• #Denis_Salas : « La #justice se trouve confrontée à un phénomène totalement inédit »

    Pour le magistrat et président de l’association française pour l’histoire de la justice, "l’#état_d'urgence_sanitaire" instauré pour deux mois doit nous inciter à réfléchir aux #libertés_individuelles et au maintien du #débat_démocratique.

    La France est officiellement en "état d’urgence sanitaire" pour une durée de deux mois. La loi publiée ce mardi au Journal Officiel encadre notamment le #confinement décidé par le gouvernement mais également un certain nombre de mesures de #restriction_des_libertés. Denis Salas, magistrat, essayiste et président de l’association française pour l’histoire de la justice se penche sur le rôle dévolu à l’institution judiciaire, son rapport au pouvoir politique et s’interroge également sur cette remise en question des libertés individuelles dictée par la nécessité sanitaire.

    Denis Salas, quel rôle particulier incombe à l’institution judiciaire dans ce contexte de pandémie ?

    L’institution judiciaire tourne actuellement au ralenti. Les tribunaux sont pratiquement à l’arrêt, même si subsistent des audiences en urgence, comme les comparutions immédiates ou certaines audiences en matière civile. En matière de politique pénale, on voit apparaître ce que l’on pourrait appeler une #justice_prophylactique qui cherche à prévenir les risques à travers des notions juridiques nouvelles comme la #mise_en_danger_de_la_vie_d’autrui, #infraction utilisée pour tous ceux qui sortent sans autorisation ou encore des sanctions relatives au marché noir, par exemple pour ceux qui revendent des masques ou des caducées. De nouveaux #délits apparaissent pour violation des règles de confinement avec des peines d’#amende aggravées, voire des peines d’#emprisonnement de six mois en cas de réitération des infractions.

    D’un point de vue philosophique, je dirais que c’est un usage de la #fonction_dissuasive_de_la_peine qui consiste à afficher une volonté répressive mais l’application avec des tribunaux à l’arrêt se situe au second plan.

    Autrement dit, des mesures difficiles à mettre en œuvre ?

    Oui. Les tribunaux étant à l’arrêt, même si certaines urgences sont maintenues, je ne vois pas comment obtenir une application réaliste de ces infractions. Je pense donc que la fonction d’annonce de ces nouvelles infractions est en soi un but recherché par le législateur. On espère que cet affichage va dissuader des personnes de se comporter de manière illicite face au confinement : un moyen pénal d’obtenir la docilité de la population. La dissuasion reste une fonction classique de la peine mais en l’occurrence elle est pleinement utilisée pour obtenir la docilité de la population.

    J’ignore ce que diront les historiens plus tard mais je pense que c’est une forme de criminalité nouvelle en période de pandémie qui apparaît sur fond d’urgence sanitaire.

    La justice a-t-elle déjà été confrontée dans le passé à une situation similaire ?

    Concernant une pandémie, il faut remonter au XIXe siècle, à la grippe espagnole durant la Première Guerre mondiale, mais en France, à des périodes beaucoup plus anciennes, voire au Moyen Âge. La justice se trouve confrontée à un phénomène totalement inédit, ce qui explique les hésitations, les types de réponses qui sont apportées et son fonctionnement même qui peut en être affecté.

    Une justice confrontée néanmoins à un certain nombre de situations d’urgence : comparutions immédiates ou encore situations de violences conjugales ou familiales pour lesquelles les associations ont tiré la sonnette d’alarme.

    Nous verrons quel contentieux va nourrir les comparutions immédiates, sans doute un contentieux lié aux infractions au confinement : attroupements, déplacements abusifs, usage du marché noir pour revendre des masques ou d’autres produits de ce type. C’est un contentieux qui rappelle celui de l’Occupation. En travaillant sur la justice des "années sombres", nous y avions trouvé nombre d’affaires issues de la répression de la Résistance mais beaucoup d’autres de la répression du marché noir, une analogie que l’on retrouve aujourd’hui.

    Concernant les violences conjugales et familiales, les procès en cours d’assises, que ce soient viols ou « féminicides », sont reportés. Ce qui constitue une non-réponse à la situation de fait. Mais certains tribunaux maintiennent des permanences au civil où des Juges aux Affaires familiales (JAF) peuvent décider d’éloigner par exemple un mari violent. Il appartient aux magistrats d’apprécier l’urgence des situations.

    Sur la question de la détention, vous avez co-signé une tribune publiée par le journal Le Monde la semaine dernière.

    Il s’agit d’une question très préoccupante. Des révoltes ont eu lieu dans plusieurs prisons françaises, des mutineries en Italie, notamment à Naples. Dans ce texte commun, nous demandons la réduction des courtes peines par le biais de circulaires de politique pénale prises par la Chancellerie, le juge restant libre de prendre la décision, ou encore l’examen de la sortie en libération conditionnelle des détenus malades ou âgés, afin de réduire la surpopulation carcérale. D’autant que nous avons été condamnés récemment par la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. La situation s’avère surtout préoccupante dans les maisons d’arrêt, avec le problème de la détention provisoire dont l’on pourrait dépasser exceptionnellement les délais légaux vu l’état d’urgence. Mais n’y a-t-il pas une violation des droits constitutionnels liés aux libertés individuelles si l’on prolonge les détentions provisoires au-delà du délai fixé par la loi ? L’état d’urgence autorise-t-il de telles dérogations qui pourraient porter atteinte gravement aux libertés individuelles ?

    Les dispositions prévues dans le texte sur l’état d’urgence sanitaire publié au Journal Officiel peuvent faire l’objet d’un recours devant le juge administratif.

    On se demandait s’il n’y allait pas y avoir des recours « liberté » pour protester contre le confinement. Or, c’est l’inverse qui s’est produit avec ce recours devant le Conseil d’Etat, formulé par un syndicat de jeunes médecins qui réclamait un durcissement des mesures actuelles et un confinement total. Le juge n’est donc pas sollicité comme un défenseur des libertés mais comme un agent de durcissement des atteintes aux libertés. Et en l’occurrence, le Conseil d’Etat décide de ne pas aller jusqu’à un confinement total mais enjoint le gouvernement à durcir certaines dispositions, relatives à la pratique des activités sportives ou les marchés ouverts. Le Conseil d’Etat considère que c’est l’atteinte à la vie qui est en jeu, atteinte grave et manifeste à la sécurité et à la vie des personnes, article 2 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.

    En fait, le juge ne se positionne pas par rapport aux libertés classiques d’aller et venir, actuellement très restreintes mais par rapport à une autre liberté fondamentale qui est l’atteinte à la vie. En cette période exceptionnelle, il se positionne non pas comme un agent de contrôle d’activités gouvernementales au nom des libertés en général mais comme un agent de défense de la société.

    La justice avait eu à traiter récemment d’un autre état d’urgence, celui lié à la menace terroriste en novembre 2015.

    Oui et on peut se poser cette question : allons-nous vers un état d’exception permanent ? Car les principales mesures de l’état d’urgence promulgué en 2015 sont depuis inscrites dans le droit commun. Questionnement soulevé par le philosophe italien Giorgio Agamben qui théorise l’état d’exception. Pour lui, nous vivons dans des sociétés confrontées au risque en permanence et la tentation des gouvernements peut être de s’installer dans un régime d’exception permanent afin de neutraliser ces risques. Le principe de précaution devient alors déterminant.

    Dans la vision d’un état d’exception permanent, il n’existe plus d’infractions, seulement des menaces, plus de délinquants mais des groupes-cibles, les personnes infectées par exemple et des territoires concernés. Il y a là quelque chose d’extrêmement périlleux pour les libertés.

    Il s’agit donc d’un risque important selon vous ?

    Le risque de pérenniser l’exception dans le droit existe parce que l’état d’exception s’étend considérablement pour des raisons légitimes évidemment. Il est limité par le fait que les institutions de contrôle subsistent et par la notion de proportionnalité. Toutes les mesures doivent être proportionnelles par rapport aux exigences sanitaires et des contre feux, des contre-pouvoirs peuvent être soulevés.

    Je voudrais citer l’exemple de la Corée du Sud qui ne pratique pas le confinement mais le dépistage massif et le traçage de la population dépistée, en repérant les cercles de proximité où la personne a pu contaminer ses proches. Le contrôle sanitaire ne porte que sur cette population à risque avec une géolocalisation, une traçabilité, une visibilité de tous ses déplacements, via une plateforme numérique. Cela a représenté un travail très long car il y a 51 millions d’habitants en Corée du Sud. La population vit dans la sécurité, l’activité économique globale continue. Le suivi des personnes confinées est extrêmement pointu et offre en même temps une visibilité à l’ensemble de la population. Quand on va travailler, on sait qui est contaminé, qui ne l’est pas, à proximité. On a donc un modèle alternatif de gestion de l’épidémie, opposé au confinement mais au prix d’une atteinte grave aux libertés individuelles pour une durée indéterminée.

    La lecture de Michel Foucault vous inspire également une réflexion particulière.

    Je suis en train de relire les Anormaux, un cours au Collège de France de 1975. Dans sa première leçon, il oppose deux grands modèles de leçon à l’épidémie : celui de la lèpre, dès le Moyen Âge, où l’on exclut les personnes infectées aux marches de la cité, et celui de la peste, à la fin du Moyen Âge, qui est à l’inverse un modèle d’inclusion. On n’exclut pas les malades des villes, on les garde avec nous, afin d’accumuler un savoir biomédical sur cette population ciblée afin de lutter contre l’épidémie. Cette fresque de Foucault est lumineuse pour expliquer dans quelle mesure nous sommes aujourd’hui dans le modèle de la peste, un modèle presque mondialisé. "La peste, écrit Foucault, c’est le moment où le quadrillage d’une population se fait jusqu’à son point extrême. Où rien des communications dangereuses, des communautés confuses, des contacts interdits, ne peut se produire. Le moment de la peste est celui du quadrillage exhaustif d’une population par un pouvoir politique dont les ramifications atteignent sans arrêt le grain des individus eux-mêmes, leur temps, leur habitat, leur localisation, leur corps. La peste porte aussi le rêve politique d’un pouvoir exhaustif, d’un pouvoir sans obstacle, d’un pouvoir entièrement transparent à son objet, d’un pouvoir qui s’exerce à plein."

    Cette citation explique ce que Foucault appelle la biopolitique. Actuellement, nous assistons à une médicalisation du pouvoir politique et judiciaire, y compris pour la politique pénale avec des savoirs médicaux, statistiques, juridiques, des mesures qui sont prises au nom d’une logique prophylactique afin d’éliminer le danger. Et ce que craint Foucault, c’est que cette biopolitique, cette gestion massive d’une population, au nom de sa santé, crée un pouvoir exorbitant des politiques où le savoir scientifique et le pouvoir politique s’additionnent. Au nom du bien public, bien sûr, mais c’est un pouvoir énorme qui se crée, un pouvoir disciplinaire qui s’étend à l’ensemble de la population.

    La lecture de Foucault, en cette période de pandémie, nous invite à nous interroger, à rester vigilants du point de vue des libertés car ce pouvoir démesuré accordé aux politiques et aux scientifiques sur notre vie quotidienne peut susciter des inquiétudes, même si sur le moment il est nécessaire. Tenons compte des avertissements de Michel Foucault et de son analyse. Il faut absolument que cet état d’urgence sanitaire soit limité dans le temps, contrôlé par le Parlement et le juge et qu’au lieu d’une seule liberté fondamentale, l’atteinte à la vie, l’ensemble des libertés soit considéré comme devant être protégé, que l’on recherche davantage l’adhésion de la population que sa soumission passive. Dans ce contexte d’atteinte massive aux libertés, au nom de l’état de nécessité sanitaire, il faut que le débat démocratique reste vivant.

    https://www.franceculture.fr/droit-justice/denis-salas-la-justice-se-trouve-confrontee-a-un-phenomene-totalement-
    #coronavirus #état_d'urgence #urgence #répression #dissuasion #docilité #criminalité #pandémie #histoire #comparutions_immédiates #marché_noir #tribunaux #prisons #détention #maisons_d’arrêt #détention_provisoire #confinement_total #atteinte_à_la_vie #état_d’exception_permanent #état_d’exception #Agamben #Giorgio_Agamben #principe_de_précaution #menaces #exception #proportionnalité #Corée_du_Sud #traçage #dépistage_massif #cercles_de_proximité #géolocalisation #contrôle_sanitaire #Michel_Foucault #Foucault #lèpre #peste #quadrillage #biopolitique #médicalisation #santé #savoir_scientifique #pouvoir_politique #bien_public #pouvoir_disciplinaire #débat_démocratique

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    Citation pour @etraces :

    Je voudrais citer l’exemple de la Corée du Sud qui ne pratique pas le confinement mais le dépistage massif et le traçage de la population dépistée, en repérant les cercles de proximité où la personne a pu contaminer ses proches. Le contrôle sanitaire ne porte que sur cette population à risque avec une géolocalisation, une traçabilité, une visibilité de tous ses déplacements, via une plateforme numérique. Cela a représenté un travail très long car il y a 51 millions d’habitants en Corée du Sud. La population vit dans la sécurité, l’activité économique globale continue. Le suivi des personnes confinées est extrêmement pointu et offre en même temps une visibilité à l’ensemble de la population. Quand on va travailler, on sait qui est contaminé, qui ne l’est pas, à proximité. On a donc un modèle alternatif de gestion de l’épidémie, opposé au confinement mais au prix d’une atteinte grave aux libertés individuelles pour une durée indéterminée.

    • Dans le miroir obscur de la pandémie. L’état d’exception de la pandémie semble avoir accompli, au moins en partie, le rêve du capitalisme

      Je parlais avec un ami qui habite à Bergame, ville au Nord de l’Italie où j’ai vécu et étudié et qui est aujourd’hui l’une des plus affectées par l’épidémie du Coronavirus. Celui-là m’a décrit la situation comme « un épisode infini de Black Mirror ». Effectivement, il est difficile d’écarter la sensation que nous vivons une dystopie, comme celles qui sont représentées dans tant de séries du genre. Ce n’est pas un hasard si Black Mirror, peut-être la plus célèbre parmi ces séries, comporte le mot « miroir » dans son titre. Ses épisodes ne représentent pas un monde lointain – une époque distante, des galaxies éloignées, des univers parallèles – mais un futur proche de datation incertaine. À la fois étranges et familières, ses intrigues nous laissent imaginer à quoi mènerait le renforcement de tendances déjà présentes dans notre quotidien. Ce que nous vivons en ce moment peut être appréhendé de la même manière, la modification de nos habitudes semblant annoncer un futur déjà là. Que peut-on comprendre du monde où nous vivons à partir de cet « épisode infini » ? Les moments exceptionnels ou de crise peuvent aider à porter un regard critique sur ce que chacun considère comme « normal ». J’ai proposé ailleurs qu’on se regarde dans le « miroir de la terreur » pour mieux comprendre la société du capitalisme tardif qui avait engendré les formes nouvelles de terrorisme[1]. De façon analogue, je crois pertinent de réfléchir aux temps présents à partir de l’image en train de se former sur le miroir obscur de la pandémie.

      La situation nous invite à penser sur plusieurs plans : l’organisation politique, la reproduction économique, le rapport à la nature ou les usages de la science. Je veux problématiser ici seulement l’idée de « distanciation sociale », rapidement acceptée en tant que norme autour du globe, entraînant la progressive interdiction des rencontres et la normalisation d’une vie quotidienne menée en confinement. La situation pandémique repose sur une contradiction qu’il faut souligner. La rapide expansion de la maladie résulte des flux globaux qui ont unifié les populations à l’échelle planétaire. De la pandémie naît le paradoxe d’une population globale unifiée en un statut égal de confinement. Il y a, en somme, un isolement concret des individus dans un monde entièrement connecté. Ce paradoxe n’est pas un paradoxe exclusif de la pandémie, mais un paradoxe que la pandémie a mené à l’extrême, le rendant par là visible. En réalité, la dialectique entre séparation et unification (de ce qui est séparé) est à la base du développement du capitalisme occidental ayant unifié le globe.

      Guy Debord avait déjà remarqué cette contradiction structurante lorsqu’il a essayé de comprendre la phase « spectaculaire » du capitalisme, qui s’annonçait au siècle dernier. Ce qu’il a appelé la « Société du Spectacle » était une forme sociale basée sur le principe de la séparation. Ce qui a été souvent décrit comme une société de communication des masses pouvait être compris à l’inverse comme une société où la faculté de communiquer était massivement perdue. La communication au sens fort était l’apanage de la vie en communauté, un langage commun engendré par une existence en commun. Ce qui arrivait aux sociétés du capitalisme avancé était précisément le contraire. L’expansion dans l’espace – grandes villes, banlieues écartées, circulation économique globale – et la rationalisation du travail, à partir de l’hyperspécialisation des tâches individuelles, ont signifié l’éloignement concret entre les personnes et la perte de l’entendement commun, facteur amplifié par le monopole de l’Etat sur l’organisation de la vie collective. La disparition progressive de la communauté et de ses formes de communication était la condition préalable au surgissement des médias de masse – lesquels étaient le contraire des moyens de communication, puisqu’ils étaient fondés sur l’isolement réel croissant. Les millions de spectateurs prostrés devant des appareils télé, en consommant les mêmes images sans pouvoir s’en parler, restaient une figuration assez claire du fait que le spectacle, comme l’a écrit Debord, « réunit le séparé, mais il le réunit en tant que séparé » (§29). Certains croient que cette critique serait devenue désuète grâce à l’avènement de l’internet et des technologies qui en découlent. Au lieu de spectateurs prostrés devant les appareils télé d’hier, on aurait aujourd’hui des spectateurs « actifs », qui s’échangent des messages, produisent et diffusent leurs propres contenus. Mais la vérité est que rien dans le dernier demi-siècle n’a mis en question la séparation fondamentale sous-jacente au développement même des technologies de communication. La scène très habituelle d’amis autour d’une table de restaurant, qui au lieu de se parler regardent les écrans de ses propres portables, devrait suffire pour démontrer cette vérité. De nos jours, le séparé est réuni comme séparé là même où il occupe le même espace physique.

      Ce qui nous a été dérobé en ce moment de pandémie a été la possibilité de cohabiter l’espace physique. Dans les conditions présentes, l’interdiction des rencontres et l’obligation du confinement semblent plus aisément acceptables pour la population mondiale que ne l’auraient été l’interdiction ou une panne de l’internet ou des réseaux sociaux. Ironiquement, la « distanciation sociale » est maintenant revendiquée pour le sauvetage d’une société qui a toujours été fondée sur la distanciation. Le seul endroit de rencontre existant dans une société productrice de marchandise est, en vérité, le marché – c’est là que les marchandises entraînent par la main ses producteurs et consommateurs et c’est pour son compte que les hommes se rencontrent. C’est l’absence de ces rencontres, maintenant interdites, qui étonne tout le monde – la fermeture des espaces de travail et de consommation. Mais le capitalisme, qui était un rapport social médiatisé par des choses, s’est dédoublé dans un rapport social médiatisé par des images. Et il est désormais possible d’être dans un lieu sans y être. Il est possible de travailler (jusqu’à un certain degré) et consommer (sans limite) sans qu’on ait besoin de sortir de chez soi. Tout peut être à la portée de la main (ou plutôt du doigt qui touche l’écran), on peut tout avoir sans sortir de chez nous – la promesse du bonheur offert par le marché et réitéré par chaque publicité n’était-elle déjà la promesse d’une vie en confinement ?

      L’état d’exception de la pandémie semble alors avoir réalisé, au moins en partie, le rêve du capitalisme. Dans le cas où l’épisode dystopique que nous vivons en ce moment se révèle un « épisode infini », il serait aisé d’imaginer une population totalement habituée aux rapports virtuels, au confinement nourri par Netflix et les services de livraison. Les voyages seraient interdits, restreints aux flux des marchandises, fruit d’un secteur productif majoritairement automatisé. Le spectacle, qui depuis longtemps s’efforçait de détruire la rue, d’abolir la rencontre et de faire disparaître tous les espaces de dialogue – pour anéantir les alternatives à la pseudo-communication spectaculaire – aurait finalement atteint son but. L’espace réel, délaissé par les êtres humains confinés et obligés de s’enfuir dans la virtualité, n’appartiendrait plus qu’aux marchandises. La circulation humaine, « sous-produit de la circulation des marchandises », serait finalement devenue superflue, et le monde en entier livré aux « marchandises et leurs passions » (Debord, §168 et §66).

      Ceci n’est qu’un exercice d’imagination – un scénario improbable pour l’instant. Il est aisé d’anticiper pourtant que dans l’avenir nous assisterons à une augmentation du contrôle des flux globaux et de la circulation de personnes sous des prétextes sanitaires, avec une progressive normalisation des procédés d’exception actuels (de façon analogue à ce que nous avons connu pour le terrorisme après le 11 septembre 2001). De toute façon, faire des pronostics dans un contexte tellement incertain est toujours hasardeux. Mais le moment demande de la réflexion et penser à ce qu’on connaît est ce qu’on peut faire de mieux. Ce que nous ressentons comme le moins problématique en ce moment est sans doute ce qui exige précisément d’être problématisé. Reste à espérer que la distanciation sociale se convertisse en distanciation ou « effet de distanciation » (Verfremdungseffekt) dans le sens attribué par Brecht – celui de rupture avec la représentation autonomisée de la société du spectacle et ses illusions (dont la plus grande de toutes : celle de l’économie capitaliste, reproduction insensée et incessante de valeur abstraite en dépit de la vie). Une distanciation par rapport à cette forme de société : une occasion nécessaire pour repenser de manière critique les séparations qui la fondent, et les limites imposées par le capitalisme à la vie quotidienne.

      Mars 2020.

      #Gabriel_Zacarias est MCF à l’Université de Campinas au Brésil.

      http://www.palim-psao.fr/2020/04/dans-le-miroir-obscur-de-la-pandemie.l-etat-d-exception-de-la-pandemie-se

  • Malaysia’s East Coast Rail Link a double-edged sword for environment, wildlife
    https://news.mongabay.com/2017/08/malaysias-east-coast-rail-link-a-double-edged-sword-for-environment-w

    The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) is being touted as an economic “game changer” for the country. The 600-kilometer electrified line will connect Kuala Lumpur with Kelantan through the rural states of Pahang and Terengganu, cutting traveling time to as little as four hours and easing pressure on the road network by getting more people and cargo onto trains. There are also plans to extend the line west to Port Klang, Malaysia’s busiest port

    The government says the 55-billion-ringgit ($12.8 billion) project — which will be launched officially this Wednesday and is expected to be ready for use in 2024 — will boost trade and tourism and close the development gap between the country’s west and east coasts. Some seven passenger trains each day are expected to leave Kuala Lumpur to make the journey east, with cargo trains projected to carry 37 million tonnes a year of containers, iron ore, coal and other commodities by 2030.

    The project will also traverse major river systems and cut through 357 hectares of protected forest where elephants, Malayan tapir and tigers roam. It will increase pressure on the Central Forest Spine (CFS), a conservation initiative designed to connect the country’s eight major forest complexes and ensure the habitat of some the country’s most iconic species is protected.

    “The railway will affect so much of our ecosystem,” said Shariffa Sabrina Syed Akil, president of PEKA, a Malaysian NGO that has held a number of meetings with the railway developer. “Malaysia should have a forest spine, but now it’s all broken. This is where our wildlife runs into problems, trying to cross these areas. The CFS is just lip-service.”

    China, which has been investing in transport infrastructure around the world as part of its “One Belt, One Road” campaign is heavily involved in the ECRL, triggering concern among opposition politicians that the project will benefit China more than it will Malaysia.

    #train #Malaisie #Belt_Road #infrastructures

  • #Russie : #Arctique, la nouvelle frontière

    La fonte de la #banquise et le dégel des terres offrent des perspectives de navigation permanente sur l’océan Arctique, dernière grande réserve mondiale d’hydrocarbures. La région attise les convoitises territoriales des grandes compagnies pétrolières et des Etats riverains, - le Groenland, les Etats-Unis, la Norvège - quitte à se disputer le tracé des frontières…

    La Russie montre sa toute puissance militaire pour exploiter un sous-sol riche en hydrocarbures et minerais rares. Construction de ports maritimes en eau profonde, développement d’énormes complexes destinés à l’exploitation et au transport du gaz naturel et de pétrole. Éternels oubliés des enjeux environnementaux et géostratégiques, les peuples indigènes voient leurs conditions de vie totalement bouleversées par cette conquête de l’Arctique. Voyage entre un ancien monde préservé et un nouveau monde industriel en train d’émerger.

    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/086954-000-A/russie-arctique-la-nouvelle-frontiere
    #film
    #film_documentaire #géographie_politique

    #transport_maritime #Russie #pétrole #énergie #Sibérie #gaz #minerai #extractivisme #cobalt #nickel #passage_du_Nord-Est #changement_climatique #climat #Baie_d'Huston #hydrocarbures #Yamal #Total #Novatec #Chine #ports #Christophe_de_Margerie #infrastructures #aéroports #investissements #conquête_territoriale #conquête_économique #peuples_autochtones #Nénètses #Nenets #terre #sédentarisation #nomadisme #armée #présence_militaire #force_spéciale_arctique #marine_militaire #militarisation_de_l'arctique #bases_navales #Grand_Nord #économie_polaire #USA #Etats-Unis #Alaska #ressources #Canada #Norvège #OTAN #tourisme #Groenland #croisières #tourisme_de_masse #tourisme

    ping @reka @simplicissimus

  • La #Bulgarie face à la pénurie de professionnels de #santé | Euronews
    https://fr.euronews.com/2020/01/24/la-bulgarie-face-a-la-penurie-de-professionnels-de-sante

    Devant les Urgences du principal #hôpital de la capitale bulgare, Sofia, des ambulances toutes neuves sont prêtes à partir. L’#Union_Européenne a apporté un soutien massif à la Bulgarie pour améliorer ses #infrastructures médicales. Mais la véritable urgence ici, c’est la #main_d'oeuvre, pas les machines.

    [..,]

    Les médecins et les infirmières bulgares quittent massivement le pays à la recherche d’un meilleur #salaire en #Europe occidentale.

  • Chine. Le déploiement des projets d’infrastructures de l’ « Initiative Belt and Road » (BRI)

    https://www.diploweb.com/Chine-Le-deploiement-des-projets-d-infrastructures-de-l-Initiative-Belt-an

    Par Barthélémy COURMONT, Eric MOTTET, Frédéric LASSERRE , le 12 janvier 2020

    Grand projet géoéconomique, voire géopolitique, la BRI n’est cependant pas un grand projet conçu par la seule Chine. Celle-ci s’est inspirée de projets antérieurs, puis a intégré de nombreux projets antérieurs de manière opportuniste et habile. Dans la coordination globale de ces projets, le gouvernement central et la NDRC disposent certes d’un poids considérable, mais cela ne veut pas dire que la mise en œuvre de tous les projets labellisés BRI réponde à une stratégie savamment conçue et planifiée. Relèvent-ils d’une véritable vision régionale ou restent-ils fragmentés ? Voici des réponses très documentées, avec une carte. Les co-auteurs de l’article viennent de publier une référence : Frédéric Lasserre, Éric Mottet, Barthélémy Courmont, (sous la direction de) « Les nouvelles routes de la soie. Géopolitique d’un grand projet chinois » collection Asies contemporaines, Presses de l’Université de Québec, 2019.

    #Chine #route_de_la_soie #transport #infrastructures

  • Cette forêt que Tesla doit abattre pour construire la Gigafactory 4

    https://www.automobile-propre.com/cette-foret-que-tesla-doit-abattre-pour-construire-la-gigafactory

    @klaus es-tu au courant ?

    Les premières tronçonneuses ont rugi dans la forêt où la Gigafactory 4 doit s’élever. Tesla doit abattre plusieurs milliers d’arbres sur cette parcelle de 300 hectares près de Berlin. Les travaux pourraient être retardés par la présence de chauves-souris et d’oiseaux nicheurs protégés.

    Pour ériger sa Gigafactory 4 européenne près de Berlin, le constructeur doit raser 300 hectares de forêt. Les premiers arbres ont été abattus il y a quelques jours. Mais l’opération, délicate tant sur la communication que sur le terrain, soulève quelques questions. Si la parcelle concernée provient d’anciennes exploitations de sylviculture et n’est pas composée de forêt « primaire », elle abrite plusieurs espèces protégées d’animaux. La présence de chauves-souris en voie de disparition pourrait notamment retarder l’avancée des travaux.


    #berlin #tesla #automobile #transport #mobilité #infrastructure

  • #Ferroviaire. Retards, accidents : le bilan noir du futur PDG de #SNCF #Réseau | L’Humanité
    https://www.humanite.fr/ferroviaire-retards-accidents-le-bilan-noir-du-futur-pdg-de-sncf-reseau-682
    #train

    Luc Lallemand (53 ans) est depuis 2005 le patron d’Infrabel, gestionnaire de l’infrastructure ferroviaire belge. Alors qu’il est proposé pour devenir PDG de #SNCF_Réseau, sa nomination doit être confirmée par un conseil d’administration ce mardi 7 janvier.

    Bien que réputé proche du Parti socialiste (il a conseillé divers ministres socialistes), ce technocrate s’est parfaitement adapté au gouvernement de droite dure en place depuis 2014 en Belgique. Et pour cause : il prépare, avec zèle, l’ouverture à la #concurrence pour le transport de passagers, prônée par les partis de droite. C’est d’ailleurs en préparation de cette #libéralisation que les précédents gouvernements avaient décidé de la scission, totale en Belgique, entre le réseau (Infrabel) et les opérateurs tels que la SNCB pour les voyageurs ou les compagnies privées pour les marchandises.

    [...]

    Hasard du calendrier, le jour de l’annonce de son départ, le quotidien la Libre Belgique publiait une enquête sur le recours à la #sous-traitance sur le rail belge, une spécialité d’#Infrabel : « il y a tellement d’entreprises qui utilisent des sous-traitants, lesquelles recourent elles-mêmes à des sous-traitants, qu’on ne sait parfois plus qui travaille sur le rail », dénonçait ainsi un cheminot sous couvert d’anonymat. Conséquences : #accidents_du_travail, mais aussi travail bâclé et #retards en nombre.

  • How much electricity does a country use? Just ask cell-phone users. - MIT Technology Review
    https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613987/how-much-electricity-does-a-country-use-just-ask-cell-phone-users

    Socioeconomic data is generally expensive and difficult to gather. The most important data generally comes from censuses and reveals the size of the population, its geographical distribution, its age and gender structure, and a host of other details.

    But a census requires significant, costly planning, carefully analysis, and a relatively stable society. That makes such studies hard to do in the developing world, where countries are often by afflicted by poverty, war, disease, and famine.

    So economists, sociologists, and policy experts would dearly love a cheaper and faster way to gather data. And in recent years, just such a method has emerged thanks to mobile phones.

    Mobile phones have spread widely in the developing world, more quickly than other services such as electrification. In Senegal, for example, only 24% of households are electrified, and yet 75% have mobile phones, with people presumably charging them from car engines, from neighbors, or wherever they can.

    Today, we get a partial answer thanks to the work of Hadrien Salat and colleagues at the Future Cities Laboratory in Singapore. These guys have analyzed mobile-phone data from Senegal and say it has the potential to help infrastructure planning for the entire country.

    It can also be used to estimate factors such as electricity usage even when it includes just a fraction of total inhabitants. “Our aim is to use the resulting data to reduce the logistic costs of gathering information for infrastructure planning in developing countries,” they say.

    The results offer some interesting surprises. For example, they find that mobile-phone activity is not strongly correlated with the population density found in the census. However, mobile-phone activity is strongly correlated with electricity consumption. Indeed, it is a significantly better indicator than population density.

    At first sight that is something of a puzzle. But Salat and co explain the result by suggesting that electricity consumption is the result of a range of interlinked activities that are better correlated with mobile-phone usage than with the density of people alone.

    #Géolocalisation #Recensement #Développement #Urban_planning #Infrastructure

    • Résumé de l’article source sur arxiv (le texte est accessible en pdf) :
      [1907.04812] Mobile phone data’s potential for informing infrastructure planning in developing countries
      https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04812v2

      High quality census data are not always available in developing countries. Instead, mobile phone data are becoming a trending proxy to evaluate population density, activity and social characteristics. They offer additional advantages for infrastructure planning such as being updated in real-time, including mobility information and recording visitors’ activity. We combine various data sets from Senegal to evaluate mobile phone data’s potential to replace insufficient census data for infrastructure planning in developing countries. As an applied case, we test their ability at predicting domestic electricity consumption. We show that, contrary to common belief, average mobile phone activity does not correlate well with population density. However, it can provide better electricity consumption estimates than basic census data. More importantly, we use curve and network clustering techniques to enhance the accuracy of the predictions, to recover good population mapping potential and to reduce the collection of required data to substantially smaller samples.


      Figure 2 Curve profiles and network structure. (a) Number of calls per hour aggregated at national level for each day of the year. (b) Yearly average of the number of texts per hour of the day sent from each tower. (c) Network structure limited to edges corresponding to at least 2000 text messages sent in January.

  • La Domination et les arts de la résistance

    Franz Himmelbauer

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/La-Domination-et-les-arts-de-la-resistance

    James C. Scott
    La Domination et les arts de la résistance. Fragments du discours subalterne

    C’est assurément un « maître livre », comme l’écrit Ludivine Bantigny dans sa préface. Pourquoi ? Parce qu’il apporte un nouvel éclairage sur les rapports de domination. À propos de ces derniers, nous nous satisfaisons trop souvent d’une alternative binaire quelque peu simpliste : soit il y a de la domination « pure et dure », et une soumission tout aussi pure — et molle — des dominé·e·s (on pense à l’esclavage ou à d’autres situations de tyrannie, dont le patriarcat, par exemple), soit il y a aussi domination, mais avec le « consentement », en quelque sorte, des dominé·e·s — et c’est le motif de la « servitude volontaire ». Vous aurez déjà compris en lisant ces premières lignes que James C. Scott n’accepte ni l’un ni l’autre terme de l’alternative (une de ces alternatives « infernales » que dénonce la philosophe Isabelle Stengers comme l’un des sortilèges du capitalisme).

    Scott nous dit que ces rapports de domination sont des rapports dynamiques, qu’ils ne sont jamais figés. Entre dominants et dominés passe une ligne de front sans cesse mouvante et dont on peut sinon mesurer, du moins appréhender les mouvements à travers ce qu’il nomme « texte caché » et « texte public ». (...)

    #James_Scott #domination #résistance #discours_subalterne #masses #saturnales #stratagèmes #infrapolitique #zapatistes #ronds-points

  • #Avis sur la légalité internationale des transferts d’armes vers l’#Arabie_saoudite, les #Émirats_arabes_unis et les membres de la coalition militairement impliqués au #Yémen

    Le présent avis traite de la #légalité, au regard du #droit_international, des transferts d’armes vers l’Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et les membres de la Coalition militairement impliqués au Yémen. L’avis n’évalue pas la légalité de tels transferts à la lumière du droit interne de chaque État fournisseur, pas plus qu’il n’examine en détail les obligations des groupes armés non étatiques ou des entreprises dans leurs rôles de fournisseurs et d’utilisateurs d’armes.

    L’accent est mis ici sur les #obligations_juridiques_internationales des parties au #conflit au Yémen et des États tiers qui leur fournissent leurs armes. Seront examinées ci-après les principales #normes_internationales applicables aux décisions de #transfert_d’armes qui visent à assurer la #protection_de_la_population_civile au Yémen et de l’#infrastructure_civile indispensable à sa survie.

    Les États qui transfèrent des armes à d’autres pays sont soumis aux normes du droit de la responsabilité internationale de l’État. Ils ont l’obligation de retenir ces transferts d’armes lorsqu’il est raisonnablement prévisible que les destinataires les utiliseront pour commettre des violations graves du droit international ou de les détourneront vers d’autres utilisateurs. Tel qu’expliqué ci-après, les États qui fournissent des armes aux parties au conflit au Yémen portent une énorme #responsabilité en regard du grand nombre de personnes civiles qui ont subi de graves blessures et des pertes, y compris à leur domicile, entraînant des déplacements internes et externes massifs de population. Les infrastructures civiles essentielles à la survie de la population ont été détruites ou gravement endommagées lors d’attaques armées, et l’accès à l’aide humanitaire reste entravé par les forces armées et les milices. Selon les Nations Unies, des millions de personnes souffrent de ce qui a été qualifié de la “pire crise humanitaire du monde”.


    https://ipisresearch.be/publication/avis-sur-la-legalite-internationale-des-transferts-darmes-vers-larabie-
    #armes #armement #commerce_d'armes #Emirats_arabes_unis #protection_civile #guerre

    ping @reka

  • « L’#architecture_du_mépris a des effets sur nous tous »
    https://usbeketrica.com/article/l-architecture-du-mepris-a-des-effets-sur-nous-tous

    Souvent, on analyse la ville en des termes macroscopiques : les inégalités économiques, la répartition par CSP, ou encore l’injustice spatiale et juridique. Cela donne un type de vision qui n’est pas inexact, mais on passe à côté d’un mode d’action négatif des villes. Ces dernières sont obsédées par leur image, qui est leur outil de valorisation le plus important. Aussi, puisqu’elles ne peuvent ouvertement ségréger, elles signifient spatialement le mépris par une architecture excluante. Cela peut passer par du mobilier urbain, type banc à SDF, soit par de larges projets privatisés comme EuropaCity (dont l’abandon a été acté en novembre dernier par le gouvernement, ndlr) ou le réaménagement de la Gare du Nord, où on signifie aux individus que ce qui nous intéresse chez eux, c’est leur part de consommateur. Dès lors qu’ils ne peuvent l’être car ils sont insolvables, ils comprennent de facto qu’ils ne sont pas les bienvenus.

    #mobilier_urbain #infrastructures_urbaines #dfs #espace_public #aménagement_urbain #guerre_aux_pauvres #urban_matter

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox #High-Altitude_Pseudo-Satellites (#HAPS)

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

    • Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

      We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

      From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

      Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

      The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

      The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

      In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

      “In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

      Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

      “They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

      “For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

      Air Surveillance

      Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

      Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

      Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

      German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

      “The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

      “The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

      Sensors and cameras

      EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

      Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

      Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

      Surveillance centres

      In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

      https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

      At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

      Artificial intelligence

      The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

      The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

      https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

  • Google Fiber in Kansas City : there is no such thing as free infrastructure, by Tooran Alizadeh, Edward Helderop, Tony Grubesic
    https://visionscarto.net/google-fiber-kansas-city

    The pre-registration system adopted by Google proved to be a recipe for disaster; and drew strong criticism. The process manifested a sharp visualization of socio-demographic disparities and the digital divide in Kansas City: affluent white neighbourhoods easily met pre-registration targets, but lower-income, predominantly black and Hispanic neighbourhoods did not. In other words, the pre-registration process displayed how naive Google was about the implications of the deep socio-economic inequalities and pre-existing digital divide in Kansas City.

    Nous republions cet article de recherche sur le déploiement de la "fibre google" à Kansas City, extrait du livre “How to run a city like Amazon” https://meatspacepress.com

    L’affaire de la fibre, nous disent les chercheur·es, a failli tourner à la catastrophe : Kansas City est une ville fortement ségréguée et, si les quartiers les plus riches et blancs n’avaient aucune difficulté à remplir les critères d’éligibilité, les quartiers pauvres, noirs et hispaniques se retrouvaient de fait défavorisés par le processus. Après une forte mobilisation civique, Google a revu sa copie et est parvenue à limiter cette #discrimination.

    Il n’en reste pas moins que la ville a dû assumer énormément de coûts (de personnel, d’organisation), pour soutenir cette expérience grandeur nature d’#infrastructure #internet publique appartenant au privé. À contraster si l’on veut avec l’expérience de la r00thouse à La Paz https://visionscarto.net/hackers-de-bolivie

  • Morts suspectes de centaines de bovins : de nouveaux éléments désignent les lignes électriques
    https://www.franceculture.fr/environnement/morts-suspectes-de-centaines-de-bovins-de-nouveaux-elements-designent-

    Enquête | Dans plusieurs régions de France, les maladies et les morts suspectes de vaches laitières se sont multipliées. Les éleveurs incriminent les réseaux électriques, mais aucun lien de causalité n’est scientifiquement établi. Plusieurs expériences d’interruption du courant semblent leur donner raison.

    #elevage #bovins #éoliennes #environnement

  • Dans la tuyauterie d’internet
    https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/grand-reportage/dans-la-tuyauterie-dinternet


    Si internet était un pays, il serait le troisième plus gros consommateur d’énergie de la planète, d’après Greenpeace, derrière les États-Unis et la Chine. Car pour fonctionner, la toile a besoin d’infrastructures colossales : câbles sous-marins, data centers et serveurs par millions.

    Très bonne émission de France Culture sur l’infrastructure d’internet. Ici en plus des images très parlantes (ce qui pour une radio est valab’).

    #Internet #Infrastructure

  • Mapping All of Earth’s Roads and Buildings from Space
    https://www.planet.com/pulse/mapping-all-of-earths-roads-and-buildings-from-space

    Above is a map of all the roads and buildings on Earth. To our knowledge, it is the most complete and up to date map of these features ever created. It reveals details not available in popular mapping tools, in both industrialized cities and rural settlements. Built from a diversely sampled training set, the model produces quality results across a wide variety of terrains, densities, and land cover types. // Credit: Leanne Abraham, Planet

  • Gli investimenti di #Google nei cavi #Internet sottomarini

    Il colosso di #Mountain_View è attivo in questo settore dal 2008, quando iniziò la costruzione del cavo #Unity tra Usa e Giappone entrato in servizio nel 2010. Tra il 2019 e il 2021 diverranno attivi altre nove infrastrutture, portando a 14 il totale dei cavi controllati da Google.

    Come si vede dalla mappa, le due principali rotte dei dati solcano il Pacifico e il Nord Atlantico. Con il Nordamerica al centro, i cavi allacciano le coste orientali dell’Asia e l’Europa, le due estremità più decisive per il controllo dell’Eurasia, perno della grande strategia degli Stati Uniti.

    I progetti di Google sono diventati d’improvvisa attualità strategica quando si è diffusa la notizia che il dipartimento di Giustizia Usa intende bloccare un progetto ormai quasi completato, il Pacific Light Cable Network (Plcn), indicato nella carta con il numero 3. Lunga circa 8 mila chilometri e costata quasi 300 milioni di dollari, l’infrastruttura collega Los Angeles e Hong Kong ed è finanziata, oltre che da Google, da Facebook e da Dr. Peng, il quarto operatore nelle telecomunicazioni di Cina.

    http://www.limesonline.com/carta-cavi-sottomarini-internet-google-cina-pacific-light-cable-network-hong-kong/114061
    #câbles_sous-marins #cartographie #visualisation #infrastructure
    ping @fil

  • Au moins 25 000 ponts en France sont « en mauvais état structurel »
    https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2019/06/27/au-moins-25-000-ponts-en-france-presentent-des-problemes-de-securite_5482062


    Le pont reliant La Rochelle à l’île de Ré, en mai 2018.
    XAVIER LEOTY / AFP

    Selon un rapport sénatorial, la dégradation de nombre d’ouvrages est le fruit d’un « sous-investissement chronique », posant « des problèmes de sécurité et de disponibilité pour les usagers ».

    Deux semaines avant l’effondrement meurtrier du viaduc Morandi, à Gênes, le maire de la petite commune de Beaumontel, dans l’Eure, a constaté au matin du 1er août 2018 qu’un des piliers du pont sur la Risle, entre la mairie et l’église, s’était affaissé et ne soutenait plus rien. Pont fermé, 250 000 euros de travaux. Un mois après la catastrophe italienne, c’est sur l’imposant viaduc de l’île de Ré qu’un câble précontraint rompait en raison de la corrosion. Circulation restreinte, 2 millions d’euros de réparations. La France n’est pas à l’abri d’un accident tragique : au moins 25 000 ponts sont « en mauvais état structurel » et « posent des problèmes de sécurité et de disponibilité pour les usagers », selon un rapport sénatorial rendu public jeudi 27 juin, qui réclame un « plan Marshall » pour « éviter le drame ».

    Dans la foulée de l’écroulement du viaduc italien, le Sénat avait lancé une mission d’information sur l’état des ponts en France, dirigée par le président de la commission de l’aménagement du territoire et du développement durable, le centriste Hervé Maurey, et dotée des moyens d’une commission d’enquête. Le nombre de ponts en France est évalué entre 200 000 et 250 000 – une fourchette étonnamment large. C’est la première surprise du rapport : personne n’est capable de donner le nombre exact de ces ponts routiers, faute d’un recensement du patrimoine des collectivités locales. Une inconnue révélatrice « des lacunes de la politique de surveillance et d’entretien », estime la mission.

    L’Etat possède 24 000 ponts. La moitié, gérée par les sociétés concessionnaires d’autoroutes, est sans problème. Pour le reste, 7 % présentent des défauts de sécurité et 2 800 d’entre eux, construits après-guerre, arrivent en « fin de vie » et nécessitent une chirurgie lourde. Un audit externe, remis en juin 2018 au ministère des transports, estimait qu’un tiers des ponts de l’Etat avaient besoin de travaux, dont 7 % présentaient « un risque d’effondrement ». Le tableau est plus sombre encore du côté des collectivités territoriales, qui gèrent 90 % des ouvrages : entre 100 000 et 120 000 pour les départements, dont 8,5 % en mauvais état, et de 80 000 à 100 000 pour les communes, dont 18 % à 20 % présentent des défaillances.

    #paywall

  • Les profiteurs de la frontière – Juin 2019 – Corporate Watch

    La maire de Calais essaye de changer l’image de Calais, souhaitant en faire une « ville fleurie ». Mais comme des locaux ont confié à Corporate Watch le mois dernier, « #ville_barbelée » serait un label plus approprié. Du port ferry jusqu’au tunnel à Coquelles, la périphérie de la ville est un paysage cauchemardesque de #clôtures surmontées de #barbelés à lames rasoir, de #caméras et #détecteurs_de_mouvement, de #terrassements, #tranchées et #terrains_inondés, tous destinés à arrêter les « damné·e·s de la terre » entreprenant cette traversée du détroit de la Manche, si évidente et acquise pour un·e citoyen·ne européen·ne.

    Tout cela implique de l’#argent pour financer les compagnies de construction et de sécurité qui fournissent et édifient l’#infrastructure de la frontière. En 2016, Calais Research a commencé à lister et décrire les #entreprises impliquées dans le marché de la frontière. Voici une rapide mise à jour sur quelques points marquants apparus depuis.

    Le #Centre_Conjoint_d’Information_et_de_Coordination_franco-britannique à Coquelles

    Il y a deux points principaux de passage de la frontière à Calais : le #port, près du centre historique de la ville, et le tunnel sous la Manche, à quelques kilomètres de la ville, à #Coquelles. Près de l’entrée du tunnel se trouve un énorme centre commercial, la Cité Europe, fréquentée par des locaux comme par des Britanniques de passage renflouant leur stock d’alcool bon marché.

    Juste à côté se tient un complexe abritant l’infrastructure policière française anti-migrant : la base principale de la #PAF (Police aux Frontières) et des #CRS, un tribunal où sont entendus les migrants, et le #Centre_de_Rétention_Administrative (#CRA).

    En novembre 2018, un nouveau bâtiment est ajouté au complexe déjà existant : le #CCIC – Centre Conjoint d’Information et de Coordination franco-britannique.

    Selon l’Agence France Presse, le centre est financé par le gouvernement de Grande Bretagne, il est « notamment équipé de #drones », et sert de poste de commande pour les forces de police françaises et britanniques. Celles-ci incluent côté français la PAF, les #douanes et les #gendarmes, et pour l’outre-Manche la police aux frontières (UK border force), la #police du #Kent ainsi que le service national de lutte contre la criminalité (#National_Crime_Agency#NCA).

    Le jour où nous sommes passé·e·s jeter un œil, nous n’avons vu aucun drone décollant du toit. Sur le parking se trouvaient plus de voitures banalisées que de véhicules de police officiels, dont plusieurs immatriculées outre-Manche. Il y avait encore un affichage à l’extérieur du centre (cf. photo) nommant les entrepreneurs impliqués dans sa construction et son équipement. Il indique un coût de 1,844 million d’euros pour ces travaux.

    Les compagnies identifiées incluent : #Villesange_Masson (Architectes locaux) ; #Groupe_Qualiconsult (consultant·e·s pour les projets de construction) ; #Verdi ; #Cougnaud_construction (spécialisé en construction modulaire industrialisée) ; #Ramery_Batiment ; #Eiffage_énergie (grosse société d’ingénierie française) ; #Satelec (électricien·ne·s) ; #Resipelec (électricien·ne·s) ; #Pylones_du_Littoral ; #Majencia (mobilier de bureau) ; #Covage_DGL_Networks (installateur de fibre optique) ; #Econocom.

    Extension du centre de Rétention

    Juste en face du CCIS se trouve le CRA de Coquelles. Actuellement, il permet d’enfermer 79 hommes, mais l’État français veut augmenter le nombre de places. Fin mars 2019, il annonçait un projet d’extension de 480 mètres carrés. L’agence d’architectes #COAST supervise les travaux, et travaille avec #BD_engineering.

    Douanes et tranchées

    En dehors de Coquelles, on voit d’importants travaux de chaque côté de la voie rapide menant au tunnel. Ce sont de grands #bunkers, chacun avec plusieurs quais destinés à la fouille des camions. Ce ne sont pas des mesures prioritairement anti-migrants, il s’agit en fait de nouveaux parking poids-lourds et de postes de douane, construits à la hâte par #Eurotunnel, en prévision de nouveaux contrôles sur les marchandises après le Brexit.

    Cependant, ces projets participent à renforcer les mesures de sécurité exceptionnelles auxquelles on doit ce changement d’atmosphère autour de Calais. Les bunkers sont protégés par des #tranchées et de nouvelles clôtures – canaux et lacs artificiels creusés et remplis d’eau comme une autre mesure contre ces humains dont on ne veut pas. Ceci fait suite aux modèles de #déforestation et d’#inondation initiés par Eurotunnel en 2016.

    Contrôles aux frontières privatisés au parking poids-lourd #Polley

    Une petite industrie s’est développée grâce à la « crise migratoire » : le #parking_poids-lourd sécurisé. Le gouvernement britannique inflige une contravention aux entreprises de transport de marchandises si des personnes sont trouvées dans leurs véhicules sans les documents administratifs adéquats. Dans les faits, cela se traduit par l’#externalisation des contrôles frontaliers vers les camionneurs eux-même, soucieux de ne pas être surpris avec des passager·e·s clandestin·e·s. Et l’entreprise de transport va payer des emplacements sécurisés pour marquer un arrêt avant de traverser la Manche.

    À #Dunkerque, #DK_Secure_Truck_Park dispose de 250 emplacements entourés de clôtures et surveillés par « 40 #caméras_de_surveillance haute-définition ». À Calais, la plus grosse société est #Polley_Secured_Lorry_Park, dirigée par un homme d’affaire local, #Francois_Polley. Ce site de 10 hectares se targue d’être protégé par des grilles hautes de 2,40 mètres et d’être surveillé 24h/24 et 7j/7.

    Récemment, nous avons entendu parler d’une nouvelle niche dans ce business. Les cars de transport de passagers opérés par #Flixbus profitent également des services de sécurité de Polley. Les cars en route vers la Grande Bretagne passent par le parking Polley avant de se diriger vers le tunnel. Là, un des agents de sécurité privés du parking va procéder à une première fouille du véhicule, cherchant d’éventuel·le·s clandestin·e·s dans la soute à bagages. Ceci, en plus des deux contrôles qui seront effectués par les autorités françaises et britanniques une fois au tunnel.

    Flixbus et Polley fournissent peu d’information publique sur cette #fouille supplémentaire. Il y n’y en a qu’une vague référence sur le site de Flixbus, où elle est simplement mentionnée comme « un #contrôle_pré-Royaume-Uni ».

    Hôtel de police…

    Notre dernier arrêt sur notre tour des infrastructures de la frontière s’est trouvé en plein cœur de la ville de Calais. On avait entendu dire que l’ancienne pratique de constamment arrêter et harceler les personnes pouvant être des migrant·e·s dans le centre ville est progressivement devenue marginale. On se demandait donc pourquoi on continuait de voir les camionnettes de CRS patrouiller les rues principales entre la mairie et le théâtre.

    Nous avons réalisé que leur activité principale consistait à déposer et passer prendre de costauds hommes blancs en civil à la porte du #Brit_Hotel. Des locaux nous expliquent alors que ce bâtiment hôtelier a été inoccupé pendant des années, avant de rouvrir sous ce nouveau nom en 2016. Sa clientèle semble être composée presque exclusivement de CRS et de gendarmes – mais si vous rêvez de dormir à côté d’un CRS bien bâti, vous pouvez réserver une chambre pour environ 50 euros la nuit.

    Brit Hôtel est une chaîne hôtelière répandue dans tout la France.

    #business #migrations #frontières #Calais #France #profit #complexe_militaro-industriel #militarisation_des_frontières #privatisation #externalisation_des_frontières

    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Putains de camions - Les poids lourds en question | ARTE
    https://www.arte.tv/fr/videos/081593-000-A/putains-de-camions

    En Europe, 80 % des marchandises sont transportées par voie routière. Mais à quel prix ? Enquête sur la folie des #poids_lourds.

    Cela n’aura pas échappé aux automobilistes : les #autoroutes européennes sont encombrées par des files de poids lourds toujours plus interminables. Alors que près de 80 % des marchandises transitent par #voie_routière, le nombre de camions en circulation devrait augmenter de 40 % dans cinq ans. Pourquoi ce choix de la route au détriment du #rail ou du #transport_maritime, qui présentent pourtant de nombreux avantages, notamment écologiques ? Pour quelle raison les camions sont-ils aussi nombreux – un tiers d’entre eux, selon les estimations – à rouler à vide ? #Diesel bon marché, dumping sur les salaires des chauffeurs, explosion des commandes sur Internet, production et livraison à flux tendu : cette folie des poids lourds, qui résulte d’une série de décisions politiques, notamment un investissement massif dans les autoroutes, sert des intérêts économiques. Si les entreprises privées profitent de ce système, les citoyens en subissent les conséquences : embouteillages, pollution, risques sanitaires et usure précoce des infrastructures publiques. À l’échelle du continent, la #Suisse offre pourtant un modèle plus vertueux : le pays a su s’affranchir du #lobby_automobile pour miser sur le #transport_ferroviaire.

    #transport #transport_routier

    • Petite synthèse du reportage.
      1. Le #budget d’entretien des autoroutes et routes nationales allemandes est de 3,9 milliards. Ce coût s’explique en particulier par l’impact des poids lourds : 1 camion de 40 tonnes a un impact équivalent à celui de 60 000 véhicules légers.

      2. Le fonctionnement en #flux_tendu de l’ensemble du système #logistique transforme de facto le #réseau_routier en espace de #stockage grâce à un coût particulièrement intéressant ne prenant pas en compte les #externalités_négatives et reposant largement sur l’#exploitation des travailleurs de l’est de l’#union_européenne, que ce soit les chauffeurs ou les employés des #centres_logistiques. Le reportage cite notamment l’exemple d’Amazon — mais cela doit être valable pour l’ensemble des acteurs du #e-commerce
      qui installe ses centres en Pologne pour ses livraisons en Allemagne. Ce coût extrêmement faible se reflète également dans le fait que 36 % des camions roulant en Allemagne roulent à vide !

      3. Pour en revenir à l’exploitation, les patrons des sociétés de transport mettent une pression terrible sur leurs chauffeurs au détriment de la #sécurité_routière tout en profitant d’un nombre de contrôle très insuffisant et des sanctions trop légères (en #Allemagne) en cas d’irrespect de la législation européenne sur les temps de repos. Ainsi, il est estimé qu’un chauffeur routier pourra faire 100 000 kilomètres sans être contrôlé alors que 50 % de ces contrôles amènent à constater une infraction (cas allemand toujours) ! La faiblesse des sanctions amène d’ailleurs les transporteurs à prévoir leur coût lorsqu’ils ne fraudent pas directement en manipulant les instruments de contrôle.

      4. Bien entendu, le reportage aborde également la question du diesel (subventionné) et des émissions de #particules_fines avec leur impact sur la #santé : maladies cardio-vasculaires, décès prématurés.

      5. L’#électromobilité ne concernera le fret longue distance qu’à long terme, les constructeurs allemands ne s’y investissant pas pour la plupart. Il y a un début de développement de solutions pour le #fret_urbain. Pour le transport de passagers, le reportage cite l’exemple d’un #bus_électrique développé par l’entreprise Build your dreams, d’origine chinoise comme l’indique son nom, et exploité par #Flixbus pour sa liaison Paris – Amiens.

      6. En matière de lobbying, #Volkswagen entretient en particulier un groupe de pression de 40 personnes auprès des instances de l’Union.

      7. Alors qu’un train de marchandise de 740 mètres de long permet de remplacer 52 poids lourds, les #infrastructures_ferroviaires souffrent d’un manque d’investissement, de voies d’évitement trop réduites, d’une #électrification des lignes insuffisante, de gros problèmes de jonctions entre les différents réseaux nationaux.

      8. Le reportage se termine en citant le cas #suisse qui a développé une politique ambitieuse de #ferroutage. Le ferroviaire représente 37 % du fret, dont 70 % pour le transit, soit 2 fois plus qu’en Allemagne et 4 fois plus que la France. Cela s’explique notamment par la question des redevances versées pour l’usage des voies ferrées et routières qui permet de redonner sa chance au ferroviaire alors qu’il est estimé que le fret routier va augmenter en Allemagne de 40 % d’ici 2030 par rapport à 2010.

      J’en profite pour renvoyer vers ce message, de 2016, citant un article de Jean Gadrey signalant le documentaire de Gilles Balbastre, Transport de marchandises : changeons d’ère ! réalisé à l’initiative du comité d’entreprise de SCNF-fret : https://seenthis.net/messages/548855

    • merci @af_sobocinski pour ce résumé. J’ai arrêté à la publicité pour flixbus avec les interviews convenues des voyageurs émerveillé·es par les bus « non polluants », mais rien sur la pollution nucléaire, ce n’est pas sérieux.
      Déçue qu’il n’y est apparemment rien non plus sur les militants écologistes #anti-fret-routier, comme ceux certes des années 1990 de la Vallée du Somport.

      Il y a un passage sur les conducteurs de Pologne ou de Roumanie sous payés mais qui naviguent dans l’espace européen (surtout l’Allemagne) avec des camions qui font des trajets Allemagne=>Pologne=>Allemagne pour justifier ces aberrations socios-économiques-polluantes, Amazon en bonne position des pires entreprises implante ses plateformes dans les pays européens les plus pauvres.

      Et je renote ici le chiffre donné impressionnant : un poids-lourd représente le passage de 60.000 voitures . Donc, il faut inclure dans le coût global du #fret_routier la construction et l’entretien des routes, autoroutes et aires de stationnement tous saturé·es par les poids-lourds. En plus des cadeaux fiscaux, diesel moins cher, #subventions aux entreprises etc. #croissance #folie_humaine #inside_the_wall

      @aude_v j’appellerai pas ça du survivalisme mais du #déni_opportuniste
      #fin_du_monde #macronerie

    • Je n’ai pas encore pété de télé @touti mais il n’est pas trop tard pour que je m’y mette. Ce n’est pas les boîtes à conneries et les raisons qui manque. J’ai beaucoup cassé et dès l’adolescence, tout seul où en groupe. Puis on s’est calmé quand on a eu affaire aux flics. Plus tard avec un pote, on pointe à pôle-emploi (anpe à l’époque) depuis une antique cabine téléphonique. Tapez 1, tapez 2… tatati tatata, patins,couffins… au tour de mon compère, avant de finaliser par je ne sais quelle touche, il arrache le combiné et s’en sert telle une masse d’arme pour détruire la cabine. J’ai rien fait pour le retenir, je crois bien même que j’ai dû l’aider. J’ai encore, dans la tête, l’image de cette cabine toute destroy alors qu’on étaient partis faire du stop un peu plus loin.

    • Bon, je n’ai pas imaginé que ça allait déclencher de telles réactions. Je me retire de cette discussion et j’emmène avec moi la façon dont je pense que la télévision fonctionne avec une conclusion qui semble avoir activé moralisme et souvenirs de vandalisme à mon grand désarroi.

  • #Atlas_TDIE - Pour une approche renouvelée des #infrastructures de #transport - TDIE
    http://tdie.eu/cartographie/1738

    L’Atlas TDIE constitue un recueil de 21 cartes inédites à différentes échelles représentant l’évolution des réseaux d’infrastructures et des projets entre 2003 et 2017, et les propositions du COI par mode et par scénario. Les cartes sont toutes datées et ont été vérifiées par les acteurs concernés.

    #cartographie

  • Gli attivisti eritrei denunciano la Ue : “Finanzia il lavoro forzato”

    Grazie alle risorse del “#Trust_fund” per l’Africa, la Commissione europea ha stanziato 20 milioni di euro per la costruzione di una strada che collega i porti eritrei al confine etiope. Tra i lavoratori coinvolti nel progetto anche i giovani costretti alla leva obbligatoria a tempo indeterminato.

    L’Unione europea sta finanziando con un contributo di 20 milioni di euro il progetto per la costruzione di un’importante arteria stradale in Eritrea in cui la manodopera è formata in parte da giovani sottoposti al cosiddetto “National service”. Ovvero ragazzi e ragazze che vengono reclutati nell’ambito del servizio militare e civile obbligatorio, previsto nel Paese per tutti i cittadini dai 18 anni d’età (ma secondo molte denunce il reclutamento avviene anche prima). Oltre all’addestramento militare, i coscritti sono spesso costretti a lavorare come manodopera a bassissimo costo nella costruzione di infrastrutture (strade, ospedali, alberghi) o nelle miniere del Paese. Una prassi che diversi rapporti delle Nazioni Unite e di organizzazioni per i diritti umani come Human Rights Watch hanno definito un “crimine contro l’umanità” equiparandolo, di fatto, al lavoro forzato e alla riduzione in schiavitù. Il finanziamento europeo è stato erogato attraverso le risorse del “Trust Fund” per l’Africa.

    L’accusa alla Commissione europea arriva dalla “Foundation Human Rights for Eritreans” (FHRE), un’associazione con sede in Olanda che riunisce attivisti e rifugiati in fuga dal regime di Asmara. Il 1° aprile, tramite uno studio legale di Amsterdam, l’associazione ha inviato una lettera alla Commissione europea per denunciare questa situazione e chiedere un incontro. Se non ci sarà una risposta entro il 15 aprile o se l’offerta di incontro non verrà presa in considerazione, la federazione procederà con le azioni legali. “È inaccettabile che l’Unione europea finanzi un progetto che utilizza manodopera forzata -sottolinea Mulueberhan Temelso, direttore dell’FHRE-. L’Eritrea è una prigione a cielo aperto, chi è sottoposto alla coscrizione obbligatoria vive in condizioni molto dure e l’Europa è perfettamente a conoscenza di questa situazione”.

    Nella documentazione relativa al progetto (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoa-er-66_-_eritrea_road_rehabilitation.pdf) per la costruzione della strada (che andrà a collegare i porti eritrei con l’Etiopia), pubblicata sul sito del “Trust fund” vengono identificate tre tipologie di lavoratori: “Professionisti del Governo, quelli del ‘National service’ e quelli mobilitati dalle comunità locali”. “Sorprendentemente, l’Europa è chiaramente a conoscenza di questa situazione e la accetta -scrive nella lettera Emiel Jurjens, l’avvocato che sta promuovendo la causa degli attivisti eritrei-. Il ‘Trust fund’ semplicemente accetta l’affermazione del governo eritreo secondo cui non vi saranno riforme a breve termine del servizio nazionale dal momento che le attuali realtà economiche lo escludono”. La sola preoccupazione espressa dal documento europeo riguarda i rischi legati alla “bassa qualità” del lavoro a causa dell’impiego di una manodopera non-qualificata o poco specializzata”.

    L’avvocato Jurjens inoltre evidenzia come non ci siano evidenze del fatto che il recente accordo di pace tra Eritrea ed Etiopia abbia avuto un impatto positivo sul miglioramento dei diritti umani in Eritrea. Il 16 marzo 2019, l’Alto commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani, Kate Gillmore, ha chiesto all’Eritrea di mettere fine al servizio nazionale obbligatorio: “La durata della leva va ben al di là dei 18 mesi previsti dalla legge e, di fatto, è a tempo indeterminato. Inoltre spesso si svolge in condizioni estremamente lesive dei diritti umani, che possono includere il ricorso alla tortura, alle violenze sessuali e al lavoro forzato”. Il 28 marzo 2019, anche il Comitato delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani ha espresso la sua preoccupazione circa le accuse secondo cui i giovani sottoposti alla coscrizione obbligatoria “sono impiegati in varie attività lavorative, comprese le miniere o imprese di costruzione di proprietà privata ricevendo un salario estremamente basso o nullo”.

    “Finanziare progetti che fanno ricorso a manodopera forzata è una chiara violazione dei diritti umani -commenta l’avvocato Jurjens-. L’Europa deve cessare queste attività immediatamente e ripensare il suo approccio all’Eritrea. Chiediamo inoltre che la Commissione ci fornisca tutti i documenti relativi a questo progetto per indagare ulteriormente sulle modalità con cui sono state prese queste decisioni”.

    Il Fondo fiduciario europeo di emergenza per l’Africa (detto anche “Trust fund”) è stato lanciato nell’ottobre 2015 a La Valletta (Malta) con l’obiettivo di finanziare con rapidità iniziative e progetti per “affrontare le cause profonde delle migrazioni irregolari”. I destinatari di questi fondi sono 23 Paesi africani di origine e di transito dei flussi migratori. Dei circa 4 miliardi di euro destinati al “Trust fund”, circa 3,7 provengono dal Fondo sociale europeo di sviluppo e da altri strumenti finanziari dell’Unione per l’aiuto allo sviluppo nei Paesi terzi. Tuttavia, il Parlamento europeo, non ha modo di controllare né di verificare come vengono spesi questi soldi. Diverse inchieste giornalistiche e report pubblicati da organizzazioni non governative hanno messo in luce come i fondi del “Trust fund” siano stati spesso utilizzati per migliorare i controlli di polizia lungo le frontiere dei Paesi di transito.

    https://altreconomia.it/eritrea-ue-lavoro-forzato

    #travail_forcé #Erythrée #UE #EU #Europe #esclavage_moderne #trust_fund_for_africa #développement (sic) #route #infrastructure_routière #national_service

    La description de l’aide financière à l’Erythrée via le Trust fund :


    https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoa-er-66_-_eritrea_road_rehabilitation.pdf

    N’oublions pas que le but du Trust Fund est de "combattre la migration irrégulière" :

    The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa) aims to foster stability and to contribute to better migration management, including by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration.

    https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en

    ping @isskein

    • Eritrea: progetti finanziati con i soldi UE impiegano “lavoro forzato”

      Mentre prova a limitare i flussi di migranti africani e a favorire lo sviluppo in diversi Paesi del continente, l’Unione europea continua a spendere milioni di euro in Eritrea nella realizzazione di progetti in cui si utilizza “lavoro forzato”. L’anno scorso, come parte del Fondo fiduciario europeo di Emergenza per l’Africa, l’UE si è impegnata a spendere 20 milioni di euro in Eritrea per finanziare iniziative volte a limitare le migrazioni irregolari affrontandone le cause profonde. Il denaro, in particolare, è servito ad acquistare attrezzature e materiali per la costruzione e il miglioramento di strade necessarie a facilitare i trasporti di merci. Tuttavia, a partire da aprile 2019, diverse organizzazioni umanitarie, in particolare La Fondazione di difesa dei Diritti Umani per gli eritrei, con sede in Olanda, hanno cominciato a denunciare il fatto che molti lavoratori, impiegati nel cantiere, erano costretti al servizio militare obbligatorio. Ciò pare non abbia però impedito all’Unione di rivalutare l’invio di ulteriori fondi, decisi a dicembre 2019, da destinare all’Eritrea, continuando di fatto a finanziare un sistema di coscrizione forzata che le Nazioni Unite hanno descritto come “equivalente alla schiavitù”.

      L’aiuto aggiuntivo, pari a 95 milioni di euro, giunge nonostante l’Unione europea abbia ammesso di non avere una reale supervisione dei progetti che finanzia in Eritrea, una nazione chiusa fatta di circa 5 milioni di abitanti, ed è stato deciso con la clausola di non subordinare i finanziamenti alle garanzie di riforme democratiche. Il denaro fa parte del Fondo fiduciario dell’UE per l’Africa, pari a 4,6 miliardi di euro, creato al culmine della crisi migratoria del 2015 per affrontare il fenomeno alla radice. Sebbene tale piano sia supportato da un ampio consenso, la sua esecuzione ha offuscato quello che molti vedono come un obiettivo degno, sollevando persino dubbi sul fatto che stia diventando controproducente per il Paese stesso. Il flusso di richiedenti asilo provenienti dall’Eritrea rimane elevato. Almeno 5.000 l’anno hanno chiesto asilo in Europa negli ultimi dieci anni. Nel 2015 e nel 2016, il numero ha raggiunto il picco di oltre 30.000 e l’anno scorso è stato di circa 10.000. almeno l’80% delle richieste viene accolto, secondo i dati forniti dall’Eurostat. Ciò significa che, per la maggior parte dei Paesi europei, i richiedenti asilo eritrei sono considerati legittimi rifugiati.

      Nel caso dell’Eritrea, i funzionari europei adottano un approccio chiamato “a doppio binario”, che consiste nel dialogare con il governo fornendogli allo stesso tempo denaro indipendentemente dai risultati. Nel complesso, 200 milioni di euro del fondo sono destinati all’Eritrea. La speranza è che il denaro aiuti a risollevare l’economia locale, a creare posti di lavoro, a indurre gli eritrei a non lasciare le proprie case e a consolidare l’accordo di pace raggiunto con l’Etiopia nel luglio 2018. A prescindere dai risultati dell’iniziativa, secondo quanto riferiscono i critici del progetto, il fatto spaventoso è che il governo eritreo è considerato uno dei peggiori al mondo in termini di rispetto dei diritti umani.

      Il presidente di Asmara, Isaias Afwerki, mantiene lo stato d’emergenza nel Paese dal 2000. Come parte di questa condizione, il Servizio Nazionale è obbligatorio, universale e indefinito. “Nonostante l’accordo di pace con l’Etiopia, la situazione dei diritti umani in Eritrea rimane terribile”, ha dichiarato Laetitia Bader, che si occupa del Paese e della regione del Corno d’Africa all’interno di Human Rights Watch. “Il governo continua ad arruolare gran parte della sua popolazione nell’ambito del Servizio Nazionale obbligatorio e trattiene decine di detenuti politici in condizioni disumane”, ha aggiunto. Gli eritrei sono intrappolati all’interno di questo sistema e, più in generale, del Paese, perché per uscire è necessario un visto. Molti rimangono arruolati anche a 40 anni, facendo lavori civili o militari con salari minimi.

      Le Nazioni Unite e diversi gruppi per i diritti umani affermano che la leva obbligatoria in Eritrea equivale a lavoro forzato. Gli Stati Uniti hanno da tempo sospeso gli aiuti e i finanziamenti per lo sviluppo del Paese. La Commissione europea, in merito ai progetti finanziati nel Paese del Corno d’Africa, ha dichiarato di essere stata “informata” dal governo che i coscritti sarebbero stati utilizzati per i lavori stradali. Tuttavia, ha dichiarato: “L’Unione Europea non paga la manodopera nell’ambito di questo progetto. Il finanziamento riguarda solo l’approvvigionamento di materiali e attrezzature per affrontare la riabilitazione delle strade”.

      La Commissione, che ha incaricato l’Ufficio delle Nazioni Unite per i Servizi di Progetto di gestire il programma per suo conto, ha affermato che vige la massima attenzione per garantire che gli standard minimi di salute e sicurezza dei lavoratori siano rispettati. Tuttavia, l’agenzia dell’ONU non ha un ufficio in Eritrea e afferma che sta controllando la situazione attraverso visite organizzate dal governo di Asmara. In più, l’Ufficio ha ammesso: “Non siamo monitorando l’attuazione del progetto, perché questo è realizzato dal governo e i progressi vengono monitorati dal Ministero dei Lavori pubblici”. Interrogata dal New York Times sul fatto che con questo finanziamento rischia di favorire la pratica del lavoro forzato in Eritrea, un problema denunciato da molte altre agenzie delle Nazioni Unite, l’Ufficio per i Servizi di Progetto ha detto che “rispetta i principi fondamentali dell’ONU, inclusa l’eliminazione di tutte le forme di lavoro forzato o obbligatorio” ma che ha deciso di procedere ugualmente.

      https://sicurezzainternazionale.luiss.it/2020/01/08/eritrea-progetti-finanziati-soldi-ue-impiegano-lavoro-

  • En cinquante ans, l’extraction de ressources a plus que triplé dans le monde
    https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/03/21/en-cinquante-ans-l-extraction-de-ressources-a-plus-que-triple-dans-le-mon

    Aujourd’hui, l’économie mondiale extrait 92 milliards de tonnes de #ressources_naturelles par an pour fonctionner, alors que ce chiffre n’était « que » de 27 milliards de tonnes en 1970. Nous utilisons ainsi 3,4 fois plus de matières qu’il y a cinquante ans à l’échelle du globe.

    Dans un rapport, le Groupe international d’experts sur les ressources (un groupe de scientifiques organisés sous l’égide de l’ONU Environnement pour travailler sur l’utilisation des ressources naturelles dans le monde) expose ces chiffres et met en garde.

    [...] Au total en 2017, le monde prélevait près de 44 milliards de tonnes de minéraux non métalliques (de sable, de gravier, d’argile), 24 milliards de tonnes de biomasse (notamment par l’agriculture), 15 milliards de tonnes de combustibles fossiles (pétrole, charbon, gaz naturel, pourtant principale cause du changement climatique) et 9 milliards de tonnes de métaux pour satisfaire aux besoins de la production. Une répartition qui, selon les auteurs du rapport, témoigne de la place des #infrastructures dans le monde et de leur croissance dans les pays émergents.