#integrated_border_management

Così l’Italia ha svuotato il diritto alla trasparenza sulle frontiere

Il Consiglio di Stato ha ribadito la inaccessibilità “assoluta” degli atti che riguardano genericamente la “gestione delle frontiere e dell’immigrazione”. Intanto le forniture milionarie del governo a Libia, Tunisia ed Egitto continuano.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1039671

Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (2/4) : « Nous avons besoin d’aide, pas d’outils sécuritaires »

Au Sénégal, la création et l’équipement de postes-frontières constituent des éléments clés du partenariat avec l’Union européenne. Une stratégie pas toujours efficace, tandis que les services destinés aux migrants manquent cruellement de financements.

Par une étouffante journée de mars, j’arrive au poste de contrôle poussiéreux du village sénégalais de #Moussala, à la frontière avec le #Mali. Des dizaines de camions et de motos attendent, en ligne, de traverser ce point de transit majeur. Après avoir demandé pendant des mois, en vain, la permission au gouvernement d’accéder au poste-frontière, j’espère que le chef du poste m’expliquera dans quelle mesure les financements européens influencent leurs opérations. Refusant d’entrer dans les détails, il me confirme que son équipe a récemment reçu de l’Union européenne (UE) des formations et des équipements dont elle se sert régulièrement. Pour preuve, un petit diplôme et un trophée, tous deux estampillés du drapeau européen, trônent sur son bureau.

La création et l’équipement de postes-frontières comme celui de Moussala constituent des éléments clés du partenariat entre l’UE et l’#Organisation_internationale_pour_les_migrations (#OIM). Outre les technologies de surveillance fournies aux antennes de la Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), chaque poste-frontière est équipé de systèmes d’analyse des données migratoires et de systèmes biométriques de reconnaissance faciale et des empreintes digitales.

Officiellement, l’objectif est de créer ce que les fonctionnaires européens appellent un système africain d’#IBM, à savoir « #Integrated_Border_Management » (en français, « gestion intégrée des frontières »). Dans un communiqué de 2017, le coordinateur du projet de l’OIM au Sénégal déclarait : « La gestion intégrée des frontières est plus qu’un simple concept, c’est une culture. » Il avait semble-t-il en tête un changement idéologique de toute l’Afrique, qui ne manquerait pas selon lui d’embrasser la vision européenne des migrations.

Technologies de surveillance

Concrètement, ce système IBM consiste à fusionner les #bases_de_données sénégalaises (qui contiennent des données biométriques sensibles) avec les données d’agences de police internationales (comme #Interpol et #Europol). Le but : permettre aux gouvernements de savoir qui franchit quelle frontière et quand. Un tel système, avertissent les experts, peut vite faciliter les expulsions illégales et autres abus.

Le risque est tout sauf hypothétique. En 2022, un ancien agent des services espagnols de renseignement déclarait au journal El Confidencial que les autorités de plusieurs pays d’Afrique « utilisent les technologies fournies par l’Espagne pour persécuter et réprimer des groupes d’opposition, des militants et des citoyens critiques envers le pouvoir ». Et d’ajouter que le gouvernement espagnol en avait parfaitement conscience.

D’après un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, « tous les projets qui touchent à la sécurité et sont financés par l’UE comportent un volet de formation et de renforcement des capacités en matière de droits humains ». Selon cette même personne, l’UE effectue des études d’impact sur les droits humains avant et pendant la mise en œuvre de ces projets. Mais lorsque, il y a quelques mois, l’eurodéputée néerlandaise Tineke Strik a demandé à voir ces études d’impact, trois différents services de la Commission lui ont envoyé des réponses officielles disant qu’ils ne les avaient pas. En outre, selon un de ces services, « il n’existe pas d’obligation réglementaire d’en faire ».

Au Sénégal, les libertés civiles sont de plus en plus menacées et ces technologies de surveillance risquent d’autant plus d’être utilisées à mauvais escient. Rappelons qu’en 2021, les forces de sécurité sénégalaises ont tué quatorze personnes qui manifestaient contre le gouvernement ; au cours des deux dernières années, plusieurs figures de l’opposition et journalistes sénégalais ont été emprisonnés pour avoir critiqué le gouvernement, abordé des questions politiques sensibles ou avoir « diffusé des fausses nouvelles ». En juin, après qu’Ousmane Sonko, principal opposant au président Macky Sall, a été condamné à deux ans d’emprisonnement pour « corruption de la jeunesse », de vives protestations ont fait 23 morts.

« Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi »

Alors que j’allais renoncer à discuter avec la police locale, à Tambacounda, autre grand point de transit non loin des frontières avec le Mali et la Guinée, un policier de l’immigration en civil a accepté de me parler sous couvert d’anonymat. C’est de la région de #Tambacounda, qui compte parmi les plus pauvres du Sénégal, que proviennent la plupart des candidats à l’immigration. Là-bas, tout le monde, y compris le policier, connaît au moins une personne qui a tenté de mettre les voiles pour l’Europe.

« Si je n’étais pas policier, je partirais aussi », me confie-t-il par l’entremise d’un interprète, après s’être éloigné à la hâte du poste-frontière. Les investissements de l’UE « n’ont rien changé du tout », poursuit-il, notant qu’il voit régulièrement des personnes en provenance de Guinée passer par le Sénégal et entrer au Mali dans le but de gagner l’Europe.

Depuis son indépendance en 1960, le Sénégal est salué comme un modèle de démocratie et de stabilité, tandis que nombre de ses voisins sont en proie aux dissensions politiques et aux coups d’Etat. Quoi qu’il en soit, plus d’un tiers de la population vit sous le seuil de pauvreté et l’absence de perspectives pousse la population à migrer, notamment vers la France et l’Espagne. Aujourd’hui, les envois de fonds de la diaspora représentent près de 10 % du PIB sénégalais. A noter par ailleurs que, le Sénégal étant le pays le plus à l’ouest de l’Afrique, de nombreux Ouest-Africains s’y retrouvent lorsqu’ils fuient les problèmes économiques et les violences des ramifications régionales d’Al-Qaida et de l’Etat islamique (EI), qui ont jusqu’à présent contraint près de 4 millions de personnes à partir de chez elles.

« L’UE ne peut pas résoudre les problèmes en construisant des murs et en distribuant de l’argent, me dit le policier. Elle pourra financer tout ce qu’elle veut, ce n’est pas comme ça qu’elle mettra fin à l’immigration. » Les sommes qu’elle dépense pour renforcer la police et les frontières, dit-il, ne servent guère plus qu’à acheter des voitures climatisées aux policiers des villes frontalières.

Pendant ce temps, les services destinés aux personnes expulsées – comme les centres de protection et d’accueil – manquent cruellement de financements. Au poste-frontière de Rosso, des centaines de personnes sont expulsées chaque semaine de Mauritanie. Mbaye Diop travaille avec une poignée de bénévoles du centre que la Croix-Rouge a installé du côté sénégalais pour accueillir ces personnes expulsées : des hommes, des femmes et des enfants qui présentent parfois des blessures aux poignets, causées par des menottes, et ailleurs sur le corps, laissées par les coups de la police mauritanienne. Mais Mbaye Diop n’a pas de ressources pour les aider. L’approche n’est pas du tout la bonne, souffle-t-il : « Nous avons besoin d’aide humanitaire, pas d’outils sécuritaires. »

La méthode de la carotte

Pour freiner l’immigration, l’UE teste également la méthode de la carotte : elle propose des subventions aux entreprises locales et des formations professionnelles à ceux qui restent ou rentrent chez eux. La route qui mène à Tambacounda est ponctuée de dizaines et de dizaines de panneaux publicitaires vantant les projets européens.

Dans la réalité, les offres ne sont pas aussi belles que l’annonce l’UE. Binta Ly, 40 ans, en sait quelque chose. A Tambacounda, elle tient une petite boutique de jus de fruits locaux et d’articles de toilette. Elle a fait une année de droit à l’université, mais le coût de la vie à Dakar l’a contrainte à abandonner ses études et à partir chercher du travail au Maroc. Après avoir vécu sept ans à Casablanca et Marrakech, elle est rentrée au Sénégal, où elle a récemment inauguré son magasin.

En 2022, Binta Ly a déposé une demande de subvention au Bureau d’accueil, d’orientation et de suivi (BAOS) qui avait ouvert la même année à Tambacounda, au sein de l’antenne locale de l’Agence régionale de développement (ARD). Financés par l’UE, les BAOS proposent des subventions aux petites entreprises sénégalaises dans le but de dissuader la population d’émigrer. Binta Ly ambitionnait d’ouvrir un service d’impression, de copie et de plastification dans sa boutique, idéalement située à côté d’une école primaire. Elle a obtenu une subvention de 500 000 francs CFA (762 euros) – soit un quart du budget qu’elle avait demandé –, mais peu importe, elle était très enthousiaste. Sauf qu’un an plus tard, elle n’avait toujours pas touché un seul franc.

Dans l’ensemble du Sénégal, les BAOS ont obtenu une enveloppe totale de 1 milliard de francs CFA (1,5 million d’euros) de l’UE pour financer ces subventions. Mais l’antenne de Tambacounda n’a perçu que 60 millions de francs CFA (91 470 euros), explique Abdoul Aziz Tandia, directeur du bureau local de l’ARD. A peine de quoi financer 84 entreprises dans une région de plus d’un demi-million d’habitants. Selon un porte-parole de la Commission européenne, la distribution des subventions a effectivement commencé en avril. Le fait est que Binta Ly a reçu une imprimante et une plastifieuse, mais pas d’ordinateur pour aller avec. « Je suis contente d’avoir ces aides, dit-elle. Le problème, c’est qu’elles mettent très longtemps à venir et que ces retards chamboulent tout mon business plan. »

Retour « volontaire »

Abdoul Aziz Tandia admet que les BAOS ne répondent pas à la demande. C’est en partie la faute de la bureaucratie, poursuit-il : Dakar doit approuver l’ensemble des projets et les intermédiaires sont des ONG et des agences étrangères, ce qui signifie que les autorités locales et les bénéficiaires n’exercent aucun contrôle sur ces fonds, alors qu’ils sont les mieux placés pour savoir comment les utiliser. Par ailleurs, reconnaît-il, de nombreuses régions du pays n’ayant accès ni à l’eau propre, ni à l’électricité ni aux soins médicaux, ces microsubventions ne suffisent pas à empêcher les populations d’émigrer. « Sur le moyen et le long termes, ces investissements n’ont pas de sens », juge Abdoul Aziz Tandia.

Autre exemple : aujourd’hui âgé de 30 ans, Omar Diaw a passé au moins cinq années de sa vie à tenter de rejoindre l’Europe. Traversant les impitoyables déserts du Mali et du Niger, il est parvenu jusqu’en Algérie. Là, à son arrivée, il s’est aussitôt fait expulser vers le Niger, où il n’existe aucun service d’accueil. Il est alors resté coincé des semaines entières dans le désert. Finalement, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) l’a renvoyé en avion au Sénégal, qualifiant son retour de « volontaire ».

Lorsqu’il est rentré chez lui, à Tambacounda, l’OIM l’a inscrit à une formation de marketing numérique qui devait durer plusieurs semaines et s’accompagner d’une allocation de 30 000 francs CFA (46 euros). Mais il n’a jamais touché l’allocation et la formation qu’il a suivie est quasiment inutile dans sa situation : à Tambacounda, la demande en marketing numérique n’est pas au rendez-vous. Résultat : il a recommencé à mettre de l’argent de côté pour tenter de nouveau de gagner l’Europe.

►https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/07/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-2-4-nous
#OIM #retour_volontaire

Comment l’Europe sous-traite à l’Afrique le contrôle des migrations (3/4) : « Il est presque impossible de comprendre à quoi sert l’argent »

A coups de centaines de millions d’euros, l’UE finance des projets dans des pays africains pour réduire les migrations. Mais leur impact est difficile à mesurer et leurs effets pervers rarement pris en considération.

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Au chapitre migrations, rares sont les projets de l’Union européenne (UE) qui semblent adaptés aux réalités africaines. Mais il n’est pas sans risques de le dire tout haut. C’est ce que Boubacar Sèye, chercheur dans le domaine, a appris à ses dépens.

Né au Sénégal, il vit aujourd’hui en Espagne. Ce migrant a quitté la Côte d’Ivoire, où il travaillait comme professeur de mathématiques, quand les violences ont ravagé le pays au lendemain de l’élection présidentielle de 2000. Après de brefs séjours en France et en Italie, Boubacar Sèye s’est établi en Espagne, où il a fini par obtenir la citoyenneté et fondé une famille avec son épouse espagnole. Choqué par le bilan de la vague de migration aux Canaries en 2006, il a créé l’ONG Horizons sans frontières pour aider les migrants africains en Espagne. Aujourd’hui, il mène des recherches et défend les droits des personnes en déplacement, notamment celles en provenance d’Afrique et plus particulièrement du Sénégal.

En 2019, Boubacar Sèye s’est procuré un document détaillant comment les fonds des politiques migratoires de l’UE sont dépensés au Sénégal. Il a été sidéré par le montant vertigineux des sommes investies pour juguler l’immigration, alors que des milliers de candidats à l’asile se noient chaque année sur certaines des routes migratoires les plus meurtrières au monde. Lors d’entretiens publiés dans la presse et d’événements publics, il a ouvertement demandé aux autorités sénégalaises d’être plus transparentes sur ce qu’elles avaient fait des centaines de millions d’euros de l’Europe, qualifiant ces projets de véritable échec.

Puis, au début de l’année 2021, il a été arrêté à l’aéroport de Dakar pour « diffusion de fausses informations ». Il a ensuite passé deux semaines en prison. Sa santé se dégradant rapidement sous l’effet du stress, il a fait une crise cardiaque. « Ce séjour en prison était inhumain, humiliant, et il m’a causé des problèmes de santé qui durent jusqu’à aujourd’hui, s’indigne le chercheur. J’ai juste posé une question : “Où est passé l’argent ?” »

Ses intuitions n’étaient pas mauvaises. Les financements de la politique anti-immigration de l’UE sont notoirement opaques et difficiles à tracer. Les demandes déposées dans le cadre de la liberté d’information mettent des mois, voire des années à être traitées, alors que la délégation de l’UE au Sénégal, la Commission européenne et les autorités sénégalaises ignorent ou déclinent les demandes d’interviews.

La Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants (DNLT, fruit d’un partenariat entre le Sénégal et l’UE), la police des frontières, le ministère de l’intérieur et le ministère des affaires étrangères – lesquels ont tous bénéficié des fonds migratoires européens – n’ont pas répondu aux demandes répétées d’entretien pour réaliser cette enquête.
« Nos rapports doivent être positifs »

Les rapports d’évaluation de l’UE ne donnent pas de vision complète de l’impact des programmes. A dessein ? Plusieurs consultants qui ont travaillé sur des rapports d’évaluation d’impact non publiés de projets du #Fonds_fiduciaire_d’urgence_de_l’UE_pour_l’Afrique (#EUTF), et qui s’expriment anonymement en raison de leur obligation de confidentialité, tirent la sonnette d’alarme : les effets pervers de plusieurs projets du fonds sont peu pris en considération.

Au #Niger, par exemple, l’UE a contribué à élaborer une loi qui criminalise presque tous les déplacements, rendant de fait illégale la mobilité dans la région. Alors que le nombre de migrants irréguliers qui empruntent certaines routes migratoires a reculé, les politiques européennes rendent les routes plus dangereuses, augmentent les prix qu’exigent les trafiquants et criminalisent les chauffeurs de bus et les sociétés de transport locales. Conséquence : de nombreuses personnes ont perdu leur travail du jour au lendemain.

La difficulté à évaluer l’impact de ces projets tient notamment à des problèmes de méthode et à un manque de ressources, mais aussi au simple fait que l’UE ne semble guère s’intéresser à la question. Un consultant d’une société de contrôle et d’évaluation financée par l’UE confie : « Quel est l’impact de ces projets ? Leurs effets pervers ? Nous n’avons pas les moyens de répondre à ces questions. Nous évaluons les projets uniquement à partir des informations fournies par des organisations chargées de leur mise en œuvre. Notre cabinet de conseil ne réalise pas d’évaluation véritablement indépendante. »

Selon un document interne que j’ai pu me procurer, « rares sont les projets qui nous ont fourni les données nécessaires pour évaluer les progrès accomplis en direction des objectifs généraux de l’EUTF (promouvoir la stabilité et limiter les déplacements forcés et les migrations illégales) ». Selon un autre consultant, seuls les rapports positifs semblent les bienvenus : « Il est implicite que nos rapports doivent être positifs si nous voulons à l’avenir obtenir d’autres projets. »

En 2018, la Cour des comptes européenne, institution indépendante, a émis des critiques sur l’EUTF : ses procédures de sélection de projets manquent de cohérence et de clarté. De même, une étude commanditée par le Parlement européen qualifie ses procédures d’« opaques ». « Le contrôle du Parlement est malheureusement très limité, ce qui constitue un problème majeur pour contraindre la Commission à rendre des comptes, regrette l’eurodéputée allemande Cornelia Ernst. Même pour une personne très au fait des politiques de l’UE, il est presque impossible de comprendre où va l’argent et à quoi il sert. »

Le #fonds_d’urgence pour l’Afrique a notamment financé la création d’unités de police des frontières d’élite dans six pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, et ce dans le but de lutter contre les groupes de djihadistes et les trafics en tous genres. Or ce projet, qui aurait permis de détourner au moins 12 millions d’euros, fait actuellement l’objet d’une enquête pour fraude.
Aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains

En 2020, deux projets de modernisation des #registres_civils du Sénégal et de la Côte d’Ivoire ont suscité de vives inquiétudes des populations. Selon certaines sources, ces projets financés par l’EUTF auraient en effet eu pour objectif de créer des bases de #données_biométriques nationales. Les défenseurs des libertés redoutaient qu’on collecte et stocke les empreintes digitales et images faciales des citoyens des deux pays.

Quand Ilia Siatitsa, de l’ONG britannique Privacy International, a demandé à la Commission européenne de lui fournir des documents sur ces projets, elle a découvert que celle-ci n’avait réalisé aucune étude d’impact sur les droits humains. En Europe, aucun pays ne possède de base de données comprenant autant d’informations biométriques.

D’après un porte-parole de la Commission, jamais le fonds d’urgence n’a financé de registre biométrique, et ces deux projets consistent exclusivement à numériser des documents et prévenir les fraudes. Or la dimension biométrique des registres apparaît clairement dans les documents de l’EUTF qu’Ilia Siatitsa s’est procurés : il y est écrit noir sur blanc que le but est de créer « une base de données d’identification biométrique pour la population, connectée à un système d’état civil fiable ».

Ilia Siatitsa en a déduit que le véritable objectif des deux projets était vraisemblablement de faciliter l’expulsion des migrants africains d’Europe. D’ailleurs, certains documents indiquent explicitement que la base de données ivoirienne doit servir à identifier et expulser les Ivoiriens qui résident illégalement sur le sol européen. L’un d’eux explique même que l’objectif du projet est de « faciliter l’identification des personnes qui sont véritablement de nationalité ivoirienne et l’organisation de leur retour ».

Quand Cheikh Fall, militant sénégalais pour le droit à la vie privée, a appris l’existence de cette base de données, il s’est tourné vers la Commission de protection des données personnelles (CDP), qui, légalement, aurait dû donner son aval à un tel projet. Mais l’institution sénégalaise n’a été informée de l’existence du projet qu’après que le gouvernement l’a approuvé.

En novembre 2021, Ilia Siatitsa a déposé une plainte auprès du médiateur de l’UE. En décembre 2022, après une enquête indépendante, le médiateur a rendu ses conclusions : la Commission n’a pas pris en considération l’impact sur la vie privée des populations africaines de ce projet et d’autres projets que finance l’UE dans le cadre de sa politique migratoire.

Selon plusieurs sources avec lesquelles j’ai discuté, ainsi que la présentation interne du comité de direction du projet – que j’ai pu me procurer –, il apparaît que depuis, le projet a perdu sa composante biométrique. Cela dit, selon Ilia Siatitsa, cette affaire illustre bien le fait que l’UE effectue en Afrique des expériences sur des technologies interdites chez elle.

▻https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/09/08/comment-l-europe-sous-traite-a-l-afrique-le-controle-des-migrations-3-4-il-e

MIGRATION:FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES AT LAND BORDERS

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Le rapport continent un tableau sur les #murs et #barrières_frontalières :

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Morts aux #frontières_terrestres EU :

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#décès #morts #mourir_aux_frontières

The state of play of Schengen governance An assessment of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism in its first multiannual programme

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, assesses the operation and impact of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism in its first multiannual programme (2014-19), with the aim of identifying what has worked well and developing recommendations to strengthen it. The past decade has presented multiple controversies involving the governments of Schengen states as well as EU institutions, leading to a persistent state of apparent crisis. The ongoing “Schengen crisis” is rooted in political changes and in structural shortcomings of the Schengen regime. Despite these obstacles, the resilience of the Schengen system should not be underestimated.

▻https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2020)658699

Pushbacks and Rights Violations at Europe’s Borders

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#Black_Book of Pushbacks

vol 1 :

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vol 2

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Balkan Region Report – November 2020

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The Border Violence Monitoring Network published 29 testimonies of violent pushbacks in November, involving severe levels of physical, psychological and structural abuse. The testimonies collected last month voice the experience of 951 people-on-the-move. This report offers analysis of the trends observed in each of these accounts, showing how law enforcement carry out these violent collective expulsions at EU borders.

As a network comprised of grassroots organisations active in Greece and the Western Balkans, this report was produced via a joint-effort between Are You Syrious, Mobile Info Team, No Name Kitchen, Rigardu, Josoor, Disinfaux Collective, InfoKolpa, Centre for Peace Studies, Re:ports Sarajevo, Mare Liberum, Collective Aid and Fresh Response.

This report analyses among other things:
- The stranding of transit groups on the #Evros/Meriç River and Aegean Sea
– A groundbreaking video analysis of a Croatian pushback
– Violent sea and land removals from Italy
- Denial of asylum access for people from LGBTQ+ community
– Detention in Bulgaria and chain pushbacks to Turkey

The report also looks at the transit situation in Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, as well as reviewing the arrival conditions for people in North East Italy. The onset of winter has come with a spike in squat evictions, and uncertainty about the present accomodation provision across these countries. With police pressure on transit communities and the solidarity groups supporting them, the close of 2020 is being marked with a further erosion of rights in the region.

▻https://www.borderviolence.eu/balkan-region-report-november-2020

Pour télécharger le rapport en pdf :
►https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/BVMN-November-Report.pdf

#Bulgarie #refoulements_en_chaîne #Bojna #Trieste #Thessalonique #Salonique #Grèce

Europas Schande auf 1.500 Seiten

Das „Schwarzbuch“ sammelt Fälle illegaler Rückweisungen an den Außengrenzen der EU. Viele Geflüchtete berichten darin von exzessiver Gewalt.

Mehrmals hätten ihn die Polizisten mit dem Gesicht auf den Boden gedrückt. Einer habe ihn mit einem Stock geschlagen, der andere Stromstöße mit einem Taser verabreicht. Wenig später hätten ihn drohend bellende Polizeihunde umringt. Auf der Wache habe man ihm wiederholt verweigert, die Toilette zu benutzen. Schließlich hätten ihn die Polizisten mit der Fähre zurück in die griechische Hafenstadt Patras geschickt.

Dieser Bericht stammt von einem 28-jährigen Afghanen, der Ende Februar auf einem Lkw versteckt auf die Fähre nach Venedig gelangte und dort nach der Ankunft entdeckt worden war. Dokumentiert hat sein Schicksal die NGO No Name Kitchen, die entlang europäischer Migrationsrouten aktiv ist. Es ist eine von 892 Aussagen, die in einem „Black Book of Push Backs“ betitelten Dokument enthalten sind, das am heutigen Internationalen Tag der Migranten veröffentlicht wird.

Zusammengestellt hat das „Schwarzbuch“ das Border Vio­lence Monitoring Network (BVMN), ein Zusammenschluss von Menschenrechtsinitiativen, der seit Jahren die zunehmende Zahl von Pushbacks, also Rückschiebungen und Abweisungen von Migranten an europäischen Grenzen, sowie die fehlenden staatlichen Kontroll- und Sanktionsmechanismen kritisiert. In Auftrag gegeben und finanziert hat es die Fraktion der Linken (GUE/NGL) im Europaparlament, wo es diesen Freitag auch präsentiert werden soll.

Pushbacks, betont das 1.500 Seiten fassende Dokument, verstoßen gegen das in der universellen Erklärung der Menschenrechte enthaltene Recht auf Asyl, die Grundrechtecharta der EU sowie das in der Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention festgelegte Prinzip der Nichtzurückweisung.
Gewalt von Grenzbeamten bei Pushbacks

Nichtsdestotrotz hätten sie sich vor allem seit Schließung der sogenannten Balkanroute 2016 zunehmend zu einer „gut koordinierten, systematischen Praxis“ entwickelt, die im Grenzregime der EU zunehmend verbreitet sei, aber nicht offiziell eingestanden werde.

Die aufgelisteten Fälle, die 12.654 zurückgeschobene Personen betreffen, sind dabei nur ein Bruchteil des tatsächlichen Umfangs dieser Praxis. Das Schwarzbuch widmet sich in seiner detaillierten Dokumentation auch Kettenrückschiebungen, die etwa von Italien oder Österreich über Slowenien und Kroatien verlaufen – ein gesetzwidriger Transport, rückwärts entlang der stillgelegten Balkanroute bis jenseits der europäischen Außengrenzen.

Besonders im Blick steht dabei das Vorgehen der Grenzbeamten. Das BVMN spricht von „endlosen Berichten gnadenloser, sadistischer und erniedrigender Gewalt, die an brutale Diktaturen erinnern“. Zudem habe sich die Situation 2020 noch verschlimmert: „Es ist selten, nicht eine oder mehrere Formen von Missbrauch bei einem Pushback zu erleben. In Kroatien und Griechenland betrifft dies beinahe 90 Prozent der dokumentierten Fälle.“

Konkret genannt werden unter anderem exzessive und unangebrachte Gewalt, der Einsatz elektrischer Waffen, erzwungenes Entkleiden, Drohen mit Feuerwaffen, Haft ohne die grundlegendsten Standards. Die Zerstörung oder Konfiszierung persönlichen Besitzes wie Telefone ist gängige Praxis. Das Buch zeigt auch Fotos von Platzwunden am Kopf oder Rücken mit Striemen und Blutergüssen.

Cornelia Ernst, Europaabgeordnete der Linken, zeigt sich angesichts dieser Dokumentation „fassungslos“. Die Recherche des Netzwerks belege endlich, dass die Gewalt an den EU-Außengrenzen staatlich organisiert und strukturell sei. „Täglich wird an den EU-Außengrenzen gegen EU-Prinzipien und Menschenrechte verstoßen. Hundert- bis tausendfach in den letzten Jahren. Das ist eine Schande.“

▻https://taz.de/Gefluechtete-an-EU-Aussengrenzen/!5733881

Décembre 2022: 25,000 violent pushbacks at EU borders documented in the ‘Black Book’
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/982761

Sur la Carte, il faut considérer Calais comme un mur et la France devrait donc être en vert.

La costruzione di muri: un business

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
– Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
– le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
– e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
Dei budget fiorenti

Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

– Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

– La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

– Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
I muri virtuali

I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
Lobby

Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
Un business mortale, una scelta

La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

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In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

▻https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
#industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

–—

Pour @etraces :

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

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The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

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This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

Pour télécharger le rapport_
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

#rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

voir aussi :
Asylum Outsourced : McKinsey’s Secret Role in Europe’s Refugee Crisis
►https://seenthis.net/messages/862826

#Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

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For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

Air service to be supplemented with #drones

The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

Real-time tracking with FlightAware

The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

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„Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Frontex watches refugees drown

This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
#avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

- #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
- #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
- #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
- #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
▻https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

#conférence #webinar

Le business meurtrier des frontières

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Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
La fin de la fin des frontières

Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
Le business des barrières

Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

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Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
« Mourir aux frontières »

Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

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Sur le blog :

– Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

– Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : ▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

– Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

The big wall

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An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent

►https://thebigwall.org/en
►https://seenthis.net/messages/905345

#Italie

How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

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The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

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But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

“These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

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Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

“For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

“They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

▻https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

En français:
À Calais, la ville s’emmure
▻https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

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This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

Executive summary

Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
A booming industry

The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

– The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

- The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

– Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

- Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

- Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

Financing the industry

The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

– The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

- Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

- Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

- In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
Human rights and the border industry

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

– Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

– The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

– The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

- The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

– The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
Time to divest

The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

#TNI #rapport
#industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

#Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
#contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

https://www.tni.org/files/styles/cover_image/public/cover-images/outsourcingoppression-report-tnicover.png?itok=mwQBC1JP#.jpg

This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

Key findings

– The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

– Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

– Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

- The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

– Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

- Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

- Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

- Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

- The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

– The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

- The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

– The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

pour télécharger le rapport :
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

#externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

#Border_Profiteers. Corporations profiting from borders, detentions and deportations - Berlin edition

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L212xH300/Border-Profiea1c-b6061.jpg

Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

https://i.imgur.com/H565BYR.png

The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

“In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

“They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

“For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

Air Surveillance

Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

https://i.imgur.com/AsNnGoD.png

German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

“The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

“The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

Sensors and cameras

EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

Surveillance centres

In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

https://i.imgur.com/yvPgDsz.png

▻https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

Artificial intelligence

The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

Des drones en renfort dans l’#opération_Sophia

Pour renforcer la surveillance aérienne, après le départ des navires, l’opération Sophia déployée en Méditerranée (alias #EUNAVFOR_Med) va bénéficier d’un renfort d’au moins un drone #Predator de l’aeronautica militare.

L’#Italie a indiqué sa disponibilité à fournir un drone à l’opération Sophia, selon nos informations confirmées à bonne source. Ce pourrait être un #MQ-9A Predator B, la version la plus avancée et la plus récente du drone, d’une longueur de 10,80 m avec une envergure de plus de 20 mètres, qui peut voler à 445 km / heure. De façon alternative, selon les moyens disponibles, un MQ-1C Predator A, plus modeste (longueur de 8,20 m et envergure de 14,80 m), pouvant voler à 160 km/heure, pourrait aussi être déployé.

▻http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/04/09/des-drones-en-renfort-dans-loperation-sophia
#operation_Sophia

Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – First phase

Summary

The programme aims to strengthen the capacity of relevant Libyan authorities in the areas of border and migration management, including border control and surveillance, addressing smuggling and trafficking of human beings, search and rescue at sea and in the desert.
Main objectives

The specific objectives of the project are: 1) to enhance operational capacity of the competent Libyan authorities in maritime surveillance, tackling irregular border crossings, including the strengthening of SAR operations and related coast guard tasks; 2) to set up basic facilities in order to enable the Libyan guards to better organise their SAR, border surveillance and control operations; 3) to assist the concerned Libyan authorities in defining and declaring a Libyan SAR Region with adequate SAR Standard Operation Procedures, including finalising the studies for fully fledged operational rooms; and 4) to develop operational capacity of competent Libyan authorities in land border surveillance and control in the desert, focusing on the sections of southern borders most affected by illegal crossings.

▻https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-first-phase_en
#integrated_border_management

Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya - Second phase

Summary

The Overall Objective of the programme is to develop the overall capacity of the relevant Libyan authorities and strengthen institutional reform in the areas of land and sea border control and surveillance; addressing smuggling and trafficking of human beings; Search & Rescue at sea (SAR); and on land contributing to a human response of the migration crises in respect of international and human right laws.
Main objectives

The specific objectives of the project are as follows:
1. Capacity development and institutional strengthening of the relevant authorities (including #LCGPS and #GACS) covering all sea and land borders including the development SOPs of land and sea based SAR operations;
2. Further development of the capacity and the integration of the LCGPS and GACS fleets by supply of new SAR vessels as well as an accompanying maintenance programme;
3. Development of the MRCC communication network along the coast through a step by step approach;
4. Further development of the land border capacity of the relevant authorities and the engagement through community based engagement and cross border programs, particularly in the West and South.

Additional cross-cutting objectives of the activities will be:
– The improvement of the operational cooperation between the relevant Libyan agencies and bodies as well as the cooperating with UN agencies and their partners on coordination of activities, information sharing, processing and SOPs;
– The improvement of the human rights situation for migrants and refugees, particularly for women and children, including through ensuring that the Libyan authorities targeted by this action comply with human rights standards in SOPs in SAR operations;
– The concern for the environment, in particular for the hygienic and living environment for migrants in the detention centres and for the reutilisation of oil and the maintenance protocols of the ships.

▻https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-second-phase_en

The @EU_Commission boasts of “increased performance” of the Libyan coastguard as a “direct consequence” of #EU funding & training. No mention that the #Med remains more deadly than ever, and people are being forcibly returned to #Libya to inhumane detention, contrary to int’l law

▻https://twitter.com/MSF_Sea/status/1113112609136566277

https://i.imgur.com/GXR82th.png https://i.imgur.com/Lgd7ozr.png https://i.imgur.com/jHhnGYs.png

Ici, un des derniers articles en date... par la suite de ce fil des articles plus anciens...

Le supplice sans fin des migrants en Libye

Ils sont arrivés en fin d’après-midi, blessés, épuisés, à bout. Ce 23 mai, près de 117 Soudanais, Ethiopiens et Erythréens se sont présentés devant la mosquée de Beni Oualid, une localité située à 120 km au sud-ouest de Misrata, la métropole portuaire de la Tripolitaine (Libye occidentale). Ils y passeront la nuit, protégés par des clercs religieux et des résidents. Ces nouveaux venus sont en fait des fugitifs. Ils se sont échappés d’une « prison sauvage », l’un de ces centres carcéraux illégaux qui ont proliféré autour de Beni Oualid depuis que s’est intensifié, ces dernières années, le flux de migrants et de réfugiés débarquant du Sahara vers le littoral libyen dans l’espoir de traverser la Méditerranée.

Ces migrants d’Afrique subsaharienne – mineurs pour beaucoup – portent dans leur chair les traces de violences extrêmes subies aux mains de leurs geôliers : corps blessés par balles, brûlés ou lacérés de coups. Selon leurs témoignages, quinze de leurs camarades d’évasion ont péri durant leur fuite.

Cris de douleur
A Beni Oualid, un refuge héberge nombre de ces migrants en détresse. Des blocs de ciment nu cernés d’une terre ocre : l’abri, géré par une ONG locale – Assalam – avec l’assistance médicale de Médecins sans frontières (MSF), est un havre rustique mais dont la réputation grandit. Des migrants y échouent régulièrement dans un piètre état. « Beaucoup souffrent de fractures aux membres inférieurs, de fractures ouvertes infectées, de coups sur le dos laissant la chair à vif, d’électrocution sur les parties génitales », rapporte Christophe Biteau, le chef de la mission MSF pour la -Libye, rencontré à Tunis.

Leurs tortionnaires les ont kidnappés sur les routes migratoires. Les migrants et réfugiés seront détenus et suppliciés aussi longtemps qu’ils n’auront pas payé une rançon, à travers les familles restées au pays ou des amis ayant déjà atteint Tripoli. Technique usuelle pour forcer les résistances, les détenus torturés sont sommés d’appeler leurs familles afin que celles-ci puissent entendre en « direct » les cris de douleur au téléphone.

Les Erythréens, Somaliens et Soudanais sont particulièrement exposés à ce racket violent car, liés à une diaspora importante en Europe, ils sont censés être plus aisément solvables que les autres. Dans la région de Beni Oualid, toute cette violence subie, ajoutée à une errance dans des zones désertiques, emporte bien des vies. D’août 2017 à mars 2018, 732 migrants ont trouvé la mort autour de Beni Oualid, selon Assalam.

En Libye, ces prisons « sauvages » qui parsèment les routes migratoires vers le littoral, illustration de l’osmose croissante entre réseaux historiques de passeurs et gangs criminels, cohabitent avec un système de détention « officiel ». Les deux systèmes peuvent parfois se croiser, en raison de l’omnipotence des milices sur le terrain, mais ils sont en général distincts. Affiliés à une administration – le département de lutte contre la migration illégale (DCIM, selon l’acronyme anglais) –, les centres de détention « officiels » sont au nombre d’une vingtaine en Tripolitaine, d’où embarque l’essentiel des migrants vers l’Italie. Si bien des abus s’exercent dans ces structures du DCIM, dénoncés par les organisations des droits de l’homme, il semble que la violence la plus systématique et la plus extrême soit surtout le fait des « prisons sauvages » tenues par des organisations criminelles.

Depuis que la polémique s’est envenimée en 2017 sur les conditions de détention des migrants, notamment avec le reportage de CNN sur les « marchés aux esclaves », le gouvernement de Tripoli a apparemment cherché à rationaliser ses dispositifs carcéraux. « Les directions des centres font des efforts, admet Christophe Biteau, de MSF-Libye. Le dialogue entre elles et nous s’est amélioré. Nous avons désormais un meilleur accès aux cellules. Mais le problème est que ces structures sont au départ inadaptées. Il s’agit le plus souvent de simples hangars ou de bâtiments vétustes sans isolation. »

Les responsables de ces centres se plaignent rituellement du manque de moyens qui, selon eux, explique la précarité des conditions de vie des détenus, notamment sanitaires. En privé, certains fustigent la corruption des administrations centrales de Tripoli, qui perçoivent l’argent des Européens sans le redistribuer réellement aux structures de terrain.

Cruel paradoxe
En l’absence d’une refonte radicale de ces circuits de financement, la relative amélioration des conditions de détention observée récemment par des ONG comme MSF pourrait être menacée. « Le principal risque, c’est la congestion qui résulte de la plus grande efficacité des gardes-côtes libyens », met en garde M. Biteau. En effet, les unités de la marine libyenne, de plus en plus aidées et équipées par Bruxelles ou Rome, ont multiplié les interceptions de bateaux de migrants au large du littoral de la Tripolitaine.

Du 1er janvier au 20 juin, elles avaient ainsi reconduit sur la terre ferme près de 9 100 migrants. Du coup, les centres de détention se remplissent à nouveau. Le nombre de prisonniers dans ces centres officiels – rattachés au DCIM – a grimpé en quelques semaines de 5 000 à 7 000, voire à 8 000. Et cela a un impact sanitaire. « Le retour de ces migrants arrêtés en mer se traduit par un regain des affections cutanées en prison », souligne Christophe Biteau.

Simultanément, l’Organisation mondiale des migrations (OIM) intensifie son programme dit de « retours volontaires » dans leurs pays d’origine pour la catégorie des migrants économiques, qu’ils soient détenus ou non. Du 1er janvier au 20 juin, 8 571 d’entre eux – surtout des Nigérians, Maliens, Gambiens et Guinéens – sont ainsi rentrés chez eux. L’objectif que s’est fixé l’OIM est le chiffre de 30 000 sur l’ensemble de 2018. Résultat : les personnes éligibles au statut de réfugié et ne souhaitant donc pas rentrer dans leurs pays d’origine – beaucoup sont des ressortissants de la Corne de l’Afrique – se trouvent piégées en Libye avec le verrouillage croissant de la frontière maritime.

Le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR) des Nations unies en a bien envoyé certains au Niger – autour de 900 – pour que leur demande d’asile en Europe y soit traitée. Cette voie de sortie demeure toutefois limitée, car les pays européens tardent à les accepter. « Les réfugiés de la Corne de l’Afrique sont ceux dont la durée de détention en Libye s’allonge », pointe M. Biteau. Cruel paradoxe pour une catégorie dont la demande d’asile est en général fondée. Une absence d’amélioration significative de leurs conditions de détention représenterait pour eux une sorte de double peine.

▻http://lirelactu.fr/source/le-monde/28fdd3e6-f6b2-4567-96cb-94cac16d078a
#UE #EU

Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press conference with Sven Mikser, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia
Mogherini:

if you are asking me about the waves of migrants who are coming to Europe which means through Libya to Italy in this moment, I can tell you that the way in which we are handling this, thanks also to a very good work we have done with the Foreign Ministers of the all 28 Member States, is through a presence at sea – the European Union has a military mission at sea in the Mediterranean, at the same time dismantling the traffickers networks, having arrested more than 100 smugglers, seizing the boats that are used, saving lives – tens of thousands of people were saved but also training the Libyan coasts guards so that they can take care of the dismantling of the smuggling networks in the Libyan territorial waters.

And we are doing two other things to prevent the losses of lives but also the flourishing of the trafficking of people: inside Libya, we are financing the presence of the International Organisation for Migration and the UNHCR so that they can have access to the detention centres where people are living in awful conditions, save these people, protect these people but also organising voluntary returns to the countries of origin; and we are also working with the countries of origin and transit, in particular Niger, where more than 80% of the flows transit. I can tell you one number that will strike you probably - in the last 9 months through our action with Niger, we moved from 76 000 migrants passing through Niger into Libya to 6 000.

►https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26042/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-joint-press
#Libye #Niger #HCR #IOM #OIM #EU #UE #Mogherini #passeurs #smugglers

Germany, Italy float EU mission to stop migrants in southern Libya

Germany and Italy have reportedly demanded an EU mission along Libya’s southern desert border to stop migrants trying to reach Europe. Both countries said current efforts to stop human smuggling are not working.

▻http://www.dw.com/en/germany-italy-float-eu-mission-to-stop-migrants-in-southern-libya/a-38834301
#Allemagne

Il risultato degli accordi anti-migranti: aumentati i prezzi dei viaggi della speranza

L’accordo tra Europa e Italia da una parte e Niger dall’altra per bloccare il flusso dei migranti verso la Libia e quindi verso le nostre coste ha ottenuto risultati miseri. O meglio un paio di risultati li ha avuti: aumentare il prezzo dei trasporti – e quindi i guadagni dei trafficanti di uomini – e aumentare a dismisura i disagi e i rischi dei disperati che cercano in tutti i modi di attraversare il Mediterraneo. Insomma le misure adottate non scoraggiano chi vuole partire. molti di loro muoiono ma non muore la loro speranza di una vita migliore.

►http://www.africa-express.info/2017/02/03/il-risultato-dellaccordo-con-il-niger-sui-migranti-aumentati-prezzi

Italy, Germany call for EU mission on Libya-Niger border

The German and Italian interior ministers have called for an EU mission to be installed on the border between Libya and Niger to stem migrant crossings to Europe.

▻http://www.euractiv.com/section/africa/news/italy-germany-call-for-eu-mission-on-libya-niger-border

#frontières #Libye #Allemagne #EU #UE #Union_européenne

EU to conduct border patrols in Libya to stop migrants reaching Europe

Strengthening the north African country’s border management is “only a good idea, says Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs

▻http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-libya-border-controls-stop-migrants-reaching-europe-a7736696.html

C’était 2016... et OpenMigration publiait cet article:
Il processo di esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee: tappe e conseguenze di un processo pericoloso

L’esternalizzazione delle politiche europee e italiane sulle migrazioni: Sara Prestianni ci spiega le tappe fondamentali del processo, e le sue conseguenze più gravi in termini di violazioni dei diritti fondamentali.

▻http://openmigration.org/analisi/il-processo-di-esternalizzazione-delle-frontiere-europee-tappe-e-conseguenze-di-un-processo-pericoloso/?platform=hootsuite

Human Act or Devil’s Pact? Human rights aspects of migration agreements between EU and third countries
▻http://www.commissie-meijers.nl/sites/all/files/media/paper_human_act_or_devils_pact_eng_def_18.05.2017.pdf
#rapport

Per bloccare i migranti 610 milioni di euro dall’Europa e 50 dall’Italia

Con la Libia ancora fortemente compromessa, la sfida per la gestione dei flussi di migranti dall’Africa sub-sahariana si è di fatto spostata più a Sud, lungo i confini settentrionali del Niger. Uno dei Paesi più poveri al mondo, ma che in virtù della sua stabilità - ha mantenuto pace e democrazia in un’area lacerata dai conflitti - è oggi il principale alleato delle potenze europee nella regione. Gli accordi prevedono che il Niger in cambio di 610 milioni d’ euro dall’Unione Europea, oltre a 50 promessi dall’Italia, sigilli le proprie frontiere settentrionali e imponga un giro di vite ai traffici illegali. È dal Niger infatti che transita gran parte dei migranti sub-sahariani: 450.000, nel 2016, hanno attraversato il deserto fino alle coste libiche, e in misura inferiore quelle algerine. In Italia, attraverso questa rotta, ne sono arrivati 180.000 l’anno scorso e oltre 40.000 nei primi quattro mesi del 2017.

http://www.lastampa.it/rf/image_lowres/Pub/p4/2017/05/27/Esteri/Foto/RitagliWeb/5bd65877655d34617897f13df4627f46-kQHD-U11002974128966d3-1024x576%40LaStampa.it.jpg

L’#Allemagne s’y met aussi:
Germany pledges €3.5 million aids for Libya-based migration centers

The German Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, arrived on Thursday in Tripoli and met with the Head of the UN-proposed government’s Presidential Council, Fayez Al-Sirraj.

▻https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/germany-pledges-%E2%82%AC35-million-aids-libya-based-migration-centers

Germany’s Sigmar Gabriel promises millions on surprise visit to Libya

The German foreign minister has announced extra aid to improve conditions at refugee camps. He warned of growing instability and urged warring parties to overcome their differences and support the UN-backed government.

▻http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-sigmar-gabriel-promises-millions-on-surprise-visit-to-libya/a-39158636?maca=en-Twitter-sharing

The Human Rights Risks of External Migration Policies

This briefing paper sets out the main human rights risks linked to external migration policies, which are a broad spectrum of actions implemented outside of the territory of the state that people are trying to enter, usually through enhanced cooperation with other countries. From the perspective of international law, external migration policies are not necessarily unlawful. However, Amnesty International considers that several types of external migration policies, and particularly the externalization of border control and asylum-processing, pose significant human rights risks. This document is intended as a guide for activists and policy-makers working on the issue, and includes some examples drawn from Amnesty International’s research in different countries.

▻https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/6200/2017/en

EU effort to halt migrants founders in Libya’s chaos

As Italy’s interior minister later flew in to present the boats officially at a naval base in the Libyan capital, coast guards grumbled that the vessels were old and had little deck space for rescued migrants.

▻http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN19H0MB

Libya’s coast guard abuses migrants despite E.U. funding and training

The European Union has poured tens of millions of dollars into supporting Libya’s coast guard in search-and-rescue operations off the coast. But the violent tactics of some units and allegations of human trafficking have generated concerns about the alliance.

►https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libyas-coast-guard-abuses-desperate-migrants-despite-eu-funding-and-training/2017/07/10/f9bfe952-7362-4e57-8b42-40ae5ede1e26_story.html?tid=ss_tw

Libia, la svolta anti scafisti di Sarraj: “Pronti a bombardare le loro navi”

La mossa del premier è un messaggio all’Ue: disposti a misure estreme. Il governo minacciato dall’avanzata di Ghwell. Oggi Minniti a Tripoli

▻http://www.lastampa.it/2017/07/13/esteri/libia-la-svolta-anti-scafisti-di-sarraj-pronti-a-bombardare-le-loro-navi-3YQPy6251nBIZePe25WeMM/pagina.html

How Libya’s #Fezzan Became Europe’s New Border

The principal gateway into Europe for refugees and migrants runs through the power vacuum in southern Libya’s Fezzan region. Any effort by European policymakers to stabilise Fezzan must be part of a national-level strategy aimed at developing Libya’s licit economy and reaching political normalisation.

►https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/179-how-libyas-fezzan-became-europes-new-border
cc @i_s_

v. aussi ma tentative cartographique :

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L300xH175/SZJB4PApng-33fa4-1880a.png

Avramopoulos says Sophia could be deployed in Libya

(ANSAmed) - BRUSSELS, AUGUST 3 - European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos told ANSA in an interview Thursday that it is possible that the #Operation_Sophia could be deployed in Libyan waters in the future. “At the moment, priority should be given to what can be done under the current mandate of Operation Sophia which was just renewed with added tasks,” he said. “But the possibility of the Operation moving to a third stage working in Libyan waters was foreseen from the beginning. If the Libyan authorities ask for this, we should be ready to act”. (ANSAmed).

▻http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2017/08/03/avramopoulos-says-sophia-could-be-deployed-in-libya_602d3d0e-f817-42b0-ac3

Les ambivalences de Tripoli face à la traite migratoire. Les trafiquants ont réussi à pénétrer des pans entiers des institutions officielles

Par Frédéric Bobin (Zaouïa, Libye, envoyé spécial)

LE MONDE Le 25.08.2017 à 06h39 • Mis à jour le 25.08.2017 à 10h54

Les petits trous dessinent comme des auréoles sur le ciment fauve. Le haut mur hérissé de fils de fer barbelés a été grêlé d’impacts de balles de kalachnikov à deux reprises, la plus récente en juin. « Ils sont bien mieux armés que nous », soupire Khaled Al-Toumi, le directeur du centre de détention de Zaouïa, une municipalité située à une cinquantaine de kilomètres à l’ouest de Tripoli. Ici, au cœur de cette bande côtière de la Libye où se concentre l’essentiel des départs de migrants vers l’Italie, une trentaine d’Africains subsahariens sont détenus – un chiffre plutôt faible au regard des centres surpeuplés ailleurs dans le pays.

C’est que, depuis les assauts de l’établissement par des hommes armés, Khaled Al-Toumi, préfère transférer à Tripoli le maximum de prisonniers. « Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de les protéger », dit-il. Avec ses huit gardes modestement équipés, il avoue son impuissance face aux gangs de trafiquants qui n’hésitent pas à venir récupérer par la force des migrants, dont l’arrestation par les autorités perturbe leurs juteuses affaires. En 2014, ils avaient repris environ 80 Erythréens. Plus récemment, sept Pakistanais. « On reçoit en permanence des menaces, ils disent qu’ils vont enlever nos enfants », ajoute le directeur.

Le danger est quotidien. Le 18 juillet, veille de la rencontre avec Khaled Al-Toumi, soixante-dix femmes migrantes ont été enlevées à quelques kilomètres de là alors qu’elles étaient transférées à bord d’un bus du centre de détention de Gharian à celui de Sorman, des localités voisines de Zaouïa.

On compte en Libye une trentaine de centres de ce type, placés sous la tutelle de la Direction de combat contre la migration illégale (DCMI) rattachée au ministère de l’intérieur. A ces prisons « officielles » s’ajoutent des structures officieuses, administrées ouvertement par des milices. L’ensemble de ce réseau carcéral détient entre 4 000 et 7 000 détenus, selon les Nations unies (ONU).

« Corruption galopante »

A l’heure où l’Union européenne (UE) nourrit le projet de sous-traiter à la Libye la gestion du flux migratoire le long de la « route de la Méditerranée centrale », le débat sur les conditions de détention en vigueur dans ces centres a gagné en acuité.

Une partie de la somme de 90 millions d’euros que l’UE s’est engagée à allouer au gouvernement dit d’« union nationale » de Tripoli sur la question migratoire, en sus des 200 millions d’euros annoncés par l’Italie, vise précisément à l’amélioration de l’environnement de ces centres.

Si des « hot spots » voient le jour en Libye, idée que caressent certains dirigeants européens – dont le président français Emmanuel Macron – pour externaliser sur le continent africain l’examen des demandes d’asile, ils seront abrités dans de tels établissements à la réputation sulfureuse.

La situation y est à l’évidence critique. Le centre de Zaouïa ne souffre certes pas de surpopulation. Mais l’état des locaux est piteux, avec ses matelas légers jetés au sol et l’alimentation d’une préoccupante indigence, limitée à un seul plat de macaronis. Aucune infirmerie ne dispense de soins.

« Je ne touche pas un seul dinar de Tripoli ! », se plaint le directeur, Khaled Al-Toumi. Dans son entourage, on dénonce vertement la « corruption galopante de l’état-major de la DCMI à Tripoli qui vole l’argent ». Quand on lui parle de financement européen, Khaled Al-Toumi affirme ne pas en avoir vu la couleur.

La complainte est encore plus grinçante au centre de détention pour femmes de Sorman, à une quinzaine de kilomètres à l’ouest : un gros bloc de ciment d’un étage posé sur le sable et piqué de pins en bord de plage. Dans la courette intérieure, des enfants jouent près d’une balançoire.

Là, la densité humaine est beaucoup plus élevée. La scène est un brin irréelle : dans la pièce centrale, environ quatre-vingts femmes sont entassées, fichu sur la tête, regard levé vers un poste de télévision rivé au mur délavé. D’autres se serrent dans les pièces adjacentes. Certaines ont un bébé sur les jambes, telle Christiane, une Nigériane à tresses assise sur son matelas. « Ici, il n’y a rien, déplore-t-elle. Nous n’avons ni couches ni lait pour les bébés. L’eau de la nappe phréatique est salée. Et le médecin ne vient pas souvent : une fois par semaine, souvent une fois toutes les deux semaines. »

« Battu avec des tuyaux métalliques »

Non loin d’elle, Viviane, jeune fille élancée de 20 ans, Nigériane elle aussi, se plaint particulièrement de la nourriture, la fameuse assiette de macaronis de rigueur dans tous les centres de détention.

Viviane est arrivée en Libye en 2015. Elle a bien tenté d’embarquer à bord d’un Zodiac à partir de Sabratha, la fameuse plate-forme de départs à l’ouest de Sorman, mais une tempête a fait échouer l’opération. Les passagers ont été récupérés par les garde-côtes qui les ont répartis dans les différentes prisons de la Tripolitaine. « Je n’ai pas pu joindre ma famille au téléphone, dit Viviane dans un souffle. Elle me croit morte. »

Si la visite des centres de détention de Zaouïa ou de Sorman permet de prendre la mesure de l’extrême précarité des conditions de vie, admise sans fard par les officiels des établissements eux-mêmes, la question des violences dans ces lieux coupés du monde est plus délicate.

Les migrants sont embarrassés de l’évoquer en présence des gardes. Mais mises bout à bout, les confidences qu’ils consentent plus aisément sur leur expérience dans d’autres centres permettent de suggérer un contexte d’une grande brutalité. Celle-ci se déploie sans doute le plus sauvagement dans les prisons privées, officieuses, où le racket des migrants est systématique.

Et les centres officiellement rattachés à la DCMI n’en sont pas pour autant épargnés. Ainsi Al Hassan Dialo, un Guinéen rencontré à Zaouïa, raconte qu’il était « battu avec des tuyaux métalliques » dans le centre de Gharian, où il avait été précédemment détenu.

« Extorsion, travail forcé »

On touche là à l’ambiguïté foncière de ce système de détention, formellement rattaché à l’Etat mais de facto placé sous l’influence des milices contrôlant le terrain. Le fait que des réseaux de trafiquants, liés à ces milices, peuvent impunément enlever des détenus au cœur même des centres, comme ce fut le cas à Zaouïa, donne la mesure de leur capacité de nuisance.

« Le système est pourri de l’intérieur », se désole un humanitaire. « Des fonctionnaires de l’Etat et des officiels locaux participent au processus de contrebande et de trafic d’êtres humains », abonde un rapport de la Mission d’appui de l’ONU en Libye publié en décembre 2016.

Dans ces conditions, les migrants font l’objet « d’extorsion, de travail forcé, de mauvais traitements et de tortures », dénonce le rapport. Les femmes, elles, sont victimes de violences sexuelles à grande échelle. Le plus inquiétant est qu’avec l’argent européen promis les centres de détention sous tutelle de la DCMI tendent à se multiplier. Trois nouveaux établissements ont fait ainsi leur apparition ces derniers mois dans le Grand Tripoli.

La duplicité de l’appareil d’Etat, ou de ce qui en tient lieu, est aussi illustrée par l’attitude des gardes-côtes, autres récipiendaires des financements européens et même de stages de formation. Officiellement, ils affirment lutter contre les réseaux de passeurs au maximum de leurs capacités tout en déplorant l’insuffisance de leurs moyens.

« Nous ne sommes pas équipés pour faire face aux trafiquants », regrette à Tripoli Ayoub Kassim, le porte-parole de la marine libyenne. Au détour d’un plaidoyer pro domo, le hiérarque militaire glisse que le problème de la gestion des flux migratoires se pose moins sur le littoral qu’au niveau de la frontière méridionale de la Libye. « La seule solution, c’est de maîtriser les migrations au sud, explique-t-il. Malheureusement, les migrants arrivent par le Niger sous les yeux de l’armée française » basée à Madama…

Opérations de patrouille musclées

Les vieilles habitudes perdurent. Avant 2011, sous Kadhafi, ces flux migratoires – verrouillés ou tolérés selon l’intérêt diplomatique du moment – étaient instrumentalisés pour exercer une pression sur les Européens.

Une telle politique semble moins systématique, fragmentation de l’Etat oblige, mais elle continue d’inspirer le comportement de bien des acteurs libyens usant habilement de la carte migratoire pour réclamer des soutiens financiers.

La déficience des équipements des gardes-côtes ne fait guère de doute. Avec son patrouilleur de 14 mètres de Zaouïa et ses quatre autres bâtiments de 26,4 mètres de Tripoli – souffrant de défaillances techniques bien qu’ayant été réparés en Italie –, l’arsenal en Tripolitaine est de fait limité. Par ailleurs, l’embargo sur les ventes d’armes vers la Libye, toujours en vigueur, en bride le potentiel militaire.

Pourtant, la hiérarchie des gardes-côtes serait plus convaincante si elle était en mesure d’exercer un contrôle effectif sur ses branches locales. Or, à l’évidence, une sérieuse difficulté se pose à Zaouïa. Le chef local de gardes-côtes, Abdelrahman Milad, plus connu sous le pseudonyme d’Al-Bija, joue un jeu trouble. Selon le rapport du panel des experts sur la Libye de l’ONU, publié en juin, Al-Bija doit son poste à Mohamed Koshlaf, le chef de la principale milice de Zaouïa, qui trempe dans le trafic de migrants.

Le patrouilleur d’Al-Bija est connu pour ses opérations musclées. Le 21 octobre 2016, il s’est opposé en mer à un sauvetage conduit par l’ONG Sea Watch, provoquant la noyade de vingt-cinq migrants. Le 23 mai 2017, le même patrouilleur intervient dans la zone dite « contiguë » – où la Libye est juridiquement en droit d’agir – pour perturber un autre sauvetage mené par le navire Aquarius, affrété conjointement par Médecins sans frontières et SOS Méditerranée, et le Juvena, affrété par l’ONG allemande Jugend Rettet.

Duplicité des acteurs libyens

Les gardes-côtes sont montés à bord d’un Zodiac de migrants, subtilisant téléphones portables et argent des occupants. Ils ont également tiré des coups de feu en l’air, et même dans l’eau où avaient sauté des migrants, ne blessant heureusement personne.

« Il est difficile de comprendre la logique de ce type de comportement, commente un humanitaire. Peut-être le message envoyé aux migrants est-il : “La prochaine fois, passez par nous.” » Ce « passez par nous » peut signifier, selon de bons observateurs de la scène libyenne, « passez par le réseau de Mohamed Koshlaf », le milicien que l’ONU met en cause dans le trafic de migrants.

Al-Bija pratiquerait ainsi le deux poids-deux mesures, intraitable ou compréhensif selon que les migrants relèvent de réseaux rivaux ou amis, illustration typique de la duplicité des acteurs libyens. « Al-Bija sait qu’il a commis des erreurs, il cherche maintenant à restaurer son image », dit un résident de Zaouïa. Seule l’expérience le prouvera. En attendant, les Européens doivent coopérer avec lui pour fermer la route de la Méditerranée.

▻http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/08/16/en-libye-nous-ne-sommes-que-des-esclaves_5172760_3212.html

A PATTI CON LA LIBIA

La Libia è il principale punto di partenza di barconi carichi di migranti diretti in Europa. Con la Libia l’Europa deve trattare per trovare una soluzione. La Libia però è anche un paese allo sbando, diviso. C’è il governo di Tripoli retto da Fayez al-Sarraj. Poi c’è il generale Haftar che controlla i due terzi del territorio del paese. Senza contare gruppi, milizie, clan tribali. Il compito insomma è complicato. Ma qualcosa, forse, si sta muovendo.

Dopo decine di vertici inutili, migliaia di morti nel Mediterraneo, promesse non mantenute si torna a parlare con una certa insistenza della necessità di stabilizzare la Libia e aiutare il paese che si affaccia sul Mediterraneo. Particolarmente attiva in questa fase la Francia di Macron, oltre naturalmente all’Italia.

Tra i punti in discussione c’è il coinvolgimento di altri paesi africani di transito come Niger e Ciad che potrebbero fungere da filtro. Oltre naturalmente ad aiuti diretti alla Libia. Assegni milionari destinati a una migliore gestione delle frontiere ad esempio.

Ma è davvero così semplice? E come la mettiamo con le violenze e le torture subite dai migranti nei centri di detenzione? Perché proprio ora l’Europa sembra svegliarsi? Cosa si cela dietro questa competizione soprattutto tra Roma e Parigi nel trovare intese con Tripoli?

▻http://www.rsi.ch/rete-uno/programmi/informazione/modem/A-PATTI-CON-LA-LIBIA-9426001.html

Libyan militia chief admits deal with Tripoli to stem migrant flow

A powerful Libyan militia commander and suspected trafficking kingpin has struck a deal with Tripoli to stem the flow of migrants to Europe in exchange for cars, boats and the recognition of his force as a legitimate security body.

▻https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/libyan-militia-chief-admits-deal-with-tripoli-to-stem-migrant-flow-ahmed
#paywall

Libya’s migration crisis is about more than just security

There’s no shortage of news on Libya’s migration crisis, but there is a serious dearth of policy solutions.

►https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/09/11/libya-s-migration-crisis-about-more-just-security

An Europas neuer Grenze

Um Flüchtlinge abzuhalten, verschiebt Europa seine Grenzen und scheut dabei auch keine dunklen Geschäfte. Die Abwehrzonen reichen bis nach Westafrika.

▻http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-12/fluechtlinge-eu-westafrika-menschenrechte-schlepper-fluechtlingspolitik?wt_zmc=
#Niger

Le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique adopte un programme de soutien à la gestion intégrée des migrations et des frontières en Libye d’un montant de 46 millions d’euros

À la suite du plan d’action de la Commission pour soutenir l’Italie, présenté le 4 juillet, le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique a adopté ce jour un programme doté d’une enveloppe de 46 millions d’euros pour renforcer les capacités des autorités libyennes en matière de gestion intégrée des migrations et des frontières.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2187_fr.htm

L’Europe va verser 200 millions d’euros à la Libye pour stopper les migrants

Les dirigeants européens se retrouvent ce vendredi à Malte pour convaincre la Libye de freiner les traversées de migrants en Méditerranée. Ils devraient proposer d’équiper et former ses gardes-côtes. Le projet d’ouvrir des camps en Afrique refait surface.

▻https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/020217/leurope-va-verser-200-millions-deuros-la-libye-pour-stopper-les-migrants

–-> pour archivage...

Persécutés en Libye : l’Europe est complice

L’Union européenne dans son ensemble, et l’Italie en particulier, sont complices des violations des droits humains commises contre les réfugiés et les migrants en Libye. Enquête.

►https://www.amnesty.fr/refugies-et-migrants/actualites/refugies-et-migrants-persecutes-en-libye-leurope-est-complice

#complicité

Et l’utilisation du mot « persécutés » n’est évidemment pas été choisi au hasard...
–-> ça renvoie à la polémique de qui est #réfugié... et du fait que l’UE essaie de dire que les migrants en Libye sont des #migrants_économiques et non pas des réfugiés (comme ceux qui sont en Turquie et/ou en Grèce, qui sont des syriens, donc des réfugiés)...
Du coup, utiliser le concept de #persécution signifie faire une lien direct avec la Convention sur les réfugiés et admettre que les migrants en Libye sont potentiellement des réfugiés...

La position de l’UE :

#Mogherini was questioned about the EU’s strategy of outsourcing the migration crisis to foreign countries such as Libya and Turkey, which received billions to prevent Syrian refugees from crossing to Greece.

She said the situation was different on two counts: first, the migrants stranded in Libya were not legitimate asylum seekers like those fleeing the war in Syria. And second, different international bodies were in charge.

“When it comes to Turkey, it is mainly refugees from Syria; when it comes to Libya, it is mainly migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the relevant international laws apply in different manners and the relevant UN agencies are different – the UNHC

►https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/libya-human-bondage-risks-overshadowing-africa-eu-summit
voir ici : ►http://seen.li/dqtt

Du coup, @sinehebdo, « #persécutés » serait aussi un mot à ajouter à ta longue liste...

v. aussi:
Libya: Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants

In recent years, hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants have braved the journey across Africa to Libya and often on to Europe. In response, the Libyan authorities have used mass indefinite detention as their primary migration management tool. Regrettably, the European Union and Italy in particular, have decided to reinforce the capacity of Libyan authorities to intercept refugees and migrants at sea and transfer them to detention centres. It is essential that the aims and nature of this co-operation be rethought; that the focus shift from preventing arrivals in Europe to protecting the rights of refugees and migrants.

▻https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/document/?indexNumber=mde19%2f7561%2f2017&language=en
#rapport

Amnesty France : « L’Union Européenne est complice des violations de droits de l’homme en Libye »

Jean-François Dubost est responsable du Programme Protection des Populations (réfugiés, civils dans les conflits, discriminations) chez Amnesty France. L’ONG publie un rapport sur la responsabilité des gouvernements européens dans les violations des droits humains des réfugiés et des migrants en Libye.

▻https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-invite-de-6h20/l-invite-de-6h20-12-decembre-2017
#responsabilité

Accordi e crimini contro l’umanità in un rapporto di Amnesty International

La Rotta del Mediterraneo centrale, dal Corno d’Africa, dall’Africa subsahariana, al Niger al Ciad ed alla Libia costituisce ormai l’unica via di fuga da paesi in guerra o precipitati in crisi economiche che mettono a repentaglio la vita dei loro abitanti, senza alcuna possibile distinzione tra migranti economici e richiedenti asilo. Anche perché in Africa, ed in Libia in particolare, la possibilità concreta di chiedere asilo ed ottenere un permesso di soggiorno o un visto, oltre al riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato da parte dell’UNHCR, è praticamente nulla. Le poche persone trasferite in altri paesi europei dai campi libici (resettlement), come i rimpatri volontari ampiamente pubblicizzati, sono soltanto l’ennesima foglia di fico che si sta utilizzando per nascondere le condizioni disumane in cui centinaia di migliaia di persone vengono trattenute sotto sequestro nei centri di detenzione libici , ufficiali o informali. In tutti gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani, anche subito dopo la visita dei rappresentanti dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM, come dichiarano alcuni testimoni.

▻https://www.a-dif.org/2017/12/12/accordi-e-crimini-contro-lumanita-in-un-rapporto-di-amnesty-international

Bundestag study: Cooperation with Libyan coastguard infringes international conventions

“Libya is unable to nominate a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), and so rescue missions outside its territorial waters are coordinated by the Italian MRCC in Rome. More and more often the Libyan coastguard is being tasked to lead these missions as on-scene-commander. Since refugees are subsequently brought to Libya, the MRCC in Rome may be infringing the prohibition of refoulement contained in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This, indeed, was also the conclusion reached in a study produced by the Bundestag Research Service. The European Union and its member states must therefore press for an immediate end to this cooperation with the Libyan coastguard”, says Andrej Hunko, European policy spokesman for the Left Party.

The Italian Navy is intercepting refugees in the Mediterranean and arranging for them to be picked up by Libyan coastguard vessels. The Bundestag study therefore suspects an infringement of the European Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe. The rights enshrined in the Convention also apply on the high seas.

Andrej Hunko goes on to say, “For two years the Libyan coastguard has regularly been using force against sea rescuers, and many refugees have drowned during these power games. As part of the EUNAVFOR MED military mission, the Bundeswehr has also been cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and allegedly trained them in sea rescue. I regard that as a pretext to arm Libya for the prevention of migration. This cooperation must be the subject of proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, because the people who are being forcibly returned with the assistance of the EU are being inhumanely treated, tortured or killed.

The study also emphasises that the acts of aggression against private rescue ships violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nothing in that Convention prescribes that sea rescues must be undertaken by a single vessel. On the contrary, masters of other ships even have a duty to render assistance if they cannot be sure that all of the persons in distress will be quickly rescued. This is undoubtedly the case with the brutal operations of the Libyan coastguard.

The Libyan Navy might soon have its own MRCC, which would then be attached to the EU surveillance system. The European Commission examined this option in a feasibility study, and Italy is now establishing a coordination centre for this purpose in Tripoli. A Libyan MRCC would encourage the Libyan coastguard to throw its weight about even more. The result would be further violations of international conventions and even more deaths.”

▻https://andrej-hunko.de/presse/3946-bundestag-study-cooperation-with-libyan-coastguard-infringes-inter

v. aussi l’étude:
▻https://andrej-hunko.de/start/download/dokumente/1109-bundestag-research-services-maritime-rescue-in-the-mediterranean/file

Nearly There, but Never Further Away

Europe has outsourced the dirty work of border control to Libyan militias. In doing so, it has turned African migrants into commodities to be captured, sold, and traded like slaves.

https://foreignpolicymag.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/003_unloaded_tripoli.jpg?w=1500#.jpg

Migrants : « La nasse libyenne a été en partie tissée par la France et l’Union européenne »

Dans une tribune publiée dans « Le Monde », Thierry Allafort-Duverger, le directeur général de Médecins Sans Frontières, juge hypocrite la posture de la France, qui favorise l’interception de migrants par les garde-côtes libyens et dénonce leurs conditions de détention sur place.

▻https://www.msf.fr/actualite/articles/migrants-nasse-libyenne-ete-en-partie-tissee-france-et-union-europeenne
#hypocrisie

Libye : derrière l’arbre de « l’esclavage »
Par Ali Bensaâd, Professeur à l’Institut français de géopolitique, Paris-VIII — 30 novembre 2017 à 17:56

L’émotion suscitée par les crimes abjectes révélés par CNN ne doit pas occulter un phénomène bien plus vaste et ancien : celui de centaines de milliers de migrants africains qui vivent et travaillent depuis des décennies, en Libye et au Maghreb, dans des conditions extrêmes d’exploitation et d’atteinte à leur dignité.

L’onde de choc créée par la diffusion de la vidéo de CNN sur la « vente » de migrants en Libye, ne doit pas se perdre en indignations. Et il ne faut pas que les crimes révélés occultent un malheur encore plus vaste, celui de centaines de milliers de migrants africains qui vivent et travaillent depuis des décennies, en Libye et au Maghreb, dans des conditions extrêmes d’exploitation et d’atteinte à leur dignité. Par ailleurs, ces véritables crimes contre l’humanité ne sont, hélas, pas spécifiques de la Libye. A titre d’exemple, les bédouins égyptiens ou israéliens - supplétifs sécuritaires de leurs armées - ont précédé les milices libyennes dans ces pratiques qu’ils poursuivent toujours et qui ont été largement documentées.

Ces crimes contre l’humanité, en raison de leur caractère particulièrement abject, méritent d’être justement qualifiés. Il faut s’interroger si le qualificatif « esclavage », au-delà du juste opprobre dont il faut entourer ces pratiques, est le plus scientifiquement approprié pour comprendre et combattre ces pratiques d’autant que l’esclavage a été une réalité qui a structuré pendant un millénaire le rapport entre le Maghreb et l’Afrique subsaharienne. Il demeure le non-dit des inconscients culturels des sociétés de part et d’autre du Sahara, une sorte de « bombe à retardement ». « Mal nommer un objet, c’est ajouter au malheur de ce monde » (1) disait Camus. Et la Libye est un condensé des malheurs du monde des migrations. Il faut donc les saisir par-delà le raccourci de l’émotion.

D’abord, ils ne sont nullement le produit du contexte actuel de chaos du pays, même si celui-ci les aggrave. Depuis des décennies, chercheurs et journalistes ont documenté la difficile condition des migrants en Libye qui, depuis les années 60, font tourner pour l’essentiel l’économie de ce pays rentier. Leur nombre a pu atteindre certaines années jusqu’à un million pour une population qui pouvait alors compter à peine cinq millions d’habitants. C’est dire leur importance dans le paysage économique et social de ce pays. Mais loin de favoriser leur intégration, l’importance de leur nombre a été conjurée par une précarisation systématique et violente comme l’illustrent les expulsions massives et violentes de migrants qui ont jalonné l’histoire du pays notamment en 1979, 1981, 1985, 1995, 2000 et 2007. Expulsions qui servaient tout à la fois à installer cette immigration dans une réversibilité mais aussi à pénaliser ou gratifier les pays dont ils sont originaires pour les vassaliser. Peut-être contraints, les dirigeants africains alors restaient sourds aux interpellations de leurs migrants pour ne pas contrarier la générosité du « guide » dont ils étaient les fidèles clients. Ils se tairont également quand, en 2000, Moussa Koussa, l’ancien responsable des services libyens, aujourd’hui luxueusement réfugié à Londres, a organisé un véritable pogrom où périrent 500 migrants africains assassinés dans des « émeutes populaires » instrumentalisées. Leur but était cyniquement de faire avaliser, par ricochet, la nouvelle orientation du régime favorable à la normalisation et l’ouverture à l’Europe et cela en attisant un sentiment anti-africain pour déstabiliser la partie de la vieille garde qui y était rétive. Cette normalisation, faite en partie sur le cadavre de migrants africains, se soldera par l’intronisation de Kadhafi comme gardien des frontières européennes. Les migrants interceptés et ceux que l’Italie refoule, en violation des lois européennes, sont emprisonnés, parfois dans les mêmes lieux aujourd’hui, et soumis aux mêmes traitements dégradants.

En 2006, ce n’était pas 260 migrants marocains qui croupissaient comme aujourd’hui dans les prisons libyennes, ceux dont la vidéo a ému l’opinion, mais 3 000 et dans des conditions tout aussi inhumaines. Kadhafi a signé toutes les conventions que les Européens ont voulues, sachant qu’il n’allait pas les appliquer. Mais lorsque le HCR a essayé de prendre langue avec le pouvoir libyen au sujet de la convention de Genève sur les réfugiés, Kadhafi ferma les bureaux du HCR et expulsa, en les humiliant, ses dirigeants le 9 juin 2010. Le même jour, débutait un nouveau round de négociations en vue d’un accord de partenariat entre la Libye et l’Union européenne et le lendemain, 10 juin, Kadhafi était accueilli en Italie. Une année plus tard, alors même que le CNT n’avait pas encore établi son autorité sur le pays et que Kadhafi et ses troupes continuaient à résister, le CNT a été contraint de signer avec l’Italie un accord sur les migrations dont un volet sur la réadmission des migrants transitant par son territoire. Hier, comme aujourd’hui, c’est à la demande expresse et explicite de l’UE que les autorités libyennes mènent une politique de répression et de rétention de migrants. Et peut-on ignorer qu’aujourd’hui traiter avec les pouvoirs libyens, notamment sur les questions sécuritaires, c’est traiter de fait avec des milices dont dépendent ces pouvoirs eux-mêmes pour leur propre sécurité ? Faut-il s’étonner après cela de voir des milices gérer des centres de rétention demandés par l’UE ?

Alors que peine à émerger une autorité centrale en Libye, les pays occidentaux n’ont pas cessé de multiplier les exigences à l’égard des fragiles centres d’un pouvoir balbutiant pour leur faire prendre en charge leur protection contre les migrations et le terrorisme au risque de les fragiliser comme l’a montré l’exemple des milices de Misrata. Acteur important de la réconciliation et de la lutte contre les extrémistes, elles ont été poussées, à Syrte, à combattre Daech quasiment seules. Elles en sont sorties exsangues, rongées par le doute et fragilisées face à leurs propres extrémistes. Les rackets, les kidnappings et le travail forcé pour ceux qui ne peuvent pas payer, sont aussi le lot des Libyens, notamment ceux appartenant au camp des vaincus, détenus dans ce que les Libyens nomment « prisons clandestines ». Libyens, mais plus souvent migrants qui ne peuvent payer, sont mis au travail forcé pour les propres besoins des miliciens en étant « loués » ponctuellement le temps d’une captivité qui dure de quelques semaines à quelques mois pour des sommes dérisoires.

Dans la vidéo de CNN, les sommes évoquées, autour de 400 dinars libyens, sont faussement traduites par les journalistes, selon le taux officiel fictif, en 400 dollars. En réalité, sur le marché réel, la valeur est dix fois inférieure, un dollar valant dix dinars libyens et un euro, douze. Faire transiter un homme, même sur la seule portion saharienne du territoire, rapporte 15 fois plus (500 euros) aux trafiquants et miliciens. C’est par défaut que les milices se rabattent sur l’exploitation, un temps, de migrants désargentés mais par ailleurs encombrants.

La scène filmée par CNN est abjecte et relève du crime contre l’humanité. Mais il s’agit de transactions sur du travail forcé et de corvées. Il ne s’agit pas de vente d’hommes. Ce n’est pas relativiser ou diminuer ce qui est un véritable crime contre l’humanité, mais il faut justement qualifier les objets. Il s’agit de pratiques criminelles de guerre et de banditisme qui exploitent les failles de politiques migratoires globales. On n’assiste pas à une résurgence de l’esclavage. Il ne faut pas démonétiser l’indignation et la vigilance en recourant rapidement aux catégories historiques qui mobilisent l’émotion. Celle-ci retombe toujours. Et pendant que le débat s’enflamme sur « l’esclavage », la même semaine, des centaines d’hommes « libres » sont morts, noyés en Méditerranée, s’ajoutant à des dizaines de milliers qui les avaient précédés.

(1) C’est la véritable expression utilisée par Camus dans un essai de 1944, paru dans Poésie 44, (Sur une philosophie de l’expression), substantiellement très différente, en termes philosophiques, de ce qui sera reporté par la suite : « Mal nommer les choses, c’est ajouter aux malheurs du monde. »

▻http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2017/11/30/libye-derriere-l-arbre-de-l-esclavage_1613662

Europe’s Hypocritical Response to Reports of Slavery in Libya

Despite outrage over recent slavery reports, there is nothing new about migrants suffering in Libya. The E.U. has pushed to bring down their numbers regardless of the human cost, says policy expert Giulia Lagana, calling for the response to go beyond migrant returns.

▻https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/12/12/europes-hypocritical-response-to-reports-of-slavery-in-libya

Quel culot cet #Avramopoulos !

The situation in #Libya is not bad because of the EU. This discourse has to stop. On the contrary, the situation is better thanks to EU and our efforts with international partners to improve the situation on the ground.

https://i.imgur.com/WwA3KXe.png

vu sur twitter le 14.12.2017

The implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya : Bridging theory and practice

▻http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2018-01-31%20D6.2%20Working%20paper%20on%20implementation%20of%20EU%20crisis
#gardes-côtes #Operation_Sophia #EUNAVFOR_MED #passeurs #EUBAM #EU_Integrated_Border_Management_Assistance_Mission #Integrated_Border_Management #EU_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #EUTF #ECHO #IMRCC #sauvetages #mourir_en_mer #SAR #Triton

UE/#OTAN : Le plan européen met en danger les migrants étrangers détenus en Libye

Les migrants et demandeurs d’asile retenus dans ce pays y sont soumis aux risques de #meurtre, de #torture et de #viol

▻https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2016/07/06/ue/otan-le-plan-europeen-met-en-danger-les-migrants-etrangers-detenus-en-libye

Quand l’Union européenne veut bloquer les exilé-e-s en Libye

L’Union européenne renforce les capacités des garde-côtes Libyens pour qu’ils interceptent les bateaux d’exilé-e-s dans les eaux territoriales et les ramènent en Libye. Des navires de l’#OTAN patrouillent au large prétendument pour s’attaquer aux « bateaux de passeurs », ce qui veut dire que des moyens militaires sont mobilisés pour empêcher les exilé-e-s d’atteindre les côtes européennes. L’idée a été émise de faire le tri, entre les personnes qui relèveraient de l’asile et celles qui seraient des « migrants économiques » ayant « vocation » à être renvoyés, sur des bateaux ua large de la Libye plutôt que sur le sol italien, créant ainsi des « #hotspots_flottants« .

▻https://lampedusauneile.wordpress.com/2016/07/15/quand-lunion-europeenne-veut-bloquer-les-exile-e-s-en-lib

Multimedia Story : Trapped in Transit

Doctors Without Borders, which has been operating a search and rescue mission in the central Mediterranean since April 2015, exposes the shocking levels of violence and exploitation reported by asylum seekers who have passed through Libya.

▻https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/07/26/multimedia-story-trapped-in-transit

Le milizie libiche catturano in mare centinaia di migranti in fuga verso l’Europa. E li richiudono in prigione. Intanto l’Unione Europea si prepara ad inviare istruttori per rafforzare le capacità di arresto da parte della polizia libica. Ma in Libia ci sono tante «guardie costiere» ed ognuna risponde ad un governo diverso.

Sembra di ritornare al 2010, quando dopo i respingimenti collettivi in Libia eseguiti direttamente da mezzi della Guardia di finanza italiana a partire dal 7 maggio 2009, in base agli accordi tra Berlusconi e Gheddafi, si inviarono in Libia agenti della Guardia di finanza per istruire la Guardia Costiera libica nelle operazioni di blocco dei migranti che erano riusciti a fuggire imbarcandosi su mezzi sempre più fatiscenti.

▻http://dirittiefrontiere.blogspot.ch/2016/05/le-milizie-libiche-catturano-in-mare.html?m=1

Search and rescue: “I tried to picture what he must have felt, but at some point I could not...”

Oussama is working on board the MV Aquarius, a search and rescue vessel operated jointly by MSF and SOS MEDITERRANEE. Here he shares the story of 17-year-old Jonathan, who came on board in a recent rescue.

http://blogs.msf.org/sites/blogs/files/styles/wysiwyg_full_column/public/uploaded/wrists_900.jpg?itok=m3MTmsU0#.jpg http://blogs.msf.org/sites/blogs/files/styles/wysiwyg_full_column/public/uploaded/stomach_900.jpg?itok=ArejE-rC#.jpg http://blogs.msf.org/sites/blogs/files/styles/wysiwyg_full_column/public/uploaded/foot_900.jpg?itok=TpkJslVP#.jpg

The migrant slave trade is booming in Libya. Why is the world ignoring it?

I’ve seen the dangerous route to Europe through Libya, with thousands of people at the mercy of cruelty for profit. But our leaders prefer to keep them there

►https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/20/migrant-slave-trade-libya-europe?CMP=share_btn_tw

Libya unity govt seeks EU accord on migrants

ROME: Libya’s Vice President Ahmed Maetig has expressed hope that the European Union will enter into an agreement with his country similar to that between the EU and Turkey restricting the flow of migrants to Europe.

▻http://www.manilatimes.net/libya-unity-govt-seeks-eu-accord-on-migrants/257848

Merkel, Hollande Warn Libya May Be Next Big Migrant Staging Area

The European Union may need an agreement with Libya to restrict refugee flows similar to one with Turkey as the North African country threatens to become the next gateway for migrants to Europe, the leaders of Germany and France said.

►http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-07/merkel-hollande-warn-libya-may-be-next-big-migrant-staging-area
#accord #Libye #migrations #réfugiés #asile #politique_migratoire #externalisation #UE #Europe

Le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique adopte un programme de 90 millions € pour la protection des migrants et l’amélioration de la gestion des migrations en Libye

Dans le prolongement de la communication conjointe sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale et de la déclaration de Malte, le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique a adopté ce jour, sur proposition de la Commission européenne, un programme de 90 millions € visant à renforcer la protection des migrants et à améliorer la gestion des migrations en Libye.

▻http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-951_fr.htm

L’Europa non può affidare alla Libia le vite dei migranti

“Il rischio è che Italia ed Europa si rendano complici delle violazioni dei diritti umani commesse in Libia”, dice il direttore generale di Medici senza frontiere (Msf) Arjan Hehenkamp. Mentre le organizzazioni non governative che salvano i migranti nel Mediterraneo centrale sono al centro di un processo di criminalizzazione, l’Italia e l’Europa stanno cercando di delegare alle autorità libiche la soluzione del problema degli sbarchi.

▻http://www.internazionale.it/video/2017/05/04/ong-libia-migranti

MSF accuses Libyan coastguard of endangering people’s lives during Mediterranean rescue

During a rescue in the Mediterranean Sea on 23 May, the Libyan coastguard approached boats in distress, intimidated the passengers and then fired gunshots into the air, threatening people’s lives and creating mayhem, according to aid organisations Médecins Sans Frontières and SOS Méditerranée, whose teams witnessed the violent incident.

▻http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-accuses-libyan-coastguard-endangering-people%E2%80%99s-lives-during-mediter

EU to bear more financial responsibility toward Libyan coast guard to fight illegal immigration

EU council president Donald Tusk, in a letter addressed to EU leaders on Wednesday (21 June), said more must be done to keep people from disembarking from Libya’s 1,900 km coastline, EUobserver indicated.

▻http://www.libyanexpress.com/eu-to-bear-more-financial-responsibility-toward-libyan-coast-guard-to

Enquête. Le chaos libyen est en train de déborder en Méditerranée

Pour qu’ils bloquent les flux migratoires, l’Italie, appuyée par l’UE, a scellé un accord avec les gardes-côtes libyens. Mais ils ne sont que l’une des très nombreuses forces en présence dans cet État en lambeaux. Désormais la Méditerranée devient dangereuse pour la marine italienne, les migrants, et les pêcheurs.

http://www.courrierinternational.com/sites/ci_master/files/styles/image_original_1280/public/assets/images/p-20-kichka.jpg?itok=LqhD4mEW#.jpg

Migranti. La Corte dell’Aja indaga sulla Guardia costiera libica: «Gravi crimini»

L’ultimo episodio acquisito nel fascicolo d’indagine è di un mese fa, quando un pattugliatore libico aprì il fuoco, ad altezza d’uomo, contro un vecchio peschereccio carico di migranti.

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/l-aja-accusa-la-guardi-costiera-libica
#CPI #cour_pénale_internationale #crimes_contre_l'humanité

Libya’s coast guard abuses migrants despite E.U. funding and training

ZAWIYAH, Libya — The video showed a small rubber dinghy crowded with terrified migrants. Next to it, a uniformed man in a Libyan coast guard boat was yelling and wielding a bullwhip.

►https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libyas-coast-guard-abuses-desperate-migrants-despite-eu-funding-and-training/2017/07/10/f9bfe952-7362-4e57-8b42-40ae5ede1e26_story.html?tid=ss_tw

Architect of EU-Turkey refugee pact pushes for West Africa deal

“Every migrant from West Africa who survives the dangerous journey from Libya to Italy remains in Europe for years afterwards — regardless of the outcome of his or her asylum application,” Knaus said in an interview.

To accelerate the deportations of rejected asylum seekers to West African countries that are considered safe, the EU needs to forge agreements with their governments, he said.

▻http://www.politico.eu/article/migration-italy-libya-architect-of-eu-turkey-refugee-pact-pushes-for-west-a
cc @i_s_

Avec ce commentaire de Francesca Spinelli :

http://i.imgur.com/0O3Vk6t.png

Pour 20 milliards, la Libye pourrait bloquer les migrants à sa frontière sud

L’homme fort de l’Est libyen, Khalifa Haftar, estime à « 20 milliards de dollars sur 20 ou 25 ans » l’effort européen nécessaire pour aider à bloquer les flux de migrants à la frontière sud du pays.

https://www.rts.ch/2017/08/12/16/32/8837952.image?w=1500&h=844#.jpg

▻https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/8837947-pour-20-milliards-la-libye-pourrait-bloquer-les-migrants-a-sa-frontiere-

Il reportage. Libia, migranti in ostaggio: «L’Ue prima ci paghi»

I trafficanti vogliono fare pesare lo stop al business delle traversate verso l’Italia per ottenere alti «risarcimenti» dalle autorità. «I prigionieri sono la nostra assicurazione»

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/migranti-in-ostaggio-lue-prima-ci-paghi

Bruxelles offre 200 millions d’euros à la Libye pour freiner l’immigration

La Commission européenne a mis sur la table de nouvelles mesures pour freiner l’arrivée de migrants via la mer méditerranée, dont 200 millions d’euros pour la Libye. Un article de notre partenaire Euroefe.

►http://www.euractiv.fr/section/l-europe-dans-le-monde/news/bruxelles-offre-200-millions-deuros-a-la-libye-pour-freiner-limmigration/?nl_ref=29858390

#Libye #asile #migrations #accord #deal #réfugiés #externalisation
cc @reka

EU boosts Libya coastguard training to stem migrant flow

The European Union on Monday (30 January) kicked off the second stage of a training scheme for Libya’s coastguard to stem the trafficking of migrants.

▻http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-boosts-libya-coastguard-training-to-stem-migrant-flow

Libya may allow EU ships to pursue people-smugglers in its waters

UN-backed PM says foreign ships could be permitted to operate in Libyan waters alongside national military coastguard

▻https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/01/nato-eu-ships-tackle-people-trafficking-libya-mediterranean-refugees-mi
#NATO #OTAN

Stuck in Libya. Migrants and (Our) Political Responsibilities

Fighting at Tripoli’s international airport was still under way when, in July 2014, the diplomatic missions of European countries, the United States and Canada were shut down. At that time Italy decided to maintain a pied-à-terre in place in order to preserve the precarious balance of its assets in the two-headed country, strengthening security at its local headquarters on Tripoli’s seafront. On the one hand there was no forsaking the Mellitah Oil & Gas compound, controlled by Eni and based west of Tripoli. On the other, the Libyan coast also had to be protected to assist the Italian forces deployed in Libyan waters and engaged in the Mare Nostrum operation to dismantle the human smuggling network between Libya and Italy, as per the official mandate. But the escalation of the civil war and the consequent deterioration of security conditions led Rome to leave as well, in February 2015.

▻http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/stuck-libya-migrants-and-our-political-responsibilities-16294

Le deal de l’Europe avec la Libye pour freiner l’immigration

Les dirigeants européens se retrouvent ce vendredi à Malte pour convaincre la Libye de freiner les traversées de migrants en Méditerranée. Ils devraient proposer d’équiper et former ses gardes-côtes. Le projet d’ouvrir des camps en Afrique refait surface.

►https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/020217/le-deal-de-leurope-avec-la-libye-pour-freiner-l-immigration

Second batch of Libyan coastguards to begin EU #training

As a large group of Libyan coastguards completes its training aboard EU naval vessels a smaller contingent is begin a new course starting ashore in Greece.

▻https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/01/31/second-batch-of-libyan-coastguards-to-begin-eu-training

Why a refugee deal with Libya is a bad idea

The Maltese plan is less about managing migration and more about reducing the numbers arriving in Europe at any cost.

▻http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_why_a_refugee_deal_with_libya_is_a_bad_idea_7222

Libia: diritto d’asilo cercasi, smarrito fra Bruxelles e Tripoli (passando per Roma)

La recente Comunicazione congiunta della Commissione e dell’Alto rappresentante per la politica estera dell’UE, il Memorandum Italia-Libia firmato il 2 febbraio e la Dichiarazione uscita dal Consiglio europeo di venerdì 3 alla Valletta hanno delineato un progetto di chiusura della “rotta” del Mediterraneo centrale che rischia di seppellire, di fatto, il diritto d’asilo nel Paese e ai suoi confini.

▻http://viedifuga.org/libia-diritto-d-asilo-cercasi-smarrito-fra-bruxelles-e-tripoli