• Vers des jours heureux... | Le Club de Mediapart

    https://blogs.mediapart.fr/edition/les-invites-de-mediapart/article/280420/vers-des-jours-heureux

    Un virus inconnu circule autour de la planète depuis le début de l’année. Péril mortel et invisible, nous obligeant à nous écarter les uns des autres comme si nous étions dangereux les uns pour les autres, il a retourné les tréfonds des sociétés comme on retourne un gant et il a mis au grand jour ce que l’on tentait jusqu’ici de masquer. Sans doute provoque-t-il un nombre important de morts et met-il sous une lumière crue les limites des systèmes de santé des pays développés, y compris les plus riches d’entre eux. Sans doute, ailleurs, expose-t-il les populations de pays plus pauvres à un extrême danger, les contraignant pour se protéger à accomplir une obligation impossible, le confinement. Mais ceci n’est que la surface des choses.

    Le gant retourné donne à voir la voie périlleuse dans laquelle le monde se trouve engagé depuis des décennies. En mettant les services hospitaliers sous contrainte budgétaire, là où ils étaient développés, et en les négligeant là où ils sont insuffisants, les responsables politiques affolés se sont trouvés pris de court devant l’arrivée de la pandémie. En France, l’impréparation criante à ce type d’évènements, la liquidation coupable de la réserve de masques, la délocalisation de l’industrie pharmaceutique avec pour seule raison la recherche de profits plus grands, la faiblesse des moyens de la recherche scientifique, mettent le gouvernement en situation d’improvisation. En prenant le chemin du confinement dont il ne sait comment sortir, il s’est engagé dans la voie d’une mise en cause radicale des libertés publiques. S’étant privé des autres moyens de protection de la population, il bénéficie d’un acquiescement forcé de cette dernière. Pour le cas où cet acquiescement manquerait, un discours moralisateur et culpabilisant se déploie. Et pourtant, partout, d’innombrables initiatives contredisent l’individualisme entretenu par le modèle économique et social et témoignent de la permanence de la fraternité entre les humains.

    Mais le gant retourné fait apparaître aussi, au moins aux yeux les plus lucides, que la réponse aux enjeux auxquels l’humanité dans son ensemble est en ce moment confrontée, ne saurait être une addition de politiques nationales, encore moins si ces politiques tentent de se mener en vase clos. Il y manquera toujours une part, celle de la communauté des humains qui ne peut refuser plus longtemps de se voir pour ce qu’elle est : une communauté de destin, ce qu’Hannah Arendt nommait une association politique d’hommes libres.

    Ainsi, derrière la crise sanitaire qui est au premier plan, avec la crise économique qui s’amorce et la catastrophe écologique en cours, c’est une crise de civilisation qui émerge enfin. Le monde entièrement dominé par le système capitaliste qui ne cesse de creuser les inégalités et de détruire la nature, est aujourd’hui un bateau ivre qui n’a d’autre horizon que son naufrage à travers des violences insoupçonnées.

    S’il est encore temps de reprendre les commandes, alors ce séisme inédit est l’occasion que le monde doit saisir pour rompre enfin avec sa destruction largement amorcée et inventer une société entièrement différente. Ainsi, ayant conjuré la terreur de l’inconnu, les peuples danseront de joie sur les décombres du vieux monde qui menaçait de les emporter.

    Pour cela, il faut :

    – ne pas tricher avec les constats qu’il y a lieu de faire ;
    – mesurer les risques d’une sortie de crise orientée à un retour à la situation antérieure ou à d’autres dérives ;
    – saisir cette opportunité pour poser les fondements radicalement différents d’une société mondiale juste et viable.

    #covid-19 #le_monde_d_après

  • #Plainte contre l’Europe complice des horreurs perpétrées en Libye

    L’UE a violé ses obligations financières en soutenant sa gestion migratoire par la Libye selon plusieurs ONG. Dans une plainte déposée ce 27 avril, celles-ci réclament un audit de la #cour_des_comptes_européenne.

    Détention arbitraire, torture, viol, esclavage, etc. Les sévices dont sont victimes migrants et réfugiés dans la Libye en guerre sont largement documentés. Et la complicité de l’Union européenne qui externalise sa gestion migratoire, fortement dénoncée.

    Les ONG de défense des droits humains ont choisi un nouvel angle d’attaque pour contester la politique européenne de soutien aux autorités libyennes pour qu’elles interceptent en mer et maintiennent coûte que coûte sur leur sol les demandeurs d’asile. Elles ont décidé de frapper au porte-monnaie.

    Trois ONG portent plainte

    Trois organisations spécialisées dans l’expertise juridique et politique des migrations, le #Global_legal_action_network (réseau mondial d’action juridique, #GLAN), l’association pour les études juridiques sur l’immigration (#ASGI) et l’association italienne des loisirs et de la culture (#ARCI) ont déposé une plainte auprès de la cour des comptes européenne ce lundi 27 avril.

    La plainte est étayée par une déclaration de douze ONG de défense des droits humains, tels Amnesty International et la FIDH. Elle porte sur « les infractions aux #règles_financières de l’UE ». Les trois organisations estiment illégal le #soutien_financier européen à la gestion migratoire libyenne et réclament que la cour des comptes lance un audit sur la coopération de l’UE avec la Libye.

    Une plainte « révolutionnaire »

    « Les #lois_budgétaires de l’UE donnent mandat à l’UE de veiller à la bonne utilisation des #fonds_européens_de_développement, notamment en contrôlant et en évaluant en permanence leur impact sur les droits de l’homme. Sans garanties en matière de droits de l’homme, le programme de l’UE en Libye est en violation flagrante des lois européennes et internationales et se rend complice des souffrances humaines causées par le retour des migrants en Libye », fait valoir Valentina Azarova, conseillère juridique pour le GLAN.

    En s’appuyant sur le soutien matériel apporté à la Libye, cette plainte est « révolutionnaire », estime Leslie Piquemal du CIHRS, l’Institut d’études des droits de l’homme du Caire, cosignataire de la déclaration.

    Le respect des droits de l’homme transféré à la Libye

    L’UE a alloué, en juillet 2017, 91,3 millions d’euros au programme « #Gestion_intégrée_des_frontières_et_des_migrations_en_Libye » (#GIF) qui doit durer jusqu’à la fin de 2021. Ce programme a pour objectif « d’améliorer la capacité de la Libye à contrôler ses frontières et à assurer le sauvetage en mer, d’une manière pleinement conforme aux obligations et aux normes internationales en matière de droits de l’homme. » Ces #fonds ont été engagés par le biais du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’Union_européenne_pour_la stabilité_et_la_lutte_contre_les_causes_profondes_des-migrations_irrégulières_et_des personnes_déplacées_en_Afrique (#EUTFA), lui-même principalement financé par le #Fonds_européen_de_développement.

    Si le Fonds européen de développement est soumis à des règles de bonne gestion financière - les projets soutenus doivent notamment être assortis d’un système visant à évaluer, atténuer et contrôler leur impact sur les droits de l’homme - l’EUTFA, lui, en est affranchi. Cette compatibilité avec les droits de l’homme a été transférée aux bénéficiaires des fonds.

    « L’absence de programmes de surveillance des droits et le risque que les fonds de développement soient détournés au profit de programmes de sécurité, comme le montre le #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l’Afrique, sont des préoccupations flagrantes que les institutions et les États membres de l’UE devraient chercher à corriger », fait valoir la plainte.

    En 2018, la cour des comptes avait elle-même pointé les faiblesses de l’EUTFA - manque de précision et risque d’#inefficacité -, et soulignait la nécessité de les revoir.

    https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Migrants-plainte-contre-lEurope-complice-horreurs-perpetrees-Libye-2020-04
    #justice #EU #UE #Europe #Libye #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #droits_humains

    ping @karine4 @isskein @_kg_

    • Complaint to the European Court of Auditors Concerning the Mismanagement of EU Funds by the EUTrust Fund for Africa’s ‘Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya’ (IBM) Programme Submitted by Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), and Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI)

      https://c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_ae6a20e6b5ea4b00b0aa0e77ece91241.pdf

    • EU: Time to review and remedy cooperation policies facilitating abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya

      One year after the resumption of the armed conflict in Tripoli, and at a time when the humanitarian situation in Libya continues to deteriorate due to further military escalation and the spreading of the Covid-19 virus, Amnesty International, the Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EuroMed Rights), the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), Oxfam International, Migreurop, and Saferworld are calling on EU institutions to stop any actions trapping people in a country where they are in constant, grave danger.

      EU institutions should review and reform the bloc’s policies of cooperation with Libya on migration and border management and control. During the past three years, these have facilitated the containment of tens of thousands of women, men and children in a country where they have been exposed to appalling abuse.

      The call coincides with the submission by GLAN, ASGI and ARCI of a complaint before the European Court of Auditors (ECA). In their complaint, the three organisations are requesting the body to launch an audit into EU’s cooperation with Libya. Such an audit would seek to determine whether the EU has breached its financial regulations, as well as its human rights obligations, in its support for Libyan border management.

      https://euromedrights.org/publication/eu-time-to-review-and-remedy-cooperation-policies-facilitating-abuse-

    • Stop cooperation with and funding to the Libyan coastguard, MEPs ask

      The EU should stop channeling funds to Libya to manage migration and to train its coastguard, as the violation of human rights of migrants and asylum-seekers continues.

      In a debate in the Civil Liberties Committee with representatives of the Commission, Frontex, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and NGOs, a majority of MEPs insisted that Libya is not a “safe country” for disembarkation of people rescued at sea and demanded that the cooperation with the Libyan coastguard stops.

      Most of the speakers acknowledged the challenges faced by front line countries receiving most of the migrants and asylum-seekers fleeing Libya, namely Italy and Malta, and underlined that the European common asylum system needs to be reshuffled, with a focus on solidarity among member states and respect of international legislation. Others made clear that member states are entitled to protect their borders, especially in the middle of a health crisis such as the current one. Some instead criticised the closure of ports due to the COVID-19 pandemic and stressed that letting people drown cannot be a solution.

      Background

      According to UNHCR, the human rights situation inside Libya is extremely complicated, in the context of intensifying combat, the coronavirus crisis and the high number of economic migrants, refugees and internally displaced people needing material and humanitarian assistance. Around 1,500 people remain in detention centers in appalling conditions, arbitrary detentions continue to take place and resettlement schemes of the most vulnerable people to neighbouring countries have been suspended.

      Since the beginning of the year, 3,277 persons have arrived in Italy by sea and 1,135 in Malta. On 1 April, the EU naval Operation Irini succeeded Operation Sophia, with a focus on enforcing the arms embargo to Libya, in an attempt to contribute to the pacification of the country.

      You can watch the debate again: https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/es/libe-committee-meeting_20200427-1600-COMMITTEE-LIBE_vd

      https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200427IPR77915/stop-cooperation-with-and-funding-to-the-libyan-coastguard-meps-ask

    • EU : Time to review and remedy cooperation policies facilitating abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya

      One year after the resumption of the armed conflict in Tripoli, and at a time when the humanitarian situation in Libya continues to deteriorate due to further military escalation and the spreading of the Covid-19 virus, Amnesty International, the Italian Recreational and Cultural Association (ARCI), Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EuroMed Rights), the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN), Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), Oxfam International, Migreurop, and Saferworld are calling on EU institutions to stop any actions trapping people in a country where they are in constant, grave danger.
      EU institutions should review and reform the bloc’s policies of cooperation with Libya on migration and border management and control. During the past three years, these have facilitated the containment of tens of thousands of women, men and children in a country where they have been exposed to appalling abuse.
      The call coincides with the submission by GLAN, ASGI and ARCI of a complaint before the European Court of Auditors (ECA)*. In their complaint, the three organisations are requesting the body to launch an audit into EU’s cooperation with Libya. Such an audit would seek to determine whether the EU has breached its financial regulations, as well as its human rights obligations, in its support for Libyan border management.

      The EU cooperation with Libya on border control and its consequences

      EU Member States and Institutions have long responded to the arrival of refugees and migrants, crossing the central Mediterranean on unseaworthy and overcrowded boats, by cooperating with Libyan authorities to stop departures and ensure that people rescued or intercepted at sea would be disembarked in Libya. In recent years, this policy has been pursued through new and numerous means, including the provision of training, speedboats, equipment and various forms of assistance to Libyan authorities such as the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security (LCGPS, under the Ministry of Defence) and the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS, under the Ministry of Interior), both under Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA).

      EU institutions have played a key role in the definition and execution of this strategy. While significant resources have been invested in projects aimed at alleviating the suffering of refugees and migrants stranded in Libya and remain central to EU public communications on the topic, EU actions have nonetheless facilitated and perpetuated this policy of containment. The contained people have become victims of human rights violations and abuse, including indefinite, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, which such cosmetic measures have not remedied.

      Indeed, the overall policy of cooperation with the Libyan authorities on border control and management has been designed and consistently implemented at the EU level. It started with the launch of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) in 2013, with the goal to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. [1] It continued with the modification of the mandate of naval operation EunavforMed Sophia, tasked since June 2016 [2] to train members of the Libyan Coast Guard. It expanded with the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, dated 25 January 2017, indicating action to step up the capacity of the Libyan Coast Guard as a key priority. [3]] The strategy was completed through the Malta Declaration [4], of 3 February 2017, which explicitly indicated “training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies” as its first priority. Crucially, this declaration also affirmed the intention to strengthen the mainstreaming of migration within the EU’s official development assistance for Africa, including through the mobilization of resources under the EU Emergency trust fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTFA).

      The EU has then concretely implemented this strategy through the funding of specific projects, in particular the project “Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya” (IBM project), launched in July 2017 and funded by the EUTFA with a total of €91.3m. [5] The project has focused almost entirely on enhancing the operational capacity of Libyan authorities in maritime surveillance : assisting with the supply and maintenance of speedboats ; setting up basic facilities to coordinate operations and planning the establishment of fully-fledged operational rooms ; and supporting the definition of a Libyan Search and Rescue Region, declared by Libya in December 2017. This, notwithstanding the fact that the country cannot be considered a place of safety for the disembarkation of people rescued at sea, a fact that even the Libyan authorities admitted earlier this month. It should also be noted that, despite the assistance provided, Libya has been unable to attend to this rescue area and has benefited from extensive and decisive support from Italy to coordinate maritime operations, including many triggered following sightings by EU assets. [6]

      While this strategy has achieved its objective of drastically reducing the number of people reaching Europe via the central Mediterranean – as well as the absolute number of deaths at sea, given the plummeting departures – it has also led to dramatic human consequences. Following disembarkation in Libya, since 2016 tens of thousands of women, men and children have been transferred to detention centres nominally under the control of the Libyan Ministry of Interior, where people have been detained arbitrarily for an indeterminate period of time, and where inhumane conditions and overcrowding are accompanied by the prevalence of torture and other ill-treatment. Cases of beatings, sexual violence, exploitation, forced labour, unlawful killings, and deaths in custody due to inadequate medical treatment or lack of adequate food, have been widely documented. Even outside of detention centres, refugees and migrants are constantly exposed to the risk of kidnappings, robberies, trafficking and exploitation. [7]

      The already dire humanitarian situation has been compounded, in recent weeks, by newly escalating violence in Tripoli as well as by the spreading of Covid-19 disease. All parties to the conflict, including the GNA and the Libyan National Army (LNA), have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law. Indiscriminate attacks have resulted in deaths among civilians, including dozens of refugees and migrants killed in the bombing of the detention centre of Tajoura, near Tripoli, in July 2019. [8] The risk of an escalation of violence in Libya due to the fragile political situation should have been foreseen by EU decision-makers.

      Many risks were well-known by EU Member States’ and institutions’ officials when designing the cooperation with Libya. In particular, the systematic human rights violations in detention centres – the very centres where Libyan authorities detain people who, with EU support, they intercept at sea – have been documented widely for a number of years, including by UN agencies who have also attempted to respond to such risks through human rights due diligence steps and the adoption of restrictive measures on their programmes. [9]

      While fully conscious of the horrific violations and abuses experienced by refugees and migrants taken to Libya, EU institutions have undertaken to implement the above-mentioned strategy for the past four years.

      The EU has thus contributed to the disembarkation in Libya and transfer to detention centres of tens of thousands of women, men and children. What is more, taking into account the 2012 European Court of Human Rights decision in the case Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ruling that maritime pushbacks towards Libya breach the European Convention on Human Rights – this strategy has been designed to circumvent responsibility under international and EU laws, in multiple ways. [10] First, the focus on the capacity-building of the LCGPS is meant to ensure that people are intercepted at sea and subsequently disembarked in Libya by non-European actors – since both international and EU law prohibit the transfer of anyone to a country where their rights and freedoms are at serious risk. Second, EU institutions have tried to minimise the EU’s direct involvement and deflect attention from their responsibility for the serious abuses they have contributed to by focusing on funding projects implemented primarily by Member States. Finally, by transferring European
      development and other aid resources into the EUTFA, a fund that can be used with reduced transparency and limited supervision, and then using those funds to realize projects such as IBM, they have reduced avenues for holding decision-makers to account for the harmful contributions made by such actions.

      The complaint before the European Court of Auditors

      On 27 April 2020, GLAN, ASGI, and ARCI submitted a complaint before the European Court of Auditors, the EU body responsible for auditing the use and management of the EU budget.

      The complaint was drafted based on an expert opinion by academic experts on EU budget and development laws, Prof Dr Phillip Dann and Dr Michael Riegner of Humboldt University and Ms Lena Zagst of Hamburg University, published alongside the complaint. Following close to a year’s efforts to obtain information from various EU institutions about the use of EU funds, the complaint argues that EU funds used to implement the EU’s migration policy have been mismanaged, in breach of EU laws governing the EU budget, and with consequences for the EU and its Member States under international law. The complaint claims that the European Commission has failed to uphold its obligations under EU law to ensure that it is not acquiescing or contributing to serious human rights violations. In particular, it argues that provision of financial means to implement projects resulting in return to and containment in Libya of people at risk of human rights abuse, with knowledge of these consequences and in the absence of any legally required measures to mitigate such risks, engages the responsibility of the EU institutions. The complaint is unique insofar as it specifically addresses the responsibilities of EU institutions relevant to the use of EU funds in such projects, linking their financial disbursements and human rights obligations. Crucially, it is filed in the context of several previous and ongoing litigation efforts before domestic and regional courts and international bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee.

      The complaint calls on the ECA to launch an audit into the IBM programme for the misuse of EU funds and for its harmful impacts on human rights. The complaint argues, based on EU financial legislation, the illegality of the IBM programme due to inconsistency with the permissible funding objectives for development and other underlying funds disbursed by the EUTFA. Specifically, the use of EU funds in the IBM programme contravenes the obligation to follow legal requirements for the use of such funds, to ensure that use ‘does no harm’, and is compliant with EU law regarding sound financial management principles of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. The arguments are based on the appended legal opinion and supported by information specific to the IBM programme researched and analysed by the groups.

      The human rights impact of the funding is particularly severe due to the fact that the IBM programme, now in its second phase, which is set to last until late 2021, is being implemented without any conditionality or restriction on the use of funding or review of funded activities, and without a human rights review or monitoring of the human rights impact. EU and international law, the complaint argues, requires that the EU and its Member States make the implementation of the programme conditional on the closure of detention centres and the enactment of asylum laws by Libyan authorities, amongst other concrete and verifiable steps.
      The programme should also provide for robust and effective review mechanisms that could result in its suspension if conditions are not respected.

      There is no doubt that EU institutions have been long aware of the risks involved in cooperating with Libyan authorities on border control and management. A recent investigation by The Guardian revealed how in early 2019 the Director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, wrote to Paraskevi Michou, the Director-General of the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs in the European Commission, outlining issues arising from sharing information about the position of boats in distress with Libyan authorities, highlighting how “the Commission and in general institutions may face questions of a political nature as a consequence of the SAR related operational exchanges of information.” [11] Indeed, questions about the lawfulness of the cooperation have previously been asked, not only by members of civil society. As early as March 2017, a review by the UK Independent Commission for Aid Impact noted that the UK and EU work efforts to build the capacity of the LCGPS aimed at increasing the likelihood that refugees and other irregular migrants were intercepted by the LCGPS, and that those intercepted were placed in detention. The body, which reports its findings to the British Parliament, expressed concern that “the programme delivers migrants back to a system that leads to indiscriminate and indefinite detention and denies refugees their right to asylum”, and concluded that the risk of UK aid causing unintended harm to vulnerable migrants, or preventing refugees from reaching a place of safety, had been inadequately assessed. [12] Subsequently, both the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe expressed deep concern about the consequences of European cooperation with Libya on border control. [13]

      In 2018, the ECA opened a first, general audit on the EUTFA, leading to the Special Report “European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa : Flexible but lacking focus”. [14] In its conclusions, the ECA found that the fund’s more general established objectives were too broad to efficiently steer action and measure impact ; that the Commission did not comprehensively analyse needs nor the means at its disposal to address them ; that the selection of projects had been fast but not fully consistent and clear ; and that, while projects have started to deliver outputs, their monitoring was deficient. Among other weaknesses, the report highlighted the lack of a specific risk assessment framework, or – in the case of projects for the North of Africa – of any documented criteria for selecting project proposals. The funding of the IBM programme reveals that these concerns have now materialised.

      The “action fiche” for the first phase of the IBM programme – i.e. the document summarizing its objectives and relevant plans and activities – acknowledges that “Under the existing Libyan legislation, once rescued, irregular migrants generally end up in detention centres which generate international concerns.” [15] The action fiche for the second phase of the programme expands on this : “The treatment of migrants in Libyan detention centres is of great concern : there is a lack of food, hygiene is abhorrent and there is a situation of total despair. Equally important is the absence of a clear and verifiable system of the rule of law, which meets the international and human rights standards. Migrants in detention centres have often no access to legal process and cannot address any misuse of power. This situation has led to criticism on the current programs financed by the EU in Libya and influenced the design of this action.” [16]

      Despite such references to human rights and international law, the programme has not provided for any measure adequate to address the role of such funding in contributing to the dire situation of refugees and migrants trapped in Libya. Other measures supposedly adopted to mitigate the human rights impact of the programme, such as trainings and political demarches, either depend on the good will of Libyan authorities, or are tokenistic. While EU officials express concern that the continuation of abuse against refugees and migrants in Libya may “further damage the narrative and reputation of the EU”, the risk of actively facilitating this abuse is not considered in the brief risk analysis provided in the action fiche for the second phase . Notably, most of the project’s impact monitoring is outsourced to the Italian Ministry of Interior, which is also in charge of implementing many of the planned actions and has repeatedly refused to disclose information or even discuss related concerns.

      As the IBM project is set to last until end 2021, it is high time to reassess this project, as well as the implications of the wider strategy adopted by the EU and its Member States to stop irregular crossings in the central Mediterranean. Human rights violations should be stopped and remedied, not encouraged and enabled. At a time when refugees and migrants stuck in Libya, as a result of EU decisions and projects, are exposed not only to serious abuse but also to the risks emerging from intensifying conflict and spreading disease, Europe should ensure the accountability of its own institutions and that any migration cooperation programmes are devised in line with its international obligations, not least in terms of their financial dimension.

      http://www.migreurop.org/article2987

  • Les confinés, ce sont les plus mobiles !

    Le confinement spatial est aussi une question de #frontières. Les confinés sont ceux qui, même immobiles, « ont accès ». Pouvoir se confiner relève du même processus que pouvoir traverser une frontière légalement, il faut appartenir au cercle restreint des « acteurs » de la globalisation.

    Depuis que le virus Covid-19 a été identifié, le repli spatial a constitué une préconisation politique essentielle. Ce qui est recommandé sous le terme désormais consacré de distance sociale, c’est le maintien d’une distance minimale entre les personnes, bien géographique celle-là. Et la mettre en œuvre suppose une forme de maîtrise sur nos conditions de vie, sur notre habiter. Confiner, c’est placer entre des limites. Cela implique que le contour que l’on érige à la périphérie de soi-même, entoure un centre, stable lui ! En filigrane de cette politique, on voit s’esquisser une pensée politique de l’espace très classique, tout à fait en décalage avec l’analyse des mobilités contemporaines.

    Ne sont véritablement confiné·es aujourd’hui que celles et ceux qui ont un logement suffisamment grand pour permettre au nombre de personnes qui y vivent de ne pas trop en sortir. En avoir deux, qu’on soit des enfants en résidence alternée ou des couples non-concubins, c’est déjà se trouver hors de ce cadre normatif… Cette logique de sédentarité extrême se présente désormais comme une marginalité spatiale positive, car choisie. Ne sont donc concernés ni les sans-logis, ni les entassés. Notamment celles et ceux qui subissent, en prison ou en centre de rétention administrative, une assignation de mise l’écart de la société qui prend effet dans des lieux enclos où le confinement est paradoxalement impossible : les densités trop fortes s’y traduisent dans les faits par une promiscuité délétère.
    Ceux qui ont « accès »

    Le confinement dont il s’agit n’a rien d’un enfermement ! Et ce, malgré le sentiment croissant de frustration de celles et ceux qui l’appliquent depuis un mois en se privant de l’accès à la multiplicité des lieux habituellement fréquentés. A y regarder de plus près, ne sont finalement concernés que celles et ceux qui peuvent vivre entre quatre murs parce qu’ils le font de manière tout à fait connectée ! Pouvoir, depuis chez soi, conserver des ressources régulières, c’est travailler à distance, être retraité ou encore indemnisé pour un chômage partiel ou permanent, un arrêt maladie. On continue alors d’être relié à un système marchand, lui-même relayé par un complexe bancaire qui nous « donne accès ». Et place les personnes concernées en situation de continuer à consommer à distance (faire ses courses le moins loin possible du domicile, se faire livrer, etc.).

    Certes, certains biens et services, notamment immatériels, sont désormais inaccessibles : soins du corps, pratiques de sociabilité, offre culturelle. Et l’avalanche d’ouverture de contenus en ligne dans ces domaines ne compense pas ce qui fait leur force habituelle, l’intensité des liens que ces secteurs stimulent. Mais ce mode « dégradé » reste un luxe, la carapace électronique qui garantit la faisabilité de notre enfermement apparent. Toute cette insertion économique se produit dans un processus d’invisibilisation des liens, produit par le système capitaliste qui les financiarise. Qu’il est facile de commander sur une grande plateforme en ligne sans penser aux employés qui travaillent dans ses entrepôts, livrent, déploient matériellement les réseaux sur lesquels repose notre approvisionnement !
    Informalisés et autres illégalisés

    Les confiné·es sont donc celles et ceux qui, même immobiles, « ont accès ». A l’extrémité inverse du spectre social, les non-productifs, les « informalisés » et autres « illégalisés », celles et ceux qui ne peuvent plus vendre leur travail manuel et physique (ménage, construction), qui ne sont pas pris en charge par les systèmes de santé, et tous ceux qui ont du mal à se relier au monde libéral. On peut aussi assister à des bascules rapides : l’étudiant·e issu·e d’un milieu modeste, qui n’a pas d’ordinateur ou de bonne connexion internet chez lui, parfois confiné·e dans une chambre minuscule où il·elle est désormais privé de la restauration à bas prix du Crous, peut tout à fait décrocher de la dynamique vertueuse que ses efforts lui avaient permis d’intégrer, éjecté du monde mobile auquel il aspirait.

    Paradoxalement, celles et ceux qui peuvent aujourd’hui se confiner dans de bonnes conditions sont très exactement les personnes qui avaient accès à la liberté de mouvement dans le monde d’avant. Ce sont des personnes qui disposent d’un degré d’autonomie globale leur permettant de choisir les interactions qui les mondialisent : en d’autres termes. Ce sont précisément celles et ceux qui disposaient d’un niveau de « #frontiérité » élevé, pour reprendre une expression que j’ai forgée avec Frédéric Giraut pour qualifier nos capacités inégales à traverser les frontières.

    Pouvoir se confiner relève du même processus que pouvoir traverser une frontière légalement : il s’agit de deux modalités de l’appartenance au cercle restreint des « acteurs » de la globalisation. Ce sont deux faces de l’« inclusion différentielle » (Sandro Mezzadra) qui régit désormais le corps social. Loin de l’égalité démocratique, l’attribution des droits politiques, notamment l’accès à une citoyenneté pleine et entière, semble dépendre de cette aptitude à pouvoir démontrer de l’utilité individuelle dans la mondialisation. Gommer opportunément de nos radars le fait que ceux qui produisent à bas coût des jeans ou des téléphones, du coton ou des minerais, actent tout autant cette économie inter-reliée que les élites mondialisées. Ne pas voir l’écheveau des liens complexes de notre système monde dont le Covid-19 est le symptôme, ne pas considérer pas la matérialité des biens qui sont derrière les liens électroniques sur lesquels repose notre confinement, c’est faire l’autruche.

    Les confinés, c’est-à-dire les plus « frontiérisés », se trouvent être aussi les êtres humains qui ont la plus forte empreinte écologique ! Sortir du confinement ne se fera pas en réouvrant les frontières, mais en re-visibilisant les liens. L’analyse fine des inégalités territoriales du monde mobile qui a produit la crise du Covid-19 constitue une étape essentielle pour poser les bases de la justice sociale nécessaire pour imaginer l’« après ».

    https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2020/04/27/les-confines-ce-sont-les-plus-mobiles_1786544

    #confinement #mobilité #immobilité #globalisation #mondialisation #inclusion_différentielle #Mezzadra #Sandro_Mezzadra #repli_spatial #distance_sociale #distance_spatiale #sédentarité #marginalité #assignation #SDF #détention #détention_administrative #prisons #sans-abrisme #rétention #promiscuité #enfermement #télétravail #connectivité #internet #enfermement_apparent #confinés #non-confinés #espace #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #autonomie #im/mobilité #hyper-mobilité #immobilité

    Tribune de #Anne-Laure_Amilhat-Szary (@mobileborders)

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • The Solution to the Coronavirus Recession Is a Global Green New Deal
    https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/coronavirus-global-green-new-deal-south-postcolonial

    o understand the challenges facing the nations of the Global South as they grapple with COVID-19 and its fallout, we must understand the colonial and postcolonial strictures standing in their way.

    While the Global South achieved political independence with the end of colonialism, the West continued to exert control over its former colonies. Rather than directly running other nations, Western countries used what former Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah called “neocolonial domination” to get their way through political and economic means.

    The figure below lends credence to Nkrumah’s claims: the average North-South gap in per-capita income has grown, not shrunk, since the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which affirmed the right of all people to self-determination and proclaimed that colonialism should be brought to a speedy and unconditional end. Global inequality is now so high that the global Gini coefficient, which measures the level of inequality across the world, is about the same as South Africa’s — one of the most unequal societies on the planet.

    #global_green_new_deal #écologie #covid_19

    • Fermes d’avenir

      Notre mission ?

      Accélérer la transition agroécologique, en nous inspirant de la permaculture, dans le respect des humains et de la nature !

      Nous sommes convaincus que la transition vers des modèles agricoles vertueux est indispensable et impactera positivement :

      la santé des humains grâce à des produits issus de l’agriculture biologiques à un prix accessible à tous,
      les conditions de travail des agriculteur.trice.s sur des fermes viables, vivables et créatrices de valeur sur leur territoire,
      la restaurations des écosystèmes naturels : biodiversité, qualité des sols vivants, séquestration de carbone, qualité de l’eau, etc.

      Que faisons-nous ?

      Notre équipe travaille quotidiennement avec l’objectif suivant : faire pousser des fermes agroécologiques en France. Pour cela, nous développons des projets agricoles, nous formons des acteurs de la transition, nous finançons des agriculteurs et nous influençons différents publics.

      Pour relever ce défi, nos activités sont réparties en quatre pôles.

      https://fermesdavenir.org

  • Espaço e Economia: Revista Brasileira de Geografia Econômica dedica esta edição especial à primeira parte do Dossiê Coronavírus.

    A geopolítica do COVID-19 [Texto integral]
    La #géopolitique du COVID-19
    The geopolitics of COVID-19
    La geopolítica de COVID-19

    –---

    Denis Castilho
    Um vírus com DNA da globalização: o espectro da perversidade [Texto integral]
    Un virus avec le DNA de la #mondialisation : le spectre de la perversité
    Un virus con ADN de la globalización: el espectro de la perversidad
    A virus with DNA from globalization: or the specter of perversity
    #globalisation

    –--------

    Roberto Montemerli
    Os desafios da Itália na emergência do coronavírus [Texto integral]
    Os desafios da Itália na emergência do Coronavírus
    Il sfide il Italia in emergenza di coronavirus
    Los desafíos de Italia en la emergencia del coronavirus
    Italy’s challenges in the emergence of the Coronavirus
    Les défis italiens face à l’émérgence de la Covid-19
    #Italie

    –----

    Miriam Hermi Zaar e Manuel-Blas García Ávila
    El Covid-19 en España y sus primeras consecuencias [Texto integral]
    O Covid-19 na Espanha e suas primeiras consequências
    La Covid-19 en Espagne: premiers conséquences
    The Covid-19 in Spain and its first consequences

    –-----

    Maricarmen Tapia e Jerónimo Bouza.
    Lo que la pandemia deja al descubierto. El COVID-19 en España [Texto integral]
    Lo que la pandemia deja al descubierto. El COVID-19 en España
    O que a pandemia revela. El COVID-19 na Espanha.
    What the pandemic reveals. The COVID-19 in Spain.
    Révélations de la pandémie. La #Covid-19 en #Espagne

    –----
    Lucas Pacheco Campos e Tuíla Lins
    Pandemia à Portuguesa: um relato sobre o Covid-19 em Portugal [Texto integral]
    Pandémie à portugaise: témoignage sur le Covid-19
    Pandemia à portuguesa: un informe sobre Covid-19 en Portugal
    Portuguese Pandemic: an account of Covid-19 in #Portugal

    –-----

    Gaudêncio Frigotto
    Empresários mais ricos do Brasil: a ignorância, o cinismo e a ganância que matam [Texto integral]
    Empresários mais ricos do Brasil: a ignorância, o cinismo e a ganância que matam
    Los empresarios más ricos de Brasil: ignorancia, el cinismo y la avaricia que matan
    Les entrepreneurs les plus riches du #Brésil : l’#ignorance, le #cynisme et l’#avidité qui tuent
    Richest businessmen in Brazil: ignorance, cynicism and greed that kill.

    –------

    Jorge Luiz Barbosa
    Por uma quarentena de direitos para as favelas e as periferias! [Texto integral]
    Pour une #quarantaine de droits pour les #bidonvilles et les #périphéries !
    ¡Por una cuarentena de derechos para los barrios bajos y las periferias!
    For a quarantine of rights for the slums and the peripheries!

    –------

    Oséias Teixeira da Silva
    O salto ainda mais mortal que o da mercadoria e a pandemia do coronavírus. [Texto integral]
    El salto aún más mortal que el de la mercancía y la pandemia de coronavirus.
    Le saut encore plus mortel que celui de la marchandise et la pandémie de la Covid-19
    The leap even more deadly than that of merchandise and the coronavirus pandemic

    –-----

    Heitor Soares de Farias
    O avanço da Covid-19 e o isolamento social como estratégia para redução da vulnerabilidade [Texto integral]
    O avanço da Covid-19 e o isolamento social como estratégia para redução da vulnerabilidade
    L’avancement du Covid-19 et l’#isolement_social en tant que stratégie pour la réduction de la #vulnérabilité
    El avance de Covid-19 y el aislamiento social como estrategia para reducir la vulnerabilidad.
    The advancement of Covid-19 and social isolation as a strategy to reduce vulnerability

    –---

    Cláudio Luiz Zanotelli e Ednelson Mariano Dota
    A questão da desigualdade territorial municipal no Espírito Santo face à pandemia do coronavirus e a importância da existência de um Estado de bem estar social em defesa da sociedade. [Texto integral]
    La question de l’#inégalité_territoriale des communes de l’état de l’#Espírito_Santo au Brésil face à la pandémie de coronavirus et l’importance d’un État social en défense de la société.
    The issue of municipal territorial inequality in Espírito Santo in the face of the coronavírus pandemic and the importance of the existence of a welfare state in defense of society
    La cuestión de la desigualdad territorial municipal en Espírito Santo frente a la pandemia de coronavirus y la importancia de la existencia de un Estado de bienestar en defensa de la sociedad.

    –-----

    José Borzacchiello da Silva e Alexsandra Maria Vieira Muniz
    Pandemia do Coronavírus no Brasil: Impactos no Território Cearense [Texto integral]
    Conoravirus Pandemic in Brazil: Impacts in the Territory of Ceará
    Pandémie de Coronavirus au #Brésil : Répercussions chez le #Territoire_de_Ceará
    Pandemia de coronavirus en Brasil: impactos en el territorio Cearense

    –----

    Eveline Algebaile e Floriano José Godinho de Oliveira
    A superação do capitalismo em questão: com que prática, em qual direção? [Texto integral]
    A superação do capitalismo em questão: com que prática, em qual direção?
    La superación del capitalismo en cuestión: ¿con qué prácticas, en qué dirección?
    Le dépassement du #capitalisme en question : avec quelles pratiques, et dans quelle direction ?
    Overcoming capitalism in question: with which practices, in which direction?


    https://journals.openedition.org/espacoeconomia/10071

    Il y a des revues qui sont rapides...

    #coronavirus #revue #covid-19

    ping @fil @simplicissimus

  • Migrants et #épidémies : une vieille histoire

    Peur de l’épidémie et de la submersion par les migrants sont associées depuis longtemps. Une caricature publiée le 18 juillet 1883 dans le journal satirique américain Puck en témoigne, alors qu’une pandémie de #choléra affecte le monde. On y voit la société américaine se mobiliser pour repousser d’un même mouvement le spectre du choléra et les « #émigrants_assistés ».

    Au début des années 1880, une épidémie de choléra se répand à travers le monde à partir de son foyer initial situé en Inde. La maladie est connue depuis longtemps en Asie où elle trouve ses premiers foyers, mais ce n’est qu’à la faveur du renforcement de la #mondialisation qui caractérise le XIXe siècle que la maladie prend un caractère pandémique, et connaît plusieurs vagues de diffusion dans le monde. Les premiers cas ont été identifiés aux États-Unis dans les années 1830.

    Le début des années 1880 est également marqué une forte migration européenne vers les États-Unis, sous l’effet d’une dépression économique durable qui frappe l’ensemble du Vieux continent. Face à cet afflux, les États-Unis, qui ont fondé leur dynamisme sur une forte tradition d’asile, se ferment progressivement. Le 3 août 1882, le président Chester A. Arthur signe le premier Immigration Act, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une série de mesures restrictives qui culmineront avec l’ouverture du centre fédéral d’immigration d’Ellis Island en 1892.

    Le début des années 1880 voit donc la convergence d’une pandémie de choléra et d’une modification du récit national américain moins favorable aux migrants. Puisque l’épidémie circule essentiellement d’un continent à l’autre par bateau – avec les migrants mais aussi avec les marchandises, les aliments, l’eau –, les migrants apparaissent comme des coupables tout trouvés de la pandémie, comme en témoigne la caricature publiée le 18 juillet 1883 dans le journal satirique américain Puck.
    Un choléra turc sur un bateau anglais

    Cette caricature représente un bateau de migrants prêt à accoster à New-York. On ne voit du bateau que l’imposante figure de proue qui représente une faucheuse, symbole de mort explicité par le mot « choléra » qui orne le tissu posé sur ses jambes, et vêtue d’un costume traditionnel turc, particulièrement identifiable grâce au fez qui la coiffe. La présence d’un drapeau britannique, l’Union Jack, derrière cette figure ottomane qui apporte avec elle un virus venu d’Inde montre à la fois la multiplicité des origines des migrants qui arrivent alors aux États-Unis et la volonté du caricaturiste de considérer tous les migrants, d’où qu’ils viennent, comme des vecteurs de l’épidémie.

    En face de cette figure de mort qui occupe un bon tiers du dessin, tout ce qui pourrait entraver son entreprise de mort paraît dérisoire : la disproportion entre le bateau qui arrive et la barque du Board of health (bureau de la santé) montre combien il est dérisoire d’espérer arrêter l’épidémie sans renvoyer le bateau. Cela est d’autant plus vrai que les occupants de la barque ne sont armés que d’une bouteille d’acide carbolique, un simple désinfectant. Sur la côte, les bouteilles de désinfectant ont été alignées comme des canons le long de la pointe sud de Manhattan, lieu traditionnel de débarquement des migrants – on distingue Castle Clinton, qui servit de centre d’accueil des migrants entre 1855 et 1892, situé au cœur de Battery Park qui retrouve pour l’occasion sa première vocation militaire. En effet, les produits désinfectants ne sont pas là pour le soin, mais comme des armes pour repousser indistinctement la menace épidémique et les personnes qui l’incarnent. Mais ces produits, dont tous les noms ne peuvent pas être déchiffrés, sont plutôt des désinfectants que des médicaments, et montrent surtout l’impuissance de la chimie américaine à lutter contre ce nouvel ennemi. Comme pour pallier cette impuissance, en première ligne, les citoyens américains forment une barrière dérisoire de leur corps, certains munis de gourdins, plongeant à l’eau sans hésitation à l’avance de la menace. Ils se font protecteurs de la ville, à l’arrière-plan, dont la silhouette encore paisible montre que l’épidémie ne s’y est pas encore répandue.
    Quand la peur de l’épidémie rend xénophobe

    Le titre « The Kind of Assisted Emigrants we can not afford to admit » (« le genre d’immigrants assistés que nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre d’accueillir ») opère la jonction entre les deux peurs contemporaines que sont celles de l’épidémie et celle de la submersion migratoire - le champ lexical de la vague de submersion ou de la flambée leur est d’ailleurs commun. Le glissement de l’un à l’autre se fait par le biais de notions comme celle d’« émigré assisté » (« assisted emigrants ») ou de capacité financière (« affordability ») qui montrent la porosité entre le registre de la peur de la maladie et celui de la xénophobie. Ce n’est pas seulement le vecteur de diffusion d’une épidémie qui est redouté, c’est la solidarité elle-même qui pose problème : en consacrant ses ressources financières et sanitaires à aider les migrants, on se prive des moyens de lutter contre la pandémie à l’intérieur du pays. Et le message est clair : nous ne pouvons pas nous le permettre.

    On ne peut qu’être frappé de voir que ce message émane d’un journal, Puck – du nom du personnage facétieux du Songe d’une nuit d’été de Shakespeare –, qui n’a alors que dix ans d’existence et a été fondé en 1871 par un émigré allemand, Joseph Ferdinand Keppler (1838-1894), parti rejoindre son père en Amérique après avoir échoué à percer en Europe. D’abord publié en allemand, le journal vient de lancer sa version anglaise en 1877. Quant au dessinateur, Friedrich Graetz (1842-1912), il est lui-même originaire de Francfort, ce qui montre à quelle vitesse on peut passer du statut de demandeur d’asile à celui d’adversaire résolu de l’aide aux – nouveaux – migrants.
    Pour aller plus loin

    Dan Backer, Puck’s Role in Gilded Age Politics, University of Virginia, 1996.
    Mark Harrison, How commerce has spread disease. Yale University Press, 2012.
    Frank Snowden, Epidemics and Society : From the Black Death to the Present, Yale University Press, 2019.

    http://icmigrations.fr/2020/04/07/defacto-018-05

    #histoire #migrations #migrants #épidémie #pandémie #globalisation #Ellis_Island #fermeture #bateau #transport_maritime #caricature #dessin_de_presse #xénophobie #peur #solidarité #Friedrich_Graetz

    ping @visionscarto @karine4

  • Outbreaks like coronavirus start in and spread from the edges of cities

    Emerging infectious disease has much to do with how and where we live. The ongoing coronavirus is an example of the close relationships between urban development and new or re-emerging infectious diseases.

    Like the SARS pandemic of 2003, the connections between accelerated urbanization, more far-reaching and faster means of transportation, and less distance between urban life and non-human nature due to continued growth at the city’s outskirts — and subsequent trans-species infection — became immediately apparent.

    The new coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, first crossed the animal-human divide at a market in Wuhan, one of the largest Chinese cities and a major transportation node with national and international connections. The sprawling megacity has since been the stage for the largest quarantine in human history, and its periphery has seen the pop-up construction of two hospitals to deal with infected patients.

    When the outbreak is halted and travel bans lifted, we still need to understand the conditions under which new infectious diseases emerge and spread through urbanization.
    No longer local

    Infectious disease outbreaks are global events. Increasingly, health and disease tend to be urban as they coincide with prolific urban growth and urban ways of life. The increased emergence of infectious diseases is to be expected.

    SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) hit global cities like Beijing, Hong Kong, Toronto and Singapore hard in 2003. COVID-19, the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, goes beyond select global financial centres and lays bare a global production and consumption network that sprawls across urban regions on several continents.

    To study the spread of disease today, we have to look beyond airports to the European automobile and parts industry that has taken root in central China; Chinese financed belt-and-road infrastructure across Asia, Europe and Africa; and in regional transportation hubs like Wuhan.

    While the current COVID-19 outbreak exposes China’s multiple economic connectivities, this phenomenon is not unique to that country. The recent outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, shone a light on the myriad strategic, economic and demographic relations of that country.
    New trade connections

    In January 2020, four workers were infected with SARS-CoV-2 during a training session at car parts company Webasto headquartered near Munich, revealing a connection with the company’s Chinese production site in Wuhan.

    The training was provided by a colleague from the Chinese branch of the firm who didn’t know she was infected. At the time of the training session in Bavaria, she did not feel sick and only fell ill on her flight back to Wuhan.

    First one, then three more colleagues who had participated in the training event in Germany, showed symptoms and soon were confirmed to have contracted the virus and infected other colleagues and family members.

    Eventually, Webasto and other German producers stopped fabrication in China temporarily, the German airline Lufthansa, like other airlines, cancelled all flights to that country and 110 individuals who had been contact traced to have been in touch with the four infected patients in Bavaria were advised by health officials to observe “domestic isolation” or “home quarantine.”

    This outbreak will likely be stopped. Until then, it will continue to cause human suffering and even death, and economic damage. The disease may further contribute to the unravelling of civility as the disease has been pinned to certain places or people. But when it’s over, the next such outbreak is waiting in the wings.
    Disease movements

    We need to understand the landscapes of emerging extended urbanization better if we want to predict, avoid and react to emerging disease outbreaks more efficiently.

    First, we need to grasp where disease outbreaks occur and how they relate to the physical, spatial, economic, social and ecological changes brought on by urbanization. Second, we need to learn more about how the newly emerging urban landscapes can themselves play a role in stemming potential outbreaks.

    Rapid urbanization enables the spread of infectious disease, with peripheral sites being particularly susceptible to disease vectors like mosquitoes or ticks and diseases that jump the animal-to-human species boundary.

    Our research identifies three dimensions of the relationships between extended urbanization and infectious disease that need better understanding: population change and mobility, infrastructure and governance.
    Travel and transport

    Population change and mobility are immediately connected. The coronavirus travelled from the periphery of Wuhan — where 1.6 million cars were produced last year — to a distant Bavarian suburb specializing in certain auto parts.

    Quarantined megacities and cruise ships demonstrate what happens when our globalized urban lives come grinding to a halt.

    Infrastructure is central: diseases can spread rapidly between cities through infrastructures of globalization such as global air travel networks. Airports are often located at the edges of urban areas, raising complex governance and jurisdictional issues with regards to who has responsibility to control disease outbreaks in large urban regions.

    We can also assume that disease outbreaks reinforce existing inequalities in access to and benefits from mobility infrastructures. These imbalances also influence the reactions to an outbreak. Disconnections that are revealed as rapid urban growth is not accompanied by the appropriate development of social and technical infrastructures add to the picture.

    Lastly, SARS-CoV-2 has exposed both the shortcomings and potential opportunities of governance at different levels. While it is awe-inspiring to see entire megacities quarantined, it is unlikely that such drastic measures would be accepted in countries not governed by centralized authoritarian leadership. But even in China, multilevel governance proved to be breaking down as local, regional and central government (and party) units were not sufficiently co-ordinated at the beginning of the crisis.

    This mirrored the intergovernmental confusion in Canada during SARS. As we enter another wave of megaurbanization, urban regions will need to develop efficient and innovative methods of confronting emerging infectious disease without relying on drastic top-down state measures that can be globally disruptive and often counter-productive. This may be especially relevant in fighting racism and intercultural conflict.

    The massive increase of the global urban population over the past few decades has increased exposure to diseases and posed new challenges to the control of outbreaks. Urban researchers need to explore these new relationships between urbanization and infectious disease. This will require an interdisciplinary approach that includes geographers, public health scientists, sociologists and others to develop possible solutions to prevent and mitigate future disease outbreaks.

    https://theconversation.com/outbreaks-like-coronavirus-start-in-and-spread-from-the-edges-of-ci
    #villes #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #covid-19 #coronavirus #ressources_pédagogiques

    ping @reka

    • The Urbanization of COVID-19

      Three prominent urban researchers with a focus on infectious diseases explain why political responses to the current coronavirus outbreak require an understanding of urban dynamics. Looking back at the last coronavirus pandemic, the SARS outbreak in 2002/3, they highlight what affected cities have learned from that experience for handling the ongoing crisis. Exploring the political challenges of the current state of exception in Canada, Germany, Singapore and elsewhere, Creighton Connolly, Harris Ali and Roger Keil shed light on the practices of urban solidarity as the key to overcoming the public health threat.

      Guests:

      Creighton Connolly is a Senior Lecturer in Development Studies and the Global South in the School of Geography, University of Lincoln, UK. He researches urban political ecology, urban-environmental governance and processes of urbanization and urban redevelopment in Southeast Asia, with a focus on Malaysia and Singapore. He is editor of ‘Post-Politics and Civil Society in Asian Cities’ (Routledge 2019), and has published in a range of leading urban studies and geography journals. Previously, he worked as a researcher in the Asian Urbanisms research cluster at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.

      Harris Ali is a Professor of Sociology, York University in Toronto. He researches issues in environmental sociology, environmental health and disasters including the social and political dimensions of infectious disease outbreaks. He is currently conducting research on the role of community-based initiatives in the Ebola response in Africa.

      Roger Keil is a Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University in Toronto. He researches global suburbanization, urban political ecology, cities and infectious disease, and regional governance. Keil is the author of “Suburban Planet” (Polity 2018) and editor of “Suburban Constellations” (Jovis 2013). A co-founder of the International Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA), he was the inaugural director of the CITY Institute at York University and former co-editor of the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research.

      Referenced Literature:

      Ali, S. Harris, and Roger Keil, eds. 2011. Networked disease: emerging infections in the global city. Vol. 44. John Wiley & Sons.

      Keil, Roger, Creighton Connolly, and Harris S. Ali. 2020. “Outbreaks like coronavirus start in and spread from the edges of cities.” The Conversation, February 17. Available online here: https://theconversation.com/outbreaks-like-coronavirus-start-in-and-spread-from-the-edges-of-ci

      https://urbanpolitical.podigee.io/16-covid19

    • Extended urbanisation and the spatialities of infectious disease: Demographic change, infrastructure and governance

      Emerging infectious disease has much to do with how and where we live. The recent COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak is an example of the close relationships between urban development and new or re-emerging infectious diseases. Like the SARS pandemic of 2003, the connections between accelerated urbanisation, more expansive and faster means of transportation, and increasing proximity between urban life and non-human nature — and subsequent trans-species infections — became immediately apparent.

      Our Urban Studies paper contributes to this emerging conversation. Infectious disease outbreaks are now global events. Increasingly, health and disease tend to be urban as they coincide with the proliferation of planetary urbanisation and urban ways of life. The increased emergence of infectious diseases is to be expected in an era of extended urbanisation.

      We posit that we need to understand the landscapes of emerging extended urbanisation better if we want to predict, avoid and react to emerging disease outbreaks more efficiently. First, we need to grasp where disease outbreaks occur and how they relate to the physical, spatial, economic, social and ecological changes brought on by urbanisation. Second, we need to learn more about how the newly emerging urban landscapes can themselves play a role in stemming potential outbreaks. Rapid urbanisation enables the spread of infectious disease, with peripheral sites being particularly susceptible to disease vectors like mosquitoes or ticks and diseases that jump the animal-to-human species boundary.

      Our research identifies three dimensions of the relationships between extended urbanisation and infectious disease that need better understanding: population change and mobility, infrastructure and governance. Population change and mobility are immediately connected. Population growth in cities - driven primarily by rural-urban migration - is a major factor influencing the spread of disease. This is seen most clearly in rapidly urbanising regions such as Africa and Asia, which have experienced recent outbreaks of Ebola and SARS, respectively.

      Infrastructure is also central: diseases can spread rapidly between cities through infrastructures of globalisation such as global air travel networks. Airports are often located at the edges of urban areas, raising complex governance and jurisdictional issues with regards to who has responsibility to control disease outbreaks in large urban regions. We can also assume that disease outbreaks reinforce existing inequalities in access to and benefits from mobility infrastructures. We therefore need to consider the disconnections that become apparent as rapid demographic and peri-urban growth is not accompanied by appropriate infrastructure development.

      Lastly, the COVID-19 outbreak has exposed both the shortcomings and potential opportunities of governance at different levels. While it is awe-inspiring to see entire megacities quarantined, it is unlikely that such drastic measures would be accepted in countries not governed by centralised authoritarian leadership. But even in China, multilevel governance proved to be breaking down as local, regional and central government (and party) units were not sufficiently co-ordinated at the beginning of the crisis. This mirrored the intergovernmental confusion in Canada during SARS.

      As we enter another wave of megaurbanisation, urban regions will need to develop efficient and innovative methods of confronting emerging infectious disease without relying on drastic top-down state measures that can be globally disruptive and often ineffective. This urges upon urban researchers to seek new and better explanations for the relationships of extended urbanisation and the spatialities of infectious disease - an effort that will require an interdisciplinary approach including geographers, health scientists, sociologists.

      https://www.urbanstudiesonline.com/resources/resource/extended-urbanisation-and-the-spatialities-of-infectious-disease
      #géographie_de_la_santé #maladies_infectieuses

    • Cities after coronavirus: how Covid-19 could radically alter urban life

      Pandemics have always shaped cities – and from increased surveillance to ‘de-densification’ to new community activism, Covid-19 is doing it already.

      Victoria Embankment, which runs for a mile and a quarter along the River Thames, is many people’s idea of quintessential London. Some of the earliest postcards sent in Britain depicted its broad promenades and resplendent gardens. The Metropolitan Board of Works, which oversaw its construction, hailed it as an “appropriate, and appropriately civilised, cityscape for a prosperous commercial society”.

      But the embankment, now hardwired into our urban consciousness, is entirely the product of pandemic. Without a series of devastating global cholera outbreaks in the 19th century – including one in London in the early 1850s that claimed more than 10,000 lives – the need for a new, modern sewerage system may never have been identified. Joseph Bazalgette’s remarkable feat of civil engineering, which was designed to carry waste water safely downriver and away from drinking supplies, would never have materialised.

      From the Athens plague in 430BC, which drove profound changes in the city’s laws and identity, to the Black Death in the Middle Ages, which transformed the balance of class power in European societies, to the recent spate of Ebola epidemics across sub-Saharan Africa that illuminated the growing interconnectedness of today’s hyper-globalised cities, public health crises rarely fail to leave their mark on a metropolis.
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      As the world continues to fight the rapid spread of coronavirus, confining many people to their homes and radically altering the way we move through, work in and think about our cities, some are wondering which of these adjustments will endure beyond the end of the pandemic, and what life might look like on the other side.

      One of the most pressing questions that urban planners will face is the apparent tension between densification – the push towards cities becoming more concentrated, which is seen as essential to improving environmental sustainability – and disaggregation, the separating out of populations, which is one of the key tools currently being used to hold back infection transmission.

      “At the moment we are reducing density everywhere we can, and for good reason,” observes Richard Sennett, a professor of urban studies at MIT and senior adviser to the UN on its climate change and cities programme. “But on the whole density is a good thing: denser cities are more energy efficient. So I think in the long term there is going to be a conflict between the competing demands of public health and the climate.”

      Sennett believes that in the future there will be a renewed focus on finding design solutions for individual buildings and wider neighbourhoods that enable people to socialise without being packed “sardine-like” into compressed restaurants, bars and clubs – although, given the incredibly high cost of land in big cities like New York and Hong Kong, success here may depend on significant economic reforms as well.

      In recent years, although cities in the global south are continuing to grow as a result of inward rural migration, northern cities are trending in the opposite direction, with more affluent residents taking advantage of remote working capabilities and moving to smaller towns and countryside settlements offering cheaper property and a higher quality of life.

      The “declining cost of distance”, as Karen Harris, the managing director of Bain consultancy’s Macro Trends Group, calls it, is likely to accelerate as a result of the coronavirus crisis. More companies are establishing systems that enable staff to work from home, and more workers are getting accustomed to it. “These are habits that are likely to persist,” Harris says.

      The implications for big cities are immense. If proximity to one’s job is no longer a significant factor in deciding where to live, for example, then the appeal of the suburbs wanes; we could be heading towards a world in which existing city centres and far-flung “new villages” rise in prominence, while traditional commuter belts fade away.

      Another potential impact of coronavirus may be an intensification of digital infrastructure in our cities. South Korea, one of the countries worst-affected by the disease, has also posted some of the lowest mortality rates, an achievement that can be traced in part to a series of technological innovations – including, controversially, the mapping and publication of infected patients’ movements.

      In China, authorities have enlisted the help of tech firms such as Alibaba and Tencent to track the spread of Covid-19 and are using “big data” analysis to anticipate where transmission clusters will emerge next. If one of the government takeaways from coronavirus is that “smart cities” including Songdo or Shenzhen are safer cities from a public health perspective, then we can expect greater efforts to digitally capture and record our behaviour in urban areas – and fiercer debates over the power such surveillance hands to corporations and states.

      Indeed, the spectre of creeping authoritarianism – as emergency disaster measures become normalised, or even permanent – should be at the forefront of our minds, says Sennett. “If you go back through history and look at the regulations brought in to control cities at times of crisis, from the French revolution to 9/11 in the US, many of them took years or even centuries to unravel,” he says.

      At a time of heightened ethnonationalism on the global stage, in which rightwing populists have assumed elected office in many countries from Brazil to the US, Hungary and India, one consequence of coronavirus could be an entrenchment of exclusionary political narratives, calling for new borders to be placed around urban communities – overseen by leaders who have the legal and technological capacity, and the political will, to build them.

      In the past, after a widespread medical emergency, Jewish communities and other socially stigmatised groups such as those affected by leprosy have borne the brunt of public anger. References to the “China virus” by Donald Trump suggest such grim scapegoating is likely to be a feature of this pandemic’s aftermath as well.

      On the ground, however, the story of coronavirus in many global cities has so far been very different. After decades of increasing atomisation, particularly among younger urban residents for whom the impossible cost of housing has made life both precarious and transient, the sudden proliferation of mutual aid groups – designed to provide community support for the most vulnerable during isolation – has brought neighbours together across age groups and demographic divides. Social distancing has, ironically, drawn some of us closer than ever before. Whether such groups survive beyond the end of coronavirus to have a meaningful impact on our urban future depends, in part, on what sort of political lessons we learn from the crisis.

      The vulnerability of many fellow city dwellers – not just because of a temporary medical emergency but as an ongoing lived reality – has been thrown into sharp relief, from elderly people lacking sufficient social care to the low-paid and self-employed who have no financial buffer to fall back on, but upon whose work we all rely.

      A stronger sense of society as a collective whole, rather than an agglomeration of fragmented individuals, could lead to a long-term increase in public demands for more interventionist measures to protect citizens – a development that governments may find harder to resist given their readiness in the midst of coronavirus to override the primacy of markets.

      Private hospitals are already facing pressure to open up their beds without extra charge for those in need; in Los Angeles, homeless citizens have seized vacant homes, drawing support from some lawmakers. Will these kinds of sentiments dwindle with the passing of coronavirus, or will political support for urban policies that put community interests ahead of corporate ones – like a greater imposition of rent controls – endure?

      We don’t yet know the answer, but in the new and unpredictable connections swiftly being forged within our cities as a result of the pandemic, there is perhaps some cause for optimism. “You can’t ‘unknow’ people,” observes Harris, “and usually that’s a good thing.” Sennett thinks we are potentially seeing a fundamental shift in urban social relations. “City residents are becoming aware of desires that they didn’t realise they had before,” he says, “which is for more human contact, for links to people who are unlike themselves.” Whether that change in the nature of city living proves to be as lasting as Bazalgette’s sewer-pipe embankment remains, for now, to be seen.

      https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/26/life-after-coronavirus-pandemic-change-world
      #le_monde_d'après

    • Listening to the city in a global pandemic

      What’s the role of ‘academic experts’ in the debate about COVID-19 and cites, and how can we separate our expert role from our personal experience of being locked down in our cities and homes?

      This is a question we’ve certainly been struggling with at City Road, and we think it’s a question that a lot of academics are struggling with at the moment. Perhaps it’s a good time to listen to the experiences of academics as their cities change around them, rather than ask them to speak at us about their urban expertise. With this in mind, we asked academics from all over the world to open up the voice recorder on their phones and record a two minute report from the field about their city.

      Over 25 academics from all over the world responded. As you will hear, some of their recordings are not great quality, but their stories certainly are. Many of those who responded to our call are struggling , just like us, to make sense of their experience in the COVID-19 city.

      https://cityroadpod.org/2020/03/29/listening-to-the-city-in-a-global-pandemic

    • Ce que les épidémies nous disent sur la #mondialisation

      Bien que la première épidémie connue par une trace écrite n’ait eu lieu qu’en 430 avant J.-C. à Athènes, on dit souvent que les microbes, et les épidémies auxquels ils donnent lieu, sont aussi vieux que le monde. Mais le Monde est-il aussi vieux qu’on veutbien le dire ? Voici une des questions auxquelles l’étude des épidémies avec les sciences sociales permet d’apporter des éléments de réponse. Les épidémies ne sont pas réservées aux épidémiologistes et autres immunologistes. De grands géographes comme Peter Haggett ou Andrew Cliff ont déjà investi ce domaine, dans une optique focalisée sur les processus de diffusion spatiale. Il est possible d’aller au-delà de cette approche mécanique et d’appréhender les épidémies dans leurs interactions sociales. On verra ici qu’elles nous apprennent aussi beaucoup sur le Monde, sur l’organisation de l’espace mondial et sur la dimension sociétale du processus de mondialisation.

      http://cafe-geo.net/wp-content/uploads/epidemies-mondialisation.pdf
      #épidémie #globalisation

    • Città ai tempi del Covid

      Lo spazio pubblico urbano è uno spazio di relazioni, segnato dai corpi, dagli incontri, dalla casualità, da un ordine spontaneo che non può, se lo spazio è pubblico veramente, accettare altro che regole di buon senso e non di imposizione. È un palcoscenico per le vite di tutti noi, che le vogliamo in mostra o in disparte, protagonisti o comparse della commedia urbana e, come nella commedia, con un fondo di finzione ed un ombra di verità.
      Ma cosa accade se gli attori abbandonano la scena, se i corpi sono negati allo spazio? Come percepiamo quel che rimane a noi frequentabile di strade e piazze che normalmente percorriamo?

      Ho invitato gli studenti che negli anni hanno frequentato il seminario “Fotografia come strumento di indagine urbana”, ma non solo loro, ad inviarmi qualche immagine che documenta (e riflette su) spazio pubblico, città e loro stessi in questi giorni. Come qualcuno mi ha scritto sono immagini spesso letteralmente ‘rubate’, quasi sentendosi in colpa. Eppure documentare e riflettere è un’attività tanto più essenziale quanto la criticità si prolunga e tocca la vita di tutti noi.

      Appunti di viaggio – Iacopo Zetti Ho avuto modo, per una serie di evenienze, di attraversare Firenze di mattina e di sera. Aspettavo il silenzio ed infatti l’ho ascoltato. Il silenzio non è quello dei luoghi extraurbani. ...
      Inferriata – Eni Nurihana L’inferriata de balcone ricorda sempre di più le sbarre carcerarie 23 marzo 2020, 15:11
      Situazioni di necessità – Chiara Zavattaro Le strade della zona di Sant’Ambrogio a Firenze
      Ora d’aria – Antonella Zola Ho avuto la possibilità di scattare queste foto dopo 10 giorni di quarantena completa, in cui ho rinunciato a qualunque contatto con il mondo esterno. Alla fine sono dovuta uscire ...
      Firenze – Agnese Turchi Firenze - Agnese Turchi
      Nostalgia di Silenzi – Gabriele Pierini
      Il recinto – Laura Panichi In un libro che ho letto in questo periodo di “reclusione”, Haruki Murakami dice che quando si prova ad uscire da una gabbia alla fine si finisce sempre per trovarci ...
      Spazio solidale – Jacopo Lorenzini
      Castagneto Carducci – Cristian Farina Chissà se dall’alto qualcuno si è accorto che ci siamo fermati solo per un attimo Da lontano si scorgano i monumenti fermi nel tempo, quasi come noi, fermi nello spazio
      Firenze, mercoledì 18/03/20 ore 15.30 circa – Leonardo Ceccarelli Firenze, mercoledì 18/03/20 ore 15.30 circa - Leonardo Ceccarelli
      Firenze, marzo 2020 – Giulia D’Ercole Firenze, marzo 2020 - Giulia D’Ercole
      Feriale d’altri tempi – Dario Albamonte La mia fortuna è quella di vivere in campagna e di potermi muovere liberamente e avere molto spazio a disposizione senza varcare i confini di casa mia. Quello che mi ...
      L’architettura è fatta di mattoni e PERSONE – Laura Pagnotelli L’architettura è fatta di mattoni e PERSONE. Esse sono il fine ultimo del costruire, del dare vita a spazi sempre nuovi. Senza la loro presenza, dell’architettura non resta che una scatola vuota, priva ...
      Il traffico di Firenze – Veronica Capecchi Il Traffico di Firenze, oggi è scomparso, e lascia intravedere la città, profondamente diversa e silenziosa. Una città che è sempre viva, oggi priva della sua vitalità, dei suoi rumori, una ...
      Dalla finestra – Lucio Fiorentino Ho sentito dei rumori nella strada sotto la mia finestra e ho immaginato l’atmosfera scura di un film di Bergman, (goffamente) ho cercato di riprodurla Nel palazzo di fronte alla mia ...
      Livorno, 28 marzo – Giulia Bandini Luoghi affollati di ricordi vie trafficate di emozioni ormai vinte dal tempo ma vive nella mente di chi sa sperare forte
      Sesto Fiorentino: la piana senza smog – Alice Giordano Sesto Fiorentino: la piana senza smog - Alice Giordano
      Lari e Pontedera – Silvia Princi Ritorno alle origini – Perignano di Lari (Pi), 23 marzo 2020 La semina del trattore, rappresenta uno dei pochi segni di vitalità umana e meccanica,in questo periodo di quarantena e di ...
      A distanza sociale nel parco: Zurigo – Philipp Klaus A distanza sociale nel parco: Zurigo - Philipp Klaus
      Galleggiare in un mondo irreale – Alessio Prandin

      http://controgeografie.net/controgeografie/citta-ai-tempi-del-covid

    • Coronavirus Was Slow to Spread to Rural America. Not Anymore.

      Grace Rhodes was getting worried last month as she watched the coronavirus tear through New York and Chicago. But her 8,000-person hometown in Southern Illinois still had no reported cases, and her boss at her pharmacy job assured her: “It’ll never get here.”

      Now it has. A new wave of coronavirus cases is spreading deep into rural corners of the country where people once hoped their communities might be shielded because of their isolation from hard-hit urban centers and the natural social distancing of life in the countryside.

      The coronavirus has officially reached more than two-thirds of the country’s rural counties, with one in 10 reporting at least one death. Doctors and elected officials are warning that a late-arriving wave of illness could overwhelm rural communities that are older, poorer and sicker than much of the country, and already dangerously short on medical help.

      “Everybody never really thought it would get to us,” said Ms. Rhodes, 18, who is studying to become a nurse. “A lot of people are in denial.”

      With 42 states now urging people to stay at home, the last holdouts are the Republican governors of North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa and Arkansas. Gov. Kristi Noem of South Dakota has suggested that the stricter measures violated personal liberties, and she said her state’s rural character made it better positioned to handle the outbreak.

      “South Dakota is not New York City,” Ms. Noem said at a news conference last week.

      But many rural doctors, leaders and health experts worry that is exactly where their communities are heading, and that they will have fewer hospital beds, ventilators and nurses to handle the onslaught.

      “We’re behind the curve in rural America,” said Senator Jon Tester, Democrat of Montana, who said his state needs hundreds of thousands of masks, visors and gowns. “If they don’t have the protective equipment and somebody goes down and gets sick, that could close the hospital.”

      Rural nurses and doctors, scarce in normal times, are already calling out sick and being quarantined. Clinics are scrambling to find couriers who can speed their coronavirus tests to labs hundreds of miles away. The loss of 120 rural hospitals over the past decade has left many towns defenseless, and more hospitals are closing even as the pandemic spreads.

      Coronavirus illnesses and deaths are still overwhelmingly concentrated in cities and suburbs, and new rural cases have not exploded at the same rate as in some cities. But they are growing fast. This week, the case rate in rural areas was more than double what it was six days earlier.

      Deaths are being reported in small farming and manufacturing towns that barely had a confirmed case a week ago. Fourteen infections have been reported in the county encompassing Ms. Rhodes’s southern Illinois hometown of Murphysboro, and she recently quarantined with her parents, who are nurses, as a precaution after they got sick.

      Rich ski towns like Sun Valley, Idaho, and Vail, Colo., have some of the highest infection rates in the country, and are discouraging visitors and second homeowners from seeking refuge in the mountains. Indian reservations, which grapple daily with high poverty and inadequate medical services, are now confronting soaring numbers of cases.

      In some places, the virus has rushed in so suddenly that even leaders are falling ill. In the tiny county of Early in southwest Georgia, five people have died. And the mayor and the police chief of the county seat, Blakely, are among the county’s 92 confirmed cases. It has been a shock for the rural county of fewer than 11,000 people.

      “Being from a small town, you think it’s not going to touch us,” Blakely’s assistant police chief, Tonya Tinsley, said. “We are so small and tucked away. You have a perception that it’s in bigger cities.”

      That is all gone now.

      “You say, wait a minute, I know them!” she said. “It’s, like, oh my God, I knew them. I used to talk to them. I knew their family. Their kids. It’s a blow to the community each time.”

      Even a single local case has been enough to jolt some people out of the complacency of the earliest days of the virus, when President Trump spent weeks playing down the threat and many conservative leaders brushed it aside as politically driven hysteria.

      In Letcher County, Ky., which got its first case on Sunday, waiting for the disease to arrive has been unnerving. Brian Bowan, 48, likes the daily briefings by Gov. Andy Beshear, a Democrat, and he is glad for the governor’s relatively early actions to close nonessential businesses. Without them, Mr. Bowan said, “we could have a really bad pandemic. We could be like California or New York.”

      In Mississippi, a mostly rural state, the virus had spread to nearly every county by April, with more than 1,000 cases and nearly two dozen deaths reported, causing health care workers to wonder, nervously, when the governor would issue a stay-at-home order. Last week, he finally did, and doctors at the University of Mississippi Medical Center in Jackson breathed a sigh of relief.

      “There was this chatter today at the medical center, people saying ‘Oh thank goodness — we need this to get people to realize how serious this is,’ ” said Dr. LouAnn Woodward, the hospital’s top executive.

      While Americans are still divided on whether they approve of how Mr. Trump has handled the crisis, the virus is uniting nearly everyone in the country with worry — urban and rural, liberal and conservative. More than 90 percent of Americans said the virus posed a threat to the country’s economy and public health, according to a Pew Research Center poll conducted from March 19 to March 24.

      “Some of the petty things that would be in the news and on social media before have sort of fallen away,” said David Graybeal, a Methodist pastor in Athens, Tenn. “There’s a sense that we are really in this together. Now it’s, ‘How can we pull through this and support one another in this social distancing?’ ”

      In Mangum, Okla., a town of 6,000 in the western part of the state, it all started with a visit. A pastor from Tulsa appeared at a local church, but got sick shortly thereafter and became the state’s first Covid-19 fatality.

      Then somebody at the local church started to feel unwell — a person who eventually tested positive for coronavirus.

      “Then it was just a matter of time,” said Mangum’s mayor, Mary Jane Scott. Before realizing they were infected, several people who eventually tested positive for the virus had moved about widely through the city, including to the local nursing home, which now has a cluster of cases.

      Over all in the town, there are now three deaths and 26 residents who have tested positive for the coronavirus — one of the highest infection rates in rural America.

      “You’d think in rural Oklahoma, that we all live so far apart, but there’s one place where people congregate, and that’s at the nursing home,” she said. “I thought I was safe here in Southwest Oklahoma, I didn’t think there would be a big issue with it, and all of a sudden, bam.”

      Mangum now has an emergency shelter-in-place order and a curfew — just like larger towns and cities around the United States.

      Just as New Yorkers have gotten accustomed to Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s daily televised briefings, residents of Mangum have turned to the mayor’s Facebook page, where she livecasts status updates and advisories. On Monday night, it was the recommendation that residents use curbside pickup when going to Walmart, a broadcast that garnered more than 1,000 views in the hour after she posted it.

      “Since we have no newspaper, it’s the only way I know to get the word out,” she told viewers, after inviting them to contact her personally with any questions or concerns.

      She also has encouraged residents to step out onto their lawns each night at 7 p.m. where she leads them in a chorus of “God Bless America.”

      The virus has complicated huge swaths of rural life. Darvin Bentlage, a Missouri rancher, says he is having trouble selling his cattle because auctions have been canceled. In areas without reliable internet access, adults are struggling to work remotely and children are having to get assignments and school updates delivered to their door.

      Rural health providers are also challenged. A clinic in Stockton, Kan., turned to a local veterinarian for a supply of masks and gowns. One rural hospital in Lexington, Neb., was recently down to its last 500 swabs. Another in Batesville, Ind., was having its staff members store their used masks in plastic baggies in case they had to sterilize and reuse them. In Georgia, a peanut manufacturer in Blakely donated a washer and dryer to the local hospital for its handmade masks and gowns.

      The financial strain of gearing up to fight the coronavirus has put much pressure on cash-strapped rural hospitals. Many have canceled all non-emergency care like the colonoscopies, minor surgeries and physical therapy sessions that are a critical source of income.

      Last month, one hospital in West Virginia and another in Kansas shut their doors altogether.

      “It’s just absolutely crazy,” said Michael Caputo, a state delegate in Fairmont, W.Va., where the Fairmont Regional Medical Center, the only hospital in the county, closed in mid-March. “Across the country, they’re turning hotels and sports complexes into temporary hospitals. And here we’ve got a hospital where the doors are shut.”

      For now, there is an ambulance posted outside the emergency room, in case sick people show up looking for help.

      Michael Angelucci, a state delegate and the administrator of the Marion County Rescue Squad, said the hospital’s closure during the pandemic is already being felt.

      On March 23, emergency medics were called to take an 88-year-old woman with the coronavirus to the hospital, Mr. Angelucci said. Instead of making a quick drive to Fairmont Regional, about two minutes away, Mr. Angelucci said that the medics had to drive to the next-nearest hospital, about 25 minutes away. A few days later, she became West Virginia’s first reported coronavirus death.

      https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/08/us/coronavirus-rural-america-cases.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgty
      #cartographie #visualisation

    • Coronavirus in the city: A Q&A on the catastrophe confronting the urban poor

      ‘While all populations are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, not all populations are affected equally.’

      Health systems in the world’s megacities and crowded urban settlements are about to be put under enormous strain as the new coronavirus takes hold, with the estimated 1.2 billion people who live in informal slums and shanty-towns at particular risk.

      To understand more about the crisis confronting the urban poor, The New Humanitarian interviewed Robert Muggah, principal of The SecDev Group and co-founder of the Igarapé Institute, a think tank focused on urban innovation that has worked with the World Health Organisation to map pandemic threats and is supporting governments, businesses, and civil society groups to improve COVID-19 detection, response, and recovery.

      What has so far been a public healthcare crisis in mostly wealthier cities in East Asia, Europe, and the United States appears likely to become an even graver disaster for countries with far less resources in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia.

      Cities from Lagos to Mumbai to Rio de Janeiro have started locking down, but for residents of crowded slums the unenviable choice is often between a greater risk of catching and spreading disease or the certainty of hunger. Social distancing, self-isolation – handwashing even – are impossible luxuries.

      This interview, conducted by email on 29-30 March, has been edited for length and clarity.
      TNH: A lot has been made about the risks of coronavirus in crowded refugee and displacement camps – from Greece to Idlib. Do you feel the urban poor have been a little neglected?

      Robert Muggah: While all populations are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, not all populations are affected equally. Lower-income households and elderly individuals with underlying health conditions are particularly at-risk. Among the most vulnerable categories are the homeless, migrants, refugees, and displaced people. In some US cities, for example, undocumented migrants are fearful of being tested or going to the hospital for fear of forcible detainment, separation from their families, and deportation. In densely populated informal settlements and displaced person camps, there is a higher likelihood of infection because of the difficulties of social distancing. The limited testing, detection, isolation, and hospitalisation capacities in these settings mean we can expect a much higher rate of direct and excess mortality. The implications are deeply worrying.

      The COVID-19 pandemic is a totalising event – affecting virtually every country, city and neighbourhood on the planet. It is also laying open the social and economic fault lines in our urban spaces. Predictably, many governments, businesses, and societies are looking inward, seeking to shore up their own health capacities and provide for their populations through aid and assistance. Yet the virus is revealing the extent of economic and social inequalities within many countries, including among OECD members. In the process, it is exposing the deficiencies of the social contract and the ways in which certain people – especially the elderly, poor, homeless, displaced – are systematically at-risk. While media attention is growing, there is comparatively limited investment in protecting refugees and displaced people facing infectious disease outbreaks. As public awareness of the sheer scale of infection, hospitalisation, and case fatalities becomes clearer in lower- and middle-income settings, we can expect this to change; at which point it may be too late.
      TNH: Can you give us a sense of the scale of the problem in the world’s megacities and slums, where social distancing and self-isolation are a fantasy for many?

      Muggah: According to the UN, there are about 33 megacities with 10 million or more people. There are another 48 cities with between five and 10 million. Compare this to the 1950s when there were just three megacities. Most of these massive cities are located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Many of them are characterised by a concentrated metropolitan core and a sprawling periphery of informal settlements, including shanty-towns, slums, and favelas. Roughly 1.2 billion people live in densely packed informal settlements characterised by poor quality housing, limited basic services, and poor sanitation. While suffering from stigmas, these settlements tend to be a critical supply of labour for cities, an unsatisfactory answer to the crisis in housing availability and affordability. A challenge now facing large cities is that, owing to years of neglect, informal settlements are essentially “off the grid”, and as such, difficult to monitor and service.

      There are many reasons why large densely populated slums are hotbeds for the COVID-19 pandemic and other infectious disease outbreaks. In many cases, there are multiple households crammed into tiny tenements making social distancing virtually impossible. In Dharavi, Mumbai’s largest slum, there are 850,000 people per square mile. Most inhabitants of informal settlements lack access to medical and health services, making it difficult to track cases and isolate people who are infected. A majority of the people living in these areas depend on the services and informal economies, including jobs, that are most vulnerable to termination when cities are shut down and the economy begins to slow. Strictly enforced isolation won’t just lead to diminished quality of life, it will result in starvation. A large proportion of residents also frequently suffer from chronic illnesses – including respiratory infections, cancer, diabetes, and obesity – increasing susceptibility to COVID-19. These comorbidities will contribute to soaring excess deaths.

      All of these challenges are compounded by the systemic neglect and stigmatisation of these communities by the political and economic elite. Violence has already erupted in Ethiopia, Kenya, India, Liberia, and South Africa as police enforce quarantines. In Brazil, drug trafficking organisations and militia groups are enforcing social distancing and self isolation in lieu of the state authorities. In Australia, Europe, and the United States, racist and xenophobic incidents spiked against people of Asian descent. There is a real risk that governments ramp up hardline tactics and repression against marginalised populations, especially those living in lower-income communities, shanty-towns, and refugee and displaced person camps.
      TNH: How seriously were international aid agencies and other humanitarian actors taking calls to scale up urban preparedness and response before this pandemic, and to what extent is COVID-19 a wake-up call?

      Muggah: The global humanitarian aid sector was aware of the threat of a global pandemic. For more than a decade the WHO, several university and research centres, and organisations such as the CDC, the Wellcome Trust, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have publicly warned about the catastrophic risks of pandemic outbreaks. The international community experienced a series of jolting wake-up calls with SARS, H1N1, Ebola, and other major epidemics over the past 20 years, though these were typically confined to specific regions and were generally rapidly contained. Although fears of potential outbreaks emerging from China were widely acknowledged, the sheer speed and scale of COVID-19 seems to have caught most governments, and the aid community, by surprise.

      With notable exceptions such as Singapore or Taiwan, there has not been major investment in preparing cities for dealing with pandemics, however. Most attention has been focused on national capacities, and less on the specific capabilities of urban governments, health and social safety-net services. Together with Georgetown University’s Center for Health Sciences and Security, the Igarape Institute highlighted the importance of networks of mayors to share information and strategies in 2018. This call was highlighted by the Global Parliament of Mayors in 2018 and 2019. Starting in March 2020, the Bloomberg Foundation established a mayors network focusing on pandemic preparedness in the US. The Mayors Migration Council, World Economic Forum, and UN-Habitat are also looking to ramp up assistance to cities. What is also needed are systems to support mayors, city managers, and health providers in lower- and middle-income countries.
      TNH: Part of the problem is that cities are unfamiliar territory for humanitarian responders, with many new actors to deal with, from local governments to gangs. What relationships and skill sets do they need to cultivate?

      Muggah: Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, many humanitarian agencies were already refocusing some of their operations toward urban settings. International organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Oxfam set up policies and procedures for engaging in cities. There is a growing recognition across the relief and development sectors of the influence and impacts of urbanisation on their operations and beneficiary populations. This is more radical than it sounds. For at least half a century, most aid work was predominantly rural-focused. This was not surprising since most people in developing countries lived in rural or semi-rural areas. This has changed dramatically, however, with more than half of the world’s population now living in cities. Over the next 30 years, roughly 90 percent of all urbanisation will be occurring in lower- and middle-income countries – predominantly in Africa and Asia. The aid community only started to recognise these trends relatively recently.

      Working in urban settings requires changes in how many international and national aid agencies operate. For one, it often depends less on direct than indirect delivery, working in partnership with municipal service providers. It also requires less visible branding and marketing strategies, shoring up the legitimacy of public and non-governmental providers with less focus on the contribution of relief agencies. In some cases, aid agencies are also required to work with, or alongside, non-state providers, including armed groups. For example, in some Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican cities organised crime and self-defence groups are engaged in social service provision, raising complex questions for aid providers about whether and how to support vulnerable communities. Similar challenges confronted aid agencies working to provide relief in Ebola-stricken villages in eastern DRC.

      A diverse range of skill sets is required to navigate support to cities affected by epidemics, including COVID-19. Some cities may need accounting assistance and expertise in budgeting to help them rapidly procure essential services. Other cities may require epidemiological and engineering capabilities to help develop rapid detection and surveillance, as well as “surge” capacity including emergency hospitals, clinics, and treatment centres. A robust communications and public outreach strategy is essential, particularly since uncertainty can contribute to social unease and even disorder. Moreover, rapid resource injections to help cities provide safety nets to the most vulnerable populations are critical, particularly as existing resources will be redirected to shoring up critical infrastructure and recurrent expenses will be difficult to cover owing to reduced tax revenue.

      TNH: Name three things aid agencies need to do quickly to get to grips with this?

      Muggah: There are a vast array of priorities for aid agencies in the context of pandemics. At a minimum, they must rapidly coordinate with public, private, and non-governmental partners to ensure they are effectively contributing rather than creating redundancy or unintentionally undermining local responses. Humanitarian organisations must also act rapidly, especially in the face of an exponential crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Agencies cannot let perfection be the enemy of the good, and focus on delivering with speed and efficiency, albeit while being mindful of the coordination challenges above. Aid agencies must also be attentive to the health, safety, and wellbeing of their own personnel and partners – they must avoid at all costs becoming a burden to hospital systems that are already overwhelmed by the crisis.

      The first thing aid agencies can do is reach out to frontline cities and assess basic needs and their organizational potential to contribute. A range of priorities are likely, including the importance of ensuring there are adequate tests kits and testing capacities, sufficient trained health professionals, medical supplies (including ICU and ventilation capacities), and related equipment for frontline workers. Providing supplementary capacity as needed is essential. Consider that in South Sudan there are believed to be just two ventilators, and in Liberia there are reportedly only three. Other critical priorities are ensuring the integrity of the local food supply and attention to critical infrastructure. This may involve deploying a surveillance system for monitoring critical supplies, providing supplementary cash and food assistance without disrupting local prices, and ensuring a capability to rapidly address distribution disruption as they arise. Aid agencies can also help leverage resources to settings that are neglected, helping mobilise funds and/or in-kind support for over-taxed public services.
      TNH: Cities like Singapore and Taipei, Hangzhou in China – to an extent Seoul – have had some success in containing COVID-19. What can other cities learn from their approaches?

      Muggah: Cities that are open, transparent, collaborative, and adopt comprehensive responses tend to be better equipped to manage infectious disease outbreaks than those that are not. While still too early to declare a success, the early response of South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan to the COVID-19 pandemic stands out. Both Taipei and Singapore applied the lessons from past pandemics and had the investigative capacities, testing and detection services, health systems and, importantly, the right kind of leadership in place to rapidly take decisive action. They were able to flatten the pandemic curve through early detection thus keeping their health systems from becoming rapidly overwhelmed.

      Not surprisingly, cities that have robust governance and health infrastructure in place are in a better position to manage pandemics and lower case fatality rates (CFR) and excess mortality than those that do not. Adopting a combination of proactive surveillance, routine communication, rapid isolation, and personal and community protection (e.g. social distancing) measures is critical. Many of these very same measures were adopted by the Chinese city of Hangzhou within days of the discovery of the virus. Likewise, the number, quality, and accessibility (and surge capacity) of hospitals, internal care units, hospital beds, IV solution and respirators can determine whether a city effectively manages a pandemic, or not. The SecDev Group is exploring the development of an urban pandemic preparedness index to help assess health capacities as well as social and economic determinants of health. A digital tool that provides rapid insights on vulnerabilities will be key not just to planning for the current pandemic, but also the next one.
      TNH: You’ve spoken in the past about the need to develop a pandemic preparedness index. INFORM has one and Georgetown Uni has a health security assessment tool. Are these useful? What is missing?

      Muggah: The extent of a city’s preparedness depends on its capacity to prevent, detect, respond, and care for patients. This means having action plans, staff, and budgets in place for rapid response. It also requires having access to laboratories to test for infectious disease and real-time monitoring and reporting of infectious clusters as they occur. The ability to communicate and implement emergency response plans is also essential, as is the availability, quality and accessibility of hospitals, clinics, care facilities, and essential equipment.

      To this end, the Center for Global Health Science and Security at Georgetown University has created an evaluation tool – the Rapid Urban Health Security Assessment (RUHSA) – as a resource for assessing local-level public health preparedness and response capacities. The RUHSA draws from multiple guidance and evaluation tools. It was designed precisely to help city decision-makers prioritise, strengthen, and deploy strategies that promote urban health security. These kinds of platforms need to be scaled, and quickly.

      There is widespread recognition that a preparedness index would be useful. In November of 2019, the Global Parliament of Mayors issued a call for such a platform. It called for funding from national governments to develop crucial public health capacities and to develop networks to disseminate trusted information. The mayors also committed to achieving at least 80 percent vaccination coverage, reducing the spread of misinformation, improving health literacy, and sharing information on how to prevent and reduce the spread of infectious disease. A recent article published with Rebecca Katz provides some insights into what this might look like.
      TNH: All cities are not equal in this. Without a global rundown, do you have particular concerns for certain places – because they are transmission hubs that might be hit worse, or due to existing insecurity and instability?

      Cities are vulnerable both to the direct and indirect effects of COVID-19. For example, cities with a higher proportion of elderly and inter-generational mingling are especially at risk of higher infection, hospitalisation, and case fatality rates. This explains why the pandemic has been so destructive in certain Italian, Spanish, and certain US cities in Florida and New York where there is a higher proportion of elderly and frequent travel and interaction between older and younger populations. By contrast, early detection, prevention, and containment measures such as those undertaken in Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese cities helped flatten the curve. Yet even when health services have been overwhelmed in wealthier cities, they tend to have more capable governments and more extensive safety nets and supply chains to lessen the secondary effects on the economy and market.

      Many cities in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America are facing much greater direct and indirect threats from the COVID-19 pandemic than their counterparts in North America, Western Europe, or East Asia. Among the most at-risk are large and secondary cities in fragile and conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela. There, health surveillance and treatment capacities are already overburdened and under-resourced. While the populations tend to be younger, many are facing households that are already under- or malnourished and the danger of comorbidity is significant. Consider the case of Uganda, which has one ICU bed for every one million people (compared to the United States, which has one ICU bed for every 2,800 people). Specific categories of people – especially those living in protracted refugee or internal displacement camps – are among the most vulnerable. There are also major risks in large densely populated cities and slums such as Lagos, Dhaka, Jakarta, Karachi, Kolkata, Manila, Nairobi, or Rio de Janeiro where the secondary effects, including price shocks and repressive police responses, as well as explosive protests from jails, could lead to social and political unrest.
      TNH: The coronavirus itself is the immediate risk, but what greater risks do you see coming down the track for poorer people in urban settings?

      Muggah: The most significant threat of the COVID-19 pandemic may not be from the mortality and morbidity from infections, but the political and economic fallout from the crisis. While not as infectious or lethal as other diseases, the virus is obviously devastating for population health. It is not just people dying from respiratory illnesses and organ failures linked to the virus, but also the excess deaths from people who are unable to access treatment and care for existing diseases. We can expect several times more excess deaths than the actual caseload of people killed by the coronavirus itself. The lost economic productivity from these premature deaths and the associated toll on health systems and care-givers will be immense.

      “The most significant threat of the COVID-19 pandemic may not be from the mortality and morbidity from infections, but the political and economic fallout from the crisis.”

      COVID-19 is affecting urban populations in different ways and at different speeds. The most hard-hit groups are the urban poor, undocumented migrants, and displaced people who lack basic protections such as regular income or healthcare. Many of these people are already living in public or informal housing in under-serviced neighbourhoods experiencing concentrated disadvantage. The middle class will also experience severe impacts as the service economy grinds to a halt, schools and other services are shuttered, and mobility is constrained. Wealthier residents can more easily self-isolate either in cities or outside of them, and usually have greater access to private health alternatives. But all populations will face vulnerabilities if critical infrastructure – including health, electricity, water, and sanitation services – start to fail. Cut-backs in service provision will generate first discomfort and then outright protest.

      Most dangerous of all is the impact of COVID-19 on political and economic stability. The pandemic is generating both supply and demand shocks that are devastating for producers, retailers, and consumers. Wealthier governments will step in to enact quantitative easing and basic income where they can, but many will lack the resources to do so. As income declines and supply chains dry up, panic, unrest, and instability are real possibilities. The extent of these risks depend on how long the pandemic endures and when vaccinations or effective antivirals are developed and distributed. Governments are reluctant to tell their populations about the likely duration, not just because of uncertainties, but because the truth could provoke civil disturbance. These risks are compounded by the fact that many societies already exhibit a low level of trust and confidence in their governments.

      https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2020/04/01/coronavirus-cities-urban-poor

    • Les enjeux économiques de la #résilience_urbaine

      La notion de #résilience pour qualifier la capacité d’une ville à affronter un #choc, y compris économique, n’est pas nouvelle, mais elle revêt, en pleine crise du coronavirus, une dimension toute particulière.

      Les villes, en tant que #systèmes_urbains, ont toujours été au cœur des bouleversements que les sociétés ont connus. Pour autant, les fondements du paradigme économique qui gouverne les villes sont restés les mêmes. L’essor des capacités productives exportatrices et l’accroissement des valeurs ajoutées guident encore l’action locale en matière d’#économie.
      Corollaire d’un monde globalisé qui atteint ses limites, la crise sanitaire ébranle ces fondamentaux et en demande une révision profonde. Ainsi, au cœur de la crise, les ambitions de #relocalisation_industrielle, de #souveraineté_économique, d’#autonomie_alimentaire semblent avoir remplacé (au moins temporairement) celles liées à la #croissance et à la #compétitivité.

      https://www.pug.fr/produit/1798/9782706148668/les-enjeux-economiques-de-la-resilience-urbaine
      #livre #Magali_Talandier

    • #Eurasian_Geography_and_Economics is publishing a series of critical commentaries on the covid-19 pandemic, with some urban dimensions.

      These will be collated in issue 61(4) of the journal but will appear online first.

      The first two are currently OA on the journal webpage at: https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rege20/current?nav=tocList

      Xiaoling Chen (2020) Spaces of care and resistance in China: public engagement during the COVID-19 outbreak, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2020.1762690

      As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to unfold, the approach of the Chinese government remains under the spotlight, obscuring the complex landscape of responses to the outbreak within the country. Drawing upon the author’s social media experiences as well as textual analysis of a wide range of sources, this paper explores how the Chinese public responded to the outbreak in complex and nuanced ways through social media. The findings challenge conventional views of Chinese social media as simply sites of self-censorship and surveillance. On the contrary, during the COVID-19 outbreak, social media became spaces of active public engagement, in which Chinese citizens expressed care and solidarity, engaged in claim-making and resistance, and negotiated with authorities. This paper situates this public engagement within a broader context of China’s health-care reforms, calling attention to persistent structural and political issues, as well as the precarious positionalities of health-care workers within the health system.

      Xuefei Ren (2020) Pandemic and lockdown: a territorial approach to COVID-19 in China, Italy and the United States, Eurasian Geography and Economics, DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2020.1762103

      Three months into the Covid-19 crisis, lockdown has become a global response to the pandemic. Why have so many countries resorted to lockdown? How is it being implemented in different places? Why have some places had more success with lockdowns and others not? What does the effectiveness of lockdowns tell us about the local institutions entrusted with enforcing them? This paper compares how lockdown orders have been implemented in China, Italy, and the U.S. The analysis points to two major factors that have shaped the enforcement: tensions between national and local governments, and the strength of local territorial institutions.

    • Pourquoi Bergame ? Le virus au bout du territoire

      La région de #Bergame en Italie a été l’un des foyers les plus actifs du coronavirus en Europe. Marco Cremaschi remet en cause les lectures opposant de manière dualiste villes et campagnes et souligne la nécessité de repenser la gouvernance de ces territoires d’entre-deux.

      L’urbanisme a de longue date et durablement été influencé par les épidémies. Depuis le Moyen Âge, la peste et le choléra ont contribué à sédimenter un ensemble de critiques dirigées contre la densité et la promiscuité caractéristiques du mode de vie urbain. Particulièrement prégnante aux débuts de la recherche urbaine au XIXe siècle, sous l’influence du mouvement hygiéniste (Barles 1999), cette hypothèse anti-urbaine a régulièrement refait surface au gré des crises sanitaires. C’est ainsi presque naturellement qu’elle a été réactivée en lien avec la diffusion mondiale du Covid-19, y compris au cœur des sciences sociales.

      Selon certains géographes, la cause de la pandémie serait ainsi à chercher dans la « métropolisation du monde » (Faburel 2020), concept catch-all qui désigne à la fois la densification, le surpeuplement, la promiscuité des modes de vie uniformisés et la surmodernité ; en somme, tout ce qui nous aurait éloignés de la « nature ». Pourtant, si l’on exclut les situations de surpeuplement extrême de quelques mégapoles des pays en développement, rien n’indique que la densité de population soit un bon indicateur des relations humaines et en dernière analyse de la propagation des maladies. En effet, comme l’a déjà amplement montré la critique faite à la thèse « écologique » (Offner 2020), les caractéristiques de l’environnement physique ne reflètent que marginalement la culture et les modes de vie. Ce n’est qu’au niveau de la coprésence physique, telle qu’on la trouve dans les transports en commun, que la densité de la population conduit directement à une intensification des contacts humains.

      Cet article ne prétend pas avancer d’hypothèses épidémiologiques relatives aux modes socio-spatiaux de transmission du Covid-19 : en la matière, la prudence est de mise en raison de la modestie des éléments empiriques disponibles. Son objet est plutôt de proposer une description du territoire bergamasque à l’aune des grilles de lecture contemporaines de l’urbain et des grands modèles interprétatifs mobilisés actuellement dans le débat public – et d’en souligner ainsi les limites. Ni métropole, ni campagne, la région de Bergame en Italie a en effet été l’un des foyers les plus actifs du virus en Europe, et les conséquences de l’épidémie y ont été dramatiques.

      Cette description montre les limites des modèles interprétatifs binaires et suggère d’analyser, au-delà des causes de la pandémie, l’influence indirecte de la « formation socio-territoriale » (Bagnasco 1994), c’est-à-dire de la manière dont une société évolue et change dans les structures de la longue durée, bien plus probante que la densité ou la présumée uniformisation métropolitaine.
      Un entre-deux territorial

      La crise a commencé officiellement le dimanche 23 février à l’hôpital d’Alzano, à six kilomètres de Bergame : deux cas de Covid-19 sont identifiés. En dix jours, la situation s’est dégradée au-delà des prévisions les plus alarmistes. Au mois de mars, 5 400 décès ont été répertoriés dans la province, contre 900 en moyenne les trois années précédentes (Invernizzi 2020). La mortalité a donc été multipliée par six ; dans certaines municipalités, comme Alzano et Nembro, elle est même dix fois supérieure à la moyenne.

      Située au cœur de la Lombardie, région la plus riche et la plus urbanisée d’Italie (et l’une des plus riches d’Europe), à cinquante kilomètres au nord-est de Milan, la province de Bergame rassemble en 2020 un peu plus d’un million d’habitants (dont 120 000 seulement dans la ville-centre). Elle est marquée par une situation d’entre-deux territorial : ce n’est ni une métropole ni une simple ville moyenne environnée d’un pays rural ; ce n’est ni une centralité ni une périphérie marginale ; son économie prospère est fortement industrielle, à la fois ancrée localement et insérée dans les réseaux économiques mondiaux.

      Le modèle de développement bergamasque résiste aux grilles de lecture opposant de manière dualiste villes et campagnes, métropoles mondialisées et ancrage local, densité et dispersion. Il ne peut être qualifié de « périurbain », en raison de la vitalité de ses centres secondaires ; il est sensiblement plus dense que la città diffusa du nord-est de l’Italie, vaste région sans centre dominant parsemée de maisons individuelles et de petites entreprises (Indovina 1990) ; et son industrialisation est bien plus ancienne et ses entreprises plus grandes et plus robustes que ceux des « districts industriels » de l’Italie centrale (Rivière et Weber 2006).

      La population, en faible croissance depuis trois décennies, est moins âgée que la moyenne de la région. Un fort attachement territorial s’adosse à une faible mobilité géographique : environ trois quarts des habitants sont nés dans des municipalités voisines ou dans la région. Mais depuis l’après-guerre, le développement économique fulgurant a suscité une immigration de main-d’œuvre, notamment depuis l’étranger (environ 7 % de la population est d’origine étrangère en 2016). L’émergence de nouveaux besoins, liés notamment au vieillissement de la population (aides à domicile, soignants), a entraîné plus récemment une diversification des origines nationales des habitants.

      Une urbanisation par bandes linéaires

      Dans les communes de Alzano et Nembro, et en général dans la vallée Seriana, le bâti est dense [1], à peu près cinquante habitants par hectare (Lameri et al. 2016), mais entrecoupé de nombreux espaces ouverts, souvent des jardins avec des potagers, tandis que les champs interstitiels encore cultivés au début des années 2000 ont presque complètement disparu. Sur la bande d’en haut, les flancs des collines, les anciens pâturages, cèdent la place aux bois en expansion. À l’exception des centres-villes anciens, où les maisons sont adossées les unes aux autres tout au long d’une rue principale, les bâtiments sont presque toujours érigés sur des parcelles individuelles et organisées selon des bandes parallèles au fond de la vallée, dans un espace particulièrement étroit.

      L’urbanisation du territoire bergamasque témoigne d’un mélange de connaissances anciennes et de techniques récentes qui permettent de mettre en valeur chaque centimètre carré. Chaque maison exploite ainsi les plis des règles de construction et la pente de la vallée, sur la base d’un savoir local difficile à standardiser : un garage accessible depuis la rue du bas, la cour depuis celle située au-dessus, un étage supplémentaire sous les combles.

      Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, de nombreuses personnes ont restauré la cabane de leurs grands-parents dans la bande urbanisée près des pâturages et ont construit la maison de leurs enfants dans la bande inférieure, en investissant les fruits du travail industriel : c’est la génération qui était jeune pendant les trente glorieuses qui est aujourd’hui décimée par le virus, avec les conséquences dramatiques en matière de mémoire et de perte culturelle que l’on peut imaginer (Barcella 2020).

      Il ne s’agit donc pas d’une ville linéaire, mais d’une organisation urbaine par bandes linéaires. Les rues sont les repères de ce ruban urbain, qui fait l’effet d’un code-barres vu d’en haut : si vous le « coupez » perpendiculairement, vous y rencontrez en premier la zone habitée la plus ancienne, disposée tout le long de ce qui était autrefois la route romaine puis vénitienne ; en parallèle, se trouvent l’ancienne et la nouvelle route départementales, en alternance avec les fossés industriels du XIXe siècle.

      De la première mondialisation à la métropole régionale

      L’industrialisation commence au milieu du XIXe siècle : des protestants suisses et des industriels milanais trouvent dans la vallée des ressources en eau bon marché et s’approprient et complètent le réseau médiéval de canaux (Honegger fit l’histoire du textile, l’Italcementi celle du béton ; les usines de papier de Pigna, aujourd’hui propriété du groupe Buffetti, y ont déménagé en 1919 en provenance de Milan). Ces industries s’installent dans le lit majeur du fleuve et occupent l’autre rive, souvent inondée jusqu’au milieu du XXe siècle. Le coût environnemental de ce développement est considérable : destruction de terres agricoles, pollution croissante, exploitation de la nappe phréatique.

      Entre Nembro et Albino, on peut observer le cœur du système productif bergamasque : des centaines de petites et moyennes entreprises se juxtaposent et font travailler près de 4 000 employés. C’est un système totalement intégré dans les réseaux de production mondiaux : l’entreprise Acerbis, par exemple, transforme la matière plastique en réservoirs et composants pour motos ; Persico produit les coques des bateaux de la Coupe de l’America ; Polini Motori est spécialisée dans les kits de mise à niveau pour les cycles et les motos.

      Ces entreprises génèrent un trafic incessant de voitures et de camions qui encombrent l’ancienne route nationale de Val Seriana, l’autoroute qui relie Cene à Nembro et atteint Seriate, et l’autoroute qui relie Venise à Milan. Depuis 2009, un tramway relie la vallée à la gare de Bergame et transporte environ 13 000 passagers par jour.

      Le mode de vie y dépend donc autant du réseau familial organisé dans le voisinage, autour du palier ou de l’autre côté de la rue, que de l’enchevêtrement des autoroutes et des lignes aériennes qui traversent la région et mènent presque partout en quelques heures : Bergamo Orio al Serio est en effet le siège du hub italien de Ryanair et le troisième aéroport du pays, 17 millions de passagers par an et des liaisons avec le monde entier.
      Le système territorial bergamasque face au Covid-19

      L’hypermobilité (Verdeil 2020) est une des clés pour comprendre l’effet de la pandémie sur ces municipalités qui sont en même temps villageoises et métropolitaines : un exemple tragique est l’itinéraire de vacances d’un couple, elle d’Alzano, lui de Nembro, parti en vacances à La Havane le 29 février et terrassé par la maladie à Madrid le 19 mars (Nava 2020).

      Mais les contacts humains dépendent de nombreux autres facteurs, comme l’interdépendance (Baratier 2020) liée aux formes sociales et culturelles. En effet, la forme des établissements humains (la sociabilité, l’organisation spatiale, les institutions) a une influence importante, et la densité n’est plus la bonne mesure. Il semble que la sociabilité augmente les contacts sociaux qui répandent le virus, tandis que les nœuds infrastructuraux les démultiplient sur des échelles territoriales variées. Toutefois, les institutions de ces territoires n’ont aucune capacité de gouverner les effets croisés de ces différents facteurs. Du point de vue territorial, cette pandémie est une nouvelle manifestation de la discontinuité entre le politique et le territoire, qui s’était déjà manifestée bien avant le coronavirus.

      On pourrait même émettre l’hypothèse contraire, selon laquelle le modèle métropolitain est plus efficace dans la gestion de distances sociales et sa gouvernance plus résiliente face au risque de propagation liée à la sociabilité de province : les distances physiques sont mieux respectées, les institutions ont un accès privilégié aux réseaux mondiaux, et si les nœuds de transports y sont plus fréquentés, la mobilité des habitants des campagnes s’étale sur des échelles bien plus vastes.

      Comme nous ne disposons pas de données stabilisées, nous ne savons pas si la crise du virus s’ajoute à la déconnexion entre la sociabilité individualiste, les réseaux technologiques indifférents à l’environnement et les institutions, ou si elle est générée par cette déconnexion. Ce qui est certain, c’est que la région de Bergame additionne et multiplie les risques et les limites qui sont propres à la sociabilité paysanne, aux nœuds infrastructuraux urbains et aux institutions métropolitaines.

      Une fois l’urgence passée, cette crise devrait conduire à ouvrir une réflexion critique sur la gouvernance de ces territoires intermédiaires. L’examen des éléments proposés ci-dessus montre que la densité, la concentration, la promiscuité ne sont pas des indicateurs suffisants de l’uniformité du modèle de développement ; il indique également le rôle à multiples facettes des formations socio-territoriales.

      Si on doit reconnaître que le monde est urbain, comme l’a montré Henri Lefebvre, on peut sans doute questionner la métropole sans ignorer la variété de projets de métropolisation ou de rapprochement de la nature dans les différentes régions du monde. On n’a pas encore une explication exhaustive des causes de l’origine du virus, et encore moins de sa propagation : les hypothèses sous examen considèrent les déséquilibres environnementaux, les maladies pulmonaires, la capacité de réponse, les modèles de santé autant que la proximité et la distance physique. Tout résumer sous l’étiquette de métropolisation risque de ressusciter la mythologie des grandes explications, quand les spécificités des territoires réclament l’accompagnement des sociétés locales par l’étude et la compréhension de leur diversité.

      Bibliographie

      Angel, S., Parent, J., Civco D. L. et Blei, A. M. 2012. Atlas of Urban Expansion, Cambridge : Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
      Bagnasco, A. 1994. Fatti sociali formati nello spazio : cinque lezioni di sociologia urbana e regionale, Milan : Franco Angeli.
      Baratier, J. 2020. « Pandémie, résilience, villes : deux ou trois choses que nous savons d’elles », Linkedin [en ligne], 29 mars.
      Barcella, P. 2020. « Cartolina da Bergamo. Perché proprio qui ? », La Rivista del Mulino, 2 mars.
      Barles, S. 1999. La Ville délétère, Ceyzérieu : Champ Vallon.
      Faburel, G. 2020. « La métropolisation du monde est une cause de la pandémie », Reporterre [en ligne], 28 mars.
      Indovina, F. 1990. La città diffusa, Venise : Quaderno Iuav-DAEST.
      Invernizzi, I. 2020. « Coronavirus, il numero reale dei decessi : in Bergamasca 4.500 in un mese », L’Eco di Bergamo, 1er avril.
      Lameri, M. et al. 2016. Trampiù : studio delle esternalita’ territoriali generate dall’ipotesi di prolungamento della linea tranviaria T1 da Albino a Vertova, Bergame : TEB.
      Nava, F. 2020. « Mancata zona rossa nella bergamasca : storia di un contagio intercontinentale, da Alzano Lombardo a Cuba, passando per Madrid », TPI, The Post International, 31 mars.
      Offner, J.-M. 2020. Anachronismes urbains, Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.
      Rivière, D. et Weber, S. 2006. « Le modèle du district italien en question : bilan et perspectives à l’heure de l’Europe élargie », Méditerranée, n° 106, p. 57-64.
      Verdeil, E. 2020. « La métropolisation, coupable idéale de la pandémie ? », The Conversation [en ligne], 9 avril.

      https://www.metropolitiques.eu/Pourquoi-Bergame-Le-virus-au-bout-du-territoire.html

    • Rethinking the city: urban experience and the Covid-19 pandemic

      Whilst the full effects of the Covid-19 pandemic are yet to be seen, the near-global lockdown of urban centres has been a jarring experience for city-dwellers. But how does the rapid spreading of the virus change our perception of the city? Here, Ravi Ghosh argues that these conditions prompts us to see the city differently, and sets us the urgent task of extending the right to the city to all its inhabitants.

      Whilst the full effects of the Covid-19 pandemic are yet to be seen, the near-global lockdown of urban centres has been a jarring experience for city-dwellers. The optimisation narrative has been stopped in its tracks. The speed, number, and efficiency of available urban experiences are now fixed somewhere close to zero. And even the things we do to escape this logic of urban gratification — to calm the pace of everyday life — are now increasingly unavailable; without culture, community, and recreation, people are beginning to wonder what they’re actually doing here, squashed into crowded cities across the world. But, as the peak of the pandemic approaches in many countries, there are more profound forces at play beyond just the individual’s loss of activity and communication.

      To be isolating in the city is to embody an agonising contemporary paradox: that, although the coronavirus is now moving rapidly through regions like New York State and London, the connectivity, medical resources, and infrastructure in these centres means that local health prospects may actually be higher than in less infected areas. Having already spread along the avenues of globalisation — holidaying, business travel, and international supply chains — the virus is now recreating a familiar Western narrative: that of the city under siege. Whether via cabinet-war-room style depictions of central government, or makeshift hospitals in the triangle of London, Birmingham, and Manchester, cities will inevitably emerge as defiant symbols of human endeavour and resilience, irrespective of the harm their cramped organisation may also have caused.

      But what of this desire for an active city? In Urban Revolution (1970), Henri Lefebvre uses a rough axis (marked from 0 to 100% urbanisation) to imagine the city space. It starts with the political city — marked by bureaucratic power — before progressing through mercantile and industrial phases. Postindustrial society is termed ‘urban’, at which point the city undergoes a process of ‘implosion-explosion’ as it approaches the end of the axis. This rampant expansion of the ‘urban fabric’ which Lefebvre describes will evoke nostalgia to anyone living in a major hub, but unable to enjoy it:

      the tremendous concentration (of people, activities, wealth, goods, objects, instruments, means, and thought) of urban reality and the immense explosion, the projection of numerous disjunct fragments (peripheries, suburbs, vacation homes, satellite towns) into space.

      For Lefebvre, these ideas were both a loose historical commentary and a starting point for his own socialist reimagining of ‘complete urbanisation’. This is apt given the current lockdown; the current pandemic may well be an acid test for society’s infrastructure and economic model. Watching from behind closed doors as they mobilise in tandem offers an historically unique, often painful perspective. Flaws are revealed gradually, and with great cost to human life. However painful these may be now, in time they could offer a unique opportunity to remake society with the lessons learned.

      Perhaps most relevant to our current situation is Lefebvre’s broad understanding of the urban fabric; he includes vacation homes, motorways, suburbs, and even countryside supermarkets in his definition. In normal circumstances, these structures are self-sustaining and peripheral, but what we see in the current crisis is the power of individuals to balloon the city by flocking to its fringes — often at the expense of fellow citizens. When movement is coded with infection, urbanisation suddenly becomes a form of domination. Under this kind of siege, it’s better to sit tight than to flee.

      It’s interesting to see this being acknowledged by some sections of the media, even if the socio-cultural consequences remain largely unexplored. The New York Times states that to make meaningful per capita comparisons for Covid-19 cases, its data focuses upon ‘metropolitan areas’ rather than cities or countries, as they more accurately account for ‘the regions where the virus might spread quickly among families, co-workers or commuters’. The statistics for the New York area therefore include nearby suburbs in Westchester, Long Island, and northern New Jersey. And although there’s no immediate way of determining whether people are moving out of necessity or choice, a fairly obvious distinction can be made between displaced workers moving from Delhi, for example, and those in prosperous Western centres — where movement is contingent on financial stability. The pushback against needless migration is mostly anecdotal, seen through viral images of angry placards in British seaside towns, and local news stories of overwhelmed health services. The pandemic has caused a retreat into the familiarity of nation states: not just in the literal sense of repatriation, but also as a means of civic organisation, internal governance, and statistical monitoring. What some call ‘de-globalisation’ reveals what we already know: that not all nations, governments, or health services are created equal — and that this applies to sub-national groupings too. Spatial inequality will play a huge role in determining the eventual death map of the pandemic.

      In such strangely out-of-time situations, what constitutes the normal is thrown into sharp relief. Activities normally taken for granted are judged by how easily they can be replicated while upholding their essential values — which in our current time usually means a relocation to the internet. What emerges is a familiar gulf between the professional and the social. Whereas for most office-based employees, work can continue with the assistance of specialised software, communications, and adaptable management structures, the integrity of social relationships suffers far more when human contact is removed.

      We feel an acute yearning for companionship, not just because we miss our friends more than we miss our bosses, but because for the most part, the means of reproducing social intimacy online are far inferior to those which ensure the fulfilment of economic roles. That video calling is the go-to for both spheres demonstrates this; it’s somehow the optimal social medium, but exists alongside far more complex tools within the work of work, especially in highly adapted corporate industries. The overlap is somewhat inevitable given that work needs a social element to function, but it’s still grimly remarkable that to evoke all the tenderness and multiplicity of friendships, the best we’ve come up with is drinking a beer while watching someone else do the same on our phones.

      It’s tempting to read the digitalisation of work as a direct transposition of the relations of production. This may be roughly the case, but in reality, there are obvious (and often welcome) differences between urban work culture and the current isolation, which speak to Lefebvre’s earlier ideas on ‘everyday life’ (not to mention that work has been at least partially online for decades). By theorising new forms of alienation within modernity — the unpaid labour of the daily commute, for example — Lefebvre in many ways anticipated common qualms about 21st century work life. These are familiar to us, now mostly expressed in the pithy, resigned idiom of being ‘chained to the desk’, ‘meetings that could be an email’, and the general exhaustion of 24/7 communications. The lockdown has stripped back many of these rituals, revealing that much of face-to-face professional life is made up of parade, gesture, formality, and convention — even if there is enjoyment to be found in the structure and atmosphere of the office. Doing more online, and crucially, from not-the-office may be a lasting result from the current changes.

      As William Davies has recently suggested, rather than viewing the pandemic as a crisis of capitalism, ‘it might better be understood as the sort of work-making event that allows for new economic and intellectual beginnings’. While this is not the dawning of Lefebvre’s ‘urban utopia’, conceiving of digitalisation as a form of urban progression does point to potential improvements in everyday life, even if the existing internet hierarchy hardly favours citizens. As Joe Shaw and Mark Graham from Oxford Internet Institute argue in a 2017 paper, in order to democratise the city space, we need to understand contemporary urbanisation “as a period where the city is increasingly reproduced through digital information’. They focus on Google’s ability to control the reproduction of urban space through features like maps and email: ‘this is a power to choose how a city is reduced to information, and to control the manner in which it is translated into knowledge and reintroduced to material everyday reality’. Companies are utterly dominant in this area, though the relocation of work and social relations to the digital space — coupled with an overdue revaluation of critical work, a recognition of the service industry’s precarity, and an increase in corporate responsibility — could provide a turning point for some urban hierarchies. The case for universal low-cost internet will be made with renewed urgency after the pandemic; access to accurate information has suddenly become a matter of life and death. If the oft-mentioned global solidarity outlasts the pandemic, then meaningful progress could be made against tech monopolies, resource inequality, and climate breakdown.

      For all the difficulties of the lockdown, it does refine our appreciation of what came before. Social existence is naturally incidental and unpredictable — there’s a kind of randomised joy borne of living amongst others. In the city, this effect is amplified. As Lefebvre says of the city’s streets, they are ‘a place to play and learn….a form of spontaneous theatre, I become spectacle and spectator, and sometimes an actor’. There’s certainly a romantic optimism here, but as isolation brings longing, the words feel ever sincerer. A recent Financial Times article contained an amusing vignette on an empty London:

      The bankers have disappeared and new tribes with different uniforms have taken over: builders in black trousers and dusty boots; security guards in high-vis jackets pacing outside empty lobbies; and trim young men and women in lycra running or cycling through the empty streets.

      The reality, of course, is that these people were always there; it’s just that not everyone notices them. The task beyond the pandemic will be extending this right to the city to all: remaking the structures of everyday life so that they empower all citizens, and harnessing digital urbanisation rather than existing at its mercy. Extending our current social contract — which shows we are prepared to live differently to protect the vulnerable — will be a powerful first step.

      https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4648-rethinking-the-city-urban-experience-and-the-covid-19-pandemic

    • In Dense Cities Like Boston, Coronavirus Epidemics Last Longer, Northeastern Study Finds

      An analysis by Northeastern University researchers and colleagues finds that in crowded cities — like Boston — coronavirus epidemics not only grow bigger, they also tend to last longer.

      The paper, based on data from Italy and China, looks at how quickly an epidemic peaks depending on how crowded a location is.

      “In urban areas, we tend to see long, broad epidemics — for example, Boston,” says lead co-author Samuel Scarpino from the Network Science Institute at Northeastern. “And in comparatively more suburban or rural areas we tend to see sharp, quick, burst-y epidemics.”

      Scarpino says it’s key for Massachusetts to have uniform rules across the state, because movement from one area to another — say, from a town where restaurants are closed to one where they’re open — can help spread the virus. Here are some edited excerpts of our conversation, beginning with how he sums up the research just out in the journal Nature Medicine:

      Scarpino: What we report in the paper is that the structure of communities affects both the height and the duration of COVID-19 epidemics.

      Carey Goldberg: So more dense areas will have not just more cases, but a more prolonged course?

      Right. In urban areas, we’re likely to have larger outbreaks — in terms of total number, even in terms of percentage of the population — and they will be much longer, lasting weeks and weeks or months, as we’ve seen in Boston, New York City, London and many places around the world.

      However, in rural areas, or areas that have population structures that are much more tightly knit — as opposed to a looser collection of households in neighborhoods, as we have spread out across Boston — you get sharp, intense outbreaks. They can be overwhelming in terms of the resources available for caring for patients, and quite dramatic in terms of their effects on the population.

      Think about the outbreak in rural Maine that was sparked by a super-spreading event at a wedding, and how it quickly swept through the population.

      Why do these insights about community structure and its effect on transmission matter?

      In many rural areas that are at risk of these intense outbreaks, there’s much lower health care coverage and often, especially in the United States, a lot more complacency around mask-wearing and physical distancing. These areas are largely protected because they’re isolated. However, if cases show up — as we’ve seen in places like rural Maine — the outbreaks can be quite severe and rapid.

      Also, in the more dense areas, you’re going to have cases that move around throughout the population, throughout the different neighborhoods of the city. You’re going to have outbreaks go quiet in some areas, and then become louder in other areas.

      And this process can be very, very prolonged, and can make the types of intervention measures that you need to deploy either quite severe or quite complicated, because they have to be very specifically tailored to what’s happening at the really local level within the larger cities.

      So what does this mean for policy?

      Well, in related work we show that having policies that are different across a city can lead people to move out of their neighborhoods, to go to parks or to go to restaurants with different dining restrictions, or to go to venues with different limits on capacity. And that interacts with the structure of the city to spread the outbreak much more rapidly, kind of accelerating the pace and tempo of cases.

      So that really suggests that because the outbreak is going to be so long-lasting, you really either need to focus on driving it completely out or you need to have policies that will protect all of the places with lower rates of cases while intervening in a targeted way in the places with much higher rates of cases.

      So what you don’t want to do is put in tougher measures in hot-spots, because then you’re just going to drive people out to other places where they’re going to spread it even more.

      Exactly. In the state of Massachusetts, where we have the governor relaxing measures in a fairly extreme fashion in some areas and not in other areas, you are likely to have a situation where you’re just moving the infection around and putting other communities at risk.

      So having a more intermediate level of control that’s more uniformly distributed across space is much better epidemiologically.

      But that’s not what the state is doing.

      The state in many ways is really doing almost the opposite of what our paper suggests in terms of the ways in which you need to focus on controlling COVID-19, and also related work that shows this sort of patchwork of different policies really creates quite a bit of risk.

      It seems incredibly important to have hyper-local information, because in the structure you describe, the spread happens at the level of households or neighborhoods, and then you have just a bit of crossover to other places, and that’s how it just keeps going.

      That is the implication of our work and many other studies that show that COVID-19, from an epidemiological perspective, is an amalgamation of local transmission that’s happening in households, in restaurants, in occasional longer-distance transmission that moves it into new areas. So you need to have really hyper-localized information around where the cases are occurring and to find out where the cases are coming from.

      And that, unfortunately, is one of the things that we’re still not getting clear guidance on from the state: Where are the cases coming from? So that we can understand how we need to intervene.

      Without that data, we really aren’t armed with the right kinds of information to both stop the spread and to try and implement measures that will maximally control COVID-19 while having the least possible effects on our economic health, mental health and societal health.

      https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2020/10/06/coronavirus-lasts-longer-cities-boston

  • La #pandémie du #Covid-19 : un risque inhérent à la #mondialisation (2) ?

    Dans un contexte (national, européen et mondial) fortement marqué par la pandémie du Covid-19, ce deuxième billet revient sur les enseignements de trois notices développées dans le Dictionnaire critique de la mondialisation (Armand Colin, 2012), « crises », « risques » et « résilience ». Comment faut-il les interpréter à partir du vécu de la catastrophe du Covid-19 et dans la perspective d’un débat critique sur la « démondialisation » face à la métropolisation (troisième billet) ?

    1-De la « crise » et des crises

    Dans les deux éditions du Dictionnaire critique de la mondialisation, on retrouve la notice « crise » qui évoque la pluralité de crises sous trois angles différents (Martine Azuelos). Il est ainsi question de crise environnementale (en raison de l’épuisement des ressources naturelles et de la perte de la biodiversité) ; crise sociale (montée du chômage et de la précarité dans les pays développés, exploitation des travailleurs dans les pays émergents, y compris des enfants) ; et crise culturelle (déclin de la diversité culturelle et linguistique sous l’effet de l’homogénéisation des modes de vie et de consommation).

    L’analyse insiste principalement sur les risques financiers. Ce choix se justifie aisément dans la mesure où il s’agissait d’apporter un éclairage neuf sur les effets associés aux politiques de déréglementation financière et à la globalisation, soit la métamorphose du capitalisme vers une financiarisation accrue. La seconde édition du Dictionnaire paraît quatre ans après la crise financière de 2008 – – suite à la crise des subprimes (2007) et à la chute de la banque Lehman Brothers aux Etats-Unis.

    La notice fait référence à la crise comme une phase du cycle économique se traduisant par un ralentissement de la croissance et la montée du chômage. Ceci ne représente pas un phénomène propre à la mondialisation dans la mesure où elle a jalonné l’histoire de l’humanité. Mais avec l’intégration des économies productives et des marchés financiers, elle prend une nouvelle ampleur. Sa diffusion est désormais planétaire, expérience vécue lors de la crise financière de 2008.

    Dans les sociétés préindustrielles, les crises étaient liées à la sous-production agricole alors que dans les sociétés industrielles, elles sont la résultante d’un déséquilibre entre la production (industrielle) et la demande solvable suivies de perturbations d’ordre financier. Au XXème siècle, des faillites bancaires ou krachs boursiers ont précédé la baisse de l’activité, comme en 1929, en 2000, ou en 2007-2009.

    Pour de nombreux chercheurs (Michel Aglietta), les crises financières à venir seraient consubstantielles au capitalisme globalisé et financiarisé car soucieux du court terme et de liquidité. Ils insistent notamment sur les nouvelles normes comptables valorisant les actifs d’une entreprise à leur valeur de marché, comme si la vocation première d’une firme était d’être liquidée le lendemain matin. La tradition marxiste voit dans la globalisation le stade suprême du capitalisme mais les libéraux estiment au contraire qu’elle permet une accélération de la croissance et une augmentation de la prospérité à l’échelle planétaire.

    Cette seconde approche de la globalisation fut dominante au moment où les États menaient des politiques de déréglementation financière, c’est-à-dire dans les années 1980-2000. Elle l’est nettement moins depuis la récession mondiale de 2008 au sein des gouvernements européens et des organisations internationales (G20, OMC, FMI). Certes la globalisation stimule la croissance mondiale mais force de reconnaître qu’elle est aussi génératrice d’une forte instabilité.

    Après avoir présenté la notice « crise » et souligné l’ampleur qu’elle peut prendre dans un cycle de mondialisation en raison d’une certaine forme d’instabilité que partagent les sociétés contemporaines, l’analyse se poursuit avec le concept « risque ».
    2-Du « risque » et des risques

    Le « risque » fait l’objet de trois notices et d’un essai rédigé par Magali Reghezza-Zitt. La première notice définit le terme en optant pour un point de vue général. La deuxième est centrée sur le risque environnemental (MRZ) et la troisième sur le risque systémique tel qu’il est évoqué dans les cercles financiers et ceux de la révolution numérique (Catherine Distler). Quant à l’essai, il étudie les « interactions réciproques et complexes entre risques et mondialisation ».

    2.1-Nous commencerons par évoquer le risque systémique en lien avec la crise financière (précédemment explicitée) et les systèmes d’information autour d’Internet.
    Le risque systémique financier résulte de l’imbrication de plusieurs composantes : système bancaire, marchés de capitaux (shadow banking) et Internet dont l’intégrité et le bon fonctionnement sont menacés par des perturbations internes ou externes. Il s’est matérialisé en 2008 lorsque plusieurs établissements financiers américains entrent en cessation de paiement, un an après la crise des subprimes (prêts hypothécaires risqués) de 2007 que certains expliquent en raison de l’abrogation de la loi américaine Glass-Steagall (1999) qui mit fin à la séparation entre la banque d’investissement et la banque de dépôt.

    Le risque systémique est également évoqué pour les systèmes d’information et notamment pour Internet dans la mesure où la diffusion de certains virus est susceptible de corrompre les informations disponibles ou le fonctionnement du système dans son ensemble. D’où l’impératif pour les États du recours à une politique visant la cyber sécurité pour éviter la circulation des virus, à l’initiative des hackers indépendants ou en lien avec des terroristes.

    2.2-La science formalise le risque
    Pour Magali Reghezza-Zitt, le risque est devenu un concept avec l’invention du calcul des probabilités à partir du XVIIème siècle, suite à un changement de paradigme ayant permis une laïcisation du danger. Si jusque-là, la catastrophe était vue comme un acte de Dieu, des philosophes (dont Rousseau), à la suite du tremblement de terre de Lisbonne mettent en exergue la responsabilité humaine. Puis le risque est définitivement formalisé au début du XXème siècle par l’économiste américain F. Knight. Il est alors défini comme l’incertitude en tant qu’elle est objectivable car mesurable.

    2.3-Le risque environnemental désigne tout danger lié à l’environnement en dépit de la difficulté à l’appréhender parce que le concept d’environnement est ambigu du fait de sa polysémie. Ce n’est que depuis les années 1980 que l’environnement est synonyme de nature. Le risque environnemental désigne alors l’ensemble des pollutions, nuisances, atteintes aux écosystèmes, etc.

    Le recours au concept de risque environnemental est devenu au fil du temps un moyen pour contester le capitalisme globalisé jugé responsable des atteintes portées à la planète. La révolution des transports, l’augmentation des mobilités, etc. sont mis en cause. Les revendications sont portées par des idéologies différentes, venues parfois d’horizons radicalement opposés : altermondialistes, antilibéraux, écologie radicale (deep ecology), mouvements réactionnaires, etc.

    2.4-L’essai est centré sur les interactions entre « risques » et « mondialisation » (globalisation). Pour Magali Reghezza-Zitt, la mondialisation transforme les risques existants en même temps que les risques sont susceptibles de devenir une menace pour la mondialisation.
    La globalisation financière qui a permis l’intégration économique et financière des sociétés nationales et qui a renforcé les interdépendances serait à l’origine d’une mutation des risques financiers susceptibles d’entraîner à leur tour de sérieux risques sociaux (exacerbation des inégalités sociales).

    La mondialisation renouvelle des risques anciens et leur donne une nouvelle ampleur. La mondialisation des agricultures qui aurait pu se traduire par une meilleure répartition des denrées alimentaires dans le monde, a en fait participé à la résurgence de crises alimentaires mondiales qui ont plongé certains États dans l’instabilité économique, sociale et politique. Elle a conduit à penser la « sécurité alimentaire » (Nicolas Bricas) certes nationale mais également transnationale. Des ONGs viennent en aide aux personnes déplacées en raison des menaces guerrières ou victimes de catastrophes naturelles.

    L’augmentation des mobilités est source de multiples risques environnementaux : rejet massif de gaz à effet de serre qui s’ajoute à celui des industries, ce qui a des répercussions sur le climat planétaire. La délocalisation d’activités polluantes et de déchets toxiques en direction de pays moins rigoureux sur les législations ou à moindre coûts salariaux, a entraîné une diffusion de polluants dans des espaces jusque-là épargnés.

    L’auteur indique par ailleurs que l’augmentation des mobilités ne se limite pas aux risques environnementaux, elle touche aussi les risques sanitaires, comme le SRAS, les grippes aviaires, la grippe A(H1N1). En 2020 le Coronavirus ou Covid-19 a affecté 500.000 personnes dans le monde et a été à l’origine d’une politique de confinement pour les populations dans de nombreux pays.

    Si la mondialisation influe sur les risques et sur les catastrophes qu’ils entraînent, ces derniers peuvent mettre en péril la mondialisation. L’intensification des échanges pèse sur les ressources énergétiques fossiles qui à moyen terme font planer un risque important sur les échanges qui constituent le fondement de la mondialisation. Risques et catastrophes fragilisent la mondialisation. C’est ce que recherchent les terroristes lorsqu’ils s’attaquent aux tours de Manhattan, haut lieu de la mondialisation. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 peuvent être analysés comme une atteinte matérielle, mais aussi symbolique, portée à l’hypercentre de la mondialisation.

    A la suite de E. Michel-Kerjan, les chercheurs soulignent combien la planétarisation de ‘nouveaux’ risques entraînent des risques ‘à grande échelle’. Avec la mondialisation, la grande nouveauté résiderait dans le risque à grande échelle – – comme en témoigne le Covid-19- – qui donnerait de l’ampleur aux catastrophes engendrées tant en termes de coût que d’échelle spatiale. Les risques à « grande échelle » ont trois caractéristiques : (1) une probabilité d’occurrence difficile à calculer et plus largement, une forte incertitude ; (2) la diffusion rapide de la perturbation au-delà du point d’impact initial ; (3) enfin l’ubiquité qui fait que le sinistre se produit au même moment en plusieurs lieux sans que ces lieux ne soient forcément proches dans l’espace.

    Les sociétés mondialisées seraient caractérisées par des niveaux de risques globaux très élevés et inédits alors même que la nature de l’aléa n’a pas changé. Ces risques globaux affectent les territoires en fonction de leur insertion à la mondialisation et la globalisation : plus le territoire affecté initialement est intégrée à l’économie globalisée, plus les risques de diffusion seront importants.

    L’idée de changement d’échelle, consubstantielle à la mondialisation, entraîne l’idée qu’il est indispensable de penser certains risques à l’échelle planétaire et plus uniquement au niveau local ou national. Il y a désormais des interactions entre les échelles. Les thématiques du changement climatique et de la biodiversité rappellent régulièrement le caractère systémique de l’environnement naturel. Les notions de risques globaux ou de risques planétaires caractériseraient nos sociétés modernes.

    2.5-Qu’en est-il pour les villes ?

    Mondialisation et « métropolisation » – -concept utilisé depuis plusieurs décennies pour rendre compte des changements identifiés dans les processus d’urbanisation (Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin)- – qui résultent de la globalisation financière sont à l’origine d’une transformation de la matérialité des espaces urbains. La concentration des biens et des personnes entraîne une augmentation des richesses exposées aux catastrophes pendant que l’urbanisme vertical modifie sérieusement la nature des impacts physiques. Les tours et gratte-ciel (skyscraper) ont une fragilité intrinsèque qui demande des mesures de sécurité spécifiques.

    D’après Magali Reghezza-Zitt la métropolisation encouragerait l’intensification des réseaux, qui facilitent des échanges rapides, parfois instantanés, d’informations, de biens, de personnes. Or les réseaux sont de plus en plus interdépendants et ils sont devenus de puissants éléments de diffusion des sinistres à l’ensemble de la ville, mais également à des échelles supra-urbaines, qu’il s’agisse des régions métropolitaines, du pays tout entier voire du monde ou du continent. C’est la structure réticulaire des villes globalisées qui est concernée.

    Au final, la question des risques peut se comprendre comme une clé de lecture pertinente des mécanismes et conséquences de la mondialisation et de la globalisation. Mais paradoxalement les questions autour des couples risque/mondialisation/ et risque/globalisation apparaissent peu dans la littérature française alors que les corpus anglo-américains incluent de nombreuses réflexions sur le thème de « disasters and globalization » tout en se limitant, il est vrai, à la globalisation financière. L’approche française de la mondialisation qui différencie « mondialisation » et « globalisation » et « planétarisation » permettrait de mettre en évidence la question des changements d’échelle qui exprime la dialectique local/global.
    3-De la « résilience »

    L’auteur (MRZ) de la notice sur la résilience constate que depuis la fin des années 1990, le concept de résilience est présent dans une très grande variété de travaux interdisciplinaires. Il viendrait de l’écologie et aurait été théorisé par C.S. Holling (1973), pour signifier la capacité d’un écosystème à maintenir son état d’équilibre en cas de perturbation avant d’être utilisé en sciences sociales à la suite de P. Timmerman (1981). La résilience est alors perçue comme un antonyme positif de la « vulnérabilité ». Elle signifie la capacité des communautés humaines à supporter les chocs ou les perturbations externes et à se relever de tels bouleversements.

    La résilience apparaît donc comme une propriété souhaitable des sociétés et des systèmes territoriaux, dans un contexte de mondialisation des menaces (risques environnementaux, risques sanitaires, changement climatique, risques financiers et économiques, terrorisme de masse, cyber-risques etc.) en raison de l’incertitude concernant l’ampleur et la nature des changements. Elle a été mobilisée aux Etats-Unis suite aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, pour penser la capacité des habitants de la ville à se relever et à reconstruire leur ville.

    Les chercheurs proposent également de différencier la résilience ‘réactive’ de la résilience ‘proactive’ (J.W. Handmer et S.R. Dovers, 1996). La première renvoie à la capacité à intégrer la perturbation dans son fonctionnement alors que la seconde accepte le changement et tente de créer un système capable de s’adapter à de nouvelles conditions. Mais cette distinction aisée à comprendre pose en fait de sérieuses questions méthodologiques. Sur la base de quels critères peut-on parler de ‘résilience’ ou au contraire de ‘bifurcation’ du système considéré ?

    L’auteur insiste au final sur les enjeux politiques du discours sur la résilience : ce dernier peut en effet servir une stratégie d’appropriation et de maintien d’un pouvoir sur un espace. En d’autres termes il peut servir à reproduire à l’identique des systèmes inégalitaires ou injustes. Le récit de la résilience peut certainement être salué : il évite de mettre l’accent sur l’idée de vulnérabilité qui peut conduire au fatalisme pour insister sur les capacités de rebond des sociétés.
    Que nous apprend le Dictionnaire ?

    La démarche réflexive sur les trois concepts « crise », « risque » et « résilience » qui ont fait l’objet de notices dans le Dictionnaire critique de la mondialisation permet d’en déduire que les chercheurs.res qui ont participé à la fabrique du dictionnaire ont pris en compte sur le mode explicite les enjeux sociaux et politiques liés aux processus inhérents à la mondialisation, globalisation et planétarisation. Ils/elles ont ainsi mis le doigt sur les fragilités de ces processus ainsi que sur les risques conduisant à l’exacerbation des inégalités sociales.

    Mais si le Dictionnaire inclut des notices et des analyses soulignant avec précision l’incertitude qu’entraîne la mondialisation, le risque sanitaire a été moins bien mis en lumière que les risques financiers, environnementaux et ceux liés au terrorisme de masse. En d’autres termes, le changement climatique tout comme l’affirmation de réseaux transnationaux dans le trafic de la drogue ou le terrorisme ont pris le dessus sur les questions liées à la santé, en dehors des notices « pandémie » et « médicament ».

    Avec le Covid-19, les sociétés contemporaines prennent la mesure de la fragilité sanitaire des sociétés dans un monde globalisé faisant face au changement climatique. Avec cette prise de conscience quelles seront les réactions des décideurs et de la société en général ? L’idéologie en faveur d’une « démondialisation » (Cynthia Ghorra-Gobin) préconisée par certains dominera-t-elle le débat ? Le principe de la « décroissance » (Martine Azuelos) réussira-t-il à l’emporter pour mettre fin au sentiment de « vulnérabilité » (Magali Rehezza-Zitt) ?

    Ce questionnement sera explicité dans un troisième billet à partir de trois notices du Dictionnaire critique de la mondialisation (Armand Colin, 2012) : décroissance, démondialisation et vulnérabilité.

    https://skyscraper.hypotheses.org/890
    #globalisation #risque #risques #résilience #pandémie #épidémie #économie #risque_systémique

  • [Édito] Le #Coronavirus impose au monde de relocaliser ses usines

    Le coronavirus est en train de prouver que les grandes chaînes de production mondialisées, en particulier entre la Chine et les pays occidentaux, ne sont absolument pas fiables. Le Covid-19 a réussi à les mettre à genoux en quelques semaines. En France, les voix qui appellent à relocaliser les #usines sur le territoire se font de mieux en mieux entendre.

    Quand j’étais plus jeune, dans les années 90, on m’apprenait à l’école que le monde occidental entrait dans une ère post-industrielle, faite de services, de cerveaux et de valeur ajoutée. La grossière production de biens, les chaînes de productions, avaient pour vocation à être mises dans les mains des pays en voie de développement, la Chine en particulier, qui, à l’époque, commençait à peine à s’"éveiller", comme le disaient les économistes alors. Elle était la future usine du monde.

    Déjà à l’époque, l’idée me semblait absurde. Et cela fait maintenant plusieurs années que l’extrême dépendance des sociétés occidentales, européennes en particulier, aux chaînes de production délocalisées en Asie, est comprise comme un danger. Mais le retour en arrière est difficile ; tant de milliards ont été investis au loin et le coût du travail est si faible ! Le Coronavirus, qui est en train de rendre malade notre économie, va peut-être enfin réussir à défaire ce que plusieurs décennies de mauvaises doctrines économiques ont fait.

    Une industrie poids faible

    La mondialisation n’est pas mauvaise par essence, mais incontrôlée, elle est néfaste. La France le paie cher. L’industrie y représentait 25 % du PIB à la fin des années 70, elle représente maintenant à peine 10 %. La moyenne européenne est à 20 %, l’Allemagne est à 27 %... La promotion récente du Made In France, outre son succès de communication, ne parvient pas à réellement changer la donne. Surfant sur la crise du Coronavirus, Bruno le Maire en profite pour insister sur la nécessité de « relocaliser l’industrie ».

    Il évoque une vraie réorientation stratégique afin de limiter la dépendance française et européenne. Il cite trois secteurs sensibles : les médicaments (dont 90 % des principes actifs sont produits hors de l’Union européenne), l’automobile électrique (pour laquelle l’Europe commence à peine à déployer des usines), ou encore l’aéronautique (dont l’essentiel des fournisseurs est en Chine)… À cela on pourrait rajouter l’électronique et l’informatique.

    La souveraineté technologique et industrielle est un prérequis à la souveraineté politique, assure le ministre français. Alors que cette relocalisation était une question de choix jusqu’alors, le coronavirus en fait une obligation. Le risque épidémique, qui va s’accentuer à l’avenir, tout comme le risque climatique, devient un risque physique pour la survie des entreprises trop dépendantes de chaines d’approvisionnement lointaines qu’en réalité elles ne maîtrisent plus vraiment.

    https://www.novethic.fr/actualite/politique/isr-rse/edito-relocalisation-industrielle-le-coronavirus-abat-des-decennies-de-mauv
    #industrie #relocalisation #mondialisation #globalisation #production_industrielle

  • In Flüchtlingslagern leben auf engstem Raum zu viele Menschen zusam...
    https://diasp.eu/p/10610854

    In Flüchtlingslagern leben auf engstem Raum zu viele Menschen zusammen. Helfer versuchen mit strikten Regeln, einen Ausbruch von Covid-19 zu verhindern. Ärzte warnen: ein unmögliches Unterfangen. Coronavirus: Die Angst in den Flüchtlingslagern - Griechenland, Libanon Bangladesh, Kenia - DER SPIEGEL - Politik #Politik #Ausland #GlobaleGesellschaft #Flüchtlinge #Coronavirus #Griechenland #Kenia #Bangladesch #Libanon #Syrien

  • La Tropicalisation du monde - Mon blog sur l’écologie politique
    http://blog.ecologie-politique.eu/post/La-Tropicalisation-du-monde

    Et si le monde occidental, celui des pays riches et peuplés de Blanc·hes, faisait aujourd’hui l’objet d’un processus de « #tropicalisation » ? Lanata, anthropologue et économiste du développement, fait l’hypothèse que nous sommes à un point où le monstre #capitaliste, créé et nourri dans les pays du nord, est devenu tellement avide que le Sud ne lui suffit plus.


    #livre

  • Does sustainable development have an elephant in the room ?

    The inherently unequal relationship between the developed and developing world is hindering sustainable development.

    This week, the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has begun deliberating on its resolutions. Sustainable development is high on the agenda. This year UNGA has had a record number of high-level meetings - most of them either on or related to the topic.

    At the centre of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are the many disparities between the developed and developing world, including the unequal consumption and use of natural resources; the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation; economic sovereignty and opportunities; and the unequal power in international organisations and decision-making.

    Still, according to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ recent progress report on the Sustainable Development Goals, disparities between the developed and developing world continue to grow.

    CO2 emissions are on a trajectory towards disastrous tipping points and global material consumption is projected to more than double by 2060. In the last 20 years, climate-related disasters have led to a 150 percent increase in economic losses and claimed an estimated 1.3 million lives, the great majority of them in the developing world. Climate change-driven conflicts and migration are on the rise, too.

    The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is clear that moving towards sustainability requires the broadest possible international cooperation, an ethic of global citizenship and shared responsibility. Crucially, this includes decreasing international disparities between developed and developing countries, such as in international decision-making, control and use of natural resources and unsustainable patterns of consumption and production.

    However, there is an elephant in the room of sustainable development. Namely, the very relationship between the developed and developing world of domination and subordination and its historical roots in colonialism.

    Today’s unsustainability is shaped by a history that includes the control and use of natural resources and cheap labour for the benefit and consumption of European and European colonial-settler states. It is a history where a bottom line of maximising profit and economic growth included colonisation of foreign lands and peoples, a transformation of landscapes and societies across the world, enslavement, genocides, wars and systemic racial discrimination.

    Over centuries, an international order was established dominated by European colonial and colonial-settler states populated by a majority of European descendants. That is to say, largely today’s developed world.

    Although the inherently unequal relationship between the developed and developing world and its colonial history is not addressed by the Sustainable Development Goals - it is no secret to the UN.

    For example, according to the most comprehensive universal human rights instrument against racial discrimination - the declaration and programme of action of the 2001 Third World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa - the effects and persistence of colonial structures and practices are among the factors contributing to lasting social and economic inequalities in many parts of the world today.

    During the early 1970s, developing nations - many of them recently independent - passed resolutions in the UNGA to establish a new international economic order. They demanded self determination over their economy and natural resources as well as equity in determining the laws, rules and regulations of the global economy.

    The explicit objective was to address international inequities in the wake of European colonialism. Developed countries with the power to actualise such a new international economic order were not interested and nothing much became of it.

    Nonetheless, the call for a new international economic order resonated in the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development. Among other things, it calls on states to eliminate the massive violations of human rights resulting from colonialism, neo-colonialism, all forms of racism and racial discrimination.

    In recent years, there has again been a growing call by developing countries in the UNGA for a new equitable and democratic international economic order. But this time too, developing countries with the power to make that call a reality have opposed it.

    Last year a resolution was passed in the UNGA towards a new international economic order. It emphasises that development within countries needs to be supported by a favourable international economic order. Among other things, it calls for increased coordination of international economic policy in order to avoid it having a particularly negative impact on developing countries.

    An overwhelming majority of 133 of the 193 UN member states voted for the resolution. All developed countries voted against it.

    Another resolution that was passed in the UNGA last year promoted a democratic and equitable international order. It, too, calls for an international economic order based on equal participation in the decision-making process, interdependence and solidarity, in addition to transparent, democratic and accountable international institutions with full and equal participation.

    One-hundred-and-thirty-one of the 193 members of the UNGA voted for the resolution. All developed countries voted against it.

    It is well known by the UN that much of the racial discrimination in European countries and European settler colonies such as the US, Colombia and South Africa reflect colonial history. Across the Americas, the most racially discriminated against are people of colour and among them especially indigenous people and people of African descent. In the European Union too, people of colour are especially discriminated against, not least people of African descent.

    Since little more than a decade ago, there is a UN Permanent Forum, Declaration and Expert Mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples. As a result of the ongoing UN International Decade for People of African Descent 2015-2024, last year the General Assembly passed a resolution to establish a UN Permanent Forum and Declaration for people of African descent.

    One-hundred-and-twenty member states voted in favour of the resolution. Only 11 states voted against it. Among them were the US, the UK and France. All developed countries either voted against or abstained from voting on the resolution.

    This year the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, Tendayi Achiume, has submitted a report to the General Assembly on the human rights obligations of member states in relation to reparations for racial discrimination rooted in enslavement and colonialism. It is the first UN report on the topic. According to it, reparations for enslavement and colonialism include not only justice and accountability for historic wrongs, but also the eradication of persisting structures of racial inequality, subordination and discrimination that were built during enslavement and colonialism.

    It is a view of reparations that includes the pursuit of a just and equitable international order.

    This year the UNGA will also deliberate on a resolution for how to organise the new permanent Forum for People of African Descent.

    When will the developed world recognise and address the elephant in the room? Maybe when there is a real shift towards sustainable development.

    https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/sustainable-development-elephant-room-191009072428736.html
    #développement_durable #colonialisme #subordination #domination #inégalités #SDGs #développement #ressources_naturelles #extractivisme #Nord-Sud #2030_Agenda_for_Sustainable_Development
    #politics_of_development #responsabiité #éthique #coopération_internationale #production #consommation #mondialisation #globalisation #géographie_politique #colonisation #accaparement_des_terres #terres #discrimination_raciale #génocide #esclavage_moderne #continuum_colonial #colonialisme_européen #ordre_économique #droits_humains #racisme #néo-colonialisme #économie #participation #solidarité #interdépendance

    ping @mobileborders @reka @cede @karine4

    ping @reka

  • Farine de teff : main-basse sur une tradition africaine

    Pendant plus de quinze ans, une société néerlandaise a fait prospérer un brevet qu’elle avait déposé en Europe sur la farine de teff, une céréale servant d’aliment de base en Éthiopie et en Érythrée depuis des siècles, en dépit des protestations de nombre d’ONG qui considèrent cette pratique comme un vol des cultures traditionnelles, notamment africaines. Enquête.

    C’est une crêpe épaisse couleur sable, sur laquelle les cuisinières dispersent les purées, les viandes mijotées, les ragoûts. Des lambeaux déchirés avec la pince des doigts servent à porter le repas à la bouche. Depuis des siècles, c’est ainsi que l’on mange en Éthiopie et en Érythrée : sur une injera, une grande galette spongieuse et acidulée fabriquée à base de teff, une graine minuscule aux propriétés nutritives exceptionnelles, riche en protéines et sans gluten. Depuis trois mille ans, on la récolte en épi dans des brassées de fines et hautes herbes vertes sur les hauts-plateaux abyssins.

    Mais une cargaison de teff expédiée en 2003 aux Pays-Bas a aussi fait la fortune d’une petite société privée néerlandaise. Dirigée par l’homme d’affaires Johannes « Hans » Turkensteen et le chercheur Jans Roosjen, cette structure baptisée à l’époque Soil & Crop Improvements (S&C) a en effet prospéré sur un brevet européen s’appropriant l’utilisation de cette « super céréale », alors que le marché du bio et des aliments sans gluten connaissait une expansion progressive.

    Un voyage d’affaires

    Tout avait commencé quelques mois plus tôt par un voyage de Hans Turkensteen à Addis-Abeba. Se prévalant du soutien de l’Université de sciences appliquées de Larenstein, l’homme d’affaires avait signé, en mars 2003, un mémorandum avec l’Organisation éthiopienne de la recherche agricole, l’EARO, accordant à sa société la livraison de 1 440 kg de graines de teff, prétendument destinées à l’expérimentation scientifique.

    « Turkensteen a fait croire à un accord mutuellement bénéfique pour toutes les parties : un meilleur rendement du teff pour les agriculteurs éthiopiens et un programme de lutte contre la pauvreté pour l’université, raconte le journaliste éthiopien Zecharias Zelalem, qui a mené sur le sujet une grande enquête pour le quotidien éthiopien Addis Standard. Il a même utilisé le prétexte de la grande famine de 1984 pour convaincre les signataires, affirmant que si les paysans éthiopiens avaient eu un meilleur teff à l’époque, le désastre n’aurait pas eu lieu. »

    Or, parallèlement, S&C a déposé auprès de l’agence néerlandaise des brevets une demande de protection des « méthodes de transformation » du teff ; un brevet finalement accordé le 25 janvier 2005, contraignant tous ceux qui souhaiteraient produire de la farine de teff ou des produits issus de la graine éthiopienne à obtenir une licence auprès d’eux, contre le paiement de royalties. Au bas du document figurait cette mention pour le moins étonnante pour une farine utilisée depuis des millénaires : « Inventeur : Jans Roosjen ».

    « Étonnement, les autorités éthiopiennes n’ont pas admis - ou n’ont pas voulu admettre - la supercherie, se désole Zecharias Zelalem. Même après que l’Université de Larenstein a exprimé des doutes et commandé un rapport d’enquête sur l’accord et même après que les Néerlandais ont reçu un "Captain Hook Award" [une récompense infamante baptisée d’après le pirate de dessin animé Capitaine Crochet et décernée chaque année par une coalition d’ONG, la Coalition contre la biopiratie, ndlr] en 2004, pour leur exploit en matière de biopiraterie. »

    Sans autres entraves que les protestations et la mauvaise publicité, les deux associés ont donc continué leur moisson de brevets. Les années suivantes, ils ont d’abord obtenu une licence auprès de l’Office européen des brevets, lui ouvrant le droit de faire des demandes auprès des agences de protection de la propriété intellectuelle d’Allemagne, d’Australie, d’Italie et du Royaume-Uni.

    « Les plus étonnant, explique l’avocat allemand Anton Horn, spécialiste de la propriété intellectuelle, est que le bureau européen des brevets leur aient accordé un brevet exactement tel qu’ils l’avaient demandé. C’est très rare. D’habitude, on fait une demande plutôt large au départ, afin que le périmètre puisse être réduit pendant son examen par le bureau des brevets. Là, non. Il a été accepté tel quel, alors que, pour ma part, il m’a suffi de trente minutes pour comprendre que quelque chose clochait dans ce brevet. » Du reste, ajoute-t-il, celui-ci a été refusé par les agences des États-Unis et du Japon.

    Treize années de bénéfices

    Pourtant, pendant les treize années suivantes, personne n’est venu s’opposer à ce que Zecharias Zelalem considère comme « un pillage des traditions éthiopiennes et un pur et simple vol des paysans éthiopiens ». C’est la curiosité de la presse éthiopienne qui a commencé à perturber des affaires alors florissantes.

    Toutefois, de faillites opportunes en changements de noms, la compagnie néerlandaise, rebaptisée entre-temps ProGrain International, a tout fait pour conserver les droits acquis par son tour de passe-passe juridique. Elle a continué à développer son activité, au point que Turkensteen a pu, par exemple, célébrer en grande pompe, en 2010, la production de sa millième tonne de farine de teff dans ses usines d’Espagne, de Roumanie et des Pays-Bas. À raison de 100 euros le kilo, selon le compte effectué en 2012 par l’hebdomadaire éthiopien Addis Fortune, son bénéfice a été considérable, alors que l’Éthiopie n’a touché, en tout en pour tout, qu’environ 4 000 euros de dividendes, selon l’enquête du journaliste Zecharias Zelalem.

    Mais l’aventure a fini par atteindre ses limites. Un jour de 2017, saisi par un ami éthiopien devenu directeur du Bureau éthiopien de la propriété intellectuelle, l’avocat Anton Horn a d’abord suggéré aux associés néerlandais de ProGrain International, par courrier, d’abandonner, au moins en Allemagne, leurs droits sur la farine de teff. Mais le duo néerlandais n’a pas répondu. Puis une société ayant acheté une licence à la société de Turkensteen et Roosjen a attaqué le brevet néerlandais devant un tribunal de La Haye, refusant dorénavant de lui payer des royalties. Pari gagné : le 7 décembre 2018, la justice lui a donné raison et « annulé » le brevet, estimant qu’il n’était ni « innovant » ni « inventif », tandis que, simultanément, sur ses propres deniers, Anton Horn a contesté le brevet en Allemagne devant les tribunaux et obtenu, là aussi, son annulation. Deux coups portés au cœur de la machine industrielle des Néerlandais, après quinze ans sans anicroche.

    Abandon progressif

    Sollicités par RFI, ni la société détentrice des brevets restants ni Hans Turkensteen n’ont souhaité donné leur version de l’histoire. Mais le duo néerlandais semble avoir abandonné la partie et renoncé à ses droits. Annulé aux Pays-Bas et en Allemagne, le brevet reste cependant valide aujourd’hui dans plusieurs pays européens. « Mais depuis août 2019, le non-paiement des frais de renouvellement du brevet devrait conduire logiquement, durant l’été 2020, à l’annulation de celui-ci dans tous les pays de l’espace européen », espère Anton Horn.

    Cette appropriation commerciale d’une tradition africaine par une société occidentale n’est pas un cas unique. En 1997, la société américaine RiceTec avait obtenu un brevet sur le riz basmati, interdisant de fait la vente aux États-Unis de riz basmati cultivé dans ses pays d’origine, l’Inde et le Pakistan. « En 2007, la société pharmaceutique allemande Schwabe Pharmaceuticals obtenait un brevet sur les vertus thérapeutiques de la fleur dite pélargonium du Cap, originaire d’Afrique du Sud et connue pour ses propriétés antimicrobiennes et expectorantes, ajoute François Meienberg, de l’ONG suisse ProSpecieRara, qui milite pour la protection de la diversité génétique et culturelle. Brevet finalement annulé en 2010 après une bataille judiciaire. Et c’est aujourd’hui le rooibos (un thé rouge, ndlr), lui aussi sud-africain, qui fait l’objet d’une bataille similaire. »

    Des négociations internationales ont bien été engagées pour tenter de définir un cadre normatif qui enrayerait la multiplication des scandales de vol de traditions ancestrales par des prédateurs industriels. Mais elles n’ont pour l’instant débouché sur rien de significatif. Le problème est que, d’une part, « tous les pays ne protègent pas les traditions autochtones de la même manière, explique François Meierberg. Les pays scandinaves ou la Bolivie, par exemple, prennent cette question au sérieux, mais ce sont des exemples rares. » L’autre problème est que nombre d’États industrialisés refusent d’attenter à la sainte loi de la « liberté du commerce ». Au prix, du coup, de la spoliation des plus démunis.

    http://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200212-farine-teff-main-basse-une-tradition-africaine
    #teff #farine #alimentation #céréale #céréales #agriculture #Afrique #tef #injera #Pays-Bas #brevet #industrie_agro-alimentaire #mondialisation #dynamiques_des_suds #ressources_pédagogiques #prédation #géographie_culturelle #culture #Hans_Turkensteen #Turkensteen #Jans_Roosjen #Soil_&_Crop_Improvements (#S&C) #brevet #propriété_intellectuelle #gluten #bio #EARO #licence #loyalties #Université_de_Larenstein #Captain_Hook_Award #biopiraterie #pillage #vol #ProGrain_International #justice #innovation #appropriation_commerciale #RiceTec #riz #riz_basmati #basmati #Inde #Pakistan #Schwabe_Pharmaceuticals #industrie_pharamceutique #big_pharma #multinationales #mondialisation #globalisation

    L’injera, plat cuisiné dans la #Corne_de_l'Afrique, notamment #Erythrée #Ethiopie :


    https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Injera

    ping @reka @odilon @karine4 @fil @albertocampiphoto

  • These brands spend nearly $100 billion on ads. They want Facebook and Google to raise their game - CNN
    https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/23/tech/youtube-facebook-advertisers/index.html

    Davos, Switzerland (CNN Business)Some of the world’s biggest advertisers have joined forces with Facebook (FB), YouTube and Twitter (TWTR) in an attempt to prevent harmful online content messing with their campaigns. Companies such as Procter & Gamble (PG), Kellogg (K), Adidas (ADDDF), Unilever (UL), and PepsiCola (PEP), are worried that their ads can pop up next to content they don’t want associated with their brands, such as violent or terrorist videos and hate speech. The Global (...)

    #Procter_&_Gamble #Adidas #Kellogg's #PepsiCo_Inc. #Unilever #Facebook #Twitter #YouTube #censure #lobbying #marketing #publicité (...)

    ##Procter_&_Gamble ##PepsiCo_Inc. ##publicité ##GlobalAllianceforResponsibleMedia-GARM_

  • The Landscapes of Border Control : Mapping border control and resistance

    Border Criminologies is pleased to launch our new interactive website, the Landscapes of Border Control. Starting with material gathered from and about Greece and Italy this project aims to visualise what goes on in detention centres in order to increase public understanding about immigration and the treatment of immigrants in detention settings. Eventually, other countries will be added.

    Despite the increased media and political attention on Italy and Greece as key sites of European border security, we still know little about everyday life inside detention sites in these two countries. This map, and the stories that accompany it, seek to fill this gap by contextualising and communicating the presence and function of these sites of confinement as well as the lived experiences of those within them. In doing so, this project seeks not only to present the violence of the border control regime but also to illuminate the struggles of those affected by it.

    Such a project is particularly important, we believe, in the face of the alarming growth of the detention estate worldwide, and particularly in Italy and Greece. For instance, in Italy a new detention centre has been re-opened in December at Gradisca d’Isonzo, and another one is in the process of being opened in Macomer. Tragically, two deaths have already occurred in 2020, the latest one occurring on Saturday 18 January, when a 20-years old man died in the hospital of Gorizia. Early reports suggest that #Vakhtang_Enukidze had been seriously injured during an episode of violence within the Gradisca detention centre a few days before. While an investigation is currently underway, early reports from activists reveal considerable police brutality (see here). In response, they have organised a demonstration in front of the centre in solidarity with the detainees inside (see here). This latest tragedy demonstrates, once again, the importance of joint efforts to ensure that what happens in detention is not hidden from scrutiny, that detainees’ experiences are heard, and that human rights defenders are given information and support.

    Moved by these aims, this countermapping project presents a variety of forms of evidence including videography, photography, original art, oral history, and testimonies from those directly affected. The material disseminated through this platform draws on a large set of data obtained over different time periods and under a range of diverse projects and long-term engagement with civil society organisations. It is specifically designed to offer a platform to civil society organisations, solidarity groups, (ex) detainees and the public to communicate their experiences from detention and

    The map shows the locations of facilities where migrants may be detained in both Greece and Italy. Clicking on a node, you can see the name of the centre; click again and you will be directed to the centre’s page where an array of information will be provided including images, video and audio (where applicable), academic work, human rights organisations’ reports, policy briefs and other published material. We hope that in time, the material we provide will be enriched by original contributions from people in the field and those who have survived the centres.

    Items can be added easily through the button ‘add information to this location’ found at the bottom of each individual page. An example can be seen here for Ponte Galeria in Rome. Entirely new locations can also be added by filling in information on this page. Items will be screened by Border Criminologies’ members. Information can also be provided in Italian and Greek and will be translated by us.

    Contributors will remain anonymous if they wish and they can add either free text, a pdf document, video or audio files.

    This is a collaborative project, designed to give organisations and groups already in detention an avenue for publicising their findings and disseminating them to a wider audience which is not limited to their national contexts but reaches out globally. We have received considerable assistance from a range of people and collectives/NGOs in getting it this far. Among these, in Italy, we would like to mention BeFree, ADIF, ASGI, the Migrant Observatory Basilicata, LasciateCIEntrare, CILD, Antigone, Sant’Egidio, A Buon Diritto, the International University College of Turin and the Legal Clinic of Roma Tre on migration and asylum. So, too, we have worked with the Greek Refugee Council and Aitima, among others.

    We hope this initiative, which is supported by the ‘Public Engagement with Research Fund,’ at the University of Oxford and the Open Society Foundations, will challenge attempts by the Greek and Italian states to invisibilise and spatially isolate immigrants, while supporting local partners who are engaged in advocacy and strategic litigation, e.g. through factual investigation, research and analysis. We believe that this project can provoke critical witnessing. This map depicts Italy and Greece as they are experienced and shaped by migrants’ presence and their struggles.

    https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/01/landscapes-border
    #rétention #détention_administrative #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #Grèce #cartographie #carte_interactive #visualisation

    –----

    Je me demande en quoi l’initiative est vraiment différente du site web de Migreurop « #Close_the_camps » :
    https://en.closethecamps.org

    Et du #Global_detention_project :
    https://www.globaldetentionproject.org

    ping @karine4 @reka
    via @isskein

  • Private sector pledges US$250 million in refugee assistance

    #Ikea, #The_Lego_Foundation and #Vodafone lead 30 organizations at the Global Refugee Forum promising education, training, jobs, legal services and #cash_assistance to refugees.

    The growing role of the private sector in mobilizing vital resources to support millions of refugees worldwide went on show today at the Global Refugee Forum in Geneva, where business leaders made US$250 million in pledges.

    The scale and reach of the assistance became clear in a pledge by the IKEA Foundation, Ingka Group and Inter IKEA Group to assist 2,500 refugees through job training and language skills initiatives at 300 IKEA stores and units in 30 countries through 2022.

    The commitment is boosted by the IKEA Foundation’s promise to provide 100 million euros in programme grants over the next five years.

    “It is good business to do good, and we at IKEA have the fortune to think in generations,” Tolga Öncu, retail operations manager at Ingka Group told a joint news conference with executives from The LEGO Foundation and telecoms heavyweight Vodafone.

    Öncu said IKEA sought to shape a positive narrative around refugees: “These are friends and colleagues, and tomorrow it can be myself, it can be you, it can be our children or grandchildren. I think we owe the refugees today to make sure that the narrative throughout the whole world becomes a positive narrative.”

    More than half of the world’s 25.9 million refugees are children. To improve their lives, The LEGO Foundation announced a US$100 million grant for play-based learning through #PlayMatters, an initiative to strengthen resilience and build the social, emotional, cognitive, physical and creative skills of young refugee children.

    “We are particularly focused on the early years of education,” said John Goodwin, CEO of The Lego Foundation. “We feel that it’s imperative that we do all that we can to provide those children with the start that they need, both to overcome the adversity that they have experienced and to put them on a trajectory for a successful, thriving life.”

    Stepping up to the plate, the Vodafone Foundation made a commitment to expand the high-quality digital education it provides throught its #Instant_NetworkSchools programme, from 85,000 young refugees to more than 500,000.

    It aims to boost the number of Instant Network Schools in Kenya, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, connecting students to educational resources and the wider online world. Other countries will follow by 2025.

    “There are four million refugee children who don’t have access to education,” said Joakim Reiter, Group External Affairs Director at Vodafone. “We need to close the education gap to make sure that all children, no matter where you were born, and whether you were unfortunate enough to be born in a refugee camp … have the right to shape their life as best seems appropriate.”

    The first-ever World Refugee Forum is meeting in Geneva through 18 December to find solutions for 70 million children, women and men uprooted from their homes globally by war, conflict, and persecution, including 25.9 million refugees, who have sought safety across international borders.

    “We need to close the education gap.”

    The three-day gathering brings together refugees, heads of state and government, UN leaders, international institutions, development organizations, civil society representatives and business leaders.

    Over 30 other organizations – small and medium enterprises, law firms, multinationals, social enterprises, private foundations, coalitions and investment networks – have come forward with pledges.

    These are centred around the goals of the #Global_Compact_on_Refugees, a framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing affirmed by the UN General Assembly a year ago. It is set to include specific commitments around education opportunities and training and creating jobs for refugees.

    “As old conflicts continue and new ones erupt, displacing millions of people, we need smart, inspiring, engaging and inclusive ways of helping refugees and host communities, and we can all play a role,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi said ahead of the announcement.

    He added: “The private sector, with its creativity, drive and commitment, has already stepped up, making important pledges at the Global Refugee Forum. And companies stand ready to do more.”

    Other pledges are around connectivity, pro-bono legal services, business development services, investment in refugee-led companies, innovative financing and cash assistance, as well as access to clean and safe energy.

    Chobani CEO Hamdi Ulukaya, who founded the #Tent_Partnership_for_Refugees in response to the global refugee crisis, spoke of employing refugees at his operations in upstate New York, and the transformation that wrought in their lives.

    “The minute they started working,” he said, “was the minute they stopped being a refugee.”

    https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2019/12/5df7ba8d4/private-sector-pledges-us250-million-refugee-assistance.html

    #privatisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #éducation #Lego #secteur_privé #camps_de_réfugiés

    ping @karine4 @isskein @reka

  • Romaric Godin : « Les élites néolibérales ne veulent plus transiger avec le corps social »
    https://lvsl.fr/romaric-godin-les-elites-neoliberales-ne-veulent-plus-transiger-avec-le-corps-s

    Nous avons retrouvé Romaric Godin au siège de Médiapart, dans le XIIe arrondissement parisien. Journaliste économique, passé par « La Tribune » où ses analyses hétérodoxes l’ont fait connaître, il travaille désormais pour le site d’actualité dirigé par Edwy Plenel. En septembre dernier, il publie son premier livre « La guerre sociale en France. Aux sources économiques de la démocratie autoritaire » paru aux éditions La Découverte. Dans cet essai, il développe ce qui constitue selon lui la spécificité du moment Macron et analyse les racines sociales et économiques profondes qui ont présidé à l’avènement du néolibéralisme autoritaire qu’il dépeint. Source : Le vent se (...)

  • Sur le plancher des vaches IV/II
    Symboles (et plus si affinités)

    Natalie

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Sur-le-plancher-des-vaches-IV-II-Symboles-et-plus-si-affinites

    Paris, le 23 octobre 2019
    Amis,

    Sans transition, on commencera aujourd’hui par s’intéresser à l’art, et plus particulièrement aux artistes : « Dans les représentations actuelles, l’artiste voisine avec une incarnation possible du travailleur du futur, avec la figure du professionnel inventif, mobile, indocile aux hiérarchies, intrinsèquement motivé, pris dans une économie de l’incertain, et plus exposé aux risques de concurrence interindividuelle et aux nouvelles insécurités des trajectoires professionnelles. Comme si, au plus près et au plus loin de la révolution permanente des rapports de production prophétisée par Marx, l’art était devenu un principe de fermentation du capitalisme. » À cette thèse du sociologue Pierre-Michel Menger, une étudiante répond : « La massification du travail précaire dans le secteur artistique et la flexibilité du travail artistique ne constituent nullement une définition des métamorphoses du capitalisme : ils seraient même plutôt un signe de l’absorption du secteur artistique dans la mondialisation et dans la marchandisation généralisée de la culture. »

    Qui de la poule ou de l’œuf ? en somme. Soit, au bout du compte, la grande question alimentaire : est-ce le sujet qui alimente le capitalisme ou le capitalisme qui nourrit le sujet ? (...)

    #langage #symbole #art #capitalisme #massification #flexibilité #travail #projet #entreprise #carrière #objectifs #résultats #signature #durable #désir #stratégie #Terre #uniformisation #globalité #gouvernance #norme #genre #corps #Dieu #Genèse #RATP #machines #icônes #France #Rabelais

  • #Leslie_Chan

    In this regard it is interesting that you switched the term “developing countries” to “Global South” in your question. The term has multiple meanings but one of them refers to “spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization”.2 This usage focuses our attention on the nature of power and marginalization within global capitalism, and this is appropriate when it comes to the increasing control of the handful of oligarch publishers over the circulation of global public knowledge.

    https://www.openlibhums.org/news/314
    #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots #Global_South #sud_global #sud_globaux #développement #pays_en_développement #pouvoir #marginalisation #capitalisme

    ping @reka

    • #Anne_Garland_Mahler : Global South

      The Global South as a critical concept has three primary definitions. First, it has traditionally been used within intergovernmental development organizations—primarily those that originated in the Non-Aligned Movement—to refer to economically disadvantaged nation-states and as a post–Cold War alternative to “Third World.” However, within a variety of fields, and often within literary and cultural studies, the Global South has been employed in a postnational sense to address spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization. In this second definition, the Global South captures a deterritorialized geography of capitalism’s externalities and means to account for subjugated peoples within the borders of wealthier countries, such that there are Souths in the geographic North and Norths in the geographic South. While this usage relies on a longer tradition of analysis of the North’s geographic Souths—wherein the South represents an internal periphery and subaltern relational position—the epithet “global” is used to unhinge the South from a one-to-one relation to geography. It is through this deterritorial conceptualization that a third meaning is attributed to the Global South, in which it refers to the resistant imaginary of a transnational political subject that results from a shared experience of subjugation under contemporary global capitalism. This subject is forged when the world’s Souths mutually recognize one another and view their conditions as shared. The use of the Global South to refer to a transnational political subjectivity under contemporary capitalist globalization draws from the rhetoric of the so-called Third World Project, or the non-aligned and radical internationalist discourses of the Cold War. In this sense, the Global South may productively be considered a direct response to the category of postcoloniality in that it captures both a political subjectivity and ideological formulation that arises from lateral solidarities among the world’s multiple “Souths” and that moves beyond the analysis of colonial difference within postcolonial theory. Critical scholarship that falls under the rubric Global South is invested in the analysis of the formation of a Global South subjectivity, the study of power and racialization within global capitalism in ways that transcend the nation-state as the unit of comparative analysis, and in tracing contemporary South-South relations—or relations among subaltern groups across national, linguistic, racial, and ethnic lines—as well as the histories of those relations in prior forms of South-South exchange.

      https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0055.xml
      #ressources_pédagogiques