#huawei

  • Le Grand Est soutient le géant Huawei à hauteur de 800 000 euros
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/economie/250221/le-grand-est-soutient-le-geant-huawei-hauteur-de-800-000-euros

    La commission du développement économique de la Région a validé l’attribution d’une subvention d’implantation de 800 000 euros pour le groupe de télécommunications chinois, impliqué dans l’internement de masse et le travail forcé des Ouïghours.

    La commission permanente du conseil régional du Grand Est a validé le 12 février l’attribution d’une subvention de 800 000 euros à la filiale de Huawei chargée de l’implantation d’une usine à Brumath (Bas-Rhin).

    Immatriculée à Strasbourg, la branche du géant des télécommunications chinois promet d’investir 200 millions d’euros dans ce site baptisé « Huawei European Wireless Factory » et de générer 300 emplois directs, 500 à terme.

    Pour ce qui sera son premier site de production en Europe, Huawei fabriquera des « équipements de communication sans fil 4G et 5G destinés principalement au marché européen. Cela comprendra : la fabrication des stations de base, le chargement et l’adaptation des logiciels, et les tests sur les équipements liés au déploiement de la 5G en Europe », indique le rapport de la commission du développement économique de la Région daté du 8 février 2021, qui porte sur l’aide aux grandes entreprises.

    L’enveloppe totale de 4 287 665 euros a été répartie entre quinze entreprises du Grand Est, principalement des établissements industriels régionaux ou filiales d’entreprises européennes. Par exemple, la société Gaggenau à Lipsheim (Bas-Rhin) recevra 200 000 euros pour le maintien de l’emploi sur site. L’entreprise allemande Quaron à Carling (Moselle) percevra 561 000 euros, permettant de créer vingt emplois. À Huningue (Haut-Rhin), Delpharm Huningue SAS s’est vu doter de 200 000 euros pour la création de vingt emplois.

    Le rapport explique le fondement de ces subventions : « Les projets sont sélectionnés au regard de l’incitativité de l’aide régionale, de la situation de l’entreprise sur son marché ou sur un nouveau marché et de l’impact économique du projet. L’aide régionale consiste en une aide à l’investissement d’un maximum de 10 % des coûts éligibles sous forme de subvention plafonnée. »

    Mais à quoi vont donc servir les 800 000 euros d’argent public, la plus importante subvention de cette tranche d’aides, alors qu’en 2019, le groupe a enregistré 123 milliards de dollars de chiffre d’affaires ? Accusé d’espionnage par le président américain Donald Trump et interdit de commerce avec les entreprises américaines en 2019, le géant chinois avait-il besoin d’argent public pour financer son opération séduction au cœur de l’Europe ?

    En outre, Huawei participe à la répression des Ouïghours par le régime communiste de Pékin, notamment à travers son système de reconnaissance faciale. L’attribution d’une subvention publique à cette entreprise choque les personnes mobilisées sur cette question et notamment l’eurodéputé Place publique Raphaël Glucksmann.

    Après avoir accusé les dirigeants européens de lâcheté et de veulerie dans un discours le 17 décembre 2020 au Parlement européen, celui-ci a écrit au président de la Région Grand Est, Jean Rottner (LR), pour qu’il revienne sur cette subvention. Les élus socialistes de la commission permanente se sont abstenus sur ce vote.

    #Huawei #5G #Islam #lobbying #surveillance

  • How Oracle Sells Repression in China
    https://theintercept.com/2021/02/18/oracle-china-police-surveillance

    In its bid for TikTok, Oracle was supposed to prevent data from being passed to Chinese police. Instead, it’s been marketing its own software for their surveillance work. Police in China’s Liaoning province were sitting on mounds of data collected through invasive means : financial records, travel information, vehicle registrations, social media, and surveillance camera footage. To make sense of it all, they needed sophisticated analytic software. Enter American business computing giant (...)

    #Oracle #TikTok #BigData #Walmart #surveillance #HumanRightsWatch #géolocalisation #prédiction #écoutes #Microsoft #Palantir #Amazon #IBM #Predpol #DataBrokers #Huawei (...)

    ##ZTE

  • „Wolf culture“ : How Huawei controls its employees in Europe
    https://netzpolitik.org/2021/wolf-culture-how-huawei-controls-its-employees-in-europe

    Former employees accuse Huawei of discrimination. How massively the company interferes in their private lives and how it keeps its staff in line is revealed by internal documents and covert audio recordings that netzpolitik.org and the media partners of The Signals Network have analysed.

    What voices tell us from inside, on the other hand, belies the impression of a friendly atmosphere. They tell of a technology company that seems to see its employees first and foremost as raw materials from which it wants to forge its own success. About a company that moves Chinese employees around like chess pieces, that fires employees at will and where a quasi-military esprit de corps prevails. In Germany, the company sometimes violates the spirit, perhaps even the letter, of labour law.

    Huawei’s „wolf culture“

    Their accounts paint a picture of a company that is celebrated in public for it’s seemingly modern management philosophy, but at the same time pushes employees to their limits. Ex-employees speak of a toxic corporate culture that is promoted by the company’s management. The enormous pressure to succeed also plays a role.

    Those who play along with all this are rewarded by Huawei with special payments linked to company shares. But what happens when workers refuse to put their lives entirely at the service of their employer is shown by internal emails and covert audio recordings obtained by netzpolitik.org and its media partners, as well as court cases in several countries. The cases dealt with discrimination and dismissals that should never have happened under the law.

    In Spain, a case landed in court in 2018 that shows how Huawei apparently wants to have a say in the family planning of its employees. The plaintiff is a woman who goes by the pseudonym Ana. She accuses the company of sexist discrimination. Ana is Chinese, an expat. For almost a decade she worked in a senior position in the group’s finance department. Huawei sends her to Spain, where she marries a local.

    When the woman wants to have a child, the trouble begins. Twice she suffers a miscarriage, twice she calls in sick afterwards. Huawei claims Ana’s work performance has declined and curbs her annual bonus, according to court documents. When she starts fertility treatment and calls in sick again, the company fires her.

    Ana sues the company and wins. The court rules that the dismissal was not legal. A spokesperson for Huawei tells netzpolitik.org and its media partners that the Spanish judiciary has never ruled that the dismissal was due to discrimination against a pregnant woman.

    However, in a written submission to court, Ana’s lawyer makes serious allegations against Huawei: „This decision to penalise the employee in her remuneration as a consequence for her leaves of absence due to abortions suffered during her pregnancies presents itself no longer as a hint but as direct proof in fact — consequence, of discrimination based on sex, derived from her two frustrated attempts at maternity.“

    In the course of the proceedings, a pattern seems to emerge. A member of the workers’ council at Huawei’s subsidiary tells the court that she knows of at least five women who have become mothers and lost their jobs at Huawei. Three of them were Chinese.

    We have spoken to several former employees who were fired by the company. Their accounts are similar: „I always did everything exactly by the book“, says one of our sources. Nevertheless, Huawei fired the source after several years of loyal service. The ex-employee doesn’t want to read their name on the internet, to avoid trouble with the company, but says their only offence was their age.

    Huawei appears to take pride in its young workforce. Of 194,000 employees worldwide in 2019, only two per cent are older than 50 years, the company says on its website.

    Huawei does not like it when someone is employed by the company beyond their 60th birthday, according to several of our sources. According to them, if older employees do not leave voluntarily, Huawei resorts to pressure.

    The company’s strict, „wolfish“ company culture is part of its corporate folklore and at the same time part of everyday life. New employees at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen have to endure a two-week boot camp, the Washington Post reported. Its components include daily training runs at five o’clock in the morning and courses that actually bear the name „brainwashing“.

    How deeply military thinking is rooted in the company is also expressed in a framed calligraphy that, according to the New York Times, hangs on the wall at the company’s headquarters. In Chinese script, it reads: „Sacrifice is a soldier’s highest cause. Victory is a soldier’s greatest contribution.“

    In Düsseldorf, working hours from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. are the rule, at least on paper, but according to former employees, Huawei demands much longer hours from employees in some departments. Ex-employees tell of meetings at the European headquarters that are scheduled at 10 p.m. and of offices that are bustling even on Sundays. Chinese employees sometimes slept in their offices, says a former employee.

    This is hardly compatible with German labour law. For years, workers at the Düsseldorf site could only enter their arrival in a time recording system, our sources report, but the company did not allow records of the end of working days. Non-Chinese employees rebelled and have since been effectively exempted from the rule. Expats, however, are denied proper recording of their working hours, according to our sources.

    A company spokesperson insists to netzpolitik.org and its media partners that working hours are not recorded, but only the attendance of employees. At the same time, he admits that there have indeed been complaints about the recording of attendance at the European headquarters.

    #Huawei #Culture_du_loup #Red_mirror #Travail

  • Merveille de la mondialisation : Adieu #Alcatel, bonjour #Huawei – par Eric Juillot
    https://www.les-crises.fr/merveille-de-la-mondialisation-adieu-alcatel-bonjour-huawei-par-eric-juil

    500 emplois ! C’est ce que se proposent de créer les dirigeants de Huawei en France, sur le site d’une usine prochainement construite à Brumath dans le Bas-Rhin[1]. S’il faut se réjouir de chaque nouvelle de ce type – au point où nous en sommes rendus en matière de désindustrialisation –, il n’est pas interdit […]

    #Économie #Économie,_Alcatel,_Huawei

  • « Management prédateur » : comment Huawei contrôle ses expatriés en Europe
    https://korii.slate.fr/biz/huawei-management-predateur-controle-pressions-expatries-chinois-europe-

    Un climat de peur, de discrimination et d’exploitation, selon une enquête de The Signals Network. C’est à vingt kilomètres de Strasbourg, dans le Business Parc de Brumath, que le géant chinois des télécoms Huawei ouvrira son usine française géante à l’horizon 2023, avec 500 emplois à la clé. Les futurs employés feraient peut-être pourtant bien de se méfier. Selon une vaste enquête menée par le consortium d’investigation The Signals Network (qui regroupe entre autres des journalistes du Daily Telegraph, d’El (...)

    #Huawei #Amazon #racisme #discrimination #travail #santé

    ##santé

  • „Wolf culture“ : How Huawei controls its employees in Europe
    https://netzpolitik.org/2021/wolf-culture-how-huawei-controls-its-employees-in-europe

    Former employees accuse Huawei of discrimination. How massively the company interferes in their private lives and how it keeps its staff in line is revealed by internal documents and covert audio recordings that netzpolitik.org and the media partners of The Signals Network have analysed. The journalist with the camera causes nervousness. Minutes after he appears in front of Huawei’s European headquarters in Düsseldorf in mid-November, a stocky security guard and a female employee rush over. (...)

    #Huawei #racisme #discrimination #surveillance #travail

  • Technopolice, villes et vies sous surveillance
    https://www.laquadrature.net/2021/01/03/technopolice-villes-et-vies-sous-surveillance

    Depuis plusieurs années, des projets de « Smart Cities » se développent en France, prétendant se fonder sur les nouvelles technologies du « Big Data » et de l’« Intelligence Artificielle » pour améliorer notre quotidien urbain. Derrière ce vernis de ces villes soi-disant « intelligentes », se cachent des dispositifs souvent dangereusement sécuritaires. D’une part, car l’idée de multiplier les capteurs au sein d’une ville, d’interconnecter l’ensemble de ses réseaux et d’en gérer l’entièreté depuis un centre (...)

    #Cisco #Gemalto #Huawei #Thalès #algorithme #capteur #CCTV #PARAFE #SmartCity #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #comportement #surveillance #BigData #TAJ #Technopolice (...)

    ##LaQuadratureduNet

  • Inside China’s unexpected quest to protect data privacy
    https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/19/1006441/china-data-privacy-hong-yanqing-gdpr

    A new privacy law would look a lot like Europe’s GDPR—but will it restrict state surveillance?

    Late in the summer of 2016, Xu Yuyu received a call that promised to change her life. Her college entrance examination scores, she was told, had won her admission to the English department of the Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications. Xu lived in the city of Linyi in Shandong, a coastal province in China, southeast of Beijing. She came from a poor family, singularly reliant on her father’s meager income. But her parents had painstakingly saved for her tuition; very few of her relatives had ever been to college.

    A few days later, Xu received another call telling her she had also been awarded a scholarship. To collect the 2,600 yuan ($370), she needed to first deposit a 9,900 yuan “activation fee” into her university account. Having applied for financial aid only days before, she wired the money to the number the caller gave her. That night, the family rushed to the police to report that they had been defrauded. Xu’s father later said his greatest regret was asking the officer whether they might still get their money back. The answer—“Likely not”—only exacerbated Xu’s devastation. On the way home she suffered a heart attack. She died in a hospital two days later.

    An investigation determined that while the first call had been genuine, the second had come from scammers who’d paid a hacker for Xu’s number, admissions status, and request for financial aid.

    For Chinese consumers all too familiar with having their data stolen, Xu became an emblem. Her death sparked a national outcry for greater data privacy protections. Only months before, the European Union had adopted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), an attempt to give European citizens control over how their personal data is used. Meanwhile, Donald Trump was about to win the American presidential election, fueled in part by a campaign that relied extensively on voter data. That data included details on 87 million Facebook accounts, illicitly obtained by the consulting firm Cambridge Analytica. Chinese regulators and legal scholars followed these events closely.

    In the West, it’s widely believed that neither the Chinese government nor Chinese people care about privacy. US tech giants wield this supposed indifference to argue that onerous privacy laws would put them at a competitive disadvantage to Chinese firms. In his 2018 Senate testimony after the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, urged regulators not to clamp down too hard on technologies like face recognition. “We still need to make it so that American companies can innovate in those areas,” he said, “or else we’re going to fall behind Chinese competitors and others around the world.”

    In reality, this picture of Chinese attitudes to privacy is out of date. Over the last few years the Chinese government, seeking to strengthen consumers’ trust and participation in the digital economy, has begun to implement privacy protections that in many respects resemble those in America and Europe today.

    Even as the government has strengthened consumer privacy, however, it has ramped up state surveillance. It uses DNA samples and other biometrics, like face and fingerprint recognition, to monitor citizens throughout the country. It has tightened internet censorship and developed a “social credit” system, which punishes behaviors the authorities say weaken social stability. During the pandemic, it deployed a system of “health code” apps to dictate who could travel, based on their risk of carrying the coronavirus. And it has used a slew of invasive surveillance technologies in its harsh repression of Muslim Uighurs in the northwestern region of Xinjiang.

    This paradox has become a defining feature of China’s emerging data privacy regime, says Samm Sacks, a leading China scholar at Yale and New America, a think tank in Washington, DC. It raises a question: Can a system endure with strong protections for consumer privacy, but almost none against government snooping? The answer doesn’t affect only China. Its technology companies have an increasingly global footprint, and regulators around the world are watching its policy decisions.

    November 2000 arguably marks the birth of the modern Chinese surveillance state. That month, the Ministry of Public Security, the government agency that oversees daily law enforcement, announced a new project at a trade show in Beijing. The agency envisioned a centralized national system that would integrate both physical and digital surveillance using the latest technology. It was named Golden Shield.

    Eager to cash in, Western companies including American conglomerate Cisco, Finnish telecom giant Nokia, and Canada’s Nortel Networks worked with the agency on different parts of the project. They helped construct a nationwide database for storing information on all Chinese adults, and developed a sophisticated system for controlling information flow on the internet—what would eventually become the Great Firewall. Much of the equipment involved had in fact already been standardized to make surveillance easier in the US—a consequence of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

    Despite the standardized equipment, the Golden Shield project was hampered by data silos and turf wars within the Chinese government. Over time, the ministry’s pursuit of a singular, unified system devolved into two separate operations: a surveillance and database system, devoted to gathering and storing information, and the social-credit system, which some 40 government departments participate in. When people repeatedly do things that aren’t allowed—from jaywalking to engaging in business corruption—their social-credit score falls and they can be blocked from things like buying train and plane tickets or applying for a mortgage.

    In the same year the Ministry of Public Security announced Golden Shield, Hong Yanqing entered the ministry’s police university in Beijing. But after seven years of training, having received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees, Hong began to have second thoughts about becoming a policeman. He applied instead to study abroad. By the fall of 2007, he had moved to the Netherlands to begin a PhD in international human rights law, approved and subsidized by the Chinese government.

    Over the next four years, he familiarized himself with the Western practice of law through his PhD research and a series of internships at international organizations. He worked at the International Labor Organization on global workplace discrimination law and the World Health Organization on road safety in China. “It’s a very legalistic culture in the West—that really strikes me. People seem to go to court a lot,” he says. “For example, for human rights law, most of the textbooks are about the significant cases in court resolving human rights issues.”

    Hong found this to be strangely inefficient. He saw going to court as a final resort for patching up the law’s inadequacies, not a principal tool for establishing it in the first place. Legislation crafted more comprehensively and with greater forethought, he believed, would achieve better outcomes than a system patched together through a haphazard accumulation of case law, as in the US.

    After graduating, he carried these ideas back to Beijing in 2012, on the eve of Xi Jinping’s ascent to the presidency. Hong worked at the UN Development Program and then as a journalist for the People’s Daily, the largest newspaper in China, which is owned by the government.

    Xi began to rapidly expand the scope of government censorship. Influential commentators, or “Big Vs”—named for their verified accounts on social media—had grown comfortable criticizing and ridiculing the Chinese Communist Party. In the fall of 2013, the party arrested hundreds of microbloggers for what it described as “malicious rumor-mongering” and paraded a particularly influential one on national television to make an example of him.

    The moment marked the beginning of a new era of censorship. The following year, the Cyberspace Administration of China was founded. The new central agency was responsible for everything involved in internet regulation, including national security, media and speech censorship, and data protection. Hong left the People’s Daily and joined the agency’s department of international affairs. He represented it at the UN and other global bodies and worked on cybersecurity cooperation with other governments.

    By July 2015, the Cyberspace Administration had released a draft of its first law. The Cybersecurity Law, which entered into force in June of 2017, required that companies obtain consent from people to collect their personal information. At the same time, it tightened internet censorship by banning anonymous users—a provision enforced by regular government inspections of data from internet service providers.

    In the spring of 2016, Hong sought to return to academia, but the agency asked him to stay. The Cybersecurity Law had purposely left the regulation of personal data protection vague, but consumer data breaches and theft had reached unbearable levels. A 2016 study by the Internet Society of China found that 84% of those surveyed had suffered some leak of their data, including phone numbers, addresses, and bank account details. This was spurring a growing distrust of digital service providers that required access to personal information, such as ride-hailing, food-delivery, and financial apps. Xu Yuyu’s death poured oil on the flames.

    The government worried that such sentiments would weaken participation in the digital economy, which had become a central part of its strategy for shoring up the country’s slowing economic growth. The advent of GDPR also made the government realize that Chinese tech giants would need to meet global privacy norms in order to expand abroad.

    Hong was put in charge of a new task force that would write a Personal Information Protection Specification (PIPS) to help solve these challenges. The document, though nonbinding, would tell companies how regulators intended to implement the Cybersecurity Law. In the process, the government hoped, it would nudge them to adopt new norms for data protection by themselves.

    Hong’s task force set about translating every relevant document they could find into Chinese. They translated the privacy guidelines put out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and by its counterpart, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; they translated GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act. They even translated the 2012 White House Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, introduced by the Obama administration but never made into law. All the while, Hong met regularly with European and American data protection regulators and scholars.

    Bit by bit, from the documents and consultations, a general choice emerged. “People were saying, in very simplistic terms, ‘We have a European model and the US model,’” Hong recalls. The two approaches diverged substantially in philosophy and implementation. Which one to follow became the task force’s first debate.

    At the core of the European model is the idea that people have a fundamental right to have their data protected. GDPR places the burden of proof on data collectors, such as companies, to demonstrate why they need the data. By contrast, the US model privileges industry over consumers. Businesses define for themselves what constitutes reasonable data collection; consumers only get to choose whether to use that business. The laws on data protection are also far more piecemeal than in Europe, divvied up among sectoral regulators and specific states.

    At the time, without a central law or single agency in charge of data protection, China’s model more closely resembled the American one. The task force, however, found the European approach compelling. “The European rule structure, the whole system, is more clear,” Hong says.

    But most of the task force members were representatives from Chinese tech giants, like Baidu, Alibaba, and Huawei, and they felt that GDPR was too restrictive. So they adopted its broad strokes—including its limits on data collection and its requirements on data storage and data deletion—and then loosened some of its language. GDPR’s principle of data minimization, for example, maintains that only necessary data should be collected in exchange for a service. PIPS allows room for other data collection relevant to the service provided.

    PIPS took effect in May 2018, the same month that GDPR finally took effect. But as Chinese officials watched the US upheaval over the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica scandal, they realized that a nonbinding agreement would not be enough. The Cybersecurity Law didn’t have a strong mechanism for enforcing data protection. Regulators could only fine violators up to 1,000,000 yuan ($140,000), an inconsequential amount for large companies. Soon after, the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislative body, voted to begin drafting a Personal Information Protection Law within its current five-year legislative period, which ends in 2023. It would strengthen data protection provisions, provide for tougher penalties, and potentially create a new enforcement agency.

    After Cambridge Analytica, says Hong, “the government agency understood, ‘Okay, if you don’t really implement or enforce those privacy rules, then you could have a major scandal, even affecting political things.’”

    The local police investigation of Xu Yuyu’s death eventually identified the scammers who had called her. It had been a gang of seven who’d cheated many other victims out of more than 560,000 yuan using illegally obtained personal information. The court ruled that Xu’s death had been a direct result of the stress of losing her family’s savings. Because of this, and his role in orchestrating tens of thousands of other calls, the ringleader, Chen Wenhui, 22, was sentenced to life in prison. The others received sentences between three and 15 years.Retour ligne automatique
    xu yuyu

    Emboldened, Chinese media and consumers began more openly criticizing privacy violations. In March 2018, internet search giant Baidu’s CEO, Robin Li, sparked social-media outrage after suggesting that Chinese consumers were willing to “exchange privacy for safety, convenience, or efficiency.” “Nonsense,” wrote a social-media user, later quoted by the People’s Daily. “It’s more accurate to say [it is] impossible to defend [our privacy] effectively.”

    In late October 2019, social-media users once again expressed anger after photos began circulating of a school’s students wearing brainwave-monitoring headbands, supposedly to improve their focus and learning. The local educational authority eventually stepped in and told the school to stop using the headbands because they violated students’ privacy. A week later, a Chinese law professor sued a Hangzhou wildlife zoo for replacing its fingerprint-based entry system with face recognition, saying the zoo had failed to obtain his consent for storing his image.

    But the public’s growing sensitivity to infringements of consumer privacy has not led to many limits on state surveillance, nor even much scrutiny of it. As Maya Wang, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, points out, this is in part because most Chinese citizens don’t know the scale or scope of the government’s operations. In China, as in the US and Europe, there are broad public and national security exemptions to data privacy laws. The Cybersecurity Law, for example, allows the government to demand data from private actors to assist in criminal legal investigations. The Ministry of Public Security also accumulates massive amounts of data on individuals directly. As a result, data privacy in industry can be strengthened without significantly limiting the state’s access to information.

    The onset of the pandemic, however, has disturbed this uneasy balance.

    On February 11, Ant Financial, a financial technology giant headquartered in Hangzhou, a city southwest of Shanghai, released an app-building platform called AliPay Health Code. The same day, the Hangzhou government released an app it had built using the platform. The Hangzhou app asked people to self-report their travel and health information, and then gave them a color code of red, yellow, or green. Suddenly Hangzhou’s 10 million residents were all required to show a green code to take the subway, shop for groceries, or enter a mall. Within a week, local governments in over 100 cities had used AliPay Health Code to develop their own apps. Rival tech giant Tencent quickly followed with its own platform for building them.

    The apps made visible a worrying level of state surveillance and sparked a new wave of public debate. In March, Hu Yong, a journalism professor at Beijing University and an influential blogger on Weibo, argued that the government’s pandemic data collection had crossed a line. Not only had it led to instances of information being stolen, he wrote, but it had also opened the door to such data being used beyond its original purpose. “Has history ever shown that once the government has surveillance tools, it will maintain modesty and caution when using them?” he asked.

    Indeed, in late May, leaked documents revealed plans from the Hangzhou government to make a more permanent health-code app that would score citizens on behaviors like exercising, smoking, and sleeping. After a public outcry, city officials canceled the project. That state-run media had also published stories criticizing the app likely helped.

    The debate quickly made its way to the central government. That month, the National People’s Congress announced it intended to fast-track the Personal Information Protection Law. The scale of the data collected during the pandemic had made strong enforcement more urgent, delegates said, and highlighted the need to clarify the scope of the government’s data collection and data deletion procedures during special emergencies. By July, the legislative body had proposed a new “strict approval” process for government authorities to undergo before collecting data from private-sector platforms. The language again remains vague, to be fleshed out later—perhaps through another nonbinding document—but this move “could mark a step toward limiting the broad scope” of existing government exemptions for national security, wrote Sacks and fellow China scholars at New America.

    Hong similarly believes the discrepancy between rules governing industry and government data collection won’t last, and the government will soon begin to limit its own scope. “We cannot simply address one actor while leaving the other out,” he says. “That wouldn’t be a very scientific approach.”

    Other observers disagree. The government could easily make superficial efforts to address public backlash against visible data collection without really touching the core of the Ministry of Public Security’s national operations, says Wang, of Human Rights Watch. She adds that any laws would likely be enforced unevenly: “In Xinjiang, Turkic Muslims have no say whatsoever in how they’re treated.”

    Still, Hong remains an optimist. In July, he started a job teaching law at Beijing University, and he now maintains a blog on cybersecurity and data issues. Monthly, he meets with a budding community of data protection officers in China, who carefully watch how data governance is evolving around the world.

    #criminalité #Nokia_Siemens #fraude #Huawei #payement #Cisco #CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata #Baidu #Alibaba #domination #bénéfices #BHATX #BigData #lutte #publicité (...)

    ##criminalité ##CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata ##publicité ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##Nortel_Networks ##Facebook ##biométrie ##consommation ##génétique ##consentement ##facial ##reconnaissance ##empreintes ##Islam ##SocialCreditSystem ##surveillance ##TheGreatFirewallofChina ##HumanRightsWatch

  • Espionnage : l’installation d’une usine du chinois Huawei en Alsace pose question
    https://www.franceinter.fr/espionnage-l-installation-d-une-usine-du-chinois-huawei-en-alsace-pose-q

    Le géant chinois des télécoms installera en France, près de Strasbourg, sa première usine de production hors de Chine. Un choix qui interroge : l’usine se trouvera à proximité de plusieurs sites sensibles de l’Armée de Terre. « Une excellente nouvelle qui témoigne de la dynamique économique de notre territoire », a salué jeudi 17 décembre Jean Rottner, président Les Républicains de la région Grand Est. Il se félicitait ainsi de l’annonce du géant des télécoms chinois Huawei : l’entreprise va installer dans (...)

    #Huawei #5G #surveillance

  • Comment les géants chinois de la tech aident la Chine à espionner le monde
    https://www.01net.com/actualites/comment-les-geants-chinois-de-la-tech-aident-la-chine-a-espionner-le-monde-20

    Volontairement ou non, les entreprises technologiques chinoises comme Huawei ou Alibaba n’ont pas d’autres choix que de coopérer avec le pouvoir central. C’est ce que révèle une enquête fleuve de Foreign Policy. Dans le premier volet d’une trilogie d’enquêtes (qui promet d’être instructive), le site Foreign Policy révèle comment les géants chinois de la Tech aident la Chine à espionner le monde. Pourquoi ? A cause de vieilles traditions chinoises... En effet, « l’industrie chinoise a toujours été, dans (...)

    #Alibaba #Huawei #militaire #surveillance #Baidu

  • Huawei Reportedly Tested a ‘Uighur Alarm’ to Track Chinese Ethnic Minorities With Facial Recognition
    https://onezero.medium.com/huawei-reportedly-tested-a-uighur-alarm-to-track-chinese-ethnic-mino

    The system also identifies information such as age and sex Chinese tech giants Huawei and Megvii have allegedly tested software that could identify Uighurs, an ethnic minority in China, according to a new report from the Washington Post and video surveillance trade publication IPVM. The system being tested tried to identify whether a person was Uighur but also information such as their age and sex. If the system detected a Uighur person, it could notify government authorities with a (...)

    #Dahua #Hikvision #Huawei #Megvii #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #génétique #racisme #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #discrimination #Islam (...)

    ##surveillance

  • Holiday Tech Gift Guide : 2020’s Most Creepy Surveillance Gifts
    https://debugger.medium.com/a-gift-guide-to-this-holiday-seasons-creepiest-surveillance-gadgets

    Let your loved ones decide what privacy means to them One of the best things about the holiday season is that you get to force your own privacy preferences on others. Maybe your family member wouldn’t normally buy a watch that tells Google when they’re asleep or a doorbell that helps them inform on their neighbors. But during this brief window each year, you can make a whole variety of fraught privacy decisions for them through gift-giving ! They’ll be forced to live with your privacy (...)

    #Clearview #Fitbit #Google #Huawei #Mozilla #Nest #Ring #Amazon #algorithme #robotique #bracelet #CCTV #drone #sonnette #géolocalisation #pouls #santé #surveillance (...)

    ##santé ##voisinage
    https://miro.medium.com/focal/1200/632/48/46/0*qDA-p6tROLkwpN1E

  • Huawei, 5G, and the Man Who Conquered Noise
    https://www.wired.com/story/huawei-5g-polar-codes-data-breakthrough

    How an obscure Turkish scientist’s obscure theoretical breakthrough helped the Chinese tech giant gain control of the future. US telecoms never had a chance. “The city of Shenzhen in July. The weather is hot, the trees brimming with life … ” So begins the baritone voice-over in a video shot in the summer of 2018 by the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei and posted to YouTube. It chronicles a corporate event in the slightly corny style of a 1960s educational film, starting with aerial (...)

    #Huawei #5G #technologisme

  • Qui veut la peau de Google ?
    https://korii.slate.fr/et-caetera/google-proces-etats-unis-concurrence-domination-marches-youtube-publicit

    Cartes, vidéo, navigateurs... Passage en revue des marchés que la firme, poursuivie par la justice américaine, écrase de son poids colossal. Le mardi 20 octobre 2020 restera comme une date importante dans l’histoire économique et technologique moderne : c’est le jour choisi par le Département de la justice américain pour s’attaquer à Google, l’accusant de protéger illégalement sa domination dans les marchés de la recherche et de la publicité sur Internet. Cette confrontation entre le gouvernement (...)

    #Apple #DoubleClick #Google #Huawei #Microsoft #DoJ #Bing #GoogleMaps #GoogleSearch #Uber #YouTube #Android #Chrome #smartphone #iOS #procès #domination #bénéfices (...)

    ##publicité

  • « Souveraineté numérique : les câbles sous-marins, un enjeu aussi important que la 5G ». La tribune de Cyrille Dalmont, chercheur associé à l’Institut Thomas-More https://www.lopinion.fr/edition/economie/souverainete-numerique-cables-marins-enjeu-aussi-important-que-5g-225405

    Le débat sur la souveraineté numérique relatif à la 5G fait rage depuis quelque temps en France, en particulier en raison des risques pour notre souveraineté et notre sécurité intérieure que soulève une éventuelle participation de l’entreprise Huawei au déploiement des antennes relais. Ce débat, selon des modalités et une intensité variables, la plupart des pays occidentaux l’ont ou l’ont eu. La 5G et ses implications (comme la crise sanitaire d’ailleurs) nous ramènent inévitablement aux fondamentaux de la politique : qui commande ? Qui dit « nous voulons » ?

    Mais une autre guerre des mondes sévit dans le même temps à bas bruit : celle des câbles internet. La réalité est simple : pour les communications internationales, plus de 99% du trafic Internet passe par des #câbles_sous-marins. En 2020, on en recense près de 380 à travers le monde, pour un total de 1,3 million de kilomètres posés. (…)

    Accélération chinoise. Sur le terrain, la Chine est particulièrement offensive et son fer de lance était jusqu’à il y a peu la société #Huawei marine networks, créée en 2008. Dans le cadre des « Routes de la soie numériques », elle a travaillé à elle seule sur près d’une centaine de projets de construction ou de modernisation de liaisons par fibre optique sur les fonds marins. Cet expansionnisme a connu un coup d’arrêt avec l’embargo récent (15 mai 2019) de l’administration Trump à l’encontre de la firme chinoise Huawei. Accusé d’espionnage à grande échelle au profit du gouvernement chinois, il est désormais interdit aux sociétés américaines de travailler avec le constructeur chinois. Donald Trump a encore haussé le ton en mai dernier et cet embargo s’applique désormais aux fournisseurs basés hors des Etats-Unis, dès lors que leurs produits ou services utilisent des technologies américaines, qu’il s’agisse de propriété intellectuelle, de logiciels ou d’équipements de production.

    Mais cet embargo sera vite contourné car la Chine a trouvé rapidement la parade : Huawei a annoncé en juin la cession de 51% de Huawei marine networks à Hengtong optic-electric, une autre entreprise chinoise. Bien évidemment, la Chine non seulement ne ralentit pas mais entend amplifier son programme de pose de câbles comme l’a confirmé, au retour de sa tournée européenne, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Wang Yi, lors de la signature d’un accord avec le Kazakhstan.

    De leur côté, les Etats-Unis, inventeurs d’Internet, dominent toujours aujourd’hui le marché mondial du transfert de données, notamment grâce à l’activité débordante des Gafam, en particulier Facebook et Google dont l’appétit pour la pose de câbles est à la hauteur des ressources, c’est-à-dire sans limite. Google possède ou contrôle aujourd’hui pas moins de 14 câbles (dont trois en propre). Facebook en possède 10, Microsoft quatre et Amazon trois.

    Si elle est moins dépendante des câbles sous-marins que les Occidentaux, en raison du continuum de son territoire, et moins active dans la pose de câbles, la Russie, quant à elle, n’hésite pas à jouer les trouble-fêtes avec ses mini-sous-marins espions de plongée profonde à propulsion nucléaire, connus sous le terme russe AGS. Ou à mettre la pression sur des pays de son environnement pour imposer sa volonté quant au choix d’une société de pose de câble.

    C’est ce qui s’est passé en Géorgie, pour le groupe azéri Neqsol avec l’acquisition de Caucasus Online, seule société géorgienne détenant la gestion du réseau de fibre venant d’Europe à travers la Mer Noire, dans le cadre d’un projet de route de fibre optique entre l’Europe, la Géorgie, l’Azerbaïdjan, le Kazakhstan et l’Asie, qui devait permettre une alternative aux routes terrestres actuelles à travers la Russie. Cette opération, finalisée en 2019, est bloquée depuis juillet, la Commission nationale géorgienne des communications semblant chercher tous les moyens d’annuler la vente. Tous les coups sont ainsi permis dans cette guerre où le droit du plus fort devient le droit tout court.

    Et l’Europe dans tout cela ? Dans ce domaine comme dans tant d’autres, dotée d’une expérience industrielle indéniable (notamment avec le groupe Alcatel submarine networks, désormais filiale de Nokia) mais privée de direction comme de volonté politique, elle n’a ni stratégie, vision de long terme. Les entreprises européennes se contentent donc le plus souvent de participer à des projets de groupement internationaux telle que le projet 2Africa de câble sous-marin de 37 000 kilomètres reliant 23 pays d’Afrique, du Moyen-Orient et d’Europe et s’étendant vers l’Asie. (…)

    Les câbles sous-marins au centre des tensions entre Pékin et Washington https://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/les-cables-sous-marins-au-centre-des-tensions-entre-pekin-et-washington-399105

    Dernière illustration en date début septembre, lorsque Facebook et Google ont dû renoncer à leur ambitieux projet de câble sous-marin reliant Los Angeles à Hong Kong, baptisé "Pacific Light Cable Network" (PLCN). Annoncé initialement en 2016, ce projet constitué de six paires de fibres optiques visait pourtant à connecter directement Hong Kong à Los Angeles. Un trajet de près de 13 000 kilomètres, qui a dû être remanié en catastrophe afin d’obtenir l’approbation du régulateur américain, dont la direction est réputée proche de l’administration Trump – particulièrement hostile au régime chinois.

    En juin dernier, le gendarme américain des télécoms avait en effet refusé l’exploitation de ce système de câbles sous-marins se connectant directement à Hong Kong, arguant que ce projet serait contraire à l’intérêt de la sécurité nationale américaine.

    La FCC faisait également valoir que la grande capacité et la faible latence du réseau encourageraient le trafic de communication américain traversant le Pacifique à faire un détour par Hong Kong avant d’atteindre la destination prévue, ce qui augmenterait inutilement la quantité de données passant par les infrastructures contrôlées par le gouvernement chinois. Ce qui a conduit Google et Facebook à revoir leurs plans. Si Google et Facebook ont indiqué qu’elles déposeraient bientôt une nouvelle demande de licence « pour un système reconfiguré » acceptable par l’administration de Trump, celle-ci n’a toujours pas été rendue publique.

  • Bataille géopolitique autour de la 5G par Evgeny Morozov
    https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2020/10/MOROZOV/62292

    À la veille de son déploiement, la téléphonie mobile de cinquième génération — la 5G — suscite un flot de questions liées à son impact écologique, sanitaire et, plus fondamentalement, aux développements technologiques hors de contrôle. Mais le « grand jeu » de la 5G se mène aussi sur le terrain géopolitique avec, en toile de fond, l’affrontement toujours plus âpre entre les États-Unis et la Chine. En 1994, alors que Huawei n’est encore qu’un petit vendeur de commutateurs téléphoniques, son fondateur, M. Ren (...)

    #Apple #Huawei #Nokia_Siemens #Qualcomm #Samsung #Sony-Ericsson_ #NSA #ZTE #TikTok #WeChat #backdoor #smartphone #InternetOfThings #5G #technologisme #domination #brevet #copyright #lutte #PRISM (...)

    ##surveillance

  • Huawei infiltration in Uganda
    https://www.privacyinternational.org/case-study/3969/huawei-infiltration-uganda

    Unwanted Witness, our partner organisation based in Uganda, explore critical questions around Huawei’s surveillance dealings with the Ugandan government raise. While Huawei’s relationship with the government raises concerns for human rights, many of these concerns remain unaddressed. The Uganda government has a contract with Huawei to supply and install surveillance equipment in cities throughout Uganda Details about the contract remain secret - and it’s not clear whether the procurement was (...)

    #Huawei #CCTV #données #vidéo-surveillance #écoutes #surveillance #PrivacyInternational

  • Les enjeux géopolitiques de la 5G
    https://theconversation.com/les-enjeux-geopolitiques-de-la-5g-146494

    Le débat relatif à la 5G, qui permettrait d’échanger sans temps de latence 14 à 20 fois plus de données que l’actuelle 4G, s’enflamme. Il se cristallise, notamment, autour des problématiques environnementales que soulève cette nouvelle technologie. Cette question, évidemment essentielle, tend à monopoliser un débat qu’elle prive d’une lecture géopolitique du développement de la 5G. Or cet aspect est également d’une grande importance. Des tensions économiques à une guerre économique Si la 5G enflamme le (...)

    #Huawei #Nokia_Siemens #Sony-Ericsson_ #TikTok #WeChat #InternetOfThings #5G #technologisme #domination #lutte #santé (...)

    ##santé ##surveillance

  • How facial recognition is spreading in Italy : the case of Como
    https://www.privacyinternational.org/case-study/4166/how-facial-recognition-spreading-italy-case-como

    The municipality of Como, Italy, purchased a facial recognition system, which was bought, installed, and tested for months with little transparency and despite the lack of a clear legal framework. To do so it embraced a narrative of technological innovation pushed by Huawei but was forced, after the intervention of the Italian Data Protection Authority, to suspend the system. Key findings Como spent public money on a system that can’t be lawfully used Como used the Data Protection Impact (...)

    #Huawei #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance (...)

    ##PrivacyInternational

  • Trop chers Gafam ?
    https://www.alternatives-economiques.fr/chers-gafam/00093728

    A la faveur de la crise sanitaire, les capitalisations boursières des géants du numérique battent tous les records. L’euphorie peut-elle durer ? Deux mille milliards de dollars. Seule une entreprise avait déjà vu sa valeur franchir – brièvement – ce seuil symbolique : Saudi Aramco, la compagnie pétrolière saoudienne, introduite en Bourse en décembre 2019. Ce record est désormais détenu par Apple depuis le 19 août dernier. La firme à la pomme avait déjà été la première entreprise à voir sa capitalisation (...)

    #Alibaba #Apple #Google #Huawei #Microsoft #Tencent #Xiaomi #Amazon #Facebook #Baidu #domination #bénéfices #GAFAM (...)

    ##BHATX

  • À Brest, Bouygues Télécom va devoir démonter ses antennes Huawei
    https://www.ouest-france.fr/bretagne/brest-29200/a-brest-bouygues-telecom-va-devoir-demonter-ses-antennes-huawei-6950290

    À Brest, l’Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI) refuse le déploiement de la 5G sur les antennes réseaux fabriquées par l’entreprise chinoise Huawei. L’Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (ANSSI) n’a pas autorisé le déploiement de la future 5G par des antennes réseau de la marque chinoise Huawei dans quatre villes françaises dont Brest. En raison de la proximité de la base navale et des sous-marins nucléaires de l’Ïle-Longue. Après des soupçons d’espionnage (...)

    #ANSSI #Bouygues #Huawei #5G #technologisme #surveillance

  • Facebook, Google, Big Tech Line Up for New Nationalist Tech War With China
    https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/27/china-tech-facebook-google

    China’s rise has pushed Silicon Valley away from the values it once claimed to hold. Last month, the CEOs of Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon were hauled before the U.S. Congress to be interrogated about their companies’ monopolistic behavior. While Democrats relentlessly grilled the four CEOs over their breach of antitrust laws, Republicans were just as interested in questioning their national loyalty and asking whether they had ties with the Chinese military. At the hearing, Republican (...)

    #Apple #Google #Huawei #Microsoft #Tencent #TikTok #Amazon #Baidu #Facebook #WeChat #militaire #domination #BHATX #GAFAM (...)

    ##lutte

  • Manipulations numériques en Afrique, par André-Michel Essoungou
    https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2020/09/ESSOUNGOU/62142

    Début juin, Facebook a fermé 446 pages, 96 groupes et plus de 200 comptes Instagram administrés par la société franco-tunisienne URéputation. Celle-ci aurait cherché à influencer, par la diffusion de fausses informations, des élections en Afrique francophone. Laboratoire mondial des manipulations numériques, le continent développe plusieurs types de riposte. Un temps rangées au musée des utopies, les élections démocratiques se sont répandues en Afrique au cours des trois dernières décennies. Mais, à (...)

    #CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata #ChinaMobile #Huawei #Orange #Vodafone #Facebook #Twitter #WhatsApp #manipulation #données #élections #fraude #censure #microtargeting #SocialNetwork (...)

    ##CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata ##payement

  • L’œil inquisiteur du régime chinois
    https://www.lemonde.fr/series-d-ete/article/2020/08/10/l-il-inquisiteur-du-regime-chinois_6048568_3451060.html

    Enquête« La preuve par l’image » (1/5). Comment des Etats, des particuliers ou des groupes de pression s’appuient sur l’image pour se protéger ou établir une vérité. Dans cet épisode, la Chine, où la vidéo-surveillance massive joue un rôle central dans le contrôle de la population. Ou encore dans la répression de la minorité ouïgoure. L’image pourrait être tirée d’une adaptation high-tech de 1984, la dystopie d’Orwell : de simples badauds, traversant un passage piéton, identifiés automatiquement par les (...)

    #Alibaba #Huawei #Tencent #algorithme #CCTV #QRcode #smartphone #SIM #biométrie #criminalité #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #BigData #discrimination #immatriculation #Islam #SocialCreditSystem #SocialNetwork #surveillance (...)

    ##criminalité ##_

  • Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle : le grand flou de la RATP
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/280720/videosurveillance-et-intelligence-artificielle-le-grand-flou-de-la-ratp

    Intéressée par la « vidéosurveillance automatisée », la régie publique multiplie les expérimentations avec des partenaires privés. Dernier en date : un laboratoire d’intelligence artificielle à la station Châtelet-Les Halles, sur lequel règne une grande opacité. Faute de réponses de la RATP, Mediapart a décidé de saisir la Cada pour faire respecter le droit de savoir des usagers. Elles ne scruteront plus les passants. Installées début mai à la station de métro et de RER Châtelet-Les Halles, à Paris, dans (...)

    #Axone #Datakalab #RATP #Thalès #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #masque #surveillance (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##_ ##CNIL ##LaQuadratureduNet ##LDH-France ##Hypervision3D ##SmartCity ##Huawei ##comportement ##Deepomatic