• Des images communes
    https://lundi.am/Des-images-communes

    Nous sommes à quelques jours du retour par la navette parlementaire de la proposition de loi sur la Sécurité Globale, en première lecture devant le Sénat. Son fameux article 24 sur l’enregistrement et la diffusion d’images captant les forces de l’ordre a fait couler beaucoup d’encre.

    Ironie de l’Histoire, les dispositions les plus polémiques de cette loi pourraient être réécrites par l’opposition, un siècle et demi, jour pour jour après qu’Adolphe Thiers et son gouvernement aient envoyé de nuit, la troupe commandée par le général Lecomte s’emparer des canons de la Garde nationale sur la butte Montmartre.

    L’article propose une réflexion sur la place de la photographie dans l’identification des participant.es à la Commune mais aussi son usage dans la guerre psychologique livrée entre Communard.es et Versaillais.es ainsi que sa résonance aussi bien dans l’écriture des mythes fondateurs de la République que dans notre propre imaginaire commun.

    #insurrection #Commune_de_Paris #police #photographies #images #surveillance #contrôle

  • Manchester University Press - Border images, border narratives
    https://manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/9781526146267
    https://www.biblioimages.com/mup/getimage.aspx?class=books&assetversionid=278716&cat=default&size=large

    This interdisciplinary volume explores the role of images and narratives in different borderscapes. Written by experienced scholars in the field, Border images, border narratives provides fresh insight into how borders, borderscapes, and migration are imagined and narrated in public and private spheres. Offering new ways to approach the political aesthetics of the border and its ambiguities, this volume makes a valuable contribution to the methodological renewal of border studies and presents ways of discussing cultural representations of borders and related processes.

    Influenced by the thinking of philosopher Jacques Rancière, this timely volume argues that narrated and mediated images of borders and borderscapes are central to the political process, as they contribute to the public negotiation of borders and address issues such as the in/visiblity of migrants and the formation of alternative borderscapes. The contributions analyse narratives and images in literary texts, political and popular imagery, surveillance data, border art, and documentaries, as well as problems related to borderland identities, migration, and trauma. The case studies provide a highly comparative range of geographical contexts ranging from Northern Europe and Britain, via Mediterranean and Mexican-USA borderlands, to Chinese borderlands from the perspectives of critical theory, literary studies, social anthropology, media studies, and political geography.

    #frontières

  • Migrants : Louis Witter et Simon Hamy dénoncent une « entrave » à la liberté d’informer devant la justice
    https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/01/04/etre-tenus-a-l-ecart-ce-n-est-pas-normal-deux-journalistes-denoncent-une-ent

    Affirmant qu’ils ont été empêchés de documenter l’évacuation de camps de #migrants près de #Calais, les reporters indépendants Louis Witter et Simon Hamy ont déposé, lundi, un recours en référé-liberté. Par Laurie Moniez (Lille, correspondante)

    « Jusqu’ici, il n’y avait que deux pays qui m’avaient empêché de travailler : la Hongrie de Viktor Orban et le Maroc de Mohammed VI. Maintenant, il y a la France. » Photojournaliste indépendant, Louis Witter, 25 ans, couvre les crises migratoires depuis six ans. Lundi 4 janvier, devant le tribunal administratif de Lille, le reporter dénonçait, avec son confrère Simon Hamy, l’ « entrave » à la #liberté_d’informer que représente selon eux l’impossibilité d’accéder à des évacuations de camps de migrants sur le littoral du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais.

    Dans une requête en référé-liberté, tous deux demandent au tribunal d’enjoindre aux préfectures de les « autoriser à accéder aux différents sites » d’évacuation pour y effectuer leurs reportages. En cause, notamment : plusieurs épisodes durant lesquels les deux journalistes disent avoir été empêchés d’exercer leur métier.

    Mardi 29 décembre 2020, au petit matin, le photojournaliste et son collègue rédacteur indépendant suivaient l’évacuation d’un camp de migrants à Grande-Synthe. Après un contrôle de leurs pièces d’identité et cartes de presse, « prises en photo par ce qui semblait être le téléphone personnel de policiers », racontent-ils à la présidente du tribunal, les forces de l’ordre leur interdisent de passer au-delà d’un périmètre de sécurité. « Cette interdiction de filmer et de photographier a été faite verbalement et physiquement avec la main sur l’objectif de l’appareil, en plus du phare d’un fourgon de police braqué vers nous », précise Louis Witter.

    A cinq reprises, les 29 et 30 décembre, ils se sont ainsi vu refuser l’accès aux sites démantelés à Grande-Synthe, Calais et Coquelles. Le Syndicat national des journalistes (SNJ), première organisation de la profession, a « condamné ces pratiques d’obstruction et d’intimidation ». L’avocat des deux journalistes, Me Henry-François Cattoir, dénonce une atteinte grave à la liberté d’informer. « Il faudrait donc, comme l’a sous-entendu [le ministre de l’intérieur, Gérald] Darmanin, une accréditation pour suivre des opérations de police maintenant ? », feint-il de s’interroger à l’audience.

    « Qu’est-ce qui gêne ? »

    Sur son compte Twitter, le photojournaliste Louis Witter avait diffusé mardi 29 décembre des #images prises au téléobjectif des tentes des migrants lacérées à coups de couteau par un homme chargé selon lui du « nettoyage » du camp de migrants.

    Voici une photo des membres des équipes de nettoyage qui accompagnent les policiers lors des expulsions de réfugiés à Grande-Synthe.

    Cagoule deux trous, couteau à la main pour lacérer les tentes. Imaginez deux seconde la stupeur des exilés réveillés par ça à 8H ce matin.

    Comment lacérer à coups de couteau une tente de réfugié à neuf heures du matin par trois degrés celsius", mode d’emploi offert par @prefet59 ce matin à Grande-Synthe.

    https://twitter.com/LouisWitter/status/1343833651667206145

    « Pourquoi interdire l’accès aux journalistes ?, insiste Me Cattoir. Pour les empêcher de documenter sur la manière dont se passent les opérations ? Qu’est-ce qui gêne ? » « Un périmètre de sécurité, c’est quelque chose de tout à fait classique, cela ne choque absolument personne et pas même la presse », répond au nom de la préfecture du Nord Hervé Tourmente, rappelant que l’opération d’évacuation du camp de Grande-Synthe le 29 décembre s’était déroulée sur ordonnance judiciaire avec octroi de la force publique. « Il n’y a pas un incendie, une expulsion, une interpellation sans un périmètre de sécurité. L’enjeu est d’éviter tout suraccident », assure-t-il au tribunal.

    Le sous-préfet de Calais, Michel Tournaire, précise de son côté qu’ « un compte rendu complet des opérations avait été fourni à travers un communiqué de presse détaillant de manière assez précise le déroulé, ce qui permet après à la presse locale d’informer les lecteurs si nécessaire ».(sic) Mais les journalistes souhaitent pouvoir décrire ces évacuations à partir de ce qu’ils ont vu. « On voulait vérifier sur place ce que les ONG et consortiums d’associations nous avaient décrit, explique le journaliste Simon Hamy, 30 ans. Ils nous avaient souhaité bonne chance. On s’est sentis impuissants à témoigner. »

    Les deux reporters ont prévu de retourner sur les camps de migrants du Calaisis dès cette semaine. « On a déposé cette requête en référé-liberté, car c’est important de marquer le coup, pas forcément pour nous mais pour tous les journalistes qui souhaitent travailler sur les expulsions, confie Louis Witter. Certains ont l’impression d’être dans la normalité en étant ainsi tenus à l’écart, mais ce n’est pas normal. »

    Depuis le démantèlement de la « jungle » de Calais en 2016 – où ont vécu jusqu’à 10 000 migrants –, les autorités veulent éviter par tous les moyens les « points de fixation ». Lors de l’opération du 30 décembre à Calais, seuls 85 migrants sur près de 300 ont été mis à l’abri par les services de la préfecture. La décision du tribunal administratif de Lille sur la requête en référé des deux journalistes est attendue au plus tard pour mardi.

  • La via della vergogna Sulla rotta balcanica delle migrazioni

    Il viaggio disperato lungo la rotta dei Balcani, tra violenze e torture inaudite da parte della polizia Centinaia di profughi con diritto alla protezione respinti dall’Italia

    È la schiena curva e livida dei respinti a dire le sprangate. Sono le gambe sanguinanti a raccontare la disperata corsa giù dal valico. A piedi nudi, con le caviglie spezzate dalle bastonate e i cani dell’esercito croato che azzannano gli ultimi della fila. È l’umiliato silenzio di alcuni ragazzi visitati dai medici volontari nel campo bosniaco di #Bihac per le cure e il referto: stuprati e seviziati dalla polizia con dei rami raccolti nella boscaglia. I meno sfortunati se la sono cavata con il marchio di una spranga incandescente, a perenne memoria dell’ingresso indesiderato nell’Unione Europea.

    Gli orrori avvengono alla luce del sole. Affinché gli altri, i recidivi degli attraversamenti e quelli che dalle retrovie attendono notizie, battano in ritirata. Velika Kladuša e il valico della paura. Di qua è Croazia, Europa. Di la è Bosnia, fuori dalla cortina Ue. Di qua si proclamano i diritti, ma si usa il bastone. Oramai tra i profughi della rotta balcanica lo sanno tutti che con gli agenti sloveni e gli sbirri croati non si scherza.

    «Siamo stati consegnati dalla polizia slovena alla polizia croata. Siamo stati picchiati, bastonati, ci hanno tolto le scarpe, preso i soldi e i telefoni. Poi ci hanno spinto fino al confine con la Bosnia, a piedi scalzi. Tanti piangevano per il dolore e per essere stati respinti». Sono le parole di chi aveva finalmente visto i cartelli stradali in italiano, ma è stato rimandato indietro, lungo una filiera del respingimento come non se ne vedeva dalla guerra nella ex Jugoslavia. Certi metodi non sembrano poi cambiati di molto.

    Tre Paesi e tre trattamenti. I militari italiani non alzano le mani, ma sono al corrente di cosa accadrà una volta rimandati indietro i migranti intercettati a Trieste come a Gorizia. Più si torna al punto di partenza, e peggio andranno le cose. Le testimonianze consegnate ad Avvenire dai profughi, dalle organizzazioni umanitarie, dai gruppi di avvocati lungo tutta la rotta balcanica, sembrano arrivare da un’altra epoca.

    Le foto non mentono. Un uomo si è visto quasi strappare il tendine del ginocchio destro da uno dei mastini delle guardie di confine croate. Quasi tutti hanno il torso attraversato da ematomi, cicatrici, escoriazioni. C’è chi adesso è immobile nella tendopoli di Bihac con la gamba ingessata, chi con il volto completamente bendato, ragazzini con le braccia bloccate dai tutori in attesa che le ossa tornino al loro posto. I segni degli scarponi schiacciati contro la faccia, le costole incrinate, i calci sui genitali. Un ragazzo pachistano mostra una profonda e larga ferita sul naso, il cuoio capelluto malridotto, mentre un infermiere volontario gli pratica le quotidiane medicazioni. Un afghano appena maggiorenne ha l’orecchio destro interamente ricucito con i punti a zigzag. Centinaia raccontano di essere stati allontanati dal suolo italiano.

    Una pratica, quella dei respingimenti a ritroso dal confine triestino fino agli accampamenti nel fango della Bosnia, non più episodica. «Solo nei primi otto mesi del 2020 sono state riammesse alla frontiera italo-slovena oltre 900 persone, con una eccezionale impennata nel trimestre estivo, periodo nel quale il fenomeno era già noto al mondo politico che è però rimasto del tutto inerte », lamenta Gianfranco Schiavone, triestino e vicepresidente di Asgi, l’associazione di giuristi specializzati nei diritti umani. «Tra le cittadinanze degli stranieri riammessi in Slovenia il primo posto va agli afghani (811 persone), seguiti da pachistani, iracheni, iraniani, siriani e altre nazionalità, la maggior parte delle quali – precisa Schiavone – relative a Paesi da cui provengono persone con diritto alla protezione ». A ridosso del territorio italiano arriva in realtà solo chi riesce a sfuggire alla caccia all’uomo fino ai tornanti che precedono la prima bandiera tricolore. Per lasciarsi alle spalle quei trecento chilometri da Bihac a Trieste possono volerci due settimane.

    Secondo il Danish Refugee Council, che nei Paesi coinvolti ha inviato numerosi osservatori incaricati di raccogliere testimonianze dirette, nel 2019 sono tornate nel solo campo di bosniaco di Bihac 14.444 persone, 1.646 solo nel giugno di quest’anno.

    I dati a uso interno del Viminale e visionati da Avvenire confermano l’incremento delle “restituzioni” direttamente alla polizia slovena. Nel secondo semestre del 2019 le riammissioni attive verso Zagabria sono state 107: 39 da Gorizia e 78 da Trieste. Il resto, circa 800 casi, si concentra tutto nel 2020. Il “Border violence monitoring”, una rete che riunisce lungo tutta la dorsale balcanica una dozzina di organizzazioni, tra cui medici legali e avvocati, ha documentato con criteri legali (testimonianze, foto, referti medici) 904 casi di violazione dei diritti umani. Lungo i sentieri sul Carso, tra i cespugli nei fitti boschi in cima ai dirupi, si trovano i tesserini identificativi rilasciati con i timbri dell’Alto commissariato Onu per i rifugiati o dall’Agenzia Onu per le migrazioni. I migranti li abbandonano lì. Testimoniano di come a decine avessero ottenuto la registrazione nei campi allestiti a ridosso del confine balcanico dell’Unione Europea.

    Quel documento, che un tempo sarebbe stato considerato un prezioso salvacondotto per invocare poi la protezione internazionale, oggi può essere una condanna. Perché averlo addosso conferma di provenire dalla Bosnia e dunque facilita la “riconsegna” alla polizia slovena. Anche per questo lo chiamano “game”.

    Un “gioco” puoi vincere una domanda d’asilo in Italia o in un’altro Paese dell’Ue, o un’altra tornata nell’inferno dei respingimenti. «Quando eravamo nascosti in mezzo ai boschi, la polizia slovena – racconta un altro dei respinti – era anche accompagnata dai cani. Qualcuno si era accucciato nel bosco e non era stato inizialmente visto, ma quattro o cinque cani li hanno scovati e quando hanno provato a scappare sono stati rincorsi dai cani e catturati».

    https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/lorrore-alle-porte-delleuropa

    #photographie #témoignage #images #violence #violences #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #torture #Croatie #game #the_game #viols #Velika_Kladuša #Velika_Kladusa #Bosnie #Slovénie #refoulements_en_chaîne #push-backs #refoulements #réadmission #chiens

    • Violenza sui migranti, in un video le prove dalla Croazia

      Impugnano una spranga da cui pende una corda. Stanno per spaccare ginocchia, frustare sulla schiena, lanciare sassi mirando alla testa dei profughi. Sono soldati croati...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tacXXCD8UL8&feature=emb_logo

      Non è per il freddo delle gelate balcaniche che gli uomini appostati nella radura indossano un passamontagna. Il branco è lì per un’imboscata. Impugnano una spranga da cui pende una corda. Stanno per spaccare ginocchia, frustare sulla schiena, lanciare sassi mirando alla testa dei profughi. Sono soldati croati. E stavolta Zagabria non potrà più dire che non ci sono prove.

      Ora c’è un video che conferma le accuse di questi anni. Nei giorni scorsi, dopo la ricostruzione di Avvenire e la pubblicazione di immagini e testimonianze di alcune tra le migliaia di persone seviziate dai gendarmi, era intervenuta la commissaria agli Affari Interni dell’Ue, Ylva Johansson. «Abbiamo sentito di respingimenti dagli Stati membri e non è accettabile». Nessun accenno, però, alla violenza. Il governo di Zagabria, infatti, ha sempre respinto le accuse dei profughi respinti a catena da Italia, Slovenia e Croazia. «Nonostante i report lo Stato croato ha negato, mettendo in dubbio la credibilità dei migranti, degli attivisti e dei giornalisti – ricordano i legali del “Border violence monitoring” – citando la mancanza di prove fotografiche». Ora quelle prove ci sono.

      I fotogrammi e i video raccolti sul campo non lasciano spazio a dubbi. La frusta schiocca i primi colpi. Un uomo viene atterrato dopo che l’aggressore lo ha quasi azzoppato. Neanche il tempo di stramazzare tra i rovi che viene centrato in pieno volto. Poco distante, in un fossato che segna il confine con la Bosnia Erzegovina, altri due uomini a volto coperto, entrambi con divise blu scure, afferrano dei grossi sassi e li scagliano contro alcuni ragazzi che corrono per riguadagnare il confine bosniaco, a meno di 30 metri, dove gli aggressori croati sanno di non potere addentrarsi.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rtEDbuDbqzU&feature=youtu.be

      Le sequenze sono raccapriccianti. Le urla spezzano il fiato. I militari infieriscono ripetutamente su persone inermi. A tutti sono state tolte le scarpe, i telefoni, il denaro, gli zainetti con gli unici ricordi delle propRie origini. Un uomo piange. Il volto gonfio, una gamba dolorante, alcune ferite alla testa, il labbro superiore sanguinante. Nella sua lingua biascica la più universale delle invocazioni: «Mamma mia».

      Le immagini,che risalgono alla fine di marzo, sono state analizzate per mesi da legali e periti di vari Paesi per conto del “Border violence monitoring”, il network di organizzazioni di volontariato attivo in tutti i Balcani. Nel video integrale (sintetizzato da Avvenire in una versione di 4 minuti in questo articolo) si possono vedere i filmati con le ricostruzioni forensi. Oltre alle identità dei feriti è stato possibile riconoscere anche i corpi di appartenenza dei picchiatori: guardie di confine, nuclei speciali della polizia e militari dell’esercito.

      Le forze di sicurezza, come sempre, avevano pensato a impedire che le testimonianze potessero trovare riscontri fotografici. Questa volta, però, un ragazzo afghano è riuscito a beffarli. Poco prima del respingimento altri agenti in un posto di polizia avevano rubato denaro, telefoni ed effetti personali. Con le scarpe e i vestiti avevano fatto un falò. Nella concitazione, da uno degli zainetti è scivolato un telefono. Il ragazzo ha fatto in tempo a nasconderlo nelle mutande. Per consegnarci le immagini della vergogna all’interno dell’Unone europea.

      Dopo una corsa disperata, inseguito dalle sprangate e dalle scudisciate, una volta superato il fossato ha riacceso il cellulare danneggiato durante l’aggressione. C’era ancora abbastanza batteria. Si sente anche la sua voce mentre non riesce a tener ferme le mani: «Mi fa male una gamba, ho troppo dolore». Un altro accanto a lui comprende l’importanza di quegli istanti: «Ti tengo io, devi continuare a riprendere».

      Pochi giorni prima The Guardian aveva pubblicato un inchiesta di Lorenzo Tondo: la polizia croata veniva accusata di segnare i migranti islamici con una croce sulla testa, ma ancora una volta Zagabria aveva negato.

      Le riammissioni a catena, con cui dal confine italo–sloveno «si deportano illegalmente i rifugiati fino in Bosnia, hanno l’effetto di esporre le persone a condizioni inumane e a un rischio di morte: vanno pertanto immediatamente fermate», chiede il Consorzio italiano di solidarietà (Ics). Anche in Bosnia vengono denunciati episodi di violenza ed uso eccessivo della forza da parte della polizia.

      L’11 dicembre, sei giorni dopo la pubblicazione della prima puntata dell’inchiesta di Avvenire (LEGGI QUI), è intervenuta la Commissaria ai diritti umani del Consiglio d’Europa, il consesso che ha dato vita alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’Uomo. In una lettera la bosniaca Dunja Mijatovic parla delle «segnalazioni di gruppi di vigilantes locali che attaccano i migranti e distruggono i loro beni personali», esprimendo preoccupazione «per le segnalazioni di attacchi e minacce contro i difensori dei diritti umani che aiutano i migranti, tra cui una campagna diffamatoria e minacce di morte».

      E non sarà certo la prima neve a fermare le traversate.

      Ieri la polizia serba ha bloccato 300 persone in due distinte operazioni: 170 sono stati trovati nella zona di Kikinda, lungo un sentiero sul confine con la Romania; altri 140 sono stati vicino al valico di Horgos, alla frontiera con l’Ungheria. Sperano così di aggirare la sbirraglia.

      Nicola Bay, direttore in Bosnia del “Danish refugee council” spiega di avere identificato con la sua organizzazione «14.500 casi di respingimenti dalla Croazia alla Bosnia dall’inizio del 2020. Nel solo mese di ottobre, i casi sono stati 1.934, tra cui 189 episodi in cui migranti sono stati soggetti a brutale violenza, e in due episodi anche violenza sessuale, da parte di uomini in uniformi nere, con i volti mascherati». Perciò «non è accettabile che i respingimenti violenti siano utilizzati, di fatto, come strumento per il controllo dei confini dagli stati europei. È giunto il momento di esigere, da parte della Commissione Europea e degli stati membri della Ue, inclusa l’Italia, il pieno rispetto delle più basilari norme del diritto comunitario e internazionale».

      E non è escluso che grazie a queste immagini si apra finalmente una inchiesta giudiziaria per individuare i responsabili, i loro superiori e fermare i crimini contro gli esseri umani commessi nell’Unione Europea.

      https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/torture-su-migranti-al-confine-tra-croazia-e-bosnia-vide-scavo

    • L’inchiesta. Abusi sui migranti della rotta balcanica, scende in campo l’Ue

      Dopo le denunce su violenze e respingimenti, l’Agenzia Ue per i diritti umani: monitorare i comportamenti della polizia. Zagabria: violenze presunte. A Trieste con i volontari che curano le ferite

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBfEBYHMXXE&feature=emb_logo

      La lavanda dei piedi comincia all’ora del vespro. È il quotidiano rito dei volontari che ogni sera, nel piccolo parco tra la stazione e il vecchio porto, dai loro zaini da studente estraggono garze, cerotti, unguenti. Passano da lì gli impavidi del game, i superstiti della roulette russa dei respingimenti a catena, e a bastonate, verso la Bosnia. Cacciati fuori dai confini Ue.

      Dopo le nuove denunce di queste settimane, qualcosa tra Bruxelles e Zagabria si muove. L’agenzia Ue per i diritti fondamentali è pronta a monitorare i comportamenti delle polizie lungo i confini. Ma manca una data per l’avvio del piano di prevenzione degli abusi.

      Pochi giorni fa a Bruxelles hanno chiuso un rapporto che racconta di vicende sfuggite alle principali cronache internazionali. Sono ancora in corso le indagini per episodi ch si ripetono da anni senza che mai si arrivi a individuare delle responsabilità. Nel novembre 2017 «una bambina afghana di sei anni, Madina Hosseini, è stata uccisa da un treno in transito al confine tra Croazia e Serbia» si legge nel dossier, che precisa: «Secondo il rapporto del difensore civico croato, Madina e la sua famiglia erano arrivate in Croazia e avevano chiesto asilo, quando è stato detto loro di tornare in Serbia». Una violazione delle norme sul diritto d’asilo finita in dramma. La famiglia è stata trasferita «in un veicolo della polizia vicino alla ferrovia e istruita a seguire i binari fino alla Serbia. Poco dopo, la bambina di sei anni è stata uccisa da un treno». D allora non molto è cambiato in meglio.

      Da Kabul a Trieste sono 4mila chilometri. Da qui il villaggio di casa è lontano, la guerra anche. C’è chi l’ultimo tratto lo ha percorso cinque volte. Perché acciuffato dagli agenti sloveni, infine riportato in Bosnia dopo una lezione della polizia croata. E c’è chi a Trieste invece c’era quasi arrivato, ma è stato colto dalla polizia italiana sulla fascia di confine, e poco dopo «riammesso» in Slovenia, come prevede un vecchio accordo tra Roma e Lubiana siglato quando implodeva la ex Jugoslavia.

      Scarpe sfondate, vestiti rotti, le caviglie gonfie e gli occhi troppo stanchi di chi l’ultima volta che s’è accucciato su un materasso era in un qualche posto di polizia. Per Gianfranco Schiavone, vicepresidente dell’Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (Asgi), è più che «anomalo che la riammissione possa avvenire senza l’emanazione di un provvedimento amministrativo». Anche perché «è indiscutibile che l’azione posta in essere dalla pubblica sicurezza attraverso l’accompagnamento forzato in Slovenia produce effetti rilevantissimi – aggiunge – sulla situazione giuridica dei soggetti interessati».

      Ricacciati indietro senza neanche poter presentare la domanda di protezione, molti passano per le mani delle guardie croate. Anche qui, però, il compatto muro di omertà tra uomini in divisa comincia a incrinarsi. La diffusione di immagini e filmati che documentano la presenza di gendarmi tra i picchiatori di migranti sta convincendo diversi agenti a denunciare anche i loro superiori. Gli ordini, infatti, arrivano dall’alto. Il merito è dell’Ufficio per la protezione dei diritti umani di Zagabria, dotato di poteri investigativi che stanno aprendo la strada a indagini della magistratura, garantendo l’anonimato ai poliziotti che collaborano con le indagini. Il ministero dell’Interno di Zagabria respinge le accuse arrivate nelle ultime settimane da testate come Der Spiegel, The Guardian e Avvenire, riguardo le violenze commesse dalle autorità lungo i confini. Foto e filmati mostrano uomini in divisa armati di spranghe e fruste. «Non si può confermare con certezza che siano membri regolari della polizia croata», si legge in una nota. «La polizia croata protegge il confine dalla migrazione illegale, lo protegge dalle azioni illegali e dai pericoli – aggiunge – che possono portare con sé persone senza documenti e senza identità, e lo fa per fornire pace e sicurezza al popolo croato». Tuttavia «non tolleriamo alcuna violenza nella protezione delle frontiere né (la violenza) è parte integrante delle nostre azioni». Riguardo al filmato e alla ricostruzione di Border Violence Monitoring «concludiamo che non abbiamo registrato azioni in base alla data e al luogo dichiarati nell’annuncio». Quali indagini siano state condotte non è però dato saperlo. «Controlleremo accuratamente i presunti eventi».

      Mentre dal Carso i primi refoli della sera si scontrano con quelli che soffiano dal mare, i volontari appostati nei dintorni della statua della principessa Sissi si preparano a un’altra serata con dolori da alleviare e lamenti da ascoltare. Lorena Fornasier, 67 anni, psicoterapeuta, e suo marito Gian Andrea Franchi, 83 anni, professore di filosofia in pensione, passano spesso di qua. Raccolgono quelli messi peggio. Lo fanno da anni, senza clamore, e si devono a loro le prime denunce sui maltrattamenti subiti dove finiscono i Balcani e comincia la Mitteleuropa.

      «Bisogna portare in tribunale dei casi individuali con l’intento di definire un precedente che sia valido per tutti, per attivare dei cambiamenti normativi che permettano un maggiore rispetto dei diritti fondamentali», osserva Giulia Spagna, direttrice per l’Italia del Danish refugee council, le cui squadre continuano a raccogliere prove di abusi lungo tutta la dorsale balcanica. «Da una parte – aggiunge – si devono offrire soluzioni concrete alle persone che hanno subito soprusi, attraverso supporto legale, oltre che medico e psicologico. Dall’altra usare questi episodi per influenzare le politiche europee e nazionali».

      https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/a-trieste-tra-chi-cura-le-ferite-reportage-migranti

  • Les exilé·es chassé·es de la #République. #Violence d’un soir, continuité d’une politique

    Lundi soir, place de la République, les forces de police ont brutalement appliqué le principe "#zéro_tolérance" qui résume à lui seul la politique de #harcèlement méthodiquement menée contre les exilé·es qui tentent, faute de solutions d’hébergement, de survivre en s’installant dans les #interstices de l’#espace_public.

    Au cœur de #Paris, sur cette place symbole et sous le regard de témoins qui peuvent et savent se faire entendre, la violence de cette politique est devenue visible : les coups, les tentes arrachées et confisquées, leurs occupant·es pourchassé·es à coups de grenades lacrymogènes ou de désencerclement ont répliqué à la "constitution d’un campement" qui n’était tout simplement "pas acceptable" selon le communiqué par lequel la préfecture de police et celle de la région Île-de-France (Prif) ont tenté de justifier "la dispersion de cette occupation illicite ».

    Cette opération de police n’a fait que mettre en évidence le traitement que les exilé·es subissent, en réalité, depuis des mois sinon des années. En tout cas depuis que la doctrine du gouvernement repose sur un même credo : parce que leur seule présence n’est "pas acceptable", empêcher qu’ils se rassemblent, disperser tout regroupement, interdire la (re)constitution de tout ce qui peut ressembler, de près ou de loin, à un lieu de vie. Et pour ce faire, entraver et discréditer l’action de toutes celles et ceux qui tentent de substituer l’entraide à l’isolement, la solidarité au dénuement.

    Que personne ne s’y trompe, ces #violences sont depuis longtemps le lot quotidien des habitants des #campements. À Paris et dans les environs de Paris où, par exemple, celles et ceux que la dispersion de celui de Saint Denis, le mardi précédent, avait laissé·es sans solution d’hébergement étaient, ces derniers soirs, systématiquement traqués jusque dans les fourrés où ils étaient contraints de se cacher.

    Si la brutalité policière de la place de la République justifie pleinement les condamnations indignées qu’elle suscite, elle n’a pour autant rien à envier à celle que subissent pareillement, à Calais et dans sa région, les centaines d’exilé·es qui tentent, depuis plusieurs années, de survivre dans le même dénuement et où sévit, sous l’autorité du ministre de l’intérieur, la même politique d’éradication des "points de fixation". Dispersion systématique des campements, harcèlement policier permanent, confiscation des tentes et des effets personnels, coups, invectives, gazages, sont régulièrement constatés et documentés par les associations et bénévoles qui, dans une indifférence fataliste, s’épuisent à tenter d’inverser la logique du rejet.

    En confiant une enquête à l’IGPN sur les événements de la place de la République, le ministre feint d’ignorer que le mauvais scénario qui s’y est joué n’est que la réplique de l’action constante de ses forces de police et le produit d’une politique délibérée qui prétend faire du harcèlement une méthode de dissuasion. Aurait-il soudainement pris conscience des excès, voire même des impasses, de la guerre d’usure ainsi menée contre les exilé·es ?

    Ce serait un revirement spectaculaire de celui qui, après avoir reçu la maire de Calais le 10 septembre dernier, annonçait le renforcement des effectifs de CRS et avoir demandé au préfet du Pas de Calais de prendre un arrêté interdisant aux associations de distribuer de la nourriture aux exilé·es dans le centre de la ville [1].

    « Choquantes », c’est le qualificatif que Gérald Darmanin a choisi à propos des images et vidéos non floutées que les réseaux sociaux ont permis de diffuser et qui lui auraient ouvert les yeux sur les violences exercées par ses propres services.

    Si d’aventure il entendait convaincre de sa volonté de tourner le dos à la politique sur laquelle les événements de la place de la République ont jeté une lumière crue, le retrait du projet de loi sur la sécurité globale serait un premier test de sa sincérité.

    https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article6508
    #violences_policières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #destruction #démantèlement #France #23_novembre_2020
    #place_de_la_République

    • Evacuation de la place de la République : le #rapport vite fait mal fait de l’#IGPN

      Dans son rapport de synthèse sur la soirée de lundi, rendu public sur décision de Gérald Darmanin, la « police des polices » n’évoque que trois scènes. Et concède d’éventuels #manquements dont deux sont déjà aux mains de la justice.

      C’est la copie médiocre d’un élève pris par le temps, mais obligé de rendre son devoir. Saisie d’une #enquête_administrative sur l’évacuation de la place de la République, lundi soir, l’Inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) explique qu’elle a fait de son mieux compte tenu du délai imparti et du cadre posé : « la diffusion sur les réseaux sociaux de vidéos et de messages évoquant des comportements inappropriés de policiers ».

      Dans un « rapport de synthèse » de deux pages adressé au préfet de police de Paris Didier Lallement et rendu public jeudi soir (à télécharger ici) – Gérald Darmanin s’y était engagé –, la directrice de l’IGPN s’excuse presque. « Dans le temps imparti (48 heures), je ne peux vous rendre compte que des conclusions provisoires qui sont contenues dans les trois rapports d’enquête joints. » Lesdits rapports restent confidentiels, les citoyens ayant seulement accès à leur substantifique moelle.

      Il faut souligner, d’abord, ce que le rapport de synthèse n’évoque pas. Rien sur le dispositif policier en lui-même, sa pertinence, sa proportionnalité, les ordres donnés, le recours à des BAC de nuit plutôt qu’à des unités spécialisées dans le maintien de l’ordre. Rien sur les nasses dans lesquelles se sont retrouvés piégés des manifestants et des élus, des avocats, des journalistes. Rien, surtout, sur les migrants vidés de leurs tentes comme des jambons, les affaires confisquées, les chaussures manquantes, la poursuite dans les rues puis la reconduite aux frontières de Paris.

      Invité sur France 2 pour une interview de sept minutes, jeudi soir, le ministre de l’intérieur n’a développé aucun discours critique sur le déroulement de l’opération, renouvelant son soutien au préfet de police. Gérald Darmanin a rappelé que la manifestation place de la République était « illégale » puisque sans « aucune autorisation ». « J’ai demandé qu’on évacue, bien sûr, cette place », a ajouté le ministre, appelant ses concitoyens à ne pas « toujours juger dans l’émotion » provoquée, selon lui, par les images.

      Le rapport de l’IGPN ne porte pas sur la soirée entière mais sur trois scènes, filmées et largement relayées sur les réseaux sociaux comme dans les médias traditionnels. Deux d’entre elles ont déclenché, mardi, l’ouverture d’enquêtes préliminaires menées par le parquet de Paris pour « violences par personne dépositaire de l’autorité publique ». C’est sur celles-là que le rapport s’attarde.

      La première scène montre le croche-pied d’un policier sur un migrant qui tombe au sol, interrompu dans sa fuite. L’auteur de ce croche-pied, un commissaire divisionnaire de la BAC nuit en Seine-Saint-Denis, a reconnu son geste, qu’il explique par la fatigue, la lassitude et un dispositif de maintien de l’ordre mal construit.

      Selon le rapport de synthèse, ce commissaire « avait reçu la mission d’empêcher les usagers d’emprunter la rue dont il tentait d’interdire l’accès ». « S’il est possible de comprendre qu’au regard de ces instructions, il ait envisagé un moyen pour ralentir ou stopper la progression des manifestants, […] le barrage qu’il constituait quasiment seul n’était ni efficace ni inviolé. »

      Compte tenu du risque de blessure grave, et puisque l’homme qui court ne représente aucune menace, l’IGPN conclut que ce geste, choisi « sans doute en une fraction de seconde », constitue « un manquement par un usage disproportionné de la force ». Le ministre a complété au 20 heures : pour cet acte « totalement injustifié », il réclame un conseil de discipline, l’organe interne à la police qui propose des sanctions.

      La deuxième scène, faisant également l’objet d’une enquête judiciaire, montre le journaliste de Brut, Rémy Buisine – même si le rapport prend soin de flouter son nom – recroquevillé au sol, contre un mur, un policier s’agitant au-dessus de lui. Le journaliste a fait savoir, par la suite, que le même agent s’en était pris trois fois à lui dans la soirée. Mais les vidéos de ce moment précis ne permettent pas de discerner, il est vrai, s’il reçoit des coups.

      À ce sujet, le rapport de l’IGPN souligne dans un langage administratif alambiqué que « les constatations réalisées sur la vidéo, malgré l’impression donnée par les images, ne font état d’aucun coup porté par le policier avec les poings ou avec la matraque ». Il résume l’audition du gardien de la paix, qui « nie tout acte de violence, ayant simplement cherché à se dégager d’une situation de corps à corps ».

      Les déclarations de ce policier n’étant « ni corroborées ni infirmées » par d’autres témoignages ou d’autres vidéos, l’IGPN promet de continuer ses investigations « pour compléter et déterminer s’il y a eu usage de la force, pour quelles raisons éventuelles et dans quelles conditions M. Buisine s’est retrouvé allongé au sol ».

      Au détour d’une phrase, le rapport souligne que « l’usager victime n’a pas répondu aux sollicitations de l’IGPN », ce qu’a répété le ministre de l’intérieur sur France 2. « C’est bien évidemment faux, je reste à disposition des enquêteurs dans les plus brefs délais », a répondu Rémy Buisine quelques minutes plus tard.

      Le gardien de la paix mis en cause par Rémy Buisine, appartenant lui aussi à la BAC de nuit du 93, est visible sur d’autres images au cours de la soirée. L’IGPN écarte tout manquement professionnel dans la troisième scène, tendue, où ce fonctionnaire écarte un manifestant d’un coup de pied à l’entrejambe. Car pour l’IGPN, il ne s’agit pas d’un simple coup de pied, mais d’un « chassé frontal », geste technique d’intervention enseigné dans les écoles de police.

      « La technique a été mise en œuvre avec un objectif à ce moment précis de maintien à distance. Le danger (attitude offensive et agressive des manifestants) était réel et de plus en plus imminent. » Ce policier sans casque ni bouclier, qui selon l’IGPN ne disposait pas non plus de gazeuse lacrymogène, « semble avoir utilisé la seule possibilité qu’il avait de repousser ses agresseurs. […] Il a atteint son objectif et n’a pas blessé d’usager ».

      Anticipant, peut-être, les critiques, voire les moqueries, l’IGPN prend soin de rappeler que « tout usage de la force, quelle que soit l’analyse technique et juridique que l’on puisse en faire, est par nature choquant pour des observateurs ». Mais qu’elle se doit de « décortiquer les images » pour en proposer une analyse légale et déontologique. Ce geste, le seul examiné dans son rapport à ne pas faire l’objet d’une enquête pénale, lui semble donc conforme aux canons de la profession.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/261120/evacuation-de-la-place-de-la-republique-le-rapport-vite-fait-mal-fait-de-l

    • #Fabien_Jobard, sociologue, à propos de l’#évacuation de la place de la #République

      #Fabien_Jobard, sociologue, à propos de l’#évacuation de la place de la #République : « Cela illustre la hantise des pouvoirs publics de tout mouvement qui s’installe. Les préfets aujourd’hui sont formés à craindre tout ce qui peut ressembler à une zone d’occupation temporaire ».

      https://twitter.com/_alairlibre/status/1331300451833274372

      Transcription :

      "La hantise de la part des pouvoirs publics de tout mouvement qui s’installe quelque part... Les préfets aujourd’hui sont formés en France à craindre tout ce qui peut, de près ou de loin, ressembler à une #zone_d'occupation_temporaire, voire le pire de tout, une #ZAD.
      En ce qui concerne les migrants, la #peur du #campement.
      Effectivement, on intervient le plus tôt possible, pour éviter que se mettent en place des #habitudes : apporter de la #nourriture, apporter de l’eau, mettre en place des toilettes sèches, que sais-je... qui transforment la Place la république et qui rendent, plus tard, l’évacuation médiatiquement plus difficile. Cela explique une intervention très précoce, brutale, quasi-instantanée, qui a l’avantage en plus, puisqu’on est dans une #bataille_de_l'image... la manifestation... c’est rendre manifeste, rendre visible les choses. Là, elle a l’avantage, en hiver, de se dérouler de #nuit, donc ça explique cette intervention très rapide. Bien sûr les migrants ne sont pas seuls, il y a autour d’eux depuis au moins les années 1970 tout un ensemble d’associations , y compris d’#élus, d’élus locaux, #Audrey_Pulvard, d’élus nationaux comme #Eric_Coquerel... et donc ça donne ces #images difficilement compréhensibles d’élus de la République ne pouvant être entendus, ne parlant presque pas la même langue que des policiers qui semblent exécuter des #ordres venus d’une #autorité très lointaine.

      #Place_de_la_république #points_de_fixation #fixation

    • La #violence comme seul horizon politique

      Inacceptable ; c’est le mot qu’a utilisé le préfet de police de Paris, à propos de l’« #occupation_illicite » de la place de la République après que des exilé·es y ont installé une centaine de tentes, pour justifier la violence rare avec laquelle a été menée, le 24 novembre, leur « #dispersion ».

      Sans doute estimait-il « acceptable » que plusieurs centaines de personnes qui n’avaient pas été prises en charge une semaine auparavant, lors de l’évacuation du campement dans lequel elles survivaient depuis plusieurs semaines porte de Paris, à Saint-Denis, soient privées de toit, contraintes à l’errance et exposées au harcèlement policier.

      Depuis des mois, les violences à l’égard des personnes exilées se sont amplifiées, que ce soit dans le nord-ouest de la France [1], le long de la frontière franco-italienne ou à Paris et dans sa périphérie. Celles infligées lors des opérations de démantèlement de leurs campements – au caractère hautement politique – sont particulièrement impressionnantes.

      Le 17 novembre, une énième expulsion – c’est le 65e démantèlement de grande ampleur en Île-de-France depuis 2015 – mobilise d’importantes forces de police dès 4 heures du matin. Il s’agit, comme chaque fois, de « mettre à l’abri » – provisoirement et dans des hébergements d’urgence [2] – des personnes survivant dans des conditions insalubres et contraires à la dignité humaine. Comme chaque fois, des centaines d’entre elles ne peuvent même pas grimper dans le bus qui les mènerait vers cet hébergement, juste pour souffler. Car, comme chaque fois, l’opération policière n’a pour but que de les faire disparaître. Cette fois encore, les forces de l’ordre ont pourchassé tou·tes ces recalé·es de l’hébergement en banlieue nord et jusque dans les rues de la capitale pour les empêcher de poser leur tente. Au cours des nuits qui ont suivi, la chasse à l’homme a continué avec une violence inouïe.

      Pour que leur sort ne reste pas dans l’ombre, des exilé·es, rejoint·es par des militant·es, ont installé un campement symbolique place de la République en plein cœur de Paris. Dans l’espoir que, leur situation étant ainsi exposée, des solutions de mise à l’abri pérenne leur soient proposées. Mais le préfet de police ne l’entendait pas ainsi et ses troupes, mobilisées en hâte, ne les ont pas lâché·es ; il ne leur a pas fallu plus d’une heure pour sortir les matraques, les grenades lacrymogènes ou de désencerclement et les LBD. Des vidéos, largement diffusées sur les réseaux sociaux, montrent des policiers soulevant des tentes et les secouant pour en faire tomber les occupants, et jetant dans un camion le peu d’affaires que les exilé·es avaient réussi à conserver… Tolérance zéro. Et à nouveau, la traque impitoyable et indigne a recommencé.

      Rarement mises en évidence et condamnées, les violences policières ont cette fois suscité de nombreuses réactions d’indignation, y compris de responsables politiques dont on pourrait attendre qu’ils mobilisent les moyens à leur disposition plutôt que de se contenter de protestations, aussi bienvenues soient-elles. Au demeurant, elles ne peuvent faire oublier que ces violences s’inscrivent dans la continuité de la politique d’éradication des « points de fixation » méthodiquement menée depuis plusieurs années tant à Paris qu’à la frontière britannique ; parce que leur seule présence n’est « pas acceptable », il s’agit d’empêcher que les exilé·es se rassemblent et d’interdire la (re)constitution de tout ce qui peut ressembler à un lieu de vie. Et, pour ce faire, d’entraver et de discréditer l’action de toutes celles et ceux qui tentent de substituer l’entraide à l’isolement, la solidarité au dénuement [3].

      Plusieurs actions sont en cours pour dénoncer ces violences commises devant des journalistes, des membres d’associations et des élu·es, comme la demande de mise en place d’une commission d’enquête parlementaire et le dépôt de plaintes pénales groupées pour violences volontaires et dégradations de biens. On espère qu’elles auront plus de succès que l’enquête confiée à l’IGPN par le ministre de l’intérieur qui s’est dit « choqué » par les événements de la place de la République… feignant d’ignorer qu’ils sont la réplique de l’action constante de ses forces de police et le produit d’une politique délibérée qui prétend ériger le harcèlement en méthode de dissuasion.

      Si le ministre a dû se résoudre à cette désapprobation minimaliste, c’est qu’il ne pouvait que s’incliner devant l’évidence après la circulation de vidéos montrant la violence des forces de l’ordre. Ces images, sans appel, font écho au délit que le gouvernement tente d’intégrer dans la proposition de loi sur la sécurité globale. Les diffuser pourrait, désormais, être passible d’emprisonnement ! En muselant les défenseurs des libertés publiques, le gouvernement veut imposer un monopole policier sur le récit des opérations dites de maintien de l’ordre.

      L’invisibilisation est de longue date un élément central des politiques ignorant les droits et rejetant a priori toute revendication des exilé·es, que les gouvernements voudraient isoler dans un face-à-face à huis clos avec les forces de l’ordre. En cherchant à priver l’ensemble des mouvements sociaux du « droit à l’image », le gouvernement franchit une nouvelle étape de son projet visant à étouffer les voix dissidentes sous la pression policière. Ne le laissons pas faire. Nous ne renoncerons pas à opposer la réalité vécue par les exilé·es aux « éléments de langage » institutionnels.

      https://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article6526

  • Au #Tigré_éthiopien, la #guerre « sans pitié » du prix Nobel de la paix

    Le premier ministre éthiopien #Abyi_Ahmed oppose une fin de non-recevoir aux offres de médiation de ses pairs africains, alors que les combats entre l’armée fédérale et les forces de la province du Tigré ne cessent de prendre de l’ampleur.

    Le gouvernement d’Addis Abéba continue de parler d’une simple opération de police contre une province récalcitrante ; mais c’est une véritable guerre, avec blindés, aviation, et des dizaines de milliers de combattants, qui oppose l’armée fédérale éthiopienne aux forces de la province du Tigré, dans le nord du pays.

    Trois semaines de combats ont déjà provoqué l’afflux de 30 000 #réfugiés au #Soudan voisin, et ce nombre pourrait rapidement grimper après l’ultimatum lancé hier soir par le gouvernement aux rebelles : 72 heures pour se rendre. L’#armée demande aussi à la population de la capitale tigréenne, #Makelle, de se « libérer » des dirigeants du #Front_de_libération_du_peuple_du_Tigré, au pouvoir dans la province ; en cas contraire, a-t-elle prévenu, « il n’y aura aucune pitié ».

    Cette escalade rapide et, en effet, sans pitié, s’accompagne d’une position inflexible du premier ministre éthiopien, Abyi Ahmed, vis-à-vis de toute médiation, y compris celle de ses pairs africains. Addis Abéba a opposé une fin de non-recevoir aux tentatives de médiation, celle des voisins de l’Éthiopie, ou celle du Président en exercice de l’Union africaine, le sud-africain Cyril Ramaphosa. Ils seront poliment reçus à Addis Abéba, mais pas question de les laisser aller au Tigré ou de rencontrer les leaders du #TPLF, le front tigréen considéré comme des « bandits ».

    Pourquoi cette position inflexible ? La réponse se trouve à la fois dans l’histoire particulièrement violente de l’Éthiopie depuis des décennies, et dans la personnalité ambivalente d’Abyi Ahmed, le chef du gouvernement et, ne l’oublions pas, prix Nobel de la paix l’an dernier.

    L’histoire nous donne des clés. Le Tigré ne représente que 6% des 100 millions d’habitants de l’Éthiopie, mais il a joué un rôle historique déterminant. C’est du Tigré qu’est partie la résistance à la sanglante dictature de Mengistu Haile Mariam, qui avait renversé l’empire d’Haile Selassie en 1974. Victorieux en 1991, le TPLF a été au pouvoir pendant 17 ans, avec à sa tête un homme fort, Meles Zenawi, réformateur d’une main de fer, qui introduira notamment le fédéralisme en Éthiopie. Sa mort subite en 2012 a marqué le début des problèmes pour les Tigréens, marginalisés après l’élection d’Abyi Ahmed en 2018, et qui l’ont très mal vécu.

    La personnalité d’Abyi Ahmed est aussi au cœur de la crise actuelle. Encensé pour ses mesures libérales, le premier ministre éthiopien est également un ancien militaire inflexible, déterminé à s’opposer aux forces centrifuges qui menacent l’unité de l’ex-empire.

    Ce contexte laisse envisager un #conflit prolongé, car le pouvoir fédéral ne renoncera pas à son offensive jusqu’à ce qu’il ait, au minimum, repris Mekelle, la capitale du Tigré. Or cette ville est à 2500 mètres d’altitude, dans une région montagneuse où les avancées d’une armée régulière sont difficiles.

    Quant au front tigréen, il a vraisemblablement envisagé une position de repli dans la guerrilla, avec des forces aguerries, dans une région qui lui est acquise.

    Reste l’attitude des pays de la région, qui risquent d’être entrainés dans cette #guerre_civile, à commencer par l’Érythrée voisine, déjà touchée par les hostilités.

    C’est une tragédie pour l’Éthiopie, mais aussi pour l’Afrique, car c’est le deuxième pays le plus peuplé du continent, siège de l’Union africaine, l’une des locomotives d’une introuvable renaissance africaine. L’Afrique doit tout faire pour mettre fin à cette guerre fratricide, aux conséquences dévastatrices.

    https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/geopolitique/geopolitique-23-novembre-2020

    #Ethiopie #Tigré #Corne_de_l'Afrique #Tigray

    • Conflict between Tigray and Eritrea – the long standing faultline in Ethiopian politics

      The missile attack by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front on Eritrea in mid-November transformed an internal Ethiopian crisis into a transnational one. In the midst of escalating internal conflict between Ethiopia’s northernmost province, Tigray, and the federal government, it was a stark reminder of a historical rivalry that continues to shape and reshape Ethiopia.

      The rivalry between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the movement which has governed Eritrea in all but name for the past 30 years – the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front – goes back several decades.

      The histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia have long been closely intertwined. This is especially true of Tigray and central Eritrea. These territories occupy the central massif of the Horn of Africa. Tigrinya-speakers are the predominant ethnic group in both Tigray and in the adjacent Eritrean highlands.

      The enmity between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dates to the mid-1970s, when the Tigrayan front was founded in the midst of political turmoil in Ethiopia. The authoritarian Marxist regime – known as the Derg (Amharic for ‘committee’) – inflicted violence upon millions of its own citizens. It was soon confronted with a range of armed insurgencies and socio-political movements. These included Tigray and Eritrea, where the resistance was most ferocious.

      The Tigrayan front was at first close to the Eritrean front, which had been founded in 1970 to fight for independence from Ethiopia. Indeed, the Eritreans helped train some of the first Tigrayan recruits in 1975-6, in their shared struggle against Ethiopian government forces for social revolution and the right to self-determination.

      But in the midst of the war against the Derg regime, the relationship quickly soured over ethnic and national identity. There were also differences over the demarcation of borders, military tactics and ideology. The Tigrayan front eventually recognised the Eritreans’ right to self-determination, if grudgingly, and resolved to fight for the liberation of all Ethiopian peoples from the tyranny of the Derg regime.

      Each achieved seminal victories in the late 1980s. Together the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and the Eritrean front overthrew the Derg in May 1991. The Tigrayan-led front formed government in Addis Ababa while the Eritrean front liberated Eritrea which became an independent state.

      But this was just the start of a new phase of a deep-rooted rivalry. This continued between the governments until the recent entry of prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

      If there’s any lesson to be learnt from years of military and political manoeuvrings, it is that conflict in Tigray is unavoidably a matter of intense interest to the Eritrean leadership. And Abiy would do well to remember that conflict between Eritrea and Tigray has long represented a destabilising fault line for Ethiopia as well as for the wider region.
      Reconciliation and new beginnings

      In the early 1990s, there was much talk of reconciliation and new beginnings between Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea. The two governments signed a range of agreements on economic cooperation, defence and citizenship. It seemed as though the enmity of the liberation war was behind them.

      Meles declared as much at the 1993 Eritrean independence celebrations, at which he was a notable guest.

      But deep-rooted tensions soon resurfaced. In the course of 1997, unresolved border disputes were exacerbated by Eritrea’s introduction of a new currency. This had been anticipated in a 1993 economic agreement. But in the event Tigrayan traders often refused to recognise it, and it caused a collapse in commerce.

      Full-scale war erupted over the contested border hamlet of Badme in May 1998. The fighting swiftly spread to other stretches of the shared, 1,000 km long frontier. Air strikes were launched on both sides.

      It was quickly clear, too, that this was only superficially about borders. It was more substantively about regional power and long standing antagonisms that ran along ethnic lines.

      The Eritrean government’s indignant anti-Tigray front rhetoric had its echo in the popular contempt for so-called Agame, the term Eritreans used for Tigrayan migrant labourers.

      For the Tigray front, the Eritrean front was the clearest expression of perceived Eritrean arrogance.

      As for Isaias himself, regarded as a crazed warlord who had led Eritrea down a path which defied economic and political logic, it was hubris personified.

      Ethiopia deported tens of thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent.

      Ethiopia’s decisive final offensive in May 2000 forced the Eritrean army to fall back deep into their own territory. Although the Ethiopians were halted, and a ceasefire put in place after bitter fighting on a number of fronts, Eritrea had been devastated by the conflict.

      The Algiers Agreement of December 2000 was followed by years of standoff, occasional skirmishes, and the periodic exchange of insults.

      During this period Ethiopia consolidated its position as a dominant power in the region. And Meles as one of the continent’s representatives on the global stage.

      For its part Eritrea retreated into a militaristic, authoritarian solipsism. Its domestic policy centred on open-ended national service for the young. Its foreign policy was largely concerned with undermining the Ethiopian government across the region. This was most obvious in Somalia, where its alleged support for al-Shabaab led to the imposition of sanctions on Asmara.

      The ‘no war-no peace’ scenario continued even after Meles’s sudden death in 2012. The situation only began to shift with the resignation of Hailemariam Desalegn against a backdrop of mounting protest across Ethiopia, especially among the Oromo and the Amhara, and the rise to power of Abiy.

      What followed was the effective overthrow of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front which had been the dominant force in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition since 1991.

      This provided Isaias with a clear incentive to respond to Abiy’s overtures.
      Tigray’s loss, Eritrea’s gain

      A peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, was signed in July 2018 by Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afeworki. It formally ended their 1998-2000 war. It also sealed the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Many in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front were unenthusiastic about allowing Isaias in from the cold.

      Since the 1998-2000 war, in large part thanks to the astute manoeuvres of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Eritrea had been exactly where the Tigray People’s Liberation Front wanted it: an isolated pariah state with little diplomatic clout. Indeed, it is unlikely that Isaias would have been as receptive to the deal had it not involved the further sidelining of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, something which Abiy presumably understood.

      Isaias had eschewed the possibility of talks with Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn. But Abiy was a different matter. A political reformer, and a member of the largest but long-subjugated ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromo, he was determined to end the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s domination of Ethiopian politics.

      This was effectively achieved in December 2019 when he abolished the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and replaced it with the Prosperity Party.

      The Tigray People’s Liberation Front declined to join with the visible results of the current conflict.

      À lire aussi : Residual anger driven by the politics of power has boiled over into conflict in Ethiopia

      Every effort to engage with the Tigrayan leadership – including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – in pursuit of a peaceful resolution must also mean keeping Eritrea out of the conflict.

      Unless Isaias is willing to play a constructive role – he does not have a good track record anywhere in the region in this regard – he must be kept at arm’s length, not least to protect the 2018 peace agreement itself.

      https://theconversation.com/conflict-between-tigray-and-eritrea-the-long-standing-faultline-in-

      #Derg #histoire #frontières #démarcation_des_frontières #monnaie #Badme #Agame #travailleurs_étrangers #Oromo #Ethiopian_People’s_Revolutionary_Democratic_Front #Prosperity_Party

      –—

      #Agame , the term Eritreans used for Tigrayan migrant labourers.

      –-> #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots
      ping @sinehebdo

    • Satellite Images Show Ethiopia Carnage as Conflict Continues
      – United Nations facility, school, clinic and homes burned down
      – UN refugee agency has had no access to the two camps

      Satellite images show the destruction of United Nations’ facilities, a health-care unit, a high school and houses at two camps sheltering Eritrean refugees in Tigray, northern Ethiopia, belying government claims that the conflict in the dissident region is largely over.

      The eight Planet Labs Inc images are of Hitsats and the Shimelba camps. The camps hosted about 25,000 and 8,000 refugees respectively before a conflict broke out in the region two months ago, according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

      “Recent satellite imagery indicates that structures in both camps are being intentionally targeted,” said Isaac Baker, an analyst at DX Open Network, a U.K. based human security research and analysis non-profit. “The systematic and widespread fires are consistent with an intentional campaign to deny the use of the camp.”

      DX Open Network has been following the conflict and analyzing satellite image data since Nov. 7, three days after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declared war against a dissident group in the Tigray region, which dominated Ethiopian politics before Abiy came to power.

      Ethiopia’s government announced victory against the dissidents on Nov. 28 after federal forces captured the regional capital of Mekelle. Abiy spoke of the need to rebuild and return normalcy to Tigray at the time.

      Calls and messages to Redwan Hussein, spokesman for the government’s emergency task force on Tigray and the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Spokeswoman Billene Seyoum were not answered.

      In #Shimelba, images show scorched earth from apparent attacks in January. A World Food Programme storage facility and a secondary school run by the Development and Inter-Aid Church Commission have also been burned down, according to DX Open Network’s analysis. In addition, a health facility run by the Ethiopian Agency for Refugees and Returnees Affairs situated next to the WFP compound was also attacked between Jan. 5 and Jan. 8.

      In #Hitsats camp, about 30 kilometers (19 miles) away, there were at least 14 actively burning structures and 55 others were damaged or destroyed by Jan. 5. There were new fires by Jan. 8, according to DX Open Network’s analysis.

      The UN refugee agency has not had access to the camps since fighting started in early November, according to Chris Melzer, a communications officer for the agency. UNHCR has been able to reach its two other camps, Mai-Aini and Adi Harush, which are to the south, he said.

      “We also have no reliable, first-hand information about the situation in the camps or the wellbeing of the refugees,” Melzer said in reference to Hitsats and Shimelba.

      Eritrean troops have also been involved in the fighting and are accused of looting businesses and abducting refugees, according to aid workers and diplomats briefed on the situation. The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea have denied that Eritrean troops are involved in the conflict.

      The UN says fighting is still going on in several Tigray areas and 2.2 million people have been displaced in the past two months. Access to the region for journalists and independent analysts remains constrained, making it difficult to verify events.

      https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-09/satellite-images-show-destruction-of-refugee-camps-in-ethiopia?srnd=premi

      #images_satellitaires #camps_de_réfugiés #réfugiés

    • Ethiopia’s government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon

      A rebel region is being starved into submission

      ETHIOPIA HAS suffered famines in the past. Many foreigners know this; in 1985 about one-third of the world’s population watched a pop concert to raise money for starving Ethiopians. What is less well understood is that poor harvests lead to famine only when malign rulers allow it. It was not the weather that killed perhaps 1m people in 1983-85. It was the policies of a Marxist dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who forced peasants at gunpoint onto collective farms. Mengistu also tried to crush an insurgency in the northern region of Tigray by burning crops, destroying grain stores and slaughtering livestock. When the head of his own government’s humanitarian agency begged him for cash to feed the starving, he dismissed him with a memorably callous phrase: “Don’t let these petty human problems...consume you.”

      https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/01/23/ethiopias-government-appears-to-be-wielding-hunger-as-a-weapon

      #famine #faim
      #paywall

    • Amnesty International accuses Eritrean troops of killing hundreds of civilians in the holy city of #Axum

      Amnesty International has released a comprehensive, compelling report detailing the killing of hundreds of civilians in the Tigrayan city of Axum.

      This story has been carried several times by Eritrea Hub, most recently on 20th February. On 12 January this year the Axum massacre was raised in the British Parliament, by Lord David Alton.

      Gradually the picture emerging has been clarified and is now unambiguous.

      The Amnesty report makes grim reading: the details are horrifying.

      Human Rights Watch are finalising their own report, which will be published next week. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is also publishing a report on the Axum massacre.

      The Ethiopian government appointed interim administration of Tigray is attempting to distance itself from the actions of Eritrean troops. Alula Habteab, who heads the interim administration’s construction, road and transport department, appeared to openly criticise soldiers from Eritrea, as well as the neighbouring Amhara region, for their actions during the conflict.

      “There were armies from a neighbouring country and a neighbouring region who wanted to take advantage of the war’s objective of law enforcement,” he told state media. “These forces have inflicted more damage than the war itself.”

      The full report can be found here: The Massacre in Axum – AFR 25.3730.2021. Below is the summary (https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-Massacre-in-Axum-AFR-25.3730.2021.pdf)

      https://eritreahub.org/amnesty-international-accuses-eritrean-troops-of-killing-hundreds-of-civ

      #rapport #massacre

    • Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis: How a massacre in the sacred city of #Aksum unfolded

      Eritrean troops fighting in Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray killed hundreds of people in Aksum mainly over two days in November, witnesses say.

      The mass killings on 28 and 29 November may amount to a crime against humanity, Amnesty International says in a report.

      An eyewitness told the BBC how bodies remained unburied on the streets for days, with many being eaten by hyenas.

      Ethiopia and Eritrea, which both officially deny Eritrean soldiers are in Tigray, have not commented.

      The Ethiopian Human Rights commission says it is investigating the allegations.

      The conflict erupted on 4 November 2020 when Ethiopia’s government launched an offensive to oust the region’s ruling TPLF party after its fighters captured federal military bases in Tigray.

      Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, told parliament on 30 November that “not a single civilian was killed” during the operation.

      But witnesses have recounted how on that day they began burying some of the bodies of unarmed civilians killed by Eritrean soldiers - many of them boys and men shot on the streets or during house-to-house raids.

      Amnesty’s report has high-resolution satellite imagery from 13 December showing disturbed earth consistent with recent graves at two churches in Aksum, an ancient city considered sacred by Ethiopia’s Orthodox Christians.

      A communications blackout and restricted access to Tigray has meant reports of what has gone on in the conflict have been slow to emerge.

      In Aksum, electricity and phone networks reportedly stopped working on the first day of the conflict.
      How was Aksum captured?

      Shelling by Ethiopian and Eritrea forces to the west of Aksum began on Thursday 19 November, according to people in the city.

      “This attack continued for five hours, and was non-stop. People who were at churches, cafes, hotels and their residence died. There was no retaliation from any armed force in the city - it literally targeted civilians,” a civil servant in Aksum told the BBC.
      1px transparent line

      Amnesty has gathered similar and multiple testimonies describing the continuous shelling that evening of civilians.

      Once in control of the city, soldiers, generally identified as Eritrean, searched for TPLF soldiers and militias or “anyone with a gun”, Amnesty said.

      “There were a lot of... house-to-house killings,” one woman told the rights group.

      There is compelling evidence that Ethiopian and Eritrean troops carried out “multiple war crimes in their offensive to take control of Aksum”, Amnesty’s Deprose Muchena says.
      What sparked the killings?

      For the next week, the testimonies say Ethiopia troops were mainly in Aksum - the Eritreans had pushed on east to the town of Adwa.

      A witness told the BBC how the Ethiopian military looted banks in the city in that time.

      he Eritrean forces reportedly returned a week later. The fighting on Sunday 28 November was triggered by an assault of poorly armed pro-TPLF fighters, according to Amnesty’s report.

      Between 50 and 80 men from Aksum targeted an Eritrean position on a hill overlooking the city in the morning.

      A 26-year-old man who participated in the attack told Amnesty: “We wanted to protect our city so we attempted to defend it especially from Eritrean soldiers... They knew how to shoot and they had radios, communications... I didn’t have a gun, just a stick.”
      How did Eritrean troops react?

      It is unclear how long the fighting lasted, but that afternoon Eritrean trucks and tanks drove into Aksum, Amnesty reports.

      Witnesses say Eritrean soldiers went on a rampage, shooting at unarmed civilian men and boys who were out on the streets - continuing until the evening.

      A man in his 20s told Amnesty about the killings on the city’s main street: “I was on the second floor of a building and I watched, through the window, the Eritreans killing the youth on the street.”

      The soldiers, identified as Eritrean not just because of their uniform and vehicle number plates but because of the languages they spoke (Arabic and an Eritrean dialect of Tigrinya), started house-to-house searches.

      “I would say it was in retaliation,” a young man told the BBC. “They killed every man they found. If you opened your door and they found a man they killed him, if you didn’t open, they shoot your gate by force.”

      He was hiding in a nightclub and witnessed a man who was found and killed by Eritrean soldiers begging for his life: “He was telling them: ’I am a civilian, I am a banker.’”

      Another man told Amnesty that he saw six men killed, execution-style, outside his house near the Abnet Hotel the following day on 29 November.

      “They lined them up and shot them in the back from behind. Two of them I knew. They’re from my neighbourhood… They asked: ’Where is your gun’ and they answered: ’We have no guns, we are civilians.’”
      How many people were killed?

      Witnesses say at first the Eritrean soldiers would not let anyone approach the bodies on the streets - and would shoot anyone who did so.

      One woman, whose nephews aged 29 and 14 had been killed, said the roads “were full of dead bodies”.

      Amnesty says after the intervention of elders and Ethiopian soldiers, burials began over several days, with most funerals taking place on 30 November after people brought the bodies to the churches - often 10 at a time loaded on horse- or donkey-drawn carts.

      At Abnet Hotel, the civil servant who spoke to the BBC said some bodies were not removed for four days.

      "The bodies that were lying around Abnet Hotel and Seattle Cinema were eaten by hyenas. We found only bones. We buried bones.

      “I can say around 800 civilians were killed in Aksum.”

      This account is echoed by a church deacon who told the Associated Press that many bodies had been fed on by hyenas.

      He gathered victims’ identity cards and assisted with burials in mass graves and also believes about 800 people were killed that weekend.

      The 41 survivors and witnesses Amnesty interviewed provided the names of more than 200 people they knew who were killed.
      What happened after the burials?

      Witnesses say the Eritrean soldiers participated in looting, which after the massacre and as many people fled the city, became widespread and systematic.

      The university, private houses, hotels, hospitals, grain stores, garages, banks, DIY stores, supermarkets, bakeries and other shops were reportedly targeted.

      One man told Amnesty how Ethiopian soldiers failed to stop Eritreans looting his brother’s house.

      “They took the TV, a jeep, the fridge, six mattresses, all the groceries and cooking oil, butter, teff flour [Ethiopia’s staple food], the kitchen cabinets, clothes, the beers in the fridge, the water pump, and the laptop.”

      The young man who spoke to the BBC said he knew of 15 vehicles that had been stolen belonging to businessmen in the city.

      This has had a devastating impact on those left in Aksum, leaving them with little food and medicine to survive, Amnesty says.

      Witnesses say the theft of water pumps left residents having to drink from the river.
      Why is Aksum sacred?

      It is said to be the birthplace of the biblical Queen of Sheba, who travelled to Jerusalem to visit King Solomon.

      They had a son - Menelik I - who is said to have brought to Aksum the Ark of the Covenant, believed to contain the 10 commandments handed down to Moses by God.

      It is constantly under guard at the city’s Our Lady Mary of Zion Church and no-one is allowed to see it.

      A major religious celebration is usually held at the church on 30 November, drawing pilgrims from across Ethiopia and around the world, but it was cancelled last year amid the conflict.

      The civil servant interviewed by the BBC said that Eritrean troops came to the church on 3 December “terrorising the priests and forcing them to give them the gold and silver cross”.

      But he said the deacons and other young people went to protect the ark.

      “It was a huge riot. Every man and woman fought them. They fired guns and killed some, but we are happy as we did not fail to protect our treasures.”

      https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56198469

  • CNES Géoimage Nouvelles ressources

    Dans une situation difficile, tendue et régressive, les cours en présentiel sont impossibles, les bibliothèques, universitaires en particulier, et les librairies sont fermées et les risques de décrochages se multiplient. Dans ce contexte, le site Géoimage du CNES (Centre Nat. d’Etudes Spatiales) met à disposition en ligne plus de 300 dossiers réalisés par 165 auteurs sur 86 pays et territoires. Pour votre information, voici les derniers dossiers réalisés ces deux derniers mois. Ils constituent peut être une ressource utile pour vos étudiants. En restant a votre disposition.

    1. Nouveaux dossiers en ligne

    #Frontières : entre #guerres, #tensions et #coopérations

    #Pakistan-#Inde-#Chine. Le massif du #K2 et le #Glacier_Siachen : #conflits_frontaliers et affrontements militaires sur le « toit du monde » (L. Carroué )

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/pakistan-inde-chine-le-massif-du-k2-et-le-glacier-siachen-conflits-fro

    Pakistan-Chine. La #Karakoram_Highway : un axe transfrontalier géostratégique à travers l’#Himalaya (L. Carroué)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/pakistan-chine-la-karakoram-highway-un-axe-transfrontalier-geostrategi

    #Afghanistan/ #Pakistan/ #Tadjikistan - Le corridor de #Wakhan : une zone tampon transfrontalière en plein Himalaya (L. Carroué)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/afghanistan-pakistan-tadjikistan-le-corridor-de-wakhan-une-zone-tampon

    Affrontement aux sommets sur la frontière sino-indienne, autour du #Lac_Pangong_Tso dans l’Himalaya (F. Vergez)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/affrontement-aux-sommets-sur-la-frontiere-sino-indienne-sur-le-lac-pan

    #Brésil - #Argentine#Paraguay. La triple frontière autour d’#Iguazu : un des territoires transfrontaliers les plus actifs au monde (C. Loïzzo)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/bresil-argentine-paraguay-la-triple-frontiere-autour-diguazu-un-des-te

    #Grèce#Turquie. Les îles grecques de #Samos et #Lesbos en #mer_Egée : tensions géopolitiques frontalières et flux migratoires (F. Vergez)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/grece-turquie-les-iles-grecques-de-samos-et-lesbos-en-mer-egee-tension

    #Jordanie/ #Syrie : guerre civile, frontière militarisée et #camps_de_réfugiés de #Zaatari (L. Carroué)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/jordanie-syrie-guerre-civile-frontiere-militarisee-et-camps-de-refugie

    Frontières : France métropolitaine et outre-mer

    #Calais : un port de la façade maritime européenne aux fonctions transfrontalières transmanches (L. Carbonnier et A. Gack)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/hauts-de-france-calais-un-port-de-la-facade-maritime-europeenne-aux-fo

    L’Est-#Maralpin : un territoire transfrontalier franco-italo-monégaste au cœur de l’arc méditerranéen (F. Boizet et L. Clerc)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/lest-maralpin-un-territoire-transfrontalier-franco-italo-monegaste-au-

    La principauté de #Monaco : le défi du territoire, entre limite frontalière, densification et extensions urbaines maritimes (P. Briand)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/la-principaute-de-monaco-le-defi-du-territoire-entre-limite-frontalier

    #Guyane_française/ Brésil. La frontière : d’un territoire longtemps contesté à une difficile coopération régionale transfrontalière (P. Blancodini )

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/guyane-francaise-bresil-la-frontiere-un-territoire-longtemps-conteste-

    (Frontières. Pages concours - Capes, Agrégations)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/les-frontieres

    Enjeux géostratégiques et géopolitiques

    Pakistan. #Gwadar : un port chinois des Nouvelles Routes de la Soie dans un #Baloutchistan désertique et instable (C. Loïzzo)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/pakistan-gwadar-un-port-chinois-des-nouvelles-routes-de-la-soie-dans-u

    #Chine. L’archipel des #Paracels : construire des #îles pour projeter sa puissance et contrôler la #Mer_de_Chine méridionale (L. Carroué)

    Chine - L’archipel des Paracels : construire des îles pour projeter sa puissance et contrôler la Mer de Chine méridionale

    #Kings_Bay : la grande base sous-marine nucléaire stratégique de l’#Atlantique (L. Carroué)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/etats-unis-kings-bay-la-grande-base-sous-marine-nucleaire-strategique-

    #Kitsap - #Bangor : la plus grande #base_sous-marine nucléaire stratégique au monde (L. Carroué)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/etats-unis-kitsap-bangor-la-plus-grande-base-sous-marine-nucleaire-str

    #Djibouti / #Yémen. Le détroit de #Bab_el-Mandeb : un verrou maritime géostratégique entre la #mer_Rouge et l’#océan_Indien (E. Dallier et P. Denmat)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/djiboutiyemen-le-detroit-de-bab-el-mandeb-un-verrou-maritime-geostrate

    #Abu_Dhabi : une ville capitale, entre mer et désert (F. Tétart)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/emirats-arabes-unis-abu-dhabi-une-ville-capitale-entre-mer-et-desert

    France et #DROM : dynamiques et mutations

    Languedoc. #Cap_d’Agde : une station touristique au sein d’un littoral très aménagé en région viticole (Y. Clavé)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/languedoc-cap-dagde-une-station-touristique-au-sein-dun-littoral-tres-

    Le sud-est de la #Grande-Terre : les plages touristiques et les #Grands_Fonds, entre survalorisation, inégalités et développement durable (J. Fieschi et E. Mephara)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/guadeloupe-le-sud-est-de-la-grande-terre-les-plages-touristiques-et-le

    #Normandie. #Lyons-la-Forêt et son environnement : entre #Rouen et Paris, un espace rural sous emprise forestière (T. Puigventos)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/normandie-lyons-la-foret-et-son-environnement-entre-rouen-et-paris-un-

    #PACA. L’agglomération de #Fréjus - #Saint-Raphaël : un #littoral méditerranéen touristique urbanisé (S. Revert)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/paca-lagglomeration-de-frejus-saint-raphael-un-littoral-mediterraneen-

    #Tourisme et #patrimonialisation dans le monde

    #Portugal#Lisbonne : la capitale portugaise aux défis d’une #touristification accélérée et d’une patrimonialisation accrue (J. Picollier)

    Portugal - Lisbonne : la capitale portugaise aux défis d’une touristification accélérée et d’une patrimonialisation accrue

    #Floride : le Sud-Ouest, un nouveau corridor touristique et urbain (J.F. Arnal)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/etats-unis-floride-le-sud-ouest-un-nouveau-corridor-touristique-et-urb

    #Alaska. Le #Mont_Denali : glaciers, #parc_national, #wilderness et changement climatique (A. Poiret)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/alaska-le-mont-denali-glaciers-parc-national-wilderness-et-changement-

    #Ile_Maurice. Le miracle de l’émergence d’une petite île de l’#océan_Indien (M. Lachenal)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/ile-maurice-le-miracle-de-lemergence-dune-petite-ile-de-locean-indien

    Le #Grand-Prismatic du Parc National du #Yellowstone : entre wilderness, protection, patrimonialisation et tourisme de masse (S. Sangarne et N. Vermersch)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/etats-unis-le-grand-prismatic-du-parc-national-du-yellowstone-entre-wi

    #Maroc. Contraintes, défis et potentialités d’un espace désertique marocain en bordure du Sahara : Ouarzazate (M. Lachenal)

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/maroc-contraintes-defis-et-potentialites-dun-espace-desertique-marocai

    2. Nouvelle rubrique : « Images A la Une »

    La rubrique Image A La Une a pour objectif de mettre en ligne une image satellite accompagnée d’un commentaire en lien avec un point d’actualité et qui peut donc être facilement mobilisée en cours (cf. incendies de forêt en Australie en janv./ 2020, impact du Coronavirus en avril 2020).

    Fabien Vergez : Affrontements aux sommets sur la frontière sino-indienne, sur le lac Pangong Tso dans l’Himalaya

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/affrontement-aux-sommets-sur-la-frontiere-sino-indienne-sur-le-lac-pan

    Virginie Estève : Les "#Incendies_zombies" en #Arctique : un phénomène surmédiatisé qui alerte sur le réchauffement climatique.

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/incendies-zombies-en-arctique-un-phenomene-surmediatise-qui-alerte-sur

    3. Ouverture d’une nouvelle rubrique : « La satellithèque »

    Le site Géoimage du CNES se dote d’une nouvelle rubrique afin d’enrichir son offre. A côté des images déjà proposées dans les rubriques "dossiers thématiques" ou "Images A la Une", le site Géoimage du CNES met en ligne comme autres ressources des images brutes non accompagnées d’un commentaire ou d’une analyse.

    L’objectif de cette #Satellithèque est d’offrir au plus grand nombre - enseignants, universitaires, chercheurs, étudiants, grand public... - de nombreuses images de la France et du monde. Ainsi, progressivement, dans les mois qui viennent des centaines d’images nouvelles seront disponibles et téléchargeable directement et gratuitement en ligne afin d’accompagner leurs travaux, recherches ou voyages.

    https://geoimage.cnes.fr/fr/geoimage/satellitheque

    4. Ouverture de comptes Twitter et Instagram

    Suivez et partagez l’actualité du site GeoImage à travers Twitter / Instagram, que ce soit de nouvelles mises en ligne ou des évènements autour de ce projet. La publication de nouveaux dossiers et leurs référencements, tout comme la publication de notules dans images à la une est accompagnée de brèves sur ces réseaux sociaux

    Ci-dessous les identifiants pour s’abonner aux comptes Twitter et Instagram

    Compte twitter : @Geoimage_ed

    Compte Instagram : geoimage_ed

    #images_satellitaires #visualisation

    #ressources_pédagogiques

  • Thierry Fournier | La Main invisible

    https://www.thierryfournier.net/la-main-invisible

    La Main invisible

    Série d’#images numériques, impressions fine art sur dibond, dimensions variables, 2020
    Créées à partir de photographies et avec l’aimable autorisation de NnoMan, Amaury Cornu, Benoît Durand, Anne Paq, Julien Pitinome, Kiran Ridley et Charly Triballeau, de 2016 à 2020

    La Main invisible transforme des photographies qui témoignent de #violences_policières, en effaçant intégralement les policiers de l’image. En soulevant la question de la censure et en faisant mine de s’y soumettre, l’image ne montre plus que les personnes subissant un assaut, mené par un vide spectral qui n’a plus ni corps ni visage. Le terme de “main invisible” est un des concepts historiques du libéralisme, qui postule que la somme spontanée des actions du marché conduirait au bien commun.

    Je remercie très chaleureusement les photographes pour leur confiance et leur concours.

  • La #Technopolice, moteur de la « #sécurité_globale »

    L’article 24 de la #loi_Sécurité_Globale ne doit pas devenir l’arbre qui cache la forêt d’une politique de fond, au cœur de ce texte, visant à faire passer la #surveillance et le #contrôle_de_la_population par la police à une nouvelle ère technologique.

    Quelques jours avant le vote de la loi Sécurité Globale à l’Assemblée Nationale, le ministère de l’Intérieur présentait son #Livre_blanc. Ce long #rapport de #prospective révèle la #feuille_de_route du ministère de l’Intérieur pour les années à venir. Comme l’explique Gérard Darmanin devant les députés, la proposition de loi Sécurité Globale n’est que le début de la transposition du Livre dans la législation. Car cette loi, au-delà de l’interdiction de diffusion d’#images de la police (#article_24), vise surtout à renforcer considérablement les pouvoirs de surveillance des #forces_de_l’ordre, notamment à travers la légalisation des #drones (article 22), la diffusion en direct des #caméras_piétons au centre d’opération (article 21), les nouvelles prérogatives de la #police_municipale (article 20), la #vidéosurveillance dans les hall d’immeubles (article 20bis). Cette loi sera la première pierre d’un vaste chantier qui s’étalera sur plusieurs années.

    Toujours plus de pouvoirs pour la police

    Le Livre blanc du ministère de l’Intérieur envisage d’accroître, à tous les niveaux, les pouvoirs des différentes #forces_de_sécurité (la #Police_nationale, la police municipale, la #gendarmerie et les agents de #sécurité_privée) : ce qu’ils appellent, dans la novlangue officielle, le « #continuum_de_la_sécurité_intérieure ». Souhaitant « renforcer la police et la rendre plus efficace », le livre blanc se concentre sur quatre angles principaux :

    - Il ambitionne de (re)créer une #confiance de la population en ses forces de sécurité, notamment par une #communication_renforcée, pour « contribuer à [leur] légitimité », par un embrigadement de la jeunesse – le #Service_National_Universel, ou encore par la création de « #journées_de_cohésion_nationale » (page 61). Dans la loi Sécurité Globale, cette volonté s’est déjà illustrée par la possibilité pour les policiers de participer à la « #guerre_de_l’image » en publiant les vidéos prises à l’aide de leurs #caméras_portatives (article 21).
    - Il prévoit d’augmenter les compétences des #maires en terme de sécurité, notamment par un élargissement des compétences de la police municipale : un accès simplifié aux #fichiers_de_police, de nouvelles compétences en terme de lutte contre les #incivilités … (page 135). Cette partie-là est déjà en partie présente dans la loi Sécurité Globale (article 20).
    - Il pousse à une #professionnalisation de la sécurité privée qui deviendrait ainsi les petites mains de la police, en vu notamment des #Jeux_olympiques Paris 2024, où le besoin en sécurité privée s’annonce colossal. Et cela passe par l’augmentation de ses #compétences : extension de leur #armement, possibilité d’intervention sur la #voie_publique, pouvoir de visionner les caméras, et même le port d’un #uniforme_spécifique (page 145).
    - Enfin, le dernier grand axe de ce livre concerne l’intégration de #nouvelles_technologies dans l’arsenal policier. Le titre de cette partie est évocateur, il s’agit de « porter le Ministère de l’Intérieur à la #frontière_technologique » (la notion de #frontière évoque la conquête de l’Ouest aux États-Unis, où il fallait coloniser les terres et les premières nations — la reprise de ce vocable relève d’une esthétique coloniale et viriliste).

    Ce livre prévoit une multitude de projets plus délirants et effrayants les uns que les autres. Il propose une #analyse_automatisée des #réseaux_sociaux (page 221), des #gilets_connectés pour les forces de l’ordre (page 227), ou encore des lunettes ou #casques_augmentés (page 227). Enfin, le Livre blanc insiste sur l’importance de la #biométrie pour la police. Entre proposition d’#interconnexion des #fichiers_biométriques (#TAJ, #FNAEG, #FAED…) (page 256), d’utilisation des #empreintes_digitales comme outil d’#identification lors des #contrôles_d’identité et l’équipement des #tablettes des policiers et gendarmes (#NEO et #NEOGEND) de lecteur d’empreinte sans contact (page 258), de faire plus de recherche sur la #reconnaissance_vocale et d’#odeur (!) (page 260) ou enfin de presser le législateur pour pouvoir expérimenter la #reconnaissance_faciale dans l’#espace_public (page 263).

    Le basculement technologique de la #surveillance par drones

    Parmi les nouveaux dispositifs promus par le Livre blanc : les #drones_de_police, ici appelés « #drones_de_sécurité_intérieure ». S’ils étaient autorisés par la loi « Sécurité Globale », ils modifieraient radicalement les pouvoirs de la police en lui donnant une capacité de surveillance totale.

    Il est d’ailleurs particulièrement marquant de voir que les rapporteurs de la loi considèrent cette légalisation comme une simple étape sans conséquence, parlant ainsi en une phrase « d’autoriser les services de l’État concourant à la #sécurité_intérieure et à la #défense_nationale et les forces de sécurité civile à filmer par voie aérienne (…) ». Cela alors que, du côté de la police et des industriels, les drones représentent une révolution dans le domaine de la sécurité, un acteur privé de premier plan évoquant au sujet des drones leur « potentiel quasiment inépuisable », car « rapides, faciles à opérer, discrets » et « tout simplement parfaits pour des missions de surveillance »

    Dans les discours sécuritaires qui font la promotion de ces dispositifs, il est en effet frappant de voir la frustration sur les capacités « limitées » (selon eux) des caméras fixes et combien ils fantasment sur le « potentiel » de ces drones. C’est le cas du maire LR d’Asnières-sur-Seine qui en 2016 se plaignait qu’on ne puisse matériellement pas « doter chaque coin de rue de #vidéoprotection » et que les drones « sont les outils techniques les plus adaptés » pour pallier aux limites de la présence humaine. La police met ainsi elle-même en avant la toute-puissance du #robot par le fait, par exemple pour les #contrôles_routiers, que « la caméra du drone détecte chaque infraction », que « les agents démontrent que plus rien ne leur échappe ». Même chose pour la #discrétion de ces outils qui peuvent, « à un coût nettement moindre » qu’un hélicoptère, « opérer des surveillances plus loin sur l’horizon sans être positionné à la verticale au-dessus des suspects ». Du côté des constructeurs, on vante les « #zooms puissants », les « #caméras_thermiques », leur donnant une « #vision_d’aigle », ainsi que « le #décollage possible pratiquement de n’importe où ».

    Tout cela n’est pas que du fantasme. Selon un rapport de l’Assemblée nationale, la police avait, en 2019, par exemple 30 drones « de type #Phantom_4 » et « #Mavic_Pro » (ou « #Mavic_2_Enterprise » comme nous l’avons appris lors de notre contentieux contre la préfecture de police de Paris). Il suffit d’aller voir les fiches descriptives du constructeur pour être inondé de termes techniques vantant l’omniscience de son produit : « caméra de nacelle à 3 axes », « vidéos 4K », « photos de 12 mégapixels », « caméra thermique infrarouge », « vitesse de vol maximale à 72 km/h » … Tant de termes qui recoupent les descriptions faites par leurs promoteurs : une machine volante, discrète, avec une capacité de surveiller tout (espace public ou non), et de loin.

    Il ne s’agit donc pas d’améliorer le dispositif de la vidéosurveillance déjà existant, mais d’un passage à l’échelle qui transforme sa nature, engageant une surveillance massive et largement invisible de l’espace public. Et cela bien loin du léger cadre qu’on avait réussi à imposer aux caméras fixes, qui imposait notamment que chaque caméra installée puisse faire la preuve de son utilité et de son intérêt, c’est-à-dire de la nécessité et de la #proportionnalité de son installation. Au lieu de cela, la vidéosurveillance demeure une politique publique dispendieuse et pourtant jamais évaluée. Comme le rappelle un récent rapport de la Cour des comptes, « aucune corrélation globale n’a été relevée entre l’existence de dispositifs de vidéoprotection et le niveau de la délinquance commise sur la voie publique, ou encore les taux d’élucidation ». Autre principe fondamental du droit entourant actuellement la vidéosurveillance (et lui aussi déjà largement inappliqué) : chaque personne filmée doit être informée de cette surveillance. Les drones semblent en contradiction avec ces deux principes : leur utilisation s’oppose à toute notion d’information des personnes et de nécessité ou proportionnalité.

    Où serons-nous dans 4 ans ?

    En pratique, c’est un basculement total des #pratiques_policières (et donc de notre quotidien) que préparent ces évolutions technologiques et législatives. Le Livre blanc fixe une échéance importante à cet égard : « les Jeux olympiques et paralympiques de Paris de 2024 seront un événement aux dimensions hors normes posant des enjeux de sécurité majeurs » (p. 159). Or, « les Jeux olympiques ne seront pas un lieu d’expérimentation : ces technologies devront être déjà éprouvées, notamment à l’occasion de la coupe de monde de Rugby de 2023 » (p. 159).

    En juillet 2019, le rapport parlementaire cité plus haut constatait que la Police nationale disposait de 30 drones et de 23 pilotes. En novembre 2020, le Livre blanc (p. 231) décompte 235 drones et 146 pilotes. En 14 mois, le nombre de drones et pilotes aura été multiplié par 7. Dès avril 2020, le ministère de l’Intérieur a publié un appel d’offre pour acquérir 650 drones de plus. Rappelons-le : ces dotations se sont faites en violation de la loi. Qu’en sera-t-il lorsque les drones seront autorisés par la loi « sécurité globale » ? Avec combien de milliers d’appareils volants devra-t-on bientôt partager nos rues ? Faut-il redouter, au cours des #JO de 2024, que des dizaines de drones soient attribués à la surveillance de chaque quartier de la région parisienne, survolant plus ou moins automatiquement chaque rue, sans répit, tout au long de la journée ?

    Les évolutions en matières de reconnaissance faciale invite à des projections encore plus glaçantes et irréelles. Dès 2016, nous dénoncions que le méga-fichier #TES, destiné à contenir le visage de l’ensemble de la population, servirait surtout, à terme, à généraliser la reconnaissance faciale à l’ensemble des activités policières : enquêtes, maintien de l’ordre, contrôles d’identité. Avec le port d’une caméra mobile par chaque brigade de police et de gendarmerie, tel que promis par Macron pour 2021, et la retransmission en temps réel permise par la loi « sécurité globale », ce rêve policier sera à portée de main : le gouvernement n’aura plus qu’à modifier unilatéralement son #décret_TES pour y joindre un système de reconnaissance faciale (exactement comme il avait fait en 2012 pour permettre la reconnaissance faciale à partir du TAJ qui, à lui seul, contient déjà 8 millions de photos). Aux robots dans le ciel s’ajouteraient des humains mutiques, dont le casque de réalité augmentée évoqué par le Livre Blanc, couplé à l’analyse d’image automatisée et aux tablettes numériques NEO, permettrait des contrôles systématiques et silencieux, rompus uniquement par la violence des interventions dirigées discrètement et à distance à travers la myriade de drones et de #cyborgs.

    En somme, ce Livre Blanc, dont une large partie est déjà transposée dans la proposition de loi sécurité globale, annonce le passage d’un #cap_sécuritaire historique : toujours plus de surveillance, plus de moyens et de pouvoirs pour la police et consorts, dans des proportions et à un rythme jamais égalés. De fait, c’est un #État_autoritaire qui s’affirme et se consolide à grand renfort d’argent public. Le Livre blanc propose ainsi de multiplier par trois le #budget dévolu au ministère de l’Intérieur, avec une augmentation de 6,7 milliards € sur 10 ans et de 3 milliards entre 2020 et 2025. Une provocation insupportable qui invite à réfléchir sérieusement au définancement de la police au profit de services publiques dont le délabrement plonge la population dans une #insécurité bien plus profonde que celle prétendument gérée par la police.

    https://www.laquadrature.net/2020/11/19/la-technopolice-moteur-de-la-securite-globale
    #France #Etat_autoritaire

    ping @isskein @karine4 @simplicissimus @reka @etraces

  • Les parapluies du Perthus. La #Retirada et les paradoxes de la #visibilité

    Malgré sa force évocatrice, le caractère iconique de l’image documentaire fait parfois ombrage à une partie de la mémoire des événements. Les photographies de l’#exil espagnol en #France à la fin des années 1930 en témoignent, il faut savoir épuiser le visible pour saisir une réalité plus enfouie de cet épisode. L’historienne Marianne Amar se confronte à cet exercice et propose une relecture de quatre images de la Retirada.

    Il pleuvait ce jour-là au #col_du_Perthus, mais la #mémoire n’en a rien gardé. Les photographies de l’exil espagnol en France — près de cinq cent mille réfugiés au début de 1939, à la fin de la guerre civile — construisent, par leur abondance, un continent visuel au croisement des #iconographies de la #guerre et de l’exil. Ce territoire sans cesse redessiné par des #images retrouvées, constitue un corpus labile, patiemment édifié par des photographes aux trajectoires multiples. Les uns, comme #Robert_Capa ou #David_Seymour, ont affûté leur vision en Espagne, pendant la guerre. Ils arrivent à la #frontière dans le sillage des #réfugiés, ne restent que quelques jours mais produisent des #icônes. D’autres, comme #Auguste_Chauvin, travaillent à #Perpignan. Ils assistent à l’événement depuis la France et en rendent compte dans la diversité de ses lieux et de ses acteurs. Les derniers, enfin, comme #Augusti_Centelles, photographe de l’armée républicaine espagnole interné à son arrivée, en sont à la fois les protagonistes et les témoins.

    Pourtant, en dépit de cette abondance, ce corpus demeure travaillé par l’#invisibilité. Manquent les images « absentes », perdues ou détruites dans la tourmente qui va suivre. Mais l’invisibilité se cache aussi dans les replis de la photographie, qu’il faut questionner et « inquiéter » pour en révéler toute la puissance documentaire. Les images les plus connues de la Retirada fonctionnent comme des icônes, qui construisent un répertoire visuel désormais bien balisé : la « #vague » des réfugiés saisie frontalement au col du Perthus ; l’empilement des armes confisquées aux soldats ; les femmes et les enfants harassés ; les réfugiés encadrés par des gendarmes ; les #camps d’internement improvisés, puis structurés autour des marques de l’ordre — #barbelés, #baraques, #miradors. Autant d’archétypes qui assurent durablement la #mise_en_spectacle du réfugié, mais qu’il faut mettre en doute pour dévoiler ce qui reste invisible. On proposera, pour esquisser une méthode, quatre exercices de relecture.

    Le premier constitue une mise en abyme de l’image et de son auteur. Robert Capa arrive à #Argelès, en mars 1939, passablement abattu. Il avait quitté les exilés juste avant l’ouverture de la frontière ; il revient pour un reportage sur les #camps_d’internement. Sa position a changé. Il n’est plus le témoin engagé aux côtés des combattants, mais un visiteur qui doit solliciter autorisations et accréditations. Distance accrue par sa position personnelle : apatride, bientôt « indésirable » pour l’administration française, il pense rejoindre sa famille déjà installée à New York. « Ici, le moral est mauvais et je ne sais pas ce qui va se passer. », a-t-il confié à sa mère début février. Entre Argelès et #Le_Barcarès, Capa prend, à sa manière, congé de l’Espagne et son portrait d’un réfugié, violon à la main, ressemble fort à un autoportrait du photographe, qu’il faut relire au travers de sa biographie, inquiet et d’une infinie mélancolie.

    Retour à la frontière. Une photographie publiée par L’Illustration en février 1939 montre un groupe sur la route du #col_d’Arès. Deux enfants et un adulte cheminent difficilement, tous trois mutilés, entourés d’un autre homme et d’un adolescent. Rien ne permet alors de les identifier, mais quelle importance ? Cadrés d’assez près, privés de détails contextuels, ils incarnent les « désastres de la guerre » et l’image prend ainsi une portée universelle. Or, deux enquêtes menées dans les années 2000 permettent de la relire autrement. Avancent côte à côte, et sur deux rangs, Mariano Gracia et ses trois enfants. À leurs côtés, marche Thomas Coll, un Français ancien combattant de 14-18, lui aussi mutilé, venu en voisin soutenir et accompagner les réfugiés. S’incarne donc ici, dans le silence de l’image, des gestes ordinaires de solidarité, qui viennent nuancer les représentations d’une France hostile et xénophobe.

    Le camp de #Bram, saisi par Augusti Centelles à hauteur d’interné, brouille également les évidences. Autorisé à conserver son matériel et à photographier à l’intérieur des barbelés, il tient boutique dans une baraque, vend ses tirages aux gendarmes et bénéficie de l’aide logistique du commandant. Tous les internés ne furent pas, bien sûr, logés à pareille enseigne. Mais les images de Centelles, leurs conditions de production et les comptes minutieusement tenus dans son journal révèlent que la photographie fut, pour lui, un instrument de survie et contribuent à mettre en lumière, dans une chronologie fine, les sociabilités complexes dans les camps de la République.

    À Perpignan, Auguste Chauvin fournit la presse, surtout locale, et, pour des événements d’importance, il tire et vend des séries de cartes postales. Il fera ainsi un « Album souvenir de l’exode espagnole » (sic) légendé en deux langues. Dans sa chronique quotidienne de la Retirada, Chauvin révèle des présences et des moments ignorés : les #soldats_coloniaux, mobilisés pour surveiller les réfugiés, caracolant sur la plage d’Argelès à côté de leur campement ; les forces franquistes arrivées au #Perthus et fêtant leur victoire ; les réfugiés passant la frontière de nuit ; la visite d’Albert Sarraut, ministre de l’Intérieur.

    Les photographies de Chauvin n’ont pas la puissance des icônes, mais elles en sont l’indispensable contrepoint. Nulle dimension héroïque dans ses cadrages et ses compositions : Chauvin reste à bonne distance des réfugiés sans jamais faire corps avec l’exil. Mais avec ces images banales, parfois maladroites, il les dépouille, par instants, d’une identité de réfugié et les réintègre dans une vie ordinaire. Attendre devant le bureau de change ou ceux de la douane ; faire halte pour manger, en uniforme, sur le bord de la route ; aller aux nouvelles à l’entrée d’une baraque ; regarder la mer. Et sortir un parapluie pour s’abriter d’une averse au Perthus.

    http://icmigrations.fr/2020/10/08/defacto-022-04

    #photographie #histoire #guerre_d'Espagne

    ping @albertocampiphoto

  • Open-source #satellite data to investigate #Xinjiang concentration camps

    The second part of this series discusses techniques on how to analyse a dire human rights situation in and around Xinjiang’s re-education and detention facilities.

    A pressing need to investigate characteristics of Xinjiang’s detention camps

    The story has been widely covered. Calls by human rights advocates to define China’s practices as ‘genocide’ grow louder. Hundreds of thousands of Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslims detained in internment camps. Many still are.

    “Inmates undergo months or years of indoctrination and interrogation aimed at transforming them into secular and loyal supporters of the party”, the New York Times wrote and published documents that unmistakably prove a dire human rights situation in the west of China.

    First China denied the camps ever existed. Then the Chinese consulate doesn’t bother anymore to play a smoke and mirror game and admits: “Xinjiang has set up vocational education and training centres in order to root out extreme thoughts…”. Their purpose: ‘compulsory programs for terrorist criminals’.

    Now, the language changed again. China’s President said the ‘strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era is completely correct.’

    Unacceptable (and unwise) of some to deny it. Social media commentators, some who are frequently quoted by large media organisations, keep casting doubt on the tragic story. Margaret_Kimberley tweeted — after an ITV news report emerged — “These are lies. There is no evidence of Uighur concentration camps. More hybrid war against China” (it received 2,000 likes).

    While there is no room left to doubt that these camps do exist, there remains vast uncertainty whether investigative journalists and human rights advocates located all facilities spread out across the province.

    Researchers/journalists who made it their beat to find them, like Nathan Ruser at Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), says “we don’t believe that we have found them all”, after posting 380 facilities online.

    Germany’s chancellor last week said China’s President Xi offered delegates to send envoys to visit Xinjiang province [and camps] to see for themselves. Chances increase to see more of the so-called ‘show camps’ for a short period of time or as long as the visits take (the BBC encountered it when it visited last time). Xi also ensured that there will be an ‘ongoing human-rights dialogue’. But Ursula von der Leyen tweeted “a lot remains to be done .. in other chapters of our relations”.

    Satelite investigations exposing more and more evidence. OSINT journalists rely on them. It’s one reason why some open-source intelligence journalism colleagues keep hearing rumours that some of the camps may have moved underground (e.g. detention in under-surface facilities) to hide from the spying eyes and scrutiny of satellite data analysts (we don’t have proof for this thesis but I encourage you to reach out if you have evidence).
    Mounting number of facilities

    The number of confirmed facilities steadily grew. A 2018 BBC investigation looked at 101 campsites, which got pinpointed via various media reports and academic research, the author says.

    Most recently, Buzzfeed investigated 268 compounds, many from previous lists I worked on too. In February, the list of ‘confirmed re-education camps’, so lower-security sites, mainly for indoctrination purposes, was limited to mere 50 facilities. ‘Confirmed’ in this context means they have been validated by eye-witness reports. Back then, there were another 170 that had yet to be confirmed.

    It is of vital importance to keep this investigation rolling. This means to forensically document the changes in these camps and to spend more time on characterizing each detail. ASPI just dropped a new list and we are going to work with that one instead of the original 50 we received (the list can be downloaded here and geodata that can be simply dragged and dropped into QGIS and Google Earth Pro, it is available here).

    Finally, news broke via Reuters (and research by Adrian Zenz) that evidence of forced labour is mounting also in Tibet (we will look into this later, too).
    List of ‘expanded camps’ extended

    Earlier in the year US-based Uighure group ETNAM shared a list with around 50 confirmed sites. We and others scrutinised this list on increased activity on the ground via aggregated satellite remote sensing data (link). The list was shared as klm. file. It helped enormously with going through them one by one. All the coordinates as well as the Chinese names of the places are accessible via Google Earth Pro. Now that ASPI dropped a new list with coordinates and updated 2020 records, some of the work we have started can be extended and match.

    Because we are most interested in the camps that got expanded (so buildings or features were added), we will concentrate on the list of facilities that were developed. It includes a list of 61 sites.

    Why is the onus on expanded camps? In addition to the characteristics ASPI added as classifiers, the extended camps might tell us where the local administration invests and where forced labour in the firm of Uighur prisoners went. We added a few more details for each facility that we thought was worth looking at (see sheet above).
    We will go through various ways to characterise/investigate facilities and their surroundings

    First significant markers includes the size of the camps. That includes quantitative details such as the number of buildings on the premise and adjacent to it. We will go through how to compare them. There are the walls of camps that are usually quite straight-lined. Their height, which we will define and validate, and the walls’ thickness may tell us something about recent developments (e.g. how secure the sites are, or were meant to be).

    Guard towners are also a quantifiable element. ASPI and others counted them. Because they can be seen from outside they may act as a signal to local residents. That is also likely the reason why those facilities that have some or all of their towers removed recently tend to locate closer to residential buildings (see my stats below).

    These changes are further revealing as they may tell us something about how the local government in various parts of the region varied in their response to international pressure (or not, by keeping them in place). ‘A lot [camps] had their security features removed in the second half of 2019’, Zenz explained. Some remained in place (important to add here, it remains doubtful that conditions improved inside of the camps, even if towers or security features were removed).

    Zenz has an explanation for some of the changes: “On the same time they invited all these delegations and visitors, they released a lot of people. If you release a lot of people, you can afford to run with fewer security features. That can still be run like an internment camp, I’m sure”. We will look closer at what has changed ourselves.

    Including those features above, there are a number of other aspects to take into account. We put them into the list below — each will be discussed separately:

    What blue factory buildings in and around camps can tell us
    What typical ‘prison features’ tell us
    What cars in parking lots tell us about personnel working at the facilities during Covid-19
    What walls can tell us
    What guard towers can tell us
    What sports facilities can tell us
    What the shapes/types of buildings and location can tell us
    What agricultural space (e.g. fields) around the camps can tell us
    What potential crematory sites reveal
    What Xinjiang’s export tell us
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment and surveillance
    What Baidu maps can tell us

    Blue-roofed factory buildings

    In satellite images, they are very pronounced with their blue coating. They may also heat up in the summer.

    Most of them are factory buildings, has been reported. You can see them added in and around camp facilities, whether they are low or high security premises.

    We can quantify them by counting them or via quantifying the space they take up. ASPIT decided to count them, though some buildings are smaller and other are massive. Google Earth has a polygon area measuring tool. A third option is to write a statistical model to calculate square meters factory floor space. If you are lazy you can consult a service that helps you with that via a visual detection algorithm — it calculates the area and records the number of blue roof buildings for a given satellite image.

    One of the camps that expanded in the past two years is the tier 1 low-security re-education facility in Bugur in Bayingolu (41.808855284.3005783). It has a dense network of factory buildings nearby (around 23) and within its own walls there are eight. We used ASPI’s data to confirm this that noted: ‘considerable room for expansion’.

    Let’s run the classification system over it and classify how much blue-roofed buildings that scatter around the camp can we count (importantly not all are factory spaces but many will be).

    On the AI model: I downloaded the images with their highest resolution from Google Earth. To make the image a bit clearer for the model, I adjusted the brightness, upped the contrast and tinkered with the exposure. We can see the blue buildings, roughly in a radius of 1.5 to 2 miles (see image), account for about 1,464.9 m² (0.15ha). The number of little blue buildings expanded considerably since 2014 where they accounted for 1,022m2 (0.10 ha) — sadly we only have an image for 2014 and one for 2019.

    Short intersection on the availability of images available in Google Earth:

    Some of the important images to document the progression of these camps are missing. Some camps have a mere handful of publically available images (as in the case above). This is appalling and private satellite image companies need to be nudged to make more images public. Especially for the latest developments, this is urgently needed. Researchers noted down the latest dates for which images are available at the time of writing. Below we see them grouped by months, and then by facility category (tier 1 to 4).

    What about bias to provide fewer updates on higher-security facilities? We don’t have much to go in here (there is no direct evidence that western satellite companies are being pressured into not publishing their images for camps on Google). Despite only a few camps that didn’t get updated at all over the past two years, we can see at the time of writing that Google and others hold more images for lower tier facilities (1 and 2) than for higher-security facilities (tier 3 and 4):

    Continuing on the factories, another example is the facility in Maralbeshi County (39°49’7.84"N, 78°31’4.37"E). It was erected around 2017/2018. In Google Earth, you can see how the blue-roofed buildings surround the internment complex. Note, how the larger blue factory complexes to the left and right were there before the camp was erected.

    In other words, the camp was planned and embedded into existing factory operation. It further corroborates a thesis that factory work by prisoners (in the form of forced labour), was part of a grander plan all along (though, to be certain, looking at satellite images alone does not suffice).

    Adrain Zenz thinks blue roof factories is something that warrants looking into in more detail. A bunch of these blue roof factory building were erected in 2018, especially in the second half. Zenz explains it’s important timing because the policy documents on forced labour, as explained in his post from last December, shows that a lot of this kind of policy was released in the first half or mid of 2018.

    A recent Buzzfeed investigation did mention blue roofs but surprisingly didn’t pay more attention to the matter. The factories grow in importance as the forced labour of imprisoned groups is being increasingly ‘commercialised’.

    ASPI’s data recorded the distance (measured in km I assume) between the 380 facilitates and the local/nearest industrial parks — where some of the forced labour could have moved to put to work. The data categorizes facilities in four areas of security (ranging from Tier 1= re-education camp to Tier 4= prison facility). Tear two and tier three camps tend to be located more closely to the industrial centre of the towns, the data suggests (see chart below):

    Zenz adds: “what’s significant is the sudden increase of blue roof, single story, flat type factory buildings. It’s consistent with policy, and also release, the Karakax list also talks about people being released into forced labour. A lot of that took place in 2019.”

    The blue metal barracks found in Dabancheng shining light yellow in the sentinel IR images as they are being reflected. Low res Sentinel 2 data also suggests that these metal-like structures in the south of the Payzawat camp (Payzawat County, 39.538372, 76.713606) may also heat up in the summer. SWIR (short-wave infrared imagery) and NIR can be used for heat monitoring.

    Prisons features: camps that imprisoned people become more ‘secure’ not less:

    Among the around 60 camps that have expanded recently, half of it are tier 3 or tier 4 facilities —detention centers and prisons with high security features.

    While it is true that some camps removed some of the towers and other security features (labelled ‘desecuritisation’ by ASPI’s records), others increased theirs. Those happened to be facilities that are detention centres and prison. In the context that Chinese authorities moved prisoners to these more secure facilities with less transparency and harsher treatments, this is cause for concern.

    Let’s look at an example. From the list of expanded camps, there is the camps Yarkant Facility in the Kashgar prefecture (38.351531177.3055467). Since 2018, we saw a nearly 10,000 m2 large factory compound built (compare images from 5/8/2018 with 1/21/2018). Then, a year later, watch downers got added. There are now 8 towners. For such a small facility that’s quite conspicuous. The reason it’s a high-security prison facility.

    Newly built detention/prison facilities created between 2018 and 2020 are of special interest. Camps like the tier 3 (detention) camp of Sanji Facility (#3, 44.102764,86.9960751), a with several watchtowers and an external wall is important as we can follow the progression of each step of the building process with high-resolution images.

    The location was probably chosen because of a lower-security area nearby, north of the facility (3/7/2018). Building must have started in the summer. A couple of months after the last shot (8/11/2018) the blue-roofed factory gets built-in the north-west of the camp (a reason to assume a direct relationship there) and within two weeks in August the main building takes shape. At the same time, the walls get erected and we can make out the layout of the facility with its heavy concrete structures.

    We can see, those are fundamentally different from building built in other lower-security camps. Then two months later it’s almost completed.

    The speed of building is noteworthy (better trackable if we had access to a more continuous stream of images). From the few images we have above and those from Sentinel 2, below, we can assume that it took the developers between three to four months in pure building time to pull it up — an astonishing pace. China is renowned for its fast building pace. For many other areas, such as coal plants and artificial island-building its cookie-cutter approach — where blueprints are being re-used over and over again - it permits building more quickly.

    Other who looked at the situation in Xinjiang reported that many Uighurs held in lower-tier facilities could have been moved/transferred to higher-tier prisons. In other words, despite some re-education camps have experienced ‘de-securitisation’, half of the camps that expanded are higher security facilities, so tier 3 (detention) or tier 4 (prison) camp facilities.

    What parking lots tell us about the camps during Covid-19

    I believe this topic has largely remained unexplored. Busy parking lots are one way to tell how many staff members are on site. Especially interesting it this for the recent month that were affected by coronavirus. We dont know much about the conditions inside of the facilities.

    But with fewer staff members around (and fewer visitors allowed — previous reporting has revealed that detention centres have ‘small visitor centres’), the lives of inmates may have worsened. There was some reporting that Covid-19 cases spiralled in the province of Xinjiang and some expressed concern that cases could spread within camps. It’s possible, no doubt. With only a few cases in the whole region, though, the risk is lower.

    Pandemic related fears may have affected the material and food supply. Sick imprisoned detainees may go without healthcare treatment for weeks or months. All these are assumptions for which we have little evidence. But the possibility alone raises concerns. If it is true that prisoners remained in the facilities during Covid, they could have suffered from the absence of staff and proper care.

    From satellite images, it is hard to know — though there is some evidence from an eyewitness account shared by a historian, a Georgetown professor on his Medium page.

    We might be able to tell how many temporary people were on sites (those that use their car to leave for the night). Counting vehicles at nearby car parks is one way.

    At some facilities, we can clearly see the parking lot. An example is Ghulja City (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). It’s a fairly large car park. We can use Picterra system (there is a 10 day free trial version) to check the satellite images for May 23 — thought there isn’t much to count, the car park is empty.

    Seven months earlier, on October 24th of 2019, we count around 120 cars (with some false positives, but that’s good enough for us). The algo gives you a count so you don’t have to count the red boxes one by one. Once trained, we can run it on subsequent images.

    Let’s walk you through how to train and count the cars. I simplify here (a more complete tutorial can be found here and in their platform). First, we use one of the images to train the algorithm on the cars in the car park. Then we run it on the other pictures. It’s neat and simple (and quick if you don’t have time to run your own statistical model in python).

    The number of vehicles dropped during the heights of Covid-19.

    We could do this for other confirmed location such as the facility in Chochek City (Tǎchéng Shì, 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E) where car numbers dropped in April. We see this in many other facilities (for those that expanded).

    Hotan City Facility #1 (37.1117019, 79.9711546) with 81 cars in the parking lot at the end of 2019 dropped to 10 during the height of the pandemic. Similar developments have been perceived at Hotan County Facility 1 (37.2420734 79.8595074), Ghulja Facility 1 (43.9756437 81.5009539) and a number of others.
    Calculating rooms and capacity

    How many people fit in a facility. If we take the example of the re-education camp in Chochek City ( 46°43’3.79"N, 82°57’15.23"E), we have high res Google images for the end of March and end of April of 2020. We can see the thin middle part is three stories high and in earlier images (Jul 18, 19) we can see the southern part is four stories high. In 2018, we got an image of the foundation when it was built. This provides enough detail to calculate that the facility has around 367 rooms — for the total t-shaped building with the arms.

    –—

    –—

    In the example above, we shouldn’t be too sure that alls detainees were kept in the facility during Covid. Some reports claim that some of the other lower security re-education centres kept people ‘only during the day for indoctrination classes’ (it’s certainly different for the high-security prison facility that is also on the premise of the Payzawat facility, see in the south, with their towers).

    Comparing camp sizes

    The total size of the camps matters, especially when they get extended. Most of the camps have clear wall frames build around them. It’s one of the most important and simple characteristics. The wall frames makes it relatively easy to draw shapes in your geolocation system of choice (the sheer size of the walls, might be less ideal to gauge the number of prisoners).

    Some have vast empty space in between might suggest that other faculty sections or factory buildings are due to be added. Some are cramped with building.

    Tracing and calculating the area of wall frames in Google Earth for some of the largest camps, we get what we already knew:

    To emulate the work ASPI’s data was posted here. A number of track and trace tutorials for Google Earth (one here on measuring property space) are available on YouTube.
    Staking out camp size:

    The Qariqash County/قاراقاش ناھىيىسى‎ /墨玉县(Mòyù Xiàn, 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E) sits in the South of the large stretch of desert.

    We use the polygon tool in Google Earth to stake out the clearly marked walls. You usually end up with a rectangle. Under measurements (right-click on the item) you can see the perimeter is around 1.65 km and the area is roughly 16.7 hectares (0.17 square km).

    Now we can compare it with another one on the list, the camp in Aqsu City (41°11’27.12"N, 80°16’25.08"E). It’s markedly smaller, with a perimeter of 1.1km and only an area of 5.65 hectares. There are other ways to do this in QGIS, a geoinformation system more efficiently.
    What can walls and towers tell us?

    How tall are walls at some of the camps? The answer varies across the vast variety of facilities. Height may tell us something about who built the camp and the level of security. It’s unsurprising to find different heights at different camps built by different planners.

    Where we don’t have shades available, we can check the two images above and reference them with the people in the image and define the height this way. Another standard way to calculate height is using the shades by the walls and towers and calculate the height via Google Earth and SunCalc.

    The shade of the southern wall in the satellite image from 03/19/2020 for the Dabancheng camp is around 7.62 meters long. The towers on the southern wall for those dates result in a height of around ~8meters.

    But the images in the Reuters shots look different. That’s why they were taken a year or two earlier. Satellite images from 4/22/2018 show clearly the octagonal shapes of the tower shades. If we calculate again, the shade of the tower is around 9 meters long, translating into around 14 meters in height.

    We do this for the wall as well. What we find is that, although the towers disappeared (though, some are still there, just not protruding so visibly), the only thing that really changed is the height of the walls — now around 13.5m tall, compared with 9.5m in 2018. The same towners, removed from one Dabancheng camp, then re-emerged half a kilometre south-east at the other newly built one (2019).

    Why are we even bothering measuring height? On one hand we want to answer how security changed across the camps. Are walls getting higher? Do they change in their layout. It helps to classify the type of camps. The higher the walls, the more secure they probably were meant to be. Higher wall might mean higher chance that prisoners are held at facilities over night. It also may help to disprove claims by XJ denialists.

    We can verify the Suncalc analysis with images. Cherchen County, for which we reviewed images for 12/14/19 shows roughly the same height. Explainer how to measure the height of an object from satellite image available here and here.

    The number of press images of the camps is limited. Most are by Reuters or AFP/Badung Police. It is this one here (37°14’29.78"N, 79°51’35.00"E). More local street footage, though not of camps, might be obtainable via Mapillary.

    Buildings shapes/outlines and location of camps

    Let’s start with the location of the facilities first. ASPI recorded the type of security for its 380 odd facilities, and for many the distance to populated areas such as residential buildings. When local administration planned on where to place the facilities they might have taken into account how the neighbouring public should (or shouldn’t) perceived them. More secluded camps are more hidden from public scrutiny. Those near people’s homes or schools may be placed there to have the opposite effect.

    What’s immediately apparent when running a few inferential statistics on the records is that the more secure detention centres tend to be kept further away from buzzing residential areas — meaning, further away than for instance Tier 1 re-education camps, which are often nestled between residential parts of cities, or occupying old schools.

    Agriculture/fields around the camps — investigating forced labour by detainees

    Identifying agricultural fields near or around facilities may reveal some potential aspects of how forced labour in the camps were used in close vicinity.

    Especially for secluded faculties, with not much else urban life going on (so reducing the possibility that other local farmers were involved in working the them), the chance increases that Uighurs detained were used.

    One example is the facility near Yingye’ercun, in Gulja, with a 0.16km2 large campground (43°58’37.52"N, 81° 8’18.98"E). The farming area that was developed since 2018 (shortly after the multistorey buildings was built in the core of the facility) spans 1.7km2 and is clearly marked (which includes the facility itself, see in red below).

    In other words, once the camp was built the fields surrounding it got worked and developed— unlikely to be only a convenient coincident. The nearby factory complex was also extended.

    Often it warrant also checking with Sentinel 2 images on EO browser. In this case, it’s useful because it allows us to visualise agricultural development via its invisible light remote sensing capabilities. Additional bands (which Google images lack) give access to the invisible spectrum and shows the agricultural expansion (here shown in red via the false colour composite, commonly used to assess plant density and health, “since plants reflect near-infrared and green light, while they absorb red”. Exposed ground are grey or tan, vegetation is red).
    Image for post

    Another camp in this regard is the Maralbeshi Facility (#6) in Kashgar (39.7406222 78.0115086) with lots of fields surrounding it.

    Why is the forced labour aspect in Xinjiang’s agriculture so important in this debate? For one, it’s part of the human rights abuse that more and more governments and industry leaders recognise (such as Swedish company H&M, who profited from cotton supplies and other kinds within their supply chain). Some decided to cut ties with suppliers in the region. It may the answer for the short term. In the long run, western businesses much apply pressure to get suppliers on their own to dissuade local forced labour practices (see example on ads that emerged to sell Uighur forced labour online).

    According to the ILO Forced Labour Convention from 1930, forced or compulsory labour is defined as ‘all work or service which is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person has not offered himself or herself voluntarily’.
    Sports grounds: (basketball and other sports courts)

    Some found value in observing their development. BBC’s John Sudworth found that just before a press tour organised for his press teams two years ago the appearance of recreational areas altered. In some of the places they were taken to, satellite images and the internal security fencing — and what looked like watchtowers- where taken down shortly before the tours for journalists began. Specifically on sports grounds, they noticed that empty exercise yards have been transformed into sports facilities.

    The reporters asked: if the journalists have been presented with mere ‘show camps’, what may this say about the places they were not taken to. Sport facilities are quite easy to spot from satellite. The BBC travelled to Kaxgar in the very east of the region, about 100km south of Kazakhstan’s border. Their footages shows how the camp put up courts shortly before the press trip. But they didn’t last long. We found evidence that these very courts disappeared again in early 2020 (see below).

    In one of the camps in Qariqash (37°15’32.54"N, 79°44’52.08"E) the sports facilities were made unavailable as recently as July. Now big brown sheets, what looks like blankets with knobs on them, cover them. Those have never appeared on satellite images before and extend to the soccer field in the north and the big parking lot next to the sports courts.

    I have mixed feelings about recreational activities. We must strongly doubt that they benefit people held for indoctrination. So are they only a smoke and mirror game to show the friendliness of re-educational camps? Or are they actually benefiting the imprisoned? It is hard to say. In recent time, they are more likely to be added than removed. In around 37 facilities on the ASPI list basketball courts, running tracks or other sports fields were noted to have been added or extended.

    When we compare the average distance of residential building for these places (1.2km) with the average distance of all the places where we have a record on the distance to buildings (1.8km), we find the recreational activities might be used as an element to signal the locals that the facilities have those recreational features.

    Dabancheng has one court in the western block and a number of other ones in the centre part. In the eastern wing, there is nothing. We haven’t got any further high res satellite images on Dabancheng (other than those until March 2020, that leaves only checking Sentinel 2 images or commercial images).

    I am going to stop here. The analysis of recreational areas yielded rather little, for me and the folks at ASPI. “I don’t think the sports grounds mean much in the detention regime”, Nathan Ruser says. If you have more info do reach out or leave a comment.
    Crematories

    The New York Times followed the lead of findings (that emerged last year, also mentioned in the state.gov report) and check the extent of description of religious sites and burial grounds. In September, the team reported that ‘thousands of religious sites’, such as mosques, shrines and other sites were bulldozed or replaced.

    As many burial grounds disappeared and people within camps families have never heard from again, the question of how Uighurs’ life proceeded became more pressing. Crematories may be one aspect. Some anecdotal evidence by a source spoke of a nascent growth of crematory sites in the areas near camps. This appears important in the context of how prisoners are treated in facilities and what happens if they die and at what rates.

    High prevalence of tuberculosis in facilities worries insiders. TB is spread via droplets through the air by someone who is infected. It’s especially deadly when the immune system of those who caught it, can’t cope with it. With the conditions reported by some of the eyewitnesses, it is feasible that the hard conditions prisoners are being subjected to, could enhance the deadliness of TB.

    The think tank which produced a previous list of facilities searched and found a handful of crematories (I don’t think they concluded the research and it continues, perhaps with your help of OSINT research).

    The reason why crematories are of interest is that Uighur are Muslim, Muslims don’t burn the bodies of their dead. They bury them (creation is strictly forbidden). Seeing more crematories pop up might be a first clue on whether dead bodies from detention facilities are being burned. We have to stress here, we have to be extremely careful with drawing quick conclusions, the base of evidence is thin. One would need to check local statistics and cross-examine them with other data source.

    We will concentrate only on the sites itself. The ‘unconfirmed sample of crematory’ consists of ten sites. These are listed below. Just a word of warning. Feel free to investigate them further — either via additional satellite footage or on-site visits. Nonetheless, these get us started. The first three are confirmed by eyewitness accounts or local records (as far as I was told, this is sadly only secondary research).

    Cr_Gholja_01 (Existed, 44° 0’17.86"N, 81°13’40.43"E); Cr_Artush_01(Existed, 39°44’35.47"N, 76°12’7.49"E); Urumchi 2 Funeral Parlor (Existed, 43°54’55.20"N; 87°36’9.01"E)

    Cri_Hotan01_(Suspected)
    Cr_Artush_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Hotan_02(Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_02 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01 (Suspected)
    Cr_Urumqi_01(Suspected)
    CrArtush_02 (Suspected)

    Now let’s take a look at the characteristics of the confirmed crematories. They have some distinctive shapes, including a rectangular architecture, walls or a treeline that fence the premises (framed in black). Where marked ‘burial grounds’, I was unable to confirm this but checked with a few other sites mentioned in the coverage that was exposed in 2019 and it looked similar (in short, more time needs to be spent on this).

    What helped the researchers identify the confirmed ones? According to the source, the Chinese called them ‘burial management facilities’. It’s apparently a euphuism for ‘crematories’. The Chinese government bulldozed some burial grounds with the justification that they would take up too much space which was covered in the 2019 reporting.

    The other aspect is whether relatives receive the body of loved ones that die in the camps. Salih Hudayar (now Prime Minister of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile) says he had a relative who died in a facility (he don’t know whether in the camps or the prison) and his family was not able to have his body returned. He thinks that many other Uighurs have not had the body of a deceased family members returned to them. He assumes they are being cremated as no record exists of a burial site.

    More crematories are only possible if you have employees who staff and run them. The Chinese government tried to find those employees online. “We assume they are being cremated because the government ran job ads and offering high salaries to work on these [crematory] sites”, he added.

    The suspected crematory facilities were then modelled upon the layout of the existing/confirmed ones — e.g. compared with buildings in and around the area. “We found a couple, but we are not 100% sure”, the source admits. Here OSINT journalists could become useful (let me know if you have intel on this matter to follow up with).

    On the description in 2019: evidence surfaced that 45 Uighur cemeteries have been destroyed since 2014, including 30 in just the past two years (research was carried out by AFP and satellite imagery by Earthrise Alliance, here reported by the SCMP).
    What population/urbanisation numbers tell us about internment

    Salih Hudayar explained that what worries him is that population statistics don’t square. An often-cited figure of 7 million Uighurs in the province is much lower than the official estimates of the Uighur people.

    The number often used is 12 million Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs. The number could be higher. Especially in the villages — Uighurs are allowed to have only three kids — some families have more than that and don’t register their offspring, as a result, many kids lack birth certificates. Other figures on the number of Uighur population is much taller (larger than twice of the 12 million figure, but remains hard to confirm that. The closes figure the Chinese government will have internally after the government’s extensive and invasive security and surveillance campaigns, in part to gain information regarding individuals’ religious adherence and practices).

    The rising number of orphanages and kindergartens is also of interest. A satellite and local administrative data analysis should track them. The premise here: the more aggressive the detention of families are in XJ (moving Uighurs from low to higher security facilities), demand for places that house children increases. More orphanages and child-caring facilities could be revealed.
    What can exports tell us about forced labour?

    The type of exports of a region can help to figures out what to look for when it comes to forced labour. Increasingly, the international textile and fashion industry wakes up to reputational damage if supply chains incorporate Xinjiang forced labour. EU leaders held a meeting with China’s president Xi last week where Xi ‘rejected’ foreign [political] meddling in his nation’s affairs. But businesses have more leverage. Xinjiang is busy trading with foreign powers. The Chinese province accounted for a large part of the world’s supply in cotton. Exports amounted to $19.3bn according to export documents (export data for the west of China can be found in China’s official data stats, Stats.gov.cn, customs.gov.cn, or mofcom — this might be useful. Comparing what the government reports and what’s happening on the ground might reveal discrepancies, as it did before).

    Exports (to Europe, across the silk road to the west) is directly connected at A busy train station connecting to the neighbouring country of Kazakstan in the northeast (the export route is called Ala Pass. A short promotional video here). Given the rebound of the Chinese economy, the shipments/trainloads must have increased in May after the effects of the pandemic subsided. What’s unclear is to what extent and whether that matches what the government said.

    Satellite images might reveal discrepancies when train containers at the Dzungarian Gate (the Dzungarian Alatau mountain range along the border between Kazakhstan and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) are analysed. It’s the main connection between China and the west.

    The main railway station in Xinjiang for the Alataw pass is the Alashankou railway station (situated here: 45°10′13″N 82°34′13″E). It’s the last resort for export containers before entering Kazakhstan.

    OSINT journalists may be able to gauge Xinjiang export traffic by counting the number of containers on rail tracks. It might be laborious effort, not sure if it yields anything.

    More useful would it be to monitor the use of agriculture and factories in the nearby vicinity of camps, as shown before. Or perhaps they can be linked up.
    Baidu maps: Checking what the Chinese tech companies are ‘hiding’:

    The Chinese government may have little interest to showcase their human-rights violations which they deem as justified (Xi’s statement). Satellite images on Baidu Maps show maps that hide most of the facility. What to make of it? Google Earth lets you upload so-called ‘overlays’. If you stretch them to the right size you can compare the uploaded screenshot (we took from Baidu) with those present in Google Earth. For Tumshuq City/تۇمشۇق شەھىرى/图木舒克市(Túmùshūkè Shì) (39°54’40.02"N, 79° 1’26.09"E), see below.

    Why is Baidu’s involvement increasing relevant? On one hand, it is important to see the connection between private sector companies and the government. Chinese satellites are able to update and provide high-resolution images to the maps on Baidu. But they don’t. We had a similar debate on Twitter, that some government used to press companies to blur our images. But because images are available on other platforms ‘unblurred’, the practice was largely discontinued (there are still examples but they are getting fewer). One reason is that if a blurred area appears, it signals others to be extra vigilant and look out for other images. Instead, what increasing happens is that companies with private satellite are ordered not to release them (read more about the debate here).

    Baidu map’s decision to not show images on certain facilities have backfired. It can be reverse-engineered. Areas where images are unavailable became extra interesting. In this way Buzzfeed used Baidu Maps to their advantage. They located/confirmed some of the camps because of it. This way, they turned shortcoming into an opportunity. You may want to be quick in replicating this principle for other parts of the country where forced labour/detention camps are expected (e.g. Tibet). Such loopholes will usually be fixed swiftly.

    Bit more on the tech. According to a 2019 report by Human Rights Watch, Baidu’s map function used in the IJOP app, a controversial system used by the police and the state that generates “a massive dataset of personal information, and of police behaviour and movements in Xinjiang (it is not known how the authorities plan to use such data): The IJOP app logs the police officer’s GPS locations and other identifying information when they submit information to the IJOP app. The IJOP app uses a map functionality by Baidu, a major Chinese technology company, for purposes including planning the shortest route for police vehicle and officers on foot, according to the app’s source code.
    https://miro.medium.com/max/653/1*umOMbKghZDqPPiy0TpGZ7w.png

    What can the camps in Tibet tell us about the camps in Xinjiang?

    Reuters reported just last week that forced labour expanded to Tibet (south of XJ). Reuter’s own reporting corroborated the findings obtained by Adrian Zenz. It would take another post to go into how to investigate the state of transferred Tibetan labourers. The quick and dirty check on the situation shows the merit of using satellite images to investigate grows as foreign journalists are being barred from areas, such as entering the Tibet region (foreign citizens are only permitted on government-approved tours). OSINT lessons from investigating XJ should be applied to Tibet too.

    How does Xinjiang link to Tibet? The former Tibet Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was chosen for the same job in Xinjiang in 2016 and headed the development of Xinjiang’s camp system, Reuters reported.

    Mass incarceration started before Quanguo came onto the scene: A fanghuiju work team was dispatched to a village in Guma wherein 38 individuals were allegedly detained in a government campaign, in early 2016 — it’s true however that Party Secretary Quanguo, appointed in August 2016, who waged a ‘Strike Hard Campaign’ against violent activities and terrorism increased repression.

    In an article last year, The Print used satellite images to prove that at least three Tibetan “re-education camps” are currently under construction. The author of the survey was Vinayak Bha, an ex-colonel retired from the Indian military intelligence unit.

    Col Vinayak Bhat (@rajfortyseven on Twitter) found three camps in 2018/2019 and share them. One of them is the one in Botuocun (see below). Bha writes about Chinese military deployment dynamics. The temple of Tibetan Buddhism is a ‘concentration camp’ that is surrounded by high walls and guard towers and has the same structural design as a prison. It is feasible that China’s mass detention to spread to Tibetans. Methods will likely base on the model executed in XJ.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*ln7TsCnetV75EKNcv4LBJg.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*DtJKKnYJUH1K7p1_Pyyicw.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*4dU7K9DK9agNbitNmLBT4g.png

    The reports of the three camps emerged in 2019. “Small-scale versions of similar military-style training initiatives have existed in the region for over a decade, but construction of new facilities increased sharply in 2016, and recent policy documents call for more investment in such sites”, one report stated. Looking at the three sites, some of them are quite old but the one below is less than three years old.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*xFr73HSkbxVqDGNgicuVCQ.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/221/1*Ylxp6Hk1Nj8AAkvvxXI21Q.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/278/1*a4UgMAeLCBp9LvRfOuf6Tw.png
    The allegation is that these facilities are now be used as detention centres for political indoctrination. “The detainees are allegedly used as forced labour in government factories and projects during the day time or as per shift timings”. It is something that rings true under the light of camps in Xinjiang but we lack evidence from the satellite images.

    There is some evidence that additional factory buildings were added. For the facility above, buildings in the upper east wing, with red roofing was added recently. Their layout reminds us of the blue-roofed buildings in and scattered around Xinjiang facilities, which we also have present: “This architecture is bang on a XJ prison, [though] with a different style roof”, Ruser said.

    https://miro.medium.com/max/512/1*GL1DwZmaqVdgUtaWsZHWdA.png

    https://miro.medium.com/max/303/1*Jr03h6ADK4_iNNfYP5YLkA.png
    https://miro.medium.com/max/328/1*RyzDtEa9SjE0WsBSwUaMfA.png

    The prison layout from the older prison facility above — with its long and vertically arranged wings and the rippled features — is similar to prisons seen in Xinjian, such as the two portrayed below (one at Qariqash County at 37° 6’44.88"N, 79°38’32.71"E and the other facility in 39°25’54.60”N, 76° 3’20.59"E).
    https://miro.medium.com/max/389/1*w01GGfJZZlcNCWm5MR4csQ.png

    Closing remarks:

    There is a mountain of stuff not included here. This is a training post and not an investigation with full-rested conclusion. This post should encourage other open-source investigative journalists to look into the facilities, follow their own reporting and help monitor developments/details that others may have missed.

    At present there are only a handful of OSINT journalists looking into it. Even fewer have the time to continuously keep this rolling, e.g. analysing the camps as other stories press them to move on.

    We need more eyes on this. The alleged human right abuse must receive all the international scrutiny it can get. People like Shawn Zhang and others with Nathan Ruser and APSI) started the journey. Other journalists must continue and expand on it.

    Also, the more open we are about sources and the analysis (hopefully) the fewer people might try to cast doubt on the existence of the camps (good thread here)

    OSINT techniques used must master the skill to help others to replicate the findings, step by step. That’s the reason this post resulted more in a hands-on tutorial than an explanatory post. I encourage anyone to start looking into the human rights abuse (though, I must stress, be careful to draw quick conclusions. Instead, share what you see on satellite images with the community of serious journalists and OSINT investigators).

    One last thought on commercial satellite imagery companies. It is crucial to get their support on this. For more than 100 camps mentioned in the latest update of the ASPI list (nearly 80 of them high-security detention facilities — classified as tier 3 or 4), we have no updated record of satellite images. This leaves researchers and journalists only to low-resolution devices, by Sentinel 2 images, or beg for images from Maxar or Planet Labs. That’s not good enough. Transparency requires companies inc to make those high-resolution images available, to anyone. Intelligence services should also consider making their high-resolution images available to the public for scrutiny, though, that unlikely to happen.

    https://medium.com/@techjournalism/open-source-satellite-data-to-investigate-xinjiang-concentration-camps-2713c
    #camps_de_concentration #architecture_forensique #images_satellitaires #rééducation #ré-éducation #camps_de_rééducation #Chine #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #Tibet

    ping @reka @isskein @visionscarto

    • I scripted a screen capture of 8000 xinjiang satellite images and uploaded them to here

      Detention Facilities in Xinjiang China : Google Earth Satellite Timelapse : 2002-2020 : 新疆看守所卫星延时摄影
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmoXVvU8G0c

      you can play them fast or find a location by latitude/longitude and step through one image at a time

      later i posted an addendum with another 20 sites, and showing China’s rebuttal to satellite evidence
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHc-TdusgaI

      other possible relevant sites not in ETNAM or ASPI datasets, that I saw in Google Earth
      46.917, 87.837
      43.958, 87.555
      43.450, 82.738
      40.594, 81.111
      40.567, 81.525
      40.563, 81.252
      40.069, 79.471
      39.947, 79.415
      39.270, 88.906
      39.269, 88.849
      39.247, 88.963
      38.197, 85.384
      37.004, 81.617

  • Bons baisers de rentrée

    Academia a décidé de recenser des témoignages écrits et photographiques de la rentrée universitaire 2020, dont nous avons reçu de premiers échos épouvantables, dont la presse s’est fait l’écho.

    –—

    - 2020, la rentrée de la honte, série sur Université ouverte : https://universiteouverte.org/tag/recit-de-rentree
    - Rentrée universitaire. La grande débrouille, par Khedidja Zerouali, Mediapart, 15/9/2020 : https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/160920/rentree-universitaire-la-grande-debrouille
    - Université de Paris. Étudiants et personnels face au chaos de la fusion, par Philomène Rozen, Révolution permanente, 17/9/2020 : https://www.revolutionpermanente.fr/Universite-de-Paris-Etudiants-et-personnels-face-au-chaos-de-la

    –---

    Selon une stratégie du choc (Noemi Klein, 2008) inacceptable1, Frédérique Vidal profite d’une rentrée hors norme pour achever de faire passer sa loi rétrograde dite « de programmation de la recherche 2021-2030 ». Enseignant·es et étudiant·es subissent des conditions d’accueil épouvantables, en licence, en Master, tandis que l’administration réclame sans vergogne les droits de Contribution de la vie étudiante et de campus (CVEC) —doctorant·es doivent s’acquitter d’une cotisation de la vie étudiante et de campus — dont déjà ielles n’avaient pas profiter l’année dernière.

    Voici une galerie de portraits de l’engagement pédagogique des maîtres·ses et des élèves, qui illustrent le mépris dans lequel leur Ministère de tutelle les tient.

    Academia invite tous et toutes celleux qui le souhaitent de lui communiquer leurs clichés ou leur témoignage.

    https://academia.hypotheses.org/25768

    #rentrée_2020 #distanciation_sociale (euhhh) #université #France #photographie #photos #images #gestes_barrières (euhhh)

  • Pour une page #Web qui dure 10 ans ?
    https://framablog.org/2020/08/24/pour-une-page-web-qui-dure-10-ans

    Des #pages web légères et moins gourmandes en ressources, du « low-tech » c’est plus écologique probablement, mais c’est aussi une des conditions pour rendre durables des #contenus qui ont une fâcheuse tendance à se volatiliser… Jeff Huang est professeur d’informatique et … Lire la suite­­

    #Autonomie_numérique #archivage #CSS #HTML #Images #marque-pages #pérennité #URL

    • #plook
      découvert cet été que des amis modifient toujours un site qui date de 2004 sans que ça casse (cms basic et sans bdd). Je me souviens d’une formation web au siècle dernier ou le prof sans méchanceté se disait toutefois perplexe devant la pauvreté des contenus. Et de fait, si on code pour le web, les mises à jour de sécurité, le suivi technique, la concurrence et la course à la nouveauté technologique ont contribué à épuiser la créativité politique du début du web.
      Je ne parle évidemment pas des industries de clic à égo.

  • MIT apologizes, permanently pulls offline huge dataset that taught AI systems to use racist, misogynistic slurs • The Register
    https://www.theregister.com/2020/07/01/mit_dataset_removed

    The dataset holds more than 79,300,000 images, scraped from Google Images, arranged in 75,000-odd categories. A smaller version, with 2.2 million images, could be searched and perused online from the website of MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL). This visualization, along with the full downloadable database, were removed on Monday from the CSAIL website after El Reg alerted the dataset’s creators to the work done by Prabhu and Birhane.

    The key problem is that the dataset includes, for example, pictures of Black people and monkeys labeled with the N-word; women in bikinis, or holding their children, labeled whores; parts of the anatomy labeled with crude terms; and so on – needlessly linking everyday imagery to slurs and offensive language, and baking prejudice and bias into future AI models.
    Screenshot from the MIT AI training dataset

    A screenshot of the 2.2m dataset visualization before it was taken offline this week. It shows some of the dataset’s examples for the label ’whore’, which we’ve pixelated for legal and decency reasons. The images ranged from a headshot photo of woman and a mother holding her baby with Santa to porn actresses and a woman in a bikini ... Click to enlarge

    Antonio Torralba, a professor of electrical engineering and computer science at CSAIL, said the lab wasn’t aware these offensive images and labels were present within the dataset at all. “It is clear that we should have manually screened them,” he told The Register. “For this, we sincerely apologize. Indeed, we have taken the dataset offline so that the offending images and categories can be removed.”

    In a statement on its website, however, CSAIL said the dataset will be permanently pulled offline because the images were too small for manual inspection and filtering by hand. The lab also admitted it automatically obtained the images from the internet without checking whether any offensive pics or language were ingested into the library, and it urged people to delete their copies of the data:

    “The dataset contains 53,464 different nouns, directly copied over from WordNet," Prof Torralba said referring to Princeton University’s database of English words grouped into related sets. “These were then used to automatically download images of the corresponding noun from internet search engines at the time, using the available filters at the time, to collect the 80 million images.”

    WordNet was built in the mid-1980s at Princeton’s Cognitive Science Laboratory under George Armitage Miller, one of the founders of cognitive psychology. “Miller was obsessed with the relationships between words,” Prabhu told us. “The database essentially maps how words are associated with one another.”

    For example, the words cat and dog are more closely related than cat and umbrella. Unfortunately, some of the nouns in WordNet are racist slang and insults. Now, decades later, with academics and developers using the database as a convenient silo of English words, those terms haunt modern machine learning.

    “When you are building huge datasets, you need some sort of structure,” Birhane told El Reg. “That’s why WordNet is effective. It provides a way for computer-vision researchers to categorize and label their images. Why do that yourself when you could just use WordNet?”

    WordNet may not be so harmful on its own, as a list of words, though when combined with images and AI algorithms, it can have upsetting consequences. “The very aim of that [WordNet] project was to map words that are close to each other,” said Birhane. "But when you begin associating images with those words, you are putting a photograph of a real actual person and associating them with harmful words that perpetuate stereotypes.”

    The fraction of problematic images and labels in these giant datasets is small, and it’s easy to brush them off as anomalies. Yet this material can lead to real harm if they’re used to train machine-learning models that are used in the real world, Prabhu and Birhane argued.

    “The absence of critical engagement with canonical datasets disproportionately negatively impacts women, racial and ethnic minorities, and vulnerable individuals and communities at the margins of society,” they wrote in their paper.

    #Intelligence_artificielle #Images #Reconnaissance_image #WordNet #Tiny_images #Deep_learning

  • Is #WebP really better than #JPEG ? - siipo.la
    https://siipo.la/blog/is-webp-really-better-than-jpeg

    Is WebP better than JPEG?

    So, is WebP better than JPEG? It depends if you are using the reference libjpeg library or the improved MozJPEG encoder.

    WebP seems to have about 10% better #compression compared to libjpeg in most cases, except with 1500px #images where the compression is about equal.

    However, when compared to MozJPEG, WebP only performs better with small 500px images. With other image sizes the compression is equal or worse.

    I think MozJPEG is the clear winner here with consistently about 10% better compression than libjpeg.

    Since most of the time WebP is used alongside JPEG fallback, by using WebP you will essentially double your storage costs with little benefit.

  • Farida : la victime n’était pas coupable – L’image sociale
    http://imagesociale.fr/8700

    Les images virales, comment ça marche ? Pour les journalistes comme pour le plupart des usagers du web, ces vidéos qui montrent un événement dramatique ou significatif sont des données qui émergent du terrain, de façon spontanée et naturelle, et constituent des faits objectifs dont l’intérêt est établi par leur diffusion même. Mais les images virales ne sont pas des faits objectifs : ce sont au contraire des récits en formation, des constructions sociales en temps réel, forgées par la conversation sur les réseaux sociaux. La lecture de ces séquences évolue rapidement en fonction de l’état du débat public, dont elles révèlent et orientent simultanément les contours.

  • Le site #Internet_Archive mis en danger par des poids lourds de l’édition

    Sous la pression d’une #plainte déposée devant un tribunal new-yorkais par quatre poids lourds de l’édition aux États-Unis, le site Internet Archive a décidé d’avancer de 15 jours la fermeture de sa #bibliothèque_d’urgence, créée en réponse à l’#épidémie de #coronavirus.

    Une infraction « massive et délibérée » au #droit_de_reproduction. C’est ce que quatre éditeurs, dont la filiale américaine du groupe #Hachette, reprochent au site Internet Archive, connu notamment pour son archivage du web mondial, la #Wayback_Machine, dans laquelle on peut retrouver des pages web disparues.

    Mais l’Internet Archive, c’est aussi une immense #médiathèque, riche de millions de #livres, #films, #images, jeux vidéo et documents sonores. Côté bibliothèque, son « but ultime » est de « mettre tous les travaux publiés de l’humanité à la disposition de tous dans le monde ». Chacun·e, à condition d’être inscrit·e, peut emprunter jusqu’à dix livres à la fois, pour une durée de quinze jours. Les livres sont prêtés sous la forme de fichiers pdf. Selon Internet Archive, 17 500 livres sont empruntés chaque jour.

    Comme dans une bibliothèque classique, un livre doit être disponible pour pouvoir être emprunté – une règle que le site a « concoctée de toutes pièces », lui reprochent les plaignants. Ce concept du « #prêt_numérique_contrôlé » autorise un prêt à la fois pour un livre numérisé donné. Soutenu par le Conseil des directeurs des bibliothèques d’État des États-Unis, il n’avait encore jamais été mis en cause devant les tribunaux.

    Ce qui a décidé les #maisons_d’édition à risquer un #procès pas gagné d’avance, c’est la #Bibliothèque_nationale_d’urgence mise en place à la fin du mois de mars par Internet Archive, pour répondre à la fermeture des écoles, bibliothèques et universités en raison du coronavirus, et donc à l’impossibilité d’aller y chercher des livres. Installé aux États-Unis, le site avait simplement décidé de « suspendre les listes d’attente […] pendant toute la durée de l’urgence nationale américaine » : c’est-à-dire qu’il n’y avait plus besoin qu’un livre (numérique) revienne pour être emprunté à nouveau. Plusieurs lecteurs pouvaient ainsi en bénéficier en même temps.

    Mercredi 10 juin, son fondateur, #Brewster_Kahle, a publié sur son blog un billet (https://blog.archive.org/2020/06/10/temporary-national-emergency-library-to-close-2-weeks-early-returning-) pour annoncer la fin prochaine du dispositif, avancée au 16 juin, espérant trouver avec les détenteurs de droits « un système qui marche ».

    Son initiative a été soutenue publiquement par des dizaines de bibliothèques et d’universités, ces institutions se revendiquant du principe du « #fair_use », qui autorise des dérogations aux droits de reproduction, particulièrement quand il s’agit d’enseignement, et selon les circonstances. C’est le cas, estime Brewster Kahle, de l’épidémie due au coronavirus.

    Au contraire, cette ouverture des portes numériques est intervenue, selon les éditeurs, au pire moment, celui-là « même où de nombreux auteurs, éditeurs et librairies indépendantes, sans parler des bibliothèques, luttent pour survivre ». Le risque pour Internet Archive est vital, la loi sur le #droit_d’auteur (#Copyright_Act) autorisant des #dommages_et_intérêts pouvant atteindre 150 000 dollars par œuvre en cas de violation délibérée. Si le site propose au prêt 1,3 million de livres, certains sont toutefois dans le #domaine_public.

    « La #gratuité est un concurrent indépassable », estiment les éditeurs dans leur plainte, rappelant l’argument le plus éculé de l’industrie musicale. Internet Archive « ne fait qu’exploiter les investissements que les éditeurs ont faits dans leurs livres », accusent-ils, et « au moyen d’un modèle économique conçu pour profiter librement du travail des autres ». La plainte s’acharne à démontrer que l’Internet Archive serait une entreprise commerciale vivant de la #numérisation des livres, un travail qu’elle effectue contre rémunération pour les bibliothèques. Urgence ou pas, elle demande la destruction de toutes les copies illégales.

    Avec les livres prêtés par l’Internet Archive, on est pourtant loin du mp3 recopié ou downloadé en clic. Brewster Kahle rappelle dans une lettre adressée le 10 avril à Thom Tillis, un sénateur républicain président de la Commission sur la #propriété_intellectuelle, réservé sur la légalité du procédé, que son organisation, sans but lucratif, est régulièrement reconnue comme bibliothèque par la Californie. Cela fait bientôt dix ans, dit-il, que les livres sont prêtés selon la règle « #un_lecteur_à_la_fois ». De plus, se défend le fondateur de la bibliothèque, « nos livres numériques sont protégés par les mêmes protections techniques que celles utilisées par les éditeurs pour garantir que les lecteurs n’ont accès à un livre que pendant les deux semaines de son prêt, et que des copies supplémentaires ne peuvent être faites ».

    Toujours à destination de l’élu républicain, il explique : « Vos électeurs ont payé pour des millions de livres auxquels ils n’ont pas accès actuellement » – 15 millions de livres bloqués derrière les portes fermées de 323 bibliothèques, rien qu’en Caroline du Nord, l’État du sénateur, a compté Brewster Kahle.

    Aux éditeurs, il fait remarquer que la bibliothèque d’urgence ne comporte aucun livre publié il y a moins de cinq ans ; 90 % des livres empruntés ont plus de dix ans, et deux tiers datent du XXe siècle. Quant aux auteurs qui ne voudraient pas que leurs livres soient ainsi prêtés, il leur suffit de le demander par mail, poursuit Kahle. Certains ont au contraire, affirme-t-il, demandé à figurer dans la bibliothèque numérique.

    Dès le 31 mars, la Guilde des auteurs avait mobilisé ses membres contre la bibliothèque d’urgence, parlant de « piratage pur et simple », et proposé un modèle de réclamation. Ce groupement d’auteurs avait déjà fait connaître son désaccord avec le prêt de livres numérisés selon le principe « un livre papier, une copie numérique » en janvier 2019. Le #Syndicat_national_des_auteurs (#National_Writers_Unions) a de son côté préféré entamer des discussions amiables avec Internet Archive et les défenseurs du prêt numérique contrôlé.

    L’Internet Archive est en effet, aux États-Unis, loin d’être la seule bibliothèque à pratiquer de la sorte. La pratique du prêt numérisé contrôlé est théorisée, défendue et pratiquée par de nombreux juristes et des bibliothèques universitaires ou locales, comme celles des villes de Los Angeles, San Francisco et Boston. Un livre imprimé peut être prêté : c’est le principe des bibliothèques. Il doit en être de même pour sa déclinaison à l’identique au format numérique, un exemplaire numérique prêté à une personne à la fois.

    En attendant la décision du tribunal new-yorkais, des internautes se posent à travers le monde la question d’archiver l’Internet Archive et ses téraoctets de documents.

    https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/110620/le-site-internet-archive-mis-en-danger-par-des-poids-lourds-de-l-edition
    #open_access #confinement #édition_scientifique #recherche #justice

  • Graffiti - Varsovie, Ciepta Ulitsa, mai 2019
    https://visionscarto.net/graffiti-varsovie-ciepta-ulitsa

    Titre : Graffiti - Varsovie, Ciepta Ulitsa, mai 2019 Lieu : Pologne Mots-clés : #graffiti #art_de_rue #street_art #migrations #asile #résistance #réfugiés #images #photographie Matériel : Photographies Auteur : Philippe Rekacewicz Date : Mai 2019 Ça pouvait arriver. Ça devait arriver. C’est arrivé avant. Après. Ici. Là-bas. À quelqu’un qui n’est pas toi. » Wislawa Szymborska, De la mort sans exagérer, 1996 Alors, remue-toi, balance-toi, cours, file ! Si t’oublies ça, si tu t’arrêtes, il va (...) #Inspirations

  • Des lieux pour apprendre et des espaces à vivre : l’#école et ses périphéries. Les dehors et les ailleurs

    Quelle approche géographique des #territoires_scolaires ? [Texte intégral]
    Exemple à partir de la cartographie des établissements du 2nd degré à #La_Réunion
    What geographical approach to school territories ? An example from the map of secondary schools on the island of Reunion
    Sylvain Genevois

    #Roms et #Voyageurs : quand les enjeux spatiaux s’invitent à l’école [Texte intégral]
    Roma and Travelers : when space challenges come to school
    Aurore Lecomte

    Les différences nationales de désignation et représentation des déplacements occasionnels des classes dans les pays d’Europe [Texte intégral]
    National differences in the designation and representation of the occasional displacing of classes in European countries
    Xavier Michel

    Images d’espaces / espaces en #images [Texte intégral]
    Étudiants, enseignants débutants, formateurs et espaces d’apprentissage
    Images of spaces / spaces in images. Students, newly qualified teachers, lecturers and learning spaces
    Jean-François Thémines et Anne-Laure Le Guern

    Les effets d’un espace d’apprentissage délocalisé : analyse d’un espace scénique [Texte intégral]
    The effects of a relocated learning space : analysis of a scenic space
    Claire de Saint Martin

    Étranges #stages à l’étranger. Quand le #Covid-19 reconfigure les #apprentissages « #Hors_les_murs » [Texte intégral]
    Strange internships abroad. When the Covid-19 reconfigures “Outside the walls” learning
    Dominique Chevalier

    Etudier et se rencontrer au sein d’une société divisée, perspectives de territoires d’apprentissage chypriotes [Texte intégral]
    Studying and meeting in a divided society : prospects for Cypriot learning territories
    Marie Pouillès-Garonzi
    #Chypre

    Ouvrir l’École sur son espace proche : enjeux de la #territorialisation de l’enseignement de la géographie dans le secondaire en #Nouvelle-Calédonie [Texte intégral]
    Opening up the School to its immediate surroundings : territorialisation challenges of geography teaching in secondary schools in New Caledonia
    Amandine Touitou, Isabelle Lefort et Séverine Ferrière

    Les trajets domicile-école des élèves de primaire peuvent-ils constituer un point de départ pour construire des apprentissages spatiaux ? [Texte intégral]
    Can the home to school journeys of primary school children constitute a starting point for building spatial learning ?
    Elsa Filâtre

    https://journals.openedition.org/geocarrefour/15007
    #revue #géographie

  • Monitoring being pitched to fight Covid-19 was tested on refugees

    The pandemic has given a boost to controversial data-driven initiatives to track population movements

    In Italy, social media monitoring companies have been scouring Instagram to see who’s breaking the nationwide lockdown. In Israel, the government has made plans to “sift through geolocation data” collected by the Shin Bet intelligence agency and text people who have been in contact with an infected person. And in the UK, the government has asked mobile operators to share phone users’ aggregate location data to “help to predict broadly how the virus might move”.

    These efforts are just the most visible tip of a rapidly evolving industry combining the exploitation of data from the internet and mobile phones and the increasing number of sensors embedded on Earth and in space. Data scientists are intrigued by the new possibilities for behavioural prediction that such data offers. But they are also coming to terms with the complexity of actually using these data sets, and the ethical and practical problems that lurk within them.

    In the wake of the refugee crisis of 2015, tech companies and research consortiums pushed to develop projects using new data sources to predict movements of migrants into Europe. These ranged from broad efforts to extract intelligence from public social media profiles by hand, to more complex automated manipulation of big data sets through image recognition and machine learning. Two recent efforts have just been shut down, however, and others are yet to produce operational results.

    While IT companies and some areas of the humanitarian sector have applauded new possibilities, critics cite human rights concerns, or point to limitations in what such technological solutions can actually achieve.

    In September last year Frontex, the European border security agency, published a tender for “social media analysis services concerning irregular migration trends and forecasts”. The agency was offering the winning bidder up to €400,000 for “improved risk analysis regarding future irregular migratory movements” and support of Frontex’s anti-immigration operations.

    Frontex “wants to embrace” opportunities arising from the rapid growth of social media platforms, a contracting document outlined. The border agency believes that social media interactions drastically change the way people plan their routes, and thus examining would-be migrants’ online behaviour could help it get ahead of the curve, since these interactions typically occur “well before persons reach the external borders of the EU”.

    Frontex asked bidders to develop lists of key words that could be mined from platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. The winning company would produce a monthly report containing “predictive intelligence ... of irregular flows”.

    Early this year, however, Frontex cancelled the opportunity. It followed swiftly on from another shutdown; Frontex’s sister agency, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), had fallen foul of the European data protection watchdog, the EDPS, for searching social media content from would-be migrants.

    The EASO had been using the data to flag “shifts in asylum and migration routes, smuggling offers and the discourse among social media community users on key issues – flights, human trafficking and asylum systems/processes”. The search covered a broad range of languages, including Arabic, Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Tigrinya, Amharic, Edo, Pidgin English, Russian, Kurmanji Kurdish, Hausa and French.

    Although the EASO’s mission, as its name suggests, is centred around support for the asylum system, its reports were widely circulated, including to organisations that attempt to limit illegal immigration – Europol, Interpol, member states and Frontex itself.

    In shutting down the EASO’s social media monitoring project, the watchdog cited numerous concerns about process, the impact on fundamental rights and the lack of a legal basis for the work.

    “This processing operation concerns a vast number of social media users,” the EDPS pointed out. Because EASO’s reports are read by border security forces, there was a significant risk that data shared by asylum seekers to help others travel safely to Europe could instead be unfairly used against them without their knowledge.

    Social media monitoring “poses high risks to individuals’ rights and freedoms,” the regulator concluded in an assessment it delivered last November. “It involves the use of personal data in a way that goes beyond their initial purpose, their initial context of publication and in ways that individuals could not reasonably anticipate. This may have a chilling effect on people’s ability and willingness to express themselves and form relationships freely.”

    EASO told the Bureau that the ban had “negative consequences” on “the ability of EU member states to adapt the preparedness, and increase the effectiveness, of their asylum systems” and also noted a “potential harmful impact on the safety of migrants and asylum seekers”.

    Frontex said that its social media analysis tender was cancelled after new European border regulations came into force, but added that it was considering modifying the tender in response to these rules.
    Coronavirus

    Drug shortages put worst-hit Covid-19 patients at risk
    European doctors running low on drugs needed to treat Covid-19 patients
    Big Tobacco criticised for ’coronavirus publicity stunt’ after donating ventilators

    The two shutdowns represented a stumbling block for efforts to track population movements via new technologies and sources of data. But the public health crisis precipitated by the Covid-19 virus has brought such efforts abruptly to wider attention. In doing so it has cast a spotlight on a complex knot of issues. What information is personal, and legally protected? How does that protection work? What do concepts like anonymisation, privacy and consent mean in an age of big data?
    The shape of things to come

    International humanitarian organisations have long been interested in whether they can use nontraditional data sources to help plan disaster responses. As they often operate in inaccessible regions with little available or accurate official data about population sizes and movements, they can benefit from using new big data sources to estimate how many people are moving where. In particular, as well as using social media, recent efforts have sought to combine insights from mobile phones – a vital possession for a refugee or disaster survivor – with images generated by “Earth observation” satellites.

    “Mobiles, satellites and social media are the holy trinity of movement prediction,” said Linnet Taylor, professor at the Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society in the Netherlands, who has been studying the privacy implications of such new data sources. “It’s the shape of things to come.”

    As the devastating impact of the Syrian civil war worsened in 2015, Europe saw itself in crisis. Refugee movements dominated the headlines and while some countries, notably Germany, opened up to more arrivals than usual, others shut down. European agencies and tech companies started to team up with a new offering: a migration hotspot predictor.

    Controversially, they were importing a concept drawn from distant catastrophe zones into decision-making on what should happen within the borders of the EU.

    “Here’s the heart of the matter,” said Nathaniel Raymond, a lecturer at the Yale Jackson Institute for Global Affairs who focuses on the security implications of information communication technologies for vulnerable populations. “In ungoverned frontier cases [European data protection law] doesn’t apply. Use of these technologies might be ethically safer there, and in any case it’s the only thing that is available. When you enter governed space, data volume and ease of manipulation go up. Putting this technology to work in the EU is a total inversion.”
    “Mobiles, satellites and social media are the holy trinity of movement prediction”

    Justin Ginnetti, head of data and analysis at the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre in Switzerland, made a similar point. His organisation monitors movements to help humanitarian groups provide food, shelter and aid to those forced from their homes, but he casts a skeptical eye on governments using the same technology in the context of migration.

    “Many governments – within the EU and elsewhere – are very interested in these technologies, for reasons that are not the same as ours,” he told the Bureau. He called such technologies “a nuclear fly swatter,” adding: “The key question is: What problem are you really trying to solve with it? For many governments, it’s not preparing to ‘better respond to inflow of people’ – it’s raising red flags, to identify those en route and prevent them from arriving.”
    Eye in the sky

    A key player in marketing this concept was the European Space Agency (ESA) – an organisation based in Paris, with a major spaceport in French Guiana. The ESA’s pitch was to combine its space assets with other people’s data. “Could you be leveraging space technology and data for the benefit of life on Earth?” a recent presentation from the organisation on “disruptive smart technologies” asked. “We’ll work together to make your idea commercially viable.”

    By 2016, technologists at the ESA had spotted an opportunity. “Europe is being confronted with the most significant influxes of migrants and refugees in its history,” a presentation for their Advanced Research in Telecommunications Systems Programme stated. “One burning issue is the lack of timely information on migration trends, flows and rates. Big data applications have been recognised as a potentially powerful tool.” It decided to assess how it could harness such data.

    The ESA reached out to various European agencies, including EASO and Frontex, to offer a stake in what it called “big data applications to boost preparedness and response to migration”. The space agency would fund initial feasibility stages, but wanted any operational work to be jointly funded.

    One such feasibility study was carried out by GMV, a privately owned tech group covering banking, defence, health, telecommunications and satellites. GMV announced in a press release in August 2017 that the study would “assess the added value of big data solutions in the migration sector, namely the reduction of safety risks for migrants, the enhancement of border controls, as well as prevention and response to security issues related with unexpected migration movements”. It would do this by integrating “multiple space assets” with other sources including mobile phones and social media.

    When contacted by the Bureau, a spokeswoman from GMV said that, contrary to the press release, “nothing in the feasibility study related to the enhancement of border controls”.

    In the same year, the technology multinational CGI teamed up with the Dutch Statistics Office to explore similar questions. They started by looking at data around asylum flows from Syria and at how satellite images and social media could indicate changes in migration patterns in Niger, a key route into Europe. Following this experiment, they approached EASO in October 2017. CGI’s presentation of the work noted that at the time EASO was looking for a social media analysis tool that could monitor Facebook groups, predict arrivals of migrants at EU borders, and determine the number of “hotspots” and migrant shelters. CGI pitched a combined project, co-funded by the ESA, to start in 2019 and expand to serve more organisations in 2020.
    The proposal was to identify “hotspot activities”, using phone data to group individuals “according to where they spend the night”

    The idea was called Migration Radar 2.0. The ESA wrote that “analysing social media data allows for better understanding of the behaviour and sentiments of crowds at a particular geographic location and a specific moment in time, which can be indicators of possible migration movements in the immediate future”. Combined with continuous monitoring from space, the result would be an “early warning system” that offered potential future movements and routes, “as well as information about the composition of people in terms of origin, age, gender”.

    Internal notes released by EASO to the Bureau show the sheer range of companies trying to get a slice of the action. The agency had considered offers of services not only from the ESA, GMV, the Dutch Statistics Office and CGI, but also from BIP, a consulting firm, the aerospace group Thales Alenia, the geoinformation specialist EGEOS and Vodafone.

    Some of the pitches were better received than others. An EASO analyst who took notes on the various proposals remarked that “most oversell a bit”. They went on: “Some claimed they could trace GSM [ie mobile networks] but then clarified they could do it for Venezuelans only, and maybe one or two countries in Africa.” Financial implications were not always clearly provided. On the other hand, the official noted, the ESA and its consortium would pay 80% of costs and “we can get collaboration on something we plan to do anyway”.

    The features on offer included automatic alerts, a social media timeline, sentiment analysis, “animated bubbles with asylum applications from countries of origin over time”, the detection and monitoring of smuggling sites, hotspot maps, change detection and border monitoring.

    The document notes a group of services available from Vodafone, for example, in the context of a proposed project to monitor asylum centres in Italy. The proposal was to identify “hotspot activities”, using phone data to group individuals either by nationality or “according to where they spend the night”, and also to test if their movements into the country from abroad could be back-tracked. A tentative estimate for the cost of a pilot project, spread over four municipalities, came to €250,000 – of which an unspecified amount was for “regulatory (privacy) issues”.

    Stumbling blocks

    Elsewhere, efforts to harness social media data for similar purposes were proving problematic. A September 2017 UN study tried to establish whether analysing social media posts, specifically on Twitter, “could provide insights into ... altered routes, or the conversations PoC [“persons of concern”] are having with service providers, including smugglers”. The hypothesis was that this could “better inform the orientation of resource allocations, and advocacy efforts” - but the study was unable to conclude either way, after failing to identify enough relevant data on Twitter.

    The ESA pressed ahead, with four feasibility studies concluding in 2018 and 2019. The Migration Radar project produced a dashboard that showcased the use of satellite imagery for automatically detecting changes in temporary settlement, as well as tools to analyse sentiment on social media. The prototype received positive reviews, its backers wrote, encouraging them to keep developing the product.

    CGI was effusive about the predictive power of its technology, which could automatically detect “groups of people, traces of trucks at unexpected places, tent camps, waste heaps and boats” while offering insight into “the sentiments of migrants at certain moments” and “information that is shared about routes and motives for taking certain routes”. Armed with this data, the company argued that it could create a service which could predict the possible outcomes of migration movements before they happened.

    The ESA’s other “big data applications” study had identified a demand among EU agencies and other potential customers for predictive analyses to ensure “preparedness” and alert systems for migration events. A package of services was proposed, using data drawn from social media and satellites.

    Both projects were slated to evolve into a second, operational phase. But this seems to have never become reality. CGI told the Bureau that “since the completion of the [Migration Radar] project, we have not carried out any extra activities in this domain”.

    The ESA told the Bureau that its studies had “confirmed the usefulness” of combining space technology and big data for monitoring migration movements. The agency added that its corporate partners were working on follow-on projects despite “internal delays”.

    EASO itself told the Bureau that it “took a decision not to get involved” in the various proposals it had received.

    Specialists found a “striking absence” of agreed upon core principles when using the new technologies

    But even as these efforts slowed, others have been pursuing similar goals. The European Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography has proposed a “Big Data for Migration Alliance” to address data access, security and ethics concerns. A new partnership between the ESA and GMV – “Bigmig" – aims to support “migration management and prevention” through a combination of satellite observation and machine-learning techniques (the company emphasised to the Bureau that its focus was humanitarian). And a consortium of universities and private sector partners – GMV among them – has just launched a €3 million EU-funded project, named Hummingbird, to improve predictions of migration patterns, including through analysing phone call records, satellite imagery and social media.

    At a conference in Berlin in October 2019, dozens of specialists from academia, government and the humanitarian sector debated the use of these new technologies for “forecasting human mobility in contexts of crises”. Their conclusions raised numerous red flags. They found a “striking absence” of agreed upon core principles. It was hard to balance the potential good with ethical concerns, because the most useful data tended to be more specific, leading to greater risks of misuse and even, in the worst case scenario, weaponisation of the data. Partnerships with corporations introduced transparency complications. Communication of predictive findings to decision makers, and particularly the “miscommunication of the scope and limitations associated with such findings”, was identified as a particular problem.

    The full consequences of relying on artificial intelligence and “employing large scale, automated, and combined analysis of datasets of different sources” to predict movements in a crisis could not be foreseen, the workshop report concluded. “Humanitarian and political actors who base their decisions on such analytics must therefore carefully reflect on the potential risks.”

    A fresh crisis

    Until recently, discussion of such risks remained mostly confined to scientific papers and NGO workshops. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought it crashing into the mainstream.

    Some see critical advantages to using call data records to trace movements and map the spread of the virus. “Using our mobile technology, we have the potential to build models that help to predict broadly how the virus might move,” an O2 spokesperson said in March. But others believe that it is too late for this to be useful. The UK’s chief scientific officer, Patrick Vallance, told a press conference in March that using this type of data “would have been a good idea in January”.

    Like the 2015 refugee crisis, the global emergency offers an opportunity for industry to get ahead of the curve with innovative uses of big data. At a summit in Downing Street on 11 March, Dominic Cummings asked tech firms “what [they] could bring to the table” to help the fight against Covid-19.

    Human rights advocates worry about the longer term effects of such efforts, however. “Right now, we’re seeing states around the world roll out powerful new surveillance measures and strike up hasty partnerships with tech companies,” Anna Bacciarelli, a technology researcher at Amnesty International, told the Bureau. “While states must act to protect people in this pandemic, it is vital that we ensure that invasive surveillance measures do not become normalised and permanent, beyond their emergency status.”

    More creative methods of surveillance and prediction are not necessarily answering the right question, others warn.

    “The single largest determinant of Covid-19 mortality is healthcare system capacity,” said Sean McDonald, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, who studied the use of phone data in the west African Ebola outbreak of 2014-5. “But governments are focusing on the pandemic as a problem of people management rather than a problem of building response capacity. More broadly, there is nowhere near enough proof that the science or math underlying the technologies being deployed meaningfully contribute to controlling the virus at all.”

    Legally, this type of data processing raises complicated questions. While European data protection law - the GDPR - generally prohibits processing of “special categories of personal data”, including ethnicity, beliefs, sexual orientation, biometrics and health, it allows such processing in a number of instances (among them public health emergencies). In the case of refugee movement prediction, there are signs that the law is cracking at the seams.
    “There is nowhere near enough proof that the science or math underlying the technologies being deployed meaningfully contribute to controlling the virus at all.”

    Under GDPR, researchers are supposed to make “impact assessments” of how their data processing can affect fundamental rights. If they find potential for concern they should consult their national information commissioner. There is no simple way to know whether such assessments have been produced, however, or whether they were thoroughly carried out.

    Researchers engaged with crunching mobile phone data point to anonymisation and aggregation as effective tools for ensuring privacy is maintained. But the solution is not straightforward, either technically or legally.

    “If telcos are using individual call records or location data to provide intel on the whereabouts, movements or activities of migrants and refugees, they still need a legal basis to use that data for that purpose in the first place – even if the final intelligence report itself does not contain any personal data,” said Ben Hayes, director of AWO, a data rights law firm and consultancy. “The more likely it is that the people concerned may be identified or affected, the more serious this matter becomes.”

    More broadly, experts worry that, faced with the potential of big data technology to illuminate movements of groups of people, the law’s provisions on privacy begin to seem outdated.

    “We’re paying more attention now to privacy under its traditional definition,” Nathaniel Raymond said. “But privacy is not the same as group legibility.” Simply put, while issues around the sensitivity of personal data can be obvious, the combinations of seemingly unrelated data that offer insights about what small groups of people are doing can be hard to foresee, and hard to mitigate. Raymond argues that the concept of privacy as enshrined in the newly minted data protection law is anachronistic. As he puts it, “GDPR is already dead, stuffed and mounted. We’re increasing vulnerability under the colour of law.”

    https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2020-04-28/monitoring-being-pitched-to-fight-covid-19-was-first-tested-o
    #cobaye #surveillance #réfugiés #covid-19 #coronavirus #test #smartphone #téléphones_portables #Frontex #frontières #contrôles_frontaliers #Shin_Bet #internet #big_data #droits_humains #réseaux_sociaux #intelligence_prédictive #European_Asylum_Support_Office (#EASO) #EDPS #protection_des_données #humanitaire #images_satellites #technologie #European_Space_Agency (#ESA) #GMV #CGI #Niger #Facebook #Migration_Radar_2.0 #early_warning_system #BIP #Thales_Alenia #EGEOS #complexe_militaro-industriel #Vodafone #GSM #Italie #twitter #détection #routes_migratoires #systèmes_d'alerte #satellites #Knowledge_Centre_on_Migration_and_Demography #Big_Data for_Migration_Alliance #Bigmig #machine-learning #Hummingbird #weaponisation_of_the_data #IA #intelligence_artificielle #données_personnelles

    ping @etraces @isskein @karine4 @reka

    signalé ici par @sinehebdo :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/849167

  • #catalogue de #films sur les #migrations

    La #liste de films ci-après a été réalisée par le RÉSEAU TRACES afin de faciliter la diffusion publique de films, l’organisation de projections qui seraient l’occasion d’échanges, mais également pour alimenter toute démarche de recherche. Cette liste est bien sûr non exhaustive et sera mise à jour très régulièrement. Il s’agit de films qui sont recommandés par des membres du réseau Traces dans une grande diversité.

    Nous tenons à votre disposition des liens de visionnement de la plupart des films, en accord avec leurs distributeurs, sur simple demande par email à reseau.traces@gmail.com.

    Nous pouvons aussi vous conseiller et vous orienter dans cette liste en fonction de thématiques ou de sensibilités qui vous intéresseraient plus particulièrement.

    http://traces-migrations.org/2020/04/09/films-sur-les-migrations
    #réseau_traces #cinéma
    #réfugiés #frontières #ressources_pédagogiques

    Liste de OUF ! #wow

    ping @isskein @_kg_ @karine4 @sinehebdo @reka

  • Cet historien de l’art a réfléchi sur toutes les images. Ses travaux nous aident à mieux comprendre le monde actuel où règnent les images
    #art #images #culture #savoirs #histoire

    https://sms.hypotheses.org/20650

    Horst Bredekamp est professeur émérite d’histoire de l’art à l’Université Humboldt de Berlin. Il appartient à une génération exceptionnelle d’historiens de l’art allemands qui ont su faire exploser les limites traditionnelles de leur champ de recherche au point qu’il n’est pas rare de les voir désigner comme anthropologues, sociologues ou bien philosophes.

    Avec Hans Belting et Gottfried Boehm, les trois « B’s » comme on les surnomme parfois, Horst Bredekamp a apporté une contribution majeure à la science de l’image (Bildwissenschaft) qu’il comprend comme une réflexion interdisciplinaire sur l’image, sur toutes les images. C’est dire l’immensité des recherches qui s’est offerte à lui. Il a écrit sur l’iconoclasme, la sculpture médiévale, le football, l’art des jardins, les cabinets d’art et de curiosité, mais aussi sur les artistes de la Renaissance (Botticelli, Michelangelo, etc), les plans de Saint-Pierre de Rome, l’iconographie politique ou encore les dessins des penseurs (Darwin, Galilée, Leibniz). (...)