• Louis Derrac - Comment les GAFAM gagnent-ils leurs milliards ?

    Une visualisation extrêmement claire de l’origine des revenus des cinq GAFAM. Cela illustre bien qu’au-delà de l’acronyme qu’ils partagent, leurs modèles économiques, et donc leurs politiques, sont très différents. Utile en intervention pédagogique donc !

    #GAFAM #RéseauxSociaux #EMI #Infographie #Economie

  • Usbek & Rica - Fréquentation, âge du public... 5 infographies pour comprendre la crise du cinéma

    Afin de mieux comprendre la nature de la crise inédite qui touche le secteur du cinéma (voir notre long format et notre interview avec la productrice Judith Lou Lévy), nous avons passé au crible plusieurs données clés, comme l’évolution de la fréquentation des salles, celle des tranches d’âge du public et, plus largement, la place du cinéma dans le « temps libre quotidien » des Français. Décryptage.

    #Cinéma #Infographie #Loisirs

  • Map of the Internet 2021 — Cool Infographics

    Map of the Internet 2021 visualizes the most popular websites in the style of an old historical map, created by Martin Vargic at Halcyon Maps. The sizes of the Internet “countries” on the map are based on the their relative web traffic, and clustered by type of website.

    #Infographie #Internet

  • See How Vaccines Can Make the Difference in #Delta Variant’s Impact - The New York Times

    Here’s how a Delta-driven outbreak might unfold in two hypothetical groups of people, all of whom are exposed to enough of the virus to infect a person:

    In either scenario, the infected group is just the start. The Delta variant is the most transmissible version of the virus yet. Those infected are likely to spread the virus to others at an even higher rate than older versions of the virus would have spread.

    With a higher number of people infected in the group with the low vaccination rate, many more people in their larger community are also likely to become infected with the virus, especially if the #vaccination rate is similarly low elsewhere in that community.

    This is true even among people who have been infected with #Covid-19 before: Those who have previously had the virus are more than twice as likely to become reinfected by the Delta variant if they are unvaccinated.

    Conversely, there is a lower risk in general of virus exposure in a highly vaccinated community. But experts say outbreaks that have occurred in heavily vaccinated groups, like the July 4 cluster in Provincetown, Mass., or those in two San Francisco hospitals, have shown the power of the vaccines: Remarkably few people faced severe illness, contrasted with how a similar outbreak may have played out in a community with a low vaccination rate.

    Of at least 965 positive cases that were traced to heavily vaccinated Provincetown, where around 60,000 people had gathered for the holiday weekend, not a single death was reported and just seven people were hospitalized.

    While a recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report suggested it’s possible that fully immunized people may also transmit the virus to others as easily, another recent study has shown that those who are fully vaccinated may carry the virus, and therefore be contagious, for fewer days than their unvaccinated counterparts. That suggests an even bigger overall difference in #transmission between places with high and low vaccination rates.

    #vaccins #sars-cov2 #infographie #interactif

  • Emma Willard’s Maps of Time

    In the 21st-century, infographics are everywhere. In the classroom, in the newspaper, in government reports, these concise visual representations of complicated information have changed the way we imagine our world. Susan Schulten explores the pioneering work of Emma Willard (1787–1870), a leading feminist educator whose innovative maps of time laid the groundwork for the charts and graphics of today.

    We live in an age of visual information. Infographics flood the web, driven by accessible platforms that instantly translate information into a variety of graphic forms. News outlets routinely harvest large data sets like the census and election returns into maps and graphs that profile everything from consumer preferences to the political landscape. The current proliferation of visual information mirrors a similar moment in the early nineteenth century, when the advent of new printing techniques coincided with the rapid expansion of education. Schoolrooms from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi frontier made room for the children of farmers as well as merchants, girls as well as boys. Together, these shifts created a robust and highly competitive market for school materials, including illustrated textbooks, school atlases, and even the new genre of wall maps.

    No individual exploited this publishing opportunity more than Emma Willard, one of the century’s most influential educators. From the 1820s through the Civil War, Willard’s history and geography textbooks exposed an entire generation of students to her deeply patriotic narratives, all of which were studded with innovative and creative pictures of information that sought to translate big data into manageable visual forms.

    When Willard began publishing textbooks in the 1820s, she knew the competition was fierce, full of sharp-elbowed authors who routinely accused one another of plagiarizing ideas and text. To build her brand, she designed cutting-edge graphics that would differentiate her work and catch the attention of the young. Take, for instance, her “Perspective Sketch of the Course of Empire” of 1835.

    By the nineteenth century, timelines had become relatively common, an innovation of the eighteenth century designed to feed growing public interest in ancient as well as modern history. First developed by Jacques Barbeu-Dubourg in the 1750s, early timelines generally charted the lives of individuals on a chronological grid, reflecting the Enlightenment assumption that history could be measured against an absolute scale of time, moving inexorably onward from zero. In 1765, Joseph Priestley drew from calendars, chronologies, and geographies to plot the lives of two thousand men between 1200 BC and 1750 AD in his popular Chart of Biography.

    After Priestley, timelines flourished, but they generally lacked any sense of the dimensionality of time, representing the past as a uniform march from left to right. By contrast, Emma Willard sought to invest chronology with a sense of perspective, presenting the biblical Creation as the apex of a triangle that then flowed forward in time and space toward the viewer. Commenting on her visual framework in 1835, Willard noted that individuals experience the past relative to their own lives, for “events apparently diminish when viewed through the vista of departed years.”1 In “Perspective Sketch of the Course of Empire”, she found striking ways to represent this dimensionality of time. The birth of Christ, for example, is marked with a bright light, marking the end of the first third of human history. The discovery of America separated the second (middle) from the third (modern) stage. Each “civilization” is situated not according to its geography, as on a traditional map, but according to its connection and relation to other civilizations. Some of these societies are permeable, flowing into others, while others, such as China, are firmly demarcated to denote their isolation. By studying this map, students were encouraged to see human history as a rise and fall of civilizations — an “ancestry of nations”.

    Moreover, as time flows forward the stream widens, demonstrating that history became more relevant as it unfolds and approaches the student’s own life. Historical time is not uniform but dimensional. On the one hand, this reflected her sense that time itself had accelerated through the advent of steam and rail. Traditional timelines, she found, were only partially capable of representing change in an era of rapid technological progress. Time was not absolute, but relative. On the other hand, Willard’s approach reflected her own deep nationalism, for it asked students to recognize the emergence of the United States as the culmination of human history and progress.

    Willard aggressively marketed her “Perspective Sketch” to American educators, believing it to be a crucial break with other materials on the market. As she confidently expressed to a friend in 1844, “In history I have invented the map”.3 She also advocated for her “map of time” as a teaching device because she strongly believed the visual preceded the verbal — that information presented to students in graphic terms would facilitate memorization, attaching images to the mind through the eyes.

    Willard’s devotion to visual mnemonics shaped much of her work. In the 1840s, she published another elaborate visual device, named the “Temple of Time”. Here, she attempted to integrate chronology with geography: the stream of time she had charted in the previous decade now occupied the floor of the temple, whose architecture she used to magnify perspective through a visual convention. Centuries — represented by pillars printed with the names of the era’s most prominent statesmen, poets, and warriors —diminished in size as they receded in time, turning the viewer’s attention toward recent history, as in the “Course of Empire”. But in the Temple of Time, the one-point perspective also invited students in to inhabit the past, laying out information in a kind of memory palace that would help them form a larger, coherent picture of world history. Readers, in other words, were invited into the palace, so they too could stand at moments in world history.

    The Temple of Time is complicated, and more than a little contrived. Yet Willard reminds readers that traditional cartography relies on the same basic conceit:

    In a map, great countries made up of plains, mountains, seas, and rivers, are represented by what is altogether unlike them; viz., lines, shades, and letters, on a flat piece of paper; but the divisions of the map enable the mind to comprehend, by proportional space and distance, what is the comparative size of each, and how countries are situated with respect to each other. So this picture made on paper, called a Temple of Time, though unlike duration, represents it by proportional space. It is as scientific and intelligible, to represent time by space, as it is to represent space by space.4

    A map, in other words, is an arrangement of symbols into a system of meaning — and we use maps because we understand the language of signs that undergirds them. If the mapping of space was a human invention, she explained, one could also invent a means of mapping time.

    Willard’s creative efforts to “map time” stemmed from personal experience. Born just after the Revolution, she was part of the first generation of American women to be educated outside the home, and she chafed at the way “female education” kept more than a few areas of knowledge off limits. One of the few subjects considered suitable for both boys and girls in that era was geography, yet Willard remembered with frustration the degree to which her textbooks lacked maps. It makes sense, then, that as a young teacher in the 1810s Willard became passionate about having her pupils draw maps — not copying them (a common practice in schools for young women at the time) but rather reproducing them in rough terms from memory to demonstrate a grasp of geographical relationships.

    Willard’s own artistic creativity as a mapmaker was evident from the start. Her first textbook — a geography written with William Woodbridge and published in 1824 — includes a metaphorical map of the Amazon River and its tributaries which illustrates the evolution of the Roman Empire. (One can see in this early effort the prototype for her elaborate “Perspective Sketch” of the 1830s.)

    Willard’s creativity as an educator was equally immense. In 1819 she published a plan to publicly fund the improvement of female education, which met with more than a little resistance. Two years later, she began to implement this vision by founding the Troy Female Seminary in New York—an institution that quickly became a preeminent school for future teachers and one of the most highly regarded schools for women in the country. At Troy, Willard assumed that females were capable of studying the same subjects as their male counterparts and incorporated “masculine studies”, such as science and history, into the curriculum. Her administration of Troy, and her intensive teaching in the decade prior to and after its foundation, convinced her of the multiple failures of contemporary pedagogy and textbooks.

    In 1828, Willard issued the first edition of her History of the United States, or The Republic of America, a textbook so popular it would remain in print until the 1860s. One key element of the book’s success was the atlas that accompanied the text — a series of maps of the eastern US that Willard designed and executed with a former female student. In this series, each map marked particular moments or eras that either led toward or resulted from nationhood, including the landing on Plymouth Rock, the Treaty of Paris, or the late War of 1812 against Britain. Perhaps the most remarkable of these was the “introductory map”, which identified indigenous tribes through a series of geographic migrations, collapsing centuries of movement into a single image. In naming this the “introductory” map, however, Willard situated Native Americans in a prehistorical era antedating the ostensibly more significant events of European settlement. The single image she created was innovative and powerful, but it also rendered the violence of Native displacement as an inevitable prelude that gave way to the real drama of colonialism and the inevitable realization of national independence.

    Willard’s commitment to creative cartography, combined with her nationalism, inspired her to create a simplified American Temple of Time in the late 1840s, which revealed a firm belief in Manifest Destiny: the providential progression from the European discovery of North America in the fifteenth century to a continental empire in the present. The concept of the American Temple was interactive, framing the chronological and geographical outlines of American history to aid memorization. Students were to identify the eight geographical entities that made up the continental United States: the original thirteen colonies, New France, the Northwest Territory, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, Oregon, and the area ceded by Mexico in the 1848 treaty that ended the Mexican–American War. Students were then instructed to locate each state and territory in time by shading its existence as it became part of the country (shading the colonies as they were settled, and the states as they joined the union). If the Temple were drawn large enough, there would also be enough space along the “floor” to identify important battles. The design is complex and unwieldy, but the goal is intriguing: an interactive exercise for students to integrate history and geography in order to understand how the past had—quite literally—taken place.

    Willard’s final contribution to visual knowledge was perhaps the most straightforward, a “Tree of Time” that presented American history as a coherent, organic whole. There is, of course, a long tradition of presenting time as a tree (family trees being the most enduring), but Willard used the image not to represent ancestors as trunks and descendants as branches, but — rather oddly — to represent time arcing from left to right, like a timeline. She was so fond of the Tree of Time she used it to introduce all subsequent editions of her popular textbook History of the United States and even issued it on a much larger scale to be hung in classrooms.

    Like the Temple, the Tree presented an encompassing history of the nation that reached back past 1789 to 1492. All of North America’s colonial history merely formed the backstory to the preordained rise of the United States. The tree also strengthened a sense of coherence, organizing the chaotic past into a series of branches that spelled out the national meaning of the past. Above all, the Tree of Time conveyed to students a sense that history moved in a meaningful direction. Imperialism, dispossession, and violence was translated, in Willard’s representation, into a peaceful and unified picture of American progress.

    Ironically, it was the cataclysms of the Civil War that challenged Willard’s harmonious picture of history in the Tree of Time. In the 1844 edition of the Tree, President Harrison’s death marched the last branch of history. Twenty years later, Willard added a new branch marking the end of the US war against Mexico and the subsequent Compromise of 1850, seismic events which both raised and temporarily settled the sectional divisions over slavery. Even though the Civil War was well underway by the time she issued her last edition of tree, she marked the last branch as “1860”, with no mention of the bloody conflict that had engulfed the entire nation. Her accompanying narrative in Republic of America brought American history to the brink of war, but no further. Willard had come up against history itself.


    #Emma_Willard #cartographie_historique #cartographie #peuples_autochtones #infographie #femme_géographe #femme_cartographe

    voir aussi :


    ajouté au fil de discussion sur les femmes géographes :

    ping @visionscarto @reka

  • Littérature numérique – Un site cartographie l’archipel saisissant d’#Italo_Calvino | 24 heures

    Le voyage littéraire dont il est ici question débute en 1943, avec quelques écrits timides qu’on pourrait considérer comme autant de préludes à une première œuvre consistante : « Le Sentier des nids d’araignées ». Le périple se prolonge quarante-deux ans durant et à l’arrivée, 200 textes plus loin, une boucle s’achève avec la dernière signature d’Italo Calvino, posée sur « Un Roi à l’écoute », texte qui charpente une pièce musicale de Luciano Berio. Entre ses deux extrémités, le corpus de l’écrivain italien ressemble à un archipel saisissant où on croise des atolls et des îlots de toutes sortes. Les plus populaires sont connus sous nos latitudes aussi : la trilogie formée par « Le Vicomte pourfendu », « Le Baron perché » et « Le Chevalier inexistant » demeure aujourd’hui encore une borne lumineuse.

    #cartographie #littérature

    • #Atlante_Calvino

      Oggi Italo #Calvino avrebbe quasi cento anni. E di fronte alle profonde trasformazioni a cui la letteratura, la stampa, i mezzi di comunicazione e la ricerca stanno assistendo non sarebbe rimasto chiuso a difendere la cittadella umanistica assediata. Sarebbe uscito a vedere.

      La letteratura come l’ha pensata, praticata e modellata Calvino tra gli anni Quaranta e gli anni Ottanta del secolo scorso aveva soprattutto un fine: quello di tenere la mente aperta. Renderla abbastanza elastica non certo da capire tutta la complessità del mondo, ma almeno da misurarla. E trarne qualche conseguenza: la prima di queste è che abbiamo bisogno di storie, perché la nostra mente non si limiti a riprodurre se stessa, ma attraverso la narrazione si trasformi in un grande laboratorio di possibilità. Aperto al futuro, grazie alla molteplicità di sguardi con cui partecipa alla costruzione del passato.

      Il progetto finanziato dal Fondo Nazionale Svizzero e intitolato Atlante Calvino: letteratura e visualizzazione ha scommesso sulla critica letteraria come esercizio intellettuale di apertura mentale e sperimentazione. Per tre anni (2017-2020) il progetto ha messo in contatto un’équipe letteraria dell’Unité d’italien dell’Université de Genève e il laboratorio di ricerca DensityDesign del Politecnico di Milano, specializzato in progetti di Digital Humanities e Data Visualization, con la collaborazione della casa editrice Mondadori, che detiene i diritti italiani dell’intera opera di Calvino.

      Le due anime del progetto, quella letteraria e quella del design dell’informazione, sono state chiamate a mescolarsi per trovare soluzioni efficaci e innovative intorno al caso esemplare dell’opera di Calvino: l’opportunità di mettere in contatto un oggetto letterario e analisi di sistemi complessi condotta tramite la visualizzazione è l’obiettivo principale di questa ricerca. Nato a Santiago de Las Vegas nel 1923 e morto a Siena nel 1985, Italo Calvino è uno dei più noti e studiati scrittori della letteratura italiana contemporanea. La statura internazionale della sua fama, insieme alla bibliografia critica ormai sterminata che lo riguarda e alla varietà sperimentale delle sue opere, lo rende un modello perfetto per una ricerca fondata sul contributo scientifico che la visualizzazione dei dati può fornire agli studi letterari.

      Il risultato del progetto è la piattaforma web in cui vi trovate, che offre la possibilità di esplorare l’opera narrativa dello scrittore da un nuovo punto di vista: vale a dire attraverso un certo numero di elaborazioni visuali, che corrispondono ad altrettante interrogazioni letterarie rivolte al corpus dei testi calviniani. L’unione tra la figura di un autore fondamentale della letteratura del XX secolo e un metodo di studio innovativo ambisce a offrire un valido esempio di ricerca nel campo delle Digital Humanities di seconda generazione, che contribuisca all’attuale esigenza di rinnovamento delle discipline letterarie. La qualità scientifica del progetto si sforza di combinarsi, in questo senso, con le sue qualità pedagogiche, estetiche e comunicative, al fine di proporre una nuova “narrazione visuale” dell’autore.

      #visualisation #infographie

  • Operazione Guardiano delle Mura
    I nuovi scontri fra Israele e Palestina

    In poco più di una settimana dall’inizio dell’escalation militare tra Israele e Hamas sono migliaia i missili e i razzi che hanno sorvolato il cielo. Un racconto interattivo per spiegare che cosa sta succedendo...

    Youssef Hassan Holgado (testi) e Filippo Teoldi (grafica e dati)


    #infographie #gaza #palestine #hamas #

  • Border barrier boondoggle. Trump’s promised inexpensive, impregnable wall was anything but.

    “I would build a great wall — and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me. And I’ll build them very inexpensively,” Donald Trump said in 2015 as he announced his presidential run. “I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.” During the campaign, Trump offered more details. His wall would span the entire length of the border, or nearly 2,000 miles, it would be fashioned with concrete — not unlike the Berlin Wall — and would be “impregnable” and “big and beautiful.”

    It didn’t quite work out that way. By the end of Trump’s term, his administration had completed construction of about 450 miles of barrier, none of which was concrete and all of which was demonstrably pregnable, at a cost at least five times that of the existing barriers. Mexico did not pay a dime for it. And the “beautiful” part? That, of course, is in the eye of the beholder.

    When Trump first promised to build the wall along the border, he apparently didn’t realize that his predecessors had already constructed hundreds of miles of barriers. It all started in 1996, when President #Bill_Clinton signed the #Illegal_Immigration_Reform_and_Responsibility_Act. Fences were constructed in urban areas, such as #Nogales and #San_Diego, with the intention of driving border crossers into the desert, where they could be more easily apprehended — but also where they were at greater risk of dying of heat-related ailments.

    A decade later, President George W. Bush signed the #Secure_Fence_Act of 2006, authorizing the construction of 700 miles of barriers. As a result, 652 miles of pedestrian and vehicle barriers already lined the border, mostly between #El_Paso and San Diego, by the time #Trump was elected. All the evidence, however, suggests that it did very little to stop undocumented migration, in part because at least two-thirds of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. arrived on #visas and then overstayed them.

    Besides, no wall is truly impregnable, as Trump himself indicated in a speech on the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, when he said: “Let the fate of the Berlin Wall be a lesson to oppressive regimes and rulers everywhere: No Iron Curtain can ever contain the iron will of a people resolved to be free.” Oddly enough, “iron curtain” may be the most accurate description of Trump’s new segments of the wall.

    On the day of his inauguration, President Joseph Biden signed an executive order halting further construction. Now, many observers are urging him to go further and dismantle the barrier, as well as try to repair the damage done. Or, as President Ronald Reagan put it in 1987, “Tear down this wall!”

    #cartographie #infographie #visualisation #murs #prix #coût #longueur #barrières_frontalières #Trump #promesses #promesses_non_maintenues #statistiques #chiffres #George_Bush #overstayers #Joe_Binden #walls_don't_work

    ping @reka

  • Un salón, un bar y una clase: así contagia el #coronavirus en el aire | Ciencia | EL PAÍS

    Los interiores son más peligrosos, pero es posible minimizar los riesgos si se ponen en juego todas las medidas disponibles para combatir el contagio por #aerosoles. Estas son las probabilidades de infección en estos tres escenarios cotidianos dependiendo de la ventilación, las mascarillas y la duración del encuentro

  • Sanctuary Cities : All You Need In An Infographic

    What are sanctuary cities?

    Sanctuary cities are local governments that refuse to help the federal government enforce immigration policy.
    The tug-of-war

    The federal government and sanctuary cities are in a tug-of-war power struggle.

    The federal government aims to get local government agents working to enforce immigration law, i.e. to have local police on the lookout for potential immigration violations. Sanctuary cities don’t want to participate. They believe enforcing immigration law will harm residents’ cooperation with local government.
    The laws relating to sanctuary cities

    The American legal structure sets the rules of the game. What are the elements of the federal government and sanctuary cities’ leverage?

    To explain how sanctuary city law works, we have produced an Infographic and a Legal Landscape.

    Legal Landscape

    Outlining the relevant laws by legal authority

    the constitution

    The Constitution gives Congress the general power to legislate (Article I). It specifically mentions that this power includes creating laws on “naturalization” (Section 8, clause 4), i.e. defining immigration categories and providing procedures on entry and on deportation. See Legislative column below for some of the laws Congress has made relating to immigration.

    The 10th Amendment says that the federal government cannot “commandeer” (boss around) the state governments. Basically, the federal government can create laws in certain categories (those listed in the Legislative Powers part of the Constitution), but it cannot force the states to help enforce them. This means states don’t have to use state or local resources (money or people that work for the state or local governments) to enforce federal policies.

    The Spending Clause of Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to control the federal budget. The federal government is tasked with providing for the welfare of the people, so it sets aside money for certain programs that it decides will provide a public benefit. Sometimes, Congress gives the money for a particular program to state governments, so that the states can “administer” (do the legwork for) the programs. Because of the 10th Amendment, the states always have the choice whether or not to participate. The Medicaid program is an example of a federal program administered by the states. A couple other examples relevant to immigration enforcement are discussed in the Legislative column below (left). Here is a useful general discussion of federal grants to states.

    federal courts

    This section outlines cases relevant to the 10th Amendment and Congress’s Spending Power. The last case listed here ruled on Trump’s executive order attempting to block local governments from getting funding if they do not help enforce immigration law.

    Courts Interpreting the 10th Amendment:

    In Printz v. United States (1997), the Supreme Court overturned part of a federal law for attempting to require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential gun purchasers. The background checks would be undertaken on behalf of the federal government because the policy was a federal policy (the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act). The court ruled that the 10th Amendment’s “dual sovereignty” principle (federal government does federal law; states do state law) barred the federal government from making states participate by doing the background checks.

    In New York v. United States (1992), the Supreme Court overturned part of a federal law that attempted to make states responsible for disposing of certain radioactive waste on behalf of the federal government. The court ruled the 10th Amendment separation between federal and state governing barred the federal government from “commandeering” the states like that.

    Courts Interpreting the Spending Power:

    In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Supreme Court upheld a federal law challenged by South Dakota. The law used a threat of revoking federal funds to get the state to raise its drinking age to 21. South Dakota argued that the law, which threatened to take 5% of the state’s highway funds if it did not comply, was an unconstitutional use of the Spending Power. The Court disagreed, saying the federal government is allowed to induce states into federal programs that “promote the general welfare,” as long as Congress made the requirement clear so that the states are aware of their choice (potential to forfeit federal funds). Further, the court said the 5% potential loss of highway funds is not coercive because it is not significant enough to cross the line into compulsion.

    In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2013) (the case challenging Obamacare), the Supreme Court ruled against the federal government’s power to use money as an incentive for states to participate in a federal program. In this case, the federal program was Medicaid. Under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government threatened to take away states’ Medicaid funds if the states did not expand the group of people to which they offered Medicaid, to align with the goal of the federal program. Until this point, Medicaid had offered money to whatever degree the states wished to participate, and with the Affordable Care Act the federal government threatened to take that away and make states accept the whole deal (give Medicaid to anyone who qualified under the new federal standard). States, at the time, received a significant portion of their total budget through the Medicaid program (around 10%). The Court ruled that the amount of money involved, in addition to it being money the states already relied on, made the Affordable Care Act requirement to expand Medicaid coercive on states. The Court distinguished South Dakota v. Dole because in that case, the funds constituted only one half of one percent of the state’s budget. In this case, the much larger percentage made the federal pressure cross the line into coercion, which the Spending Power does not allow.

    The Spending Power and Immigration Enforcement:

    Like in the cases above, the current federal government (under President Trump) is attempting to use Congress’s Spending Power to encourage states and local governments to help enforce federal law. These following two cases were consolidated because they have the same issue, and they are in the same federal district court (Northern District of California).

    County of Santa Clara v. Trump (https://www.sccgov.org/sites/cco/overview/Pages/fedlawsuit.aspx)

    City and County of San Francisco. v. Trump (https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/17-17478/17-17478-2018-08-01.html)

    These two cases were filed in federal court in California (the Northern District of California) by San Francisco and Santa Clara’s local governments. They challenged President Trump’s Sanctuary Cities Executive Order (See Executive column) for violating the 10th Amendment and the Spending Power. The Executive Order threatened to cut federal funding from local governments that do not comply with 8 U.S.C. Section 1373. Section 1373 requires local governments to communicate with federal authorities on immigration enforcement (see Legislative column, left). San Francisco and Santa Clara have policies that they will not transmit information about an individual’s suspected immigration status to federal authorities, in apparent violation of Section 1373. The local governments have the right to do this under the 10th Amendment. In other words, Section 1373 has no teeth unless Congress attaches some funds to it.

    On April 25, 2017, the court (Northern District of California) ruled on a preliminary matter: is San Francisco and Santa Clara’s case strong enough to call for a temporary block on the Executive Order? The court said yes.

    The court said President Trump’s Executive Order tried to attach all federal funds to compliance with Section 1373. That includes not just the federal funds attached to Section 1373 through Congressional power (or through delegation as mentioned in the Executive column), but even potentially Medicaid and all other funds. The court ruled such a broad attachment of funds would be a violation of the Spending Power and the 10th Amendment. The preliminary ruling is valid until the case goes to trial (or if it gets a decision on appeal).

    Update: Trump appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and lost. The 9th Circuit agreed with the lower court that the executive order is likely unconstitutional and should continue to be placed on hold (August 2018).


    The following federal laws (a non-exhaustive list) relate specifically to immigration.

    The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 governs immigration to and citizenship in the United States. It was signed in the context of the Cold War and in the scare of the spread of Communism. The Act established a preference system which determined which ethnic groups were desirable immigrants and placed importance on labor qualifications.

    The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 revised several aspects of the 1952 law. Passed during the civil rights movement, it outlaws discrimination against people seeking immigration status (eliminated national origin, race, and ancestry as bases for immigration). Among its other provisions, it gave priority to relatives of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents and to professionals and other individuals with specialized skills, and it allowed U.S. organizations to employ foreign workers either temporarily or permanently to fulfill certain types of job requirements (on visas such as the H-1B Visa).

    The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 placed rules restricting the rights of people who stayed in the U.S. unlawfully for a period of time. Among its other provisions, it made people eligible for deportation based on minor criminal offenses (like shoplifting). The Act also includes a provision that is at issue in regards to Sanctuary Cities:

    8 U.S.C. Section 1373 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1373) requires state and local governments to communicate with federal authorities regarding immigration-related information of individuals.

    8 U.S.C. Section 1373 has limited power on its own. It cannot actually force the states to use their own resources (state law enforcement agents or state money) on federal priorities like immigration. The 10th Amendment does not allow it. However, in conjunction with a federal grant program, it can have more effect on state and local governments. This is the federal government’s Spending Power. It is also called “attaching strings” or the “power of the purse.” The federal government can offer money to states with the condition that the states follow certain rules. The conditions have to be clear; they cannot be coercive. States do not have to participate.

    Congressionally-Established Federal Grant Programs:

    Usually conditions on grants are set when Congress establishes the grant program. Sometimes Congress establishes grant programs and allows a federal agency to deal with the specifics. For example, Congress gave to the Department of Justice administration of the following programs:

    The Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program gives federal money to state and local governments to help in their criminal justice efforts. It was funded by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005.

    The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program reimburses state and local governments for costs of incarcerating unauthorized immigrants. It was funded by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.

    See the Executive below for a discussion of Department of Justice potential to enforce federal law through administering a federal grant program.

    president and Executive agencies

    Federal Agencies Involved with Immigration Enforcement:

    The Department of Homeland Security includes the sub-agency Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE was established in 2003. It is responsible for enforcement of immigration law and removal of individuals in violation of immigration law. It investigates activities relating to the movement of people and goods to and from the country.

    The Department of Justice, the legal arm of the government, controls the immigration courts. It has other responsibilities relating to immigration, for example, as described below.

    Implementing the “Spending Power” through the Executive:

    Congress is the only federal authority that can use the federal government’s spending power (offer of money) to encourage states or local governments to enforce federal policies. However, Congress can give the authority to administer federal grant programs to executive agencies, like the Department of Justice.

    Because the Department of Justice administers the Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program and the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, it can set rules on how states and local governments can get the funds. It can only determine rules within the boundaries defined by Congress.

    In July 2016, the Department of Justice issued “guidance” (a formal letter) relating to the Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program and the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. The guidance said that any state or local government participating in these two of its programs related to state and local criminal justice would have to show that they cooperate with the federal government’s immigration enforcement efforts as stated in 8 U.S.C. Section 1373. The Department of Justice had the power to do this because it was granted the authority by Congress.

    Sanctuary Cities Executive Order

    In January 2017, President Trump wanted to “remind” states that the federal government has the power to give money to state and local governments. President Trump gave an Executive Order on January 25, 2017 threatening to cut federal funding to local governments that refuse to follow 8 U.S.C. Section 1373. Among the jurisdictions that could suffer from this order are those with “sanctuary policies,” cities and counties with policies that local officials should not seek immigration information from people and that refuse to turn over to the federal government people with questionable immigration status.

    If a particular federal program was attached through Congressional power (legislation or delegation) to a policy requirement (e.g. that a state or local government getting money must obey a certain law), then the funding threat is valid. If the requirement was not already there, an Executive Order cannot create it. That is why President Trump was sued by Santa Clara and San Francisco. The Executive Order purported to attach all federal grant programs to compliance with Section 1373. See Judicial column, County of Santa Clara v. Trump and City and County of San Francisco v. Trump.

    state governments

    In the immigration enforcement battle between the federal government and sanctuary cities or sanctuary counties, the state can be the deciding factor. The 10th Amendment does not allow the federal government to command cities and counties, but the state can command its own localities.

    First, see the two main camps of local governments:

    Local Government Policies on Immigration Enforcement:

    Pro-enforcement (non-sanctuary cities)

    Local governments that want to help enforce federal immigration law can participate through a type of agreement with the federal government authorized by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, provision 287(g). 287(g) Agreements give local officials the power to inquire about federal immigration offenses and to make related arrests. Another type of program called Secure Communities (a Department of Homeland Security program, not a Congressional program) works to share information between local jails and the federal government. Local governments can submit fingerprints of any arrestees to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) so the federal agency can check for potential immigration violations. If they want, the localities can hold individuals suspected of immigration violations for federal authorities.

    Against-enforcement (sanctuary cities or sanctuary counties)

    Alternatively, a local government can choose not to help the federal government enforce immigration law (unless there is a state law against it, see below). These local governments are called “Sanctuary Cities” and “Sanctuary Counties.” In these localities, the government agents (police and other public safety officials, for example) will not ask about immigration status when going about their activities. In other words, the cities/counties will not spend local funds to help the federal government enforce federal immigration law. Local governments with these policies cannot actively subvert federal enforcement efforts, but the federal government cannot command the states to perform federal responsibilities.

    State Laws on Immigration Enforcement:

    States can determine what their local governments are allowed to do. Some states have made it clear that they are on the federal enforcement team and that all their local governments must follow.

    For example, in May 2017, Texas passed a law requiring local police and other local government officials to help enforce federal immigration law. The law will probably face legal challenge from civil rights groups, who already claim it may cause 4th Amendment problems (causing unconstitutional stops and searches of individuals suspected of immigration violations).


    #villes-refuge #résistance #USA #Etats-Unis #sanctuary_cities #migrations #asile #réfugiés #infographie


    Ajouté à la métaliste sur les villes-refuge :

  • Budget européen pour la migration : plus de contrôles aux frontières, moins de respect pour les droits humains

    Le 17 juillet 2020, le Conseil européen examinera le #cadre_financier_pluriannuel (#CFP) pour la période #2021-2027. À cette occasion, les dirigeants de l’UE discuteront des aspects tant internes qu’externes du budget alloué aux migrations et à l’#asile.

    En l’état actuel, la #Commission_européenne propose une #enveloppe_budgétaire totale de 40,62 milliards d’euros pour les programmes portant sur la migration et l’asile, répartis comme suit : 31,12 milliards d’euros pour la dimension interne et environ 10 milliards d’euros pour la dimension externe. Il s’agit d’une augmentation de 441% en valeur monétaire par rapport à la proposition faite en 2014 pour le budget 2014-2020 et d’une augmentation de 78% par rapport à la révision budgétaire de 2015 pour ce même budget.

    Une réalité déguisée

    Est-ce une bonne nouvelle qui permettra d’assurer dignement le bien-être de milliers de migrant.e.s et de réfugié.e.s actuellement abandonné.e.s à la rue ou bloqué.e.s dans des centres d’accueil surpeuplés de certains pays européens ? En réalité, cette augmentation est principalement destinée à renforcer l’#approche_sécuritaire : dans la proposition actuelle, environ 75% du budget de l’UE consacré à la migration et à l’asile serait alloué aux #retours, à la #gestion_des_frontières et à l’#externalisation des contrôles. Ceci s’effectue au détriment des programmes d’asile et d’#intégration dans les États membres ; programmes qui se voient attribuer 25% du budget global.

    Le budget 2014 ne comprenait pas de dimension extérieure. Cette variable n’a été introduite qu’en 2015 avec la création du #Fonds_fiduciaire_de_l’UE_pour_l’Afrique (4,7 milliards d’euros) et une enveloppe financière destinée à soutenir la mise en œuvre de la #déclaration_UE-Turquie de mars 2016 (6 milliards d’euros), qui a été tant décriée. Ces deux lignes budgétaires s’inscrivent dans la dangereuse logique de #conditionnalité entre migration et #développement : l’#aide_au_développement est liée à l’acceptation, par les pays tiers concernés, de #contrôles_migratoires ou d’autres tâches liées aux migrations. En outre, au moins 10% du budget prévu pour l’Instrument de voisinage, de développement et de coopération internationale (#NDICI) est réservé pour des projets de gestion des migrations dans les pays d’origine et de transit. Ces projets ont rarement un rapport avec les activités de développement.

    Au-delà des chiffres, des violations des #droits_humains

    L’augmentation inquiétante de la dimension sécuritaire du budget de l’UE correspond, sur le terrain, à une hausse des violations des #droits_fondamentaux. Par exemple, plus les fonds alloués aux « #gardes-côtes_libyens » sont importants, plus on observe de #refoulements sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale. Depuis 2014, le nombre de refoulements vers la #Libye s’élève à 62 474 personnes, soit plus de 60 000 personnes qui ont tenté d’échapper à des violences bien documentées en Libye et qui ont mis leur vie en danger mais ont été ramenées dans des centres de détention indignes, indirectement financés par l’UE.

    En #Turquie, autre partenaire à long terme de l’UE en matière d’externalisation des contrôles, les autorités n’hésitent pas à jouer avec la vie des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s, en ouvrant et en fermant les frontières, pour négocier le versement de fonds, comme en témoigne l’exemple récent à la frontière gréco-turque.

    Un budget opaque

    « EuroMed Droits s’inquiète de l’#opacité des allocations de fonds dans le budget courant et demande à l’Union européenne de garantir des mécanismes de responsabilité et de transparence sur l’utilisation des fonds, en particulier lorsqu’il s’agit de pays où la corruption est endémique et qui violent régulièrement les droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées, mais aussi les droits de leurs propres citoyen.ne.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, président d’EuroMed Droits.

    « Alors que les dirigeants européens se réunissent à Bruxelles pour discuter du prochain cadre financier pluriannuel, EuroMed Droits demande qu’une approche plus humaine et basée sur les droits soit adoptée envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, afin que les appels à l’empathie et à l’action résolue de la Présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen ne restent pas lettre morte ».



    #budget #migrations #EU #UE #Union_européenne #frontières #Fonds_fiduciaire_pour_l’Afrique #Fonds_fiduciaire #sécurité #réfugiés #accord_UE-Turquie #chiffres #infographie #renvois #expulsions #Neighbourhood_Development_and_International_Cooperation_Instrument

    Ajouté à la métaliste sur la #conditionnalité_de_l'aide_au_développement :

    Et à la métaliste sur l’externalisation des contrôles frontaliers :

    ping @karine4 @rhoumour @reka @_kg_

  • What COVID-19 case clusters reveal about how #coronavirus spreads | Science News

    Studying these kinds of transmission #clusters as well as common environments where #COVID-19 moves easily from person to person provides a glimpse of how to avoid the U-turns. To that end, epidemiologist Gwenan Knight and her colleagues at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine compiled a massive database of worldwide COVID-19 case clusters based on media accounts, published scientific studies and government health department reports.

    What settings have been linked to #SARS-CoV-2 #transmission clusters? [version 2; peer review: 1 approved] | Wellcome Open Research

    #infographie #interactif #data #données

  • Ben Freeman sur Twitter : "We tracked more than $174 million in foreign funding going to the nation’s top think tanks in our new report “Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America.” It’s a must read for understanding this seldom discussed avenue of foreign influence" / Twitter

    #visualisation #infographie #think_tank

  • #métaliste de documents (surtout cartes et visualisations) qui traitent des #migrations_intra-africaines et qui peuvent servir à combattre les #préjugés de la #ruée vers l’Europe de migrants d’#Afrique subsaharienne...


    Voir notamment le livre de #Stephen_Smith qui entretien ce #mythe :
    La #ruée vers l’#Europe. La jeune #Afrique en route pour le Vieux Continent



    Les documents pour contrer ce mythe...

    Le #développement en #Afrique à l’aune des #bassins_de_migrations



    Les migrations au service de la transformation structurelle



    Many more to come ? Migration from and within Africa



    #Infographie : tout ce qu’il faut savoir sur les migrants intra-africains



    Une population en pleine expansion, fuyant les régions sous tension



    Les #migrations_internes vont-elles recomposer l’Afrique ?



    African migration : is the continent really on the move ?



    Africa : International migration, emigration 2015



    Un premier atlas sur les #migrations_rurales en Afrique subsaharienne - CIRAD


    #cartographie #visualisation #ressources_pédagogiques

    ping @reka @karine4 @fil

  • #INFOGRAPHIES:Combien les #banques gagnent des #dettes de l’État ?

    La dette gouvernementale libanaise, qui a atteint 79.5 milliards de dollars en 2017, se distribue sur cinq parties principales : Les banques commerciales (40%), la Banque du #Liban (35%), les institutions publiques (9%), les créanciers étrangers et les créanciers officieux étrangers (16%). Cependant, les banques commerciales locales possèdent la part du lion de ces revenus très élevés, sans aucun risque.

    Selon le quotidien libanais #AlAkhbar, les banques commerciales sont au nombre de 50. Néanmoins, 10 parmi elles seulement contrôlent 82% de la totalité des actifs et des emplois du secteur bancaire. Ces banques emploient 31.9 milliards de dollars dans la dette gouvernementale, distribués entre 18.4 milliards de dollars en livre libanaise (bons du trésor) et 13.5 milliards de dollars en monnaie étrangère (Eurobonds).

  • A Calais, la frontière tue ! In Calais, the border kills !


    Deaths at the Calais Border

    Uncountable lives are wasted and suffer at the hands of the Calais border regime. There is no accurate count of how many people have died. This is a list of people known in Calais or from news reports.

    For sure there will have been more, their deaths ignored, the facts covered up or altogether unreported. Many already go unnamed, without vigils and protests, without families or friends to advocate on their behalf.

    But we will never let these deaths be silenced. We will not forgive and we will never forget.

    These borders kill! One death is too many!


    #morts #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #Calais #France #frontières #Angleterre #UK #migrations #asile #réfugiés #base_de_données #database #liste #timeline #ligne_du_temps #mourir_dans_la_forteresse_Europe #visualisation #infographie #frise #frise_chronologique #time-line #chronologie

    ping @reka @simplicissimus @karine4

    • Un article de février 2018

      The deadly roads into Calais

      Since 1999, an estimated 170 migrants desperately seeking a clandestine passage across the Channel to Britain have died in road accidents in and around the port of Calais in northern France, 37 of them since 2015. One former police officer said the situation became so grim “it was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road”. One of the most recent victims was a 22-year-old Eritrean whose mutilated body was found on a motorway last month after he was run over by a truck whose driver fled the scene. Elisa Perrigueur reports from Calais, where she met with Biniam’s relatives as they prepared the return of his body home to north-east Africa.
      The temperature was below freezing point on a bleak dawn last month when Biniam’s remains were found near the port of Calais, lying on the smooth tarmac of the A16 motorway that runs parallel to the Channel coast. According to statements given to the police afterwards by those who knew him, Biniam L. (full last name withheld here), a 22-year-old Eritrean, had probably spent all night looking for a truck he could climb onto in the hope of smuggling his way to England.

      He was successful, at first. He had managed to mount one of them, hiding in its cargo hold, most certainly hoping, like so many others who attempt the same, that once it passed through the fortified perimeter of the port, which is surrounded by 39 kilometres of fencing, it would be one of the vehicles that occasionally escapes the heat scanners and sniffer-dog searches, first in Calais and then, after the brief sea passage, through the British port of Dover. With no ID documents and no baggage, just the clothes he would hope could adequately keep out the biting cold.

      But on that early morning of January 9th this year, his plan went horribly wrong. The truck he had hidden in did not turn off the motorway into Calais, but instead continued its route eastwards. The young man must have panicked when he realised the fact, for he tried to jump from the truck onto the motorway despite the speeding traffic. According to members of the local French migrant aid association, l’Auberge des migrants, who spoke to police afterwards, Biniam landed on his head and was run over by another truck following behind. But neither vehicle stopped, and there remains doubt over the exact circumstances of his final moments.

      Between December 2017 and January this year two other migrants, 15-year-old Abdullah Dilsouz and Hussein Abdoullah, 32, both Afghan nationals, lost their lives in accidents on the roads around Calais. “Since 2015, there have been 37 migrants who have died in [and around] Calais,” said a spokesperson for the local prefecture. “The highest number date back to 2015 and 2016, the great majority are road accidents.” In 2015, the death toll reached 18, followed by 14 in 2016.

      Maël Galisson, a coordinator for the network of associations in the region providing aid for migrants, the Plate-forme de services aux migrants, has carried out research to establish the number of victims over the past almost 20 years and, where possible, to record their identities. “Since 1999, we estimate that at least 170 people have died while trying to cross this frontier area,” he said. The majority of road accidents occur on the stretches of the A16 and A26 motorways close to Calais, and the ring road into the port centre.

      The day after his death, Biniam’s brother Bereket, 26, arrived in Calais from Germany, accompanied by a cousin and uncle who had travelled from Norway. “He had no ‘dream’ as people put it, he just wanted a country where he was accepted,” said Bereket, who said he had difficulty believing the news that his brother, who he said was “so young to die”, had been killed in a road accident, which he received in a phone call from a friend.

      Bereket said he was not aware of the daily reality of the migrants in Calais, the road blocks migrants mount to try and slow traffic and the clandestine crossings in trucks. In his case, he had crossed to Europe by boat across the Mediterranean Sea. Biniam, he explained, had left the family village in Eritrea, north-east Africa, one-and-a-half years ago, to escape conscription into the army. At one point, he joined up with his brother Bereket in Germany, where the latter had been granted residence. “I obtained [official residency] papers close to Stuttgart and today I work in Germany, I had begun to have a stable life,” recounted Bereket. “His asylum demand was rejected, I don’t understand why.” Biniam had re-applied a second time for right of asylum, but was again turned down. It was after that, in November, that he set off for Calais, where between 550 and 800 migrants – according to figures respectively from the prefecture and the migrant aid associations – live rough, mostly in surrounding woodland.

      The few friends of Biniam who Bereket met with in Calais were little forthcoming about his time there. Loan Torondel of the Auberge des migrants association, which had offered Biniam shelter, said he was never seen at the daily distribution of meals. “A month here is not very long for finding a truck,” he said. “Often, migrants spend months before succeeding, for those who manage to.”

      During his visit to Calais on February 2nd, French interior minister Gérard Collomb, hoping to dissuade migrants from gathering there, described the frontier point as “a wall” and “a mirage”. But from the beach, the migrants can see the English coast, where some have family and friends they hope to join, in a country with lower unemployment than in France and where finding work, undeclared, is easier. Others say they would stay in France but fear that, if they engaged in the official procedures, because their fingerprints are registered in the first European Union (EU) country they reached before travelling to France they would be sent back there, in accordance with the regulations of the EU’s so-called Dublin Agreement.

      The victims are often young men’

      For the migrants hoping to cross to Britain from Calais there are few options in how to do so. The British government has handed France about 140 million euros over the past three years to part fund the increased security measures at the port, which is the frontier point before departure for the English coast. On January 18th, at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, London announced that it was to provide a further 50.5 million euros, for a further beefing up of security and for establishing a centre for migrants at a site distanced from the town.

      For the migrants who can afford their fees, one option is to use the services of people smugglers. They charge between 1,500 euros and 10,000 euros per person for a clandestine passage in a truck, operating out of vehicle parks which they reign over as their own territory. Clashes which broke out in Calais on February 1st between Afghan and Eritrean migrants, which left 22 needing medical treatment, including four teenagers wounded by gunfire, appear to have been linked to turf wars between people smugglers.

      Others try blocking trucks on the approach roads to the port, operating in small groups to lay down obstacles to slow or even halt the vehicles in order to jump on. The method is a dangerous one, for both the migrants and the drivers. In June 2017, the polish driver of a truck died after his vehicle crashed into another truck that was blocked by migrants on the A16 motorway, burned alive in his cabin.

      Then there are those, and who probably included Biniam, who try to mount the vehicles on their own. Eupui is a 19-year-old migrant from Cameroun, in West Africa, and has lived since 2016 on the ‘Dunes’ industrial zone of the port, the site of the notorious and now razed migrant camp known as “the Jungle”. His solitary sorties to find a truck that would take him across the Channel somehow allow him “to keep going”, he told Mediapart. “I sleep three hours and then I try,” he said. “As soon as I see a truck that isn’t going too fast, even a car, I see if I can get into the boot.” He said he hides “near the bends of the motorways” because vehicles reduce speed there. “I’m not afraid, I’ve lived much worse,” he added. “I crossed the Sahara in horrible conditions to come here. I have nothing left to lose. I’ve injured my knee, but never mind.”

      Biniam’s brother Bereket said his brother did not realise the danger in the risks he was taking. “I spoke to him three weeks before he died,” said Bereket. “He told me that everything was fine for him in France. But he lied to me, he didn’t tell me he was at Calais. If I had known, I would have told him to get out of this dangerous place.”

      Bereket said he was “disappointed” by what he saw on this, his first trip to France. He has been supported by local charitable associations, including the Réveil voyageur and the Secours catholique, who usually look after relatives of those who have died. “You don’t see many officials, politicians, as if Biniam’s death had no importance,” he said bitterly.

      “The associations have been managing this for years,” said Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group. “When relatives arrive in Calais they are disappointed at not seeing many officials. They have the impression that they are not taken into account. Mr Macron referred to the death of the Polish driver, but not that of migrants,” she added, referring to a speech by the French president during his visit to Calais on January 16th.

      Undertaker Brahim Fares, based in nearby Grande-Synthe, says he charges a “lower than average” price to migrant families out of solidarity. “The dead are repatriated to Afghanistan for between about 3,400-3,500 euros, depending on the weight and the size,” he detailed. “For Eritrea, it begins at around 3,200 euros. Burials in Calais are about 1,600 euros, as opposed to a usual 2,400 euros.” Since 2015, Fares says he has organised the return home of about 15 bodies of migrants, and also the burials of about the same number in the north Calais cemetery managed by the Town Hall. The burial spots are simple ones, covered in earth and marked by crosses made of oak. “The victims are often young men, almost all of them identified,” he added. “I once had an Ethiopian woman. Not all the families can come all the way here. Those who manage to are very shocked, because the bodies are sometimes very damaged, as those in road accidents are.”

      Fares was given charge of Biniam’s body, which he recalled had “the hands cut off, the arms smashed up”. The corpse will be returned to Eritrea, where his parents live. Bereket, with his uncle and cousin, made up a large wreath of plastic flowers. “It’s really not so good but we had only that,” he said. But at the hospital in Lille where the body was placed in the coffin, they were told that they could not place the wreath on top of it, nor the white drape they had wanted to cover it with, according to their custom. “The airport authorities will end up throwing the wreath away, it’s not allowed in the hold,” Fares explained to them. After a poignant moment of silence, they asked him why it would be so complicated to do so.

      Biniam’s relatives spent two weeks attempting to find out the exact circumstances of what happened to him. At the police station in Calais, they were shown a photo of his injured face. Members of the motorway patrol police gave them the few details they had, which were the approximate time of the accident, a statement from a witness who had not seen very much, and the fact that the driver of the truck that ran over Biniam had fled the scene. “France is a developed country […] so why can’t the driver who did that be found?” asked Bereket. “Even in Eritrea we’d have found the killer of my brother.”

      Loan Torondel of the association l’Auberge des migrants said he had seen similar outrage by relatives before. “Many don’t understand why their close family member died under a lorry and that the driver did not act voluntarily,” he said. “Biniam’s family thought that there would be the launch of an investigation, like in American films. They think that the police is not [bothered into] carrying out an investigation, but in reality there are few witnesses.”

      Meanwhile, Bereket has lodged an official complaint over his brother’s death “against persons unknown”, explaining: “I won’t be able to sleep as long as I don’t know how he died, and while the person responsible is free.”

      ’It’s incredible that nobody saw anything’

      While the police systematically open investigations into the road deaths of migrants, they are often complex, beginning with the identification of the victim. Patrick Visser-Bourdon, a former Calais-based police detective, recalled the death of a Sudanese migrant whose body was found one morning in 2016 close to the port’s ring road, with “the head opened, abandoned, wearing a pair of jeans and a long-sleeved T-shirt”.

      During his enquiries, Visser-Bourdon approached the head of the Sudanese community of migrants living in the camp known as “the Jungle”, but nobody recognised the body. “We also put out his photo in the police stations,” he said. “In the majority of such cases, we mostly called on the NGOs for help.” As in the case of Biniam, the driver of what was apparently a truck that had hit the Sudanese man had not stopped. “There was blood on the road, there was necessarily some on the bumpers of the truck,” said Visser-Bourdon. “The driver therefore must have stopped his vehicle at some point to clean it, between the Jungle and the port. It’s incredible that nobody saw anything.”

      Sabriya Guivy from the Auberge des migrants group added that because some local sections of the motorways are unlit, “It is entirely possible to not realise that one has hit someone and to carry on”.

      A section of the numerous investigations into such events end up being closed, unsolved. Someone who is charged with involuntary homicide in France faces a sentence of three years in prison, and up to five years in jail in the case of aggravating circumstances such as fleeing the scene. “Sometimes, some of them don’t remain at the scene of the accident, notably in the case of dangerous [migrant] road blocks, but they go directly to present themselves to the police,” said Pascal Marconville, public prosecutor of the nearby port of Boulogne-sur-Mer, whose services have jurisdiction for events in Calais. “In that case, it’s regarded more as a hit-and-run offence which is exonerated by the circumstances.”

      Patrick Visser-Bourdon said he had welcomed the building of a wall surrounding the ring road in 2016 aimed at deterring migrants from the traffic. “It was humanly impossible to pick up more bodies from the road,” he said.



      En français :
      A Calais, les routes de la mort pour les migrants

    • Voir Calais et mourir

      Si, depuis quelques années, militants et chercheurs commencent à compter les morts sur les routes migratoires, ils ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’arc méditerranéen, négligeant la frontière franco-britannique que l’on pourrait qualifier de nasse calaisienne. Accords européens, traités bilatéraux et leurs corollaires sécuritaires font en effet de cette frontière un mur meurtrier. Et les migrants n’ont d’autre choix que de prendre toujours plus de risques pour le franchir… au péril de leur vie.

      Nawall Al Jende avait 26 ans. Elle était originaire de Nawa, une ville située à une trentaine de kilomètres de Deraa, dans le sud de la Syrie. Elle avait fui la guerre et laissé derrière elle son époux et deux de ses enfants. Avec son troisième enfant, Mohamed, âgé de 9 ans, et le frère de son mari, Oussama, son périple l’avait amenée à traverser neuf pays avant d’atteindre Calais. Sa sœur, Sawson, avait réalisé un parcours quasi similaire deux mois plus tôt et l’attendait de l’autre côté de la Manche. Nawall est décédée le 15 octobre 2015, après avoir été percutée par un taxi sur l’autoroute A16, alors qu’elle tentait de se glisser dans un camion afin de franchir la frontière franco-britannique. Comme sur les autres routes de l’exil, des personnes migrantes meurent à Calais et dans sa région. Depuis 1999, on estime qu’au moins 170 personnes sont décédées en tentant de franchir cet espace frontalier reliant la France à l’Angleterre.

      Pourquoi prêter attention aux personnes mortes en migration à la frontière franco-britannique ? Il n’existe pas de données officielles à ce sujet. Par conséquent, participer au travail de collecte d’informations contribue à documenter l’histoire du fait migratoire dans la région. En l’espace de quelques années, la question des exilés morts aux frontières s’est imposée dans le débat public. Elle a été d’abord portée, par des acteurs militants, à l’image des travaux réalisés par United for Intercultural Action, Fortress Europe ou encore Watch the Med. Puis, des journalistes se sont intéressés au sujet (The Migrants Files), ainsi que des chercheurs (Deaths at the Borders Database). Aujourd’hui, une institution officielle telle que l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) commence à recenser les personnes mortes en migration. Toutefois, dans ces différents relevés, la situation à la frontière franco-britannique est peu prise en compte, le focus étant davantage dirigé sur la mortalité aux portes de l’Europe, dans l’arc qui va des Iles Canaries à la mer Égée, en passant par le détroit de Gibraltar et le canal de Sicile. Par conséquent, travailler à la collecte d’informations sur les personnes mortes à Calais et dans la région répond à un réel besoin et rend visible une réalité méconnue.
      Redonner un nom aux morts

      Ce travail d’enquête ne veut pas s’en tenir au traitement simplement comptable ou anecdotique de la question des morts en migration. Il cherche, quand cela est possible, à redonner une identité et une histoire à ces « corps sans nom » ou à ces « noms sans histoire ». Tenter de reconstituer des récits de vie, (re)donner une dimension personnelle à chaque décès est un moyen d’éviter leur dilution dans ce qu’on nomme communément, de façon globalisante, les « drames de la migration ». Il s’agit également de rompre avec l’idée que cette hécatombe résulterait de la fatalité. Réduire ces tragédies à des accidents (accident de la route, noyade, etc.), à des violences ou des règlements de compte entre migrants est une façon d’occulter la responsabilité des pouvoirs publics dans une situation qui dure depuis plus de vingt ans dans le nord de la France. Au contraire, c’est bien l’addition d’accords européens et de traités bilatéraux, destinés à empêcher les indésirables d’accéder au territoire britannique qui a fait de cette région un mur meurtrier. De même, considérer que les seules violences exercées à l’encontre des exilés sont dues aux « réseaux de passeurs » est une manière d’occulter celles qui sont liées aux conditions de vie et à l’absence de dispositifs d’accueil adaptés, au harcèlement policier et à la surenchère de dispositifs de surveillance de la frontière.

      On constate en effet que la majorité des décès sont liés aux tentatives de passage, qu’ils soient immédiats ou qu’ils surviennent des suites de blessures que ces tentatives occasionnent. Le long de la frontière franco-britannique, les exilés meurent principalement après avoir été percutés par un train sur le site d’Eurotunnel, renversés par un véhicule – parfois volontairement – sur un axe routier non loin d’un point de passage ou écrasés sous l’essieu d’un poids lourd. Et finalement, les « règlements de compte » ou les violences « inter ou intra-communautaires » se concluant par des morts restent des événements marginaux.

      La majeure partie des exilés tentent de passer la frontière cachés dans la remorque d’un camion ou en dessous. Cette méthode s’avère extrêmement dangereuse et les risques de mourir écrasé par le contenu de la marchandise, par suffocation ou en tombant du camion (en particulier une fois arrivé sur le territoire britannique) sont importants. On pense notamment aux 58 personnes migrantes de nationalité chinoise cachées dans un camion frigorifique et découvertes mortes par asphyxie à Douvres en juin 2000. Un événement qui fait terriblement écho à la tragédie survenue 15 ans plus tard en Autriche, quand 71 exilés syriens cachés dans un camion furent abandonnés sur le bord d’une autoroute par le conducteur et décédèrent par suffocation.

      Même si le phénomène reste minoritaire, on recense plusieurs cas de noyades. Si quelques-unes se sont produites à la suite de rixes ou afin d’échapper à des violences policières, la plupart sont survenues pendant des tentatives de franchissement de la frontière. On observe ainsi plusieurs cas désespérés, et finalement mortels, survenus lors de la traversée du détroit du Pas-de-Calais, par embarcation ou à la nage. Le 12 juin 2002, un exilé russe parti en canoë s’est noyé dans la Manche. Son corps n’a jamais été retrouvé et le camarade qui l’accompagnait est resté accroché pendant cinq heures à l’embarcation à la dérive avant d’être secouru. Le précieux travail d’investigation du journaliste norvégien Anders Fjellberg [1] a permis de retracer le parcours de deux exilés syriens, Mouaz Al Balkhi et Shadi Omar Kataf. Après plusieurs semaines passées entre les Jungles de Calais et de Grande-Synthe et une douzaine de tentatives de passage « classiques » ratées, les deux compatriotes optèrent pour une autre stratégie. Le 7 octobre 2014, ils se procurèrent une combinaison de plongée au magasin Décathlon de Calais. Leurs corps ont été retrouvés quelques semaines plus tard, l’un sur une plage de Norvège, l’autre sur une plage des Pays-Bas.
      Petits arrangements entre voisins

      Les modes de franchissement de la frontière évoluent en fonction de son niveau de sécurisation. Plus un point de passage est rendu inaccessible, plus il y a de prises de risque et plus ces tentatives impliquent le recours à un « tiers », le passeur. En septembre 2014, le ministre de l’intérieur français, Bernard Cazeneuve, signait avec son homologue britannique, Theresa May, un accord bilatéral « incluant une contribution britannique de 5 millions d’euros par an pendant trois ans » dont l’une des mesures principales visait à « renforcer la sécurité, à la fois autour du port et dans la zone portuaire [2] ». Cet accord visait à empêcher, d’une part, les tentatives d’intrusions collectives sur le site portuaire et, d’autre part, les incursions sur la rocade accédant au port, technique consistant à profiter des embouteillages pour se cacher dans la remorque d’un camion La mise en œuvre du versant « sécurisation » de cet accord a été confiée à l’entreprise Zaun, une firme britannique [3], et s’est déroulée en plusieurs étapes. Dans un premier temps, à partir d’octobre 2014, les barrières ont été doublées à l’intérieur du site portuaire. Puis, au printemps 2015, sur une distance de deux kilomètres le long de la rocade accédant à la zone portuaire, a été érigée une double clôture, l’une de 4 mètres de haut et l’autre d’un peu moins de 3 mètres, équipée d’une rampe d’accès incurvée pour éviter qu’on ne s’y s’agrippe, et surmontée d’un fil barbelé. Entre les deux clôtures, un espace de détection infrarouge a été installé. La mise en place de cet arsenal autour de la zone portuaire a obligé les exilés à se détourner du port pour trouver d’autres voies de passage, plus dangereuses, notamment celle du tunnel sous la Manche. Les conséquences ne se sont pas fait attendre : alors qu’aucun des 17 décès recensés en 2014 n’avait eu lieu sur le site d’Eurotunnel, on en comptait 15 sur les 25 enregistrés en 2015. Il serait difficile d’en conclure que plus on boucle la frontière franco-britannique, plus celle-ci devient meurtrière. En effet, l’augmentation significative du nombre de morts entre 2014 et 2015 s’explique aussi par celle du nombre d’exilés présents dans le Calaisis. Les militants locaux estiment qu’il a crû, en un an, de 1 500 à environ 5 000 personnes. Il est en revanche certain qu’à la multiplication des barrières et des dispositifs dissuasifs, se sont ajoutées les désastreuses conditions de vie des exilés, obligés de survivre dans une extrême précarité et dans un contexte de surpopulation croissante, tout en tentant d’échapper aux violences policières : un cocktail explosif qui les a poussés plus nombreux à prendre des risques pour espérer passer. En août 2015, un nouvel accord franco-britannique fut signé dans lequel les deux ministres reconnaissaient que « depuis la fin du mois de juin, en raison de la sécurisation du port, les migrants ont changé de stratégie, cherchant au péril de leur vie, à s’introduire au niveau des points d’entrée dans le tunnel sous la Manche ». Mais qu’imaginent-ils pour remédier à ce constat inquiétant ? Que « la France renforce l’actuel dispositif de sécurité et l’action de ses policiers et de ses gendarmes, grâce au déploiement d’unités mobiles additionnelles » et que le Royaume-Uni alloue des moyens supplémentaires pour « sécuriser le périmètre de l’entrée du tunnel, grâce à un dispositif de clôtures, de vidéosurveillance, de technologie de détection infrarouge et de projecteurs lumineux » tout en « [aidant] la société Eurotunnel à augmenter nettement ses effectifs en charge de la sécurité et de la protection du site [4] ». Ce qui s’est traduit par l’installation de 29 kilomètres de nouvelles barrières et le « renforcement » de 10 kilomètres déjà existants. Le paysage du site d’Eurotunnel a été radicalement bouleversé : 100 hectares ont été rasés afin de faciliter la surveillance et une partie de cette zone a été volontairement inondée « pour créer des obstacles naturels qui empêchent l’accès aux clôtures » [5].

      Cette séquence n’est finalement qu’une étape supplémentaire dans la longue histoire de la fortification de la frontière franco-britannique. Elle a commencé avec le code international pour la sûreté des navires et des installations portuaires (code ISPS) régissant les zones portuaires fournissant des services internationaux et s’est prolongée, depuis le début des années 1990, par une succession d’accords bilatéraux. Alors que le protocole de Sangatte (1991) avait initié la mise en place de contrôles juxtaposés français et britanniques des deux côtés de la frontière, son protocole additionnel (2000) les a étendus aux principales gares du nord de la France et du sud de l’Angleterre.

      Au tournant des années 2000, la fortification de la frontière prend une autre dimension. Du côté du site portuaire, « en 2000, un premier programme de 6 millions d’euros est engagé pour clôturer une partie du port, installer un réseau de vidéo surveillance ainsi qu’un bâtiment spécifique au département sûreté ». Jusqu’alors, la zone portuaire n’était que très sommairement clôturée. « À partir de 2005, un deuxième programme d’investissement de 7 millions d’euros est engagé […] [permettant] de finaliser l’année suivante, un réseau de 48 caméras fixes et mobiles de vidéo surveillance [6]. » De son côté, Eurotunnel renforce la surveillance de son site à partir du printemps 2001 et bénéficie, en février 2002, du prêt d’un radar PMMW (système à détection thermique) de l’armée britannique. Tandis que la signature du traité du Touquet (2003) étend les dispositions relatives aux contrôles juxtaposés à tous les ports de la Manche et de la mer du Nord, « l’arrangement » franco-britannique de 2009 accentue le recours aux dispositifs de détection et crée un centre de coordination conjoint « chargé de recueillir et partager toutes les informations nécessaires au contrôle des biens et de personnes circulant entre la France et le Royaume-Uni » [7]. Les accords franco-britanniques de 2014 et 2015 sont venus compléter cet empilement de textes.

      Retracer de manière précise et tenter de cartographier l’évolution des dispositifs mis en place autour de la frontière franco-britannique n’est pas chose aisée. En effet, l’accès à l’information est relativement restreint, du fait notamment de la multiplicité des acteurs impliqués (services de l’État, gestionnaires des sites portuaires et du tunnel, prestataires de sécurité privés, etc.) et du manque de transparence qui en résulte. Dans ses déclarations, le porte-parole d’Eurotunnel indique que « depuis l’apparition des clandestins [sic] dans le Calaisis, Eurotunnel a, au-delà de ses obligations contractuelles, investi massivement dans les moyens physiques (clôtures, éclairages, caméras, barrières infrarouges) et humains de protection du terminal de Coquelles : plus de 160 millions d’euros, dont 13 millions d’euros au premier semestre 2015 » [8]. Difficile d’évaluer finement ce que coûte cette surenchère. Cette question fait l’objet d’une bataille de communication, notamment entre l’État et Eurotunnel, le premier reprochant au second de ne pas en faire assez en matière de sûreté tandis que le second réclame toujours plus d’aides pour protéger le site. L’affaire, connue sous le nom de « contentieux de Sangatte », s’est d’ailleurs conclue devant les tribunaux en 2003 par une victoire d’Eurotunnel qui a obtenu de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne une indemnisation pour les investissements qu’il avait consentis à cet effet [9].

      Du coût humain, il n’en est bien entendu pas question. Aux morts recensées s’ajoutent celles qui n’ont pu l’être. Par manque de sources, car « il y a suffisamment à faire avec les vivants [10] » ou par oubli tout simplement. Et puis il y a les personnes blessées, « des jeunes aux mains et aux jambes lacérées par les barbelés qui entourent le site d’Eurotunnel […] ces clôtures [qui] déchiquettent la peau de manière anarchique [11] ». Mutilées ou accidentées, ces personnes n’entrent dans aucun décompte. Le 21 octobre 2001, dans La Voix du Nord, la journaliste Sophie Leroy titrait son article « Assez de mort aux frontières » [12] en reprenant l’un des slogans de la manifestation organisée à Calais par le collectif C’Sur [13] pour dénoncer cette frontière meurtrière. Quinze années plus tard, la liste des morts n’a cessé de s’allonger.