• Des journalistes et médias s’organisent pour défendre la liberté d’informer sur l’agroalimentaire
    https://www.bastamag.net/defendre-liberte-presse-informer-agroalimentaire-bretagne-Ines-Leraud-algu

    En Bretagne, des journalistes qui enquêtent sur l’agro-alimentaire sont poursuivis ou subissent des pressions. C’est le cas de Basta ! et d’Inès Léraud poursuivis par le groupe Cheritel. Dans cette lettre ouverte à la région, plus de 250 journalistes, médias et collectifs de professionnels de la presse appellent à mettre fin à cette loi du silence. Basta ! s’associe à cet appel demandant des garanties en matière de liberté de la presse. À Loïg Chesnais-Girard, président Jean-Michel Le Boulanger, (...) ça bouge !

    / #Médias_libres, #Agriculture, #Multinationales

    #ça_bouge_ !

    • Journalistes pour la liberté d’informer sur l’agroalimentaire en Bretagne.
      https://framaforms.org/journalistes-pour-la-liberte-dinformer-sur-lagroalimentaire-en-bretagne-
      Lettre de journalistes et professionnel·les de la presse adressée à la Région Bretagne, en français et en breton, la grande classe !
      https://seenthis.net/messages/886563

      #Inès_Léraud est convoquée par la justice pour une audience qui devrait se tenir les 20 et 21 janvier 2021 au Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris. Elle est attaquée en diffamation par un chef d’entreprise guingampais, Jean Chéritel, patron du groupe Chéritel Trégor Légumes, dont elle a épinglé les pratiques managériales et commerciales dans un article publié par @bastamag #Bastamag en mars 2019.

      https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/bretagne/ines-leraud-attaquee-justice-avoir-enquete-agroalimenta

      Et le collectif de rappeler, dans son communiquer, la petite phrase d’Emmanuel Macron au pape François en 2018, quand il lui présente son ministre Jean-Yves Le Drian : « Les Bretons, c’est la mafia française ». "Cette phrase ne nous a ni fait rire, ni rendus fiers. Mais elle disait peut-être vrai".

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q0TB2t2uKL8&feature=youtu.be


      https://www.bastamag.net/Agriculture-et-alimentation

      En Bretagne, de nombreux journalistes ont décidé d’unir leur voix pour dénoncer la difficulté d’informer sur l’agroalimentaire local.
      https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-edito-m/l-edito-m-25-mai-2020

      le comité de soutien et une revue de presse sur le site d’Inès Léraud : https://seenthis.net/messages/871455#message876435

      #fnsea #agro_industrie #Bretagne #eureden #triskalia

    • Enquêter sur l’industrie agro-alimentaire n’est pas une sinécure : pressions et intimidations entravent le travail journalistique. Basta ! et la journaliste Inès Léraud passeront en procès le 28 janvier 2021 pour s’y être intéressés de trop près. Un récent documentaire de France 5 fait aussi les frais de cette omerta.
      https://seenthis.net/messages/886563#message887059
      Le documentaire « Une terre sacrifiée » n’est plus disponible en ligne comme par hasard !

      Un évènement majeur s’est produit récemment en Bretagne. France 5 a diffusé le film documentaire Bretagne, une terre sacrifiée d’Aude Rouaux et Marie Garreau de Labarre. Le documentaire décrit le coût environnemental, social et sanitaire du développement de l’agro-industrie en Bretagne. Il fait intervenir des témoins de l’intérieur habituellement peu diserts sur le sujet, comme un agriculteur intensif, Christophe Thomas qui déplore avoir reçu à son insu des aliments pour bétail contaminés par des antibiotiques, et ce de la part du plus important groupe agroalimentaire breton, Eureden.

      Avec ce film, France 5 a réalisé sa meilleure performance annuelle avec plus d’un million de téléspectateurs. Les réactions consécutives à cette diffusion mettent en lumière les moyens financiers et stratégiques que possède le secteur agroalimentaire pour museler les sources (principalement les agriculteurs), les élus et la presse.

      Quand l’agro-industrie alimentaire réécrit l’histoire

      Le premier groupe agroalimentaire breton, Eureden, n’a demandé aucun droit de réponse à France 5, mais a diffusé auprès de ses agriculteurs, via son titre de presse agricole Paysan breton, une pleine page dénonçant les soi-disant fausses informations véhiculées par le film. Il parle d’humiliation à l’égard « du travail fait par des milliers d’agriculteurs » alors que le film dénonce au contraire les mesures prises par les dirigeants de l’agro-industrie au détriment des agriculteurs et des salariés agricoles.

      #Richard_Ferrand et #Marc_Le_Fur, tous deux bretons, respectivement président (LREM) et vice-président (LR) de l’Assemblée nationale, ont chanté le même refrain à propos du film. Ils ont déploré « un réquisitoire (…) scandaleux, contre les paysans et contre la Bretagne », opérant là encore un retournement intellectuel et une manipulation de l’opinion. La même rengaine est apparue dans un courrier du président du groupe Rassemblement national à la Région, adressé aux agriculteurs, distribué directement dans leurs boîtes aux lettres, expliquant que ce film est « un procès à charge contre votre profession ».

      La branche régionale de FNSEA en Bretagne est allée jusqu’à parler de film de « fiction ». Elle a aussi diffusé sur Twitter le visage de l’une des témoins principales du documentaire, en l’occurrence une journaliste locale, Morgan Large, enquêtant sur l’agriculture intensive. Ce choix d’illustration a été perçu comme une façon sournoise de cibler la journaliste. Questionnée sur ce choix par des internautes, la FRSEA a simplement supprimé son tweet.

      Quelques jours plus tard, la journaliste a subi des nuisances à son domicile : absente le dimanche 6 décembre, elle apprend que ses animaux divaguent sur la voie publique, et découvre que leur clôture a été ouverte volontairement. Il s’agit d’une intimidation courante dans le monde agricole, vécue notamment de façon répétée par l’agricultrice Caroline Chenet, témoin du film La mort est dans le pré, qui a décidé de ne plus parler publiquement. La radio Kreiz Breizh, qui emploie Morgan Large, a quant à elle subi les jours suivants deux tentatives d’effraction de ses locaux.
      Une force de frappe médiatique et politique inédite en France

      Le lendemain de la diffusion sur France 5, une vidéo de 2 minutes, non signée, est apparue sur les réseaux sociaux, descendant le documentaire en flèche au motif qu’il aurait évincé du montage les progrès réalisé par une exploitation porcine (la ferme de Kermerrien) filmée par l’équipe de France 5. Cette vidéo bâtit là encore un retournement complet de la vérité puisque une séquence est justement consacrée aux progrès effectués par la ferme. Elle est en réalité produite par Agriculteurs de Bretagne, lobby fondé par des dirigeants du secteur agroalimentaire et faisant appel à une société de communication spécialisée dans l’attaque des opposants à l’agro-industrie. Pendant ce temps, le 3 décembre, le président du Conseil régional de Bretagne, Loïg Chesnais-Girard, présentait en conférence de presse son nouveau livre Le souffle breton préfacé par Erik Orsenna, écrivain, académicien et figure tutélaire du fameux lobby Agriculteurs de Bretagne !

      La proximité entre les représentants de l’agro-industrie et le monde politique régional va plus loin : le vice-président à l’agriculture et à l’agroalimentaire en Bretagne n’est autre que Olivier Allain (majorité présidentielle), ancien président de la branche départementale de la FNSEA et de la chambre d’agriculture des Côtes-d’Armor, dont l’exploitation perçoit d’importantes aides de la PAC (près de 80 000 euros annuels alors que lui-même participe aux négociations sur la PAC.

      Georges Gallardon, président d’Eureden qui, on l’a vu, qualifie France 5 d’organe de désinformation est lui-même vice-président (divers droite) de la communauté du Kreiz-Breizh et maire de Saint-Tréphine (Côtes-d’Armor). Philippe Le Goux, directeur de la communication d’un important groupe porcin, Aveltis, est également vice-président (PS) de Leff Armor Communauté, entre Guingamp et Saint-Brieuc. Cet élu de la République a, au titre de ses fonctions de communicant, plusieurs fois entravé le travail des journalistes en incitant par courriel les éleveurs à ne pas parler à la presse.

      Enfin, juste après la diffusion du film de France 5, le groupe agroalimentaire Eureden commandait au média Brut la réalisation de vidéos promouvant les soit-disant efforts du groupe en matière d’écologie. « Soit-disant » car une enquête des élèves journalistes de l’IUT de Lannion a montré au contraire comment ce groupe maintenait les agriculteurs dans l’usage des pesticides.

      L’agro-industrie bretonne, et même française, possède, on le voit, un arsenal d’outils impressionnants pour maîtriser le discours à son sujet : fait quasiment unique dans le paysage industriel français, elle détient ses propres titres de presse. Elle fait également appel à des agences de communication spécialisées et contrôle en partie la presse généraliste en la finançant via la publicité et des partenariats, comme l’a dénoncé le collectif Kelaouin. Elle est assez puissante pour pénétrer le tissu politique local ou faire nommer des ministres de l’Agriculture – comme l’a révélé l’ancien ministre Dominique Bussereau dans le film FNSEA, enquête sur un empire agricole de Marianne Kerfriden – et depuis 2019 elle est parvenue à ce qu’une cellule de la gendarmerie nationale lui soit spécialement dédiée : “La cellule demeter”. Tout cela en bénéficiant d’importantes subventions européennes, nationales, et régionales.

      Le procès bâillon, encore et toujours

      La tâche pour exercer un contrôle démocratique et comprendre le fonctionnement de ce fleuron industriel français qu’est l’agroalimentaire (dont, à titre d’exemple, les exportations en Arabie saoudite rapportent plus que les ventes d’armes françaises), est immense. D’autant plus que la presse régionale a intégré des réflexes d’autocensure pour ne pas perdre ses annonceurs et ne pas se mettre à dos des élus locaux. Comme l’illustrent le documentaire de France 5 et le cas de la journaliste Morgan Large, quand la presse ose dénoncer, elle est sujette à de multiples pressions.

      Ces pressions, Basta ! et moi-même les rencontrons aussi, notamment sous forme de procès bâillon, depuis que j’ai enquêté sur l’agroalimentaire et sur les algues vertes.

      Par bonheur, il existe des médias comme Basta ! qui effectuent depuis longtemps un travail extraordinaire, pointu, difficile, dans ce domaine – les archives de Basta ! sur les questions agroalimentaires sont tout simplement salutaires pour quiconque veut travailler sur ce sujet –, et qui osent s’aventurer sur des terrains risqués grâce à l’unique soutien de ses abonnés, comme c’est le cas pour l’affaire Chéritel pour laquelle Basta ! et moi-même sommes poursuivis en diffamation.

      https://www.bastamag.net/Travail-dissimule-fraude-sur-les-etiquettes-les-multiples-abus-d-un-groupe

  • Christophe Kerrero, le directeur de cabinet de Jean-Michel Blanquer siège à l’Ifrap
    http://www.cafepedagogique.net/lexpresso/Pages/2020/05/11052020Article637247793272742622.aspx

    Peut-on servir l’Etat et un organisme qui souhaite l’affaiblir ? Directeur de cabinet du ministre de l’éducation nationale, Christophe Kerrero est aussi membre du conseil scientifique de l’IFRAP, un lobby libéral très actif politiquement. Alors que l’Ifrap milite pour la réduction des effectifs de fonctionnaires, il est paradoxal de voir à la tête du ministère qui emploie la moitié des fonctionnaires d’Etat un responsable de cet organisme.
     
    Le "conseil scientifique" de l’Ifrap est une des instances dirigeantes de ce lobby. C Kerrero y siège aux cotés de Bernard Zimmern, fondateur de l’IFRAP, ancien membre du Club de l’Horloge et de plusieurs professeurs de l’ESCP Business School.
     
    Fondé par B Zimmern et JY Le Gallou, ancien président du FN, l’Ifrap s’est fait connaitre par son lobbying auprès des politiques, notamment des parlementaires, en faveur de thèses libérales. L’Ifrap a été déclaré d’utilité publique par F Fillon en 2009. Et en 2017, l’institut a soutenu le candidat, malheureux, des Républicains.

     
    En 2011, Franck Ramus, aujourd’hui membre du conseil scientifique de l’Education nationale, avait écrit que qualifier l’iFRAP « d’institut de recherche » est inadéquat car aucun des chercheurs examinés n’est détenteur d’un doctorat ou ni "n’a jamais publié le moindre article dans une revue internationale d’économie".
     
    Inspecteur général depuis 2012, ancien conseiller de Luc Chatel, Christophe Kerrero a été nommé directeur de cabinet de JM Blanquer en 2017. Après l’Institut Montaigne, proche du ministre, voici un second lobby ancré très a droite qui semble exercer son influence rue de Grenelle.

    #Ifrap #ministère #éducation

    • Depuis le terrible assassinat de Samuel Paty le 16 octobre dernier, le Ministre Blanquer a persévéré dans son discours ancré à l’extrême-droite et visant à fracturer la société et à pointer du doigt les organisations qui luttent contre les discriminations.
      https://visa-isa.org/fr/node/145968
      Dès 2017, le ministre Blanquer nommait Christophe Kerrero directeur de son cabinet. Kerrero est aussi membre du conseil scientifique de l’Ifrap, un lobby libéral qui milite pour la réduction des effectifs de fonctionnaires. L’Ifrap illustre bien les liens entre le libéralisme et l’extrême-droite puisque parmi ses fondateurs on trouve Jean-Yves Le Gallou, membre du Front national puis du MNR et co-fondateur club de l’Horloge, mais aussi Bernard Zimmern qui est également un ancien membre du Club de l’Horloge. Le club de l’Horloge est un cercle de pensée qui revendique le mariage entre le libéralisme de la droite traditionnelle avec le nationalisme de l’extrême-droite.

    • La démission du recteur de Paris charge Amélie Oudéa-Castéra
      https://www.cafepedagogique.net/2024/02/02/la-demission-du-recteur-de-paris-charge-amelie-oudea-castera

      Un recteur attaché à la mixité sociale ?

      Le programme parisien d’affectation en seconde #Affelnet, modifié par C Kerrero, suivi par Pauline Charousset et Julien Grenet (PSE), a effectivement amélioré la mixité sociale et scolaire dans les lycées parisiens. “Des établissements réputés comme Chaptal, Charlemagne ou Condorcet ont vu leur composition sociale et scolaire se rapprocher sensiblement de la moyenne, tandis qu’à l’inverse, des lycées historiquement moins cotés comme Henri Bergson, Edgard Quinet ou Voltaire ont connu une augmentation spectaculaire de leur IPS moyen et du niveau scolaire des admis“, écrivent-ils en bilan de cette action. Globalement l’indice de mixité sociale s’est amélioré dans les lycées publics.

      Mais ce programme connait aussi ses limites. Cette réforme d’Affelnet ne touche ni les #formations_élitistes (sections internationales, parcours artistiques etc.), ni les lycées publics les plus ségrégués ni les établissements privés. La ségrégation sociale et scolaire avait même augmenté en 2022 dans les lycées des beaux quartiers comme J de Sailly, Buffon, JB Say ou J de la Fontaine. Et puis il y a le privé. “Le fait que les lycées privés ne soient pas intégrés à la procédure Affelnet constitue sans doute l’obstacle le plus sérieux au renforcement de la mixité sociale et scolaire dans les lycées de la capitale“, écrivent Pauline Charousset et Julien Grenet. “Alors que les lycées publics accueillaient en moyenne 50% d’élèves de catégories sociales très favorisées à la rentrée 2022, cette proportion atteignait 78% dans les #lycées_privés. Ainsi la réforme d’Affelnet a amélioré la mixité de la plupart des lycéens du public parisien. Mais elle a préservé le séparatisme social des plus privilégiés qui se replient dans des établissements cotés ou dans le privé.

      Les PPPE, programme social ou de prolétarisation des enseignants ?

      Quant à l’ouverture des classes de PPPE elle suit des directives fixées sous JM Blanquer et prolongées par la suite. Dans ces classes, l’Education nationale pèse sur la formation des futurs enseignants en s’imposant à l’université. Sous prétexte d’ouverture sociale, il s’agit surtout d’avoir des enseignants formés aux devoirs des fonctionnaires davantage qu’aux libertés universitaires.

      Un recteur au passé chargé

      En mettant en avant cette dimension sociale, C. Kerrero alimente son image et son destin. Il a d’autant plus besoin de le faire que ses liens avec la droite la plus traditionaliste sont connus. Membre du “conseil scientifique” de l’IFRAP, un groupe de pression ultra conservateur, proche de SOS Education, il a dirigé durant trois ans le cabinet de JM Blanquer. Il y a violemment combattu les syndicats, les enseignants grévistes et a pris part aux croisades menées par JM Blanquer. Il avait aussi été membre du cabinet de Luc Chatel.

      En 2016, C Kerrero dénonçait “la décomposition pédagogiste” de l’École. Dans son ouvrage publié en 2017, Ecole, démocratie et société, C. Kerrero défend une École traditionnelle. Il dénonce “un certain pédagogisme qui privilégie des techniques d’enseignement formelles plutôt que le fond… Cela revient à saper l’autorité légitime du maitre… Le temps de l’éducation, et l’on entend par là celui qui correspond aujourd’hui à la scolarité obligatoire, doit donc être sanctuarisé“. Dans cet ouvrage il n’est pas question de mixité sociale mais de faire nation.

      Sa démission
      https://seenthis.net/messages/1039768
      https://seenthis.net/messages/1039924

      #école #ségrégation #ségrégation_scolaire #Paris #classes_préparatoires #enseignement_privé #groupes_de_niveau #ségrégation_sociale

  • Défendons la liberté d’informer sur le secteur agro-alimentaire pétition
    https://www.cyberacteurs.org/cyberactions/dynfendonslalibertyndinformersurles-3791.html

    Pétition : Défendons la liberté d’informer sur le secteur agro-alimentaire
    La crise sanitaire actuelle nous le montre : la vigilance pour la sauvegarde des libertés fondamentales est un combat à reprendre sans trêve. Pour certains, cet attachement semble un luxe dont on pourrait se passer quand la situation est dictée par l’urgence. Cette idée reçue constitue une erreur dangereuse. C’est pourquoi, même si tout semble nous inviter à regarder ailleurs et à s’accommoder de régressions démocratiques prétendument inévitables, il nous importe de porter à la connaissance publique une affaire qui attire notre plus grande attention.

    Nous sommes des militants associatifs, agriculteurs, scientifiques, auteurs, avocats, journalistes, syndicalistes, élus, citoyennes et citoyens. Nous estimons qu’il est de notre devoir, moral et civique, de faire connaître la situation inacceptable rencontrée par la journaliste Inès Léraud. Nous appelons à la soutenir alors que des intimidations et procès visent à faire taire son activité. Plus généralement, nous entendons défendre la liberté d’informer face aux intérêts privés qui aimeraient la restreindre.

    Inès Léraud est une journaliste connue pour avoir beaucoup enquêté sur l’industrie agroalimentaire en Bretagne. Elle s’est notamment immergée dans un village breton et a suivi de près l’intoxication par les pesticides dont ont été victimes des salariés de la plus grande coopérative agricole bretonne, Triskalia. Par des reportages diffusés sur France Inter et France Culture notamment, elle a mis au grand jour des pratiques courantes, illégales et souvent dangereuses, mises en œuvre par certains puissants acteurs du secteur agroalimentaire. Ces pratiques hélas, se sont révélées régulièrement « couvertes » par des administrations et les élus. Cette journaliste, dont le travail a été notamment salué par le quotidien Le Monde, s’est aussi intéressée aux « marées vertes » qui se sont répandues sur les côtes bretonnes depuis l’avènement de l’élevage industriel. Cet intérêt a débouché sur une bande dessinée réalisée en collaboration avec Pierre Van Hove aux éditions La Revue dessinée - Delcourt (2019) Algues vertes, l’histoire interdite, un album qui connaît un retentissant succès. Suite à cette publication, deux séries d’évènements nous alertent.

    Pressions et intimidations : la fabrique du silence

    En mars 2020, l’hebdomadaire Le Canard enchaîné révèle que la venue de la journaliste au Salon du livre de Quintin (Côtes d’Armor) a été annulée après l’intervention auprès de l’équipe du salon d’un élu de la municipalité. Ce dernier est par ailleurs salarié de la Chambre d’agriculture des Côtes d’Armor (dirigée par la FNSEA). Un peu plus tôt, la journaliste avait appris qu’une maison d’édition régionale avait préféré renoncer à son projet de traduction en breton de la bande-dessinée Algues vertes, l’histoire interdite, par peur de perdre des subventions du Conseil régional de Bretagne.

    Quelques mois plus tôt, fin 2019, Inès Léraud a été visée par une plainte en diffamation de Christian Buson, un personnage phare du paysage agroalimentaire breton. Il est directeur d’un « bureau d’études en environnement », le GES, qui prodigue des conseils à destination des agro-industries (près de 4 millions d’euros de chiffre d’affaire annuel). Il est aussi président de l’Institut Technique et Scientifique de l’Environnement (ISTE) fondé entre autres par les entreprises Lactalis, Daucy et Doux en 1996. Cet institut est notamment connu pour propager des thèses sur les marées vertes favorables au secteur agro-alimentaire. Il est enfin secrétaire général de l’Association Francophone des Climat-Optimistes (AFCO) qui lutte contre la diffusion des informations scientifiques relatives au réchauffement climatique.

    Dès 2017, Christian Buson n’hésitait pas à dénigrer la journaliste après la diffusion de ses enquêtes sur les marées vertes bretonnes sur les ondes radio. Il lui écrivait par courriel : “Vous pourrez postuler pour le Prix Elise Lucet de la désinformation (...) Je vous souhaite évidemment une brillante carrière”. La plainte en diffamation qu’il lui intente par la suite ressemble à une vendetta ad hominem : elle ne vise aucunement, comme il est de coutume, la journaliste et le directeur de publication (ou l’éditeur), mais uniquement la journaliste. Elle est par ailleurs déposée dans la boîte aux lettres de la maison où Inès Léraud vivait quand elle menait ses enquêtes dans un hameau, au cœur du centre-Bretagne. Prêtée par des proches, cette maison n’a jamais été sa résidence officielle. Une manière subtile de lui dire : « on sait où vous trouver » ?

    Christian Buson a renoncé à sa plainte quelques jours avant l’audience prévue le 7 janvier 2020, alors que la journaliste et son avocat avaient préparé leur dossier de défense. Une preuve que cette attaque judiciaire était une tentative d’intimidation.

    Doit-on laisser la Bretagne devenir le far-west ?

    Quelques mois plus tôt, Jean Chéritel, PDG du groupe Chéritel dépose une plainte en diffamation contre Inès Léraud, suite à la publication de son enquête intitulée “Travail dissimulé, fraude sur les étiquettes : les multiples abus d’un groupe agro-industriel breton” (Bastamag, 26 mars 2019). Le groupe Chéritel est un important grossiste en fruits et légumes, qui revendique 45 millions de chiffre d’affaires et 120 salariés. Il approvisionne les enseignes Leclerc, Intermarché, Auchan, Carrefour, Système U, Aldi ou
    encore Quick et KFC.

    Jean Chéritel n’en est pas à sa première procédure judiciaire destinée à inhiber le travail journalistique. En 2015, il attaque en diffamation le quotidien régional Le Télégramme suite à la publication d’un article sur l’emploi illégal de travailleurs bulgares au sein du groupe. Le Télégramme perd alors son procès. Mais, trois ans plus tard, en décembre 2018, les révélations du quotidien régional sont confirmées : le groupe Chéritel est condamné par le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Saint-Brieuc à 261 610 euros d’amende pour « délit de marchandage (...) commis à l’égard de plusieurs personnes : opération illégale à but lucratif de fourniture de main-d’œuvre ». Son gérant Jean Chéritel, écope de 10 000 euros d’amende, deux mois de prison avec sursis et deux ans d’interdiction d’exercer l’activité de sous-entrepreneur de main-d’œuvre. Le groupe et son gérant ont fait appel.

    Le procès intenté au Télégramme agit comme un bâillon invisible sur la presse bretonne. Après lui, celle-ci ne s’intéresse plus guère à cette entreprise. En 2017, lorsqu’une source appelle des journaux locaux pour leur faire part d’une fraude massive sur les tomates au sein du groupe Chéritel, les rédactions se censurent et ne donnent pas suite. Avertie par des confrères, Inès Léraud décide d’enquêter. Ce travail lui prend six mois. Elle découvre aussi bien les fraudes de Jean Chéritel que sa façon d’anéantir les critiques, dans l’entreprise comme au dehors. Elle s’étonne également de l’absence de syndicat au sein du groupe qui comprend pourtant 120 salariés ! Bastamag décide de publier cette enquête. Ce journal, coordonné par Agnès Rousseaux et Ivan du Roy est connu pour avoir mené plusieurs investigations sur le groupe Bolloré et remporté les nombreuses procédures intentées par cet industriel. Quelques mois après la publication de l’enquête, le groupe Chéritel est condamné à près de 100 000 euros d’amende et une peine de prison avec sursis pour maquillage de l’origine de ses produits (novembre 2019). Quoique multi-condamnée en première instance, cette entreprise continue à s’en prendre à celles et ceux qui tentent d’informer sur ses pratiques contestables. Ainsi, la procédure qu’elle vient d’intenter contre Inès Léraud. Elle débouchera sur une audience au TGI de Paris qui aura lieu les 20 et 21 janvier 2021.

    La liberté d’informer, un instrument démocratique à protéger

    En 2020, en France, une journaliste est donc inquiétée sur deux fronts pour n’avoir fait que son travail : informer ses concitoyens sur le fonctionnement d’un secteur économique central en Bretagne : l’industrie agro-alimentaire. Comment une telle stratégie d’intimidations et de menaces est-elle possible dans un territoire de la République ? Certains acteurs de l’agro-alimentaire seraient-ils au-dessus des lois au point, non seulement de contrevenir au droit, mais aussi de tout faire pour que personne ne puisse le faire savoir ?

    Nous, citoyennes et citoyens, militants associatifs, agriculteurs, scientifiques, chefs cuisiniers, avocats, journalistes, élus, syndicalistes, auteurs, nous ne nous résignons pas face à ces attaques envers la liberté d’informer. Celle-ci est déjà mise à l’épreuve par la tendance à sanctuariser le « secret des affaires » au profit des grandes puissances économiques. Nous en sommes persuadés : nos démocraties, au niveau national comme au niveau régional, ont besoin de cette liberté qui, seule, garantit l’effectivité de contre-pouvoirs citoyens. Cette liberté d’informer s’exerce à l’égard des pouvoirs politiques ; il importe qu’elle s’exerce aussi envers les puissances économiques et financières qui ont pris une importance considérable dans notre société. Ces dernières doivent donc être soumises aux devoirs qui s’appliquent à tout un chacun.

    En tant que citoyen, chacun a le droit de connaître la réalité pour être en capacité d’exprimer librement ses choix politiques, quels qu’ils soient. Soutenir la journaliste Inès Léraud face à de tels agissements, c’est défendre la liberté d’information, ce bien démocratique si précieux.

    #Agro-alimentaire #Médias #Intimidation #Censure

  • Corona-crise : le krach à venir

    http://www.palim-psao.fr/2020/04/corona-crise-le-krach-a-venir-par-tomasz-konicz.html

    Les appels manifestement absurdes mentionnés plus haut à retourner au travail salarié malgré la pandémie et à se sacrifier pour le dieu de l’argent sont précisément sous-tendus par cette compulsion fétichiste d’une valorisation illimitée du capital. Sans quoi la société capitaliste est menacée d’effondrement, car elle ne peut se reproduire socialement que lorsque les processus d’accumulation réussissent. La production d’une humanité économiquement superflue, laquelle résulte de la crise systémique du capital se déployant par à-coups, et qui pouvait être jusqu’ici largement répercutée sur les salariés de la périphérie au cours de la concurrence de crise, frapperait donc les centres de plein fouet si la lutte contre la pandémie devait s’installer dans le temps.

    En passant, le digital labor n’est qu’une des mille façons de mobiliser/exploiter les « salariés de la périphérie »

  • SUR LES ÎLES GRECQUES

    Lesbos : une traînée de poudre qui n’en finit pas
    http://cqfd-journal.org/Lesbos-une-trainee-de-poudre-qui-n

    Actes de haine, incendies criminels, refoulement de bateaux vers la Turquie, enfermement arbitraire et brutalité aveugle : ces dernières semaines, les événements dramatiques se sont succédé à une vitesse folle du côté de l’île de Lesbos, à la frontière maritime orientale de la Grèce. Passé le choc ou l’effroi, ils apparaissent pour ce qu’ils sont : une forme exacerbée du rejet systémique et de la violence que vivent, chaque jour, les exilé·es cherchant asile en Europe.

    Aux frontières, la violence première est celle de l’État – ou plutôt des États. Au cours des dernières semaines, elle s’est déployée en Grèce et ailleurs par la répression des mouvements sociaux, une dramaturgie géopolitique funeste et une violation des droits humains plus furieuse encore qu’à l’ordinaire.

    Le ton était donné dès le début du mois de février. Aux protestations des demandeurs et demandeuses d’asile contre leur confinement dans l’insalubre et surpeuplé camp de Mória, sur l’île de Lesbos, le gouvernement grec répondait par du gaz lacrymogène, des coups de matraque et des arrestations. Il réaffirmait dans la foulée sa volonté de construire des centres de rétention fermés sur trois des îles où l’Union européenne (UE), depuis 2016, parque les exilé·es.

    Pour cela, l’État s’est réservé le droit de saisir les terres des municipalités récalcitrantes. La recette répressive s’est étendue aux habitant·es de Chios et Lesbos, qui virent arriver en catimini des dizaines de bataillons de flics anti-émeutes. La riposte des insulaires fut immédiate : manifestations, affrontements de jour comme de nuit, grève générale. La lutte a fini par payer, quoique provisoirement : les condés ont été rappelés par Athènes et les travaux suspendus.

    Manœuvres cyniques
    C’est dans ce contexte explosif que le président turc Erdogan, porté par son élan militariste en Syrie, a orchestré un coup d’éclat destiné à faire pression sur l’UE : en ouvrant ses frontières et en y acheminant des milliers d’exilé·es, il pouvait être certain de déclencher la panique sur un continent où ceux-ci sont jugé·es indésirables [1].

    Le stratagème n’est pas nouveau. La politique d’externalisation des frontières menée par l’UE, par laquelle celle-ci délègue à des États tiers ses basses manœuvres, transforme les vies humaines en monnaie d’échange. De même, la réplique agressive du gouvernement grec ne fut qu’une prolongation, dans des proportions massives, de pratiques courantes aux frontières gréco-turques : refoulement, séquestration, coups, vols, humiliations à l’encontre d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants, pris·es dans des jeux politiques cyniques d’États criminels.

    Les témoignages de personnes forcées de se déshabiller à la frontière terrestre par des hommes cagoulés puis refoulées vers la Turquie apparaissent comme une forme paroxystique du dénuement auquel les exilé·es sont exposé·es dès leur entrée en Europe. Outre sa manifestation matérielle (interdiction de travailler, surveillance et confinement, dépendance vis-à-vis des autorités), ce dénuement recouvre tous les aspects personnels et sensibles des êtres, artificiellement réduit·es à l’identité de « demandeurs d’asile ».

    Mais même ce statut a été retiré à celles et ceux qui sont entré•es en Grèce après le 1er mars : malgré l’illégalité de la mesure, aucune demande d’asile n’y est plus acceptée jusqu’à nouvel ordre. Désormais, les réfugié·es sont arrêté·es à leur arrivée, enfermé·es (certain·es pendant près de dix jours à l’intérieur d’un navire militaire), puis transporté·es vers des centres de détention.

    Impunité des groupes fascistes
    La violence qui suit celle de l’État, car justifiée et encouragée par elle, s’exprime par les actes de haine qui ont rythmé les mois de février et mars à Lesbos. Le renfort apporté aux groupes fascistes locaux par des militants d’autres pays d’Europe – Allemands, Français, Irlandais – fut permis par l’impunité dont jouissent leurs exactions. Des bandes d’hommes armés de barres de fer purent contrôler et intimider réfugié·es et bénévoles pendant plusieurs semaines sans que les flics ne bronchent.

    L’apogée de la violence fasciste eut lieu le jour même où le gouvernement grec annonça son refus d’accepter de nouvelles demandes d’asile. Sept voitures transportant des médecins, des infirmiers et des infirmières bénévoles furent attaquées et leurs vitres brisées. Dans la soirée, un camp désaffecté, qui avait accueilli jusqu’à janvier dernier des migrant·es après leur traversée en mer, fut incendié.

    Le dimanche 1er mars encore, des dizaines de citoyen·nes repoussaient à coups de pied et d’insultes une embarcation charriant hommes, femmes, enfants et bébés. Cette insoutenable scène est à l’image de ce qui s’est déroulé au large des îles de la mer Égée, où les gardes-côtes helléniques et ceux de l’agence européenne Frontex ont attaqué ou laissé à la dérive des personnes en détresse [2]. En définitive, les discours et les gestes des chargé·es de l’ordre (flics, politicien·nes, fonctionnaires…) légitiment et attisent les flambées de haine. Une des dernières en date – l’incendie criminel d’une école autogérée par des réfugié·es, le 7 mars – est sans équivoque – tout comme le nom de l’établissement calciné : « École de la Paix ».

    Avec les cendres, les tensions sont retombées à Lesbos. Les mesures prises par le gouvernement grec pour limiter la propagation du virus Covid-19 ont vidé les rues. Les allées du camp de Mória sont, elles, plus bondées que jamais. Depuis le 17 mars, plus personne n’est autorisé à en quitter l’enceinte. Les fameux « gestes barrières » promus à travers le continent y sont irréalisables. Se laver les mains, quand il n’existe qu’un robinet d’eau courante pour 1 300 personnes ? Pratiquer la distanciation sociale, là où 20 000 personnes cohabitent dans (et aux abords) d’un espace conçu pour 3 000 ? Rien n’est prévu en cas de propagation du virus à Mória, ou dans les autres camps de la mer Égée.

    La plupart des ONG ont quitté l’île de Lesbos. Seule une poignée de médecins, d’infirmiers et d’infirmières alertent, au côté des habitant·es des camps, sur l’urgence qui se joue aux frontières. Leurs appels restent, pour le moment, lettre morte.

    #Covid-19 #Migration #Migrant #Balkans #Grèce #refoulement #îlesgrecques #Lesbos #Moria #Asile #Chios #Lesbos #Turquie #Frontière #Camp #Groupesfascistes

  • Je fais un post séparé pour ces infos hallucinantes, ces mesures du gouvernement destinées à favoriser la grande distribution, les supermarchés côtés en bourse, aux dépends des petits commerces et des marchés où les prix sont plus bas et où s’alimentent les plus pauvres, en région et dans les quartiers pauvres des grandes villes, souvent racisé.es...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/834154
    https://seenthis.net/messages/835682

    Confinement : des restrictions d’ouverture pour les commerces du quartier de Château Rouge, à Paris
    BFM, le 23 mars 2020
    https://www.bfmtv.com/societe/confinement-des-restrictions-d-ouverture-pour-les-commerces-du-quartier-de-ch

    Une mesure visant à favoriser le respect des mesures d’hygiène

    « De nombreux commerces alimentaires disposent d’un étal occupant la totalité de l’espace public sur le trottoir », estime le préfet de police Didier Lallement, et « de nombreux clients provenant de différents quartiers de la capitale et de banlieues parisiennes s’y retrouvent dans un espace confiné. Ce qui aboutit au non-respect des mesures d’hygiène et de distanciation sociale ».

    Les horaires d’ouverture de ces commerces seront également restreints de 8h à 10h et de 14h à 16h

    Les marchés sont fermés ? Les paysans inventent des solutions
    Estelle Dautry et Victor Point, Reporterre, le 25 mars 2020
    https://reporterre.net/Les-marches-sont-fermes-Les-paysans-inventent-des-solutions

    Lundi 23 mars, Édouard Philippe, Premier ministre, a annoncé la fermeture des marchés de plein air.

    Confinement : la préfecture de police restreint les horaires d’ouverture de commerces du quartier de Château Rouge
    France 3 Ile de France, le 26 mars 2020
    https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/paris-ile-de-france/paris/confinement-prefecture-police-restreint-horaires-ouvert

    Et quand les marchés restent ouverts, les keufs s’arrangent pour que ce soit le bordel :

    Paniers à légumes sous surveillance #2 La cour d’école
    Expansive, le 24 avril 2020
    https://expansive.info/Paniers-a-legumes-sous-surveillance-2-La-cour-d-ecole-2205

    #favoritisme #discrimination #marchés #supermarchés #racisme #classisme #solidarité (manque de) #quartiers_populaires
    #Didier_Lallement #salops #qu'ils_chopent_tous_Ebola

    Voir compile des effets délétères indirects de la pandémie :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/832147

    #coronavirus #travail

  • Groupe sanguin et coronavirus, un hasard génétique
    https://www.franceinter.fr/sciences/groupe-sanguin-et-coronavirus-un-hasard-genetique

    D’après une étude chinoise, les personnes de groupe sanguin O sont mieux immunisées contre le coronavirus que les autres groupes. Elles ont un risque d’infection 33% moindre. A contrario, les personnes de groupe A ont 20% de risque supplémentaire d’être infectées. Cette inégalité s’explique par l’action des anticorps.

    #Coronavirus #Covid19

    • L’étude originale (16/03/20202)
      #not_peer-reviewed

      Relationship between the ABO Blood Group and the COVID-19 Susceptibility | medRxiv
      https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.11.20031096v1

      OBJECTIVE To investigate the relationship between the ABO blood group and the COVID-19 susceptibility.

      DESIGN The study was conducted by comparing the blood group distribution in 2,173 patients with COVID-19 confirmed by SARS-CoV-2 test from three hospitals in Wuhan and Shenzhen, China with that in normal people from the corresponding regions. Data were analyzed using one-way ANOVA and 2-tailed χ2 and a meta-analysis was performed by random effects models.

      SETTING Three tertiary hospitals in Wuhan and Shenzhen, China.

      PARTICIPANTS A total of 1,775 patients with COVID-19, including 206 dead cases, from Wuhan Jinyintan Hospital, Wuhan, China were recruited. Another 113 and 285 patients with COVID-19 were respectively recruited from Renmin Hospital of Wuhan University, Wuhan and Shenzhen Third People’s Hospital, Shenzhen, China.

      MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES Detection of ABO blood groups, infection occurrence of SARS-CoV-2, and patient death RESULTS The ABO group in 3694 normal people in Wuhan showed a distribution of 32.16%, 24.90%, 9.10% and 33.84% for A, B, AB and O, respectively, versus the distribution of 37.75%, 26.42%, 10.03% and 25.80% for A, B, AB and O, respectively, in 1775 COVID-19 patients from Wuhan Jinyintan Hospital. The proportion of blood group A and O in COVID-19 patients were significantly higher and lower, respectively, than that in normal people (both P < 0.001). Similar ABO distribution pattern was observed in 398 patients from another two hospitals in Wuhan and Shenzhen. Meta-analyses on the pooled data showed that blood group A had a significantly higher risk for COVID-19 (odds ratio-OR, 1.20; 95% confidence interval-CI 1.02~1.43, P = 0.02) compared with non-A blood groups, whereas blood group O had a significantly lower risk for the infectious disease (OR, 0.67; 95% CI 0.60~0.75, P < 0.001) compared with non-O blood groups.In addition, the influence of age and gender on the ABO blood group distribution in patients with COVID-19 from two Wuhan hospitals (1,888 patients) were analyzed and found that age and gender do not have much effect on the distribution.

      CONCLUSION People with blood group A have a significantly higher risk for acquiring COVID-19 compared with non-A blood groups, whereas blood group O has a significantly lower risk for the infection compared with non-O blood groups.

  • #Minorités / #Majorités

    Des #villes coupées, couturées, rafistolées, des vies assignées, mais aussi émancipées : de l’analyse des #politiques_ségrégationnistes aux réflexions sur le caractère inclusif des #espaces_publics en passant par la #négociation des expériences minoritaires individuelles et collectives, les villes constituent des lieux privilégiés de l’analyse des relations entre #groupes_minoritaires et #groupes_majoritaires. La vive actualité scientifique sur le sujet en France comme ailleurs en témoigne. On peut notamment penser au colloque Question raciale / questions urbaines (https://www.pacte-grenoble.fr/actualites/question-raciale-questions-urbaines-frontieres-territoriales-et-racia) : frontières territoriales et #racialisation organisé en février 2019 à Grenoble, au dernier numéro de l’Information géographique (2019) consacré aux géographies de la #différence en ville, ou encore aux nombreuses sessions de la conférence annuelle de l’American Association of Geographers 2020 (https://aag.secure-abstracts.com/AAG%20Annual%20Meeting%202020/sessions-gallery) abordant des questions urbaines sous l’angle des #rapports_sociaux (perspectives féministes, marxistes, empruntant à la Critical Race Theory ou aux approches du Settler Colonialism). C’est dans la continuité de cette actualité que s’inscrit le #13 de la revue Urbanités. En refusant de donner a priori la primauté thématique d’un rapport social sur un autre tout en mettant l’accent sur les mécanismes de production du minoritaire et du majoritaire, ce numéro propose une pluralité de lectures des manières dont les contextes urbains participent à la (re)production des positionnements sociaux, et par conséquent, à la redéfinition du rapport entre minorités et majorités en ville.

    http://www.revue-urbanites.fr/13-edito

    Sommaire :

    Edito

    #Minorités_sexuelles en #exil : l’expérience minoritaire en ville à l’aune de #marginalisations multiples

    Les riverains contre le nourrissage des #pigeons à #Paris

    Construire sa place en #montagne quand on vient des #quartiers_populaires : un enjeu pour l’#éducation_populaire

    Mouvements de #résistance autochtones et #street-art décolonial aux #États-Unis. De la réserve de #Standing_Rock aux murs d’#Indian_Alley

    Hiérarchie sociale et politique pour la visibilité sur le territoire dans un espace ségrégé. Le cas des républicains nord-irlandais

    « L’infusion » d’approches genrées dans l’urbanisme parisien : métaphore d’une propagation aux échelles organisationnelles et individuelles

    Point(s) de rencontres dans les villes émiriennes : le partage d’espaces publics où les minorités sont majoritaires

    #revue #urban_matter #géographie_urbaine #ségrégation #genre #peuples_autochtones #Irlande_du_Nord #Emirats_Arabes_unis #USA

    –---

    Avec cette note :

    La revue Urbanités a la joie de vous annoncer la parution en ligne de son treizième numéro thématique, consacré à la question des rapports entre minorités et majorités en ville. Nous tenons également à souligner que ce numéro ne pourrait pas exister sans les apports précieux de chercheur·e·s aux statuts largement précaires. Sans elleux, ce numéro ne compterait qu’un article et sa direction serait amputée. Ces contributeur·trice·s essentiel·le·s au fonctionnement des revues méritent une plus grande visibilité et une plus grande stabilité professionnelle, garantes d’une recherche de qualité.

  • « Champagne », le sulfureux intermédiaire des industriels français au Brésil - Page 1 | Mediapart
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/281219/champagne-le-sulfureux-intermediaire-des-industriels-francais-au-bresil

    Les fleurons de l’industrie française qui ont remporté ces dernières années d’importants contrats au #Brésil sont désormais dans le viseur des magistrats #anticorruption. Le consultant José Amaro Pinto Ramos (nom de code « #Champagne ») est accusé d’avoir ventilé des #pots-de-vin pour le compte des #groupes_français.

    #corruption

  • En #Europe_centrale, une « #alliance des villes libres » contre le populisme

    Les maires de #Budapest, #Varsovie, #Prague et #Bratislava ont signé un #pacte contre les dérives des gouvernements du #groupe_de_Visegrad.

    Ils ont la quarantaine ou presque, sont de fervents défenseurs de la #démocratie_libérale et fermement proeuropéens. A l’occasion d’une journée hautement symbolique, les maires de Prague, Varsovie, Budapest et Bratislava ont célébré, lundi 16 décembre dans la capitale hongroise, la naissance d’une « #alliance_des_villes_libres » destinée à contrecarrer les tendances populistes de leurs gouvernements respectifs.

    Dans ce « groupe de Visegrad » constitué de la #Pologne, la #Hongrie, la #République_tchèque et la #Slovaquie, qui fait régulièrement l’actualité pour ses dérives en matière d’Etat de droit et de refus des #valeurs_européennes, l’initiative des élus des quatre capitales montre que la #résistance_locale est réelle, même si elle est souvent encore minoritaire au niveau national.

    « Ilots de #liberté »

    « Nous venons de différents partis politiques, mais nous avons les mêmes #valeurs. Nos villes sont libres, progressistes, tolérantes et surtout proeuropéennes », a vanté le maire de Varsovie, Rafal Trzaskowski, largement élu en 2018 contre un candidat ultraconservateur du parti Droit et justice, qui gouverne la Pologne depuis 2015 en multipliant les atteintes à l’indépendance des médias et de la justice.

    Cette alliance a été rendue possible par la victoire historique d’un candidat de l’opposition à la mairie de Budapest le 13 octobre. Alors que la capitale hongroise était gouvernée depuis 2010 par le Fidesz, le parti du premier ministre nationaliste Viktor Orban, Gergely Karacsony, président d’un petit parti de centre gauche, a réussi à l’emporter avec 50,9 % des voix. Le Fidesz a aussi perdu à cette occasion le contrôle de six autres grandes villes du pays.

    https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/12/17/en-europe-centrale-une-alliance-des-villes-libres-contre-le-populisme_602311
    #urban_matter #villes #résistance #populisme #pro-Europe #progressisme #tolérance

    ping @karine4

    via @mobileborders

  • Des #pêcheurs pris dans un étau

    « La mer c’est la liberté. Aujourd’hui nous sommes emprisonnés à même l’eau » déplore Slah Eddine Mcharek, président de l’Association Le Pêcheur pour le développement et l’environnement[1] à #Zarzis. Leurs projets sont ambitieux : protection des ressources aquatiques, développement d’une pêche durable et responsable et défense de la pêche artisanale. Mais les obstacles sont de taille : pris entre la raréfaction des ressources halieutiques, les menaces à leur sécurité, la réduction de leur zone de pêche et la criminalisation du sauvetage des migrants en mer, les pêcheurs se retrouvent enserrés dans un véritable étau.

    Au-delà de la petite ville de Zarzis et de ses plages où se côtoient hôtels de luxe, corps de naufragés et pêcheurs en lutte, le récit de Slah Eddine rappelle l’importance de la justice migratoire et environnementale.

    La mer, déchetterie nationale

    Depuis quelques années, un phénomène prend de l’ampleur : les rejets de déchets plastiques envahissent les rives et encombrent les zones où travaillent les pêcheurs. Faute d’un système opérationnel de collecte des ordures ménagères et de sensibilisation aux risques liés à la pollution des eaux par le plastique, ces déchets s’entassent dans les canaux de la ville avant de se disperser dans la mer, au point que les pêcheurs réclament l’interdiction des sacs plastiques.

    Aux déchets ménagers s’ajoute le problème des rejets industriels. Slah Eddine déploie une carte du bassin méditerranéen et pointe du doigt le sebkhet el melah (marais salant) des côtes de Zarzis. Le salin appartient à Cotusal, vestige colonial d’une filiale française qui a exploité pendant longtemps les ressources salines de la Tunisie, dans le cadre de concessions avantageuses qui n’ont pas été renégociées depuis l’indépendance[2]. L’exploitation du sel dans cette région, en plus de saliniser les terres agricoles, rejette des produits de traitement du sel dans la mer. Surtout, les eaux zarzisiennes sont polluées par les rejets du Groupe Chimique Tunisien, notamment le phosphogypse, et par les eaux usées non traitées par l’ONAS (Office National de l’Assainissement). Cette dernière ne remplit pas sa mission de traitement des eaux industrielles et ménagères, notamment sur l’île de Djerba. Une partie des eaux est traitée de manière inefficace et insuffisante, l’autre non traitée du tout.

    Un équilibre écologique rompu

    Pour les êtres vivants qui habitent ces eaux, les rejets industriels mêlés aux déchets et eaux usées ne peuvent faire que mauvais mélange. « La mer est devenue des toilettes à ciel ouvert » s’indigne Slah Eddine, pointant cette fois du doigt deux poissons dessinés sur une affiche. L’un est le loup de mer et l’autre la dorade. « Là où les usines rejettent leurs eaux, ces poissons n’y vivent plus » explique-t-il. La contamination de ces eaux rompt un équilibre essentiel à la survie de la faune et la flore maritimes.

    Dans ces eaux, la reproduction marine est difficile sinon impossible, entraînant la disparition de plusieurs espèces de poissons et notamment les espèces cartilagineuses. Les éponges souffrent quant à elles du réchauffement climatique et présentent depuis quelques années des signes de maladies, au désespoir des familles qui vivent de leur commerce. Ainsi, en 2017, suite à la montée des températures (24°C à 67m de profondeur !), de nombreuses éponges sont mortes, par leur fragilité aux changements du milieu ou par une épidémie favorisée par cette augmentation de température[3].

    L’accumulation des pollutions a fini par asphyxier toute forme de vie dans les eaux proches de Djerba et Zarzis et notamment dans le golfe quasi fermé de Boughrara. Les pêcheurs estiment que 90 % des poissons et mollusques auraient disparu en dix ou vingt ans, privant beaucoup de personnes, notamment des jeunes et des femmes, d’un revenu stable. Mais alors que les pêcheurs de Gabès reçoivent des compensations à cause de la pollution et viennent pêcher sur les côtes de Zarzis, les pêcheurs zarzisiens ne reçoivent rien alors qu’ils sont aussi affectés.

    Plus au nord, sur les côtes sfaxiennes, c’est un autre phénomène qui s’est produit deux fois cette année, en juin puis en novembre, notamment à Jbeniana : la mer est devenue rouge, entrainant une forte mortalité de poissons. Le phénomène a été expliqué par la présence de microalgues eutrophisant la mer, c’est-à-dire la privant de son oxygène. Mais la version officielle s’arrête là[4], la prolifération de ces microalgues n’a pas été expliquée. Or, des phénomènes similaires sont connus à d’autres endroits de la planète, notamment dans le golfe du Mexique où la prolifération des algues est due à l’excès d’engrais phosphaté et azoté qui se retrouve dans la mer, ou du rejet d’eaux usées, qui produisent des concentrations trop importantes de matières organiques[5]. Il est donc fort probable que les rejets concentrés en phosphate du Groupe Chimique Tunisien à Gabès et Sfax, d’autres rejets industriels et ménagers et/ou des rejets d’engrais agricoles par les oueds soient à l’origine du phénomène.

    Le coût de Daesh

    Alors que certaines espèces disparaissent, d’autres se multiplient en trop grand nombre. Le crabe bleu, surnommé « Daesh » par les pêcheurs de la région du fait de son potentiel invasif et destructeur, en est le meilleur exemple. Cette espèce, apparue fin 2014 dans le golfe de Gabès[6], a rapidement proliféré au large des côtes, se nourrissant des poissons qui jusque-là constituaient le gagne-pain des pêcheurs du coin. « Daesh détruit tout : les dorades, les crevettes, les seiches …. Tous les bons poissons ! » s’exclame-t-il. La voracité du crabe bleu a aggravé les problèmes économiques de bien des pêcheurs. Si la chair de cette espèce invasive fait le bonheur de certains palais et qu’un marché à l’export est en plein développement en direction de l’Asie et du Golfe, les habitants de Zarzis qui vivent de la pêche artisanale, eux, ne s’y retrouvent pas. « Un kilo de loup ou de dorade se vend 40 dinars. Un kilo de crabe bleu, c’est seulement 2 dinars ! » affirme un pêcheur de l’association.

    Le calcul est vite fait, d’autant plus que les crabes bleus font assumer aux pêcheurs un coût du renouvellement du matériel beaucoup plus important, leurs pinces ayant tendance à cisailler les filets. « Avant l’arrivée de Daesh, nous changions les filets environ deux fois par an, maintenant c’est quatre à cinq fois par ans ! » se désole l’un d’entre eux.

    Bloqués dans un Sahara marin

    Comme le martèlent les pêcheurs, « la zone de pêche de Zarzis est devenue un Sahara, un véritable désert ». Suite au partage international de la Méditerranée, les pêcheurs zarzisiens sont cantonnés dans des eaux côtières, qui se vident de poisson suite aux désastres écologiques et à la surpêche.

    « Avant 2005 et le dialogue 5+5[7] on pouvait accéder à des zones de pêche intéressantes, mais depuis les autres pays ont agrandi leur territoire marin ». En effet, c’est en 2005 que la Libye met en place sa zone de pêche exclusive, interdisant ainsi l’accès aux pêcheurs tunisiens. La Tunisie met elle aussi en place sa zone économique exclusive[8], mais, à la différence de la zone libyenne[9], elle autorise des navires étrangers à y pêcher. Les chalutiers égyptiens sont particulièrement présents, et s’ajoutent aux chalutiers tunisiens (de Sfax notamment) qui ne peuvent plus pêcher dans les eaux poissonneuses libyennes. Il arrive même que ces chalutiers pénètrent dans les eaux territoriales, en toute impunité. En plus des désastres écologiques, les eaux du sud tunisien se vident ainsi de leurs poissons à cause de la surpêche.

    Limites des différentes zones maritimes tunisiennes[10] :

    Or, les frontières officielles ne semblent pas délimiter la zone où les pêcheurs tunisiens peuvent réellement travailler, cette dernière étant manifestement beaucoup plus restreinte et empiétée par la zone libyenne. Sur la carte maritime qu’il a déployée devant lui, Slah Eddine matérialise la zone où les pêcheurs de Zarzis peuvent pêcher de manière effective et montre en resserrant ses doigts l’évolution de la zone de pêche libyenne au détriment de la zone tunisienne. Mais alors, pourquoi ce déplacement de frontière maritime n’apparaît dans aucun texte ou accord international[11] ? Y a-t-il des accords cachés ? Les garde-côtes libyens s’arrogent-ils le droit de pénétrer les eaux tunisiennes ? Ou les pêcheurs tunisiens auraient-ils intégré l’obligation de ne pas pénétrer une zone tampon pour ne pas craindre pour leur sécurité ?

    Les pêcheurs sous les feux des groupes armés libyens

    Au-delà des problèmes économiques auxquels ils doivent faire face, les pêcheurs de Zarzis sont confrontés à de graves problèmes de sécurité dans les eaux où ils naviguent. Alors que les bateaux de pêche libyens ne se gênent pas, selon Slah Eddine, pour venir exploiter les eaux tunisiennes, il n’existe aucune tolérance pour les pêcheurs tunisiens qui s’aventurent en dehors de leur zone. Ces dernières années, le pêcheur ne compte plus les cas d’agressions, de saisies de bateaux, de menaces et prises d’otages, par les groupes armés, et parmi eux les gardes côtes officiels libyens, équipés par les programmes européens de lutte contre la migration non réglementaire.

    En 2012, un pêcheur tunisien mourrait ainsi sous les balles tirées d’une vedette côtière libyenne tandis que les 18 autres membres de l’équipage étaient faits prisonniers à Tripoli[12]. En 2015, quatre bateaux de pêche tunisiens qui avaient pénétré les eaux libyennes étaient également pris en otage par des groupes armés libyens et acheminés au port d’El Zaouira[13]. Les attaques ont eu lieu jusque dans les eaux tunisiennes, comme en février 2016 lorsque treize chalutiers tunisiens avec soixante-dix marins à bord ont été arraisonnés et emmenés dans le même port, la partie libyenne exigeant alors une rançon contre leur libération[14]. L’année suivante, en 2017, des pêcheurs libyens de Zaouira menaçaient de kidnapper tous les marins tunisiens qu’ils rencontreraient en mer en représailles au contrôle d’un chalutier libyen dans le port de Sfax par la garde maritime tunisienne. Depuis, les prises d’otage se multiplient. Enième épisode d’une saga sans fin, la dernière attaque libyenne date de septembre dernier.

    L’insécurité ne touche pas que les pêcheurs de Zarzis, mais tous les pêcheurs tunisiens qui naviguent à proximité des zones frontalières : au Sud-Est, ce sont les feux des groupes libyens qui les menacent ; au Nord-Ouest, ceux de la garde côtière algérienne. Le 31 janvier de cette année, un pêcheur originaire de Tabarka et âgé de 33 ans a été tué par les autorités algériennes alors que son bateau avait pénétré les eaux territoriales de l’Algérie[15]. « Le danger est partout ! », « on se fait tirer dessus ! », s’exclament les pêcheurs de l’Association. Entre deuil et colère, ils dénoncent l’absence de réponse ferme des autorités tunisiennes contre ces agressions et se font difficilement à l’idée qu’à chaque départ en mer leur vie puisse être menacée.

    Les autres damnés de la mer

    Comme tout marin, les pêcheurs de Zarzis doivent porter assistance aux bateaux en détresse qu’ils croisent sur leur chemin. Et des bateaux en détresse, ce n’est pas ce qui manque au large de Zarzis. Le hasard a fait que leur zone de pêche se trouve sur la route des migrants qui fuient la Libye sur des embarcations de fortune et les accidents sont fréquents dans ces eaux dangereuses. Porter secours aux survivants, prendre contact avec le Centre de Coordination des Sauvetages en Mer, ramener les corps de ceux pour lesquels ils arrivent trop tard afin de leur offrir une sépulture digne, c’est aussi cela, le quotidien des pêcheurs de Zarzis. L’effroi et la colère de l’impuissance lorsque des cadavres se prennent dans les filets pêche, l’inquiétude et le soulagement lorsque le pire est évité et que tout le monde arrive à bon port.

    Sauver des vies lorsqu’il est encore temps, c’est avant tout un devoir d’humanité pour ces hommes et ces femmes de la mer. La question ne se pose même pas, malgré les heures de travail et l’argent perdus. Pour être plus efficaces dans leurs gestes et secourir le plus grand nombre, plus d’une centaine de pêcheurs de Zarzis ont suivi en 2015 une formation de 6 jours sur le secours en mer organisée par Médecins sans frontières[16]. Alors que les politiques européennes de criminalisation des ONG menant des opérations de recherche et de secours en mer ont laissé un grand vide en Méditerranée, les pêcheurs tunisiens se retrouvent en première ligne pour les opérations de sauvetage. Aussi, quand ils partent en mer, prévoient-ils toujours de l’eau et de la nourriture en plus, des fois qu’un bateau à la dérive croise leur chemin.

    Des sauveurs que l’Europe veut faire passer pour des criminels

    Au-delà d’un devoir d’humanité, porter secours aux embarcations en détresse est une obligation inscrite dans le droit international maritime et en particulier dans la Convention internationale sur la Sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer (SOLAS), qui s’applique à tous les navires. Le texte prévoit l’obligation pour tous les Etats de coordonner leurs secours et de coopérer pour acheminer les personnes dans un lieu sûr[17], où la vie des survivants n’est plus menacée et où l’on peut subvenir à leurs besoins fondamentaux.

    Aussi, lorsque l’équipage de Chameseddine Bourrasine croise lors l’été 2018 une embarcation avec 14 migrants à la dérive, c’est sans hésitation qu’il décide de leur porter secours. Mais alors que les rescapés menacent de se suicider s’ils sont ramenés en Tunisie et qu’il ne saurait être question de les livrer aux garde-côtes de Libye où c’est l’enfer des geôles qui les attend, le capitaine décide d’appeler la garde côtière du pays sûr le plus proche, à savoir l’Italie. Après plusieurs tentatives de contact restées sans réponse, il décide alors de remorquer le bateau vers l’Italie pour débarquer les migrants dans un lieu où ils seront en sécurité[18]. Accusé avec son équipage de s’être rendu coupable d’aide à l’immigration dite « clandestine », ce sauvetage coûtera aux 7 marins-pêcheurs 22 jours d’incarcération en Sicile.

    Si le procès s’est résolu par un non-lieu, les pêcheurs de Zarzis restent dans le collimateur des autorités italiennes. « Nous les pêcheurs tunisiens, l’Italie voudrait nous contrôler et encore limiter la zone dans laquelle nous pouvons pêcher » se désole Slah Eddine, « les Italiens nous surveillent ! ». Il évoque aussi la surveillance d’EUNAVFOR Med, également appelée Sophia, opération militaire lancée par l’Union européenne en 2015 en Méditerranée pour, selon les mots de la Commission « démanteler le modèle économique des passeurs et des trafiquants d’êtres humains »[19]. Si l’opération militaire les surveille de près lorsqu’il s’agit du secours en mer, lorsqu’il est question d’attaques par des milices libyennes, Sophia détourne le regard et abandonne les pêcheurs tunisiens à leur sort.

    Les harraga de demain ? [20]

    « On ne peut plus, ce n’est plus possible, il n’y a plus rien », répètent les pêcheurs, acquiesçant les paroles par lesquelles Slah Eddine vient de présenter leur situation. Entre les eaux polluées, les problèmes économiques, le fléau de Daesh, les poissons qui ne se reproduisent plus, les éponges malades, les attaques libyennes, les pressions italiennes et européennes, être un pêcheur en Tunisie, « ce n’est plus une vie ». Leurs fils à eux sont partis pour la plupart, en Europe, après avoir « brûlé » la mer. Ils savent que dans cette région qui vit surtout de la pêche, il n’y a pas d’avenir pour eux.

    Et puis il y a ceux qui, privés de toute autre source de revenus, sont contraints à se reconvertir dans des activités de passeurs. Nés dans des familles où la pêche se transmet de père en fils, ils connaissent la mer, ses vents, tempêtes, marées et courants. Ils savent où se procurer des bateaux. Lorsque ces loups de mer sont à la barre, le voyage est plus sûr pour celles et ceux risquent la traversée vers l’Europe à bord d’un rafiot. Alors que les harragas tunisiens sont de plus en plus systématiquement déportés lorsqu’ils sont arrêtés par les autorités italiennes[21], certains passeurs ont troqué leur clientèle tunisienne pour une clientèle subsaharienne, de plus en plus nombreuse à mesure que leur situation en Libye se dégrade. Faute de voies régulières pour les migrants, la demande de passage vers l’Europe augmente. Et faute de ressources alternatives pour les pêcheurs, l’offre se développe.

    Or ce n’est ni la « main invisible » ni une quelconque fatalité qui poussent ces pêcheurs au départ ou à la diversification de leurs activités, mais le mélange entre le modèle de développement polluant et incontrôlé, l’inaction des autorités tunisiennes en matière de protection de l’environnement, et le cynisme des politiques migratoires sécuritaires et meurtrières de l’Union européenne.

    https://ftdes.net/des-pecheurs-pris-dans-un-etau
    #environnement #sauvetage #Méditerranée #pêche #développement #émigration #Cotusal #pollution #plastique #colonialisme #sel #salines #phosphogypse #Groupe_Chimique_Tunisien #eaux_usées #reproduction_marine #poissons #éponges #Djerba #mollusques #Gabès #Jbeniana #microalgues #phosphate #crabe_bleu #Libye #différend_territorial #zone_économique_exclusive #surpêche #asile #migrations #réfugiés #criminalisation #Chameseddine_Bourrasine #EUNAVFOR_Med #Operation_Sophia #harraga

    #ressources_pédagogiques #dynamiques_des_suds

    • Making misery pay : Libya militias take EU funds for migrants

      When the European Union started funneling millions of euros into Libya to slow the tide of migrants crossing the Mediterranean, the money came with EU promises to improve detention centers notorious for abuse and fight human trafficking.

      That hasn’t happened. Instead, the misery of migrants in Libya has spawned a thriving and highly lucrative web of businesses funded in part by the EU and enabled by the United Nations, an Associated Press investigation has found.

      The EU has sent more than 327.9 million euros to Libya (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya), with an additional 41 million approved in early December (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/all-news-and-stories/new-actions-almost-eu150-million-tackle-human-smuggling-protect-vulnerable), largely channeled through U.N. agencies. The AP found that in a country without a functioning government, huge sums of European money have been diverted to intertwined networks of militiamen, traffickers and coast guard members who exploit migrants. In some cases, U.N. officials knew militia networks were getting the money, according to internal emails.

      The militias torture, extort and otherwise abuse migrants for ransoms in detention centers under the nose of the U.N., often in compounds that receive millions in European money, the AP investigation showed. Many migrants also simply disappear from detention centers, sold to traffickers or to other centers.

      The same militias conspire with some members of Libyan coast guard units. The coast guard gets training and equipment from Europe to keep migrants away from its shores. But coast guard members return some migrants to the detention centers under deals with militias, the AP found, and receive bribes to let others pass en route to Europe.

      The militias involved in abuse and trafficking also skim off European funds given through the U.N. to feed and otherwise help migrants, who go hungry. For example, millions of euros in U.N. food contracts were under negotiation with a company controlled by a militia leader, even as other U.N. teams raised alarms about starvation in his detention center, according to emails obtained by the AP and interviews with at least a half-dozen Libyan officials.

      In many cases, the money goes to neighboring Tunisia to be laundered, and then flows back to the militias in Libya.

      The story of Prudence Aimée and her family shows how migrants are exploited at every stage of their journey through Libya.

      Aimée left Cameroon in 2015, and when her family heard nothing from her for a year, they thought she was dead. But she was in detention and incommunicado. In nine months at the Abu Salim detention center, she told the AP, she saw “European Union milk” and diapers delivered by U.N.staff pilfered before they could reach migrant children, including her toddler son. Aimée herself would spend two days at a time without food or drink, she said.

      In 2017, an Arab man came looking for her with a photo of her on his phone.

      “They called my family and told them they had found me,” she said. “That’s when my family sent money.” Weeping, Aimée said her family paid a ransom equivalent of $670 to get her out of the center. She could not say who got the money.

      She was moved to an informal warehouse and eventually sold to yet another detention center, where yet another ransom — $750 this time — had to be raised from her family. Her captors finally released the young mother, who got on a boat that made it past the coast guard patrol, after her husband paid $850 for the passage. A European humanitarian ship rescued Aimée, but her husband remains in Libya.

      Aimée was one of more than 50 migrants interviewed by the AP at sea, in Europe, Tunisia and Rwanda, and in furtive messages from inside detention centers in Libya. Journalists also spoke with Libyan government officials, aid workers and businessmen in Tripoli, obtained internal U.N. emails and analyzed budget documents and contracts.

      The issue of migration has convulsed Europe since the influx of more than a million people in 2015 and 2016, fleeing violence and poverty in the Mideast, Afghanistan and Africa. In 2015, the European Union set up a fund intended to curb migration from Africa, from which money is sent to Libya. The EU gives the money mainly through the U.N.’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the High Commissioner for Refugees. (UNHCR).

      But Libya is plagued by corruption and caught in a civil war. The west, including the capital Tripoli, is ruled by a U.N.-brokered government, while the east is ruled by another government supported by army commander Khalifa Hifter. The chaos is ideal for profiteers making money off migrants.

      The EU’s own documents show it was aware of the dangers of effectively outsourcing its migration crisis to Libya. Budget documents from as early as 2017 for a 90 million euro (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-03.pdf) outlay warned of a medium-to-high risk that Europe’s support would lead to more human rights violations against migrants, and that the Libyan government would deny access to detention centers. A recent EU assessment (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/risk_register_eutf_0.pdf) found the world was likely to get the “wrong perception” that European money could be seen as supporting abuse.

      Despite the roles they play in the detention system in Libya, both the EU and the U.N. say they want the centers closed. In a statement to the AP, the EU said that under international law, it is not responsible for what goes on inside the centers.

      “Libyan authorities have to provide the detained refugees and migrants with adequate and quality food while ensuring that conditions in detention centers uphold international agreed standards,” the statement said.

      The EU also says more than half of the money in its fund for Africa is used to help and protect migrants, and that it relies on the U.N. to spend the money wisely.

      The U.N. said the situation in Libya is highly complex, and it has to work with whoever runs the detention centers to preserve access to vulnerable migrants.

      “UNHCR does not choose its counterparts,” said Charlie Yaxley, a spokesman for the U.N. refugee agency. “Some presumably also have allegiances with local militias.”

      After two weeks of being questioned by the AP, UNHCR said it would change its policy on awarding of food and aid contracts for migrants through intermediaries.

      “Due in part to the escalating conflict in Tripoli and the possible risk to the integrity of UNHCR’s programme, UNHCR decided to contract directly for these services from 1 January 2020,” Yaxley said.

      Julien Raickman, who until recently was the Libya mission chief for the aid group Médecins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders, believes the problem starts with Europe’s unwillingness to deal with the politics of migration.

      “If you were to treat dogs in Europe the way these people are treated, it would be considered a societal problem,” he said.

      EXTORTION INSIDE THE DETENTION CENTERS

      About 5,000 migrants in Libya are crowded into between 16 and 23 detention centers at any given time, depending on who is counting and when. Most are concentrated in the west, where the militias are more powerful than the weak U.N.-backed government.

      Aid intended for migrants helps support the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center, named for the militia that controls it, in the western coastal town of Zawiya. The U.N. migration agency, the IOM, keeps a temporary office there for medical checks of migrants, and its staff and that of the UNHCR visit the compound regularly.

      Yet migrants at the center are tortured for ransoms to be freed and trafficked for more money, only to be intercepted at sea by the coast guard and brought back to the center, according to more than a dozen migrants, Libyan aid workers, Libyan officials and European human rights groups. A UNHCR report in late 2018 noted the allegations as well, and the head of the militia, Mohammed Kachlaf, is under U.N. sanctions (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970/materials/summaries/individual/mohammed-kachlaf) for human trafficking. Kachlaf, other militia leaders named by the AP and the Libyan coast guard all did not respond to requests for comment.

      Many migrants recalled being cut, shot and whipped with electrified hoses and wooden boards. They also heard the screams of others emerging from the cell blocks off-limits to U.N. aid workers.

      Families back home are made to listen during the torture to get them to pay, or are sent videos afterward.

      Eric Boakye, a Ghanaian, was locked in the al-Nasr Martyrs center twice, both times after he was intercepted at sea, most recently around three years ago. The first time, his jailers simply took the money on him and set him free. He tried again to cross and was again picked up by the coast guard and returned to his jailers.

      “They cut me with a knife on my back and beat me with sticks,” he said, lifting his shirt to show the scars lining his back. “Each and every day they beat us to call our family and send money.” The new price for freedom: Around $2,000.

      That was more than his family could scrape together. Boakye finally managed to escape. He worked small jobs for some time to save money, then tried to cross again. On his fourth try, he was picked up by the Ocean Viking humanitarian ship to be taken to Italy. In all, Boakye had paid $4,300 to get out of Libya.

      Fathi al-Far, the head of the al-Nasr International Relief and Development agency, which operates at the center and has ties to the militia, denied that migrants are mistreated. He blamed “misinformation” on migrants who blew things out of proportion in an attempt to get asylum.

      “I am not saying it’s paradise — we have people who have never worked before with the migrants, they are not trained,” he said. But he called the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center “the most beautiful in the country.”

      At least five former detainees showed an AP journalist scars from their injuries at the center, which they said were inflicted by guards or ransom seekers making demands to their families. One man had bullet wounds to both feet, and another had cuts on his back from a sharp blade. All said they had to pay to get out.

      Five to seven people are freed every day after they pay anywhere from $1,800 to $8,500 each, the former migrants said. At al-Nasr, they said, the militia gets around $14,000 every day from ransoms; at Tarik al-Sikka, a detention center in Tripoli, it was closer to $17,000 a day, they said. They based their estimates on what they and others detained with them had paid, by scraping together money from family and friends.

      The militias also make money from selling groups of migrants, who then often simply disappear from a center. An analysis commissioned by the EU and released earlier this month by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (https://globalinitiative.net/migrant-detention-libya) noted that the detention centers profit by selling migrants among themselves and to traffickers, as well as into prostitution and forced labor.

      Hundreds of migrants this year who were intercepted at sea and taken to detention centers had vanished by the time international aid groups visited, according to Médecins Sans Frontières. There’s no way to tell where they went, but MSF suspects they were sold to another detention center or to traffickers.

      A former guard at the Khoms center acknowledged to the AP that migrants often were seized in large numbers by men armed with anti-aircraft guns and RPGs. He said he couldn’t keep his colleagues from abusing the migrants or traffickers from taking them out of the center.

      “I don’t want to remember what happened,” he said. The IOM was present at Khoms, he noted, but the center closed last year.

      A man who remains detained at the al-Nasr Martyrs center said Libyans frequently arrive in the middle of the night to take people. Twice this fall, he said, they tried to load a group of mostly women into a small convoy of vehicles but failed because the center’s detainees revolted.

      Fighting engulfed Zawiya last week, but migrants remained locked inside the al-Nasr Martyrs center, which is also being used for weapons storage.

      TRAFFICKING AND INTERCEPTION AT SEA

      Even when migrants pay to be released from the detention centers, they are rarely free. Instead, the militias sell them to traffickers, who promise to take them across the Mediterranean to Europe for a further fee. These traffickers work hand in hand with some coast guard members, the AP found.

      The Libyan coast guard is supported by both the U.N. and the EU. The IOM highlights (https://libya.iom.int/rescue-sea-support) its cooperation with the coast guard on its Libya home page. Europe has spent more than 90 million euros since 2017 for training and faster boats for the Libyan coast guard to stop migrants from ending up in Europe.

      This fall, Italy renewed a memorandum of understanding with Libya to support the coast guard with training and vessels, and it delivered 10 new speedboats to Libya in November.

      In internal documents obtained in September by the European watchdog group Statewatch, the European Council described the coast guard as “operating effectively, thus confirming the process achieved over the past three years” (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/eu-council-libya-11538-19.pdf). The Libyan coast guard says it intercepted nearly 9,000 people in 2019 en route to Europe and returned them to Libya this year, after quietly extending its coastal rescue zone 100 miles offshore with European encouragement.

      What’s unclear is how often militias paid the coast guard to intercept these people and bring them back to the detention centers — the business more than a dozen migrants described at the al-Nasr Martyrs facility in Zawiya.

      The coast guard unit at Zawiya is commanded by Abdel-Rahman Milad, who has sanctions against him for human trafficking by the U.N.’s Security Council. Yet when his men intercept boats carrying migrants, they contact U.N. staff at disembarkation points for cursory medical checks.

      Despite the sanctions and an arrest warrant against him, Milad remains free because he has the support of the al-Nasr militia. In 2017, before the sanctions, Milad was even flown to Rome, along with a militia leader, Mohammed al-Khoja, as part of a Libyan delegation for a U.N.-sponsored migration meeting. In response to the sanctions, Milad denied any links to human smuggling and said traffickers wear uniforms similar to those of his men.

      Migrants named at least two other operations along the coast, at Zuwara and Tripoli, that they said operated along the same lines as Milad’s. Neither center responded to requests for comment.

      The U.N.’s International Organization for Migration acknowledged to the AP that it has to work with partners who might have contacts with local militias.

      “Without those contacts it would be impossible to operate in those areas and for IOM to provide support services to migrants and the local population,” said IOM spokeswoman Safa Msehli. “Failure to provide that support would have compounded the misery of hundreds of men, women and children.”

      The story of Abdullah, a Sudanese man who made two attempts to flee Libya, shows just how lucrative the cycle of trafficking and interception really is.

      All told, the group of 47 in his first crossing from Tripoli over a year ago had paid a uniformed Libyan and his cronies $127,000 in a mix of dollars, euros and Libyan dinars for the chance to leave their detention center and cross in two boats. They were intercepted in a coast guard boat by the same uniformed Libyan, shaken down for their cell phones and more money, and tossed back into detention.

      “We talked to him and asked him, why did you let us out and then arrest us?” said Abdullah, who asked that only his first name be used because he was afraid of retaliation. “He beat two of us who brought it up.”

      Abdullah later ended up in the al-Nasr Martyrs detention center, where he learned the new price list for release and an attempted crossing based on nationality: Ethiopians, $5,000; Somalis $6,800; Moroccans and Egyptians, $8,100; and finally Bangladeshis, a minimum $18,500. Across the board, women pay more.

      Abdullah scraped together another ransom payment and another crossing fee. Last July, he and 18 others paid $48,000 in total for a boat with a malfunctioning engine that sputtered to a stop within hours.

      After a few days stuck at sea off the Libyan coast under a sweltering sun, they threw a dead man overboard and waited for their own lives to end. Instead, they were rescued on their ninth day at sea by Tunisian fishermen, who took them back to Tunisia.

      “There are only three ways out of the prison: You escape, you pay ransom, or you die,” Abdullah said, referring to the detention center.

      In all, Abdullah spent a total of $3,300 to leave Libya’s detention centers and take to the sea. He ended up barely 100 miles away.

      Sometimes members of the coast guard make money by doing exactly what the EU wants them to prevent: Letting migrants cross, according to Tarik Lamloum, the head of the Libyan human rights organization Beladi. Traffickers pay the coast guard a bribe of around $10,000 per boat that is allowed to pass, with around five to six boats launching at a time when conditions are favorable, he said.

      The head of Libya’s Department for Combating Irregular Migration or DCIM, the agency responsible for the detention centers under the Ministry of Interior, acknowledged corruption and collusion among the militias and the coast guard and traffickers, and even within the government itself.

      “They are in bed with them, as well as people from my own agency,” said Al Mabrouk Abdel-Hafez.

      SKIMMING PROFITS

      Beyond the direct abuse of migrants, the militia network also profits by siphoning off money from EU funds sent for their food and security — even those earmarked for a U.N.-run migrant center, according to more than a dozen officials and aid workers in Libya and Tunisia, as well as internal U.N. emails and meeting minutes seen by The Associated Press.

      An audit in May of the UNHCR (https://oios.un.org/audit-reports, the U.N. refugee agency responsible for the center, found a lack of oversight and accountability at nearly all levels of spending in the Libya mission. The audit identified inexplicable payments in American dollars to Libyan firms and deliveries of goods that were never verified.

      In December 2018, during the period reviewed in the audit, the U.N. launched its migrant center in Tripoli (https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/12/5c09033a4/first-group-refugees-evacuated-new-departure-facility-libya.html), known as the #Gathering_and_Departure_Facility or #GDF, as an “ alternative to detention” (https://apnews.com/7e72689f44e45dd17aa0a3ee53ed3c03). For the recipients of the services contracts, sent through the Libyan government agency LibAid, it was a windfall.

      Millions of euros in contracts for food (https://apnews.com/e4c68dae65a84c519253f69c817a58ec) and migrant aid went to at least one company linked to al-Khoja, the militia leader flown to Rome for the U.N. migration meeting, according to internal U.N. emails seen by the AP, two senior Libyan officials and an international aid worker. Al-Khoja is also the deputy head of the DCIM, the government agency responsible for the detention centers.

      One of the Libyan officials saw the multimillion-euro catering contract with a company named Ard al-Watan, or The Land of the Nation, which al-Khoja controls.

      “We feel like this is al-Khoja’s fiefdom. He controls everything. He shuts the doors and he opens the doors,” said the official, a former employee at the U.N. center who like other Libyan officials spoke anonymously out of fear for his safety. He said al-Khoja used sections of the U.N. center to train his militia fighters and built a luxury apartment inside.

      Even as the contracts for the U.N. center were negotiated, Libyan officials said, three Libyan government agencies were investigating al-Khoja in connection with the disappearance of $570 million from government spending allocated to feed migrants in detention centers in the west.

      At the time, al-Khoja already ran another center for migrants, Tarik al-Sikka, notorious for abuses including beating, hard labor and a massive ransom scheme. Tekila, an Eritrean refugee, said that for two years at Tarik al-Sikka, he and other migrants lived on macaroni, even after he was among 25 people who came down with tuberculosis, a disease exacerbated by malnutrition. Tekila asked that only his first name be used for his safety.

      “When there is little food, there is no choice but to go to sleep,” he said.

      Despite internal U.N. emails warning of severe malnutrition inside Tarik al-Sikka, U.N. officials in February and March 2018 repeatedly visited the detention center to negotiate the future opening of the GDF. AP saw emails confirming that by July 2018, the UNHCR’s chief of mission was notified that companies controlled by al-Khoja’s militia would receive subcontracts for services.

      Yaxley, the spokesman for UNHCR, emphasized that the officials the agency works with are “all under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.” He said UNHCR monitors expenses to make sure its standard rules are followed, and may withhold payments otherwise.

      A senior official at LibAid, the Libyan government agency that managed the center with the U.N., said the contracts are worth at least $7 million for catering, cleaning and security, and 30 out of the 65 LibAid staff were essentially ghost employees who showed up on the payroll, sight unseen.

      The U.N. center was “a treasure trove,” the senior Libaid official lamented. “There was no way you could operate while being surrounded by Tripoli militias. It was a big gamble.”

      An internal U.N. communication from early 2019 shows it was aware of the problem. The note found a high risk that food for the U.N. center was being diverted to militias, given the amount budgeted compared to the amount migrants were eating.

      In general, around 50 dinars a day, or $35, is budgeted per detainee for food and other essentials for all centers, according to two Libyan officials, two owners of food catering companies and an international aid worker. Of that, only around 2 dinars is actually spent on meals, according to their rough calculations and migrants’ descriptions.

      Despite the investigations into al-Khoja, Tarik al-Sikka and another detention center shared a 996,000-euro grant from the EU and Italy in February.

      At the Zawiya center, emergency goods delivered by U.N. agencies ended up redistributed “half for the prisoners, half for the workers,” said Orobosa Bright, a Nigerian who endured three stints there for a total of 11 months. Many of the goods end up on Libya’s black market as well, Libyan officials and international aid workers say.

      IOM’s spokeswoman said “aid diversion is a reality” in Libya and beyond, and that the agency does its best. Msehli said if it happens regularly, IOM will be forced to re-evaluate its supports to detention centers “despite our awareness that any reduction in this lifesaving assistance will add to the misery of migrants.”

      Despite the corruption, the detention system in Libya is still expanding in places, with money from Europe. At a detention center in Sabaa where migrants are already going hungry, they were forced to build yet another wing funded by the Italian government, said Lamloum, the Libyan aid worker. The Italian government did not respond to a request for comment.

      Lamloum sent a photo of the new prison. It has no windows.

      TUNISIA LAUNDERING

      The money earned off the suffering of migrants is whitewashed in money laundering operations in Tunisia, Libya’s neighbor.

      In the town of Ben Gardane, dozens of money-changing stalls transform Libyan dinars, dollars and euros into Tunisian currency before the money continues on its way to the capital, Tunis. Even Libyans without residency can open a bank account.

      Tunisia also offers another opportunity for militia networks to make money off European funds earmarked for migrants. Because of Libya’s dysfunctional banking system, where cash is scarce and militias control accounts, international organizations give contracts, usually in dollars, to Libyan organizations with bank accounts in Tunisia. The vendors compound the money on Libya’s black-market exchange, which ranges between 4 and 9 times greater than the official rate.

      Libya’s government handed over more than 100 files to Tunisia earlier this year listing companies under investigation for fraud and money laundering.

      The companies largely involve militia warlords and politicians, according to Nadia Saadi, a manager at the Tunisian anti-corruption authority. The laundering involves cash payments for real estate, falsified customs documents and faked bills for fictitious companies.

      “All in all, Libya is run by militias,” said a senior Libyan judicial official, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of risking his life. “Whatever governments say, and whatever uniform they wear, or stickers they put....this is the bottom line.”

      Husni Bey, a prominent businessman in Libya, said the idea of Europe sending aid money to Libya, a once-wealthy country suffering from corruption, was ill-conceived from the beginning.

      “Europe wants to buy those who can stop smuggling with all of these programs,” Bey said. “They would be much better off blacklisting the names of those involved in human trafficking, fuel and drug smuggling and charging them with crimes, instead of giving them money.”

      https://apnews.com/9d9e8d668ae4b73a336a636a86bdf27f

  • Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans - WSJ
    https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of

    Search giant is amassing health records from Ascension facilities in 21 states; patients not yet informed

    Google is engaged with one of the country’s largest health-care systems to collect and crunch the detailed personal health information of millions of Americans across 21 states.

    The initiative, code-named “Project Nightingale,” appears to be the largest in a series of efforts by Silicon Valley giants to gain access to personal health data and establish a toehold in the massive health-care industry.

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • Chez #Chronopost, ces #sans-papiers que l’on ne veut pas voir

    Toutes les entreprises concernées par la #grève des travailleurs de la filiale de la #Poste à #Alfortville se renvoient la balle. Et refusent de traiter le dossier.

    Scoop : Libération a rencontré des gens qui n’existent pas. Début juillet, on relatait le combat des travailleurs sans papiers de Chronopost, qui ont installé le 11 juin un piquet de grève devant le site de la filiale de la Poste à Alfortville (#Val-de-Marne). Ces quelque trente Maliens, Sénégalais ou encore Guinéens chargés de la #logistique demandent depuis trois mois maintenant leur #régularisation, en dénonçant des #conditions_de_travail intenables - conditions contre lesquelles ils peuvent difficilement lutter, vu qu’ils risquent l’expulsion. Mais voilà : ces dernières semaines, les différentes entreprises concernées ont invariablement répondu à Libération, qui voulait savoir ce qu’elles allaient faire pour régler la situation, qu’elles ne connaissaient pas ces personnes. Une pyramide de #déresponsabilisation permise par un système de #sous-traitance en cascade. Reprenons.

    Au sommet de l’édifice, on trouve la #Poste, maison mère de Chronopost, qui sous-traite une partie de sa logistique à #Derichebourg sur son site d’Alfortville, lequel Derichebourg fait appel à une société d’#intérim pour trouver de la #main-d’œuvre. C’est d’abord vers la Poste que l’on se tourne tout naturellement, comme l’a fait en juillet le député PS du Val-de-Marne Luc Carvounas, qui a adressé un courrier au PDG de l’entreprise publique, Philippe Wahl. « Seriez-vous prêt, monsieur le président, à donner les instructions nécessaires afin de régler […] la situation professionnelle de ces travailleurs en leur délivrant enfin un véritable contrat de travail en bonne et due forme ? » demandait Carvounas. Réponse de Philippe Wahl : ces « travailleurs se présentant comme des sans-papiers » ne sont « aucunement des salariés Chronopost », et donc encore moins de la Poste.

    Le deuxième échelon, c’est donc Chronopost. Joint par Libération sur les bons conseils de la Poste, l’entreprise tient sans surprise le même discours : « Nous sommes sensibles à la situation des personnes qui manifestent actuellement devant notre site d’Alfortville. Ces personnes n’ont cependant jamais été employées par Chronopost. » Chronopost, qui « subit une situation dont elle n’est pas responsable » (dixit Philippe Wahl), renvoie donc vers l’entreprise Derichebourg, « qui se porte garante du respect de l’ensemble de ses obligations vis-à-vis de la législation. C’est elle qui recrute, encadre et gère au quotidien les salariés qu’elle emploie ».

    Fort bien, Libé se tourne donc vers Derichebourg. Réponse : « Nous n’avons aucun salarié gréviste. Nous n’avons également aucun salarié sans papiers, ni aucun intérimaire sans papiers. » Etonné, Libération relance : ces salariés rencontrés en juillet devant le siège de Chronopost sont-ils imaginaires ? « Je ne me permettrais pas de dire que ces salariés sans papiers sont imaginaires », rétorque la chargée de communication de Derichebourg, complétant : « Qu’il y ait une manifestation est un fait. Je vous réaffirme simplement que nous n’avons aucun salarié gréviste, aucun salarié sans papiers, ni aucun intérimaire sans papier. »

    Il ne reste alors qu’un acteur à interroger : la société #Groupe_Europa, qui gère l’agence Mission intérim de Corbeil-Essonnes - celle qui fournit la main-d’œuvre. Une femme - dont on ne connaîtra pas l’identité - décroche le téléphone et affirme, catégorique : « Ces gens n’ont jamais été employés par #Mission_intérim. » « Les victimes sont les entreprises », complète-t-elle, sans vouloir qu’on la cite tout en demandant que l’on reprenne ses propos, avant de conclure sur cette observation : « On ne peut pas accueillir les problèmes de tout le monde. »

    Par quel miracle ces quatre entreprises peuvent-elles chacune affirmer qu’elles n’ont rien à voir avec le schmilblick ? En fait, chacune joue sur les mots, et sur une réalité : du fait de leur situation, les sans-papiers doivent recourir à des alias pour travailler. C’est ainsi que la femme de Groupe Europa nous explique tranquillement : « Les journalistes parlent tout le temps de l’#exploitation par les employeurs, mais ce sont les gens qui s’exploitent entre eux. Ils se louent les papiers. » De son côté, elle l’assure : « Nous avons des personnes qui ont les papiers en règle. S’ils trafiquent les papiers entre eux, on ne le sait pas. »

    En réalité, tout le monde a au moins sa petite idée, puisque Philippe Wahl écrit dans sa réponse à Luc Carvounas que des travailleurs « ont ouvertement admis qu’ils pratiquaient l’#usurpation_d’identité pour tromper leur employeur afin de revendiquer leur présence effective au travail ». « La meilleure preuve qu’ils savent, c’est que les sous-traitants et intérimaires n’ont pas de #badge pour accéder au site, précisément parce qu’ils sont sans-papiers », répond Eddy Talbot, membre du bureau fédéral de SUD PTT. Pour lui, Chronopost devrait dire « on ne peut pas vous employer dans ces conditions ». Et rompre avec Derichebourg.

    En attendant, puisque les entreprises refusent de traiter le dossier, le collectif de sans-papiers échange essentiellement avec la préfecture du Val-de-Marne. Théoriquement, cette dernière peut aller au-delà des critères de la circulaire Valls (du nom d’un ancien ministre de l’Intérieur), qui fixe plusieurs conditions, notamment un certain nombre d’heures travaillées au cours des derniers mois, pour prétendre à une régularisation.

    Mais est-elle prête à le faire ? Au téléphone, la préfecture explique que pour se prononcer, elle attend que des dossiers soient déposés. Mais de leur côté, les grévistes demandent un traitement collectif. « Au cas par cas, on n’a pas de garantie que ça ne se terminera pas avec des #OQTF », des obligations de quitter le territoire français, relève Jean-Louis Marziani, de Solidaires 94. Fin septembre, une délégation a pu pour la première fois échanger avec le préfet en personne. « On nous a dit que les dossiers seraient examinés avec bienveillance », rapporte Eddy Talbot, comprenant par là que la #préfecture est prête à aller au-delà des critères Valls. « Mais on nous a aussi dit par avance que tous les dossiers ne seront pas acceptés », regrette-t-il.

    De son côté, la préfecture maintient sa position : impossible de s’engager sur quoi que ce soit tant que les dossiers individuels n’auront pas été déposés. Ni de s’engager publiquement à une certaine mansuétude pour ceux dont le dossier serait refusé, par exemple en les exemptant d’OQTF : « Le préfet est chargé d’appliquer la loi. »


    https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/10/08/chez-chronopost-ces-sans-papiers-que-l-on-ne-veut-pas-voir_1756319
    #travail #France

  • #Village_Global

    #Mazé, petite commune paisible…jusqu’à ce que le maire annonce la rénovation de la vieille chapelle… dans le but d’accueillir des réfugiés ! Les réactions ne tardent pas. Bien décidés à s’opposer à cette décision, certains habitants fondent le #G.R.I.N.C (#Groupe_de_Résistance_à_l’Invasion_de_Nos_Campagnes) tandis que d’autres organisent l’#accueil…Toute ressemblance, ou similitude avec des personnages et des faits existants ou ayant existé, ne serait que pure coïncidence !


    http://steinkis.com/village-global-3-99.html

    Dans le livre, il y a des #cartes intéressantes, qui représentent les #itinéraires_migratoires :

    #BD #asile #migrations #réfugiés #France #préjugés #rural #campagne #accueil #livre #parcours_migratoires

    ping @karine4 @reka @isskein @fbahoken

  • Une entreprise agro-alimentaire jugée pour tromperie sur l’origine de ses tomates
    https://www.bastamag.net/Tomates-origine-France-Cheritel-fraude-Aldi-grande-distribution-agro-alime

    Ce 19 septembre, l’entreprise Chéritel Trégor Légumes comparaissait devant le tribunal de grande instance de Saint-Brieuc (Côtes d’Armor) pour tromperie. Ce grossiste breton, épinglé à deux reprises par la répression des fraudes, a vendu à la centrale d’achat du hard discounter Aldi, plusieurs centaines de tonnes de tomates néerlandaises, espagnoles ou marocaines en les faisant passer pour des françaises. Ils pensaient manger des tomates 100% françaises. C’est même peut-être pour cette raison qu’ils les (...) En bref

    / #Justice, #Agriculture, #Alimentation

  • Le Monde en pièces, pour une critique de la gestion, Volume 2 : Informatiser, Groupe Oblomoff, 2019
    https://sniadecki.wordpress.com/2019/08/25/oblomoff-monde2

    Nouvelle publication des éditions La Lenteur de cette année.

    L’informatisation, voilà ce qui caractérise avant toute chose notre époque. Chacun d’entre nous dédie aux ordinateurs une part considérable, et sans cesse croissante, de son temps ; de manière directe ou indirecte, libre ou contrainte, pour produire ou pour consommer, durant le temps de travail comme durant les loisirs. L’ampleur du phénomène est difficile à nier ; son impact écologique a été démontré ; ses conséquences sur la santé sont l’objet de rapports inquiets des médecins ; ses effets sur la vie sociale documentés par les sociologues, sur les enfants par les pédagogues, etc., etc. Les conditions effroyables dans lesquelles ces machines sont produites sont connues. Et cependant, l’informatisation n’est jamais appréhendée de manière globale. On ne fait en quelque sorte qu’empiler des faits de société (Parcoursup, l’intelligence artificielle…), qui peuvent certes susciter de légitimes inquiétudes, mais dont on pourrait éviter les aspects nuisibles par un usage approprié. Les journaux et la radio prodiguent de sages conseils d’utilisation. N’exposez pas vos enfants aux écrans. Cet été, apprenez à ne pas consulter 25 fois par jour votre messagerie… Certaines vedettes – des Michel Serres, des Serge Tisseron – se sont placées sur ce marché en pleine expansion : la vente de tranquillisants à destination du public, en attendant que l’administration se charge elle-même de protéger sa population, instaure le « droit à la déconnection » et organise ses propres « semaines sans écrans ».

    #critique_techno #Éditions_La_Lenteur #livre #informatisation #gestion #Groupe_Oblomoff

  • #Exit

    #Karen_Winther est passée d’un extrême à l’autre : membre d’un groupe de la gauche radicale à l’adolescence, elle a ensuite viré de bord pour rejoindre la mouvance néonazie. Après avoir définitivement rompu avec l’extrémisme, la réalisatrice norvégienne, encore hantée par son passé violent, est allée à la rencontre de personnes du monde entier qui, après avoir connu une « déradicalisation » similaire, ont souhaité témoigner de leur parcours. En Floride, Angela, ex-membre de l’organisation d’extrême droite Aryan Nations, passée par la case prison, s’engage aujourd’hui pour prévenir ces dérives. Manuel, l’un des anciens visages du mouvement néonazi allemand, vit aujourd’hui reclus pour sa propre sécurité. Quant au Français David, hier aspirant djihadiste de l’État islamique, il a quitté la mouvance après sa sortie de prison. Comment ces personnes d’horizons divers ont-elles réussi à tourner la page ? Un documentaire intimiste qui met en lumière les racines de leurs engagements, mais aussi les soutiens et les perspectives qui les ont aidées à s’en détourner.


    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/55267_1

    #David_Vallat, ex-djihadiste :

    « On pense que la violence, l’usage de la #violence peut changer les choses, mais à partir du moment où vous l’utilisez c’est la violence qui vous change parce vous changez le regard sur le monde »

    #film #documentaire #extrême_droite #néo-nazis #haine #Ingo_Hasselbach #témoignage #honte #peur #Tore_Bjørg (chercheur sur la police) #djihadisme #GIA #groupe_islamiste_armé #Exit (association) #idéologie #vide #Life_after_hate (association) #colère #viol #traumatisme #pardon #culpabilité #radicalisation

  • La taxe sur les géants du net est désormais une réalité
    https://www.numerama.com/politique/536242-la-taxe-sur-les-geants-du-net-est-desormais-une-realite.html

    En gestation depuis plusieurs mois, la loi visant à taxer les géants du net a fini par voir le jour. Elle doit rapporter 500 millions d’euros chaque année. Ça y est. Au Journal officiel du 25 juillet, le gouvernement a fait publier sa fameuse loi destinée à faire contribuer davantage les géants du net aux finances publiques. Ce dispositif doit ramener dans les caisses de l’État en moyenne 500 millions d’euros chaque année de 2020 à 2022, le temps que soit trouvé un accord international sur les règles (...)

    #Alibaba #Amadeus #Apple #Criteo #Google #Match #Microsoft #Verizon #Airbnb #Alibaba.com #Amazon #eBay #Expedia #Facebook #Groupon #Match.com #Rakuten #booking.com #Twitter #Uber #Zalando #domination (...)

    ##bénéfices
    //c1.lestechnophiles.com/www.numerama.com/content/uploads/2017/05/gafam.jpg

  • Les profiteurs de la frontière – Juin 2019 – Corporate Watch

    La maire de Calais essaye de changer l’image de Calais, souhaitant en faire une « ville fleurie ». Mais comme des locaux ont confié à Corporate Watch le mois dernier, « #ville_barbelée » serait un label plus approprié. Du port ferry jusqu’au tunnel à Coquelles, la périphérie de la ville est un paysage cauchemardesque de #clôtures surmontées de #barbelés à lames rasoir, de #caméras et #détecteurs_de_mouvement, de #terrassements, #tranchées et #terrains_inondés, tous destinés à arrêter les « damné·e·s de la terre » entreprenant cette traversée du détroit de la Manche, si évidente et acquise pour un·e citoyen·ne européen·ne.

    Tout cela implique de l’#argent pour financer les compagnies de construction et de sécurité qui fournissent et édifient l’#infrastructure de la frontière. En 2016, Calais Research a commencé à lister et décrire les #entreprises impliquées dans le marché de la frontière. Voici une rapide mise à jour sur quelques points marquants apparus depuis.

    Le #Centre_Conjoint_d’Information_et_de_Coordination_franco-britannique à Coquelles

    Il y a deux points principaux de passage de la frontière à Calais : le #port, près du centre historique de la ville, et le tunnel sous la Manche, à quelques kilomètres de la ville, à #Coquelles. Près de l’entrée du tunnel se trouve un énorme centre commercial, la Cité Europe, fréquentée par des locaux comme par des Britanniques de passage renflouant leur stock d’alcool bon marché.

    Juste à côté se tient un complexe abritant l’infrastructure policière française anti-migrant : la base principale de la #PAF (Police aux Frontières) et des #CRS, un tribunal où sont entendus les migrants, et le #Centre_de_Rétention_Administrative (#CRA).

    En novembre 2018, un nouveau bâtiment est ajouté au complexe déjà existant : le #CCIC – Centre Conjoint d’Information et de Coordination franco-britannique.

    Selon l’Agence France Presse, le centre est financé par le gouvernement de Grande Bretagne, il est « notamment équipé de #drones », et sert de poste de commande pour les forces de police françaises et britanniques. Celles-ci incluent côté français la PAF, les #douanes et les #gendarmes, et pour l’outre-Manche la police aux frontières (UK border force), la #police du #Kent ainsi que le service national de lutte contre la criminalité (#National_Crime_Agency#NCA).

    Le jour où nous sommes passé·e·s jeter un œil, nous n’avons vu aucun drone décollant du toit. Sur le parking se trouvaient plus de voitures banalisées que de véhicules de police officiels, dont plusieurs immatriculées outre-Manche. Il y avait encore un affichage à l’extérieur du centre (cf. photo) nommant les entrepreneurs impliqués dans sa construction et son équipement. Il indique un coût de 1,844 million d’euros pour ces travaux.

    Les compagnies identifiées incluent : #Villesange_Masson (Architectes locaux) ; #Groupe_Qualiconsult (consultant·e·s pour les projets de construction) ; #Verdi ; #Cougnaud_construction (spécialisé en construction modulaire industrialisée) ; #Ramery_Batiment ; #Eiffage_énergie (grosse société d’ingénierie française) ; #Satelec (électricien·ne·s) ; #Resipelec (électricien·ne·s) ; #Pylones_du_Littoral ; #Majencia (mobilier de bureau) ; #Covage_DGL_Networks (installateur de fibre optique) ; #Econocom.

    Extension du centre de Rétention

    Juste en face du CCIS se trouve le CRA de Coquelles. Actuellement, il permet d’enfermer 79 hommes, mais l’État français veut augmenter le nombre de places. Fin mars 2019, il annonçait un projet d’extension de 480 mètres carrés. L’agence d’architectes #COAST supervise les travaux, et travaille avec #BD_engineering.

    Douanes et tranchées

    En dehors de Coquelles, on voit d’importants travaux de chaque côté de la voie rapide menant au tunnel. Ce sont de grands #bunkers, chacun avec plusieurs quais destinés à la fouille des camions. Ce ne sont pas des mesures prioritairement anti-migrants, il s’agit en fait de nouveaux parking poids-lourds et de postes de douane, construits à la hâte par #Eurotunnel, en prévision de nouveaux contrôles sur les marchandises après le Brexit.

    Cependant, ces projets participent à renforcer les mesures de sécurité exceptionnelles auxquelles on doit ce changement d’atmosphère autour de Calais. Les bunkers sont protégés par des #tranchées et de nouvelles clôtures – canaux et lacs artificiels creusés et remplis d’eau comme une autre mesure contre ces humains dont on ne veut pas. Ceci fait suite aux modèles de #déforestation et d’#inondation initiés par Eurotunnel en 2016.

    Contrôles aux frontières privatisés au parking poids-lourd #Polley

    Une petite industrie s’est développée grâce à la « crise migratoire » : le #parking_poids-lourd sécurisé. Le gouvernement britannique inflige une contravention aux entreprises de transport de marchandises si des personnes sont trouvées dans leurs véhicules sans les documents administratifs adéquats. Dans les faits, cela se traduit par l’#externalisation des contrôles frontaliers vers les camionneurs eux-même, soucieux de ne pas être surpris avec des passager·e·s clandestin·e·s. Et l’entreprise de transport va payer des emplacements sécurisés pour marquer un arrêt avant de traverser la Manche.

    À #Dunkerque, #DK_Secure_Truck_Park dispose de 250 emplacements entourés de clôtures et surveillés par « 40 #caméras_de_surveillance haute-définition ». À Calais, la plus grosse société est #Polley_Secured_Lorry_Park, dirigée par un homme d’affaire local, #Francois_Polley. Ce site de 10 hectares se targue d’être protégé par des grilles hautes de 2,40 mètres et d’être surveillé 24h/24 et 7j/7.

    Récemment, nous avons entendu parler d’une nouvelle niche dans ce business. Les cars de transport de passagers opérés par #Flixbus profitent également des services de sécurité de Polley. Les cars en route vers la Grande Bretagne passent par le parking Polley avant de se diriger vers le tunnel. Là, un des agents de sécurité privés du parking va procéder à une première fouille du véhicule, cherchant d’éventuel·le·s clandestin·e·s dans la soute à bagages. Ceci, en plus des deux contrôles qui seront effectués par les autorités françaises et britanniques une fois au tunnel.

    Flixbus et Polley fournissent peu d’information publique sur cette #fouille supplémentaire. Il y n’y en a qu’une vague référence sur le site de Flixbus, où elle est simplement mentionnée comme « un #contrôle_pré-Royaume-Uni ».

    Hôtel de police…

    Notre dernier arrêt sur notre tour des infrastructures de la frontière s’est trouvé en plein cœur de la ville de Calais. On avait entendu dire que l’ancienne pratique de constamment arrêter et harceler les personnes pouvant être des migrant·e·s dans le centre ville est progressivement devenue marginale. On se demandait donc pourquoi on continuait de voir les camionnettes de CRS patrouiller les rues principales entre la mairie et le théâtre.

    Nous avons réalisé que leur activité principale consistait à déposer et passer prendre de costauds hommes blancs en civil à la porte du #Brit_Hotel. Des locaux nous expliquent alors que ce bâtiment hôtelier a été inoccupé pendant des années, avant de rouvrir sous ce nouveau nom en 2016. Sa clientèle semble être composée presque exclusivement de CRS et de gendarmes – mais si vous rêvez de dormir à côté d’un CRS bien bâti, vous pouvez réserver une chambre pour environ 50 euros la nuit.

    Brit Hôtel est une chaîne hôtelière répandue dans tout la France.

    #business #migrations #frontières #Calais #France #profit #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #privatisation #externalisation_des_frontières

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Niger : 100 000 nouveaux réfugiés et déplacés

    L’ONU tire à nouveau la sonnette d’alarme au Niger, pays en proie à l’#insécurité où les activités des #groupes_armés, notamment #Boko_Haram, sont à l’origine de nombreux déplacements de populations. L’ONU estime ainsi que cette année, quelque 2,3 millions de personnes, soit 10,4% de la population, auront besoin d’une assistance humanitaire. Un constat établi jeudi lors d’une réunion entre agences de l’ONU, des représentants d’ONG et des partenaires.

    Depuis le mois de janvier, plus de 100 000 nouveaux #réfugiés et déplacés ont été recensés au Niger, alors que le pays en abritait déjà quelque 300 000. Et les inquiétudes sont localisées. À #Diffa notamment, dans le sud-est, région frontalière de l’État nigérian de #Borno, les groupes armés tels que Boko Haram ont provoqué le mouvement d’environ 25 000 personnes.

    Toujours près de cette frontière nigériane, mais plus à l’ouest, dans la région de #Maradi, ce sont ici environ 20 000 Nigérians qui ont fui les #violences de leur pays.

    Il y a aussi les zones proches des #frontières maliennes et burkinabè, dans les régions de #Tahoua et #Tillabéry. Des zones très instables selon l’ONU qui ont vu l’arrivée de 70 000 personnes.

    Pour faire face à cette situation, il faut de l’argent. Pourtant, les Nations unies déplorent un manque de ressources. Pour 2019, les besoins humanitaires sont chiffrés à 383 millions de dollars, mais sur cette somme, seuls 15% ont pu être mobilisés à l’heure actuelle.


    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/17401/niger-100-000-nouveaux-refugies-et-deplaces?ref=tw_i
    #Niger #migrations #IDPs #déplacés_internes #instabilité

    ping @karine4 @isskein