• Border pre-screening centres part of new EU migration pact

    The European Commission’s long-awaited and long-delayed pact on migration will include new asylum centres along the outer rim of the European Union, EUobserver has been told.

    The idea is part of a German proposal, floated last year, that seeks to rapidly pre-screen asylum seekers before they enter European Union territory.

    Michael Spindelegger, director-general of the Vienna-based International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) told EUobserver on Thursday (9 July) that the European Commission had in fact decided to include it into their upcoming migration pact.

    “I got some information that this will be part of these proposals from the European Commission. So this is what I can tell you. I think this really is something that could bring some movement in the whole debate,” he said.

    Spindelegger was Austria’s minister of foreign affairs and finance minister before taking over the ICMPD in 2016, where he has been outspoken in favour of such centres as a means to unblock disagreements among member states on the overhaul of the future EU-wide asylum system.

    The German non-paper published in November 2019 proposed a mandatory initial assessment of asylum applications at the external border.

    The idea is to prevent irregular and economic migrants from adding to the administrative bottlenecks of bona-fide asylum seekers and refugees.

    “Manifestly unfounded or inadmissible applications shall be denied immediately at the external border, and the applicant must not be allowed to enter the EU,” stated the paper.

    EUobserver understands the new pact may also include a three-tiered approach.

    Abusive claims would be immediately dismissed and returned, those clearly in the need for protection would be relocated to an EU state, while the remainder would end up in some sort of facility.

    Spindelegger concedes the idea has its detractors - noting it will be also be tricky to find the legal framework to support it.

    “To give people, within some days, the right expectation is a good thing - so this is more or less a surprise that the European Commission took this initiative, because there are also some people who are totally against this,” he said.
    EU ’hotspots’ in Greece

    Among those is Oxfam International, an NGO that says people may end up in similar circumstances currently found in the so-called hotspots on the Greek islands.

    “We are very concerned that the Greek law and the hotspots on the islands are going to be the blueprint for the new asylum and migration pact and we have seen them failed in every criteria,” said Oxfam International’s Raphael Shilhav, an expert on migration.

    The hotspots were initially touted as a solution by the European Commission to facilitate and expedite asylum claims of people seeking international protection, who had disembarked from Turkey to the Greek islands.

    The zones on the islands quickly turned into overcrowded camps where people, including women and children, are forced to live amid filth and violence.

    Shilvav said some people at the hotspots who deserved asylum ended up falling through the cracks, noting new Greek laws effectively bar many people who do not have legal support from appealing an asylum rejection.

    EUobserver has previously spoken to one asylum seeker from the Congo who had spent almost three years living in a tent with others at the hotspot in Moria on Lesbos island.

    The new pact is a cornerstone policy of the Von der Leyen Commission and follows years of bickering among member states who failed to agree on a previous proposal to overhaul the existing EU-wide asylum rules.

    “Over the past few years, many member states simply refused to find a solution,” Germany’s interior minister Horst Seehofer said ahead of the current German EU presidency’s first debate on home affairs issues.

    The commission has so far refused to release any specific details of the plan - which has been delayed until September, following the eruption of the pandemic and on-going debates over the EU’s next long-term budget.

    “This proposal will be there to protect and defend the right to asylum and that includes the possibility to apply for asylum, that is a right for everybody to do so,” EU home affairs commissioner Ylva Johansson told MEPs earlier this week.

    For its part, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) says the new pact needs to be common and workable.

    “This means establishing fair and fast asylum procedures to quickly determine who needs international protection and who does not,” a UNHCR spokeswoman said, in an emailed statement.

    She also noted that some 85 percent of the world’s refugees are currently hosted in neighbouring and developing countries and that more funds are needed for humanitarian and development support.

    https://euobserver.com/migration/148902
    #migration_pact #pacte_migratoire #Europe #identification #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #pré-identification #centres_d'identification #hotspots #Grèce #contrôles_migratoires #contrôles_frontaliers #externalisation #EU #UE #frontières_extérieures #relocalisation #renvois #expulsions

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • L’État décide de frapper au porte-monnaie les départements qui résistent au fichage des #enfants

    Tout juste sorti de cette période de confinement, et alors que la crise sanitaire a fortement impacté la situation des mineur⋅es isolé⋅es, le gouvernement reprend l’offensive réglementaire à l’encontre de leurs droits.

    Un #décret daté du 23 juin 2020 vient d’autoriser l’État à réduire sa #contribution_financière aux #départements qui refusent de faire intervenir les #préfectures dans le processus d’évaluation et d’#identification de ces enfants.

    Pour mémoire, ce sont la #loi_Collomb de septembre 2018 et son décret d’application du 30 janvier 2019 qui ont institué un #fichier des mineur⋅es isolé⋅es permettant aux départements d’associer les préfectures à la détermination de leur #minorité, et de faciliter l’éloignement de celles et ceux qui auront fait l’objet d’une décision provisoire de non-admission à l’#aide_sociale_à_l’enfance.

    L’ensemble du secteur de la #protection_de_l’enfance – et en particulier le #Conseil_national_de_la_protection_de_l’enfance –, ainsi que la totalité des organisations qui se sont exprimées sur le sujet, ont dénoncé la confusion entre protection de l’enfance et lutte contre l’immigration irrégulière organisée par ce dispositif. Malgré quelques réserves, le Conseil constitutionnel et le Conseil d’État l’ont malheureusement validé.

    Un an après son entrée en vigueur, environ un tiers des départements, pour des motifs divers et variés, continue à refuser d’appliquer ce dispositif.

    Aussi, à défaut de pouvoir contraindre l’ensemble des départements à conclure avec les préfectures une convention permettant de vérifier si ces enfants figurent déjà dans deux #fichiers destinés au contrôle migratoire (#Visabio et #AGDREF) et de les inscrire dans un troisième, dénommé « #appui_à_l’évaluation_de_la_minorité » (#AEM), le gouvernement a décidé de les frapper au porte-monnaie.

    Ainsi, il recourt à présent au #chantage_financier pour contraindre les derniers départements réfractaires à ce mélange des genres. Ce faisant, il fait montre de son acharnement pour imposer sa logique du #soupçon et du #contrôle à la question de l’#accueil et de la protection des mineur⋅es isolé⋅es.

    Nos organisations demandent l’abrogation de ce décret, la mise en œuvre du premier accueil, l’accompagnement socio-éducatif des jeunes isolé⋅es, sans discrimination et dans le strict cadre de la protection de l’enfance.

    https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article6438

    #France #fichage #migrations #asile #réfugiés #MNA #mineurs_non_accompagnés #enfance #renvois #expulsions #dissuasion #âge #catégorisation #tri #résistance

    ping @karine4 @isskein @etraces

  • EU: Damning draft report on the implementation of the Return Directive

    Tineke Strik, the Green MEP responsible for overseeing the passage through the European Parliament of the ’recast Return Directive’, which governs certain common procedures regarding the detention and expulsion of non-EU nationals, has prepared a report on the implementation of the original 2008 Return Directive. It criticises the Commission’s emphasis, since 2017, on punitive enforcement measures, at the expense of alternatives that have not been fully explored or implemented by the Commission or the member states, despite the 2008 legislation providing for them.

    See: DRAFT REPORT on the implementation of the Return Directive (2019/2208(INI)): https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2020/jun/ep-libe-returns-directive-implementation-draft-rep-9-6-20.pdf

    From the explanatory statement:

    “This Report, highlighting several gaps in the implementation of the Return Directive, is not intended to substitute the still overdue fully-fledged implementation assessment of the Commission. It calls on Member States to ensure compliance with the Return Directive and on the Commission to ensure timely and proper monitoring and support for its implementation, and to enforce compliance if necessary.

    (...)

    With a view to the dual objective of the Return Directive, notably promoting effective returns and ensuring that returns comply with fundamental rights and procedural safeguards, this Report shows that the Directive allows for and supports effective returns, but that most factors impeding effective return are absent in the current discourse, as the effectiveness is mainly stressed and understood as return rate.”

    Parliamentary procedure page: Implementation report on the Return Directive (European Parliament, link: https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2019/2208(INI)&l=en)

    https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-damning-draft-report-on-the-implementation-of-the-return-directive
    #Directive_Retour #EU #Europe #Union_européenne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #renvois #expulsions #rétention #détention_administrative #évaluation #identification #efficacité #2008_Return_Directive #régimes_parallèles #retour_volontaire #déboutés #sans-papiers #permis_de_résidence #régularisation #proportionnalité #principe_de_proportionnalité #AVR_programmes #AVR #interdiction_d'entrée_sur_le_territoire #externalisation #Gambie #Bangladesh #Turquie #Ethiopie #Afghanistan #Guinée #Côte_d'Ivoire #droits_humains #Tineke_Strik #risque_de_fuite #fuite #accord #réadmission

    –—

    Quelques passages intéressants tirés du rapport:

    The study shows that Member States make use of the possibility offered in Article 2(2)(a) not to apply the Directive in “border cases”, by creating parallel regimes, where procedures falling outside the scope of the Directive offer less safeguards compared to the regular return procedure, for instance no voluntary return term, no suspensive effect of an appeal and less restrictions on the length of detention. This lower level of protection gives serious reasons for concern, as the fact that border situations may remain outside the scope of the Directive also enhances the risks of push backs and refoulement. (...) Your Rapporteur considers that it is key to ensure a proper assessment of the risk of refoulement prior to the issuance of a return decision. This already takes place in Sweden and France. Although unaccompanied minors are rarely returned, most Member States do not officially ban their return. Their being subject to a return procedure adds vulnerability to their situation, due to the lack of safeguards and legal certainty.

    (p.4)
    #frontières #zones_frontalières #push-backs #refoulement

    Sur les #statistiques et #chiffres de #Eurostat:

    According to Eurostat, Member States issued over 490.000 return decisions in 2019, of which 85% were issued by the ten Member States under the current study. These figures are less reliable then they seem, due to the divergent practices. In some Member States, migrants are issued with a return decision more than once, children are not issued a decision separately, and refusals at the border are excluded.

    Statistics on the percentage of departure being voluntary show significant varieties between the Member States: from 96% in Poland to 7% in Spain and Italy. Germany and the Netherlands have reported not being able to collect data of non-assisted voluntary returns, which is remarkable in the light of the information provided by other Member States. According to Frontex, almost half of the departures are voluntary.

    (p.5)

    As Article 7(4) is often applied in an automatic way, and as the voluntary departure period is often insufficient to organise the departure, many returnees are automatically subject to an entry ban. Due to the different interpretations of a risk of absconding, the scope of the mandatory imposition of an entry ban may vary considerably between the countries. The legislation and practice in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, the Netherlands and Sweden provides for an automatic entry ban if the term for voluntary departure was not granted or respected by the returnee and in other cases, the imposition is optional. In Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria however, legislation or practice provides for an automatic imposition of entry bans in all cases, including cases in which the returnee has left during the voluntary departure period. Also in the Netherlands, migrants with a voluntary departure term can be issued with an entry ban before the term is expired. This raises questions on the purpose and effectiveness of imposing an entry ban, as it can have a discouraging effect if imposed at an early stage. Why leave the territory in time on a voluntary basis if that is not rewarded with the possibility to re-enter? This approach is also at odds with the administrative and non-punitive approach taken in the Directive.

    (p.6)

    National legislation transposing the definition of “risk of absconding” significantly differs, and while several Member States have long lists of criteria which justify finding a risk of absconding (Belgium has 11, France 8, Germany 7, The Netherlands 19), other Member States (Bulgaria, Greece, Poland) do not enumerate the criteria in an exhaustive manner. A broad legal basis for detention allows detention to be imposed in a systematic manner, while individual circumstances are marginally assessed. National practices highlighted in this context also confirm previous studies that most returns take place in the first few weeks and that longer detention hardly has an added value.

    (p.6)

    In its 2016 Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission recognised that cooperation with third countries is essential in ensuring effective and sustainable returns. Since the adoption of this Communication, several informal arrangements have been concluded with third countries, including Gambia, Bangladesh, Turkey, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Guinea and Ivory Coast. The Rapporteur regrets that such informal deals are concluded in the complete absence of duly parliamentary scrutiny and democratic and judicial oversight that according to the Treaties the conclusion of formal readmission agreements would warrant.

    (p.7)

    With the informalisation of cooperation with third countries in the field of migration, including with transit countries, also came an increased emphasis on conditionality in terms of return and readmission. The Rapporteur is concerned that funding earmarked for development cooperation is increasingly being redirected away from development and poverty eradication goals.

    (p.7)
    #développement #aide_au_développement #conditionnalité_de_l'aide

    ping @_kg_ @isskein @i_s_ @karine4 @rhoumour

  • Trump Has Flooded DC With Law Enforcement Officers Who Won’t Identify Themselves – Mother Jones
    https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/06/trump-has-flooded-dc-with-law-enforcement-officers-who-wont-identify-th

    I asked two men who they were with. “We’re with the Department of Justice,” one answered. “Are you with a specific agency?” I asked. “Are you regular DOJ employees or just detailed there?” He responded: “We’re with the Department of Justice” to all my questions. He asked me who I was with, which I was happy to share, and why I wanted to know, which I’d hoped was obvious. This is America. We are supposed to know who’s policing us.

    But things are changing. The Trump administration, in the name of order, is claiming the power to use unidentified federal law enforcement personnel to police protests. On top of the dizzying array of federal law enforcement already out in force this week, these are some of the “federal assets” that Donald Trump said he was deploying in DC in the wake of large protests and substantial looting and property damage on Sunday night. These officers, if that’s what they are, have not only declined to identify themselves, but appear to be actively taking steps to hide their affiliation.

    Défaut d’#identification, ça fait flipper les US. Imagine avec une petite customisation de faf comme en France !
    #police

  • Le Conseil d’Etat suspend l’usage de drones par la préfecture de Paris
    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/180520/le-conseil-d-etat-suspend-l-usage-de-drones-par-la-prefecture-de-paris

    La haute juridiction a sommé l’État, lundi 18 mai, « de cesser, sans délai, de procéder aux mesures de #surveillance par #drone », dans le cadre d’une procédure intentée par La Quadrature du Net et la Ligue des droits de l’homme. Cette suspension est effective jusqu’à la parution d’un arrêté ministériel.

    Les voix métalliques des drones ne se feront plus entendre à Paris : le Conseil d’État vient de les clouer au sol. La haute juridiction a sommé l’État, lundi 18 mai, « de cesser, sans délai, de procéder aux mesures de surveillance par drone », dans le cadre d’une procédure intentée par La Quadrature du Net et la Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH).

    Les deux associations, dans un recours déposé le 4 mai, avaient estimé que l’utilisation de drones par la préfecture de police de Paris en lien avec les mesures de confinement était attentatoire aux libertés individuelles.

    Selon l’ordonnance du Conseil d’État, cette suspension est effective jusqu’à la parution d’un arrêté ministériel.

    Le 25 avril dernier, Mediapart avait publié un article sur le flou juridique qui entoure le déploiement de ces aéronefs par les forces de l’ordre depuis le début du confinement – plusieurs de ces appareils équipés de caméras orientaient les équipes de policiers au sol vers d’éventuels attroupements.

    Dix jours plus tard, La Quadrature du Net et la LDH déposaient un recours en urgence contre l’utilisation de drones par la préfecture de police de Paris. « Puisqu’ils sont déployés en l’absence de tout cadre légal spécifique et adapté, affirme alors La Quadrature du Net dans un communiqué, ce sont eux qui violent la loi et nos libertés. » D’abord déboutées par le tribunal administratif de Paris, les associations de défense des libertés font appel devant le Conseil d’État, espérant pouvoir tenir « un débat plus constructif ».

    Celui-ci se cristallise autour de deux questions centrales : le traitement des données personnelles recueillies par les drones permet-il d’identifier des individus ? Et comment sont utilisées ces données personnelles ?

    Le 14 mai, la veille de l’audience du Conseil d’État, la préfecture de police prend les devants. Elle communique à la haute juridiction une note, datée du jour même, clarifiant sa doctrine d’emploi des drones dans le cadre d’opérations de respect du confinement.

    Le document précise que les appareils ne seront plus utilisés que pour « informer l’état-major de la préfecture de police afin que puisse être décidé, en temps utile, le déploiement d’une unité d’intervention », et, surtout, qu’ils voleront entre « 80 et 100 mètres de hauteur », filmeront toujours « avec un grand angle » et ne seront pas équipés d’une carte mémoire.

    Avocat de la LDH, Me Patrice Spinosi estime que « voulant éviter une éventuelle censure, le ministère a modifié sa doctrine d’action et a décidé, dans le cadre de cette note, qu’il n’y aurait plus d’enregistrement ». Si le Conseil d’État reconnaît que cette doctrine fixée à partir du 14 mai « n’est pas de nature à porter, par elle-même, une atteinte grave et manifestement illégale aux libertés fondamentales », il considère néanmoins qu’elle n’est pas une garantie suffisante.

    Deux éléments centraux ont amené le Conseil d’État à conclure que le déploiement de ces drones pouvait constituer « un usage contraire aux règles de protection des données personnelles ». Le premier est le modèle des aéronefs, révélé dans l’article de Mediapart : des Mavic Enterprise, un produit du leader mondial du secteur, le chinois DJI. Dotés de « zooms optiques », pouvant voler « à une distance inférieure à celle fixée par la note du 14 mai », les appareils ne présentent, selon le Conseil d’État, « aucun dispositif technique » certifiant que les images collectés ne seront pas utilisables à des fins d’identification.

    La #police nationale et la #gendarmerie étant exemptées du cadre légal d’utilisation des drones – fixé par l’arrêté du 17 décembre 2015 –, du moment que « les circonstances de la mission et les exigences de l’ordre et de la sécurité publique le justifient », le Conseil d’État a également estimé que les drones pouvaient évoluer à des distances permettant une identification des individus. « On ne parle pas de reconnaissance faciale, mais de filmer avec une possibilité d’identifier l’individu par un vêtement ou sa silhouette », clarifie Martin Drago, de La Quadrature du Net.

    « Dans ces conditions, note le Conseil d’État, les données susceptibles d’être collectées par le traitement litigieux doivent être regardées comme revêtant un caractère personnel ». La juridiction exige que l’état cesse « sans délai, de procéder aux mesures de surveillance par drone » tant qu’un texte réglementaire, pris après avis de la Cnil, n’aura pas clarifié leur usage. Le champ d’action de cette décision dépasse le périmètre parisien, puisque tous les usages de drones policiers sont maintenant susceptibles de tomber dans l’illégalité. La LDH de l’Hérault a déjà affirmé avoir entamé des procédures en ce sens.

    « C’est une importante décision de principe, réagit l’avocat de la LDH, Me Spinosi. Le juge a estimé qu’il y avait traitement de données personnelles dans le seul fait de capter des images en temps réel, à partir du moment où l’appareil utilisé a les capacités de le faire. » Pour Martin Drago, cette première victoire n’est qu’un début et ouvre notamment le débat de « [l’]utilisation [des drones] durant les manifestations ».

    De son côté, la Cnil a indiqué dans un communiqué avoir débuté le 23 avril « des contrôles auprès du ministère de l’intérieur concernant l’usage de drones dans plusieurs villes. Ces contrôles visent des services de la police nationale et de la gendarmerie ».

    #surveillance #libertés_individuelles #données_personnelles #identification

  • Migrants sue German state over mobile phone searches

    In Germany, three migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Cameroon are suing the state for accessing personal data on their mobile phones. A civil rights group taking part in the action says the phone searches are a serious invasion of privacy.

    29-year-old Syrian Mohammad A. was recognized as a refugee in Germany in 2015. Four years later, the German Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), reviewed his case – without giving a specific reason. During the review, they carried out an evaluation of his smartphone.

    “Suddenly the #BAMF employee told me to hand over my mobile phone and unlock it,” said Mohammad A. in a statement published by the Berlin-based Society for Civil Rights (GFF). “I didn’t know what was happening. Nothing was explained to me. But I was afraid of being deported. So I gave him the mobile phone. It felt like I was handing over my whole life.”

    Under a law passed in 2017, German authorities can examine the mobile phones of asylum seekers who are unable to present a valid passport on arrival, in order to verify information provided regarding identity. But the GFF, which filed the lawsuits together with the three refugees, says this represents “a particularly serious and extensive encroachment on the privacy of those affected.”

    Law fails to uncover false information

    The law permitting phone searches was meant to prevent “asylum abuse”. As many of those who arrive in Germany after fleeing their home countries cannot present a valid passport, it was seen as an effective way to detect fraudulent claims. However, the GFF says that despite thousands of such mobile phone searches, hardly any have uncovered false information.

    The GFF also argues that asylum authorities do not ensure that core areas of the asylum seekers’ rights are protected. “The BAMF is disregarding the strict constitutional rules by which the state must abide when accessing personal data,” Lea Beckmann from the GFF told Reuters.

    According to the news agency, a spokesman for BAMF said it was aware that checking mobile data was an intrusion and every case was determined by strict rules. “A mobile phone is often the only, or a very important, source to establish the identity and nationality of people entering Germany without a passport or identification documents,” he said.

    Privacy, transparency concerns

    The GFF argues that BAMF should be using mobile phone reading as a last resort, and that there are other, less drastic, means of clarifying doubts about identity. Mobile phone readouts are also extremely error-prone, the organization claims.

    The BAMF has also been criticized over a lack of transparency. For example, according to the GFF, little is known about how the software used to read and analyze the information obtained from phones actually works.
    Similarly, Reuters reports, the World Refugee Council has warned that consent for data collection is rarely sought and refugees often do not know how their data is used.

    Mohammad A.’s case is pending before a local court in the northwestern German city of Hanover. The case of an Afghan woman aged about 37 was lodged in Berlin and that of a 25-year-old woman from Cameroon, in the southwestern city of Stuttgart. The GFF hopes that the cases will lead to a constitutional review of the legal basis for mobile phone data evaluation.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/24574/migrants-sue-german-state-over-mobile-phone-searches

    #smartphone #données #Allemagne #justice #asile #migrations #réfugiés #surveillance #données_personnelles #téléphone_portable #identité #identification #procédure_d'asile #nationalité

    ping @etraces @karine4 @_kg_

  • The faces and names of a migration tragedy

    Italian newspaper identifies migrants who died on boat which drifted for days

    The Italian newspaper Avvenire has identified migrants who were “left to drown” before the boat they were in the central Mediterranean was taken back to Libya a few days after Easter.

    “The faces of silence: Here are the refugees who were left to drown,” the newspaper said in its headline on Wednesday.

    Times of Malta reported last week that a Libyan-registered fishing boat owned by a Maltese man had been directed by local authorities to help the migrants at sea. The vessel took migrants back to Libya.

    Five of the migrants aboard were found dead in the boat while another seven were missing when survivors were returned to Libya.

    “The victims of our indifference have names and faces like us,” Archbishop Charles Scicluna said in comments to Times of Malta.

    Avvenire said those who died on the boat were Nohom Mehari, Kidus Yohannes, Filmon Habtu, Filmon Desale and Debesay Rusom.

    The other seven missing were Filmon Mengstab, Mogos Tesfamichael, Hdru Yemane, Huruy Yohannes, Omer Seid, Hzqiel Erdom and Teklay Kinfe, it said

    They were aged between 18 and 25 and some were on their second attempt to cross into Europe.

    The newspaper says the migrants set sail from Sabratha in Libya between April 9 and 10 and drifted for days without food or water ’in an attempt to realise their dream of arriving in Christian Europe on Easter day."

    “They knew what it meant to be captured by the Libyans and returned to the hands of the torturers,” the newspaper adds.

    Their boat was spotted by a Frontex (European border agency) plane and their position was forwarded to the Italian and Maltese authorities

    “For five days they were left adrift, despite the desperate requests for help from (NGO) Alarm Phone and despite the appeals of the Maltese Church,” it adds.

    Italian and Maltese coordination centres reportedly argued over which area of responsibility the boat was in - Libyan, Maltese or Italian.

    “It was Good Friday, the Pilate’s day,” the newspaper remarks, a reference to Pontius Pilate having shirked responsibility.

    Two days after Easter the migrants’ boat was intercepted by a ’mysterious fishing boat’. Some of the migrants died when they jumped into the rough sea, trying to reach the fishing boat.

    The tragedy happened with Lampedusa just 30 miles away, and Malta 80 miles away.

    But the surviving migrants were taken back to Libya, ’fed to the Libyan torturers’.

    The newspaper said it hoped someone would show the faces of the migrants to investigators in Malta looking into the case.

    It quoted lawyer Giulia Tranchina insisting that “all the elements and evidence that have emerged so far indicate serious legal responsibilities on the part of the Maltese authorities,” the boat having drifted for days in the Malta search and rescue zone.

    The incident is now the subject of a magisterial inquiry.

    https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/the-faces-and-names-of-a-migration-tragedy.788723
    #identification #noms #nommer #identifier #13_avril_2020 #naufrage #Méditerranée #morts #décès #mourir_en_mer #morts_en_mer #tragédie_de_Pâques #Malte #Libye

    voir aussi:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/849512

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • En Allemagne, une fraude massive aux « allocations coronavirus » pour les travailleurs indépendants
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2020/04/27/en-allemagne-une-fraude-massive-aux-allocations-coronavirus-pour-les-travail

    Outre-Rhin, des centaines de milliers d’autoentrepreneurs ont obtenu des aides publiques depuis le début du confinement. Mais, profitant de la faiblesse des contrôles, de nombreux escrocs ont abusé de la générosité de l’Etat.

    L’escroc n’avait pas fait les choses à moitié. Après que les autorités du Land de Berlin eurent mis en place, le 27 mars, un programme d’aides d’urgence pour les petites entreprises et les travailleurs indépendants mis en difficulté par le Covid-19, ce Berlinois de 31 ans et son épouse avaient demandé en tout 80 000 euros de subventions pour sept sociétés de nettoyage. Le couple avait obtenu 35 000 euros de l’IBB, la banque publique d’investissement berlinoise. Jeudi 23 avril, la justice a placé le fraudeur en détention provisoire. « Plusieurs de ces sociétés étaient fictives », a déclaré Nina Thom, procureure générale du Land de Berlin, à la radio publique Deutschlandfunk.

    C’était la première arrestation pour fraude aux aides publiques liées au coronavirus en Allemagne. Et il y en aura probablement d’autres. Dans la capitale, la justice a d’ores et déjà lancé 46 procédures, auxquelles s’ajoutent une centaine d’enquêtes de la police criminelle (LKA), pour un préjudice estimé à 700 000 euros. C’est certes une goutte d’eau par rapport au 1,7 milliard d’euros d’« allocation corona » que l’IBB a versé à 200 000 autoentrepreneurs berlinois en un temps record, mais le nombre d’enquêtes s’accroît désormais tous les jours.

    Un salafiste et une influenceuse

    Pour secourir au plus vite les travailleurs indépendants privés de revenu du fait de la pandémie, le Land de Berlin avait, en effet, allégé au maximum la procédure : en quelques clics, le formulaire de demande d’allocation était envoyé. Mais cette simplicité présentait un inconvénient majeur. « Il n’y a pas de contrôle pour vérifier l’identité du requérant ou l’existence réelle de sa société », a déploré Jochen Sindberg, inspecteur en chef au LKA de Berlin.

    Les criminels hameçonnaient les données confidentielles des requérants, puis les utilisaient pour obtenir les aides publiques à leur place
    Grâce à la réactivité des banques, obligées par la loi de signaler tout retrait d’espèces suspect, la police berlinoise a pu rapidement identifier quelques indélicats. Ainsi, le LKA a d’ores et déjà saisi les 18 000 euros de subvention perçus par un prédicateur salafiste fiché par les services de renseignement, ainsi que les allocations indûment versées à une « instagrameuse » de 22 ans.

    Le problème est toutefois loin de se limiter à la capitale allemande. En Rhénanie-du-Nord-Westphalie, l’étendue de la fraude était telle que les autorités régionales ont dû suspendre le versement des aides d’urgence pendant une semaine, du 9 au 16 avril. Dans le Land le plus peuplé d’Allemagne, des aigrefins avaient créé plus de 100 fausses pages Internet imitant le site officiel de demande de subvention. Grâce à ces formulaires frauduleux, les criminels hameçonnaient les données confidentielles des requérants, puis les utilisaient sur la page officielle pour obtenir les aides publiques à leur place.

    « J’en appelle aux citoyens : de grâce, évitez ces faux sites Web et n’y saisissez pas vos données », avait alors imploré Herbert Reul (CDU), le ministre de l’intérieur du Land. Des sites d’hameçonnage ont également fleuri en Saxe, ainsi qu’à Hambourg. Dans cette ville-Etat, les autorités ont dû interrompre toute demande de subvention les 15 et 16 avril.

    Des faiblesses bien allemandes

    Cependant, la Rhénanie-du-Nord-Westphalie est de loin la région la plus visée par ces sites d’hameçonnage, ou phishing. Selon les autorités régionales, entre 3 500 et 4 000 utilisateurs ont été pris au piège de ces sites hébergés à l’étranger, et 20 000 dossiers douteux (sur plus de 400 000 demandes) ont été bloqués. La raison de cette vulnérabilité était, là encore, la simplicité de la procédure. Le gouvernement régional s’en était d’ailleurs vanté. « En Rhénanie-du-Nord-Westphalie, il était possible d’effectuer toute la démarche sur un formulaire en ligne, souligne Isabel Skierka, experte en cybersécurité à l’institut ESMT de Berlin. Dans d’autres Länder, les demandeurs devaient d’abord télécharger le formulaire, puis l’envoyer au ministère par courrier électronique ou postal, souvent avec une preuve d’identité. »

    A Hambourg, comme en région rhénane, les autorités ont donc renforcé les contrôles. Ainsi, l’IFB, la banque publique d’investissement du Land de Hambourg, a introduit une procédure d’identification par vidéo pour les demandeurs de l’« allocation corona ». Ceux-ci doivent désormais joindre des documents officiels à leur dossier. Pour les spécialistes, ces déboires sont révélateurs de faiblesses bien allemandes. « Au niveau régional et fédéral, l’administration a pris des années de retard dans la transition numérique, juge Mme Skierka. Or, le succès de cette transformation n’est pas qu’une question de technologie, mais surtout de processus, de bonne gestion et de coopération entre les différents acteurs. »

    #allocation_corona #hameçonnage #identification_vidéo

  • #387. #Numéro_387 disparu en Méditerranée

    C’est l’histoire d’un médecin grec qui collectionne des pendentifs et des bracelets. C’est l’histoire d’une Italienne qui se bat depuis 15 ans pour « faire parler les corps ». C’est l’histoire de celles et ceux qui veillent les migrants oubliés. Selon l’Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations, 5083 personnes ont trouvé la mort en 2016 en tentant de rejoindre l’Europe par la mer. 5 083 noms, dont la grande majorité se diluent dans les eaux si bleues de la Méditerranée. Que deviennent ces #morts ? Qui les nomme ? Comment font les mères, les frères, pour tenter de retrouver leurs disparus ? Numero 387 nous emmène dans cette quête de l’#identité.


    http://www.film-documentaire.fr/4DACTION/w_fiche_film/52256_1
    #film #documentaire #film_documentaire #asile #migrations #réfugiés #mourir_en_mer #Méditerranée #identification #cadavres #corps #décès

  • Don’t assume technology is racially neutral

    Without adequate and effective safeguards, the increasing reliance on technology in law enforcement risks reinforcing existing prejudices against racialised communities, writes Karen Taylor.

    Within the European Union, police and law enforcement are increasingly using new technologies to support their work. Yet little consideration is given to the potential misuse of these technologies and their impact on racialised communities.

    When the everyday experience of racialised policing and ethnic profiling is already causing significant physical, emotional and social harm, how much will these new developments further harm people of colour in Europe?

    With racialised communities already over-policed and under-protected, resorting to data-driven policing may further entrench existing discriminatory practices, such as racial profiling and the construction of ‘suspicious’ communities.

    This was highlighted in a new report published by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and the Open Society Justice Initiative.

    Using systems to profile, survey and provide a logic for discrimination is not new; what is new is the sense of neutrality afforded to data-driven policing.

    The ENAR report shows that law enforcement agencies present technology as ‘race’ neutral and independent of bias. However, such claims overlook the evidence of discriminatory policing against racialised minority and migrant communities throughout Europe.

    European criminal justice systems police minority groups according to the myths and stereotypes about the level of ‘risk’ they pose rather than the reality.

    This means racialised communities will feel a disproportionate impact from new technologies used for identification, surveillance and analysis – such as crime analytics, the use of mobile fingerprinting scanners, social media monitoring and mobile phone extraction - as they are already overpoliced.

    For example, in the UK, social media is used to track ‘gang-associated individuals’ within the ‘Gangs Matrix’. If a person shares content on social media that references a gang name or certain colours, flags or attire linked to a gang, they may be added to this database, according to research by Amnesty International.

    Given the racialisation of gangs, it is likely that such technology will be deployed for use against racialised people and groups.

    Another technology, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras, leads to concerns that cars can be ‘marked’, leading to increased stop and search.

    The Brandenburg police in Germany used the example of looking for “motorhomes or caravans with Polish license plates” in a recent leaked internal evaluation of the system.

    Searching for license plates of a particular nationality and looking for ‘motorhomes or caravans’ suggests a discriminatory focus on Travellers or Roma.

    Similarly, mobile fingerprint technology enables police to check against existing databases (including immigration records); and disproportionately affects racialised communities, given the racial disparity of those stopped and searched.

    Another way in which new technology negatively impacts racialised communities is that many algorithmically-driven identification technologies, such as automated facial recognition, disproportionately mis-identify people from black and other minority ethnic groups – and, in particular, black and brown women.

    This means that police are more likely to wrongfully stop, question and potentially arrest them.

    Finally, predictive policing systems are likely to present geographic areas and communities with a high proportion of minority ethnic people as ‘risky’ and subsequently make them a focus for police attention.

    Research shows that data-driven technologies that inform predictive policing increased levels of arrest for racialised communities by 30 percent. Indeed, place-based predictive tools take data from police records generated by over-policing certain communities.

    Forecasting is based on the higher rates of police intervention in those areas, suggesting police should further prioritise those areas.

    We often – rightly – discuss the ethical implications of new technologies and the current lack of public scrutiny and accountability. Yet we also urgently need to consider how they affect and target racialised communities.

    The European Commission will present a proposal on Artificial Intelligence within 100 days of taking office. This is an opportunity for the European Parliament to put safeguards in place that ensure that the use of AI does not have any harmful and/or discriminatory impact.

    In particular, it is important to consider how the use of such technologies will impact racialised communities, so often overlooked in these discussions. MEPs should also ensure that any data-driven technologies are not designed or used in a way that targets racialised communities.

    The use of such data has wide-ranging implications for racialised communities, not just in policing but also in counterterrorism and immigration control.

    Governments and policymakers need to develop processes for holding law enforcement agencies and technology companies to account for the consequences and effects of technology-driven policing.

    This should include implementing safeguards to ensure such technologies do not target racialised as well as other already over-policed communities.

    Technology is not neutral or objective; unless safeguards are put in place, it will exacerbate racial, ethnic and religious disparities in European justice systems.

    https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/don%E2%80%99t-assume-technology-racially-neutral

    #neutralité #technologie #discriminations #racisme #xénophobie #police #profilage_ethnique #profilage #données #risques #surveillance #identification #big-data #smartphone #réseaux_sociaux #Gangs_Matrix #automatic_number_plate_recognition (#ANPR) #Système_de_reconnaissance_automatique_des_plaques_minéralogiques #plaque_d'immatriculation #Roms #algorythmes #contrôles_policiers

    –--------

    Pour télécharger le rapport :


    https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/data-driven-profiling-web-final.pdf

    ping @cede @karine4 @isskein @etraces @davduf

  • La #reconnaissance_faciale des #manifestants est déjà autorisée – La #Quadrature du Net
    https://www.laquadrature.net/2019/11/18/la-reconnaissance-faciale-des-manifestants-est-deja-autorisee
    #fichage

    Depuis six ans, le gouvernement a adopté plusieurs décrets pour autoriser l’#identification_automatique et massive des manifestants. Cette autorisation s’est passée de tout #débat_démocratique. Elle résulte de la combinaison insidieuse de trois dispositifs : le fichier TAJ (traitement des antécédents judiciaires), le fichier TES (titres électroniques sécurisés) et la loi #renseignement.

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

  • #Alicem : la #reconnaissance_faciale imposée à tous dès novembre ? - Les Numériques
    https://www.lesnumeriques.com/vie-du-net/alicem-la-reconnaissance-faciale-imposee-a-tous-des-novembre-n141651.

    Question technique, l’application ne se contentera pas d’une bête photo. Il faudra fournir une rapide vidéo permettant au service d’analyser les expressions du visage sous plusieurs angles — il faudra également cligner des yeux. Cette vidéo sera bien évidemment “effacée immédiatement après la vérification” et aucune donnée ne sera transmise à des tiers, précise le site du ministère de l’Intérieur. Pour le moment, seule une app Android est prévue.

    Cette accélération du gouvernement sur le sujet de la reconnaissance faciale arrive au moment où l’#UE cherche à imposer des règles pour encadrer cette #technologie polémique. Comme le rapportait le Financial Times fin août, le nouveau collège qui siégera sous la présidence d’Ursula Von Der Leyen veut se saisir du sujet, et plus précisément de l’usage qui en est fait dans la #surveillance. Et si les deux sujets ne sont pas directement liés, comme dit La Quadrature du Net, Alicem cherche à “normaliser la reconnaissance faciale comme outil d’#identification”. Puis comme outil de surveillance ?

    #France

  • Le fichage. Note d’analyse ANAFE
    Un outil sans limites au service du contrôle des frontières ?

    La traversée des frontières par des personnes étrangères est un « outil » politique et médiatique, utilisé pour faire accepter à la population toutes les mesures toujours plus attentatoires aux libertés individuelles, au nom par exemple de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le prétexte sécuritaire est érigé en étendard et il est systématiquement brandi dans les discours politiques, assimilant ainsi migration et criminalité, non seulement pour des effets d’annonce mais de plus en plus dans les législations.
    Les personnes étrangères font depuis longtemps l’objet de mesures de contrôle et de surveillance. Pourtant, un changement de perspective s’est opéré pour s’adapter aux grands changements des politiques européennes vers une criminalisation croissante de ces personnes, en lien avec le développement constant des nouvelles technologies. L’utilisation exponentielle des fichiers est destinée à identifier, catégoriser, contrôler, éloigner et exclure. Et si le fichage est utilisé pour bloquer les personnes sur leurs parcours migratoires, il est aussi de plus en plus utilisé pour entraver les déplacements à l’intérieur de l’Union et l’action de militants européens qui entendent apporter leur soutien aux personnes exilées.
    Quelles sont les limites à ce développement ? Les possibilités techniques et numériques semblent illimitées et favorisent alors un véritable « business » du fichage.

    Concrètement, il existe pléthore de fichiers. Leur complexité tient au fait qu’ils sont nombreux, mais également à leur superposition. De ce maillage opaque naît une certaine insécurité juridique pour les personnes visées.
    Parallèlement à la multiplication des fichiers de tout type et de toute nature, ce sont désormais des questions liées à leur interconnexion[1], à leurs failles qui sont soulevées et aux abus dans leur utilisation, notamment aux risques d’atteintes aux droits fondamentaux et aux libertés publiques.

    Le 5 février 2019, un accord provisoire a été signé entre la présidence du Conseil européen et le Parlement européen sur l’interopérabilité[2] des systèmes d’information au niveau du continent pour renforcer les contrôles aux frontières de l’Union.

    http://www.anafe.org/IMG/pdf/note_-_le_fichage_un_outil_sans_limites_au_service_du_controle_des_frontieres

    #frontières #contrôle #surveillance #migration #réfugiés #fichage #interconnexion #interopérabilité

  • EU supports Bosnia and Herzegovina in managing migration with additional €10 million

    On 19 August 2019, the European Commission adopted a decision to allocate €10 million of additional funds to support Bosnia and Herzegovina addressing the increased presence of migrants and refugees. This additional allocation brings the total EU funding for migration to Bosnia and Herzegovina to €34 million since the beginning of 2018.

    The EU funds will be mainly used to set up additional temporary reception centres and provide basic services and protection, including food and accommodation, access to water sanitation and hygiene.

    The EU will also continue improving the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities for identification, registration and referral of third-country nationals crossing the border and for border control and surveillance, thereby also contributing to the fight against and prevention of migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and other types of cross-border crimes. It will also help the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin.

    Background

    Nearly 36,000 refugees and migrants entered Bosnia and Herzegovina since January 2018, according to official estimates. Approximately 7,400 refugees and migrants in need of assistance are currently present in the country, mostly in the Una-Sana Canton. Approximately 4,100 are accommodated in EU-funded temporary reception centres.

    Since 2007, the European Union has been providing assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina worth € 58.6 million in the area of migration and border management through the Instrument for pre-accession assistance. The country is also benefiting from the IPA regional programme ‘Support to Protection-Sensitive Migration Management’ worth up to €14.5 million.

    EU overall assistance already being implemented to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2018 to cope with the increased migratory presence amounts to €24 million (€20.2 million from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance and €3.8 million of humanitarian aid). This supplementary allocation brings the total to €34 million. This is in addition to €24.6 million assistance the European Union has provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the area of asylum, migration and border management since 2007.

    http://europa.ba/?p=65185
    #EU #UE #Bosnie-Herzégovine #migrations #réfugiés #asile #aide_financière

    Aide à l’#accueil (dont #hébergement), mais évidemment aussi :

    The EU will also continue improving the capacity of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s authorities for identification, registration and referral of third-country nationals crossing the border and for border control and surveillance, thereby also contributing to the fight against and prevention of migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and other types of cross-border crimes.

    #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #surveillance...
    Et aussi #identification #enregistrement...
    Encore une fois, donc, voici un bel exemple où sous couvert d’#aide_humanitaire, ce qu’on fait en réalité c’est... externaliser les contrôles frontaliers à un pays tiers... dans ce cas la Bosnie...
    Et #externalisation des procédures d’asile...

    J’ajoute à cette métaliste :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765335

    ping @isskein

  • #Espagne : les migrants inconnus des cimetières du détroit de #Gibraltar

    Selon le décompte de plusieurs ONG andalouses, entre 6 700 et 8 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant la traversée de la mer Méditerranée entre le Maroc et l’Espagne, ces trois dernières décennies. Des tombes mais aussi des plaques à la mémoire de ces migrants morts en mer parsèment les cimetières qui bordent le détroit de Gibraltar.

    De Tarifa, on aperçoit facilement les côtes marocaines. En ce mois de juin, le vent souffle avec sa force et sa régularité habituelle. Les voiles aux couleurs vives des kitesurf flottent dans un ciel d’un bleu intense.

    La petite ville située tout au bout de la péninsule ibérique a des allures de station balnéaire. Mais ses habitués savent-ils que le vieux fort à l’entrée du port est un centre de détention pour les migrants entrés de façon irrégulière sur le territoire espagnol ? Qui sait que c’est sur la plage de Los Lances, à la pointe de la péninsule, qu’en novembre 1988 le premier corps d’un migrant marocain a été rejeté par la mer ?

    Une visite au petit cimetière sur les hauteurs de la ville offre un autre regard sur Tarifa. Les sépultures sont simples, blanches, fleuries et se logent dans des niches, comme bien souvent en Andalousie. Un seau d’eau à la main, des habitants viennent enlever le sable et la poussière qui s’accumulent sur les tombes de leurs proches.

    En regardant vers les niches en hauteur, on découvre les tombes d’hommes et de femmes qui ont perdu la vie en traversant le détroit dans la clandestinité. « Immigrant du Maroc, 7 mars 2001 » : quatre plaques funéraires portent cette inscription. Un peu plus loin, deux autres portent la même mention mais sont datées de 2009. Enfin, une simple plaque déposée dans une niche porte une inscription encore plus administrative : « cadavre non identifié. 3ème chambre du tribunal d’Algésiras. Décision provisoire 47/2017 ».

    En 2018, selon l’APDHA, 1064 personnes ont perdu la vie en tentant la courte mais périlleuse traversée vers l’Europe. La plupart de ces victimes sont rapidement identifiées, car, lorsque se produit un naufrage, les survivants connaissent souvent l’identité de ceux qui n’ont pas réussi à gagner le rivage. Mais il y a aussi les anonymes, ceux dont les corps sont alors enterrés sans noms, en Espagne.

    En continuant la visite du cimetière de Tarifa, d’autres stèles attirent l’attention. Celles-ci portent des noms aux consonances peu espagnoles : Esther Adawale, Nigéria, 24 février 2003. Hope Ibrahim, Nigéria, 19 avril 2005. Yacouba Koné, Côte d’Ivoire, 17 avril 2013. Dans ces tombes reposent des migrants qui ont été identifiés par la police judiciaire espagnole mais qui, pour diverses raisons, n’ont pas été rapatriés vers leurs pays d’origine.

    José Maria Perez, un membre actif de la paroisse locale, raconte que ces tombes reçoivent les visites périodiques de « chrétiens et de musulmans » et que « de l’autre côté du détroit, on connaît l’existence de ces sépultures ».

    Miguel Delgado, en charge de l’aide aux migrants à l’archevêché de Cadix (dont dépend la commune de Tarifa), organise, lui, chaque 1er Novembre une cérémonie œcuménique à la mémoire des immigrants morts dans les eaux du détroit.

    Fidèle au message de l’église catholique sur le sujet des migrations, il réclame « un passage sûr pour ceux qui veulent émigrer en Europe et dont l’Europe a besoin ». Pour sensibiliser ses paroissiens et l’opinion publique, chaque deuxième mercredi du mois, dans plusieurs villes de part et d’autres du détroit (Cadix, Barbate, Tarifa, Algésiras, Ceuta, Tanger, Tétouan, Melila etc…) son association organise des « rondes du silence » qui réunissent des personnes de tous horizons derrière un seul mot d’ordre « solidarité avec les immigrants ».

    Chaque année, pour la journée internationale des migrants, il se rend sur la plage de Tarifa pour une prière publique qui réunit militants, habitants et parfois quelques surfeurs.

    A 25 kilomètres de Tarifa, dans le port de Barbate, l’apparition de corps de migrants sans vie sur les rivages n’est pas non plus inédite. Dans le cimetière, les mêmes tombes blanches nichées sur les murs révèlent les histoires des disparus du détroit.

    Là aussi, des emplacements sont marqués par un simple numéro ou une mention « inconnu », ainsi qu’une date. Les plus anciennes de ces tombes de migrants anonymes datent de 2002, les plus récentes de 2019. Là encore, des corps non identifiés. Et une plaque à la mémoire « des victimes du détroit ».

    Mais dans une des allées, une tombe se distingue des autres. Celle de Samuel Kabamba, un enfant originaire de la RD Congo âgé de 5 ans. Son histoire a provoqué une grande émotion dans cette région du sud de l’Espagne et bien au delà.

    Fin janvier 2017, son corps a été retrouvé sans vie sur une plage proche du petit port de pêche andalou. Celui de sa mère, Véronique, est rejeté par la mer 15 jours plus tard sur les côtes algériennes.

    La découverte du corps du petit garçon a provoqué l’indignation des associations de défense des migrants et de Gabriel Delgado qui a organisé une veillée funèbre le 1er février sur la plage où il s’était échoué. Une centaine de personne sont venues prier et lancer des fleurs à la mer. L’affaire s’est médiatisée faisant écho à celle du petit Alan Kurdi, cet enfant syrien retrouvé noyé sur une plage de Turquie en septembre 2015.

    Début mars, les autorités espagnoles ont autorisé le père du petit garçon à se rendre en Espagne. Un test d’ADN a confirmé que le petit Samuel était bien son fils. Le père de famille a organisé l’enterrement de son fils à Barbate, le 10 mars.

    Ce jour-là, l’église était pleine à craquer. Les habitants de Barbate sont venus en nombre, le petit Samuel repose désormais parmi eux. Chaque jour, des femmes fleurissent sa tombe « car ses proches sont loin, il faut bien que quelqu’un s’occupe de lui » confie une vieille dame.


    https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/18435/espagne-les-migrants-inconnus-des-cimetieres-du-detroit-de-gibraltar
    #cimetière #morts #décès #migrations #réfugiés #asile #cadavres #identification #mourir_en_mer

  • Espagne-Maroc : « Les migrants morts en mer ne parlent pas, moi je suis leur voix »

    « Croque-mort » de son état, l’Espagnol #Martin_Zamorra se démène depuis des années pour identifier les corps de migrants morts en traversant le détroit de Gibraltar en mer Méditerranée. Il souhaite rapatrier leurs dépouilles vers leur pays d’origine. Portrait.

    On devine que sa vie n’a pas été tout a fait rectiligne. Martin #Zamorra est un homme à la fois affable et singulier. Du bord de l’autoroute A7 qui relie Algésiras à Malaga, dans le sud de l’Espagne, il dirige une petite entreprise de #pompes_funèbres - qui a connu des jours meilleurs.

    Fumeur compulsif (mais il vient d’arrêter), Martin Zamora n’est ni un anonyme ni un discret dans ce coin d’Andalousie puisque ses aventures ont inspiré un film de fiction, « Retour à Hansala » sorti en 2008. Le scénario : un croque mort espagnol peu scrupuleux rapatrie au pays le corps d’un migrant en compagnie de sa sœur, une jeune femme marocaine. Un voyage qui transforme pour toujours les deux personnages…

    L’affaire qui l’occupe principalement en cette matinée de juin, c’est celle des victimes d’un naufrage qui s’est produit en novembre 2018, à Barbate, non loin du détroit de Gibraltar. Vingt-six personnes s’étaient alors noyées à proximité du port andalou. La plupart des victimes étaient marocaines.

    Dans les semaines qui ont suivi, la police judiciaire espagnole est parvenue à identifier 21 victimes qui furent rapatriées. Mais cinq autres n’ont pas quitté l’Espagne, la médecine légale n’étant pas parvenue à mettre un nom sur ces corps sans vie. Ces dépouilles sans identité sont devenues l’affaire de Martin Zamorra.

    Face à des autorités espagnoles impuissantes, il actionne ses contacts au Maroc. Grâce à une méthode bien rôdée, il parvient à identifier les victimes en quelques heures.

    « Tout d’abord, j’ai besoin d’une photo. Puis j’ai besoin de déterminer de quel pays vient la victime. Ensuite, je diffuse l’information, principalement parmi les contacts que j’ai accumulés pendant des années. Ensuite, généralement, on m’appelle. Parfois, cela prend du temps et la justice ordonne l’inhumation d’un corps anonyme. Et c’est à moi que revient la procédure d’exhumation du corps, quand une famille s’est manifesté et que l’on a pu identifier formellement le corps ».

    Mais la plupart du temps, l’identification d’un corps ne prend que quelques heures : les survivants d’un naufrage communiquent à leurs proches les noms des disparus. La nouvelle se répand à la vitesse des échanges sur Whatsapp.
    Parfois encore, Martin Zamorra envoie des photos à ses contacts, et des familles qui reconnaissent les visages sans vie de leurs enfants.

    Les lourdeurs bureaucratiques empêchent un rapatriement rapide des corps

    Reste que pour la justice espagnole, reconnaître un corps n’autorise pas son transfert au Maroc. La justice réclame qu’un lien de parenté soit établi et donc qu’un prélèvement d’ADN soit effectué sur les personnes qui réclament les corps des défunts.

    Sept mois après le drame, les policiers espagnols ne se sont toujours pas rendus au Maroc pour récolter un peu de salive ou quelques cheveux d’une mère, d’un père ou d’un frère.

    Malgré la forte coopération policière entre les deux pays, la bureaucratie des deux côtés du détroit ralentit le processus, peste Martin Zamorra. « Je voudrais que l’on m’explique qui va réclamer le corps d’un noyé et payer pour son rapatriement si il ne s’agit pas d’un membre de sa famille ou l’un de ses proches ! »

    Pour lui, l’impasse bureaucratique s’explique aussi par des conflits politiques. Il doit y avoir des querelles internes entre juges, ce qui rend l’affaire « encore plus lamentable » estime-t-il. « Moi, je ne suis personne, mais c’est à moi que l’on envoie des photos, déplore-t-il. J’en reçois toute la journée sur mon téléphone. Tout le monde a mon numéro : les policiers ou des membres des ONG... » Martin Zamorra voudrait que les choses aillent plus vite.

    Pour se faire comprendre, le croque-mort fait défiler sous nos yeux des dizaines de conversations Whatsapp. On aperçoit alors sur l’écran du smartphone (qui ne semble jamais s’arrêter de sonner) des visages de morts et de vivants, des photocopies de papiers d’identité.

    Effectue-t-il un travail de détective ? À cette question qu’il entend souvent, Martin Zamorra soupire. Il hausse les épaules et répond que son seul domaine, « c’est la thanatologie, je ne suis un expert que dans le domaine funéraire ».

    Quand on lui demande comment il fait payer ses précieux services, il reste flou. Il n’évoque pas de compassion particulière. Mais derrière des airs de misanthrope, ses yeux et sa voix trahissent une grande émotion quand il explique son travail.

    Albert Bitoden Yaka, un travailleur social d’Algésiras venu du Cameroun il y a une vingtaine d’année connaît Martin Zamorra et sa drôle de quête. « Il veut aider les migrants, il fait beaucoup pour eux. Pourquoi et comment… ? Il y a certainement une part de mystère mais c’est comme si il avait une dette morale. Il a une grande sensibilité, il vit avec la douleur des gens ».

    Une ONG s’est créée il y a peu : le Centre International Pour l’Identification des Migrants Disparus (CIPIMD). L’organisation estime que 769 personnes sont mortes - ou portées disparues - pour la seule année 2018, en tentant d’atteindre les côtes espagnoles. Elle réclame des autorités espagnoles un peu plus de coopération mais elle sait qu’il y aura toujours Martin Zamorra pour tenter de résoudre les affaires les plus compliquées.

    #identification #corps #cadavres #asile #migrations #réfugiés #mourir_en_mer #Méditerranée #Maroc #Espagne

  • Le numéro 1, un très beau numéro de la revue
    #Nunatak , Revue d’histoires, cultures et #luttes des #montagnes...

    Sommaire :

    Une sensation d’étouffement/Aux frontières de l’Iran et de l’Irak/Pâturages et Uniformes/La Banda Baudissard/
    À ceux qui ne sont responsables de rien/Des plantes dans l’illégalité/Conga no va !/Mundatur culpa labore

    La revue est disponible en pdf en ligne (https://revuenunatak.noblogs.org/numeros), voici l’adresse URL pour télécharger le numéro 1 :
    https://revuenunatak.noblogs.org/files/2017/03/Nunatak1HiverPrintemps2017.pdf

    Je mettrai ci-dessous des mots-clés et citations des articles...

  • L’Argentine retrouve “la petite-fille nº 129”, enlevée à sa famille pendant la dictature | Romina Navarro
    https://fr.globalvoices.org/2019/04/13/235350

    Le 9 avril en fin d’après-midi, les Grands-mères de la place de Mai [fr] (une ONG argentine de défense des droits humains) ont annoncé lors d’une conférence de presse avoir retrouvé la petite-fille nº 129, disparue en Argentine pendant la dernière dictature [fr]. La petite-fille en question est une femme de 42 ans qui vit en Espagne et son identification marque une nouvelle victoire pour l’organisation qui se bat depuis plus de 40 ans pour localiser ces enfants [disparus] et les rendre à leurs familles légitimes. Source : Global Voices

  • Island.eu

    Island.eu was the first event in the #Vertical_Atlas research project. It explores ways of mapping new techno-political geographies, based on the tension between Europe’s data protection against the borderless reality of cyberspace and the simultaneous datafication of the Mediterranean sea as an extended border of European sovereignty.

    https://verticalatlas.hetnieuweinstituut.nl/en/islandeu
    #données #surveillance #cyberspace #internet #cartographie #technologie #cartographie #souveraineté #identité #identification #iris #IrisGuard #Attribute_Based_Credentials #ABC
    ping @fil

  • Au pays des disparus

    #Taina_Tervonen remonte le fil de l’histoire d’un #migrant_anonyme, décédé à bord du chalutier clandestin qui a fait naufrage dans les eaux internationales, au large de la #Libye. Sa piste l’emmène de Milan à Catane, en passant par le #Niger et le #Sénégal. Sur sa route, elle croise des centaines de destins brisés aux portes de l’Europe, et entend le désarroi de leurs proches face à l’impossible #deuil. Une enquête, aussi bouleversante que vertigineuse, sur un des plus gros enjeux de notre temps.
    18 avril 2015. Un chalutier clandestin transportant
    800 personnes en direction de l’Italie sombre
    dans les eaux internationales, au large de la Libye.
    Au lendemain du naufrage, Matteo Renzi s’engage
    devant la presse à remonter l’épave et à donner à
    chaque victime une sépulture digne et un nom.
    Lorsque la journaliste Taina Tervonen se rend
    à la #morgue de Milan seize mois plus tard, pour
    rencontrer l’équipe en charge des identifications, elle
    découvre parmi les objets personnels des naufragés
    un téléphone Nokia jaune citron en trois morceaux
    et un bout de plastique, destiné à le protéger de l’eau.
    C’est tout ce qui reste de #PM390047, dont le #corps
    resté anonyme est enterré dans le carré des migrants
    du #cimetière de #Catane, en Sicile.
    Qui était-il ? Taina Tervonen décide de remonter
    le fil de son histoire, de Milan à Catane, en passant
    par le Niger et le Sénégal. Sur sa route, elle croise
    des dizaines de destins brisés aux portes de l’Europe,
    et entend le désarroi de leurs proches face à
    l’impossible deuil. Une enquête, aussi bouleversante
    que vertigineuse, sur un des plus gros enjeux de notre
    temps.
    Taina Tervonen est journaliste et réalisatrice.
    Elle a travaillé sur les disparus en Bosnie et en
    Méditerranée.


    https://www.fayard.fr/documents-temoignages/au-pays-des-disparus-9782213712390
    #parcours_migratoire #route_migratoire #mort #décès #livre #mourir_en_mer #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #ceux_qui_restent #anonymat #identification

    ping @reka @karine4 @isskein @pascaline

  • A défaut d’un système d’#identification centralisé concernant les migrants irréguliers décédés en mer. Des #morts_sous_X par centaines

    Comment des milliers de migrants morts échoués sur les côtés marocains sont-ils identifiés ? Comment les autorités marocaines parviennent-elles à connaître leurs noms et leur identité et permettent-elles à leurs familles de faire leur deuil ? « Le taux d’identification demeure faible voire limité et ce sujet ne semble pas se poser avec acuité pour les autorités locales », a indiqué Younous Arbaoui, responsable plaidoyer & coordination au sein de la Plateforme nationale protection migrants (PNPM) lors d’une conférence de presse organisée mercredi dernier pour présenter le rapport de la PNPM intitulé « Identification des personnes migrantes décédées aux frontières maritimes marocaines ». D’après lui, les autorités marocaines ne disposent d’aucun système centralisé ni de démarches procédurales permettant d’identifier les corps des migrants qui voyagent le plus souvent sans documents d’identité.
    L’intervenant a également précisé que l’identification des corps se fait grâce à des témoignages (déclarations des migrants qui ont vécu avec le défunt, des représentants communautaires ou associations) ou à des témoins (reconnaissance faciale par un membre de la famille ou un ami). Pourtant, il a précisé que le taux d’identification demeure très faible comme en atteste le cas de la ville de Tanger où ce taux ne dépasse pas, en moyenne, 2% selon des chiffres émanant des responsables de la morgue de la ville, ce qui veut dire que 98% des personnes repêchées par les autorités de Tanger sont non-identifiées et restent anonymes. A Nador, le taux est également très faible. En fait, sur les 81 corps repêchés au cours de l’été 2017, seulement 15 personnes ont été identifiées soit uniquement 18,5 %. Idem à Tétouan où la majorité des morts n’a pas été identifiée formellement.
    Concernant l’identification par témoin, l’intervenant a révélé que, souvent, les personnes qui ont survécu au naufrage sont rapidement séparées des morts par les autorités qui les considèrent comme des « migrants irréguliers » qui n’intéressent que les seules autorités nationales chargées du contrôle des frontières et ces personnes sont même souvent soit déplacées de force vers les villes du Sud du Maroc ou bien détenues/expulsées sans les impliquer ou leur donner l’occasion de contribuer à l’identification de leurs compagnons de voyage.
    En ce qui concerne l’usage des indices matériels trouvés sur les corps des victimes, la manière dont ils sont analysés et archivés n’est pas claire. Idem pour l’autopsie où l’expertise, les ressources ou encore le savoir-faire qui font défaut.
    Pour les méthodes basées sur l’analyse des empreintes et l’ADN (méthodes formelles), le défi est souvent de trouver des échantillons de référence. Ceci d’autant plus que les migrants ne sont pas tous enregistrés auprès des autorités marocaines avant leur mort. En fait, un nombre important de migrants n’est pas connu par les autorités car ils entrent clandestinement au Maroc et se dirigent vers Tanger ou Nador.
    Cependant, l’intervenant a affirmé que les migrants sénégalais font exception puisque la majorité des morts est identifiée grâce à l’implication du consulat sénégalais à travers ses agents installés dans différentes provinces du Maroc.
    L’autre problème, et non le moindre, réside dans la décomposition des corps des migrants décédés. C’est souvent le cas lorsque les dépouilles restent longtemps en mer et/ou conservées dans les réfrigérateurs de la morgue. A ce propos, Elouafa Jamal, de clinque El Hijra- Rabat, a indiqué que les autorités marocaines peinent à trouver des espaces et des facilités pour conserver les corps. Les témoignages collectés montrent que la capacité des morgues dans les trois villes concernées (Tanger, Tétouan et Nador) est limitée. Dans ce sens, il a noté qu’à Nador, la morgue est souvent obligée de conserver plus de dépouilles dans des espaces destinés initialement à en accueillir moins et qu’il arrive même que des corps soient conservés dans des chambres dont la température est inadéquate. Pire, quand un corps n’est pas identifié dans les deux mois, le procureur du Roi à Nador donne l’ordre de l’enterrer, ce qui permet de décharger la morgue. A Tétouan, la morgue est parfois obligée de mettre deux corps dans un espace destiné à un seul dans l’attente de la mise en fonction de la nouvelle morgue qui souffre d’un manque de personnel. A Tanger, la capacité de la morgue est limitée car l’identification prend du temps et si la dépouille n’est pas identifiée à l’issue de deux mois, elle doit être enterrée.
    Comment le PNPM envisage-t-il de résoudre ce problème ? Quelle réponse institutionnelle, réglementaire et juridique faut-il y apporter ? Qui sera chargé de gérer ce dossier face à la multiplication des intervenants (ministères de la Santé, de l’Intérieur et de la Justice, communes, Gendarmerie Royale,…) ? Qui doit payer les frais générés par l’opération d’identification (L’ UE, le Maroc, les pays d’origine des migrants, les familles, …) ? « L’enjeux est de taille et sincèrement, nous n’avons pas de réponse claire. D’ailleurs, notre ambition, via ce rapport, est d’ouvrir le débat sur ce sujet et d’impliquer l’opinion publique nationale et les autorités », nous a expliqué Younous Arbaoui. Mais en attendant que ce débat national soit initié, la Plateforme nationale protection migrants recommande l’implication des survivants des naufrages dans la procédure d’identification et le renforcement de la collaboration avec les consulats étrangers.
    Il est également question d’élargir la recherche des empreintes digitales en consultant tous les systèmes d’enregistrement d’empreintes disponibles au niveau national et en impliquant le système d’enregistrement du Haut-commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) sans oublier de collaborer avec les autorités des pays d’origine.
    La PNPM demande de cesser d’arrêter les membres de la famille des défunts qui se présenteraient aux autorités dans l’objectif de leur permettre de prélever des échantillons de référence ADN, et ce même s’ils sont en situation irrégulière ; ou bien de mandater une autre institution (qui n’a pas le mandat d’arrêter les migrants irréguliers) pour opérer les prélèvements d’ADN.
    Le ministère de la Santé a été aussi sollicité afin de pouvoir utiliser les échantillons prélevés dans les établissements de soins dans le cadre d’examens médicaux ou du sang stocké dans les banques dédiées. Le département de la Santé est également appelé à adapter la capacité d’accueil des morgues des villes frontalières au phénomène des morts en mer. Enfin, le PNPM estime qu’il est nécessaire de mener une enquête interne sur le manque d’intérêt des agents chargés de l’identification, sur l’usage des indices matériels trouvés sur les corps des victimes et sur la façon dont ces indices sont analysés et archivés.


    https://www.libe.ma/A-defaut-d-un-systeme-d-identification-centralise-concernant-les-migrants-irreg
    #mer #Mer_Méditerranée #cadavres #décès #mourir_en_mer #morts #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Maroc #Tétouan #taux_d'identification #Tanger #Nador #ADN

    • Les autorités marocaines appelées à identifier les migrants décédés aux frontières maritimes

      Aucune donnée ne permet, aujourd’hui, de connaître le nombre exact de migrants décédés ni la manière avec laquelle ils sont traités en tant que “morts”.

      Ils ne sont pas des anonymes. Ils ont un nom, une famille, une histoire, des droits. Le réseau de plaidoyer “Plateforme nationale de protection des migrants” (PNPM) veut attirer l’attention sur l’identification de migrants décédés aux frontières maritimes marocaines. Aucune donnée ne permet, aujourd’hui, de connaître avec exactitude le nombre de ces décès ni la manière avec laquelle ils sont traités en tant que “morts”. C’est le constat que dresse cette plateforme en ouvrant, ce mercredi à Rabat, le débat sur ce sujet qu’elle estime absent de la scène marocaine. “Il s’agit d’un engagement pris par les Etats dans le cadre du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières et le droit international qui les contraint à respecter les morts”, déclare le responsable du plaidoyer et coordinateur de la PNPM, Younous Arbaoui, en présentant ce rapport.

      Ce respect dû aux morts commence par leur “donner vie”. Le processus n’a rien de facile, car le taux d’identification formelle des ces migrants décédés, pour le moment, “est très faible”. A Tanger, il est de 2%, selon la morgue, relève ce rapport, constatant, ainsi que 98% des personnes repêchées par les autorités de la ville sont restées des anonymes. Dans la ville de Nador, cette fois-ci, sur 81 morts, au cours de l’été 2017, 15 seulement ont pu être identifiés, soit 18,5%, ajoute la même source. Quant à Tétouan, la plateforme n’a pas réussi à établir une estimation, précisant que la morgue de la ville l’avait informée que la majorité des morts n’est pas identifiée formellement. Toutefois, la PNPM relève une exception auprès des services consulaires sénégalais qui lui ont affirmé, de leur côté, qu’à travers leurs agents installés dans différentes provinces du Maroc, la majorité des personnes décédées d’origine sénégalaise est identifiée.

      Le fait que la plupart de ces migrants décédés ne soit pas identifiée n’est pas sans conséquences. La PNPM explique que leurs familles ne peuvent en faire le deuil, ni prendre les mesures légales que le décès d’un membre implique notamment au niveau de l’héritage, des assurances, du remariage ou encore du pouvoir parental. Une situation qui montre à quel point l’identification formelle doit se faire en tant qu’urgence sociale.

      “Une identification faciale peut se faire par témoins, mais ce n’est pas suffisant pour reconnaître formellement une personne”, signale Younes Arbaoui. Et pour cause, l’identification par témoin n’apporte pas toujours les indices nécessaires mais peut, néanmoins, servir de “valeur ajoutée”, pour augmenter les chances d’identification formelle. Sur ce point, la PNPM regrette que les survivants des naufrages ne soient pas impliqués dans l’identification. Considérés comme des “clandestins”, ces derniers sont séparés des morts et remis aux autorités nationales chargées des frontières, pour être, ensuite, expulsés ou détenus. Tandis que les morts relèvent de la responsabilité des autorités locales, souligne ce rapport.
      Des recommandations

      “Le ministère de l’Intérieur devrait essayer d’impliquer les survivants dans ce processus. C’est notre première recommandation !”, souligne Arbaoui, ajoutant que plusieurs indices matériels peuvent également servir dans ce processus. Ces indices concernent le passeport ou les papiers d’identité retrouvés sur le corps de la victime. “Il faut archiver ces indices pour mener de nouvelles tentatives d’identification. Tout ce que porte la victime doit être conservé. Pour cela, nous recommandons au Maroc de collaborer avec le comité de la Croix rouge en cas de manque d’expertise”, propose le président de la Clinique juridique Hijra, Jamal El Ouafa.

      À ces indices matériels s’ajoutent d’autres, scientifiques, servant à l’identification, notamment les empreintes. “C’est un grand défi ! Souvent, les empreintes sont putréfiées par l’eau. Alors, il faut retrouver les empreintes de la victime enregistrées avant sa mort, sauf que ces migrants ne se font pas enregistrer par les autorités”, constate le coordinateur de la plateforme. Pour relever ce “grand défi”, la PNPM recommande aux autorités marocaines d’élargir leurs recherches à toutes les bases de données disponibles au-delà de la gendarmerie et de la police et d’impliquer également le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR). Ce dernier procède, en effet, à l’enregistrement des demandeurs d’asile et peut aider, selon la PNPM, à identifier certaines victimes. Et à ces efforts, la plateforme recommande de joindre les autorités des pays d’origine pour faciliter l’identification.

      Tout aussi formelle que les empreintes, l’analyse ADN est également recommandée par la plateforme estimant, toutefois, que la difficulté de trouver l’échantillon référence pose là aussi une sérieuse difficulté. “D’après les témoignages recueillis, la seule possibilité est de faire appel à la famille de la victime. Mais, parfois, cette dernière ne réside pas au Maroc, sinon, elle est réticente à se présenter aux autorités”, fait remarquer Arbaoui. Et de préciser qu’”à Tanger, la PNPM a appris que certains membres de familles se sont faits arrêter alors qu’ils se présentaient pour un prélèvement ADN”.

      La plateforme appelle ainsi les autorités à ne pas interpeller les familles concernées “même si ses membres sont clandestins” et recommande aux ministères de l’Intérieur et de la Santé de travailler en collaboration pour établir une base de données commune. “Il est préférable de faire appel à des institutions qui n’ont pas pour mandat d’arrêter le migrant irrégulier, comme les morgues, afin d’effectuer ces prélèvements”, propose-t-elle.

      Autre problème que le Maroc est appelé à résoudre concerne les morgues. A Tanger, indique Jamal El Ouafa, “au bout de 2 mois, le corps d’un migrant anonyme est enterré et si l’identification est accomplie, l’enterrement doit se faire dans les plus brefs délais”. Le ministère de la Santé devrait adapter la capacité de ses morgues se trouvant dans les zones frontalières à ce phénomène, estime-t-il.

      Par ailleurs, la PNPM nourrit un doute quant à la volonté des fonctionnaires locaux de procéder à l’identification de ces morts. Dans son rapport, elle suppose que les agents de l’autorité ne font pas assez, par conviction, peut-être, que cette mission relève de “l’impossible”. “La victime est considérée comme ‘juste’ un migrant”, souligne le coordinateur de la plateforme, appelant le ministère de l’Intérieur à mener des enquêtes internes pour s’en assurer. “Il faut s’assurer si ce n’est pas l’attitude des fonctionnaires locaux envers les migrants, liée à leur origine ou à la manière dont ils sont décrits par les politiciens et parfois les médias comme ‘un groupe’ qui est à l’origine du faible taux d’identification”.

      https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/entry/les-autorites-marocaines-appelees-a-identifier-les-migrants-decedes