments anywhere in the world, subject to agreement with the state in question. There are now EU border guards stationed in Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.[11] The agency is seeking agreements with Niger, Senegal and Morocco, and has recently received visits from Tunisian and Egyptian officials with a view to stepping up cooperation.[12]

In a recent report for the organisation EuroMed Rights, Antonella Napolitano highlighted “a new element” in the EU’s externalisation strategy: “the use of EU funds – including development aid – to outsource surveillance technologies that are used to entrench political control both on people on the move and local population.” Five means of doing so have been identified: provision of equipment; training; financing operations and procurement; facilitating exports by industry; and promoting legislation that enables surveillance.[13]

The report highlights Frontex’s extended role which, even without agreements allowing deployments on foreign territory, has seen the agency support the creation of “risk analysis cells” in a number of African states, used to gather and analyse data on migration movements. The EU has also funded intelligence training in Algeria, digital evidence capacity building in Egypt, border control initiatives in Libya, and the provision of surveillance technology to Morocco. The European Ombudsman has found that insufficient attention has been given to the potential human rights impacts of this kind of cooperation.[14]

While the EU and its member states may provide the funds for the acquisition of new technologies, or the construction of new border control systems, information on the companies that receive the contracts is not necessarily publicly available. Funds awarded to third countries will be spent in accordance with those countries’ procurement rules, which may not be as transparent as those in the EU. Indeed, the acquisition of information on the externalisation in third countries is far from simple, as a Statewatch investigation published in March 2023 found.[15]

While EU and member state institutions are clearly committed to continuing with plans to strengthen border controls, there is a plethora of organisations, initiatives, campaigns and projects in Europe, Africa and elsewhere that are calling for a different approach. One major opportunity to call for change in the years to come will revolve around proposals for the EU’s new budgets in the 2028-35 period. The European Commission is likely to propose pouring billions more euros into borders – but there are many alternative uses of that money that would be more positive and productive. The challenge will be in creating enough political pressure to make that happen.

This article was originally published by Welt Sichten, and is based upon the Statewatch/EuroMed Rights report Europe’s techno-borders.

Notes

[1] ►https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls

[2] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/december/tracking-the-pact-human-rights-disaster-in-the-works-as-parliament-makes

[3] ▻https://www.mpg.de/14588889/frontex

[4] ►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

[5] ▻https://frontexfiles.eu/en.html

[6] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[7] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[8] ►https://www.statewatch.org/publications/reports-and-books/europe-s-techno-borders

[9] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-

[10] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/media/4103/eu-com-von-der-leyen-ec-letter-annex-10-23.pdf

[11] ►https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/briefing-external-action-frontex-operations-outside-the-eu

[12] ►https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-, ▻https://www.statewatch.org/publications/events/secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

[13] ▻https://privacyinternational.org/challenging-drivers-surveillance

[14] ►https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Euromed_AI-Migration-Report_EN-1.pdf

[15] ▻https://www.statewatch.org/access-denied-secrecy-and-the-externalisation-of-eu-migration-control

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2024/border-security-with-drones-and-databases
#frontières #militarisation_des_frontières #technologie #données #bases_de_données #drones #complexe_militaro-industriel #migrations #réfugiés #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #sécurité_frontalière #biométrie #données_biométriques #intelligence_artificielle #algorithmes #smugglers #passeurs #Frontex #Airbus #BAE_Systems #Leonardo #Thales #EUROSUR #coût #business #prix #Smiths_Detection #Fraunhofer_Institute #Engineering_Ingegneria_Informatica #informatique #Tunisie #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Albanie #Monténégro #Serbie #Bosnie-Herzégovine #Macédoine_du_Nord #Egypte #externalisation #développement #aide_au_développement #coopération_au_développement #Algérie #Libye #Maroc #Afrique_du_Nord

Beyond borders, beyond boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/bc40e5d2a-3c51e6/pw1GsGJt4170/01Ns0KgPV4Pl91rFF5IrvPERJoIpRNbDGOllF5gV.png

In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have intensified their effort to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching their borders. One strategy to reach this goal consists of funding programs for third countries’ coast guards and border police, as currently happens in Libya and Tunisia.

These programs - funded by the #EUTF_for_Africa and the #NDICI-Global_Europe - allocate funding to train and equip authorities, including the delivery and maintenance of assets. NGOs, activists, and International Organizations have amassed substantial evidence implicating Libyan and Tunisian authorities in severe human rights violations.

The Greens/EFA in the European Parliament commissioned a study carried out by Profundo, ARCI, EuroMed Rights and Action Aid, on how EU funding is linked to human rights violations in neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia and Libya.

The study answers the following questions:

- What is the state of EU funding for programs aimed at enhancing border control capacities in Libya and Tunisia?
- What is the human rights impact of these initiatives?
- What is the framework for human rights compliance?
- How do the NDICI-Global Europe decision-making processes work?

The report highlights that the shortcomings in human rights compliance within border control programs, coupled with the lack of proper transparency clearly contradicts EU and international law. Moreover, this results in the insufficient consideration of the risk of human rights violations when allocating funding for both ongoing and new programs.

This is particularly concerning in the cases of Tunisia and Libya, where this report collects evidence that the ongoing strategies, regardless of achieving or not the questionable goals of reducing migration flows, have a very severe human rights impact on migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.

Pour télécharger l’étude:
►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

►https://www.greens-efa.eu/fr/article/study/beyond-borders-beyond-boundaries

#Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Tunisie #aide_financières #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #rapport #trust_fund #profundo #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument #droits_humains #gestion_des_frontières #EU #UE #Union_européenne #fonds_fiduciaire #IVCDCI #IVCDCI-EM #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #EUTFA #coût #violence #crimes_contre_l'humanité #impunité #Méditerranée #mer_Méditerranée #naufrages

Fewer boat crossings, visit to Frontex : EU and Tunisia implement migration pact

Despite an alleged repayment of funds for migration defence, Tunisia is cooperating with the EU. Fewer refugees are also arriving across the Mediterranean – a decrease by a factor of seven.

In June, the EU Commission signed an agreement on joint migration control with Tunisia. According to the agreement, the government in Tunis will receive €105 million to monitor its borders and “combat people smuggling”. Another €150 million should flow from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) in the coming years for the purposes of border management and countering the “smuggling” of migrants.

Tunisia received a first transfer under the agreement of €67 million in September. The money was to finance a coast guard vessel, spare parts and marine fuel for other vessels as well as vehicles for the Tunisian coast guard and navy, and training to operate the equipment. Around €25 million of this tranche was earmarked for “voluntary return” programmes, which are implemented by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the International Organisation for Migration.

However, a few weeks after the transfer from Brussels, the government in Tunis allegedly repaid almost the entire sum. Tunisia “does not accept anything resembling favours or alms”, President Kais Saied is quoted as saying. Earlier, the government had also cancelled a working visit by the Commission to implement the agreement.

Successes at the working level

Despite the supposed U-turn, cooperation on migration prevention between the EU and Tunisia has got off the ground and is even showing initial successes at the working level. Under the agreement, the EU has supplied spare parts for the Tunisian coast guard, for example, which will keep “six ships operational”. This is what Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote last week to MEPs who had asked about the implementation of the deal. Another six coast guard vessels are to be repaired by the end of the year.

In an undated letter to the EU member states, von der Leyen specifies the equipment aid. According to the letter, IT equipment for operations rooms, mobile radar systems and thermal imaging cameras, navigation radars and sonars have been given to Tunisia so far. An “additional capacity building” is to take place within the framework of existing “border management programmes” implemented by Italy and the Netherlands, among others. One of these is the EU4BorderSecurity programme, which among other things provides skills in sea rescue and has been extended for Tunisia until April 2025.

The Tunisian Garde Nationale Maritime, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre benefit from these measures. This MRCC has already received an EU-funded vessel tracking system and is to be connected to the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network. Through this, the EU states exchange information about incidents off their coasts. This year Tunisia has also sent members of its coast guards to Italy as liaison officers – apparently a first step towards the EU’s goal of “linking” MRCC’s in Libya and Tunisia with their “counterparts” in Italy and Malta.

Departures from Tunisia decrease by a factor of seven

Since the signing of the migration agreement, the departures of boats with refugees from Tunisia have decreased by a factor of 7, according to information from Migazin in October. The reason for this is probably the increased frequency of patrols by the Tunisian coast guard. In August, 1,351 people were reportedly apprehended at sea. More and more often, the boats are also destroyed after being intercepted by Tunisian officials. The prices that refugees have to pay to smugglers are presumably also responsible for fewer crossings; these are said to have risen significantly in Tunisia.

State repression, especially in the port city of Sfax, has also contributed to the decline in numbers, where the authorities have expelled thousands of people from sub-Saharan countries from the centre and driven them by bus to the Libyan and Algerian borders. There, officials force them to cross the border. These measures have also led to more refugees in Tunisia seeking EU-funded IOM programmes for “voluntary return” to their countries of origin.

Now the EU wants to put pressure on Tunisia to introduce visa requirements for individual West African states. This is to affect, among others, Côte d’Ivoire, where most of the people arriving in the EU via Tunisia come from and almost all of whom arrive in Italy. Guinea and Tunisia come second and third among these nationalities.

Reception from the Frontex Director

In September, three months after the signing of the migration agreement, a delegation from Tunisia visited Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, with the participation of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The visit from Tunis was personally received by Frontex Director Hans Leijtens. EU officials then gave presentations on the capabilities and capacities of the border agency, including the training department or the deportation centre set up in 2021, which relies on good cooperation with destination states of deportation flights.

Briefings were also held on the cross-border surveillance system EUROSUR and the “Situation Centre”, where all threads from surveillance with ships, aircraft, drones and satellites come together. The armed “permanent reserve” that Frontex has been building up since 2021 was also presented to the Tunisian ministries. These will also be deployed in third countries, but so far only in Europe in the Western Balkans.

However, Tunisia still does not want to negotiate such a deployment of Frontex personnel to its territory, so a status agreement necessary for this is a long way off. The government in Tunis is also not currently seeking a working agreement to facilitate the exchange of information with Frontex. Finally, the Tunisian coast guard also turned down an offer to participate in an exercise of European coast guards in Greece.

Model for migration defence with Egypt

Aiding and abetting “smuggling” is an offence that the police are responsible for prosecuting in EU states. If these offences affect two or more EU states, Europol can coordinate the investigations. This, too, is now to get underway with Tunisia: In April, EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson had already visited Tunis and agreed on an “operational partnership to combat people smuggling” (ASOP), for which additional funds will be made available. Italy, Spain and Austria are responsible for implementing this police cooperation.

Finally, Tunisia is also one of the countries being discussed in Brussels in the “Mechanism of Operational Coordination for the External Dimension of Migration” (MOCADEM). This working group was newly created by the EU states last year and serves to politically bundle measures towards third countries of particular interest. In one of the most recent meetings, the migration agreement was also a topic. Following Tunisia’s example, the EU could also conclude such a deal with Egypt. The EU heads of government are now to take a decision on this.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2023/11/01/fewer-boat-crossings-visit-to-frontex-eu-and-tunisia-implement-migrati

#Europe #Union_européenne #EU #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #accord #gestion_des_frontières #aide_financière #protocole_d'accord #politique_migratoire #externalisation #Memorandum_of_Understanding (#MoU) #Tunisie #coopération #Frontex #aide_financière #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument (#NDICI) #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #militarisation_des_frontières #retours_volontaires #IOM #OIM #UNHCR #EU4BorderSecurity_programme #Seahorse_Mediterranean #officiers_de_liaison #arrivées #départs #chiffres #statistiques #prix #Frontex #operational_partnership_to_combat_people_smuggling (#ASOP) #Mechanism_of_Operational_Coordination_for_the_External_Dimension_of_Migration (#MOCADEM)

–—
ajouté à la métaliste sur le Mémorandum of Understanding entre l’UE et la Tunisie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1020591

EU pays for surveillance in Gulf of Tunis

https://digit.site36.net/files/2020/06/Tunisian_Sea_Copernicus-1024x711.png

A new monitoring system for Tunisian coasts should counter irregular migration across the Mediterranean. The German Ministry of the Interior is also active in the country. A similar project in Libya has now been completed. Human rights organisations see it as an aid to „#pull_backs“ contrary to international law.

In order to control and prevent migration, the European Union is supporting North African states in border surveillance. The central Mediterranean Sea off Malta and Italy, through which asylum seekers from Libya and Tunisia want to reach Europe, plays a special role. The EU conducts various operations in and off these countries, including the military mission „#Irini“ and the #Frontex mission „#Themis“. It is becoming increasingly rare for shipwrecked refugees to be rescued by EU Member States. Instead, they assist the coast guards in Libya and Tunisia to bring the people back. Human rights groups, rescue organisations and lawyers consider this assistance for „pull backs“ to be in violation of international law.

With several measures, the EU and its member states want to improve the surveillance off North Africa. Together with Switzerland, the EU Commission has financed a two-part „#Integrated_Border_Management Project“ in Tunisia. It is part of the reform of the security sector which was begun a few years after the fall of former head of state Ben Ali in 2011. With one pillar of this this programme, the EU wants to „prevent criminal networks from operating“ and enable the authorities in the Gulf of Tunis to „save lives at sea“.

System for military and border police

The new installation is entitled „#Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance“ (#ISMariS) and, according to the Commission (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000891-ASW_EN.html), is intended to bring together as much information as possible from all authorities involved in maritime and coastal security tasks. These include the Ministry of Defence with the Navy, the Coast Guard under the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard, and IT management and telecommunications authorities. The money comes from the #EU_Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa, which was established at the Valletta Migration Summit in 2015. „ISMariS“ is implemented by the Italian Ministry of the Interior and follows on from an earlier Italian initiative. The EU is financing similar projects with „#EU4BorderSecurity“ not only in Tunisia but also for other Mediterranean countries.

An institute based in Vienna is responsible for border control projects in Tunisia. Although this #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (ICMPD) was founded in 1993 by Austria and Switzerland, it is not a governmental organisation. The German Foreign Office has also supported projects in Tunisia within the framework of the #ICMPD, including the establishment of border stations and the training of border guards. Last month German finally joined the Institute itself (▻https://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/download/dokumente/1493-deutscher-beitritt-zum-international-centre-for-migration-policy-development/file). For an annual contribution of 210,000 euro, the Ministry of the Interior not only obtains decision-making privileges for organizing ICMPD projects, but also gives German police authorities the right to evaluate any of the Institute’s analyses for their own purposes.

It is possible that in the future bilateral German projects for monitoring Tunisian maritime borders will also be carried out via the ICMPD. Last year, the German government supplied the local coast guard with equipment for a boat workshop. In the fourth quarter of 2019 alone (▻http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/194/1919467.pdf), the Federal Police carried out 14 trainings for the national guard, border police and coast guard, including instruction in operating „control boats“. Tunisia previously received patrol boats from Italy and the USA (▻https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/tunisia).

Vessel tracking and coastal surveillance

It is unclear which company produced and installed the „ISMariS“ surveillance system for Tunisia on behalf of the ICPMD. Similar facilities for tracking and displaying ship movements (#Vessel_Tracking_System) are marketed by all major European defence companies, including #Airbus, #Leonardo in Italy, #Thales in France and #Indra in Spain. However, Italian project management will probably prefer local companies such as Leonardo. The company and its spin-off #e-GEOS have a broad portfolio of maritime surveillance systems (▻https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/sea/maritime-domain-awareness/coastal-surveillance-systems).

It is also possible to integrate satellite reconnaissance, but for this the governments must conclude further contracts with the companies. However, „ISMariS“ will not only be installed as a Vessel Tracking System, it should also enable monitoring of the entire coast. Manufacturers promote such #Coastal_Surveillance_Systems as a technology against irregular migration, piracy, terrorism and smuggling. The government in Tunisia has defined „priority coastal areas“ for this purpose, which will be integrated into the maritime surveillance framework.

Maritime „#Big_Data“

„ISMariS“ is intended to be compatible with the components already in place at the Tunisian authorities, including coastguard command and control systems, #radar, position transponders and receivers, night vision equipment and thermal and optical sensors. Part of the project is a three-year maintenance contract with the company installing the „ISMariS“.

Perhaps the most important component of „ISMariS“ for the EU is a communication system, which is also included. It is designed to improve „operational cooperation“ between the Tunisian Coast Guard and Navy with Italy and other EU Member States. The project description mentions Frontex and EUROSUR, the pan-European surveillance system of the EU Border Agency, as possible participants. Frontex already monitors the coastal regions off Libya and Tunisia (▻https://insitu.copernicus.eu/FactSheets/CSS_Border_Surveillance) using #satellites (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003212-ASW_EN.html) and an aerial service (▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/26/frontex-air-service-reconnaissance-for-the-so-called-libyan-coast-guar).

#EUROSUR is now also being upgraded, Frontex is spending 2.6 million Euro (▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:109760-2020:TEXT:EN:HTML) on a new application based on artificial intelligence. It is to process so-called „Big Data“, including not only ship movements but also data from ship and port registers, information on ship owners and shipping companies, a multi-year record of previous routes of large ships and other maritime information from public sources on the Internet. The contract is initially concluded for one year and can be extended up to three times.

Cooperation with Libya

To connect North African coastguards to EU systems, the EU Commission had started the „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ project two years after the fall of North African despots. To combat irregular migration, from 2013 onwards Spain, Italy and Malta have trained a total of 141 members of the Libyan coast guard for sea rescue. In this way, „Seahorse Mediterranean“ has complemented similar training measures that Frontex is conducting for the Coastal Police within the framework of the EU mission #EUBAM_Libya and the military mission #EUNAVFOR_MED for the Coast Guard of the Tripolis government.

The budget for „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ is indicated by the Commission as 5.5 million Euro (▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000892-ASW_EN.html), the project was completed in January 2019. According to the German Foreign Office (▻http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/196/1919625.pdf), Libya has signed a partnership declaration for participation in a future common communication platform for surveillance of the Mediterranean. Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are also to be persuaded to participate. So far, however, the governments have preferred unilateral EU support for equipping and training their coastguards and navies, without having to make commitments in projects like „Seahorse“, such as stopping migration and smuggling on the high seas.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/28/eu-pays-for-surveillance-in-gulf-of-tunis

#Golfe_de_Tunis #surveillance #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance_des_frontières #Tunisie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #Algérie #Egypte #Suisse #EU #UE #Union_européenne #Trust_Fund #Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Allemagne #Italie #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #intelligence_artificielle #IA #données #Espagne #Malte #business

ping @reka @isskein @_kg_ @rhoumour @karine4

–—

Ajouté à cette métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330

Et celle-ci sur le lien entre développement et contrôles frontaliers :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

Comment l’Europe contrôle ses frontières en #Tunisie ?

Entre les multiples programmes de coopération, les accords bilatéraux, les #équipements fournis aux #gardes-côtes, les pays européens et l’Union européenne investissent des millions d’euros en Tunisie pour la migration. Sous couvert de coopération mutuelle et de “#promotion_de_la mobilité”, la priorité des programmes migratoires européens est avant tout l’externalisation des frontières. En clair.

À la fois pays de transit et pays de départ, nœud dans la région méditerranéenne, la Tunisie est un partenaire privilégié de l’Europe dans le cadre de ses #politiques_migratoires. L’Union européenne ou les États qui la composent -Allemagne, France, Italie, Belgique, etc.- interviennent de multiples manières en Tunisie pour servir leurs intérêts de protéger leurs frontières et lutter contre l’immigration irrégulière.

Depuis des années, de multiples accords pour réadmettre les Tunisien·nes expulsé·es d’Europe ou encore financer du matériel aux #gardes-côtes_tunisiens sont ainsi signés, notamment avec l’#Italie ou encore avec la #Belgique. En plus de ces #partenariats_bilatéraux, l’#Union_européenne utilise ses fonds dédiés à la migration pour financer de nombreux programmes en Tunisie dans le cadre du “#partenariat_pour_la_mobilité”. Dans les faits, ces programmes servent avant tout à empêcher les gens de partir et les pousser à rester chez eux.

L’ensemble de ces programmes mis en place avec les États européens et l’UE sont nombreux et difficiles à retracer. Dans d’autres pays, notamment au Nigeria, des journalistes ont essayé de compiler l’ensemble de ces flux financiers européens pour la migration. Dans leur article, Ils et elle soulignent la difficulté, voire l’impossibilité de véritablement comprendre tous les fonds, programmes et acteurs de ces financements.

“C’est profondément préoccupant”, écrivent Maite Vermeulen, Ajibola Amzat et Giacomo Zandonini. “Bien que l’Europe maintienne un semblant de transparence, il est pratiquement impossible dans les faits de tenir l’UE et ses États membres responsables de leurs dépenses pour la migration, et encore moins d’évaluer leur efficacité.”

En Tunisie, où les investissements restent moins importants que dans d’autres pays de la région comme en Libye, il a été possible d’obtenir un résumé, fourni par la Délégation de l’Union européenne, des programmes financés par l’UE et liés à la migration. Depuis 2016, cela se traduit par l’investissement de près de 58 millions d’euros à travers trois différents fonds : le #FFU (#Fonds_Fiduciaire_d’Urgence) de la Valette, l’#AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) et l’Instrument européen de voisinage (enveloppe régionale).

Mais il est à noter que ces informations ne prennent pas en compte les autres investissements d’#aide_au_développement ou de soutien à la #lutte_antiterroriste dont les programmes peuvent également concerner la migration. Depuis 2011, au niveau bilatéral, l’Union européenne a ainsi investi 2,5 billions d’euros en Tunisie, toutes thématiques confondues.

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L’écrasante majorité de ces financements de l’UE - 54 200 000 euros - proviennent du #Fond_fiduciaire_d'urgence_pour_l'Afrique. Lancé en 2015, lors du #sommet_de_la_Valette, ce FFU a été créé “en faveur de la stabilité et de la lutte contre les #causes_profondes de la migration irrégulière et du phénomène des personnes déplacées en Afrique” à hauteur de 2 milliards d’euros pour toute la région.

Ce financement a été pointé du doigt par des associations de droits humains comme Oxfam qui souligne “qu’une partie considérable de ses fonds est investie dans des mesures de #sécurité et de #gestion_des_frontières.”

“Ces résultats montrent que l’approche des bailleurs de fonds européens vis-à-vis de la gestion des migrations est bien plus axée sur des objectifs de #confinement et de #contrôle. Cette approche est loin de l’engagement qu’ils ont pris (...) de ‘promouvoir des canaux réguliers de migration et de mobilité au départ des pays d’Europe et d’Afrique et entre ceux-ci’ (...) ou de ‘Faciliter la migration et la mobilité de façon ordonnée, sans danger, régulière et responsable’”, détaille plus loin le rapport.

Surveiller les frontières

Parmi la vingtaine de projets financés par l’UE, la sécurité des frontières occupe une place prépondérante. Le “#Programme_de_gestion_des_frontières_au_Maghreb” (#BMP_Maghreb) est, de loin, le plus coûteux. Pour fournir de l’équipement et des formations aux gardes-côtes tunisiens, l’UE investit 20 millions d’euros, près d’un tiers du budget en question.

Le projet BMP Maghreb a un objectif clairement défini : protéger, surveiller et contrôler les #frontières_maritimes dans le but de réduire l’immigration irrégulière. Par exemple, trois chambres d’opération ainsi qu’un système pilote de #surveillance_maritime (#ISmariS) ont été fournis à la garde nationale tunisienne. En collaboration avec le ministère de l’Intérieur et ses différents corps - garde nationale, douane, etc. -, ce programme est géré par l’#ICMPD (#Centre_international_pour_le_développement_des_politiques_migratoires).

“Le BMP Maghreb est mis en place au #Maroc et en Tunisie. C’est essentiellement de l’acquisition de matériel : matériel informatique, de transmission demandé par l’Etat tunisien”, détaille Donya Smida de l’ICMPD. “On a fait d’abord une première analyse des besoins, qui est complétée ensuite par les autorités tunisiennes”.

Cette fourniture de matériel s’ajoute à des #formations dispensées par des #experts_techniques, encore une fois coordonnées par l’ICMPD. Cette organisation internationale se présente comme spécialisée dans le “renforcement de capacités” dans le domaine de la politique migratoire, “loin des débat émotionnels et politisés”.

"Cette posture est symptomatique d’un glissement sémantique plus général. Traiter la migration comme un sujet politique serait dangereux, alors on préfère la “gérer” comme un sujet purement technique. In fine, la ’gestionnaliser’ revient surtout à dépolitiser la question migratoire", commente #Camille_Cassarini, chercheur sur les migrations subsahariennes en Tunisie. “L’ICMPD, ce sont des ‘techniciens’ de la gestion des frontières. Ils dispensent des formations aux États grâce à un réseau d’experts avec un maître-mot : #neutralité politique et idéologique et #soutien_technique."

En plus de ce programme, la Tunisie bénéficie d’autres fonds et reçoit aussi du matériel pour veiller à la sécurité des frontières. Certains s’inscrivent dans d’autres projets financés par l’UE, comme dans le cadre de la #lutte_antiterroriste.

Il faut aussi ajouter à cela les équipements fournis individuellement par les pays européens dans le cadre de leurs #accords_bilatéraux. En ce qui concerne la protection des frontières, on peut citer l’exemple de l’Italie qui a fourni une douzaine de bateaux à la Tunisie en 2011. En 2017, l’Italie a également soutenu la Tunisie à travers un projet de modernisation de bateaux de patrouille fournis à la garde nationale tunisienne pour environ 12 millions d’euros.

L’#Allemagne est aussi un investisseur de plus en plus important, surtout en ce qui concerne les frontières terrestres. Entre 2015 et 2016, elle a contribué à la création d’un centre régional pour la garde nationale et la police des frontières. A la frontière tuniso-libyenne, elle fournit aussi des outils de surveillance électronique tels que des caméras thermiques, des paires de jumelles nocturnes, etc…

L’opacité des #accords_bilatéraux

De nombreux pays européens - Allemagne, Italie, #France, Belgique, #Autriche, etc. - coopèrent ainsi avec la Tunisie en concluant de nombreux accords sur la migration. Une grande partie de cette coopération concerne la #réadmission des expulsé·es tunisien·nes. Avec l’Italie, quatre accords ont ainsi été signés en ce sens entre 1998 et 2011. D’après le FTDES* (Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux), c’est dans le cadre de ce dernier accord que la Tunisie accueillerait deux avions par semaine à l’aéroport d’Enfidha de Tunisien·nes expulsé·es depuis Palerme.

“Ces accords jouent beaucoup sur le caractère réciproque mais dans les faits, il y a un rapport inégal et asymétrique. En termes de réadmission, il est évident que la majorité des #expulsions concernent les Tunisiens en Europe”, commente Jean-Pierre Cassarino, chercheur et spécialiste des systèmes de réadmission.

En pratique, la Tunisie ne montre pas toujours une volonté politique d’appliquer les accords en question. Plusieurs pays européens se plaignent de la lenteur des procédures de réadmissions de l’Etat tunisien avec qui “les intérêts ne sont pas vraiment convergents”.

Malgré cela, du côté tunisien, signer ces accords est un moyen de consolider des #alliances. “C’est un moyen d’apparaître comme un partenaire fiable et stable notamment dans la lutte contre l’extrémisme religieux, l’immigration irrégulière ou encore la protection extérieure des frontières européennes, devenus des thèmes prioritaires depuis environ la moitié des années 2000”, explique Jean-Pierre Cassarino.

Toujours selon les chercheurs, depuis les années 90, ces accords bilatéraux seraient devenus de plus en plus informels pour éviter de longues ratifications au niveau bilatéral les rendant par conséquent, plus opaques.

Le #soft_power : nouvel outil d’externalisation

Tous ces exemples montrent à quel point la question de la protection des frontières et de la #lutte_contre_l’immigration_irrégulière sont au cœur des politiques européennes. Une étude de la direction générale des politiques externes du Parlement européen élaborée en 2016 souligne comment l’UE “a tendance à appuyer ses propres intérêts dans les accords, comme c’est le cas pour les sujets liés à l’immigration.” en Tunisie.

Le rapport pointe du doigt la contradiction entre le discours de l’UE qui, depuis 2011, insiste sur sa volonté de soutenir la Tunisie dans sa #transition_démocratique, notamment dans le domaine migratoire, tandis qu’en pratique, elle reste focalisée sur le volet sécuritaire.

“La coopération en matière de sécurité demeure fortement centrée sur le contrôle des flux de migration et la lutte contre le terrorisme” alors même que “la rhétorique de l’UE en matière de questions de sécurité (...) a évolué en un discours plus large sur l’importance de la consolidation de l’État de droit et de la garantie de la protection des droits et des libertés acquis grâce à la révolution.”, détaille le rapport.

Mais même si ces projets ont moins de poids en termes financiers, l’UE met en place de nombreux programmes visant à “développer des initiatives socio-économiques au niveau local”, “ mobiliser la diaspora” ou encore “sensibiliser sur les risques liés à la migration irrégulière”. La priorité est de dissuader en amont les potentiel·les candidat·es à l’immigration irrégulière, au travers de l’appui institutionnel, des #campagnes de #sensibilisation...

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L’#appui_institutionnel, présenté comme une priorité par l’UE, constitue ainsi le deuxième domaine d’investissement avec près de 15% des fonds.

Houda Ben Jeddou, responsable de la coopération internationale en matière de migration à la DGCIM du ministère des Affaires sociales, explique que le projet #ProgreSMigration, créé en 2016 avec un financement à hauteur de 12,8 millions d’euros, permet de mettre en place “ des ateliers de formations”, “des dispositifs d’aides au retour” ou encore “des enquêtes statistiques sur la migration en Tunisie”.

Ce projet est en partenariat avec des acteurs étatiques tunisiens comme le ministère des Affaires Sociales, l’observatoire national des migrations (ONM) ou encore l’Institut national de statistiques (INS). L’un des volets prioritaires est de “soutenir la #Stratégie_nationale_migratoire_tunisienne”. Pour autant, ce type de projet ne constitue pas une priorité pour les autorités tunisiennes et cette stratégie n’a toujours pas vu le jour.

Houda Ben Jeddou explique avoir déposé un projet à la présidence en 2018, attendant qu’elle soit validée. "Il n’y a pas de volonté politique de mettre ce dossier en priorité”, reconnaît-elle.

Pour Camille Cassarini, ce blocage est assez révélateur de l’absence d’une politique cohérente en Tunisie. “Cela en dit long sur les stratégies de contournement que met en place l’État tunisien en refusant de faire avancer le sujet d’un point de vue politique. Malgré les investissements européens pour pousser la Tunisie à avoir une politique migratoire correspondant à ses standards, on voit que les agendas ne sont pas les mêmes à ce niveau”.

Changer la vision des migrations

Pour mettre en place tous ces programmes, en plus des partenariats étatiques avec la Tunisie, l’Europe travaille en étroite collaboration avec les organisations internationales telles que l’#OIM (Organisation internationale pour les migrations), l’ICMPD et le #UNHCR (Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés), les agences de développement européennes implantées sur le territoire - #GiZ, #Expertise_France, #AfD - ainsi que la société civile tunisienne.

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Dans ses travaux, Camille Cassarini montre que les acteurs sécuritaires sont progressivement assistés par des acteurs humanitaires qui s’occupent de mener une politique gestionnaire de la migration, cohérente avec les stratégies sécuritaires. “Le rôle de ces organisations internationales, type OIM, ICMPD, etc., c’est principalement d’effectuer un transfert de normes et pratiques qui correspondent à des dispositifs de #contrôle_migratoire que les Etats européens ne peuvent pas mettre directement en oeuvre”, explique-t-il.

Contactée à plusieurs reprises par Inkyfada, la Délégation de l’Union européenne en Tunisie a répondu en fournissant le document détaillant leurs projets dans le cadre de leur partenariat de mobilité avec la Tunisie. Elle n’a pas souhaité donner suite aux demandes d’entretiens.

En finançant ces organisations, les Etats européens ont d’autant plus de poids dans leur orientation politique, affirme encore le chercheur en donnant l’exemple de l’OIM, une des principales organisations actives en Tunisie dans ce domaine. “De par leurs réseaux, ces organisations sont devenues des acteurs incontournables. En Tunisie, elles occupent un espace organisationnel qui n’est pas occupé par l’Etat tunisien. Ça arrange plus ou moins tout le monde : les Etats européens ont des acteurs qui véhiculent leur vision des migrations et l’État tunisien a un acteur qui s’en occupe à sa place”.

“Dans notre langage académique, on les appelle des #acteurs_épistémologiques”, ajoute Jean-Pierre Cassarino. A travers leur langage et l’étendue de leur réseau, ces organisations arrivent à imposer une certaine vision de la gestion des migrations en Tunisie. “Il n’y a qu’à voir le #lexique de la migration publié sur le site de l’Observatoire national [tunisien] des migrations : c’est une copie de celui de l’OIM”, continue-t-il.

Contactée également par Inkyfada, l’OIM n’a pas donné suite à nos demandes d’entretien.

Camille Cassarini donne aussi l’exemple des “#retours_volontaires”. L’OIM ou encore l’Office français de l’immigration (OFII) affirment que ces programmes permettent “la réinsertion sociale et économique des migrants de retour de façon à garantir la #dignité des personnes”. “Dans la réalité, la plupart des retours sont très mal ou pas suivis. On les renvoie au pays sans ressource et on renforce par là leur #précarité_économique et leur #vulnérabilité", affirme-t-il. “Et tous ces mots-clés euphémisent la réalité d’une coopération et de programmes avant tout basé sur le contrôle migratoire”.

Bien que l’OIM existe depuis près de 20 ans en Tunisie, Camille Cassarini explique que ce système s’est surtout mis en place après la Révolution, notamment avec la société civile. “La singularité de la Tunisie, c’est sa transition démocratique : l’UE a dû adapter sa politique migratoire à ce changement politique et cela est passé notamment par la promotion de la société civile”.

Dans leur ouvrage à paraître “Externaliser la gouvernance migratoire à travers la société tunisienne : le cas de la Tunisie” [Externalising Migration Governance through Civil Society : Tunisia as a Case Study], Sabine Didi et Caterina Giusa expliquent comment les programmes européens et les #organisations_internationales ont été implantées à travers la #société_civile.

“Dans le cas des projets liés à la migration, le rôle déterminant de la société civile apparaît au niveau micro, en tant qu’intermédiaire entre les organisations chargées de la mise en œuvre et les différents publics catégorisés et identifiés comme des ‘#migrants_de_retour’, ‘membres de la diaspora’, ou ‘candidats potentiels à la migration irrégulière’", explique Caterina Giusa dans cet ouvrage, “L’intérêt d’inclure et et de travailler avec la société civile est de ‘faire avaler la pilule’ [aux populations locales]”.

“Pour résumer, tous ces projets ont pour but de faire en sorte que les acteurs tunisiens aient une grille de lecture du phénomène migratoire qui correspondent aux intérêts de l’Union européenne. Et concrètement, ce qui se dessine derrière cette vision “gestionnaire”, c’est surtout une #injonction_à_l’immobilité”, termine Camille Cassarini.

►https://inkyfada.com/fr/2020/03/20/financements-ue-tunisie-migration
#externalisation #asile #migrations #frontières #Tunisie #EU #UE #Europe #contrôles_frontaliers #politique_de_voisinage #dissuasion #IOM #HCR #immobilité

Ajouté à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330

Et celle sur la conditionnalité de l’aide au développement :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

Aerei da pattugliamento e #radar. Ecco il piano segreto anti-sbarchi

Si delinea la strategia del governo per dare supporto alle Guardie costiere di Libia e Tunisia.
La Marina militare da sola non riesce a tenere sotto controllo il Mediterraneo e perciò si ricorrerà anche all’Aeronautica. Oltre le navi che già presidiano il mare a sud della Sicilia, saranno schierati aerei-radar, droni e aerei da pattugliamento. L’obiettivo sono i soliti barconi e barchini che partono da Libia e Tunisia. Questo il piano segreto di Matteo Salvini, condiviso dall’intero governo, per frenare le partenze dei clandestini e aiutare in maniera sostanziale le due Guardie costiere, quella libica e quella tunisina, le sole che possono operare nelle rispettive acque territoriali, ma non hanno una tecnologia all’altezza, occorre un salto di qualità. E a questo ci penseranno gli italiani con una rete di osservazione dal mare e dal cielo.

►https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primo-piano/2019/07/09/news/aerei-da-pattugliamento-e-radar-nbsp-ecco-il-piano-segreto-anti-sbarchi-1.3
#externalisation #asile #migrations #frontières #réfugiés #avions #miltiarisation_des_frontières #Méditerranée #Italie #Libye #gardes-côtes_libyens #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #Tunisie

–----

Ajouté à ces métalistes :
1. Externalisation des contrôles frontaliers en #Libye :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/765324
2. L’externalisation en #Tunisie (accords avec l’Italie notamment) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330