#immunité

EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

#technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

State-of-play report

At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

The new standing corps

Recruitment

A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

Training

The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

Use of force

The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

“On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

Privileges and immunities

The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

“Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

Law enforcement

To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

Fundamental rights and data protection

The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

Returns

The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

“The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

EUROSUR

The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

Summary

Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

Jane Kilpatrick

Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

“the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
“The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
“if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

Endnotes

[1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

[2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[3] Section 1.1, state of play report

[4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

[5] Section 7.1, state of play report

[6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, ▻https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

[7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

[9] Chapter III, state of play report

[10] Section 2.5, state of play report

[11] Protocol (No 7), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

[12] Chapter III, state of play report

[13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

[14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, ▻https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

[15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

[16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

[18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

[19] Section 8, state of play report

[20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

[21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, ▻https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

[22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

[23] Section 9, state of play report

[24] ERRIN, ▻https://returnnetwork.eu

[25] Section 3.2, state of play report

[26] Chapter III, state of play report

[27] Section 3.2, state of play report

[28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[29] State of play report, p. 19

[30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, ►http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

[31] Section 4, state of play report

[32] Section 7.2, state of play report
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Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

#EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

What is the standing corps?

The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
Long-term staff seconded from member states;
Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

The size of the standing corps

The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

–-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

What are the profiles?

The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

border checks and surveillance;
interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
verifying travel documents;
escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
operating data systems and platforms; and
offering cultural mediation

*Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

Recruitment for the profiles

Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

“Never touch yourself with gloves”

Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

Fit for service?

The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

Jane Kilpatrick

Endnotes

[1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

[4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

[5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

[8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

[9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

[10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

[11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

[12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, ▻https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

[13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

[14] Ibid.

[15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, ▻http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

[16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, ►https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

[17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, ▻https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

[19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, ▻https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
#gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

Frontex seeks company for drone flights

The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

Aircraft from arms companies

Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

New interested parties for drone flights

At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

Information to non-EU countries

The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

Matthias Monroy

An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

Endnotes

[1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, ►https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

[2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

[3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, ▻https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

[4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, ▻https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

[5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, ▻http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

[6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, ▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

[7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, ▻http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

[8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

[9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, ▻https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

[10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, ▻https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

[11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, ▻https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

[12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, ▻https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

[13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, ▻https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

[14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, ▻https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

[15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, ▻http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

[16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

[17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

[18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

[19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, ▻https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

[20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, ▻https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

[21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

[22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

#drones

Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

From external to internal surveillance

Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

Legal provisions

A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

“EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

“…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

“The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

“The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

Sources of data

The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

national border surveillance systems;
stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
local, regional and other coordination centres;
other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
border checks;
Frontex;
other member states’ national coordination centres;
third countries’ authorities;
ship reporting systems;
other relevant European and international organisations; and
other sources.[10]

For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

national coordination centres;
national situational pictures;
immigration liaison officers;
Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
third countries’ authorities.[11]

The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

“The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

Operational activities at the internal borders

Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

“When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

“there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

Chris Jones

Endnotes

[1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, ►https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

[2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), ▻https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

[3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, ▻http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

[4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

[5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, ▻http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

[6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, ▻https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

[7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

[8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

[9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

[10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

[11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

[12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, ▻https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

[13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

[14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, ►http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

[15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: ▻https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

[16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, ▻https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

[17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, ▻https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

[18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

[19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, ▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

▻https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

#mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

voir aussi cette enquête de #ZDF : The #Frontex_files :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/900554

Les données sont accessibles
avec les variables qualitatives
(on remarque que dans le graphique ci-dessus, les individus pour lesquels il y a 3 mesures ne sont pas intégrés)

analyse par sexe

https://dl.dropbox.com/s/xcbkm2keogb0eqk/Sars-CoV2%20antibody%20decay%20HF.jpg

Ce n’es pas simple du tout.

Longitudinal analyses reveal immunological misfiring in severe COVID-19 | Nature
▻https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2588-y

Immune system variation can predict severe COVID-19 outcomes | YaleNews
▻https://news.yale.edu/2020/07/27/immune-system-variation-can-predict-severe-covid-19-outcomes

... in the early course of treatment, researchers found indicators that predicted which patients were at greatest risk of developing severe forms of the illness.

[...]

Curiously, said researchers, one risk factor was the presence of alpha #interferon, a #cytokine mobilized to combat viral pathogens such as the flu virus. However, COVID-19 patients with high levels of alpha interferon fared worse than those with low levels.

“This virus just doesn’t seem to care about alpha interferon,” Iwasaki said. “The cytokine appears to be hurting, not helping.”

Immunité(s) contre le SARS-CoV-2 : votre thriller de l’été ! - EurekaSanté par VIDAL
►https://seenthis.net/messages/869842

Interferon responses in viral pneumonias | Science
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/872808

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH452/F1largejpg-22add-d8304.jpg

Potent neutralizing antibodies directed to multiple epitopes on SARS-CoV-2 spike | Nature
►https://seenthis.net/messages/868681

Paradoxalement, les chercheurs de l’université Columbia ont identifié ces anticorps en analysant ceux produits par des patients extrêmement malades.

Men make more coronavirus antibodies than women - NHS Blood and Transplant
►https://seenthis.net/messages/869134

Les hommes pourtant plus vulnérables

COVID-19 : Moins d’anticorps et sévérité moindre chez l’Enfant ? | santé log
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/878274

Découverte d’anomalies immunologiques et génétiques associées à des formes sévères de Covid-19 –…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/878613

Le plasma le plus riche en anticorps peut également être le plus riche en auto-anticorps dirigés contre l’immunité innée ; ces derniers devraient donc être systématiquement recherchés avant d’administrer le plasma.

Rogue antibodies could be driving severe COVID-19
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/898455

Prof. Akiko Iwasaki sur Twitter : "Are you confused about the role of type I interferons (IFN) in…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/879441

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH249/EjMU0HEXYAEUfcb6-348c7.jpg

SARS-CoV-2 Antibody Responses Do Not Predict COVID-19 Disease Severity
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/879451

Les formes sévères de Covid-19 seraient liées à une réponse anticorps de type auto-immune
►https://seenthis.net/messages/880720

Superantigenic character of an insert unique to SARS-CoV-2 spike supported by skewed TCR repertoire…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/881074

Distinct early serological signatures track with SARS-CoV-2 survival - ScienceDirect
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/870961

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L375xH375/1-s20-S107471e36-472ba.jpg

Defining the features and duration of antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 infection associated with…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893216

“We found that the severity of the illness correlates with the ratio of antibodies recognizing domains of the spike protein compared with other nonprotective viral targets. Those people with mild illness tended to have a higher proportion of anti-spike antibodies, and those who died from their disease had more antibodies that recognized other parts of the virus.”

Afucosylated IgG characterizes enveloped viral responses and correlates with COVID-19 severity |…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893358

Synthèse provisoire :

– une déficience de l’immunité innée conduit à des formes sévères de la maladie,

– sur le plan quantitatif l’immunité adaptative n’est pas le reflet d’une plus grande capacité à combattre le virus ;

– l’immunité adaptative est d’autant plus forte quantitativement que la maladie est sévère

– des variations qualitatives de l’immunité adaptative conduisent à des formes plus ou moins sévères de la maladie.

COVID-19 neutralizing antibodies predict disease severity and survival : Cell
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/893371

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH600/EpTSL4RW4AImfc42-7a248.jpg

Les taux d’#anticorps, y compris neutralisant, sont d’autant plus élevés que la maladie est sévère et les décès sont nombreux ;

Le taux de survie dépend de la puissance des anticorps neutralisant

Pas d’i#mmunité croisée avec des coronavirus qui n’ont pas (encore) franchi la barrière d’espèce.

Kinetics of antibody responses dictate COVID-19 outcome | medRxiv
►https://seenthis.net/messages/895581

La mortalité est corrélée au caractère différé de la production d’anticorps

COVID-19 mortality does not correlate with the cross-sectional antiviral antibody levels per se, but rather with the delayed kinetics of NAb production.

SARS-CoV-2 induces human plasmacytoid predendritic cell diversification via UNC93B and IRAK4 |…
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/899411

Grâce à une collaboration étroite entre les équipes Inserm d’Ali Amara, virologue, et Vassili Soumelis, immunologiste à l’Institut de Recherche Saint-Louis (Université de Paris/Inserm/AP-HP), l’étude a pu caractériser la réponse immunitaire innée dans les 24 à 48 h suivant un contact avec le virus SARS-CoV-2.

Coronavirus Deranges the Immune System in Complex and Deadly Ways | Kaiser Health News
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/904932

Some People Get Covid-19 and Never Feel a Thing : Why ?
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/908744

[...] a small recent study suggests that asymptomatics mount a weaker immune response than the people who get sick — suggesting that mechanisms are at work that have nothing to do with fighting infection.

Une étonnante corrélation entre la sévérité de la maladie et le taux d’anticorps neutralisants chez…
►https://seenthis.net/messages/913229

Covid-19 : pourquoi une infection par le SARS-CoV-2 n’est pas toujours synonyme d’un test sérologique positif
►https://seenthis.net/messages/895090

Rappels, sur la gestion du coronavirus en France
C’est bien mieux que de balancer chiffres et courbes, à longueur de journées.

Epidémie de Coronavirus : Le gouvernement est-il à la hauteur ? Va-t-on tous mourir ? Janvier 2020

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f0kMeZkoir8

Une fois de plus la Chine répand ces miasmes sur le monde ! L’épidémie de coronavirus progresse rapidement en Chine malgré les mesures radicales du gouvernement. Pendant ce temps Agnès Buzyn colle des affichettes dans les aéroports de France.
Rappelons que la grippe saisonnière fait plus de 8000 victimes par ans, rien qu’en France. Il est donc inutile de paniquer, mais en cas d’aggravation du virus l’amateurisme du gouvernement Français ne peut que nous inquiéter.
#coronavirus #chine #buzyn

Coronavirus : Ça tousse en Haute-Savoie et dans l’économie mondiale. Février 2020

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqeeE-q_SNs

Nouveau point sur l’épidémie de Coronavirus.
Malgré des progrès sur la transparence, on peut difficilement faire confiance aux chiffres officiels Chinois. Agnès Buzyn est toujours pied et poing lié par l’OMS qui prépare le terrain pour les profits des groupes pharmaceutiques. Pendant ce temps des Anglais viennent tousser dans nos chalets, et les abrutis qui paniquent à cause du virus, devraient plutôt s’inquiéter pour leur emploi.
#Chine #coronavirus #Wuhan

Coronavirus : La stratégie de Macron nous a mis en DANGER ! (Et trop de Français sont cons) Mars 2020

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-feHm0MTS0

Avez-vous entendu parler de l’immunité contrôlé ? C’est la stratégie majoritairement mené en Europe contre l’épidémie de « Sars-Cov-2 » jusqu’à ce que nos dirigeants se rendent compte qu’elle va faire des centaines de milliers de morts dans chaque pays.
Les populations doivent réagir et prendre conscience de la gravité de la situation. Nous devons prendre des mesures radicales pour compenser nos erreurs et notre impréparation.
Quant à nos « dirigeants », une fois cette crise passé, comme ils se sont bien occupés de nous, on va bien s’occuper d’eux !
#immunité_contrôlé

La Macronie ment sur l’inutilité des masques ! Fabriquons-les ! Mars 2020

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyMEBwKQwTo

Alors que le 12 mars, le conseil scientifique du gouvernement recommandait d’assurer la disponibilité des masques chirurgicaux pour la population, 10 jours plus tard, ce même gouvernement martel qu’ils sont inutile, voire dangereux, car les gens seraient trop cons pour s’en servir correctement. Avec cette excuse bidon ils tentent de masquer la pénurie de masque, quitte à mettre la population en danger en nous décourageant d’utiliser ces protections.
Tous les pays asiatiques sont consternés par les propos de notre gouvernement. Ils nous font honte !
Les masques sont utiles ! A Hong-Kong les gens ont fabriqué leurs propres masques pour faire face à la pénurie le mois dernier, nous pouvons en faire autant !
#EHPAD #masques

#preprint

Publié par la suite
Robust T Cell Immunity in Convalescent Individuals with Asymptomatic or Mild COVID-19: Cell
▻https://www.cell.com/cell/abstract/S0092-8674(20)31008-4

https://els-jbs-prod-cdn.jbs.elsevierhealth.com/cms/asset/c975d7ea-f637-4a10-874e-c57e63d78576/fx1.jpg

« MAGA », Make America Great Again

https://66.media.tumblr.com/0da7024843316622b35c5881ba687a42/2ae04a8eabba6cc8-80/s1280x1920/9d50723ed438c9ef7bea8dbaceabebac0ba462a5.jpg

A second paper, published on Thursday in the journal Nature, suggests that even low levels of antibodies might be enough to thwart the virus. “It does appear that even low levels of certain antibodies have potent neutralizing capability,” said Dr. Rasmussen, the Columbia University virologist. “Low antibody titers don’t necessarily determine whether a patient will be protected from reinfection.”

Un élément qui ressort de plus en plus c’est la possibilité d’anomalies radiologiques et/ou biologiques chez les personnes cliniquement asymptomatiques.

Convergent antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 in convalescent individuals | Nature
▻https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2456-9

We Still Don’t Fully Understand The Label ’Asymptomatic’ : Goats and Soda : NPR
▻https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/06/23/864536258/we-still-dont-fully-understand-the-label-asymptomatic

Entre autres parce que des lésions pulmonaires peuvent exister sans manifestations cliniques.

Thoughts on Antibody Persistence and the Pandemic | In the Pipeline
▻https://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2020/06/22/thoughts-on-antibody-persistence-and-the-pandemic

... when you hear of patients who are infected but are showing no symptoms, you could have a mental picture of a stronger immune response that’s keeping the virus knocked down more. But it’s clearly not that simple: this paper shows that the asymptomatic patients had a weaker antibody response that tended to disappear during the convalescent phase. That’s the result that’s gotten a lot of attention – as it should – although it’s important to not run with it too quickly. Remember, there is more than one type of immune response – you have T cells pitching in as well. That response is one of the great unanswered questions of the epidemic, from what I can see.

[...]

Everyone will have seen the various population surveys with antibody testing that have suggested, in most cases, that a rather small percentage of people have been exposed. Think of the various ways you could get such a result: (1) it’s just what it looks like, and most people are unprotected because they have so far been unexposed. (2) the antibody results are what they look like – low exposure – but people’s T-cell responses mean that there are actually more people protected than we realize. (3) the antibody results are deceiving, because (as this latest paper seems to show) the antibody response fades over time, meaning that more people have been exposed than it looks like. And that means you can split that into (3a) the antibody response fades, but the T-cell response is still protective and (3b) the antibody response fades and so does the T-cell response. That last one is not a happy possibility.

You can extend this thinking to the effects of the coming vaccines.

Je ne comprends pas dans quel sens marche le seul critère signifiant concernant l’exposition. Présence d’un cas suspect dans le ménage : contaminant du soignant ou contaminé par le soignant ? Pas de précision…

Sinon, l’#anosmie (perte de l’odorat) est le symptôme de loin le plus marquant.

#Suède #mortalité #coronavirus #covid-19 #immunité_de_groupe #taux_de_mortalité

Tableau Worldometers du 13/06 : cliquer sur la case « Deaths/1M pop » pour un classement décroissant : si les données transmises par la France sont fiables (toujours le conditionnel, hélas), la Suède se place juste avant « nous » en terme de ratio de mortalité rapportée à la population totale.

►https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus

@sombre et en plus pour un pays qui a une densité de population 4 fois plus faible que la France, on peut dire que c’est un échec total...

Je ne sais pas si la densité de population sur un territoire donné est un indicateur pertinent (117 pour la France et 25 pour la Suède d’après les données du site sus-mentionné) car il y a là aussi un effet de lissage dû à un calcul de « moyenne ». Plutôt observer la répartition de chaque population sur leurs territoires nationaux respectifs. Mais aussi identifier les zones de territoires où se déroule quotidiennement un fort transit de population pour les activités économiques et sociales.
En fait pouvoir établir une cartographie comme dans cet exemple :

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/19/France_population_density_40pc.png

En l’occurrence en Suède ça se passe surtout dans le sud du pays, avec quelques grosses villes et on parle de 10 millions d’habitants en tout, bref ce n’était en tout cas pas plus compliqué qu’ailleurs de prendre des mesures. Je m’interroge aussi sur le fait que c’est un pays qui a (a priori) des pratiques démocratiques bien plus évoluées qu’en France et malgré tout les décisions qui ont été prises, ou plutôt non prises, se rapprochent plus de celles de Trump/Bolsonaro/Johnson (même si je crois que les discours des politiciens suédois n’ont pas complètement minimisé l’importance de faire attention) que de celles de l’Allemagne ou même la France, ce qui n’est pas très rassurant...

Les faits  : Les pays qui ont laissé filer le virus l’on bien dans le cul actuellement  ; des pays qui sont en été, ont un climat + chaud et une population qui vit + dehors ont quand même des accélérations du virus (Inde).
Les variables les + importantes  : distanciation physique, densité de population et inégalités.

Oui. Mais ce que je comprends de l’hypothèse du papier (qui n’est rien d’autre qu’un relais ciblé sur un "public cultivé" du "comité scientifique"...) est un peu plus sioux : en gros l’épidémie arrive (peut massacrer : N-Y, Brésil, Inde, Iran si laisser aller) puis devient saisonnière. Affaire de "cinétique" de la propagation, affaire de rythmes hétérogènes (mais là, je vois comme je "pense" par ailleurs, sur d’autres objets.)

J’avais laissé la mention d’un des exemples,

Patrick Berche : « Quand la grippe espagnole s’est éteinte, le virus est devenu saisonnier » , Propos recueillis par Sandrine Cabut
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2020/06/08/patrick-berche-quand-la-grippe-espagnole-s-est-eteinte-le-virus-est-devenu-s

Grippes, peste, SARS… Le médecin biologiste Patrick Berche revient sur d’anciennes pandémies, et comment elles ont décliné.

Médecin biologiste, le professeur Patrick Berche est professeur émérite à l’université de Paris, membre de l’Académie de médecine. Il est l’auteur de nombreux ouvrages grand public consacrés à l’histoire de la médecine, aux maladies infectieuses et aux menaces biologiques.

Les grandes épidémies du passé peuvent-elles nous éclairer pour prédire l’évolution de la pandémie de Covid-19 ?

On peut bien sûr faire des analogies avec d’autres virus, comme ceux de la grippe, mais il est difficile d’extrapoler les connaissances. Celui-ci est complètement nouveau. Certes il est apparenté avec deux coronavirus pandémiques responsables, en 2002, du SARS [syndrome aigu respiratoire sévère], et, en 2012, du MERS [syndrome respiratoire du Moyen-Orient]. Mais le SARS-CoV et le MERS-CoV étaient beaucoup plus virulents et moins contagieux que le nouveau coronavirus, le SARS-CoV-2. La létalité du SARS est de 7 %, celle du MERS de 30 %, contre 0,7 % pour le nouveau coronavirus. Celui-ci est contagieux avant même les signes cliniques alors que le SARS-CoV-1 ne le devenait que deux jours après le début des symptômes. Cette association mortalité importante/faible contagiosité et les mesures sanitaires de quarantaine ont permis de casser la chaîne épidémique, ce qui explique pourquoi la pandémie de SARS est restée relativement limitée et s’est éteinte.

Deuxième vague, persistance du virus à bas bruit… Les prédictions concernant le devenir de la pandémie dans les prochains mois sont très contrastées. Quelle est votre analyse ?

Il reste beaucoup d’inconnues dans cette pandémie. Il est possible qu’elle s’éteigne, comme on l’a vu avec le SRAS et le MERS, mais on peut aussi envisager une résurgence atténuée, car seulement 10 % de la population serait immunisée. On considère qu’il faut un seuil d’immunité collective à 50 %-60 % pour endiguer une épidémie. Cependant, il semble exister une certaine immunité croisée avec les coronavirus saisonniers très répandus, comme le suggèrent des études récentes. Cela favoriserait l’immunité collective requise pour arrêter l’épidémie. Cela expliquerait aussi certaines disparités entre les pays. En cas de résurgence, nous sommes désormais beaucoup mieux préparés et la population est éduquée aux gestes barrières, lavage de mains et au port de masques, ce qui peut permettre d’éviter le confinement.

Sur l’évolution de la virulence, je suis plutôt optimiste avec le SARS-CoV-2, car ce virus a un système de réparation de son ARN qui corrige les erreurs. Il mute ponctuellement comme tous les virus, mais reste relativement stable. C’est à la fois une bonne et une mauvaise nouvelle. Bonne parce qu’il est peu probable qu’émerge une souche plus virulente, même s’il faut rester prudent. Mauvaise puisque le virus ne perdra pas sa virulence, contrairement à d’autres virus épidémiques (grippe).

En été, la promiscuité est moindre, on vit plus à l’air libre et il est possible que le virus survive moins bien dans l’environnement. Ces germes sont toutefois surtout transportés par les humains, dont la température est de 37 °C. Les données de l’épidémie dans les pays chauds doivent être interprétées avec prudence. En Afrique, le nombre de malades et de décès déclarés n’est pas très élevé, mais il y a une sous-déclaration manifeste et une forte mortalité infectieuse. Il s’agit aussi de populations jeunes, polyparasitées, pouvant conférer une immunité non spécifique. Il faut étudier de plus près ce qui se passe en Afrique. Le fait que l’Amérique du Sud soit très touchée, même s’il y a là aussi une sous-déclaration importante, suggère cependant que la température n’est pas le seul facteur.

Revenons au passé, comment se sont finies les pandémies de grippe ?

Les virus grippaux sont responsables d’épidémies saisonnières depuis le XVIe siècle et celles-ci prennent parfois une allure pandémique quand la virulence du virus se modifie de façon importante. La pandémie la plus connue, la grippe espagnole, qui a duré de 1918 à 1920, nous a beaucoup appris, et notamment qu’un virus grippal peut circuler pendant l’été. Après une première vague pendant l’hiver 1918, les autorités alliées avaient annoncé la fin de l’épidémie en juillet. Quelques jours plus tard, elle repartait et la deuxième vague a été bien plus mortelle, avec une létalité entre 2 % et 4 % (contre 0,1 % pour la première vague, un taux comparable aux épidémies saisonnières). Il faut aussi souligner que cette pandémie a atteint le continent africain avec une intensité particulière. Parmi les 50 millions de décès de la grippe espagnole, la majorité des décès sont survenus dans les pays en Afrique et en Asie.
Quand cette pandémie s’est progressivement éteinte, le virus responsable, que l’on a identifié plus tard comme étant un H1N1, est devenu saisonnier. Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, les virus grippaux qui circulent sont des recombinants de ce H1N1 ancestral.

Il y a encore beaucoup de mystères autour des virus de la grippe, leur saisonnalité, les résurgences. Une des théories est la migration pendulaire : l’hémisphère nord est atteint en hiver, à l’inverse de l’hémisphère sud durant l’hiver austral. Les virus grippaux seraient transportés par les voyageurs, expliquant l’impact considérable des transports aériens. L’existence de porteurs chroniques de ces virus est aussi avancée, mais n’est pas démontrée.

La peste a aussi été responsable de nombreuses épidémies et plusieurs pandémies, qui ont décimé jusqu’à la moitié de la population. Comment cette maladie infectieuse a-t-elle régressé, même si elle n’a pas complètement disparu ?

Le mode de transmission est particulier puisqu’il existe un réservoir de la bactérie Yersinia pestis, les rats. Pendant très longtemps, les épisodes de peste en Europe sont venus d’Orient, par bateau. En débarquant, les rats contaminés infectaient les rats noirs autochtones qui vivaient au contact des humains. Le bacille se transmettait principalement par des puces, passant des rongeurs à l’homme.
Les épidémies débutaient en général par des cas de peste bubonique (atteinte des ganglions lymphatiques), puis certains malades faisaient des « métastases » pulmonaires. Cette peste pulmonaire peut diffuser par voie respiratoire entre humains. La mortalité atteignait souvent 80 %.
Au fil des siècles, des périodes épidémiques ont alterné avec des phases de déclin. La peste de Justinien, la première pandémie, a duré de 541 à 767. Puis, il y a eu une deuxième pandémie, du XIVe au XIXe siècle, avec des résurgences régulières.

Outre les mesures d’isolement des malades, la régression de la peste s’explique en partie par le remplacement des rats noirs par les rats norvégiens, qui, eux, ne vivent pas au contact des humains, à partir du XVIIIe siècle. L’amélioration du niveau de vie a joué aussi certainement un rôle car la peste est une maladie liée à la pauvreté. Mais les réservoirs n’ont pas disparu, et la peste non plus. Au XXe siècle, il y a eu plusieurs épidémies, notamment en Inde, en 1994-1995, et la peste est toujours endémique, notamment à Madagascar et aux Etats-Unis.

La variole est-elle définitivement éradiquée ?

Elle a été déclarée éradiquée officiellement en 1980, mais elle reste pour moi la plus sérieuse menace bioterroriste aujourd’hui. Le virus de la variole se transmet par voie respiratoire. C’est une infection qui est assez contagieuse [taux de reproduction de base, ou R0, de 3 environ], avec une létalité très forte, entre 25 % et 45%. De plus, les symptômes surviennent après quatorze jours d’incubation et l’éruption caractéristique après quatre jours de forte fièvre, ce qui retarde le diagnostic. Des centaines de souches de virus varioliques sont conservées dans des laboratoires américains, à Atlanta, et russes, en Sibérie. On craint qu’une dizaine de pays aient gardé des souches et que ce virus puisse être aussi synthétisé en laboratoire. Ce n’est pas le seul. En 2005, le virus très virulent de la grippe espagnole a pu être reconstitué entièrement à partir du cadavre d’une jeune femme inuit décédée en 1918, conservée dans le permafrost.

#biologie #histoire

Coronavirus : « Ne relâchons pas nos efforts, sinon l’épidémie reviendra », prévient Santé publique France - Le Parisien
▻https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/sante/coronavirus-ne-relachons-pas-nos-efforts-sinon-l-epidemie-reviendra-previ

https://cloudfront-eu-central-1.images.arcpublishing.com/leparisien/DLRP2VMLEXQO7CTWRCSKG5BQ2Y.jpg

De ce que j’observe, c’est quand même pas mal la fête. Celles et ceux qui acceptaient le confinement (pas seulement dans son principe, très compréhensible, mais aussi dans ses modalités) font maintenant les rebelles avec force bisous, serrages de paluches et oubli de tous les gestes dits barrières. Et reviennent expliquer que vraiment, on n’a pas à contrôler leur vie ! Ah ah !

Grâce à un phénomène appelé « immunité croisée », certaines personnes seraient en partie protégées contre le SARS-CoV-2 par des défenses acquises en combattant d’autres infections. Ces défenses reposent sur deux piliers : les lymphocytes B (qui produisent les anticorps) et les lymphocytes T, dont les CD4 (les « chefs de guerre ») et les CD8 (les « soldats tueurs »). Après chaque infection, le corps « stocke » pour une durée plus ou moins longue une partie de cet arsenal : elle sera réactivée en cas de nouvelle attaque par le même agent infectieux, ou par un autre présentant certaines similitudes.

« Le plus bel exemple d’immunité croisée, c’est la vaccine et la variole » , remarque Hervé Fleury, professeur émérite à l’université de Bordeaux (CNRS UMR5234). La vaccine est la variole des vaches et, contrairement à la variole humaine, c’est une maladie bénigne. « Au XVIIIe siècle, un médecin anglais, Edward Jenner, contamine volontairement un homme avec la vaccine. Exposé ensuite au virus de la variole, l’homme “vacciné” ne développe pas la maladie. L’immunité acquise vis-à-vis d’un virus proche de celui de la variole protège efficacement contre cette dernière » , raconte le virologue.

Lors de la pandémie de grippe A(H1N1) en 2009-2010, les personnes âgées étaient moins sujettes à une forme grave de la maladie, à l’inverse des jeunes. On suppose qu’elles avaient conservé une réponse cytotoxique CD8 acquise contre d’autres souches de virus grippal de type H1N1 ayant circulé quelques décennies plus tôt.

Une partie de la population pourrait de même bénéficier d’une certaine protection contre le SARS-CoV-2. En l’absence d’un vaccin, celle-ci compenserait en partie le faible niveau d’immunité dans la population, même s’il est trop tôt pour en connaître l’impact.

« Distance génétique »

Ainsi, une étude, publiée dans la prestigieuse revue Cell ▻https://www.cell.com/cell/pdf/S0092-8674(20)30610-3.pdf
par une équipe californienne, montre que 100 % des patients infectés par le SARS-CoV-2 possèdent des CD4 réagissant au virus, mais c’est aussi le cas de 50 % des personnes qui ne l’ont jamais rencontré. Ces chiffres sont de 70 % et 20 % respectivement pour les CD8.

« Cette immunité croisée pourrait jouer un rôle chez les personnes peu ou pas symptomatiques, notamment les enfants » , souligne le virologue Etienne Decroly, directeur de recherche au CNRS, en rappelant qu’ « au début de l’épidémie on pensait que la distance génétique entre le SARS-CoV-2 et les autres coronavirus était trop lointaine pour que cela marche » . Depuis, les connaissances ont évolué.

« Plusieurs publications ont montré l’existence d’une protection croisée contre le SARS-CoV-2 chez des personnes qui ont été infectées par le SARS-CoV en 2003. Le problème est qu’il y avait eu peu de cas d’infection lors de l’épidémie de SRAS [syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère]. Rien à voir avec la pandémie actuelle » , souligne James Di Santo, directeur du laboratoire Immunité innée à l’Institut Pasteur (Inserm U1223). Peu de gens bénéficieraient donc de cette protection liée au SRAS.

La réponse humorale est facilement mise en évidence en plaçant la souche virale en présence du sérum à analyser et en regardant si les anticorps qu’il contient bloquent la réplication du virus. « La réponse cytotoxique par les CD8 est plus difficile à mesurer. il faut stimuler in vitro les cellules et voir si elles fabriquent de l’interféron gamma » , détaille le professeur Fleury. Les deux réponses sont présentes face au SARS-CoV-2. Une équipe australienne décrit dans Nature Medicine
►https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0819-2
le cas d’une femme de 47 ans, hospitalisée pour un Covid-19. A partir du septième jour après l’apparition des symptômes, elle a développé une réponse immunitaire aussi bien sous forme d’anticorps neutralisants que de lymphocytes T CD8 cytotoxiques.

« Ligne de défense »

Dans une étude, publiée le 18 mai sur le site de la revue Nature ,
▻https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2349-ydes chercheurs d’une biotech suisse et de plusieurs universités ont passé au crible les anticorps monoclonaux produits par les lymphocytes B à mémoire d’un individu infecté par le SARS-CoV en 2003. L’un d’entre eux, appelé S309, possède une forte capacité de neutraliser le SARS-CoV-2.

Encore mal connue, l’#immunité_cellulaire serait déterminante pour combattre le SARS-CoV-2. « La défaillance de cette ligne de défense favoriserait la réplication virale, ce qui entraînerait la production d’un grand nombre d’anticorps, peut-être pas suffisamment efficaces ou arrivant trop tard dans la bataille » , indique M. Decroly.

Pour leur part, des chercheurs de l’hôpital universitaire de la Charité,
▻https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.17.20061440v1
à Berlin, ont retrouvé des lymphocytes T CD4 chez 83 % de dix-huit malades du Covid-19, mais aussi chez un tiers d’un groupe de 68 donneurs de sang en bonne santé et séronégatifs. Chez ces derniers, ces cellules pourraient être porteuses d’une mémoire acquise lors de rhumes dus à des coronavirus saisonniers.

C’est aussi l’explication avancée au fait que les jeunes enfants font généralement des formes beaucoup moins graves de Covid-19, alors qu’ils peuvent autant être infectés que les adultes. Cette protection croisée serait héritée des fréquentes infections par l’un des quatre coronavirus saisonniers. Dans une étude britannique, les trois quarts des enfants de 3 ans avaient déjà été infectés par deux des coronavirus saisonniers, notamment CoV-NL63, qui utilise le même récepteur que le SARS-CoV-2 pour infecter les cellules.

« Il y a eu peu d’études sur les coronavirus saisonniers. Il faut étudier le type de protection croisée qui pourrait en résulter, mais elle pourrait ne pas avoir un fort impact, car la réponse immunitaire est souvent proportionnelle à l’intensité des manifestations clinique » , tempère M. Di Santo.

Différents scénarios

En modifiant la circulation du virus et la population susceptible d’être infectée, l’existence d’une immunité croisée change l’allure des modèles utilisés pour « prédire » l’évolution de l’épidémie. Dans un article publié dans la revue Science ,
▻https://science.sciencemag.org/content/368/6493/860.long
une équipe de l’école de santé publique Harvard T. H. Chan (Boston) explore différents scénarios en faisant varier le degré d’immunité croisée avec deux autres coronavirus saisonniers − HCoV-OC43 et HCoV-HKU1 −, la durée de l’immunité contre le SARS-CoV-2 et la valeur selon les saisons du R0, le nombre moyen de personnes contaminées par chaque individu infecté.

A une exception près, tous les scénarios prédisent une réémergence de l’épidémie avec des vagues espacées de plusieurs mois ou années. « Même si l’immunité contre le SARS-CoV-2 ne dure que deux ans, une légère (30 %) immunité croisée modérée contre le HCoV-OC43 et le HCoV-HKU1 pourrait efficacement empêcher la transmission du SARS-CoV-2 pendant trois ans, avant une résurgence en 2024 », estiment les auteurs de l’article. Si la protection conférée par une première infection se révèle inférieure à un an, le SARS-CoV-2 pourrait réapparaître chaque hiver, avec des « vaguelettes » semblables à celles des autres coronavirus. Rien de comparable avec la vague qui s’achève.

L’état des connaissances scientifiques ne permet pas de privilégier un scénario plutôt que l’autre : les mécanismes d’immunité croisée sont encore mal cernés, et la durée de l’immunité acquise par les personnes infectées par le SARS-CoV-2 ne sera pas connue avant plusieurs années. Il a fallu attendre 2006 pour déterminer que les anticorps présents chez les personnes touchées par le SRAS de 2003 diminuaient beaucoup après deux ans.
▻https://academic.oup.com/jid/article/193/6/792/1031353

Des études sérologiques seront aussi nécessaires pour estimer avec précision la part de la population contaminée par le SARS-CoV-2 après la première vague épidémique, et le nombre de personnes déjà immunisées contre d’autres coronavirus, susceptibles, donc, d’être protégées. Enfin, l’impact des mesures de distanciation physique n’est pas pris en compte par les épidémiologistes dans ces scénarios.

Paul Benkimoun, Chloé Hecketsweiler

#immunité #immunité_croisée

L’URL de l’article du Monde révèle que le titre d’origine n’était pas bien glorieux (genre titre qui buzz) : « coronavirus-et-si-une-partie-de-la-population-etait-deja-protegee ».

Ce classique pour les noirs : ils sont vivant jusqu’à ce qu’ils croisent un policier, mais ce n’est pas la police qui les a tués :

mais aussi ses « pathologies sous-jacentes » (le document affirme qu’il souffrait d’hypertension et d’une maladie des artères coronaires) et la « potentielle » présence de stupéfiants dans son organisme.

Accessoirement, c’est beau comme du J.-D. Michel :
►https://jdmichel.blog.tdg.ch/archive/2020/03/18/covid-19-fin-de-partie-305096.html

Il faut oser le dire : ce n’est pas le virus qui tue, ce sont les pathologies chroniques qui rendent une infection au SARS-CoV-2 potentiellement fatale à certains patients déjà lourdement touchés par ces maladies de société, alors qu’il est il est bénin pour les personnes en bonne santé.

C’est exactement ce que je me suis dit : les flics, c’est comme la covid, ce sont les comorbidités qui tuent.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EZIg7UvXgAAgrer.jpg

#impunité jusqu’à ce que quelques millions de dollars de dégâts suivent sa mise à pied, et qu’il soit nécessaire de l’inculper. Il y aura fallut aussi un #murder_porn à grande diffusion.

#George_Floyd #justice #Police #CV #crimes_policiers #Black_lives_matter

La notion d’« immunité qualifiée ». Décentralisation, difficultés à poursuivre les agents en justice, héritage culturel… Selon le chercheur Jesse Jannetta, les raisons qui ont mené à la mort de George Floyd lors de son interpellation sont multiples, Stéphanie Le Bars
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/05/31/aux-etats-unis-la-police-est-a-l-aise-avec-l-usage-de-la-force_6041325_3210.

Jesse Jannetta est chercheur, spécialiste des questions de justice et de police pour le think tank Urban Institute de Washington, DC. Il a participé à l’évaluation de l’initiative nationale lancée à partir de 2015 dans six villes américaines pour améliorer les relations entre les forces de l’ordre et la population. Minneapolis (Minnesota), où la mort de George Floyd à la suite d’une arrestation violente suscite depuis plusieurs jours des protestations à travers le pays, en faisait partie.

L’arrestation puis la mort de George Floyd, un Afro-Américain plaqué au sol par un policier blanc de Minneapolis, qui a appuyé durant de longues minutes sur son cou avec son genou sous le regard de ses collègues, a relancé le débat sur les violences policières aux Etats-Unis. Comment expliquez-vous ce type de comportements de la part de policiers ?

Les raisons sont complexes, mais il faut relever en premier lieu la latitude des policiers à user de la force, d’un point de vue juridique, avec notamment la notion d’ « immunité qualifiée » [qui empêche les officiers de police d’être poursuivis pour des actions discrétionnaires dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions] . On a vu dans de nombreux cas la difficulté de la justice à poursuivre des officiers de police qui avaient tué des citoyens, même lorsque les preuves de leurs comportements inappropriés étaient évidentes. Les conventions collectives sont aussi la plupart du temps protectrices et ne facilitent pas les procédures pour que les policiers soient tenus responsables de leurs actes. Selon les termes de ces contrats, il arrive ainsi que des fonctionnaires suspendus ou licenciés soient réintégrés.

Par ailleurs, l’organisation des forces de l’ordre est complètement décentralisée aux Etats-Unis et il existe des milliers d’agences avec des règles différentes. Les standards peuvent donc varier d’une ville à l’autre car la police est en grande partie organisée et gérée par les autorités locales élues. En outre, faute d’un fichier national, un policier renvoyé d’un service de police pour fautes peut être réembauché dans un autre département.

La formation des officiers de police est-elle en cause dans l’utilisation de la force de manière disproportionnée ?

C’est un aspect du problème, mais ce n’est pas le seul. Dans le cas de Minneapolis, par exemple, le sujet n’est pas la formation de ce policier : ce qu’il a fait [mettre le genou sur la nuque d’un homme ne présentant pas de danger immédiat] ne répond à aucune règle et rien ne lui permettait de faire ce geste [Si ce n’est que cette technique d’immobilisation est enseigné aux policiers, pratiquée, Bien que l’on puisse douter que le record d’obstination de 9 minutes soit fréquent, ndc] . Il s’agit davantage d’un problème culturel : que les policiers comprennent ce que doit être leur travail, qu’ils soient conscients qu’ils doivent répondre de leurs actes et que les conséquences peuvent être graves [le policier en question a été inculpé pour meurtre] . Le fait que ses trois collègues présents n’aient pas réagi démontre aussi un échec dans la compréhension de ce qui est permis et de ce qui ne l’est pas. Et montre que la police aux Etats-Unis est à l’aise avec l’usage de la force. C’est cette culture qu’il faut changer, mais il s’agit d’une tâche de longue haleine.

Il faut aussi avoir en tête une spécificité du contexte américain : le fait que le pays soit lourdement armé affecte le comportement des policiers. Face à des citoyens potentiellement armés, le policier veille à sa propre sécurité. Et, s’il est vrai que certaines des personnes tuées par la police ne sont pas armées, beaucoup le sont.

En 2019, quelque mille personnes ont été tuées par la police, parmi lesquelles la part d’Afro-Américains est disproportionnée (23 %, alors que cette communauté représente 12 % de la population totale, selon un décompte du « Washington Post »). Pourquoi ce déséquilibre persistant ?

La police américaine s’est développée dans un contexte historique compliqué et racialisé. Les services de police trouvent une partie de leurs origines dans la #chasse_aux_esclaves et la mise en application des lois sur la #ségrégation_raciale, notamment dans les Etats du Sud, mais aussi ailleurs dans le pays. Les biais que l’on constate aujourd’hui par rapport à la population noire viennent en partie de cette longue histoire et du fait que les policiers, comme le reste de la population, ont tendance à percevoir les hommes noirs plus menaçants que n’importe qui d’autre.

Le travail qui a été fait à Minneapolis et dans cinq autres villes pour aborder ce problème et tenter de rebâtir la confiance entre la police et les communautés afro-américaines a permis quelques améliorations, mais elles sont insuffisantes. Elles demandent beaucoup de temps et d’énergie ; on constate aujourd’hui qu’elles n’ont pas empêché des comportements comme ceux qui ont entraîné la mort de George Floyd. Or, dans le cadre de ce programme, tous les policiers de la ville avaient suivi trois jours de formation au cours desquels avaient été abordés les biais raciaux implicites, l’histoire…

Comment expliquez-vous la flambée de protestation à travers le pays, à la suite de ce nouveau drame ?

Après chaque drame de ce type, on se rend compte que, si les cas précis sont différents, les problèmes sous-jacents sont les mêmes. Et les gens dans les autres villes se disent : « Ça pourrait être nous, cela pourrait se produire chez nous. » Il faut donc continuer à chercher les moyens pour que ces événements arrivent de moins en moins souvent.

#immunité_qualifiée #impunité_pollicière

#pathologies_sous-jacentes aussi évoquées dans le cas #Adama_Traoré en #France :

Une nouvelle expertise exonère les gendarmes dans la mort d’Adama Traoré
Louise Couvelaire, Le Monde, le 29 mai 2020
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/857351

#justice_complice