#inf

De la confidienne à la covidienne
▻http://jetfm.fr/site/La-Confidienne-la-quotidienne-du,11868.html
▻http://jetfm.fr/site/stockage/emissions%20equipe/2019-2020/La%20Confidienne/La_Confidienne_8_mai_Julien_Coop7.mp3

Un entretien avec Julien Bellanger de l’association Ping , une structure qui œuvre pour une approche et une utilisation des outils numériques dans une perspective citoyenne et d’éducation populaire.

▻http://www.pingbase.net
▻http://jetfm.fr/site/-La-Covidienne-du-lundi-au-vendredi-.html

#Merkel #Macron #Allemagne #infantilisation #France #mensonge #mensonges #Johann_Chapoutot

« don’t pratonize me ! »

Derrière #paywall... C’est un des sujets sur lesquels j’ai envie d’écrire en ce moment.

Professeur d’histoire contemporaine à la Sorbonne, grand spécialiste du nazisme (lire ici et là), Johann Chapoutot éclaire les failles de la gestion française de l’épidémie au regard de l’expérience allemande depuis janvier. Dans un entretien à Mediapart, l’universitaire décrit un pouvoir politique allemand « disponible », s’adressant à la « raison » de ses citoyens, quand l’exécutif français, « très contesté de toutes parts » avant l’épidémie, semble « préoccupé uniquement de lui-même et du raffermissement de son pouvoir ».

Comment expliquer la meilleure gestion de l’épidémie du Covid-19 en Allemagne, à ce stade, par rapport à la France ?

Johann Chapoutot : D’abord, les Allemands, c’est-à-dire le gouvernement fédéral mais aussi les exécutifs régionaux des Länder, ont fait de la médecine. Ils ont fait ce que la médecine prescrit en cas de pandémie. Non pas un confinement de masse, qui n’a pas eu lieu en tant que tel en Allemagne, mais du dépistage : des tests systématiques ont été pratiqués en cas de symptômes légers ou graves, et les personnes malades ont été isolées et traitées.

Pourquoi l’Allemagne l’a fait, et pas la France ? Parce que l’Allemagne a les capacités industrielles de produire des tests. Les tests les plus rapides ont été élaborés par des scientifiques et industriels allemands, dès la fin du mois de janvier. Et la production a été possible grâce aux capacités de production dans le pays : alors que la France a connu une désindustrialisation de masse, il persiste en Allemagne un tissu industriel de PME, qui a été sacrifié en France.

L’Allemagne a donc fait, dès fin janvier, ce que l’on nous promet de faire en France après le 11 mai : dépister, isoler et traiter. Sachant que l’on n’est même pas sûr, en France, de pouvoir le faire.

Les capacités d’accueil des hôpitaux allemands ont semble-t-il joué également, ce qui peut paraître contradictoire avec la vision d’une Allemagne arc-boutée sur le remboursement de la dette... Qu’en dites-vous ?

Les chiffres des lits d’hôpitaux sont sidérants : 28 000 lits en réanimation opérationnels fin janvier en Allemagne, contre 5 000 à peine en France. À quoi est-ce dû ? L’Allemagne a économisé sur presque tout, et c’est un vrai problème qu’une partie des représentants du patronat dénonce également : manque d’investissements dans les routes, les ponts, les écoles... Mais elle n’a pas économisé sur le système de santé.

Pourquoi ? Pour les mêmes raisons qu’elle a économisé sur le reste. Elle a appliqué son mantra ordo-libéral du zéro déficit, le « Schwarze Null ». C’est ce que demandait l’électorat de la droite allemande, fait de retraités, qui détient des pensions par capitalisation privée, et qui vote donc pour une politique d’économies et de désinflation.

En raison de la volonté de cet électorat également, il n’y a pas eu d’économies sur les hôpitaux, car c’est un électorat âgé, qui veut faire des économies, mais pas au détriment de sa santé.

Y a-t-il une autre explication aux différences manifestes dans la gestion de l’épidémie ?

Oui. Les pouvoirs politiques allemands étaient disponibles, au moment du surgissement du Covid-19. Ils avaient une capacité de diagnostic politique et social, une capacité d’attention dont était privé le pouvoir politique français.

Il faut se reporter quelques semaines en arrière : l’exécutif français était focalisé sur l’enjeu de la réforme des retraites. Le 29 février 2020, un conseil des ministres exceptionnel, consacré censément à la crise du coronavirus, décidait de l’application de l’article 49-3 de la Constitution sur la réforme des retraites. Deuxièmement, ce pouvoir politique français était déjà très faible, très contesté de toutes parts. Il était préoccupé uniquement de lui-même et du raffermissement de son pouvoir.

Souvenons-nous que la ministre de la santé démissionne le 16 février pour aller sauver une candidature à la mairie de Paris – ce serait totalement impensable en Allemagne ! Autocentré, le pouvoir français est également violent, comme le montre le traitement des médecins, infirmières et aides-soignants matraqués et gazés par la police au cours de leurs nombreuses manifestations ces derniers mois. Le résultat est que le gouvernement français, qui n’était pas à l’écoute, n’était plus écouté non plus.

En même temps, Angela Merkel semblait, à la fin de l’année 2019, très affaiblie elle aussi.

C’est certain, et depuis plus d’un an même. Depuis qu’Angela Merkel a renoncé à la présidence de la CDU [en octobre 2018 – ndlr], ce qui était alors une première pour un chancelier en exercice de renoncer à la présidence du parti majoritaire. Mais c’est sa successeure à la tête de la CDU qui a échoué. Merkel, elle, n’était pas contestée en tant que chancelière. Son pouvoir n’était pas contesté. Certainement pas dans la rue, comme l’était le pouvoir en France.

Diriez-vous que le fédéralisme allemand est plus efficace que l’hypercentralisme français, face à la pandémie ?

J’aborderai cette question du fédéralisme dans une perspective plus large, celui du dialogue rationnel, de la conception que l’on a, en Allemagne, de la citoyenneté et de la décision politique. Tout le monde a relevé les différences de registre entre les interventions d’Angela Merkel, le 19 mars, et de Frank-Walter Steinmeier, le président fédéral allemand, le 11 avril, d’un côté [les deux interventions sont à voir en intégralité ci-dessous – ndlr], et celles d’Emmanuel Macron de l’autre.

Merkel, comme Steinmeier, parle à la raison de leurs auditeurs. Je cite Merkel : « La situation est dynamique, nous allons apprendre d’elle au fur et à mesure. [...] Je vous le demande, ne vous fiez pas aux rumeurs [...] Nous sommes une démocratie, nous ne vivons pas de la contrainte, mais d’un savoir partagé. » Quant à Steinmeier : « Nous sommes une démocratie vivante, avec des citoyens conscients de leur responsabilité, nous écoutons les faits et les arguments, nous nous faisons confiance. »

Merkel comme Steinmeier parlent à des adultes, à des citoyens rationnels. Le contraste est net avec la France, où l’on nous parle comme à des enfants. Comme l’avait dit Sibeth Ndiaye, on assume de mentir pour « protéger le président ». Je me demande d’ailleurs comment il a été possible de nommer porte-parole du gouvernement une femme qui avait fait cette déclaration quelques mois plus tôt.

En France, on nous ment. On nous félicite, on nous enguirlande, on nous gronde, on nous récompense, à l’instar de Macron dans ses interventions ; ou l’on nous tance ou nous insulte, comme le déplorable préfet de police de Paris, Didier Lallement. En France, on masque l’impuissance concrète, réelle, du gouvernement par des rodomontades ridicules. « Nous sommes en guerre », avait dit Macron, auquel répond Steinmeier, calmement et fermement : « Non, ceci n’est pas une guerre. »

C’est dans ce cadre plus large que je conçois la question du fédéralisme : l’importance donnée en Allemagne au dialogue, à la concertation et à la raison. La structure fédérale fait qu’Angela Merkel ne peut prendre de décision sans consulter les 16 ministres-présidents des 16 Länder. En France, les mesures annoncées lors de la dernière allocution du 13 avril ont été communiquées aux ministres quinze minutes avant le discours du monarque républicain qui, verticalement et de manière transcendante, surprend jusqu’à son propre gouvernement. C’est stupéfiant d’archaïsme.
« En Allemagne, il n’y a pas eu d’état d’urgence »

La Cour constitutionnelle de Karlsruhe est-elle intervenue dans le débat sur la gestion du Covid-19, et les stratégies de déconfinement ?

À ce stade, non. Mais il est certain que le pouvoir exécutif allemand parle et agit sous le contrôle de deux instances fondamentales, d’une part le Parlement, le Bundestag, et d’autre part la Cour constitutionnelle. Cette cour est d’ailleurs une véritable entité juridique, composée de juristes.

Rien à voir avec le Conseil constitutionnel en France, où l’on recase des hommes et femmes politiques en fin de carrière. En Allemagne, c’est quelque chose de sérieux. La République fédérale allemande est par ailleurs une véritable République parlementaire. C’est le Bundestag qui gouverne par le truchement du gouvernement. À tout instant, il peut lui retirer sa confiance.

Dans le cadre de l’état d’urgence en France, des pouvoirs exceptionnels ont été conférés à l’administration. En Allemagne, aucune disposition de ce type n’a été prise. Pour une raison simple : en raison de précédents historiques fâcheux, l’attachement aux libertés individuelles est fort, tout comme la vigilance citoyenne, y compris des médias, sur ces questions.

En France, les droits et les libertés fondamentaux sont totalement négligés et piétinés par le pouvoir exécutif. Depuis l’état d’urgence antiterroriste, dont une partie est devenue du droit commun depuis 2017, puis l’état d’urgence sanitaire, dont on sait, là aussi, que de nombreuses dispositions, par un effet de cliquet, vont rester dans le droit commun. À chaque fois qu’un état d’urgence est voté, on perd en liberté. Ce n’est pas le cas en Allemagne.

N’y a-t-il pas eu, comme on l’a vu en Espagne, des tensions entre Berlin et certaines régions, dans la gestion de l’épidémie ?

Non. Le dialogue s’est fait en bonne intelligence. Les compétences entre fédéral et régional sont partagées pour le financement des structures hospitalières. Mais ce qui relève de l’ordre public – et donc du confinement – comme de la police est une compétence régionale.

On a d’ailleurs observé des disparités entre des régions comme la Bavière et la Sarre [à la frontière avec le Luxembourg – ndlr] qui ont rapidement voté et mis en place le confinement, et d’autres Länder. Cela recoupe, il me semble, un facteur culturel, que l’on retrouve aussi à l’échelle européenne, voire mondiale.

D’un côté, des pays, comme la France, l’Espagne ou l’Italie, marqués par un catholicisme culturel, avec une forte présence de l’État, lui-même hérité de l’Église. Et de l’autre, des États et des zones géographiques marqués par le protestantisme et la primauté de l’individu, où domine le laisser-faire, parfois même au détriment de la santé des individus, comme au Royaume-Uni ou aux États-Unis. Cette division se retrouve en Allemagne, entre des régions catholiques comme la Bavière, où le confinement a même été réalisé de manière assez autoritaire, sous les injonctions du président CSU Markus Söder, et d’autres Länder, où les libertés fondamentales sont plus importantes.

À Bruxelles, Berlin continue de s’opposer, comme en 2008 vis-à-vis de la Grèce, à davantage de solidarité envers des pays plus fortement touchés par l’épidémie, par exemple en mutualisant une partie des dettes générées par la gestion de l’épidémie. Cette position d’Angela Merkel est-elle encore tenable ?

Le débat est vif sur ces questions en Allemagne, et depuis 2008. Très tôt, Die Linke – allié de La France insoumise – s’est prononcé pour la mutualisation des dettes, et la solidarité européenne envers Athènes. Les Verts et une partie du SPD [sociaux-démocrates – ndlr] ont ensuite suivi.

Cela fait plusieurs années que la droite patronale met en garde sur la politique d’austérité et du zéro déficit : attention, prévient-elle, c’est une catastrophe, nous allons mourir riches, faute d’investissements structurels qui minent notre compétitivité. En ce qui concerne une émission de dettes en commun au sein de la zone euro, là encore, certains à droite expliquent désormais que cette solidarité ne représenterait pas qu’un coût pour Berlin, mais un gain, étant donné que les produits manufacturés allemands sont avant tout exportés, non pas en Chine, mais chez les voisins européens.

Le débat est en cours. Et Angela Merkel joue, sur ce sujet comme d’autres, une politique d’intérêts bien calculés. Parmi les éléments qui joueront dans sa décision, il faut citer la stratégie de l’AfD [parti d’extrême droite – ndlr], qui s’était créé pendant la crise de l’euro, justement contre l’aide à la Grèce, et qui vient de réenfourcher son cheval de bataille originel. Il faudra aussi voir comment les lignes bougent au sein du SPD.

#industrie #désindustrialisation #austérité_sélective #gouvernance #concertation #incurie

Liens vers
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/301214/la-carte-mentale-du-nazisme
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/culture-idees/170120/les-nazis-pionniers-du-management
▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/100220/allemagne-la-cdu-en-crise-avec-le-depart-surprise-de-sa-presidente

#coronavirus #solidarité #France #marchés

Voir à ce sujet :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/836239

Voir aussi la compile des effets délétères indirects de la pandémie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/832147

Entre autre ça amène la discussion sur le #contact_tracing et notamment sur la proposition #DP-3T
►https://github.com/DP-3T/documents

Je vais essayer d’être diplomate (même si c’est pas gagné) car je comprends qu’avec l’inquiétude actuelle et l’impuissance dans laquelle nous sommes isolés, certaines personnes soient tentées de trouver dans le contact tracing une solution à étudier attentivement.
Se consacrer à cela n’est-il pas un moyen efficace de se détourner de la réalité de la maladie et de ses effets de bord sociaux et politiques déjà à l’œuvre ?
Pouvons nous essayé de prendre un peu de distance au lieu de rêver à un miracle technologique (que certain·es nomment le #bluff_technologique) pour analyser factuellement les proratas médicaux (tests/masques/soins hospitaliers), puis si il le faut vraiment creuser l’application du contact tracing d’un point de vue uniquement technique (comment marche le bluetooth et avec qui).
Faire cela avant même d’activement se remémorer l’histoire de la mise en place exponentielle des moyens de surveillance globale de la population appuyés sur la peur et la précipitation depuis 25 ans ? avant même de penser qu’un tel basculement ne peut nous mener qu’à la mise en danger de la démocratie ?

►https://seenthis.net/messages/844226

De toute manière, sur une bonne partie de la population, ça ne marchera pas plus qu’un numéro vert pour un problème de société.

1⃣ Il faut des téléphoner compatibles (et beaucoup de gens préfèrent des téléphones qui ne font qui téléphoner).
2⃣ Il faut savoir les utiliser → on est toujours pas certains d’avoir réussi à expliquer à ma belle-mère comment avoir une téléconsultation avec sa psy.
3⃣ ceux qui réunissent les 2 premières conditions sont les + susceptibles de savoir aussi contourner le dispositif au besoin.

Donc, on arrête de perdre du temps sur des doudous stupides et on doit juste repenser toute l’organisation sociale…

C’est le problème rencontré en sécurité informatique où sur l’usage d’outils que nous pensons basiques, le dysfonctionnement est d’abord entre la chaise et l’écran.

Un exemple aussi d’une grand-maman bien connue de mes services bisoux virtuels à qui j’ai envoyé un lien à cliquer pour pouvoir échanger par visio sur jitsi. Une heure au téléphone pour lui demander de cliquer sur le lien qu’elle avait reçu sur sa tablette (oui, la famille lui a offert une tablette second prix l’année dernière pour qu’elle reçoive de leurs nouvelles). Elle a abandonné, on devait se voir depuis Noël, on repoussait notre venue, voila, on ne se verra pas, même pas en visio.

Cette dame de 83 ans sait toutefois se servir des textos, au grand dam de ses petits enfants qui reçoivent des SMS de trois mots quand ils se sont fendus d’un long texte bien écrit en beau français :)

D’autres points à considérer :

– les outils technologiques de surveillance de masse existent déjà, qu’on le veuille ou non ; si les services de renseignement veulent tracer où tu as été et qui tu as fréquenté, c’est déjà faisable, et sans doute déjà fait dans de nombreux pays, comme l’a montré Snowden ;

– Facebook, c’est 37 millions d’utilisateurs actifs chaque mois en France. Prétendre que les gens ne sont pas équipés, ne savent faire, ou qu’ils ne veulent pas se faire fliquer, c’est une vue de l’esprit ; il y a de nombreuses difficultés avec les logiciels « privacy first », mais l’aspect diffusion/acceptabilité ne me semble pas le plus complexe ;

– une question qui se pose de manière extrêmement urgente, c’est de savoir si les États vont utiliser cet épisode pour officialiser les outils les plus intrusifs et répressifs, où si l’on peut refuser l’officialisation des outils tels qu’ils sont ouvertement utilisés dans l’autres pays, et pousser pour aller vers les outils conçus par des spécialistes du « privacy-first » plutôt que par Palantir et avec une absence à peu près totale de contrôle démocratiqu ;

Dit autrement : les outils de surveillance de masse existent déjà, mais leur valeur répressive est relativement limitée, parce que leur utilisation n’est pas officielle (c’est du domaine du renseignement, qui est certes très problématique, mais qui est plus ou moins limité). Si on officialise ces outils dans le cadre de l’épidémie, on change d’échelle, et leur valeur répressive restera, parce qu’on aura accepté ça cette fois. Une fois qu’on aura officialisé l’idée qu’un outil à la Palantir est utile en étant accessible aux flics « de terrain » et peut être utilisé dans une procédure juridique (démontrer que tu n’as pas respecté le confinement plusieurs fois de suite), ça restera si on invoque le terrorisme, les black blocks, les néonazis, les violeurs pédophiles ou je ne sais quoi. L’alternative envisagée, c’est donc de proposer l’utilisation d’outils conçus pour ne pas pouvoir être utilisés de manière répressive (parce que sans moyens d’identification) mais qui rempliront le même but (limiter la propagation de l’épidémie), retirant ainsi la « justification » de l’utilisation de moyens intrusifs.

– le grand risque, c’est que le déconfinement soit suivi, moins d’un mois après, par une hausse brutale des contaminations et l’imposition dans l’urgence d’un second confinement ; s’il y a échec du déconfinement (et ça nous semble à tous très probable), la question des libertés publiques deviendra tellement accessoire qu’on va pleurer. Si l’État se retrouve avec un second confinement et absolument tout le monde qui exige de lui de trouver immédiatement une solution (Saint Raoult priez pour nous), je n’ai rigoureusement aucune doute, mais alors aucun, que les méthodes instaurées seront d’une violence que l’on pense aujourd’hui impossible. Croire qu’on échappera alors à Palantir et à la surveillance électronique renforcée (tout ça sera de toute façon réclamé par la population), ça me semble dangereusement naïf. On prendra le logiciel et les méthodes de flicage sud-coréens, au mieux, et on les appliquera à la Lallement, et ce ne sera plus du tout discutable.

– dans l’immédiat, on n’a pas le droit de sortir de chez nous, si on le fait c’est avec la crainte de tomber sur des flics, on n’a pas le droit de se rencontrer, on n’a pas le droit de manifester, on n’a pas le droit d’aller voter, l’effondrement économique a aussi pour conséquence qu’on a de moins en moins la possibilité de subvenir aux besoins de sa famille (je ne suis pas pour le « tout économique », mais tout de même), ce sont les plus faibles socialement et physiquement qui en prennent plein la gueule les premiers, etc. On n’est pas dans une situation où il y aurait des choix parfaits, et où l’on peut considèrer des absolus quant à nos libertés. Parce que pour l’instant et pour une période dangereusement longue, notre libertés fondamentales sont déjà abolies (aller et venir, rassemblement, démocratie, éducation…).

– l’autre grosse alternative, et c’est certainement la solution qui se met en place sans le dire explicitement, c’est l’immunité de groupe (malgré les doutes sur l’immunité). Le confinement ne sert dans cette optique qu’à atteindre un niveau d’acceptabilité, dans nos démocraties, au fait qu’on va laisser crever une partie de notre population. Le coût d’un second confinement serait tellement intolérable que la population acceptera ce choix, initialement indéfendable. Depuis une semaine, on a d’ailleurs en France toute une littérature qui fleurit allant dans ce sens.

Du coup, dans cette logique (et dans un sens donc contraire aux considérations précédentes), on peut suspecter que l’annonce du logiciel soit, justement, une sorte de gri-gri destiné à calmer l’opinion et justifier le déconfinement, et pouvoir dire, s’il y a trop de morts, que vous voyez bien, on avait tout mis en place, mais les gens n’ont pas voulu utiliser l’outil qu’on leur avait proposé. (Donc c’est la faute aux gens.)

Tout comme Arno, je pense que la plupart des gens vont installer l’appli sans sourciller, tout comme ils utilisent Facebook et tous les services de Google... Il n’y a qu’à voir aussi comment en ce moment tout le monde se rue sur Zoom malgré tous les articles et avertissements qu’on peut lire partout, alors que des alternatives tout aussi pratiques (voire mieux) et open-source existent, comme jitsi. La question est donc d’exiger une appli qui ne fera que du tracking anonyme et rien d’autre. J’y crois moyen et en même temps j’ai une petite lueur d’espoir depuis que j’ai vu que le code de leur formulaire d’attestation dérogatoire était publié sur Github (même si on peut toujours penser que le code effectivement mis en œuvre n’est pas tout à fait celui qui nous est présenté).

La suite, la présentation plus détaillée du fonctionnement de #DP3T et de ses limites.

▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKZOBSdkUBo

Le contact tracing sans surveillance (DP3T) | COVID 3

DP3T est une solution Open Source de contact tracing sans surveillance, conçue et développée par des chercheurs à travers l’Europe et en particulier à l’EPFL. Cette vidéo présente son fonctionnement, ses forces et ses faiblesses.

– les outils technologiques de surveillance de masse existent déjà, qu’on le veuille ou non ; si les services de renseignement veulent tracer où tu as été et qui tu as fréquenté, c’est déjà faisable, et sans doute déjà fait dans de nombreux pays, comme l’a montré Snowden ;

Tu fais des suppositions non démontrées et en avançant ainsi tu considères que personne n’y peut rien et tu invites à renoncer à dénoncer les différents procédés de surveillance et de suivi. L’argument du on le sait déjà n’est pas recevable, parce qu’il tient du fantasme paranoïaque, ça ne veut pas dire que c’est faux, mais qu’il y a certaines formes de surveillance. Heureusement qu’il existe encore des moyens d’y échapper.

– Facebook, c’est 37 millions d’utilisateurs actifs chaque mois en France. Prétendre que les gens ne sont pas équipés, ne savent faire, ou qu’ils ne veulent pas se faire fliquer, c’est une vue de l’esprit ; il y a de nombreuses difficultés avec les logiciels « privacy first », mais l’aspect diffusion/acceptabilité ne me semble pas le plus complexe ;

Merci de citer tes sources. 37 millions de comptes actifs, ce n’est pas 37 millions de personnes. Ce n’est pas une vue de l’esprit de se rendre compte que les personnes les plus exposées sont des personnes qui ne sont pas équipées en smartphone. On ne parle pas d’un ordinateur à la maison.

– une question qui se pose de manière extrêmement urgente, c’est de savoir si les États vont utiliser cet épisode pour officialiser les outils les plus intrusifs et répressifs, où si l’on peut refuser l’officialisation des outils tels qu’ils sont ouvertement utilisés dans l’autres pays, et pousser pour aller vers les outils conçus par des spécialistes du « privacy-first » plutôt que par Palantir et avec une absence à peu près totale de contrôle démocratique ;

Il y a urgence de masques et de tests, de lits d’hopitaux mais certainement pas urgence de la mise en place d’une surveillance sociale de masse électronique telle qu’elle voudrait s’imposer actuellement. N’oublions pas le contexte politique, voir la différence de gestion sanitaire en Allemagne et en France, on parle bien d’un but sanitaire et tout concoure à montrer le contraire. Je continue de dire que nous nous épuisons dans un débat technologique qui ne devrait pas avoir lieu et qui est une façon de nous détourner des réalités catastrophiques.

Je peux malheureusement répondre oui à la première question, parce que cela se vérifie à chaque crise depuis 25 ans, les libertés se réduisent aux profits d’un Etat sécuritaire, toute occasion est bonne et les tenants de la surveillance électronique, du croisement de fichiers et du traçage sont des lobbyistes très actifs, de type Babinet (video youtube du 1er avril), qui n’ont aucune limite ni scrupule politique à t’exposer que les mails sont une source à prendre en compte dans le dossier médical multidatas qu’ils promeuvent et qui rêvent de fermer la CNIL déjà réduite à rien. Concernant Palentir, c’est une boite américaine qui analyse pour la DGSE et autres services secrets français les résultats des données collectées en france. Ça me laisse toujours pontoise de réaliser que les français sont carrement naïfs ou que nous sommes simplement toujours dans les mains des mêmes industriels du complexe militaro industriel depuis 1941 qui font croire à une guerre économique entre pays alors qu’elle est entre classes dominantes et les 99% qui subissent leurs incompétences délirantes et leurs fantasmes de contrôle total. Mais oui, je pense que ce sera Palantir et Consorts et même pire.

Pour revenir à la croyance en des alternatives de traçage, à partir du moment où les principes démocratiques sont baffoués parce qu’il y aura violation de la vie privé via une technique de suivi personnalisé (sous des prétextes fallacieux car je répète que l’efficience sanitaire du traçage est loin d’être prouvée), qu’elle soit anonyme ou pas ne change rien (il n’y a pas d’anonymat dans du traçage), ni de garanti par un encadrement de la CNIL qui a appris à aplatir ses prérogatives chaque fois qu’un échelon supplémentaire est franchi.

Je vois plutôt se profiler une surveillance de multiples sources justifiée par une meilleure efficience et surtout pour notre bien sanitaire. FB+internet+conversations filtrées+Géolocalisation+traçage+biométrie+rfid+ saupoudrage d’un peu d’alternatifs pour faire plaisir aux geeks qui rêvent d’un monde libre informatisé et faire croire que tout est sous contrôle démocratique.

Nos avis démocratiques ne pèseront pas grand chose face aux milliards de $ que pèsent les données de santé et de profilage, surtout pour sauver des vies dont ils se foutent totalement. Ce qui m’intéresse à regarder actuellement c’est la méthode de persuasion qui va être utilisée. Ça suit son cours et la diversion fonctionne à merveille …

Dit autrement : les outils de surveillance de masse existent déjà, mais leur valeur répressive est relativement limitée, parce que leur utilisation n’est pas officielle (c’est du domaine du renseignement, qui est certes très problématique, mais qui est plus ou moins limité). Si on officialise ces outils dans le cadre de l’épidémie, on change d’échelle, et leur valeur répressive restera, parce qu’on aura accepté ça cette fois. Une fois qu’on aura officialisé l’idée qu’un outil à la Palantir est utile en étant accessible aux flics « de terrain » et peut être utilisé dans une procédure juridique (démontrer que tu n’as pas respecté le confinement plusieurs fois de suite), ça restera si on invoque le terrorisme, les black blocks, les néonazis, les violeurs pédophiles ou je ne sais quoi. L’alternative envisagée, c’est donc de proposer l’utilisation d’outils conçus pour ne pas pouvoir être utilisés de manière répressive (parce que sans moyens d’identification) mais qui rempliront le même but (limiter la propagation de l’épidémie), retirant ainsi la « justification » de l’utilisation de moyens intrusifs.

Prends juste l’exemple de Tarnac, avec Coupat qui est soupçonné parce qu’il n’a pas de téléphone portable, la répression est déjà là et n’a pas besoin de notre accord pour se déployer. La technique le permet, la répression suit, l’accompagne. Ce n’est pas de quelle manière cela va se déployer, ni si il y a anonymat ni si les intentions sont louables, mais si nous savons faire bloc contre cette hallucination collective pro technosurveillance. Je préfère me battre contre toutes les prisons car il n’y a pas de prison alternative.

– le grand risque, c’est que le déconfinement soit suivi, moins d’un mois après, par une hausse brutale des contaminations et l’imposition dans l’urgence d’un second confinement ; s’il y a échec du déconfinement (et ça nous semble à tous très probable), la question des libertés publiques deviendra tellement accessoire qu’on va pleurer. Si l’État se retrouve avec un second confinement et absolument tout le monde qui exige de lui de trouver immédiatement une solution (Saint Raoult priez pour nous), je n’ai rigoureusement aucune doute, mais alors aucun, que les méthodes instaurées seront d’une violence que l’on pense aujourd’hui impossible. Croire qu’on échappera alors à Palantir et à la surveillance électronique renforcée (tout ça sera de toute façon réclamé par la population), ça me semble dangereusement naïf. On prendra le logiciel et les méthodes de flicage sud-coréens, au mieux, et on les appliquera à la Lallement, et ce ne sera plus du tout discutable.

Depuis le début du covid le gvt nous mène en bateau, je n’ai aucun doute qu’on arrivera à palentir par un chemin ou un autre et en plus avec l’assentiment de la population et le chemin le plus court trouvé pour le moment c’est de laisser travailler les « alternatifs » dessus, histoire que la gauche technophile se foute bien sur la gueule.

– dans l’immédiat, on n’a pas le droit de sortir de chez nous, si on le fait c’est avec la crainte de tomber sur des flics, on n’a pas le droit de se rencontrer, on n’a pas le droit de manifester, on n’a pas le droit d’aller voter, l’effondrement économique a aussi pour conséquence qu’on a de moins en moins la possibilité de subvenir aux besoins de sa famille (je ne suis pas pour le « tout économique », mais tout de même), ce sont les plus faibles socialement et physiquement qui en prennent plein la gueule les premiers, etc. On n’est pas dans une situation où il y aurait des choix parfaits, et où l’on peut considèrer des absolus quant à nos libertés. Parce que pour l’instant et pour une période dangereusement longue, notre libertés fondamentales sont déjà abolies (aller et venir, rassemblement, démocratie, éducation…).

C’est assez bien vendu en effet mais je n’achète pas.

– l’autre grosse alternative, et c’est certainement la solution qui se met en place sans le dire explicitement, c’est l’immunité de groupe (malgré les doutes sur l’immunité). Le confinement ne sert dans cette optique qu’à atteindre un niveau d’acceptabilité, dans nos démocraties, au fait qu’on va laisser crever une partie de notre population. Le coût d’un second confinement serait tellement intolérable que la population acceptera ce choix, initialement indéfendable. Depuis une semaine, on a d’ailleurs en France toute une littérature qui fleurit allant dans ce sens.

Disons que laisser mourir des personnes et même les euthanasier sans leur accord ni celui de leurs familles sous prétexte qu’ils auraient peut-être le covid et qu’il n’y a pas assez de lits en réanimation c’est aujourd’hui et maintenant en france. Ça me suffit pour voir que ce gouvernement n’en a absolument rien à foutre de sa population et que s’il faut s’allier aux pires des américains pour réaliser le grand panoptique de surveillance cette crise servira comme excellent prétexte et au lieu de tests et de masques et de lits d’hopitaux, tout le monde demandera des drones et du traçage et de la répression bien entendu.

Du coup, dans cette logique (et dans un sens donc contraire aux considérations précédentes), on peut suspecter que l’annonce du logiciel soit, justement, une sorte de gri-gri destiné à calmer l’opinion et justifier le déconfinement, et pouvoir dire, s’il y a trop de morts, que vous voyez bien, on avait tout mis en place, mais les gens n’ont pas voulu utiliser l’outil qu’on leur avait proposé. (Donc c’est la faute aux gens.)

Oui, parfaitement d’accord, c’est la méthode de persuasion qui sera probablement utilisée, le #bluff_technologique, one more time.

Pour poursuivre mes propos, voila comment avec #stopcovid les bonimenteurs du traçage numérique des #données_personnelles sensibles commes les #données_de_santé peuvent enfin placer leurs discours : ici le babinet national, qui refuse de dire pour quelles entreprises il travaille (YT V4yf3HOEHPk) mais dispose de sa place en tant que #digital-champion (sic) français (groupe des conseillers au numérique européen). Souvenez-vous, c’est lui qui voulait fermer la CNIL et sert ici de conseil au smartank de l’#institut_Montaigne (Bébéar), ne vous méprenez pas sur le style alternatif cool sympa qu’il se donne, ce qu’il propose est bien une #société_de_contrôle totalitaire avec profilage médical de chacun·e basé sur l’aspiration de données provenant de sources diverses comme les données d’alimentation ou la lecture des emails …
extrait de la vidéo

https://i.imgur.com/bwrK3kq.png

1er avril 2020
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rxt-8Z1dQHg?t=471

Comment ça, vous ne saviez pas à quoi vous attendre avec la république numérique de Macron ?

#future-of-innovation-in-europe
Friday, 20 March
▻https://www.iiea.com/event/france-and-the-future-of-innovation-in-europe

In his address to the IIEA, Gilles Babinet will offer his perspective on the future of innovation in Europe and discuss the French Government’s work on innovation and startups (Visa Tech, Next40). He will comment on the implications of europeanisation as French efforts increasingly focus on French champions. Gilles Babinet will also discuss issues such as 5G, connected objects, the need for an overarching ecosystem and how to prepare for it.

#babinet

pourquoi je te dis que babinet est un mec dangereux vu le poste qu’il occupe (co-président du conseil national du numérique)
▻https://youtu.be/Qt9Yhx8vlVk?t=1159

… les machines seront toujours inférieur à ce que nous sommes.

#IA #babinet #informatique

Le mur construit en 2012...

Dans la région de l’Evros, un mur inutile sur la frontière greco-turque :

https://visionscarto.net/local/cache-vignettes/L370xH500/18671404365_40ff-322f7.jpg?1433938629#.jpg

je suis tombé sur une vidéo YT d’un compte néo-nazi montrant une attaque du mur de l’Evros par des migrants. L’attaque y est présentée comme soutenue par la police turque, ce qui est vraiment beaucoup solliciter les images… les migrants sont noyés sous les lacrymos.

Evros: Greece to extend the fence on the borders with Turkey to 40km

Greece will extend the fence to its Evros borders with Turkey to 40 km, government spokesman Stelios Petsas said on Friday morning. The additional fence will be installed in “sensitive” areas preferred for illegal entries by migrants and refugees.

The fence currently covers 12.5 km.

Speaking to ANT1 TV, Petsas noted that at the moment the most vulnerable border point is in the south.

The current 12.5 km fence of land access points is installed north and south of Kastanies customs office, where thousands of migrants and refugees have amassed.

According to the daily Kathimerini, the 40 kilometers new fence is planned to be partially installed either in areas where the Evros waters are low or in areas where the landscape favors illegla paasage.

Sections such as Ormenio, Gardens, Feres, Tychero, Soufli, Dikaia, Dilofo, Marassia, Nea Vyssa and elsewhere have been designated as the areas where the new fence will installed by the Greek Army and support by the police.

According to a report by daily Elftheros Typos, Greece’s Plan B aside from the fence extension is the presence of about 4,000 police officers and soldiers in parallel patrols, helicopters, unmanned aircraft, message broadcasting, cameras for audio-video.

A Greek Army – Greek Police “joint operations center” is to be established in Nea Vryssa.

According to the daily more than 1,000 soldiers, two commandos squads, 1,500 police and national guards are currently operating in the Evros area.

Petsas underlined that the Greek government has changed its policy because there is a national security issue at the moment.

He reiterated the new policy saying that “no one will cross the border.”

▻https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/03/06/evros-greece-fence-borders-turkey-extension

Vidéos à partager pour dénoncer la situation des violences contre les exilé·es à la frontière gréco-turque

Côté turc à #Pazarkule, des exilés parlent de la répression qu’ils subissent chaque jours, 7 mars 2020

https://i.imgur.com/c1hPEEv.png https://i.imgur.com/r86r7Pe.png

▻https://indymotion.fr/videos/watch/3ef5e701-fbc1-4d94-a900-6ac2e22892aa
#vidéo #campement

Video 2 - Violences contre les exilé·es à la frontière gréco-turque

Depuis le début du mois de mars 2020, des milliers d’exilé·es, incité·es voire poussé·es par les autorités turques, se sont précipité·es aux frontières terrestres et maritimes entre la Turquie et la Grèce. Ils et elles se sont heurté·es à la violence de la police et de l’armée grecque, ainsi que de groupe fascistes, mobilisés pour leur en interdire le franchissement, la suite : www.gisti.org/spip.php ?article6368

▻https://indymotion.fr/videos/watch/e8938a1c-5456-46e8-a0cb-be0806c96051?start=1s

Greece shields Evros border with blades wire, 400 new border guards

Greece is strengthening ifs defense and is preparing for a possible new wave of migrants at its Evros border. A fence of sharp blades wire (concertina wire) and 400 additional border guards are to shield the country for the case Turkey will open its borders again so that migrants can cross into Europe.

According to daily ethnos (▻https://www.ethnos.gr/ellada/105936_ohyronetai-o-ebros-frahtis-me-lepidoforo-syrmatoplegma-kai-400-neoi-sy), Ankara has already been holding groups of migrants in warehouses near the border, while the Greek side is methodically being prepared for the possibility of a new attempt for waves of migrants to try to cross again the border.

“At the bridgeheads of Peplos and Fera, at the land borders after the riverbed is aligned, and in other vulnerable areas along the border, kilometer-long of metal fence with sharp blades wire are being installed, the soil is being cleaned from wild vegetation and clearing of marsh lands.

The fence in the northern part is being strengthened and expanded, and 11 additional border pylons, each one 50 meters high, will be installed along the river in the near future. Each pylon will be equipped with cameras and modern day and night surveillance systems, with a range of several kilometers and multiple telecommunications capabilities, the daily notes.

Within the next few months, 400 newly recruited border guards will be on duty and will almost double the deterrent force and enhance the joint patrols of the Army and Police, ethnos adds.

Big armored military vehicles destined for Libya and confiscated five years ago south of Crete have been made available to the Army in the area, the daily notes.

One and a half month after the end of the “war without arms” at the Evros border from end of February till the end of March, sporadic movement on the Turkish side of the border has been observed.

At least four shooting incidents have been reported in the past two weeks, with Turkish jandarmerie to have fired at Greek border guards and members of the Frontex.

Greece’s security forces are on high alert.

Just a few days ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu reiterated that Ankara’s policy of “open borders” will continue for anyone wishing to cross into Europe.

Speaking to nationalist Akit TV on Wednesday, Cavusoglu claimed that Greece used “inhumane” behavior towards the migrants who want to cross into the country.

Also Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu had threatened that the migrants will be allowed to leave Turkey again once the pandemic was over.

PS It could be a very hot summer, should Turkey attempt to send migrants to Europe by land through Evros and by sea with boats to the Aegean islands and at the same time, deploys a drilling ship off Crete in July, as it claimed a few days ago.

▻https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2020/05/17/greece-shields-evros-border-blades-wire-400-border-guards

#militarisation_des_frontières

Pour la bagatelle de 63 millions d’euro...

Greece to extend fence on land border with Turkey to deter migrants

Greece will proceed with plans to extend a cement and barbed-wire fence that it set up in 2012 along its northern border with Turkey to prevent migrants from entering the country, the government said on Monday.

The conservative government made the decision this year, spokesman Stelios Petsas said, after tens of thousands of asylum seekers tried to enter EU member Greece in late February when Ankara said it would no longer prevent them from doing so.

Greece, which is at odds with neighbouring Turkey over a range of issues, has been a gateway to Europe for people fleeing conflicts and poverty in the Middle East and beyond, with more than a million passing through the country in 2015-2016.

The project led by four Greek construction companies will be completed within eight months at an estimated cost of 63 million euros, Petsas told a news briefing.

The 12.5-kilometre fence was built eight years ago to stop migrants from crossing into Greece. It will be extended in areas indicated by Greek police and the army, Petsas said without elaborating. In March, he said it would be extended to 40 kilometres.

Tensions between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, who disagree over where their continental shelves begin and end, have recently escalated further over hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean region.

▻https://kdal610.com/2020/08/24/greece-to-extend-fence-on-land-border-with-turkey-to-deter-migrants

Greece to extend fence on land border with Turkey to deter migrants

Greece will proceed with plans to extend a cement and barbed-wire fence that it set up in 2012 along its northern border with Turkey to prevent migrants from entering the country, the government said on Monday.

The conservative government made the decision this year, spokesman Stelios Petsas said, after tens of thousands of asylum seekers tried to enter EU member Greece in late February when Ankara said it would no longer prevent them from doing so.

Greece, which is at odds with neighbouring Turkey over a range of issues, has been a gateway to Europe for people fleeing conflicts and poverty in the Middle East and beyond, with more than a million passing through the country in 2015-2016.

The project led by four Greek construction companies will be completed within eight months at an estimated cost of 63 million euros, Petsas told a news briefing.

The 12.5-kilometre fence was built eight years ago to stop migrants from crossing into Greece. It will be extended in areas indicated by Greek police and the army, Petsas said without elaborating. In March, he said it would be extended to 40 kilometres.

Tensions between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, who disagree over where their continental shelves begin and end, have recently escalated further over hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean region.

▻https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-turkey-fence/greece-to-extend-fence-on-land-border-with-turkey-to-deter-migrants-idUK

Outre l’extension du mur... l’envoi de policiers (notamment par l’#Autriche) :

“There was no hesitation about supporting Greece,” Nehammer said about the decision to send dozens of police officers to the border.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/873240

Evros land border fence to be ready in eight months

https://www.ekathimerini.com/resources/2020-08/evros_fence-thumb-large-thumb-large.jpg

The construction of a new fence on northeastern Greece’s Evros land border with Turkey will be completed in eight months, according to Citizens’ Protection Minister Michalis Chrysochoidis, speaking in Parliament on Monday.

The border fence project has a total budget of 62.9 million euros and has been undertaken by a consortium put together by four construction companies.

It will have a total length of 27 kilometers and eight elevated observatories will be constructed to be used by the Hellenic Army.

Moreover, the existing fence will be reinforced with a steel railing measuring 4.3 meters in height, instead of the current 3.5 meters.

Damage to the existing fence during attempts by thousands of migrants to cross into Greece territory from Turkey, as well as bad weather, will be repaired – including a 400-meter stretch that collapsed as a result of flooding.

▻https://www.ekathimerini.com/256184/article/ekathimerini/news/evros-land-border-fence-to-be-ready-in-eight-months

New Evros fence to be completed by April next year, PM says during on-site inspection

https://www.ekathimerini.com/resources/2020-10/evros2-thumb-large.jpg

Construction of a new fence designed to stop undocumented migrants from slipping into Greece along its northeastern border with Turkey, demarcated by the Evros River, is expected to be completed by April next year, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said during a visit at the area of Ferres on Saturday.

“Building the Evros fence was the least we could do to secure the border and make the people of Evros feel more safe,” Mitsotakis said.

The 62.9-million-euro steel fence with barbed wire will be five meters high and have a total length of 27 kilometers. Eight elevated observatories will be constructed to be used by the Hellenic Army. The project, which is designed to also serve as anti-flood protection, has been undertaken by a consortium put together by four construction companies.

During a meeting with local officials, Mitsotakis also confirmed the hiring of 400 guards to patrol the border.

▻https://www.ekathimerini.com/258187/article/ekathimerini/news/new-evros-fence-to-be-completed-by-april-next-year-pm-says-during-on-s

https://i.imgur.com/2Qp8FDV.png

To Vima: Evros wall will be ready in April, the Min. of Public
Order said that ’labourers worked in the snow to finish the fence’.
It also claims drones fly daily over the border - can anyone confirm? Only found older news saying they were to be deployed.

▻https://twitter.com/lk2015r/status/1363625427307278340

–—

Εβρος : Ο φράκτης, τα drones και ο χιονιάς

O καινούργιος φράκτης στα σύνορα με μήκος 27 χιλιόμετρα και με 13 χιλιόμετρα ο παλαιός, θα είναι απόλυτα έτοιμος τον Απρίλιο.

https://www.tovima.gr/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/19/evros2-768x369.jpg

Ούτε το χιόνι, ούτε οι λευκές νύχτες του Φεβρουαρίου, ούτε οι θερμοκρασίες κάτω από το μηδέν εμπόδισαν τα συνεργεία στις εργασίες τους για την κατασκευή του φράκτη στον Έβρο. Όπως μου είπε ο Μιχάλης Χρυσοχοΐδης « μηχανήματα και εργάτες δούλεψαν μέσα στα χιόνια για να ολοκληρώσουν τον φράκτη ». Μου αποκάλυψε μάλιστα ότι ο καινούργιος φράκτης στα σύνορα με μήκος 27 χιλιόμετρα και με 13 χιλιόμετρα ο παλαιός, θα είναι απόλυτα έτοιμος τον Απρίλιο. Και τούτο παρά το γεγονός ότι αυτές τις ημέρες το μόνον που δυσκολεύει τις εργασίες είναι τα πολλά νερά του ποταμού ο οποίος έχει υπερχειλίσει. Ωστόσο τα drones πετούν καθημερινά και συλλέγουν πληροφορίες, οι περιπολίες είναι συνεχείς και τα ηχοβολιστικά μηχανήματα έτοιμα, εάν χρειαστεί να δράσουν.

▻https://www.tovima.gr/2021/02/19/opinions/evros-o-fraktis-ta-drones-kai-o-xionias

In post-pandemic Europe, migrants will face digital fortress

https://i.imgur.com/fkN80my.png

As the world begins to travel again, Europe is sending migrants a loud message: Stay away!

Greek border police are firing bursts of deafening noise from an armored truck over the frontier into Turkey. Mounted on the vehicle, the long-range acoustic device, or “sound cannon,” is the size of a small TV set but can match the volume of a jet engine.

It’s part of a vast array of physical and experimental new digital barriers being installed and tested during the quiet months of the coronavirus pandemic at the 200-kilometer (125-mile) Greek border with Turkey to stop people entering the European Union illegally.

A new steel wall, similar to recent construction on the US-Mexico border, blocks commonly-used crossing points along the Evros River that separates the two countries.

Nearby observation towers are being fitted with long-range cameras, night vision, and multiple sensors. The data will be sent to control centers to flag suspicious movement using artificial intelligence analysis.

“We will have a clear ‘pre-border’ picture of what’s happening,” Police Maj. Dimonsthenis Kamargios, head of the region’s border guard authority, told the Associated Press.

The EU has poured 3 billion euros ($3.7 billion) into security tech research following the refugee crisis in 2015-16, when more than 1 million people – many escaping wars in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan – fled to Greece and on to other EU countries.

The automated surveillance network being built on the Greek-Turkish border is aimed at detecting migrants early and deterring them from crossing, with river and land patrols using searchlights and long-range acoustic devices.

Key elements of the network will be launched by the end of the year, Kamargios said. “Our task is to prevent migrants from entering the country illegally. We need modern equipment and tools to do that.”

Researchers at universities around Europe, working with private firms, have developed futuristic surveillance and verification technology, and tested more than a dozen projects at Greek borders.

AI-powered lie detectors and virtual border-guard interview bots have been piloted, as well as efforts to integrate satellite data with footage from drones on land, air, sea and underwater. Palm scanners record the unique vein pattern in a person’s hand to use as a biometric identifier, and the makers of live camera reconstruction technology promise to erase foliage virtually, exposing people hiding near border areas.

Testing has also been conducted in Hungary, Latvia and elsewhere along the eastern EU perimeter.

The more aggressive migration strategy has been advanced by European policymakers over the past five years, funding deals with Mediterranean countries outside the bloc to hold migrants back and transforming the EU border protection agency, Frontex, from a coordination mechanism to a full-fledged multinational security force.

But regional migration deals have left the EU exposed to political pressure from neighbors.

Earlier this month, several thousand migrants crossed from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in a single day, prompting Spain to deploy the army. A similar crisis unfolded on the Greek-Turkish border and lasted three weeks last year.

Greece is pressing the EU to let Frontex patrol outside its territorial waters to stop migrants reaching Lesbos and other Greek islands, the most common route in Europe for illegal crossing in recent years.

Armed with new tech tools, European law enforcement authorities are leaning further outside borders.

Not all the surveillance programs being tested will be included in the new detection system, but human rights groups say the emerging technology will make it even harder for refugees fleeing wars and extreme hardship to find safety.

Patrick Breyer, a European lawmaker from Germany, has taken an EU research authority to court, demanding that details of the AI-powered lie detection program be made public.

“What we are seeing at the borders, and in treating foreign nationals generally, is that it’s often a testing field for technologies that are later used on Europeans as well. And that’s why everybody should care, in their own self-interest,” Breyer of the German Pirates Party told the AP.

He urged authorities to allow broad oversight of border surveillance methods to review ethical concerns and prevent the sale of the technology through private partners to authoritarian regimes outside the EU.

Ella Jakubowska, of the digital rights group EDRi, argued that EU officials were adopting “techno-solutionism” to sideline moral considerations in dealing with the complex issue of migration.

“It is deeply troubling that, time and again, EU funds are poured into expensive technologies which are used in ways that criminalize, experiment with and dehumanize people on the move,” she said.

Migration flows have slowed in many parts of Europe during the pandemic, interrupting an increase recorded over years. In Greece, for example, the number of arrivals dropped from nearly 75,000 in 2019 to 15,700 in 2020, a 78% decrease.

But the pressure is sure to return. Between 2000 and 2020, the world’s migrant population rose by more than 80% to reach 272 million, according to United Nations data, fast outpacing international population growth.

At the Greek border village of Poros, the breakfast discussion at a cafe was about the recent crisis on the Spanish-Moroccan border.

Many of the houses in the area are abandoned and in a gradual state of collapse, and life is adjusting to that reality.

Cows use the steel wall as a barrier for the wind and rest nearby.

Panagiotis Kyrgiannis, a Poros resident, says the wall and other preventive measures have brought migrant crossings to a dead stop.

“We are used to seeing them cross over and come through the village in groups of 80 or a 100,” he said. “We were not afraid. … They don’t want to settle here. All of this that’s happening around us is not about us.”

▻https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1162084/in-post-pandemic-europe-migrants-will-face-digital-fortress

#pandémie #covid-19 #coronavirus #barrière_digitale #mur_digital #pré-mur #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #AI #IA #intelligence_artificielle #détecteurs_de_mensonge #satellite #biométrie #Hongrie #Lettonie #Frontex #surveillance #privatisation #techno-solutionism #déshumanisation

Greece: EU Commission upgrades border surveillance – and criticises it at the same time

https://i.imgur.com/yq8pSVt.png

The Greek border police are using a sound cannon and drones on a new border fence, and the EU Commission expresses its „concern“ about this. However, it is itself funding several similar research projects, including a semi-autonomous drone with stealth features for „effective surveillance of borders and migration flows“

On Monday, the Associated Press (AP) news agency had reported (▻https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-europe-migration-technology-health-c23251bec65ba45205a0851fab07e) that police in Greece plan to deploy a long-range sound cannon at the external border with Turkey in the future. The device, mounted on a police tank, makes a deafening noise with the volume of a jet engine. It is part of a system of steel walls that is being installed and tested along with drones on the 200-kilometre border with Turkey for migration defence. The vehicle, made by the Canadian manufacturer #Streit, comes from a series of seized „#Typhoons“ (▻https://defencereview.gr/mrap-vehicles-hellenic-police) that were to be illegally exported to Libya via Dubai (▻https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/streit-libya-un-1.3711776).

After the AP report about the sound cannons went viral, Commission spokesman Adalbert Jahnz had clarified that it was not an EU project (▻https://twitter.com/Ad4EU/status/1400010786064437248).

https://i.imgur.com/QpNyH6T.png

Yesterday, AP reported again on this (▻https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-europe-migration-government-and-politics-2cec83ae0d8544a719a885a). According to Jahnz, the Commission has „noted with concern“ the installation of the technology and is requesting information on its use. Methods used in EU member states would have to comply with European fundamental rights, including the „right to dignity“. The right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement in states where refugees face persecution must also be respected.

The Commission’s outrage is anything but credible. After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used refugees to storm the Turkish-Greek border in March 2020, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen travelled to the border river Evros before the start of a Frontex mission and declared her solidarity there. Literally, the former German Defence Minister said (►https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_380): „I thank Greece for being our European shield“.

Commission funds research on border surveillance

Also yesterday, the Commission-funded #ROBORDER project (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/740593/de) said in a statement (▻https://roborder.eu/2021/06/03/new-collaboration-with-borderuas-project) that it is now cooperating with the #BorderUAS project (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/883272/de). Both are about the use of drones. The police in Greece are involved and the applications are to be tested there.

The acronym ROBORDER stands for „#Autonomous_Swarm_of_Heterogeneous_Robots_for_Border_Surveillance“. It works with drones on water, on land and in the air. In Greece, for example, a drone is to be used to detect „unauthorised sea border crossing“ (▻https://roborder.eu/the-project/demonstrators), as well as an aircraft from the #Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft with a surveillance test platform, #radar systems and thermal imaging cameras.

All drones in ROBORDER are supposed to be able to operate in swarms. They are controlled via a mobile control centre from the German company #Elettronica. This „#Multipurpose_Mission_Support_Vehicle“ (#MUROS) is used to collect all recorded data (▻https://www.elettronica.de/de/produkte/oeffentliche-sicherheit-integration). The project, which will soon come to an end, will cost around nine million euros, of which the EU Commission will pay the largest share.

High-resolution cameras on lighter-than-air drones

The acronym BorderUAS means „#Semi-Autonomous_Border_Surveillance_Platform_with_a_High-Resolution_Multi-Sensor_Surveillance_Payload“. Border authorities, police forces as well as companies and institutes mainly from Eastern Europe and Greece want to use it to investigate so-called lighter-than-air drones.

These can be small zeppelins or balloons that are propelled by alternative propulsion systems and have a multitude of sensors and cameras. The participating company #HiperSfera (▻https://hipersfera.hr) from Croatia markets such systems for border surveillance, for example.

The project aims to prevent migration on the so-called Eastern Mediterranean route, the Western Balkan route and across the EU’s eastern external land border. According to the project description, these account for 58 percent of all detected irregular border crossings. BorderUAS ends in 2023, and the technology will be tested by police forces in Greece, Ukraine and Belarus until then. The Commission is funding the entire budget with around seven million euros.

Civilian and military drone research

For border surveillance, the EU Defence Agency and the Commission are funding numerous civilian and military drone projects in Greece. These include the €35 million #OCEAN2020 project (▻https://ocean2020.eu), which conducts research on the integration of drones and unmanned submarines into fleet formations. #ARESIBO, which costs around seven million euros (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/833805/de) and on which the Greek, Portuguese and Romanian Ministries of Defence and the #NATO Research Centre are working on drone technology, will end in 2022. With another five million euros, the Commission is supporting an „#Information_Exchange_for_Command_Control_and_Coordination_Systems_at_the_Borders“ (#ANDROMEDA) (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/833881/de). This also involves drones used by navies, coast guards and the police forces of the member states.

In #CAMELOT (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/740736/de) are flying various drones from Israel and Portugal, and as in ROBORDER, a single ground station is to be used for this purpose. A scenario „illegal activity, illegal immigration persons“ is being tested with various surveillance equipment at the Evros river. The Commission is contributing eight million euros of the total sum. This year, results from #FOLDOUT (▻https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/214861/factsheet/de) will also be tried out on the Greek-Turkish border river Evros, involving satellites, high-flying platforms and drones with technology for „through-foliage detection“ (▻https://foldout.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Flyer_v1_Foldout_EN_v2_Print.pdf) in the „outermost regions of the EU„. The Commission is allocating eight million euros for this as well.

Also with EU funding, predominantly Greek partners, including drone manufacturers #ALTUS and #Intracom_Defense, as well as the Air Force, are developing a drone under the acronym LOTUS with „autonomy functions“ and stealth features for surveillance. The project manager promotes the system as suitable for „effective surveillance of borders and migration flows“ (▻https://www.intracomdefense.com/ide-leader-in-european-defense-programs).

▻https://digit.site36.net/2021/06/04/greece-eu-commission-upgrades-border-surveillance-and-criticises-it-at

#drones #Canada #complexe_militaro-industriel

A border guard at the newly-built steel wall at the River Evros on the Greek-Turkish border.

https://i.imgur.com/sMSeFWm.png

Autour de la construction d’une #barrière_acoustique :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/920711
#surdité #mur_acoustique #son #mur_sonore #Long_Range_Acoustic_Device (#LRAD)

La Grèce construit un mur sur sa frontière avec la Turquie

22 août - 13h : La Grèce a annoncé vendredi avoir achevé une clôture de 40 km à sa frontière avec la Turquie et mis en place un nouveau système de #surveillance pour empêcher d’éventuels demandeurs d’asile d’essayer d’atteindre l’Europe après la prise de contrôle de l’Afghanistan par les talibans.

La crise afghane a créé « des possibilités de flux de migrants », a déclaré le ministre de la Protection des citoyens Michalis Chrysochoidis après s’être rendu vendredi dans la région d’Evros avec le ministre de la Défense et le chef des forces armées. « Nous ne pouvons pas attendre passivement l’impact possible », a-t-il affirmé. « Nos frontières resteront sûres et inviolables. »

►https://www.courrierdesbalkans.fr/refugies-balkans-les-dernieres-infos

#limes

En 2021, le gouvernement grec demande une nouvelle rallonge de 35 km :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/935658

Des images du mur trouvées dans la presse :

https://i.imgur.com/QSyO9Fp.png

https://i.imgur.com/kfC9kCQ.png

« N’ayez pas peur de la lenteur. Craignez seulement d’être à l’arrêt. »

Comment envisager d’instaurer un monde vivable et écologiquement moins destructeur si partout explosent les consommations énergétiques, des infrastructures matérielles destructrices, et des promesses abstraites et creuses sur les futurs technologiques heureux. Mais aussi, que signifie concrètement s’opposer à l’informatisation du monde et de nos vies alors que le consumérisme high tech ne cesse d’être vantée, promue et encouragée partout, y compris dans les milieux militants qui invitent à liker, tweeter et partager sur Facebook leurs actions pour les rendre visibles.

[…]

L’informatique offre de multiples avantages et facilités apparentes – c’est comme ça qu’il s’impose – tout en multipliant les nouvelles complexités, les nouvelles dépendances et les nouvelles fragilités. Les deux vont ensembles et sont indissociables, c’est toute l’ambivalence de ce qu’on nomme le « progrès technique ». Ce débat travaille de nombreux groupes militants qui consacrent un temps croissant à s’agiter sur le net, et une revue en ligne comme Terrestres elle-même n’est pas exempt de ce défaut en faisant le choix de circuler en ligne, via des réseaux sociaux, tout en invitant à redevenir terrestre. Il ne s’agit pas de culpabiliser ni de renvoyer aux usages individuels, car la plupart des gens n’ont pas choisi ni ne sont enthousiastes face à la numérisation en cours. Il s’agit d’abord de penser ces questions d’un point de vue collectif et global, et de s’opposer aux discours officiels et médiatiques dominants, conditions préalables à la possibilité de formes de vies et d’expérimentations différentes.

[…]

Contre le philosophe et économiste Frédéric Lordon, la critique se fait plus ravageuse puisqu’il est présenté comme un habile rhéteur, aux positions visibles dans la gauche radicale contemporaine, mais qui refuse obstinément de penser la question technique comme une question politique, ni d’affronter totalement le monde réel tel qu’il est.

copié ici aussi
▻https://sniadecki.wordpress.com/2020/05/29/jarrige-lalenteur

#Éditions_La_Lenteur #informatisation #numérique

Éluder la question technologique et le développement industriel en relation avec une économie de marché (même étatisé) est un des plus gros biais du marxisme politique.

Sur la Carte, il faut considérer Calais comme un mur et la France devrait donc être en vert.

La costruzione di muri: un business

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
– Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
– le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
– e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
Dei budget fiorenti

Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

– Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

– La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

– Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
I muri virtuali

I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
Lobby

Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
Un business mortale, una scelta

La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

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In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

▻https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
#industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

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Pour @etraces :

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

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The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

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This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

Pour télécharger le rapport_
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

#rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

voir aussi :
Asylum Outsourced : McKinsey’s Secret Role in Europe’s Refugee Crisis
►https://seenthis.net/messages/862826

#Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

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For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

Air service to be supplemented with #drones

The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

Real-time tracking with FlightAware

The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

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„Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Frontex watches refugees drown

This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
#avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

- #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
- #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
- #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
- #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
▻https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

#conférence #webinar

Le business meurtrier des frontières

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Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
La fin de la fin des frontières

Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
Le business des barrières

Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

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Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
« Mourir aux frontières »

Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

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Sur le blog :

– Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

– Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : ▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

– Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

The big wall

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An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent

►https://thebigwall.org/en
►https://seenthis.net/messages/905345

#Italie

How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

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The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

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But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

“These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

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Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

“For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

“They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

▻https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

En français:
À Calais, la ville s’emmure
▻https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

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This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

Executive summary

Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
A booming industry

The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

– The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

- The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

– Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

- Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

- Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

Financing the industry

The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

– The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

- Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

- Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

- In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
Human rights and the border industry

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

– Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

– The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

– The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

- The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

– The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
Time to divest

The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

#TNI #rapport
#industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

#Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
#contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

https://www.tni.org/files/styles/cover_image/public/cover-images/outsourcingoppression-report-tnicover.png?itok=mwQBC1JP#.jpg

This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

Key findings

– The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

– Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

– Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

- The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

– Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

- Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

- Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

- Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

- The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

– The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

- The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

– The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

pour télécharger le rapport :
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

#externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

#Border_Profiteers. Corporations profiting from borders, detentions and deportations - Berlin edition

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L212xH300/Border-Profiea1c-b6061.jpg

Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

https://i.imgur.com/H565BYR.png

The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

“In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

“They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

“For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

Air Surveillance

Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

https://i.imgur.com/AsNnGoD.png

German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

“The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

“The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

Sensors and cameras

EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

Surveillance centres

In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

https://i.imgur.com/yvPgDsz.png

▻https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

Artificial intelligence

The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

BASTARD OPERATOR FROM HELL #1 - 8416 views (5.6.2023)
▻https://groups.google.com/g/alt.tasteless/c/W9u1mvR78LA
le premier #BOFH

Simon Travaglia
unread,
Jun 9, 1992, 11:14:40 PM
to

BASTARD OPERATOR FROM HELL #1
It’s backup day today so I’m pissed off. Being the BOFH, however, does have
it’s advantages. I assign the tape device to null - it’s so much more
economical on my time as I don’t have to keep getting up to change tapes every
5 minutes. And it speeds up backups too, so it can’t be all bad.

A user rings

“Do you know why the system is slow?” they ask

“It’s probably something to do with...” I look up today’s excuse “.. clock
speed”

“Oh” (Not knowing what I’m talking about, they’re satisfied) “Do you know
when it will be fixed?”

“Fixed? There’s 275 users on your machine, and one of them is you. Don’t be
so selfish - logout now and give someone else a chance!”

“But my research results are due in tommorrow and all I need is one page of
Laser Print..”

“SURE YOU DO. Well; You just keep telling yourself that buddy!” I hang up.

Sheesh, you’d really think people would learn not to call!

The phone rings. It’ll be him again, I know. That annoys me. I put on a
gruff voice

“HELLO, SALARIES!”

“Oh, I’m sorry, I’ve got the wrong number”

“YEAH? Well what’s your name buddy? Do you know WASTED phone calls cost
money? DO YOU? I’ve got a good mind to subtract your wasted time, my wasted
time, and the cost of this call from your weekly wages! IN FACT I WILL! By
the time I’ve finished with you, YOU’LL OWE US money! WHAT’S YOUR NAME - AND
DON’T LIE, WE’VE GOT CALLER ID!”

I hear the phone drop and the sound of running feet - he’s obviously going to
try and get an alibi by being at the Dean’s office. I look up his username
and find his department. I ring the Dean’s secretary.

“Hello?” she answers

“Hi, SIMON, B.O.F.H HERE, LISTEN, WHEN THAT GUY COMES RUNNING INTO YOUR OFFICE
IN ABOUT 10 SECONDS, CAN YOU GIVE HIM A MESSAGE?”

“I think so...” she says

“TELL HIM `HE CAN RUN, BUT HE CAN’T HIDE’”

“Um. Ok”

“AND DON’T FORGET NOW, I WOULDN’T WANT TO HAVE TO TELL ANYONE ABOUT THAT FILE
IN YOUR ACCOUNT WITH YOUR ANSWERS TO THE PUURITY TEST IN IT...”

I hear her scrabbling at the terminal...

“DON’T BOTHER - I HAVE A COPY. BE A GOOD GIRL AND PASS THE MESSAGE ON”

She sobs her assent and I hang up. And the worst thing is, I was just guessing
about the purity test thing. I grab a quick copy anyway, it might make for
some good late-night reading.

Meantime backups have finished in record time, 2.03 seconds. Modern technology
is wonderful, isn’t it?

Another user rings.

“I need more space” he says

“Well, why don’t you move to Texas?” I ask

“No, on my account, stupid.”

Stupid?!?.... Uh-Oh..

“I’m terribly sorry” I say, in a polite manner equal to that of Jimmy Stewart
in a Family Matinee “I didn’t quite catch that. What was it that you said?”

I smell the fear coming down the line at me, but it’s too late, he’s a goner
and he knows it.

“Um, I said what I wanted was more space on my account, please”

“Sure, hang on”

I hear him gasp his relief even though he covered the mouthpeice.

“There, you’ve got plenty of space now”

“How much have I got”

Now this REALLY PISSES ME OFF! Not only do they want me to give them
extra disk, they want to check it, to correct me if I don’t give them enough.
They should be happy with what I give them and that’s it!!!

Back into Jimmy Stewart mode.

“Well, let’s see, you have 4 Meg available”

“Wow! Eight Meg in total, thanks!” he says pleased with his bargaining power

“No” I interrupt, savouring this like a fine red, at room temperature “4 Meg in
total...”

“Huh?... I’d used 4 Meg already, How could I have 4 Meg Available?”

I say nothing. It’ll come to him.

“aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaagggggghhhhhH!”

I kill me; I really do!
–-

+-----------+ Terminal Sticker: “My other terminal is a chunk of shit too”
|+----+ | +----------------------------------------------------------+
|| | | | Simon Travaglia, Computer Services, University of Waikato|
|+----+VT100| | Priv. Bag, Hamilton, New Zealand. s...@grace.waikato.ac.nz|
+-----------+ +----------------------------------------------------------+

The telephone pole was approaching fast, I was attempting to swerve out of
it’s path when it struck my front end.

#internet #informatique #admin #wtf #histoire #usenet

Coming of age? Reflections on the centenary of women’s admission to the Royal Geographical Society

Women’s admission to the Royal Geographical Society was at least a two-staged affair, with a cohort of 22 women being admitted in 1892–93 before open access to women from 1913. However, whilst official membership was defined by these historic line-in-the-sand ‘boundary’ moments, some aspects of women’s participation within the Society were enacted in a permeable ‘frontier zone’. Both prior to, and after, fully accessing Fellowship in 1913, women were active producers of geographical knowledge – travelling, researching, writing, and teaching. Given these blurred thresholds of participation and recognition, and the complex social politics of majority/minority views on women’s access to full membership, marking and celebrating the centenary of women’s admission to the Society is riddled with ambiguities. What is unambiguous, however, is that the centenary presents a long-overdue opportunity to celebrate over a hundred years of women’s geographical work. It also offers a moment to pause and reflect on the status of women within the discipline today.

▻http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/geoj.12051/full

Les premières géographes universitaires en France : enquête sur les débuts d’une féminisation disciplinaire (1913-1928)

Dans le premier quart du XXe siècle, la géographie universitaire française connaît une féminisation lente et difficile, mais réelle, accélérée par la Grande Guerre. C’est le temps des pionnières, autant dans les revues disciplinaires que dans l’institution académique. Cependant, si plusieurs noms sont déjà connus parmi ces premières géographes féminines, il s’agit ici de systématiser l’étude, de quantifier et d’expliquer le phénomène, et d’évaluer la réalité de cette présence dans un champ scientifique jeune mais considéré comme particulièrement rétif aux femmes, en particulier dans le travail de terrain. A ce titre, une large place est accordée aux marges de la discipline, aux outsiders masculins et féminins et à la comparaison internationale, pour donner une vision plus équilibrée d’une évolution jusqu’ici sous-estimée.

▻http://journals.openedition.org/cybergeo/27138

Early Women Geography Educators, 1783-1932

This article is a study of early women geography educators between the years 1783 and 1932. Many women were working in the field at that time, but with varying degrees of activity. Twenty-six were especially active in geography contributing significantly to the growth of geography in universities, colleges, and public schools. Some of the women wrote geography textbooks in the pre-professional geography period before 1875. As such, they would be considered geographers, but it was not until the 1890s that women became involved in professional geography. The professional activities of seven women are highlighted as representative of women who were especially active in the discipline.

▻http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00221349908978944

Jacqueline Beaujeu-Garnier
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacqueline_Beaujeu-Garnier

Germaine Veyret-Verner (1913-1973)
▻http://www.persee.fr/doc/rga_0035-1121_1974_num_62_1_1354

Complex Locations: Women’s Geographical Work in the UK 1850-1970
▻http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781444310702

Quelques (très rares) femmes dans ce bouquin :
Dictionnaire biographique de géographes français du XXe siècle, aujourd’hui disparus

Le XXème siècle a vu se former puis s’étendre la communauté des géographes, en même temps que la discipline s’est développée et enrichie, depuis le rôle déterminant du Service Géographique de l’Armée dans les domaines de la topographie, de la géodésie et de la cartographie, et le rôle fondateur des excursions interuniversitaires annuelles permettant aux étudiants d’accompagner leurs professeurs et d’apprendre la géographie sur le terrain. Le XXème siècle a vu aussi naître les principales organisations et associations de géographes français ainsi que l’Union Géographique Internationale en 1922. À la suite de la présentation de ces structures, les notices biographiques de plus de 400 géographes français sont complétées par une vaste collection de photographies prises au long du siècle - de 1897 au début des années 2000.

▻http://geoprodig.cnrs.fr/items/show/42528

Yvette Veyret en géo physique
▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yvette_Veyret

Renée Rochefort (1924-2012)

Repères bibliographiques (non exhaustifs)
1958 « Un dossier sur le temps présent : les bas-fonds de Palerme, d’après l’enquête de Danilo Dolci » [note critique], Annales É.S.C., 13-2, pp. 349-358.
1959 « Misère paysanne et troubles sociaux. Un pays du Latifondo sicilien : Corleone », Annales. É.S.C., 1959, Volume 14, Numéro 3, pp. 441-460.
1961 Le Travail en Sicile. Étude de géographie sociale, Paris, PUF, 1961.
Les bouches de Kotor. Étude de géographie régionale, essai sur les espaces d’une région, Lyon, Université de Lyon, Faculté des Lettres.
1963 « Géographie sociale et sciences humaines », Bulletin de l’Association de géographes français, 1963, XL, n° 314, pp. 18-32.
« Sardes et Siciliens dans les grands ensembles des Charbonnages de Lorraine », Annales de Géographie, 1963, LXXII, n° 391, pp. 272-302.
1970 « Grands ensembles et mutations des banlieues lyonnaises », Revue de géographie de Lyon, 1970, XLV, n° 2, pp. 201-214.
1972 « Géographie sociale et environnement », dans La pensée géographique française. Mélanges offerts au Professeur A. Meynier, Saint-Brieuc, Presses universitaires de Bretagne, 1972, p. 395-405.
1977 « Les enfants et adolescents dans l’agglomération lyonnaise en 1976 : disparités et ségrégations », Revue de géographie de Lyon, 1977, LII, n° 4, pp. 319-337.
1983 « Réflexions liminaires sur la géographie sociale », dans Noin, D., dir., Géographie sociale, actes du colloque de Lyon, 14-16 octobre 1982, dactylographié, 1983, p. 11-14.
1984 « Pourquoi la géographie sociale ? », dans Coll., De la géographie urbaine à la géographie sociale. Sens et non-sens de l’espace, Paris, 1984, p. 13-17.
1984 « Les classes sociales, l’État et les cultures en géographie sociale », Revue de géographie de Lyon, 1984, LIX, p. 157-172.

https://img.over-blog-kiwi.com/1/48/16/12/20170123/ob_052b61_renee-rochefort-03a.JPG

Elle travaille notamment sur les #banlieue et les #grands_ensembles :
▻http://www.persee.fr/doc/geo_0003-4010_1963_num_72_391_16412

▻http://www.persee.fr/doc/geoca_0035-113x_1977_num_52_4_6141

#géographie_sociale

Quelques grandes voyageuses, pas académiques:
Alexandra David-Néel

Louise Eugénie Alexandrine Marie David, plus connue sous le nom d’Alexandra David-NéelNote 1, née le 24 octobre 1868 à Saint-Mandé, morte à près de 101 ans le 8 septembre 1969 à Digne-les-Bains, est une orientaliste, tibétologue, chanteuse d’opéra et féministe, journaliste et anarchiste, écrivaine et exploratrice, franc-maçonne et bouddhiste de nationalités française et belge.

Elle fut, en 1924, la première femme d’origine européenne à séjourner à Lhassa au Tibet, exploit dont les journaux se firent l’écho un an plus tard1 et qui contribua fortement à sa renommée, en plus de ses qualités personnelles et de son érudition.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8c/Alexandra_David-Neels.jpg/440px-Alexandra_David-Neels.jpg

▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexandra_David-N%C3%A9el

Ella Maillart

Ella Maillart (20 février 1903 à Genève - 27 mars 1997 à Chandolin, Suisse) est une voyageuse, écrivaine et photographe suisse.

http://ir0.mobify.com/1440/http://www.artemis-films.ch/media/k2/galleries/13/06.jpg

Et cet article signalé par @odilon et @reka
Femmes en géographie au temps des changements

Longtemps minoritaires, mais absolument pas absentes du champ de la géographie universitaire française depuis le début du xxe siècle, les femmes ont occupé une place croissante dans la discipline après 1945. Cette féminisation s’est accentuée à partir des années 1960, selon des modalités que la présente étude s’efforce de mesurer pour la période 1960-1990, époque de profondes modifications académiques, morphologiques et scientifiques dans la communauté disciplinaire. On montrera en particulier que, pour être solidement ancrée dans des domaines parfois inattendus, ce phénomène s’appuie alors sur des réseaux féminins constitués et un féminisme relativement précoce et affirmé, quoique marginal.

►https://www.cairn.info/revue-espace-geographique-2017-3-p-236.htm

Géographie au féminin : les premières collaboratrices des #Annales_de_Géographie (1919-1939)
▻http://www.persee.fr/doc/geo_0003-4010_2001_num_110_618_1767

En #géographie_physique:
Four facts about #Marie_Tharp, the woman whose art mapped the bottom of the sea

She discovered the Earth’s ‘backbone’ even though men wouldn’t let her on a ship for 17 years

https://takeshape-prod.imgix.net/fd194db7-7b25-4b5a-8cc7-da7f31fab475/dev/07043176-38fb-4ea3-9344-b5518738901c/Massive_Tharp_deck.jpg?auto=compress%2Cformat#.jpg

Si je peux ?
Margaret Geller, pionnière en cartographie de l’Univers

http://static1.squarespace.com/static/508dc759e4b044ecf46b82d3/t/52b87d96e4b0f630e3bb3857/1387822490647/geller.gif

Astrophysicienne américaine, Margaret J. Geller (née en 1947) a mené un important travail de cartographie des amas de galaxie et de la distribution de matière noire dans l’Univers. En 1989, elle a découvert « le Grand Mur ».

#astronome

Certainement que tu peux, @touti même si elle n’est pas géographe... mais on s’en fou, car plus on en parle de ces femmes oubliées par l’histoire, et mieux c’est... Mais du coup, je tague son nom #Margaret_Geller

Aventurière, écrivaine et même cantatrice : découvrez la vie trépidante d’#Alexandra_David_Néel

Chaque semaine, dans « Chacun sa route », Elodie Font dresse le portrait d’une #exploratrice de génie. Alexandra David-Néel est sans doute la plus connue des exploratrices françaises, une femme au caractère assez dur pour une vie de rencontres et d’écriture.

▻https://www.franceinter.fr/culture/aventuriere-ecrivaine-et-meme-cantatrice-decouvrez-la-vie-trepidante-d-a
#exploration

L’altra mappa

https://diabasis.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Altra-mappa-Rossi.png

Perché le donne non fanno parte, al pari dei loro colleghi maschi, della società di esploratori, viaggiatori e geografi? Eppure non sono poche le donne esploratrici, viaggiatrici e geografe che in età moderna e contemporanea hanno dato il loro contributo alla rappresentazione del mondo. Alcune sono più note: Lady Montagu in viaggio a Costantinopoli nella prima metà del Settecento; Léonie d’Aunet, compagna di Victor Hugo, in viaggio verso Polo Nord e Lapponia; Dora d’Istria, colta europeista ante litteram. E ancora la tedesca Ida Pfeiffer, viaggiatrice “patentata” da A. Von Humboldt; Alexandra David-Néel, prima donna a entrare nel cerchio sacro della città di Lhasa. Ma assai vasta sarebbe la galleria delle figure inedite. Dopo un’ampia introduzione teorica, la prima parte del volume si snoda fra viaggi che sembrano veri e sono inventati, e viaggi reali che fanno fatica a essere riconosciuti come tali; la seconda parte riguarda alcuni casi di viaggiatrici-esploratrici del XIX e XX secolo: insieme ai nomi, ai volti, ai viaggi, Luisa Rossi ci restituisce una geografia diversa, un’altra mappa.

▻https://diabasis.it/prodotto/laltra-mappa

Portraits d’exploratrices méconnues

Chaque semaine durant l’été 2020, dans « Chacun sa Route », Élodie Font présente la vie d’une exploratrice méconnue. Retrouvez ici les différents portraits.

▻https://www.franceinter.fr/dossier/portraits-d-exploratrices-meconnues

Lady Travellers

Tra la fine dell’800 e i primi del ‘900, una vera rivoluzione travolge il vecchio e il nuovo mondo. Le donne iniziano a viaggiare sole, sfidando le convenzioni dell’epoca. Annotano, fotografano, disegnano e raccontano la loro versione della realtà. Ma esiste veramente un modo di viaggiare tutto femminile?

https://i.imgur.com/oQV08c0.jpg

Lady Travellers, donne viaggiatrici, è una serie storico-documentaristica che ricostruisce 6 imprese straordinarie condotte a cavallo tra ‘800 e ‘900, raccontate dal punto di vista femminile.

Ogni episodio è dedicato a una donna diversa e alla sua incredibile impresa, e ogni impresa è dedicata a un paese diverso. Le vicende umane delle protagoniste sono narrate in prima persona, attraverso la tecnica del teatro delle ombre, impastati a repertori fotografici e video d’epoca.

Le donne viaggiatrici sono:

#Alexandra_David_Neel, francese, la prima donna a raggiungere Lhasa;
#Giuseppina_Croci, una giovane donna italiana di 27 anni che alla fine dell’800 va a lavorare in una filanda in Cina;
#Mary_Kingsley, inglese, trascorse alcuni mesi in Africa per studiare le tribù cannibali
#Isabella_Bird, inglese, la prima donna ammessa alla Royal Geographical Society
#Carmen_De_Burgos, prima donna spagnola inviata di guerra
#Marga_D’Andurain, avventuriera basca francese, spia e contessa, voleva essere la prima donna a raggiungere La Mecca.
#Nellie_Bly, giornalista statunitense, è stata la prima donna a fare il giro del mondo in solitaria
#Aurora_Bertrana, spagnola, viaggiò dalla Polinesia al Marocco, pioniera della narrativa di viaggio e punto di riferimento per molte donne.
#Ella_Maillart, viaggiò con la barca vela per tutto il mediterraneo. All’età di 23 anni abbandona le regate e comincia a viaggiare per l’Europa e per l’Unione Sovietica.
#Gertrude_Bell, scrittrice, diplomatica, archeologa: fu la prima fautrice di un rapporto con i popoli del Medio Oriente orientato al rispetto e a una progressiva indipendenza politica ed economica
#Freya_Madaleine_Stark, è stata la prima occidentale a raggiungere la leggendaria Valle degli Assasini, in Iran, alla ricerca della fortezza di Alamut
#Eva_Mameli_Calvino, madre dello scrittore Italo Calvino e docente di botanica, si trasferisce a Cuba e qui studia piante mai viste prima. Partecipa alla resistenza ed è fucilata.

▻http://www.raiscuola.rai.it/programma.aspx?ID=217

Femme géographe

▻https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cat%C3%A9gorie:Femme_g%C3%A9ographe

Isabelle Eberhardt

Isabelle Wilhelmine Marie Eberhardt1 née le 17 février 1877 à Genève et morte, le 21 octobre 1904 à Aïn-Sefra, en Algérie est une écrivaine suisse, de parents d’origine russe, devenue française par mariage.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/95/Isabelle_Eberhardt.jpg/220px-Isabelle_Eberhardt.jpg https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/8a/IsEberhardt.jpg/220px-IsEberhardt.jpg https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/33/Tombe_Isabelle_Eberhardt.jpg/220px-Tombe_Isabelle_Eberhardt.jpg

aussi signalée ici:
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/754829

#Emma_Willard (1787–1870), a leading feminist educator whose innovative maps of time laid the groundwork for the charts and graphics of today

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH421/13233002-edibb6b-02bab.jpg

►https://seenthis.net/messages/917838

#cartographie #femmes_cartographes #infographie

#Ida_Laura_Pfeiffer

Ida Laura Reyer, è un’austriaca e di famiglia benestante, nata a Vienna il 4 ottobre 1797: è la quinta di sei fratelli, tutti maschi, figli di un agiato mercante di tessuti che muore prematuramente quando lei ha appena nove anni.

Sin da piccola non segue il modello dell’eterno femminino e veste come i fratelli, forgiata anche dalla rigida educazione del padre Alois, improntata a coraggio, determinazione, sobrietà… È un’accanita lettrice di libri di viaggi e di avventura e tutto ciò che le permette di evadere dal “quotidiano” l’attira irrefrenabilmente.

https://tiritere72663953.files.wordpress.com/2021/09/ida_pfeiffer-1.jpg

Gli amici di famiglia raccontano che amava correre fuori casa per veder passare, con lo sguardo sognante, le diligenze che lasciavano la città.

Si innamora del suo giovane precettore, che le trasmette la passione per la geografia, ma la madre si oppone al loro amore e, costretta dalle difficoltà economiche in cui versa la famiglia, a ventidue anni accetta di sposare l’avvocato Max Anton Pfeiffer, molto più anziano di lei: è un matrimonio triste e senza amore, vissuto in ristrettezze economiche per il fallimento del marito e con il cuore gonfio di malinconia. Non resta con le mani in mano e per tirare avanti dà lezioni di piano e fa la segretaria.

Scrive di quegli anni: «Solo il cielo sa cosa ho sofferto. Vi sono stati giorni in cui vi era solo pane secco per la cena dei miei figli».

Vede il mare per la prima volta nel 1836, quando si reca a Trieste con un figlio, e in quel momento scatta la scintilla.

Nel 1842, diventata vedova e con i figli già grandi, all’età di quarantasette anni guarda oltre lo steccato della mediocrità e dell’ovvio. Spinta dal desiderio incontrollato della conoscenza e dotata di grandissima immaginazione e coraggio verso la scoperta dell’ignoto, part per 9 mesi e, e da sola: discende il Danubio, si addentra in Turchia e in Libano, visita la Palestina, arriva in Egitto, sosta a Malta e risale l’Italia fino a Trieste.

A casa studia le lingue del Nord e poi riparte per altri sei mesi, alla volta di Scandinavia e Islanda.

Diviene navigatrice, esploratrice a bordo di mezzi di fortuna, gira il mondo portando a casa testimonianze di alternative esistenze dove non il denaro o il ceto sociale, ma lo stato di natura e la collocazione dell’umanità al suo interno erano motivo di studio, come forma di miglioramento della propria esperienza da trasmettere agli altri.

Sono viaggi spartani, fatti in economia, spesso avvalendosi di passaggi gratuiti: a volte indossa abiti maschili per potersi mescolare alle gente e osservare più liberamente il comportamento delle popolazioni incontrate nel suo peregrinare tra i continenti.

Percorrerà 140.000 miglia marine e 20.000 miglia inglesi via terra.

Il suo primo viaggio intorno al mondo dura due anni e sette mesi. Si imbarca da Amburgo per raggiungere il Brasile e poi il Cile. Da qui poi attraversa l’Oceano Pacifico approdando a Tahiti fino ad arrivare all’isola di Ceylon. Risale attraverso l’India fino al Mar Nero e alla Grecia sbarcando a Trieste e ritornando a Vienna.

Mentre si trova in Oriente scrive sul suo diario: «In quella mischia ero davvero sola e confidavo solo in Dio e nelle mie forze. Nessuna anima gentile mi si avvicinò».

Il secondo giro del mondo va in senso opposto, da Ovest verso Est, e dura quattro anni: da Londra giunge a Città del Capo per poi esplorare il Borneo e avere contatti ravvicinati con i “tagliatori di teste” del Dayak, attraversa l’Oceano Pacifico in senso inverso, arriva in California e inizia a percorrere tutti gli Stati americani.

È la prima donna bianca che nel 1852 si reca nella giungla di Sumatra 1852) abitata dai batak, ritenuti cannibali. In quell’occasione riesce a salvarsi dicendo ai cannibali: «La mia testa è troppo vecchia e dura per essere mangiata», e il saggio capo tribù inizia a ridere e la lascia libera.

Non si risparmia nulla in fatto di pericoli, in un mondo non ancora sotto la lente d’ingrandimento di un satellite.

https://tiritere72663953.files.wordpress.com/2021/09/la-sua-tomba-al-cimitero-centrale-di-vienna.jpg?w=367#.jpg

E poi il Madagascar, Réunion e Mauritius, con la malaria che la tiene sotto assedio e la porterà a quell’ultimo viaggio da cui non c’è ritorno.

Dei suoi viaggi scrive appunti a matita, con una calligrafia piccola e minuta, raccontando i suoi sette viaggi in tredici volumi di diari che diventano bestseller e vengono tradotti in sette lingue.

Finalmente, viene ammessa a far parte delle Società geografiche di Berlino e Parigi, ma non di quella inglese, ostinatamente negata alle donne.

I musei di Vienna custodiscono, ancora oggi, piante, insetti e farfalle che lei raccoglie ovunque e porta in patria.

In una bellissima e significativa foto del 1856 Ida è seduta su un divano con un vestito dell’epoca, con il capo coperto da una cuffietta bianca di pizzo, il braccio destro su un grosso libro, accanto a lei un enorme mappamondo, i suoi occhi non guardano l’obiettivo ma altrove, lontano lontano.

Muore il 27 ottobre 1858. Il cimitero centrale di Vienna ne conserva le spoglie.

Nel 2018 l’Università della stessa Vienna le intitola una cattedra con borsa di studio, ma nelle vie della sua città natale manca ancora il suo nome. È Monaco di Baviera a dedicarle la sua prima strada.

▻https://vitaminevaganti.com/2021/09/18/ida-laura-pfeiffer

Si les enfants sont heureux comme dit le texte les services sociaux partirons vite. "Les gosses c’est vivant, pas empaillé" et ca peut être victime de violences aussi parfois. Ca me semble la moindre des choses qu’il y ai « l’obligation d’ouvrir un dossier » en cas de signalement de violences contre des enfants.

@mad_meg Il n’est pas ici question d’un signalement pour violence envers les enfants, je viens de relire attentivement l’article des vregens. Non, il s’agit, comme cela m’est arrivé une fois, d’un signalement (donc effectivement d’une délation qui ne dit pas son nom) sans doute pour de la maltraitance ou de la carence supposées au vue de la saleté (supposée) des enfants, et c’est d’une violence (pour le coup) sans nom envers les parents en question.

Mon conseil pour ces parents, réunir des témoignages factuels et écrits de proches, d’amis, d’enseignants s’ils sont bienveillants (et donc pas au départ de ce signalement manifestement discriminatoire), de voisins bienveillants et le truc qui tue le truc dans l’oeuf d’un certificat médical par le, médecin traitant.

Et surtout, surtout, de se faire confiance à soi.

C’est la parole d’un ami des parents, qui lui ne parle que de ce qu’il peu savoir. Je ne dit pas que ca peut pas être un cas de signalement inapproprié, faux ou/et malveillant, mais faut pas non plus faire comme si ca n’était pas possible que ces enfants soient signalés pour de bonnes raisons.

@mad_meg Ce faisant tu légitimes le fait que ce signalement anonyme (quel courage !) puisse ouvrir la voie à cette enquête, signalement et enquête étant d’une violence très dure pour les parents en question.

C’est simple, tu dois pouvoir t’imaginer la même violence en l’adaptant à ton contexte, une personne qui aurait intérêt à te causer du tort, signale à la police que certains de tes dessins, tels qu’il ou elle croient les avoir vus sur ton site internet, comportent, au choix, de la pédophilie, de la zoophilie, l’apologie du terrorisme que sais-je ?, et sur la seule base de ce témoignage, dont tu m’accorderas qu’il est douteux, des inspecteurs de je ne sais quelle institution viennent remuer tous les cartons à dessin de ton atelier, voir si des fois ils ne trouveraient pas matière à donner corps à ce signalement.

Pour corser la chose, je ne doute pas que tu as de l’attachement vis-à-vis de tes dessins, imagine avec tes enfants. Crois-moi c’est bien violent (et viscéral), au point de t’en faire perdre tout jugement et toute capacité de réflexion.

Les signalements d’enfants maltraité se font anonymement si on le veux et j’ai aucun problème avec ca. Je n’appel pas cela de la délation. La délation c’est le fait de tiré un bénéfice d’une dénonciation.
Si ca t’amuse de comparé les lanceureuses d’alerte avec des délateurices je te laisse le faire sans moi.

Mes dessins ne sont pas mes enfants ! On parle de vrais enfants pas de foutus dessins de merde. Qu’une personne s’amuse à me dénoncé pour dessins zoophiles, et autres ce n’est absolument pas le même probleme. La maltraitance à enfants ce n’est pas un droit d’expression.

J’ai juste parlé d’une possiblilité et rappelé que c’est normal qu’il y ai une enquête en cas de signalements. Il est possible que l’amie ne sache pas tout et comme l’anonyme est anonyme on sais pas non plus à quel point c’est une personne proche.

J’ai pas dit que ces gens n’étaient pas innocents ni nier qu’il y avait une guerre aux pauvres.
Pour le cas de la maladie des os de verre, si elle n’était pas diagnostiqué c’est quant même normal que les services sociaux aient pensé à des maltraitances. Un enfant avec des fractures inexpliqué et répété ca mérite de l’attention.

Je sais bien qu’il y a des disfonctionnements graves dans les sérvices sociaux. Peut être qu’on retir les enfants aux parents de famille pauvres mais c’est quant même une procédure compliqué, c’est déjà difficile d’éloigné un enfant d’un père violents notoire avec un casier chargé ou d’un incestueux, alors je pense quant même que cette famille va garder ses enfants sans soucis. Et je trouve bien qu’il y ai automatiquement une enquête lors d’un signalement de faits de violences contre des enfants et je trouve bien que les signalements puissent être faits anonymement.

Petit rappel des procédures à suivre pour les services sociaux en cas de signalement par un anonyme (tel que précisé dans la loi de 2002 de rénovation de la protection de l’enfance et de 2007 sur la protection de l enfance).

Toute personne ayant dès suspicion de maltraitance physique ou psychologique sur un enfant peut appeler le 119 qui est anonyme et gratuit même si les appelant sont incités à laisser leurs coordonnés.
Apres échangé avec l’appelant et récolte des raisons d’inquiétudes, le dossier et soit archivé soit transmis aux services de l aide sociale à l’enfance dédié au 119 si les raisons d’inquiétudes semblent convaincantes.

Une assistante sociale de secteur ou une assistante sociale scolaire prendra alors Rdv Aves les parents pour les informer de l’existence de ce 119 et faire avec eux le points sur leur situation et celle des enfants.
Il peut y avoir un ou plusieurs Rdv et obligatoirement un Rdv au domicile de la famille.
A l’issu de ces Rdv deux solutions :
C’était encore n’importe quoi ce 119 ( la majorité des cas) et le dossier est classé.
Il y a des difficultés familiales et une mesure d’accompagnement éducative à domicile est proposée. Cette mesure est administrative.
Depuis 2002 à part en cas de maltraitance grave et avérée, les services sociaux ont l’obligation de proposer une mesure administrative avant toute transmission au juge pour enfant.

A l’issu de cette mesure de 6 mois renouvelable si nécessaire, il y a encore deux solutions :
Les difficultés se sont aplanies et l’ont classe le dossier.
Les difficultés se sont aggravées au point que le danger pour l’enfant devient trop grand et le dossier est transmis au juge pour enfant.

Le/la juge pour enfant pourra ordonner soit une mesure d accompagnement à domicile en milieu ouvert ou un placement temporaire de l’enfant.

Il existe dès placement administrative qui se font en accord ou à la demande des parents.

La situation financière ne peut en aucun cas etre le seul motif de placement judiciaire d’un enfant.

Apres, on peut considèrer le 119 comme un système de délation, comme on peut pointer du doigt les défaillances de la protection de l’enfance qui n’est pas fiable à 100% evidemment.
On peut aussi s’intéresser au nombre d’enfant protégés, aux situations familiales améliorées dont on se garde bien de fournir des chiffres ou d’interroger les familles bénéficiaires et encore moins les professionnels ( dont j ai ete pendant 18 ans) !

Pour ce qui en est du témoignage en question, je déconseille fortement d’arriver avec des témoignages écrits de qui que se soit au premier Rdv qui risquerait d’être interpréter comme un mode défensif voire parano.
Au contraire si tout va bien dans la famille sauf le manque d’argent, y aller décontracté, avec les enfants, laisser les enfants parler seuls avec l’assistante sociale, ne pas cacher les difficultés financières , bien au contraire, l’assistante sociale pourra aussi peut être aider à trouver des solutions.

Et je trouve bien qu’il y ai automatiquement une enquête lors d’un signalement de faits de violences contre des enfants et je trouve bien que les signalements puissent être faits anonymement.

Encore une fois je ne pense pas à la lecture de l’article que le signalement ait trait à des faits de violence envers ces enfants.

@corinne2

C’était encore n’importe quoi ce 119 ( la majorité des cas) et le dossier est classé.

Donc, dans la majorité des cas, ces signalements anonymes n’ont aucune valeur, ce dont on s’assure avec deux rendez-vous. Et, si je poursuis ton raisonnement, il n’y a pas mort d’homme (ce qui est vrai).

Tu dis avoir fait ce métier, fort louable au demeurant, pendant 18 ans, je te pense bienveillante, je n’ai aucune raison d’en douter, donc je pense que tu peux aussi comprendre que ce qui est quotidien pour toi, un rendez-vous avec des parents signalés, n’est pas quotidien pour les parents en question, et donc pas du tout, mais alors pas du tout neutre.

Quand une principale de collège te menace d’un signalement parce qu’elle souhaite avant tout exclure ton enfant autiste de son collège élitiste, et donc elle ferait n’importe quoi pour te donner de la difficulté, ce n’est plus tout à fait une blague en fait, c’est même du harcèlement. Et quand bien même tu n’as littéralement rien à te reprocher, cela t’atteint à un endroit extrêmement douloureux. D’ailleurs c’est étonnant parce que quand tu t’en ouvres à ton entourage, les gens commencent par rire tellement c’est gros, puis à la tête que tu fais comprennent immédiatement que ce n’est pas drôle, que ce n’est pas pour rire et que tu vis la chose comme une véritable possibilité que l’on te retire tes enfants, quand bien même c’est la plus flagrante des injustices

Alors franchement, je n’ose même pas imaginer ce que c’est quand on est socialement en difficulté.

Et tout cela sur un signalement anonyme. Encore une fois quand on déplace légèrement le problème dans un autre champ, on se rend compte que c’est insupportable. Et que c’est effectivement de la délation.

Maintenant ma question est la suivante, quelle est la part des 119 qui sont encore n’importe quoi (la majorité d’après toi) et qui sont le fait d’appels anonymes restés anonymes, et quelle est la part des 119 qui sont effectivement avérés (et dont je ne remercierais jamais assez tes collègues et toi d’y trouver des solutions humaines forcément humaines) et qui sont le fait des appels de gens qui ont par ailleurs laissé leur identité ?

Et lorsque le signalement est abusif est-ce que l’on demande des comptes au signaleur pour ne pas dire délateur ?

@philippe_de_jonckheere
J ai pleinement conscience du caractère traumatique d’un tel signalement auprès des parents et j’ai toujours tente de les rassurer au maximum.
Et non, ce n’est pas un quotidien, sachant l enjeu qui il y a derrière ces entretiens pour les parents et les travailleurs sociaux. Ne pas accuser à tord, ne pas laisser passer un cas de violence mais surtout apporter une aide si besoin et si c’est possible, rassurer et surtout écouter, chercher à comprendre sans juger.

Pour les principales de collège ou de n’importe quel etablissement scolaire, je me suis regulierement battu contre ce genre d’énergumènes et pourtant là où je bossais c’était pas particulièrement élitiste comme quartier...

Quand au chiffre dont tu parle peut être faudrait il se tourner vers l ONED. Je dois avouer ne pas m être penché sur leur publication depuis pas mal de temps.

Chiffres 2014 ici (avec les statistiques d’appel du 119)

▻http://www.oned.gouv.fr/chiffres-cles-en-protection-lenfance

Y a ca aussi, à partir de la page 37
▻http://www.oned.gouv.fr/system/files/publication/ragp_2016_-_version_finale_2_leger.pdf