• Des analyses critiques du documentaire Un pays qui se tient sage de David Dufresne
    https://ricochets.cc/Des-analyses-critiques-du-documentaire-Un-pays-qui-se-tient-sage-de-David-

    Deux articles proposent des critiques et remarques très intéressantes et constructives à propos du film documentaire de David Dufresne : [Un cinéma qui se tient sage >https://lundi.am/Un-cinema-qui-se-tient-sage] - Une critique cinématographique du film de David Dufresne - Un pays qui se tient sage de David Dufresne tient l’affiche, des séances partout – au cinéma public de Montreuil ; au cinéma indépendant d’art et d’essai du quartier latin comme au MK2 Bastille ou au Gaumont des fauvettes – tout le (...) #Les_Articles

    / #Violences_policières, Vidéos, films...

    #Vidéos,_films...
    https://lundi.am/Un-cinema-qui-se-tient-sage
    https://paris-luttes.info/a-propos-du-documentaire-un-pays-14399
    https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC7PN7TtA8u-XoKU4M1joCCA
    https://ricochets.cc/IMG/distant/html/watchv8x7tzi64e9-c518023.html

    • Je suis heureux de voir sur grand écran ces images de manif – ces images des luttes autant que cette lutte pour les images – leur place est au cinéma. Si je suis critique envers ce film, je reste admiratif qu’il pose la question d’une lutte populaire comme celle des Gilets-Jaunes et d’une autre, celle des vidéos amateurs dans le champ de l’image. Avec ces films, bons ou mauvais, qui prennent à bras le corps le monde actuel et les formes qu’il produit, le cinéma redevient politique (et plus seulement un produit culturel) parce qu’il recrée du commun et c’est au moins l’intérêt de ce film que de se proposer comme support d’un commun – un an et demi de lutte intense et des milliers d’images youtube.

      Immédiatement, lorsque le cinéma est commun, la critique redevient primordiale et tout simplement possible. Il devient possible et intéressant de discuter d’un film comme Un pays qui se tient sage. Et pas seulement probable mais nécessaire car il s’agit avec ce film de débattre d’au moins deux problématiques majeures : que faire des images « amateur » des violences policières et quel est le lien entre ces images et quelque chose qui s’appellerait le cinéma ? Et par ailleurs, à qui donner la parole, comment documenter une lutte ?

      #film #cinéma #politique #police #violences_policière #image #critique

  • Les parapluies du Perthus. La #Retirada et les paradoxes de la #visibilité

    Malgré sa force évocatrice, le caractère iconique de l’image documentaire fait parfois ombrage à une partie de la mémoire des événements. Les photographies de l’#exil espagnol en #France à la fin des années 1930 en témoignent, il faut savoir épuiser le visible pour saisir une réalité plus enfouie de cet épisode. L’historienne Marianne Amar se confronte à cet exercice et propose une relecture de quatre images de la Retirada.

    Il pleuvait ce jour-là au #col_du_Perthus, mais la #mémoire n’en a rien gardé. Les photographies de l’exil espagnol en France — près de cinq cent mille réfugiés au début de 1939, à la fin de la guerre civile — construisent, par leur abondance, un continent visuel au croisement des #iconographies de la #guerre et de l’exil. Ce territoire sans cesse redessiné par des #images retrouvées, constitue un corpus labile, patiemment édifié par des photographes aux trajectoires multiples. Les uns, comme #Robert_Capa ou #David_Seymour, ont affûté leur vision en Espagne, pendant la guerre. Ils arrivent à la #frontière dans le sillage des #réfugiés, ne restent que quelques jours mais produisent des #icônes. D’autres, comme #Auguste_Chauvin, travaillent à #Perpignan. Ils assistent à l’événement depuis la France et en rendent compte dans la diversité de ses lieux et de ses acteurs. Les derniers, enfin, comme #Augusti_Centelles, photographe de l’armée républicaine espagnole interné à son arrivée, en sont à la fois les protagonistes et les témoins.

    Pourtant, en dépit de cette abondance, ce corpus demeure travaillé par l’#invisibilité. Manquent les images « absentes », perdues ou détruites dans la tourmente qui va suivre. Mais l’invisibilité se cache aussi dans les replis de la photographie, qu’il faut questionner et « inquiéter » pour en révéler toute la puissance documentaire. Les images les plus connues de la Retirada fonctionnent comme des icônes, qui construisent un répertoire visuel désormais bien balisé : la « #vague » des réfugiés saisie frontalement au col du Perthus ; l’empilement des armes confisquées aux soldats ; les femmes et les enfants harassés ; les réfugiés encadrés par des gendarmes ; les #camps d’internement improvisés, puis structurés autour des marques de l’ordre — #barbelés, #baraques, #miradors. Autant d’archétypes qui assurent durablement la #mise_en_spectacle du réfugié, mais qu’il faut mettre en doute pour dévoiler ce qui reste invisible. On proposera, pour esquisser une méthode, quatre exercices de relecture.

    Le premier constitue une mise en abyme de l’image et de son auteur. Robert Capa arrive à #Argelès, en mars 1939, passablement abattu. Il avait quitté les exilés juste avant l’ouverture de la frontière ; il revient pour un reportage sur les #camps_d’internement. Sa position a changé. Il n’est plus le témoin engagé aux côtés des combattants, mais un visiteur qui doit solliciter autorisations et accréditations. Distance accrue par sa position personnelle : apatride, bientôt « indésirable » pour l’administration française, il pense rejoindre sa famille déjà installée à New York. « Ici, le moral est mauvais et je ne sais pas ce qui va se passer. », a-t-il confié à sa mère début février. Entre Argelès et #Le_Barcarès, Capa prend, à sa manière, congé de l’Espagne et son portrait d’un réfugié, violon à la main, ressemble fort à un autoportrait du photographe, qu’il faut relire au travers de sa biographie, inquiet et d’une infinie mélancolie.

    Retour à la frontière. Une photographie publiée par L’Illustration en février 1939 montre un groupe sur la route du #col_d’Arès. Deux enfants et un adulte cheminent difficilement, tous trois mutilés, entourés d’un autre homme et d’un adolescent. Rien ne permet alors de les identifier, mais quelle importance ? Cadrés d’assez près, privés de détails contextuels, ils incarnent les « désastres de la guerre » et l’image prend ainsi une portée universelle. Or, deux enquêtes menées dans les années 2000 permettent de la relire autrement. Avancent côte à côte, et sur deux rangs, Mariano Gracia et ses trois enfants. À leurs côtés, marche Thomas Coll, un Français ancien combattant de 14-18, lui aussi mutilé, venu en voisin soutenir et accompagner les réfugiés. S’incarne donc ici, dans le silence de l’image, des gestes ordinaires de solidarité, qui viennent nuancer les représentations d’une France hostile et xénophobe.

    Le camp de #Bram, saisi par Augusti Centelles à hauteur d’interné, brouille également les évidences. Autorisé à conserver son matériel et à photographier à l’intérieur des barbelés, il tient boutique dans une baraque, vend ses tirages aux gendarmes et bénéficie de l’aide logistique du commandant. Tous les internés ne furent pas, bien sûr, logés à pareille enseigne. Mais les images de Centelles, leurs conditions de production et les comptes minutieusement tenus dans son journal révèlent que la photographie fut, pour lui, un instrument de survie et contribuent à mettre en lumière, dans une chronologie fine, les sociabilités complexes dans les camps de la République.

    À Perpignan, Auguste Chauvin fournit la presse, surtout locale, et, pour des événements d’importance, il tire et vend des séries de cartes postales. Il fera ainsi un « Album souvenir de l’exode espagnole » (sic) légendé en deux langues. Dans sa chronique quotidienne de la Retirada, Chauvin révèle des présences et des moments ignorés : les #soldats_coloniaux, mobilisés pour surveiller les réfugiés, caracolant sur la plage d’Argelès à côté de leur campement ; les forces franquistes arrivées au #Perthus et fêtant leur victoire ; les réfugiés passant la frontière de nuit ; la visite d’Albert Sarraut, ministre de l’Intérieur.

    Les photographies de Chauvin n’ont pas la puissance des icônes, mais elles en sont l’indispensable contrepoint. Nulle dimension héroïque dans ses cadrages et ses compositions : Chauvin reste à bonne distance des réfugiés sans jamais faire corps avec l’exil. Mais avec ces images banales, parfois maladroites, il les dépouille, par instants, d’une identité de réfugié et les réintègre dans une vie ordinaire. Attendre devant le bureau de change ou ceux de la douane ; faire halte pour manger, en uniforme, sur le bord de la route ; aller aux nouvelles à l’entrée d’une baraque ; regarder la mer. Et sortir un parapluie pour s’abriter d’une averse au Perthus.

    http://icmigrations.fr/2020/10/08/defacto-022-04

    #photographie #histoire #guerre_d'Espagne

    ping @albertocampiphoto

  • Open-source #satellite data to investigate #Xinjiang concentration camps

    The second part of this series discusses techniques on how to analyse a dire human rights situation in and around Xinjiang’s re-education and detention facilities.

    A pressing need to investigate characteristics of Xinjiang’s detention camps

    The story has been widely covered. Calls by human rights advocates to define China’s practices as ‘genocide’ grow louder. Hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims detained in internment camps. Many still are.

    “Inmates undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them into secular and loyal supporters of the party”, the New York Times wrote and published documents that unmistakably prove a dire human rights situation in the west of China.

    First China denied the camps ever existed. Then the Chinese consulate doesn’t bother anymore to play a smoke and mirror game and admits: “Xinjiang has set up vocational education and training centres in order to root out extreme thoughts…”. Their purpose: ‘compulsory programs for terrorist criminals’.

    Now, the language changed again. China’s President said the ‘strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct.’

    Unacceptable (and unwise) of some to deny it. Social media commentators, some who are frequently quoted by large media organisations, keep casting doubt on the tragic story. Margaret_Kimberley tweeted — after an ITV news report emerged — “These are lies. There is no evidence of Uighur concentration camps. More hybrid war against China” (it received 2,000 likes).

    While there is no room left to doubt that these camps do exist, there remains vast uncertainty whether investigative journalists and human rights advocates located all facilities spread out across the province.

    Researchers/journalists who made it their beat to find them, like Nathan Ruser at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), says “we don’t believe that we have found them all”, after posting 380 facilities online.

    Germany’s chancellor last week said China’s President Xi offered delegates to send envoys to visit Xinjiang province [and camps] to see for themselves. Chances increase to see more of the so-called ‘show camps’ for a short period of time or as long as the visits take (the BBC encountered it when it visited last time). Xi also ensured that there will be an ‘ongoing human-rights dialogue’. But Ursula von der Leyen tweeted “a lot remains to be done .. in other chapters of our relations”.

    Satelite investigations exposing more and more evidence. OSINT journalists rely on them. It’s one reason why some open-source intelligence journalism colleagues keep hearing rumours that some of the camps may have moved underground (e.g. detention in under-surface facilities) to hide from the spying eyes and scrutiny of satellite data analysts (we don’t have proof for this thesis but I encourage you to reach out if you have evidence).
    Mounting number of facilities

    The number of confirmed facilities steadily grew. A 2018 BBC investigation looked at 101 campsites, which got pinpointed via various media reports and academic research, the author says.

    Most recently, Buzzfeed investigated 268 compounds, many from previous lists I worked on too. In February, the list of ‘confirmed re-education camps’, so lower-security sites, mainly for indoctrination purposes, was limited to mere 50 facilities. ‘Confirmed’ in this context means they have been validated by eye-witness reports. Back then, there were another 170 that had yet to be confirmed.

    It is of vital importance to keep this investigation rolling. This means to forensically document the changes in these camps and to spend more time on characterizing each detail. ASPI just dropped a new list and we are going to work with that one instead of the original 50 we received (the list can be downloaded here and geodata that can be simply dragged and dropped into QGIS and Google Earth Pro, it is available here).

    Finally, news broke via Reuters (and research by Adrian Zenz) that evidence of forced labour is mounting also in Tibet (we will look into this later, too).
    List of ‘expanded camps’ extended

    Earlier in the year US-based Uighure group ETNAM shared a list with around 50 confirmed sites. We and others scrutinised this list on increased activity on the ground via aggregated satellite remote sensing data (link). The list was shared as klm. file. It helped enormously with going through them one by one. All the coordinates as well as the Chinese names of the places are accessible via Google Earth Pro. Now that ASPI dropped a new list with coordinates and updated 2020 records, some of the work we have started can be extended and match.

    Because we are most interested in the camps that got expanded (so buildings or features were added), we will concentrate on the list of facilities that were developed. It includes a list of 61 sites.

    Why is the onus on expanded camps? In addition to the characteristics ASPI added as classifiers, the extended camps might tell us where the local administration invests and where forced labour in the firm of Uighur prisoners went. We added a few more details for each facility that we thought was worth looking at (see sheet above).
    We will go through various ways to characterise/investigate facilities and their surroundings

    First significant markers includes the size of the camps. That includes quantitative details such as the number of buildings on the premise and adjacent to it. We will go through how to compare them. There are the walls of camps that are usually quite straight-lined. Their height, which we will define and validate, and the walls’ thickness may tell us something about recent developments (e.g. how secure the sites are, or were meant to be).

    Guard towners are also a quantifiable element. ASPI and others counted them. Because they can be seen from outside they may act as a signal to local residents. That is also likely the reason why those facilities that have some or all of their towers removed recently tend to locate closer to residential buildings (see my stats below).

    These changes are further revealing as they may tell us something about how the local government in various parts of the region varied in their response to international pressure (or not, by keeping them in place). ‘A lot [camps] had their security features removed in the second half of 2019’, Zenz explained. Some remained in place (important to add here, it remains doubtful that conditions improved inside of the camps, even if towers or security features were removed).

    Zenz has an explanation for some of the changes: “On the same time they invited all these delegations and visitors, they released a lot of people. If you release a lot of people, you can afford to run with fewer security features. That can still be run like an internment camp, I’m sure”. We will look closer at what has changed ourselves.

    Including those features above, there are a number of other aspects to take into account. We put them into the list below — each will be discussed separately:

    What blue factory buildings in and around camps can tell us
    What typical ‘prison features’ tell us
    What cars in parking lots tell us about personnel working at the facilities during Covid-19
    What walls can tell us
    What guard towers can tell us
    What sports facilities can tell us
    What the shapes/types of buildings and location can tell us
    What agricultural space (e.g. fields) around the camps can tell us
    What potential crematory sites reveal
    What Xinjiang’s export tell us
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment and surveillance
    What Baidu maps can tell us

    Blue-roofed factory buildings

    In satellite images, they are very pronounced with their blue coating. They may also heat up in the summer.

    Most of them are factory buildings, has been reported. You can see them added in and around camp facilities, whether they are low or high security premises.

    We can quantify them by counting them or via quantifying the space they take up. ASPIT decided to count them, though some buildings are smaller and other are massive. Google Earth has a polygon area measuring tool. A third option is to write a statistical model to calculate square meters factory floor space. If you are lazy you can consult a service that helps you with that via a visual detection algorithm — it calculates the area and records the number of blue roof buildings for a given satellite image.

    One of the camps that expanded in the past two years is the tier 1 low-security re-education facility in Bugur in Bayingolu (41.808855284.3005783). It has a dense network of factory buildings nearby (around 23) and within its own walls there are eight. We used ASPI’s data to confirm this that noted: ‘considerable room for expansion’.

    Let’s run the classification system over it and classify how much blue-roofed buildings that scatter around the camp can we count (importantly not all are factory spaces but many will be).

    On the AI model: I downloaded the images with their highest resolution from Google Earth. To make the image a bit clearer for the model, I adjusted the brightness, upped the contrast and tinkered with the exposure. We can see the blue buildings, roughly in a radius of 1.5 to 2 miles (see image), account for about 1,464.9 m² (0.15ha). The number of little blue buildings expanded considerably since 2014 where they accounted for 1,022m2 (0.10 ha) — sadly we only have an image for 2014 and one for 2019.

    Short intersection on the availability of images available in Google Earth:

    Some of the important images to document the progression of these camps are missing. Some camps have a mere handful of publically available images (as in the case above). This is appalling and private satellite image companies need to be nudged to make more images public. Especially for the latest developments, this is urgently needed. Researchers noted down the latest dates for which images are available at the time of writing. Below we see them grouped by months, and then by facility category (tier 1 to 4).

    What about bias to provide fewer updates on higher-security facilities? We don’t have much to go in here (there is no direct evidence that western satellite companies are being pressured into not publishing their images for camps on Google). Despite only a few camps that didn’t get updated at all over the past two years, we can see at the time of writing that Google and others hold more images for lower tier facilities (1 and 2) than for higher-security facilities (tier 3 and 4):

    Continuing on the factories, another example is the facility in Maralbeshi County (39°49’7.84"N, 78°31’4.37"E). It was erected around 2017/2018. In Google Earth, you can see how the blue-roofed buildings surround the internment complex. Note, how the larger blue factory complexes to the left and right were there before the camp was erected.

    In other words, the camp was planned and embedded into existing factory operation. It further corroborates a thesis that factory work by prisoners (in the form of forced labour), was part of a grander plan all along (though, to be certain, looking at satellite images alone does not suffice).

    Adrain Zenz thinks blue roof factories is something that warrants looking into in more detail. A bunch of these blue roof factory building were erected in 2018, especially in the second half. Zenz explains it’s important timing because the policy documents on forced labour, as explained in his post from last December, shows that a lot of this kind of policy was released in the first half or mid of 2018.

    A recent Buzzfeed investigation did mention blue roofs but surprisingly didn’t pay more attention to the matter. The factories grow in importance as the forced labour of imprisoned groups is being increasingly ‘commercialised’.

    ASPI’s data recorded the distance (measured in km I assume) between the 380 facilitates and the local/nearest industrial parks — where some of the forced labour could have moved to put to work. The data categorizes facilities in four areas of security (ranging from Tier 1= re-education camp to Tier 4= prison facility). Tear two and tier three camps tend to be located more closely to the industrial centre of the towns, the data suggests (see chart below):

    Zenz adds: “what’s significant is the sudden increase of blue roof, single story, flat type factory buildings. It’s consistent with policy, and also release, the Karakax list also talks about people being released into forced labour. A lot of that took place in 2019.”

    The blue metal barracks found in Dabancheng shining light yellow in the sentinel IR images as they are being reflected. Low res Sentinel 2 data also suggests that these metal-like structures in the south of the Payzawat camp (Payzawat County, 39.538372, 76.713606) may also heat up in the summer. SWIR (short-wave infrared imagery) and NIR can be used for heat monitoring.

    Prisons features: camps that imprisoned people become more ‘secure’ not less:

    Among the around 60 camps that have expanded recently, half of it are tier 3 or tier 4 facilities —detention centers and prisons with high security features.

    While it is true that some camps removed some of the towers and other security features (labelled ‘desecuritisation’ by ASPI’s records), others increased theirs. Those happened to be facilities that are detention centres and prison. In the context that Chinese authorities moved prisoners to these more secure facilities with less transparency and harsher treatments, this is cause for concern.

    Let’s look at an example. From the list of expanded camps, there is the camps Yarkant Facility in the Kashgar prefecture (38.351531177.3055467). Since 2018, we saw a nearly 10,000 m2 large factory compound built (compare images from 5/8/2018 with 1/21/2018). Then, a year later, watch downers got added. There are now 8 towners. For such a small facility that’s quite conspicuous. The reason it’s a high-security prison facility.

    Newly built detention/prison facilities created between 2018 and 2020 are of special interest. Camps like the tier 3 (detention) camp of Sanji Facility (#3, 44.102764,86.9960751), a with several watchtowers and an external wall is important as we can follow the progression of each step of the building process with high-resolution images.

    The location was probably chosen because of a lower-security area nearby, north of the facility (3/7/2018). Building must have started in the summer. A couple of months after the last shot (8/11/2018) the blue-roofed factory gets built-in the north-west of the camp (a reason to assume a direct relationship there) and within two weeks in August the main building takes shape. At the same time, the walls get erected and we can make out the layout of the facility with its heavy concrete structures.

    We can see, those are fundamentally different from building built in other lower-security camps. Then two months later it’s almost completed.

    The speed of building is noteworthy (better trackable if we had access to a more continuous stream of images). From the few images we have above and those from Sentinel 2, below, we can assume that it took the developers between three to four months in pure building time to pull it up — an astonishing pace. China is renowned for its fast building pace. For many other areas, such as coal plants and artificial island-building its cookie-cutter approach — where blueprints are being re-used over and over again - it permits building more quickly.

    Other who looked at the situation in Xinjiang reported that many Uighurs held in lower-tier facilities could have been moved/transferred to higher-tier prisons. In other words, despite some re-education camps have experienced ‘de-securitisation’, half of the camps that expanded are higher security facilities, so tier 3 (detention) or tier 4 (prison) camp facilities.

    What parking lots tell us about the camps during Covid-19

    I believe this topic has largely remained unexplored. Busy parking lots are one way to tell how many staff members are on site. Especially interesting it this for the recent month that were affected by coronavirus. We dont know much about the conditions inside of the facilities.

    But with fewer staff members around (and fewer visitors allowed — previous reporting has revealed that detention centres have ‘small visitor centres’), the lives of inmates may have worsened. There was some reporting that Covid-19 cases spiralled in the province of Xinjiang and some expressed concern that cases could spread within camps. It’s possible, no doubt. With only a few cases in the whole region, though, the risk is lower.

    Pandemic related fears may have affected the material and food supply. Sick imprisoned detainees may go without healthcare treatment for weeks or months. All these are assumptions for which we have little evidence. But the possibility alone raises concerns. If it is true that prisoners remained in the facilities during Covid, they could have suffered from the absence of staff and proper care.

    From satellite images, it is hard to know — though there is some evidence from an eyewitness account shared by a historian, a Georgetown professor on his Medium page.

    We might be able to tell how many temporary people were on sites (those that use their car to leave for the night). Counting vehicles at nearby car parks is one way.

    At some facilities, we can clearly see the parking lot. An example is Ghulja City (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). It’s a fairly large car park. We can use Picterra system (there is a 10 day free trial version) to check the satellite images for May 23 — thought there isn’t much to count, the car park is empty.

    Seven months earlier, on October 24th of 2019, we count around 120 cars (with some false positives, but that’s good enough for us). The algo gives you a count so you don’t have to count the red boxes one by one. Once trained, we can run it on subsequent images.

    Let’s walk you through how to train and count the cars. I simplify here (a more complete tutorial can be found here and in their platform). First, we use one of the images to train the algorithm on the cars in the car park. Then we run it on the other pictures. It’s neat and simple (and quick if you don’t have time to run your own statistical model in python).

    The number of vehicles dropped during the heights of Covid-19.

    We could do this for other confirmed location such as the facility in Chochek City (Tǎchéng Shì, 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E) where car numbers dropped in April. We see this in many other facilities (for those that expanded).

    Hotan City Facility #1 (37.1117019, 79.9711546) with 81 cars in the parking lot at the end of 2019 dropped to 10 during the height of the pandemic. Similar developments have been perceived at Hotan County Facility 1 (37.2420734 79.8595074), Ghulja Facility 1 (43.9756437 81.5009539) and a number of others.
    Calculating rooms and capacity

    How many people fit in a facility. If we take the example of the re-education camp in Chochek City ( 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E), we have high res Google images for the end of March and end of April of 2020. We can see the thin middle part is three stories high and in earlier images (Jul 18, 19) we can see the southern part is four stories high. In 2018, we got an image of the foundation when it was built. This provides enough detail to calculate that the facility has around 367 rooms — for the total t-shaped building with the arms.

    –—

    –—

    In the example above, we shouldn’t be too sure that alls detainees were kept in the facility during Covid. Some reports claim that some of the other lower security re-education centres kept people ‘only during the day for indoctrination classes’ (it’s certainly different for the high-security prison facility that is also on the premise of the Payzawat facility, see in the south, with their towers).

    Comparing camp sizes

    The total size of the camps matters, especially when they get extended. Most of the camps have clear wall frames build around them. It’s one of the most important and simple characteristics. The wall frames makes it relatively easy to draw shapes in your geolocation system of choice (the sheer size of the walls, might be less ideal to gauge the number of prisoners).

    Some have vast empty space in between might suggest that other faculty sections or factory buildings are due to be added. Some are cramped with building.

    Tracing and calculating the area of wall frames in Google Earth for some of the largest camps, we get what we already knew:

    To emulate the work ASPI’s data was posted here. A number of track and trace tutorials for Google Earth (one here on measuring property space) are available on YouTube.
    Staking out camp size:

    The Qariqash County/قاراقاش ناھىيىسى‎ /墨玉县(Mòyù Xiàn, 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E) sits in the South of the large stretch of desert.

    We use the polygon tool in Google Earth to stake out the clearly marked walls. You usually end up with a rectangle. Under measurements (right-click on the item) you can see the perimeter is around 1.65 km and the area is roughly 16.7 hectares (0.17 square km).

    Now we can compare it with another one on the list, the camp in Aqsu City (41°11’27.12"N, 80°16’25.08"E). It’s markedly smaller, with a perimeter of 1.1km and only an area of 5.65 hectares. There are other ways to do this in QGIS, a geoinformation system more efficiently.
    What can walls and towers tell us?

    How tall are walls at some of the camps? The answer varies across the vast variety of facilities. Height may tell us something about who built the camp and the level of security. It’s unsurprising to find different heights at different camps built by different planners.

    Where we don’t have shades available, we can check the two images above and reference them with the people in the image and define the height this way. Another standard way to calculate height is using the shades by the walls and towers and calculate the height via Google Earth and SunCalc.

    The shade of the southern wall in the satellite image from 03/19/2020 for the Dabancheng camp is around 7.62 meters long. The towers on the southern wall for those dates result in a height of around ~8meters.

    But the images in the Reuters shots look different. That’s why they were taken a year or two earlier. Satellite images from 4/22/2018 show clearly the octagonal shapes of the tower shades. If we calculate again, the shade of the tower is around 9 meters long, translating into around 14 meters in height.

    We do this for the wall as well. What we find is that, although the towers disappeared (though, some are still there, just not protruding so visibly), the only thing that really changed is the height of the walls — now around 13.5m tall, compared with 9.5m in 2018. The same towners, removed from one Dabancheng camp, then re-emerged half a kilometre south-east at the other newly built one (2019).

    Why are we even bothering measuring height? On one hand we want to answer how security changed across the camps. Are walls getting higher? Do they change in their layout. It helps to classify the type of camps. The higher the walls, the more secure they probably were meant to be. Higher wall might mean higher chance that prisoners are held at facilities over night. It also may help to disprove claims by XJ denialists.

    We can verify the Suncalc analysis with images. Cherchen County, for which we reviewed images for 12/14/19 shows roughly the same height. Explainer how to measure the height of an object from satellite image available here and here.

    The number of press images of the camps is limited. Most are by Reuters or AFP/Badung Police. It is this one here (37°14’29.78"N, 79°51’35.00"E). More local street footage, though not of camps, might be obtainable via Mapillary.

    Buildings shapes/outlines and location of camps

    Let’s start with the location of the facilities first. ASPI recorded the type of security for its 380 odd facilities, and for many the distance to populated areas such as residential buildings. When local administration planned on where to place the facilities they might have taken into account how the neighbouring public should (or shouldn’t) perceived them. More secluded camps are more hidden from public scrutiny. Those near people’s homes or schools may be placed there to have the opposite effect.

    What’s immediately apparent when running a few inferential statistics on the records is that the more secure detention centres tend to be kept further away from buzzing residential areas — meaning, further away than for instance Tier 1 re-education camps, which are often nestled between residential parts of cities, or occupying old schools.

    Agriculture/fields around the camps — investigating forced labour by detainees

    Identifying agricultural fields near or around facilities may reveal some potential aspects of how forced labour in the camps were used in close vicinity.

    Especially for secluded faculties, with not much else urban life going on (so reducing the possibility that other local farmers were involved in working the them), the chance increases that Uighurs detained were used.

    One example is the facility near Yingye’ercun, in Gulja, with a 0.16km2 large campground (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). The farming area that was developed since 2018 (shortly after the multistorey buildings was built in the core of the facility) spans 1.7km2 and is clearly marked (which includes the facility itself, see in red below).

    In other words, once the camp was built the fields surrounding it got worked and developed— unlikely to be only a convenient coincident. The nearby factory complex was also extended.

    Often it warrant also checking with Sentinel 2 images on EO browser. In this case, it’s useful because it allows us to visualise agricultural development via its invisible light remote sensing capabilities. Additional bands (which Google images lack) give access to the invisible spectrum and shows the agricultural expansion (here shown in red via the false colour composite, commonly used to assess plant density and health, “since plants reflect near-infrared and green light, while they absorb red”. Exposed ground are grey or tan, vegetation is red).
    Image for post

    Another camp in this regard is the Maralbeshi Facility (#6) in Kashgar (39.7406222 78.0115086) with lots of fields surrounding it.

    Why is the forced labour aspect in Xinjiang’s agriculture so important in this debate? For one, it’s part of the human rights abuse that more and more governments and industry leaders recognise (such as Swedish company H&M, who profited from cotton supplies and other kinds within their supply chain). Some decided to cut ties with suppliers in the region. It may the answer for the short term. In the long run, western businesses much apply pressure to get suppliers on their own to dissuade local forced labour practices (see example on ads that emerged to sell Uighur forced labour online).

    According to the ILO Forced Labour Convention from 1930, forced or compulsory labour is defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily’.
    Sports grounds: (basketball and other sports courts)

    Some found value in observing their development. BBC’s John Sudworth found that just before a press tour organised for his press teams two years ago the appearance of recreational areas altered. In some of the places they were taken to, satellite images and the internal security fencing — and what looked like watchtowers- where taken down shortly before the tours for journalists began. Specifically on sports grounds, they noticed that empty exercise yards have been transformed into sports facilities.

    The reporters asked: if the journalists have been presented with mere ‘show camps’, what may this say about the places they were not taken to. Sport facilities are quite easy to spot from satellite. The BBC travelled to Kaxgar in the very east of the region, about 100km south of Kazakhstan’s border. Their footages shows how the camp put up courts shortly before the press trip. But they didn’t last long. We found evidence that these very courts disappeared again in early 2020 (see below).

    In one of the camps in Qariqash (37°15’32.54"N, 79°44’52.08"E) the sports facilities were made unavailable as recently as July. Now big brown sheets, what looks like blankets with knobs on them, cover them. Those have never appeared on satellite images before and extend to the soccer field in the north and the big parking lot next to the sports courts.

    I have mixed feelings about recreational activities. We must strongly doubt that they benefit people held for indoctrination. So are they only a smoke and mirror game to show the friendliness of re-educational camps? Or are they actually benefiting the imprisoned? It is hard to say. In recent time, they are more likely to be added than removed. In around 37 facilities on the ASPI list basketball courts, running tracks or other sports fields were noted to have been added or extended.

    When we compare the average distance of residential building for these places (1.2km) with the average distance of all the places where we have a record on the distance to buildings (1.8km), we find the recreational activities might be used as an element to signal the locals that the facilities have those recreational features.

    Dabancheng has one court in the western block and a number of other ones in the centre part. In the eastern wing, there is nothing. We haven’t got any further high res satellite images on Dabancheng (other than those until March 2020, that leaves only checking Sentinel 2 images or commercial images).

    I am going to stop here. The analysis of recreational areas yielded rather little, for me and the folks at ASPI. “I don’t think the sports grounds mean much in the detention regime”, Nathan Ruser says. If you have more info do reach out or leave a comment.
    Crematories

    The New York Times followed the lead of findings (that emerged last year, also mentioned in the state.gov report) and check the extent of description of religious sites and burial grounds. In September, the team reported that ‘thousands of religious sites’, such as mosques, shrines and other sites were bulldozed or replaced.

    As many burial grounds disappeared and people within camps families have never heard from again, the question of how Uighurs’ life proceeded became more pressing. Crematories may be one aspect. Some anecdotal evidence by a source spoke of a nascent growth of crematory sites in the areas near camps. This appears important in the context of how prisoners are treated in facilities and what happens if they die and at what rates.

    High prevalence of tuberculosis in facilities worries insiders. TB is spread via droplets through the air by someone who is infected. It’s especially deadly when the immune system of those who caught it, can’t cope with it. With the conditions reported by some of the eyewitnesses, it is feasible that the hard conditions prisoners are being subjected to, could enhance the deadliness of TB.

    The think tank which produced a previous list of facilities searched and found a handful of crematories (I don’t think they concluded the research and it continues, perhaps with your help of OSINT research).

    The reason why crematories are of interest is that Uighur are Muslim, Muslims don’t burn the bodies of their dead. They bury them (creation is strictly forbidden). Seeing more crematories pop up might be a first clue on whether dead bodies from detention facilities are being burned. We have to stress here, we have to be extremely careful with drawing quick conclusions, the base of evidence is thin. One would need to check local statistics and cross-examine them with other data source.

    We will concentrate only on the sites itself. The ‘unconfirmed sample of crematory’ consists of ten sites. These are listed below. Just a word of warning. Feel free to investigate them further — either via additional satellite footage or on-site visits. Nonetheless, these get us started. The first three are confirmed by eyewitness accounts or local records (as far as I was told, this is sadly only secondary research).

    Cr_Gholja_01 (Existed, 44° 0’17.86"N, 81°13’40.43"E); Cr_Artush_01(Existed, 39°44’35.47"N, 76°12’7.49"E); Urumchi 2 Funeral Parlor (Existed, 43°54’55.20"N; 87°36’9.01"E)

    Cri_Hotan01_(Suspected)
    Cr_Artush_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Hotan_02(Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01(Suspected)
    CrArtush_02 (Suspected)

    Now let’s take a look at the characteristics of the confirmed crematories. They have some distinctive shapes, including a rectangular architecture, walls or a treeline that fence the premises (framed in black). Where marked ‘burial grounds’, I was unable to confirm this but checked with a few other sites mentioned in the coverage that was exposed in 2019 and it looked similar (in short, more time needs to be spent on this).

    What helped the researchers identify the confirmed ones? According to the source, the Chinese called them ‘burial management facilities’. It’s apparently a euphuism for ‘crematories’. The Chinese government bulldozed some burial grounds with the justification that they would take up too much space which was covered in the 2019 reporting.

    The other aspect is whether relatives receive the body of loved ones that die in the camps. Salih Hudayar (now Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile) says he had a relative who died in a facility (he don’t know whether in the camps or the prison) and his family was not able to have his body returned. He thinks that many other Uighurs have not had the body of a deceased family members returned to them. He assumes they are being cremated as no record exists of a burial site.

    More crematories are only possible if you have employees who staff and run them. The Chinese government tried to find those employees online. “We assume they are being cremated because the government ran job ads and offering high salaries to work on these [crematory] sites”, he added.

    The suspected crematory facilities were then modelled upon the layout of the existing/confirmed ones — e.g. compared with buildings in and around the area. “We found a couple, but we are not 100% sure”, the source admits. Here OSINT journalists could become useful (let me know if you have intel on this matter to follow up with).

    On the description in 2019: evidence surfaced that 45 Uighur cemeteries have been destroyed since 2014, including 30 in just the past two years (research was carried out by AFP and satellite imagery by Earthrise Alliance, here reported by the SCMP).
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment

    Salih Hudayar explained that what worries him is that population statistics don’t square. An often-cited figure of 7 million Uighurs in the province is much lower than the official estimates of the Uighur people.

    The number often used is 12 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs. The number could be higher. Especially in the villages — Uighurs are allowed to have only three kids — some families have more than that and don’t register their offspring, as a result, many kids lack birth certificates. Other figures on the number of Uighur population is much taller (larger than twice of the 12 million figure, but remains hard to confirm that. The closes figure the Chinese government will have internally after the government’s extensive and invasive security and surveillance campaigns, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices).

    The rising number of orphanages and kindergartens is also of interest. A satellite and local administrative data analysis should track them. The premise here: the more aggressive the detention of families are in XJ (moving Uighurs from low to higher security facilities), demand for places that house children increases. More orphanages and child-caring facilities could be revealed.
    What can exports tell us about forced labour?

    The type of exports of a region can help to figures out what to look for when it comes to forced labour. Increasingly, the international textile and fashion industry wakes up to reputational damage if supply chains incorporate Xinjiang forced labour. EU leaders held a meeting with China’s president Xi last week where Xi ‘rejected’ foreign [political] meddling in his nation’s affairs. But businesses have more leverage. Xinjiang is busy trading with foreign powers. The Chinese province accounted for a large part of the world’s supply in cotton. Exports amounted to $19.3bn according to export documents (export data for the west of China can be found in China’s official data stats, Stats.gov.cn, customs.gov.cn, or mofcom — this might be useful. Comparing what the government reports and what’s happening on the ground might reveal discrepancies, as it did before).

    Exports (to Europe, across the silk road to the west) is directly connected at A busy train station connecting to the neighbouring country of Kazakstan in the northeast (the export route is called Ala Pass. A short promotional video here). Given the rebound of the Chinese economy, the shipments/trainloads must have increased in May after the effects of the pandemic subsided. What’s unclear is to what extent and whether that matches what the government said.

    Satellite images might reveal discrepancies when train containers at the Dzungarian Gate (the Dzungarian Alatau mountain range along the border between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) are analysed. It’s the main connection between China and the west.

    The main railway station in Xinjiang for the Alataw pass is the Alashankou railway station (situated here: 45°10′13″N 82°34′13″E). It’s the last resort for export containers before entering Kazakhstan.

    OSINT journalists may be able to gauge Xinjiang export traffic by counting the number of containers on rail tracks. It might be laborious effort, not sure if it yields anything.

    More useful would it be to monitor the use of agriculture and factories in the nearby vicinity of camps, as shown before. Or perhaps they can be linked up.
    Baidu maps: Checking what the Chinese tech companies are ‘hiding’:

    The Chinese government may have little interest to showcase their human-rights violations which they deem as justified (Xi’s statement). Satellite images on Baidu Maps show maps that hide most of the facility. What to make of it? Google Earth lets you upload so-called ‘overlays’. If you stretch them to the right size you can compare the uploaded screenshot (we took from Baidu) with those present in Google Earth. For Tumshuq City/تۇمشۇق شەھىرى/图木舒克市(Túmùshūkè Shì) (39°54’40.02"N, 79° 1’26.09"E), see below.

    Why is Baidu’s involvement increasing relevant? On one hand, it is important to see the connection between private sector companies and the government. Chinese satellites are able to update and provide high-resolution images to the maps on Baidu. But they don’t. We had a similar debate on Twitter, that some government used to press companies to blur our images. But because images are available on other platforms ‘unblurred’, the practice was largely discontinued (there are still examples but they are getting fewer). One reason is that if a blurred area appears, it signals others to be extra vigilant and look out for other images. Instead, what increasing happens is that companies with private satellite are ordered not to release them (read more about the debate here).

    Baidu map’s decision to not show images on certain facilities have backfired. It can be reverse-engineered. Areas where images are unavailable became extra interesting. In this way Buzzfeed used Baidu Maps to their advantage. They located/confirmed some of the camps because of it. This way, they turned shortcoming into an opportunity. You may want to be quick in replicating this principle for other parts of the country where forced labour/detention camps are expected (e.g. Tibet). Such loopholes will usually be fixed swiftly.

    Bit more on the tech. According to a 2019 report by Human Rights Watch, Baidu’s map function used in the IJOP app, a controversial system used by the police and the state that generates “a massive dataset of personal information, and of police behaviour and movements in Xinjiang (it is not known how the authorities plan to use such data): The IJOP app logs the police officer’s GPS locations and other identifying information when they submit information to the IJOP app. The IJOP app uses a map functionality by Baidu, a major Chinese technology company, for purposes including planning the shortest route for police vehicle and officers on foot, according to the app’s source code.
    https://miro.medium.com/max/653/1*umOMbKghZDqPPiy0TpGZ7w.png

    What can the camps in Tibet tell us about the camps in Xinjiang?

    Reuters reported just last week that forced labour expanded to Tibet (south of XJ). Reuter’s own reporting corroborated the findings obtained by Adrian Zenz. It would take another post to go into how to investigate the state of transferred Tibetan labourers. The quick and dirty check on the situation shows the merit of using satellite images to investigate grows as foreign journalists are being barred from areas, such as entering the Tibet region (foreign citizens are only permitted on government-approved tours). OSINT lessons from investigating XJ should be applied to Tibet too.

    How does Xinjiang link to Tibet? The former Tibet Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was chosen for the same job in Xinjiang in 2016 and headed the development of Xinjiang’s camp system, Reuters reported.

    Mass incarceration started before Quanguo came onto the scene: A fanghuiju work team was dispatched to a village in Guma wherein 38 individuals were allegedly detained in a government campaign, in early 2016 — it’s true however that Party Secretary Quanguo, appointed in August 2016, who waged a ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ against violent activities and terrorism increased repression.

    In an article last year, The Print used satellite images to prove that at least three Tibetan “re-education camps” are currently under construction. The author of the survey was Vinayak Bha, an ex-colonel retired from the Indian military intelligence unit.

    Col Vinayak Bhat (@rajfortyseven on Twitter) found three camps in 2018/2019 and share them. One of them is the one in Botuocun (see below). Bha writes about Chinese military deployment dynamics. The temple of Tibetan Buddhism is a ‘concentration camp’ that is surrounded by high walls and guard towers and has the same structural design as a prison. It is feasible that China’s mass detention to spread to Tibetans. Methods will likely base on the model executed in XJ.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*ln7TsCnetV75EKNcv4LBJg.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*DtJKKnYJUH1K7p1_Pyyicw.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*4dU7K9DK9agNbitNmLBT4g.png

    The reports of the three camps emerged in 2019. “Small-scale versions of similar military-style training initiatives have existed in the region for over a decade, but construction of new facilities increased sharply in 2016, and recent policy documents call for more investment in such sites”, one report stated. Looking at the three sites, some of them are quite old but the one below is less than three years old.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*xFr73HSkbxVqDGNgicuVCQ.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*Ylxp6Hk1Nj8AAkvvxXI21Q.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/278/1*a4UgMAeLCBp9LvRfOuf6Tw.png
    The allegation is that these facilities are now be used as detention centres for political indoctrination. “The detainees are allegedly used as forced labour in government factories and projects during the day time or as per shift timings”. It is something that rings true under the light of camps in Xinjiang but we lack evidence from the satellite images.

    There is some evidence that additional factory buildings were added. For the facility above, buildings in the upper east wing, with red roofing was added recently. Their layout reminds us of the blue-roofed buildings in and scattered around Xinjiang facilities, which we also have present: “This architecture is bang on a XJ prison, [though] with a different style roof”, Ruser said.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/512/1*GL1DwZmaqVdgUtaWsZHWdA.png

    https://miro.medium.com/max/303/1*Jr03h6ADK4_iNNfYP5YLkA.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/328/1*RyzDtEa9SjE0WsBSwUaMfA.png

    The prison layout from the older prison facility above — with its long and vertically arranged wings and the rippled features — is similar to prisons seen in Xinjian, such as the two portrayed below (one at Qariqash County at 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E and the other facility in 39°25’54.60”N, 76° 3’20.59"E).
    https://miro.medium.com/max/389/1*w01GGfJZZlcNCWm5MR4csQ.png

    Closing remarks:

    There is a mountain of stuff not included here. This is a training post and not an investigation with full-rested conclusion. This post should encourage other open-source investigative journalists to look into the facilities, follow their own reporting and help monitor developments/details that others may have missed.

    At present there are only a handful of OSINT journalists looking into it. Even fewer have the time to continuously keep this rolling, e.g. analysing the camps as other stories press them to move on.

    We need more eyes on this. The alleged human right abuse must receive all the international scrutiny it can get. People like Shawn Zhang and others with Nathan Ruser and APSI) started the journey. Other journalists must continue and expand on it.

    Also, the more open we are about sources and the analysis (hopefully) the fewer people might try to cast doubt on the existence of the camps (good thread here)

    OSINT techniques used must master the skill to help others to replicate the findings, step by step. That’s the reason this post resulted more in a hands-on tutorial than an explanatory post. I encourage anyone to start looking into the human rights abuse (though, I must stress, be careful to draw quick conclusions. Instead, share what you see on satellite images with the community of serious journalists and OSINT investigators).

    One last thought on commercial satellite imagery companies. It is crucial to get their support on this. For more than 100 camps mentioned in the latest update of the ASPI list (nearly 80 of them high-security detention facilities — classified as tier 3 or 4), we have no updated record of satellite images. This leaves researchers and journalists only to low-resolution devices, by Sentinel 2 images, or beg for images from Maxar or Planet Labs. That’s not good enough. Transparency requires companies inc to make those high-resolution images available, to anyone. Intelligence services should also consider making their high-resolution images available to the public for scrutiny, though, that unlikely to happen.

    https://medium.com/@techjournalism/open-source-satellite-data-to-investigate-xinjiang-concentration-camps-2713c
    #camps_de_concentration #architecture_forensique #images_satellitaires #rééducation #ré-éducation #camps_de_rééducation #Chine #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #Tibet

    ping @reka @isskein @visionscarto

  • Image rights and wrongs: architecture in the age of infinite reproduction - Architectural Review
    https://www.architectural-review.com/essays/photography/image-rights-and-wrongs-architecture-in-the-age-of-infinite-re

    Last year, Italian architectural critic and curator Davide Tommaso Ferrando had a post censored by Facebook ostensibly for not owning the rights to an image he had shared on his news feed. He had found it on ArchDaily and credited the photographer. But as he confesses, ‘I didn’t really know who the copyright owner was: after all, in 10 years of social editing, photo ownership had never been a problem. So why did it suddenly seem to have become such a big deal?’ He concludes that it was Facebook’s engineers testing their ability to conform to a new EU directive designed to prevent online platforms from infringing copyright, by removing and preventing the publication of copyrighted text, images, audio and video. ‘Provided that the directive gets fully applied’, he writes, ‘it will change not only the dynamics, but also the meaning of online communication, putting an end to this age of hyper-sharing.’

    #architecture #image

  • Photographier les guerres coloniales, avec Daniel Foliard – Paroles d’histoire
    https://parolesdhistoire.fr/index.php/2020/09/21/151-photographier-les-guerres-coloniales-avec-daniel-foliard

    L’invité : #DanielFoliard, maître de conférences à l’université de Nanterre

    Le livre : Combattre, punir, photographier. Empires coloniaux, 1890-1914, Paris, La découverte, 2020.

    La discussion :

    La #photo de couverture du livre, frappante, et ce qu’elle dit des pratiques de photographie et de #violences de la période 1890-1914 (1’25)
    Une approche élargie de la sphère #impériale et #coloniale, des conflits lointains de cette époque (5’20)
    L’avènement non linéaire de la photographie dans ces espaces, avec les premières vues de guerre des années 1840-1850 (9’25)
    Concurrences et hybridations entre photos et dessins ou peintures (13’30)
    La #photographie, une technique d’enregistrement, et de domination, pour les administrations coloniales (16’30)
    Une photo coloniale dont il ne faut pas surestimer l’efficacité malgré le grand nombre de photographes (22’)
    Des questions davantage travaillées dans l’historiographie anglophone (23’50)
    Quelles solutions aux dilemmes #éthiques posés par les photos de violence ? (27’40)
    Une codification des genres photographiques, aux formats de plus en plus normés (carte postale, presse…) (31’20)
    Des schèmes culturels sur la guerre et des circuits de fabrication et diffusion des images qui sont en place bien avant 1914 (36’)
    Des contemporains qui ont conscience de la possibilité de retouche des images (39’)
    Des cultures visuelles différentes, suivant les pays ? (42’45)
    La présence, plus forte qu’on ne l’imagine, de morts européens, dans les pages des journaux de l’époque (46’10)

    Les références citées dans l’émission :

    Georges Didi-Huberman, Images malgré tout, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 2003
    Pierre Schill (éd.), Réveiller l’archive d’une guerre coloniale : photographies et écrits de Gaston Chérau, correspondant de guerre lors du conflit italo-turc pour la Libye (1911-1912), Grâne, Creaphis éditions, 2018.
    Joëlle Beurier, Images et violence 1914-1918. Quand Le Miroir racontait la Grande Guerre, Paris, Éd. Nouveau monde, 2007
    Susan Sontag, Devant la douleur des autres, trad. de l’anglais par F. Durant-Bogaert, Paris, Christian Bourgois, 2003.

    #colonialisme #image #podcast

  • Bons baisers de rentrée

    Academia a décidé de recenser des témoignages écrits et photographiques de la rentrée universitaire 2020, dont nous avons reçu de premiers échos épouvantables, dont la presse s’est fait l’écho.

    –—

    - 2020, la rentrée de la honte, série sur Université ouverte : https://universiteouverte.org/tag/recit-de-rentree
    - Rentrée universitaire. La grande débrouille, par Khedidja Zerouali, Mediapart, 15/9/2020 : https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/160920/rentree-universitaire-la-grande-debrouille
    - Université de Paris. Étudiants et personnels face au chaos de la fusion, par Philomène Rozen, Révolution permanente, 17/9/2020 : https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Universite-de-Paris-Etudiants-et-personnels-face-au-chaos-de-la

    –---

    Selon une stratégie du choc (Noemi Klein, 2008) inacceptable1, Frédérique Vidal profite d’une rentrée hors norme pour achever de faire passer sa loi rétrograde dite « de programmation de la recherche 2021-2030 ». Enseignant·es et étudiant·es subissent des conditions d’accueil épouvantables, en licence, en Master, tandis que l’administration réclame sans vergogne les droits de Contribution de la vie étudiante et de campus (CVEC) —doctorant·es doivent s’acquitter d’une cotisation de la vie étudiante et de campus — dont déjà ielles n’avaient pas profiter l’année dernière.

    Voici une galerie de portraits de l’engagement pédagogique des maîtres·ses et des élèves, qui illustrent le mépris dans lequel leur Ministère de tutelle les tient.

    Academia invite tous et toutes celleux qui le souhaitent de lui communiquer leurs clichés ou leur témoignage.

    https://academia.hypotheses.org/25768

    #rentrée_2020 #distanciation_sociale (euhhh) #université #France #photographie #photos #images #gestes_barrières (euhhh)

  • Game changer: #NASA data tool could revolutionize Amazon fire analysis
    https://news.mongabay.com/2020/09/game-changer-nasa-data-tool-could-revolutionize-amazon-fire-analysis

    he Amazon has already seen more forest fires this year than in all of 2019, according to satellite data made available in August 2020 by a new NASA fire analysis tool.
    While there are several good fire monitoring satellite systems currently at work above the Amazon, NASA’s new automated system provides near real time monitoring which could allow firefighting teams on the ground to pinpoint fires in remote areas and to take action to put fires out before they spread.
    The new system also differentiates between fires in newly deforested areas, understory forest fires, grassland fires and those set by smallholders to annually clear fields. This differentiation allows authorities to zero in on large scale criminal arson committed by land grabbers, while also preventing the criminalization of subsistence farmers.
    New information provided by the innovative NASA monitoring tool can count fire carbon emissions and the location and size of burnt areas, all of which could further research on global climate change, mitigation, and biodiversity impacts.

    #incendie #feu_de_forêt #détection #nasa #image_satellite #Amazonie #cartographie

  • Mâles blancs quinquagénaires et plus si affinités. Merci @libe d’illustrer à quel point ces mecs représentent le passé. (Parce qu’on voit bien avec cette couv que vous n’avez toujours rien compris à demain).

    https://twitter.com/histgeoblog/status/1300310033574645761
    #couverture #couv #médias #journalisme #presse #hommes #où_sont_les_femmes #femmes #invisibilisation #Libé #présidentielle #politique #France #image

    La couv en question :

    La réponse en image :

    ping @isskein

    signalé par @reka @albertocampiphoto

  • Pour une page #Web qui dure 10 ans ?
    https://framablog.org/2020/08/24/pour-une-page-web-qui-dure-10-ans

    Des #pages web légères et moins gourmandes en ressources, du « low-tech » c’est plus écologique probablement, mais c’est aussi une des conditions pour rendre durables des #contenus qui ont une fâcheuse tendance à se volatiliser… Jeff Huang est professeur d’informatique et … Lire la suite­­

    #Autonomie_numérique #archivage #CSS #HTML #Images #marque-pages #pérennité #URL

    • #plook
      découvert cet été que des amis modifient toujours un site qui date de 2004 sans que ça casse (cms basic et sans bdd). Je me souviens d’une formation web au siècle dernier ou le prof sans méchanceté se disait toutefois perplexe devant la pauvreté des contenus. Et de fait, si on code pour le web, les mises à jour de sécurité, le suivi technique, la concurrence et la course à la nouveauté technologique ont contribué à épuiser la créativité politique du début du web.
      Je ne parle évidemment pas des industries de clic à égo.

  • MIT apologizes, permanently pulls offline huge dataset that taught AI systems to use racist, misogynistic slurs • The Register
    https://www.theregister.com/2020/07/01/mit_dataset_removed

    The dataset holds more than 79,300,000 images, scraped from Google Images, arranged in 75,000-odd categories. A smaller version, with 2.2 million images, could be searched and perused online from the website of MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL). This visualization, along with the full downloadable database, were removed on Monday from the CSAIL website after El Reg alerted the dataset’s creators to the work done by Prabhu and Birhane.

    The key problem is that the dataset includes, for example, pictures of Black people and monkeys labeled with the N-word; women in bikinis, or holding their children, labeled whores; parts of the anatomy labeled with crude terms; and so on – needlessly linking everyday imagery to slurs and offensive language, and baking prejudice and bias into future AI models.
    Screenshot from the MIT AI training dataset

    A screenshot of the 2.2m dataset visualization before it was taken offline this week. It shows some of the dataset’s examples for the label ’whore’, which we’ve pixelated for legal and decency reasons. The images ranged from a headshot photo of woman and a mother holding her baby with Santa to porn actresses and a woman in a bikini ... Click to enlarge

    Antonio Torralba, a professor of electrical engineering and computer science at CSAIL, said the lab wasn’t aware these offensive images and labels were present within the dataset at all. “It is clear that we should have manually screened them,” he told The Register. “For this, we sincerely apologize. Indeed, we have taken the dataset offline so that the offending images and categories can be removed.”

    In a statement on its website, however, CSAIL said the dataset will be permanently pulled offline because the images were too small for manual inspection and filtering by hand. The lab also admitted it automatically obtained the images from the internet without checking whether any offensive pics or language were ingested into the library, and it urged people to delete their copies of the data:

    “The dataset contains 53,464 different nouns, directly copied over from WordNet," Prof Torralba said referring to Princeton University’s database of English words grouped into related sets. “These were then used to automatically download images of the corresponding noun from internet search engines at the time, using the available filters at the time, to collect the 80 million images.”

    WordNet was built in the mid-1980s at Princeton’s Cognitive Science Laboratory under George Armitage Miller, one of the founders of cognitive psychology. “Miller was obsessed with the relationships between words,” Prabhu told us. “The database essentially maps how words are associated with one another.”

    For example, the words cat and dog are more closely related than cat and umbrella. Unfortunately, some of the nouns in WordNet are racist slang and insults. Now, decades later, with academics and developers using the database as a convenient silo of English words, those terms haunt modern machine learning.

    “When you are building huge datasets, you need some sort of structure,” Birhane told El Reg. “That’s why WordNet is effective. It provides a way for computer-vision researchers to categorize and label their images. Why do that yourself when you could just use WordNet?”

    WordNet may not be so harmful on its own, as a list of words, though when combined with images and AI algorithms, it can have upsetting consequences. “The very aim of that [WordNet] project was to map words that are close to each other,” said Birhane. "But when you begin associating images with those words, you are putting a photograph of a real actual person and associating them with harmful words that perpetuate stereotypes.”

    The fraction of problematic images and labels in these giant datasets is small, and it’s easy to brush them off as anomalies. Yet this material can lead to real harm if they’re used to train machine-learning models that are used in the real world, Prabhu and Birhane argued.

    “The absence of critical engagement with canonical datasets disproportionately negatively impacts women, racial and ethnic minorities, and vulnerable individuals and communities at the margins of society,” they wrote in their paper.

    #Intelligence_artificielle #Images #Reconnaissance_image #WordNet #Tiny_images #Deep_learning

  • [2020.07.15] Ecrans, Images, Cybernétique et Multimédia… | by François Houste | Jul, 2020 | Medium
    https://medium.com/@fhouste/2020-07-15-ecrans-images-cybern%C3%A9tique-et-multim%C3%A9dia-6389bda45f8

    On peut très bien vivre, et s’épanouir, dans cette société des images. Elle est finalement la nôtre depuis plus de 70 ans.

    On peut également chercher à la combattre au nom de l’attention, ou de l’éducation culturelle…

    Mais quelle que soit votre position, il semble important de comprendre les origines de notre monde d’écran, et de réaliser à quel point la culture technologique du XIXe siècle et la culture consumériste de l’après-guerre a dessiné l’âge digital que nous vivons aujourd’hui.

    Cette émergence du Dieu Image est le sujet de pas mal de livres que j’ai eu l’occasion de parcourir au cours des derniers mois. De quoi donner quelques idées de lecture pour l’été, et vous donner envie, peut-être, d’explorer encore plus loin cette civilisation de l’image.

    #Lectures #Image #Histoire_médias #Fred_Turner

  • La drammatica foto dell’uomo sulla nave Talia simbolo della tragedia dei migranti

    Il mercantile ancora al largo di Malta dopo aver soccorso, tre giorni fa, 52 persone alla deriva senza cibo né acqua. La Valletta per farli sbarcare vuole garanzie dalla Ue sulla ricollocazione. Sulla Ocean Viking si stanno eseguendo i tamponi.

    La Pietà dei mari si trova sul mercantile Talia. Ha il volto scheletrico e terrorizzato di un migrante subshariano, privato ormai anche della forza per scendere le scalette di un ponte. E ha le braccia forti e compassionevoli di un marinaio in tuta blu e mascherina che lo sorregge. Questa foto è stata scattata poche ore fa sulla Talia, e da sola racconta quello che il governo di Malta si rifiuta di vedere: i 52 migranti recuperati in mare, e che le autorità della Valletta da tre giorni non vogliono far sbarcare, sono allo stremo.

    Il marinaio della foto dovrebbe essere un motorista. Il mercantile, dopo aver ricevuto la segnalazione di un gommone in avaria, ha deviato la propria rotta per recuperare gli uomini e le donne che vi viaggiavano. Come impongono le convenzioni marittime internazionali. Ora li stanno accudendo e nutrendo, pur con tutte le preoccupazioni del rischio Covid, ma non possono resistere ancora per molto.

    #Nave_Talia, i migranti ammassati a bordo vengono accuditi dai marinai del mercantile

    Malta continua a non assegnare loro un porto di sbarco. Solo due migranti sono stati autorizzati a scendere perché ritenuti in concreto pericolo di vita. L’armatore è in difficoltà, perché il Talia era atteso in Libia per consegnare un carico. Il governo di Malta dice che non consentirà l’attracco ai naufraghi fino a quando non avrà garanzie da altri Stati membri dell’Unione sulla loro immediata ricollocazione, come scrive il Times of Malta. Il 3 luglio Alarm Phone, l’ong che segnala i gommoni, aveva diramato il primo allarme. Rilanciato poi dall’italiana Mediterranea Saving Humans e dall’ong tedesca Sea Watch.

    Intanto a bordo della #Ocean_Viking, nave della ong Mediterraneé che si trova al largo di Pozzallo con 180 migranti salvati in diverse operazioni, le autorità italiane stanno effettuando i tamponi per il Covid. La ong Mediterraneé, in merito al trasbordo dei migranti sulla #nave-quarantena #Moby_Zazà previsto domani, sottolinea: «Non abbiamo ricevuto alcuna istruzione. Senza conferme, non possiamo dare soluzioni ai sopravvissuti. L’incertezza prosegue e questo significa che le tensioni permangono».

    https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/07/05/news/la_foto_shock_dell_uomo_sulla_nave_talia_simbolo_della_tragedia_dei_migra
    #image #photo #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerranée #sauvetage #Libye #faim

    A mettre en lien avec ces autres images, mises sur seenthis en 2018:

    https://seenthis.net/messages/678573

    ping @isskein

  • Is #WebP really better than #JPEG ? - siipo.la
    https://siipo.la/blog/is-webp-really-better-than-jpeg

    Is WebP better than JPEG?

    So, is WebP better than JPEG? It depends if you are using the reference libjpeg library or the improved MozJPEG encoder.

    WebP seems to have about 10% better #compression compared to libjpeg in most cases, except with 1500px #images where the compression is about equal.

    However, when compared to MozJPEG, WebP only performs better with small 500px images. With other image sizes the compression is equal or worse.

    I think MozJPEG is the clear winner here with consistently about 10% better compression than libjpeg.

    Since most of the time WebP is used alongside JPEG fallback, by using WebP you will essentially double your storage costs with little benefit.

  • The true story behind this iconic photo that became a symbol of gender equality in the Zionist movement
    The granddaughter of female pioneer seen in shorts in a quarry in Mandatory Palestine reveals that the ’propaganda’ scene was in fact staged
    Ofer Aderet | Jun. 25, 2020 | 2:19 PM
    https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-the-true-story-behind-photo-that-symbolized-gender-equality-in-the

    Among the handful of surviving photographs depicting female pioneers during the pre-state British Mandate period, one of the best known is a picture of Aviva Alef.

    She was photographed in the summer of 1941 next to an open rail-cart full of rocks at a quarry at Kibbutz Ein Harod. The man who took the image was Zoltan Kluger, one of the greatest photographers in the country at the time, and who documented the Jewish state in the making for various Zionist organizations.

    Over the years, the iconic photo became a symbol of groundbreaking female equality in the Zionist movement. Just this week, however, 79 years after it was taken, Aviva Alef’s granddaughter decided to reveal the true story behind the picture, which is now in the official photography collection of the State of Israel.

    “My grandmother became a symbol of female pioneers against her will,” her granddaughter, Yael Avrahami, told Haaretz.

    Avrahami called the photograph “propaganda.”

    In contemporary Israel, every year when the weather warms up, a controversy resurfaces in the country’s schools over the appropriate length of female students’ shorts. “Someone recalled the picture and retrieved it from the archives,” noted Avrahami, a biblical studies lecturer at the Oranim Academic College of Education in Kiryat Tivon, northern Israel.

    The photo became part of an effort to demonstrate how “things had been different here” at one time, how women went around freely in short-shorts. It turned Avrahami’s grandmother into a symbol to be emulated.

    ‘Rebellious girl’

    “Let me tell you the real story about that picture,” Avrahami wrote Monday on Facebook, recounting how her grandmother, born Lotte Perschak, fled Czechoslovakia at age 17 after the outbreak of World War II. She immigrated to Mandatory Palestine with Youth Aliyah, a Zionist organization that at the time rescued young Jews from Europe and brought them to the Holy Land.

    “Here she was arbitrarily given the name Aviva. She settled at Kibbutz Beit Hashita in the Harod Valley and thought she was coming to an agricultural dorm and that she would return home at the end of the war. A very innocent young girl,” Avrahami wrote.

    But she also quickly discovered less pleasant aspects of the pioneering enterprise that had saved her life at a time when her family was sent to the Theresienstadt concentration camp.

    “In Youth Aliyah, you weren’t allowed to speak your native language. Everyone had to speak Hebrew,” the granddaughter recounted. Aviva was caught speaking Czech with her friend one day, and as a punishment was “exiled” to work in the rock quarry next to the adjacent kibbutz, Ein Harod – “as was befitting for a rebellious girl.”

    The punishment was meted out, Avrahami said, by two adults in charge: Tikva Sarig, a kindergarten teacher, children’s author and the wife of Nahum Sarig (who later became the commander of the Negev Brigade of the pre-state Palmach elite strike force); and Aryeh Ben-Gurion, the nephew of Israel’s first prime minister.

    But unlike male pioneers, and contrary to what the famous photograph suggests, “she didn’t drive rail carts with rocks and didn’t blast rocks. She cooked and did laundry for the male pioneers,” her granddaughter disclosed.

    On the day Kluger arrived to take pictures of the pioneers, “girls’ legs suited him for the picture,” as Avrahami put it – meaning that the iconic photo was staged.

    “Men are less sexy and my grandmother’s legs were legendary,” Avrahami said. “My grandfather once said she had the prettiest legs in the valley.”

    At age 20, Aviva gave birth to a son. That son’s daughter is Yael Avrahami.

    “My grandmother was saved from the horrors of the world war by the pioneering that was forced upon her. But it’s hard to look nostalgically upon the shorts in the picture and think that anything was perfect at the time,” the granddaughter wrote, “that the world saw her for what she was and not for her beautiful legs.

    “The shorts are not the be-all and end-all,” Avrahami added.

    Aviva’s parents didn’t survive the Holocaust. Her brother survived Auschwitz and married a Catholic nurse who had taken care of him, but he died relatively young behind the Iron Curtain.

    Aviva married journalist Yitzhak Avrahami at Beit Hashita and had a son. The couple divorced and Aviva made her way to Kibbutz Ayelet Hashahar, where she married Haim Alef and took his surname. “She would work in various jobs at the kibbutz, including being in charge of purchasing at the grocery. She also worked for many years in the sewing workshop,” Avrahami recounted.

    Aviva Alef died 18 years ago. One of the stories she told her granddaughter has bothered Yael Avrahami to this day.

    “She once told me that they needed to guard the watchtowers in the valley. The immigrant girls, who were afraid to do guard duty alone, were forced ‘to kiss’ male pioneers who would come along to stand guard with them at night. ‘Kissing’ is all she told me. I hope it wasn’t more than that,” Avrahami said.

    #propagande #hasbara

  • Farida : la victime n’était pas coupable – L’image sociale
    http://imagesociale.fr/8700

    Les images virales, comment ça marche ? Pour les journalistes comme pour le plupart des usagers du web, ces vidéos qui montrent un événement dramatique ou significatif sont des données qui émergent du terrain, de façon spontanée et naturelle, et constituent des faits objectifs dont l’intérêt est établi par leur diffusion même. Mais les images virales ne sont pas des faits objectifs : ce sont au contraire des récits en formation, des constructions sociales en temps réel, forgées par la conversation sur les réseaux sociaux. La lecture de ces séquences évolue rapidement en fonction de l’état du débat public, dont elles révèlent et orientent simultanément les contours.

  • Imen Mellaz
    @Mellazimen
    https://twitter.com/Mellazimen/status/1272929930611953666

    Cette femme, c’est ma mère. 50 ans, infirmière, elle a bossé pendant 3 mois entre 12 et 14 heures par jour. A eu le covid. Aujourd’hui, elle manifestait pour qu’on revalorise son salaire, qu’on reconnaisse son travail. Elle est asthmatique. Elle avait sa blouse. Elle fait 1m55.

    On ose me dire au téléphone, évidemment, « qu’on ne sait pas ce qu’il s’est passé avant ces vidéos, mais ayez confiance, si elle n’a rien fait on la relâche ». Oui, comme #AdamaTraore par exemple ? Bien sûr, « ayez confiance ». Elle est actuellement en garde à vue.

    Rien ne justifie de TOUTE FACON une telle interpellation. Pas quand on est désarmée, pas en blouse, pas quand on fait 1m55, pas face à autant de robocop. Non, non et non.

    ““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““““
    Remy Buisine
    @RemyBuisine
    https://twitter.com/RemyBuisine/status/1272935058630983681

    Une femme en blouse blanche, tirée par les cheveux, durant une interpellation, finira évacuée le visage en sang durant la manifestation aux Invalides. Elle réclamera à plusieurs reprises sa Ventoline.

    Images issue de mon direct sur @brutofficiel
    (1H45). #soignants

    #manif16juin #soignants #soignantes

  • Le site #Internet_Archive mis en danger par des poids lourds de l’édition

    Sous la pression d’une #plainte déposée devant un tribunal new-yorkais par quatre poids lourds de l’édition aux États-Unis, le site Internet Archive a décidé d’avancer de 15 jours la fermeture de sa #bibliothèque_d’urgence, créée en réponse à l’#épidémie de #coronavirus.

    Une infraction « massive et délibérée » au #droit_de_reproduction. C’est ce que quatre éditeurs, dont la filiale américaine du groupe #Hachette, reprochent au site Internet Archive, connu notamment pour son archivage du web mondial, la #Wayback_Machine, dans laquelle on peut retrouver des pages web disparues.

    Mais l’Internet Archive, c’est aussi une immense #médiathèque, riche de millions de #livres, #films, #images, jeux vidéo et documents sonores. Côté bibliothèque, son « but ultime » est de « mettre tous les travaux publiés de l’humanité à la disposition de tous dans le monde ». Chacun·e, à condition d’être inscrit·e, peut emprunter jusqu’à dix livres à la fois, pour une durée de quinze jours. Les livres sont prêtés sous la forme de fichiers pdf. Selon Internet Archive, 17 500 livres sont empruntés chaque jour.

    Comme dans une bibliothèque classique, un livre doit être disponible pour pouvoir être emprunté – une règle que le site a « concoctée de toutes pièces », lui reprochent les plaignants. Ce concept du « #prêt_numérique_contrôlé » autorise un prêt à la fois pour un livre numérisé donné. Soutenu par le Conseil des directeurs des bibliothèques d’État des États-Unis, il n’avait encore jamais été mis en cause devant les tribunaux.

    Ce qui a décidé les #maisons_d’édition à risquer un #procès pas gagné d’avance, c’est la #Bibliothèque_nationale_d’urgence mise en place à la fin du mois de mars par Internet Archive, pour répondre à la fermeture des écoles, bibliothèques et universités en raison du coronavirus, et donc à l’impossibilité d’aller y chercher des livres. Installé aux États-Unis, le site avait simplement décidé de « suspendre les listes d’attente […] pendant toute la durée de l’urgence nationale américaine » : c’est-à-dire qu’il n’y avait plus besoin qu’un livre (numérique) revienne pour être emprunté à nouveau. Plusieurs lecteurs pouvaient ainsi en bénéficier en même temps.

    Mercredi 10 juin, son fondateur, #Brewster_Kahle, a publié sur son blog un billet (https://blog.archive.org/2020/06/10/temporary-national-emergency-library-to-close-2-weeks-early-returning-) pour annoncer la fin prochaine du dispositif, avancée au 16 juin, espérant trouver avec les détenteurs de droits « un système qui marche ».

    Son initiative a été soutenue publiquement par des dizaines de bibliothèques et d’universités, ces institutions se revendiquant du principe du « #fair_use », qui autorise des dérogations aux droits de reproduction, particulièrement quand il s’agit d’enseignement, et selon les circonstances. C’est le cas, estime Brewster Kahle, de l’épidémie due au coronavirus.

    Au contraire, cette ouverture des portes numériques est intervenue, selon les éditeurs, au pire moment, celui-là « même où de nombreux auteurs, éditeurs et librairies indépendantes, sans parler des bibliothèques, luttent pour survivre ». Le risque pour Internet Archive est vital, la loi sur le #droit_d’auteur (#Copyright_Act) autorisant des #dommages_et_intérêts pouvant atteindre 150 000 dollars par œuvre en cas de violation délibérée. Si le site propose au prêt 1,3 million de livres, certains sont toutefois dans le #domaine_public.

    « La #gratuité est un concurrent indépassable », estiment les éditeurs dans leur plainte, rappelant l’argument le plus éculé de l’industrie musicale. Internet Archive « ne fait qu’exploiter les investissements que les éditeurs ont faits dans leurs livres », accusent-ils, et « au moyen d’un modèle économique conçu pour profiter librement du travail des autres ». La plainte s’acharne à démontrer que l’Internet Archive serait une entreprise commerciale vivant de la #numérisation des livres, un travail qu’elle effectue contre rémunération pour les bibliothèques. Urgence ou pas, elle demande la destruction de toutes les copies illégales.

    Avec les livres prêtés par l’Internet Archive, on est pourtant loin du mp3 recopié ou downloadé en clic. Brewster Kahle rappelle dans une lettre adressée le 10 avril à Thom Tillis, un sénateur républicain président de la Commission sur la #propriété_intellectuelle, réservé sur la légalité du procédé, que son organisation, sans but lucratif, est régulièrement reconnue comme bibliothèque par la Californie. Cela fait bientôt dix ans, dit-il, que les livres sont prêtés selon la règle « #un_lecteur_à_la_fois ». De plus, se défend le fondateur de la bibliothèque, « nos livres numériques sont protégés par les mêmes protections techniques que celles utilisées par les éditeurs pour garantir que les lecteurs n’ont accès à un livre que pendant les deux semaines de son prêt, et que des copies supplémentaires ne peuvent être faites ».

    Toujours à destination de l’élu républicain, il explique : « Vos électeurs ont payé pour des millions de livres auxquels ils n’ont pas accès actuellement » – 15 millions de livres bloqués derrière les portes fermées de 323 bibliothèques, rien qu’en Caroline du Nord, l’État du sénateur, a compté Brewster Kahle.

    Aux éditeurs, il fait remarquer que la bibliothèque d’urgence ne comporte aucun livre publié il y a moins de cinq ans ; 90 % des livres empruntés ont plus de dix ans, et deux tiers datent du XXe siècle. Quant aux auteurs qui ne voudraient pas que leurs livres soient ainsi prêtés, il leur suffit de le demander par mail, poursuit Kahle. Certains ont au contraire, affirme-t-il, demandé à figurer dans la bibliothèque numérique.

    Dès le 31 mars, la Guilde des auteurs avait mobilisé ses membres contre la bibliothèque d’urgence, parlant de « piratage pur et simple », et proposé un modèle de réclamation. Ce groupement d’auteurs avait déjà fait connaître son désaccord avec le prêt de livres numérisés selon le principe « un livre papier, une copie numérique » en janvier 2019. Le #Syndicat_national_des_auteurs (#National_Writers_Unions) a de son côté préféré entamer des discussions amiables avec Internet Archive et les défenseurs du prêt numérique contrôlé.

    L’Internet Archive est en effet, aux États-Unis, loin d’être la seule bibliothèque à pratiquer de la sorte. La pratique du prêt numérisé contrôlé est théorisée, défendue et pratiquée par de nombreux juristes et des bibliothèques universitaires ou locales, comme celles des villes de Los Angeles, San Francisco et Boston. Un livre imprimé peut être prêté : c’est le principe des bibliothèques. Il doit en être de même pour sa déclinaison à l’identique au format numérique, un exemplaire numérique prêté à une personne à la fois.

    En attendant la décision du tribunal new-yorkais, des internautes se posent à travers le monde la question d’archiver l’Internet Archive et ses téraoctets de documents.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/110620/le-site-internet-archive-mis-en-danger-par-des-poids-lourds-de-l-edition
    #open_access #confinement #édition_scientifique #recherche #justice

  • Lose Yourself in a Mesmerizing, Meticulous Map of the Met - Atlas Obscura

    https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/mesmerizing-map-met-museum

    n March, the Metropolitan Museum of Art joined thousands of museums that have closed their galleries to prevent the spread of COVID-19. It might be months before its doors reopen, but anyone with an internet connection can explore 5,000 years of art from the museum’s holdings. You can revel in the intricacies of incense burners from around the world; lose yourself in a garden; even go bird-watching.

    A standout among these many resources is a charming, illustrated map of the museum that was created before the Met had a Digital Media Department. Hand-drawn by artist John Kerschbaum, who received the commission in 2004, the Family Map charts out every gallery of the museum on a single, 18-by-24-inch page. Kerschbaum lives in New York City and based the Met map on a similarly saturated 1976 poster of Manhattan by artist Tony Graham.

    #cartographie #image #leaflet ?