• Rapporti di monitoraggio

    Sin dal 2016 il progetto ha pubblicato report di approfondimento giuridico sulle situazioni di violazione riscontrate presso le diverse frontiere oggetto delle attività di monitoraggio. Ciascun report affronta questioni ed aspetti contingenti e particolarmente interessanti al fine di sviluppare azioni di contenzioso strategico.

    Elenco dei rapporti pubblicati in ordine cronologico:

    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri a Ventimiglia (giugno 2015): profili di illegittimità“

    Il report è stato redatto nel giugno del 2015 è costituisce una prima analisi delle principali criticità riscontrabili alla frontiera italo-francese verosimilmente sulla base dell’Accordo bilaterale fra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Governo della Repubblica francese sulla cooperazione transfrontaliera in materia di polizia e dogana (Accordo di Chambery)
    #Vintimille #Ventimiglia #frontière_sud-alpine #Alpes #Menton #accord_bilatéral #Accord_de_Chambéry #réadmissions

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091
    Et plus précisément ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091#message887941

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    “Le riammissioni di cittadini stranieri alla frontiera di Chiasso: profili di illegittimità”

    Il report è stato redatto nell’estate del 2016 per evidenziare la situazione critica che si era venuta a creare in seguito al massiccio afflusso di cittadini stranieri in Italia attraverso la rotta balcanica scatenata dalla crisi siriana. La frontiera italo-svizzera è stata particolarmente interessata da numerosi tentativi di attraversamento del confine nei pressi di Como e il presente documento fornisce una analisi giuridica delle criticità riscontrate.

    Ajouté à la #métaliste de liens autour d’#accords_de_réadmission entre pays européens...
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091
    Et plus précisément ici:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/736091#message887940

    –-----

    “Lungo la rotta del Brennero”

    Il report, redatto con la collaborazione della associazione Antenne Migranti e il contributo della fondazione Alex Langer nel 2017, analizza le dinamiche della frontiera altoatesina e sviluppa una parte di approfondimento sulle violazioni relative al diritto all’accoglienza per richiedenti asilo e minori, alle violazioni all’accesso alla procedura di asilo e ad una analisi delle modalità di attuazione delle riammissioni alla frontiera.

    #Brenner #Autriche

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    “Attività di monitoraggio ai confini interni italiani – Periodo giugno 2018 – giugno 2019”

    Report analitico che riporta i dati raccolti e le prassi di interesse alle frontiere italo-francesi, italo-svizzere, italo-austriache e italo slovene. Contiene inoltre un approfondimento sui trasferimenti di cittadini di paesi terzi dalle zone di frontiera indicate all’#hotspot di #Taranto e centri di accoglienza del sud Italia.

    #Italie_du_Sud

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    “Report interno sopralluogo Bosnia 27-31 ottobre 2019”

    Report descrittivo a seguito del sopralluogo effettuato da soci coinvolti nel progetto Medea dal 27 al 31 ottobre sulla condizione delle persone in transito in Bosnia. Il rapporto si concentra sulla descrizione delle strutture di accoglienza presenti nel paese, sull’accesso alla procedura di protezione internazionale e sulle strategie di intervento future.

    #Bosnie #Bosnie-Herzégovine

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    “Report attività frontiere interne terrestri, porti adriatici e Bosnia”

    Rapporto di analisi dettagliata sulle progettualità sviluppate nel corso del periodo luglio 2019 – luglio 2020 sulle diverse frontiere coinvolte (in particolare la frontiera italo-francese, italo-slovena, la frontiera adriatica e le frontiere coinvolte nella rotta balcanica). Le novità progettuali più interessanti riguardano proprio l’espansione delle progettualità rivolte ai paesi della rotta balcanica e alla Grecia coinvolta nelle riammissioni dall’Italia. Nel periodo ad oggetto del rapporto il lavoro ha avuto un focus principale legato ad iniziative di monitoraggio, costituzione della rete ed azioni di advocacy.

    #Slovénie #mer_Adriatique #Adriatique

    https://medea.asgi.it/rapporti

    #rapport #monitoring #medea #ASGI
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières
    #frontières_internes #frontières_intérieures #Balkans #route_des_balkans

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • EU pays for surveillance in Gulf of Tunis

    A new monitoring system for Tunisian coasts should counter irregular migration across the Mediterranean. The German Ministry of the Interior is also active in the country. A similar project in Libya has now been completed. Human rights organisations see it as an aid to „#pull_backs“ contrary to international law.

    In order to control and prevent migration, the European Union is supporting North African states in border surveillance. The central Mediterranean Sea off Malta and Italy, through which asylum seekers from Libya and Tunisia want to reach Europe, plays a special role. The EU conducts various operations in and off these countries, including the military mission „#Irini“ and the #Frontex mission „#Themis“. It is becoming increasingly rare for shipwrecked refugees to be rescued by EU Member States. Instead, they assist the coast guards in Libya and Tunisia to bring the people back. Human rights groups, rescue organisations and lawyers consider this assistance for „pull backs“ to be in violation of international law.

    With several measures, the EU and its member states want to improve the surveillance off North Africa. Together with Switzerland, the EU Commission has financed a two-part „#Integrated_Border_Management Project“ in Tunisia. It is part of the reform of the security sector which was begun a few years after the fall of former head of state Ben Ali in 2011. With one pillar of this this programme, the EU wants to „prevent criminal networks from operating“ and enable the authorities in the Gulf of Tunis to „save lives at sea“.

    System for military and border police

    The new installation is entitled „#Integrated_System_for_Maritime_Surveillance“ (#ISMariS) and, according to the Commission (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000891-ASW_EN.html), is intended to bring together as much information as possible from all authorities involved in maritime and coastal security tasks. These include the Ministry of Defence with the Navy, the Coast Guard under the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard, and IT management and telecommunications authorities. The money comes from the #EU_Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa, which was established at the Valletta Migration Summit in 2015. „ISMariS“ is implemented by the Italian Ministry of the Interior and follows on from an earlier Italian initiative. The EU is financing similar projects with „#EU4BorderSecurity“ not only in Tunisia but also for other Mediterranean countries.

    An institute based in Vienna is responsible for border control projects in Tunisia. Although this #International_Centre_for_Migration_Policy_Development (ICMPD) was founded in 1993 by Austria and Switzerland, it is not a governmental organisation. The German Foreign Office has also supported projects in Tunisia within the framework of the #ICMPD, including the establishment of border stations and the training of border guards. Last month German finally joined the Institute itself (https://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/download/dokumente/1493-deutscher-beitritt-zum-international-centre-for-migration-policy-development/file). For an annual contribution of 210,000 euro, the Ministry of the Interior not only obtains decision-making privileges for organizing ICMPD projects, but also gives German police authorities the right to evaluate any of the Institute’s analyses for their own purposes.

    It is possible that in the future bilateral German projects for monitoring Tunisian maritime borders will also be carried out via the ICMPD. Last year, the German government supplied the local coast guard with equipment for a boat workshop. In the fourth quarter of 2019 alone (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/194/1919467.pdf), the Federal Police carried out 14 trainings for the national guard, border police and coast guard, including instruction in operating „control boats“. Tunisia previously received patrol boats from Italy and the USA (https://migration-control.info/en/wiki/tunisia).

    Vessel tracking and coastal surveillance

    It is unclear which company produced and installed the „ISMariS“ surveillance system for Tunisia on behalf of the ICPMD. Similar facilities for tracking and displaying ship movements (#Vessel_Tracking_System) are marketed by all major European defence companies, including #Airbus, #Leonardo in Italy, #Thales in France and #Indra in Spain. However, Italian project management will probably prefer local companies such as Leonardo. The company and its spin-off #e-GEOS have a broad portfolio of maritime surveillance systems (https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/sea/maritime-domain-awareness/coastal-surveillance-systems).

    It is also possible to integrate satellite reconnaissance, but for this the governments must conclude further contracts with the companies. However, „ISMariS“ will not only be installed as a Vessel Tracking System, it should also enable monitoring of the entire coast. Manufacturers promote such #Coastal_Surveillance_Systems as a technology against irregular migration, piracy, terrorism and smuggling. The government in Tunisia has defined „priority coastal areas“ for this purpose, which will be integrated into the maritime surveillance framework.

    Maritime „#Big_Data

    „ISMariS“ is intended to be compatible with the components already in place at the Tunisian authorities, including coastguard command and control systems, #radar, position transponders and receivers, night vision equipment and thermal and optical sensors. Part of the project is a three-year maintenance contract with the company installing the „ISMariS“.

    Perhaps the most important component of „ISMariS“ for the EU is a communication system, which is also included. It is designed to improve „operational cooperation“ between the Tunisian Coast Guard and Navy with Italy and other EU Member States. The project description mentions Frontex and EUROSUR, the pan-European surveillance system of the EU Border Agency, as possible participants. Frontex already monitors the coastal regions off Libya and Tunisia (https://insitu.copernicus.eu/FactSheets/CSS_Border_Surveillance) using #satellites (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003212-ASW_EN.html) and an aerial service (https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/26/frontex-air-service-reconnaissance-for-the-so-called-libyan-coast-guar).

    #EUROSUR is now also being upgraded, Frontex is spending 2.6 million Euro (https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:109760-2020:TEXT:EN:HTML) on a new application based on artificial intelligence. It is to process so-called „Big Data“, including not only ship movements but also data from ship and port registers, information on ship owners and shipping companies, a multi-year record of previous routes of large ships and other maritime information from public sources on the Internet. The contract is initially concluded for one year and can be extended up to three times.

    Cooperation with Libya

    To connect North African coastguards to EU systems, the EU Commission had started the „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ project two years after the fall of North African despots. To combat irregular migration, from 2013 onwards Spain, Italy and Malta have trained a total of 141 members of the Libyan coast guard for sea rescue. In this way, „Seahorse Mediterranean“ has complemented similar training measures that Frontex is conducting for the Coastal Police within the framework of the EU mission #EUBAM_Libya and the military mission #EUNAVFOR_MED for the Coast Guard of the Tripolis government.

    The budget for „#Seahorse_Mediterranean“ is indicated by the Commission as 5.5 million Euro (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-000892-ASW_EN.html), the project was completed in January 2019. According to the German Foreign Office (http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/196/1919625.pdf), Libya has signed a partnership declaration for participation in a future common communication platform for surveillance of the Mediterranean. Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are also to be persuaded to participate. So far, however, the governments have preferred unilateral EU support for equipping and training their coastguards and navies, without having to make commitments in projects like „Seahorse“, such as stopping migration and smuggling on the high seas.

    https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/28/eu-pays-for-surveillance-in-gulf-of-tunis

    #Golfe_de_Tunis #surveillance #Méditerranée #asile #migrations #réfugiés #militarisation_des_frontières #surveillance_des_frontières #Tunisie #externalisation #complexe_militaro-industriel #Algérie #Egypte #Suisse #EU #UE #Union_européenne #Trust_Fund #Emergency_Trust_Fund_for_Africa #Allemagne #Italie #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_tunisiens #intelligence_artificielle #IA #données #Espagne #Malte #business

    ping @reka @isskein @_kg_ @rhoumour @karine4

    –—

    Ajouté à cette métaliste sur l’externalisation des frontières :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/731749#message765330

    Et celle-ci sur le lien entre développement et contrôles frontaliers :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/733358#message768701

  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAuv1QyP8l0&feature=emb_logo

    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).
    Lobbying

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.

    https://www.tni.org/en/businessbuildingwalls

    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :


    https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/business_of_building_walls_-_full_report.pdf

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/809783
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    • La costruzione di muri: un business

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

      Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

      Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
      Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

      Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

      È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

      Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

      Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

      Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
      – Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
      – le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
      – e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
      Dei budget fiorenti

      Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

      Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

      Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
      I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

      Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

      – Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
      Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
      Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      – La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
      Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

      – Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

      Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

      Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

      Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
      Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

      La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

      Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

      I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

      Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
      Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

      I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

      Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

      Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

      La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

      Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

      La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

      La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
      CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
      Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

      L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
      I muri virtuali

      I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
      Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

      Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

      Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

      GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
      Lobby

      Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

      Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

      Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
      Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

      I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

      Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

      Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
      Un business mortale, una scelta

      La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

      Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

      Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

      È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

      Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

    • How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

      In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

      In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

      While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

      The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

      This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

      An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

      Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

      EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

      These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

      Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

      The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

      This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

      The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

      This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

      The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

      These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

      Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

      The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

      The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

      The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

      https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
      #industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

      –—

      Pour @etraces :

      Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

    • GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

      The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

      This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

      The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

      The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

      A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

      Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

      https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

      Pour télécharger le rapport_
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

      #rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

    • #Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

      For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

      The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

      Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

      Air service to be supplemented with #drones

      The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

      In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

      Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

      Real-time tracking with FlightAware

      The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

      Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

      Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

      „Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

      In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

      Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

      Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

      Frontex watches refugees drown

      This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

      The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

      However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

      https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
      #avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

    • Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
      This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

      - #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
      - #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
      - #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
      - #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
      https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

      #conférence #webinar

    • Le business meurtrier des frontières

      Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

      Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

      Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
      La fin de la fin des frontières

      Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

      D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

      Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
      L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

      La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

      De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

      Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
      Le business des barrières

      Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

      L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

      Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
      « Mourir aux frontières »

      Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

      Sur le blog :

      – Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

      – Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

      – Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

      http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

    • How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

      The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

      Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

      Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

      As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

      The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

      The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

      These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

      But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

      Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

      “These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

      Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

      “For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

      Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

      In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

      “They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

      According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

      As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

      Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

      He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

      https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

      En français:
      À Calais, la ville s’emmure
      https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

    • Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

      Executive summary

      Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

      States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

      This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

      This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
      A booming industry

      The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

      The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

      – The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

      - The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

      – Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

      - Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

      - Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

      Financing the industry

      The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

      – The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

      - Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

      - Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

      - In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

      In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
      Human rights and the border industry

      Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

      Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

      The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

      – Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

      – The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

      – The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

      - The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

      – The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

      The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

      The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

      The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

      The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
      Time to divest

      The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

      There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

      Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

      https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

      #TNI #rapport
      #industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

      #Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
      #contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

    • Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

      This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

      Key findings

      – The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

      – Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

      – Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

      - The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

      – Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

      - Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

      - Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

      - Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

      - The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

      – The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

      - The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

      – The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

      https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

      pour télécharger le rapport :
      https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

      #externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

  • Drone Surveillance Operations in the Mediterranean: The Central Role of the Portuguese Economy and State in EU Border Control

    Much has been written in the past years about the dystopic vision of EU borders increasingly equipped with drone surveillance (see here: http://www.europeanpublicaffairs.eu/high-tech-fortress-europe-frontex-and-the-dronization-of-borde, here: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/10/the-next-phase-of-european-border-and.html, here: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/EU-startet-Langstreckendrohnen-zur-Grenzueberwachung-4038306.html and here: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2018/11/role-technology). Yet, when the first joint drone surveillance operation of #Frontex, the #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) and Portuguese authorities was launched on 25 September 2018, there was a lack of response both from the media and concerned activists or researchers. Yet, the EMSA offered details about the operation on its website, and Frontex as well. In addition, Frontex mentioned in its press statement parallel operations undertaken in Italy and Greece in the same period.

    These operations were a crucial step for the setup of the joint European information system for border surveillance, #EUROSUR. The drone surveillance program in the context of Frontex operations is a major step in the operational setup of the EUROSUR program that aims to integrate databases and national coordination centres of 24 European countries. EUROSUR was officially introduced with a policy paper in 2008, and the system itself was launched on 1 December 2013 as a mechanism of information exchange among EU member states. But it is not yet fully operational, and drone surveillance is commonly seen as a central component for full operationability. Thus, the cooperation between the EMSA, Frontex and the Portuguese state in the recent operation is a crucial milestone to achieve the aim of EUROSUR to create a unified European border surveillance system.

    This is why the operation launched in Portugal in September 2018 is of higher significance to the ones in Italy and Greece since it includes not only national authorities but also the EMSA, located in Lisbon, as a new key actor for border surveillance. EMSA was founded in 2002 as a response to various shipping disasters that lead to environmental pollution and originally focuses on monitoring the movement of ships, with a focus on the safety of shipping operations, environmental safety at sea and the trading of illegal goods via maritime transport.

    In 2016 the EMSA was allocated 76 million Euros in a bid for the production of drones for the surveillance of the Mediterranenan in the context of Frontex missions. EMSA`s bid foresaw that drones would be hired by EMSA itself. EMSA would run the operation of drones and share real-time data with Frontex. The largest part of this bid, 66 million Euros, went to the Portuguese company #Tekever, while smaller portions went to the Italian defence company #Leonardo and to the Portuguese air force that will operate drones produced by the Portuguese company #UA_Vision. At the same time, the successful bid of Tekever and the integration of Portuguese authorities in surveillance operations catapults Portugal onto the map of the defence and surveillance industry that profits immensely from the recent technological craze around border surveillance (see here, here and here).

    Lisbon-based Tekever set up a factory for the production of drones in the Portuguese mainland in #Ponte_de_Sor, an emerging new hub for the aerospace industry. Together with French #Collecte_Localisation_Service, which specialises in maritime surveillance, Tekever founded the consortium #REACT in order to produce those specific drones. Under the Portuguese operation, ground control, i.e. the technical coordination of the flight of the drones, was located in Portugal under the authority of the Portuguese air force, while the operation was coordinated remotely by Frontex experts and Portuguese authorities in the #Frontex_Situational_Centre in Poland where data were shared in real-time with EMSA. This first operation is a crucial step, testing the technical and administrative cooperation between EMSA and Frontex, and the functionality of the drones that were specifically produced for this purpose. These drones are lighter than the ones used in Greece and Italy, and they are equipped with special cameras and #radars that can detect ship movements and receive emergency calls from the sea. This allows to run data collected by the drones through an algorithm that is programmed to distinguish so-called ´#migrant_vessels´ from other ships and boats.

    The Portuguese government has set up a number of initiatives to foster this industry. For example, a national strategy called #Space_2030 (#Estratégia_Portugal_Espaço_2030) was launched in 2018, and the newly founded #Portuguese_Space_Agency (#Agência_Espacial_Portuguesa) will begin to work in the first months of 2019. The fact that border surveillance is one of the larger European programs boosting the defence and surveillance industry financially has not generated any controversy in Portugal; neither the fact that a center-left government, supported by two radical left parties is propping up surveillance, aerospace and defence industries. The colonial continuities of this industrial strategy are all too visible since narratives like ‘from the discovery of the sea to the technology of space’ are used not only by industry actors, but also, for example, by the Portuguese Chamber of Commerce in the UK on its website. In this way, social and political #domination of non-European territories and the control of the movement of racialized bodies are reduced to the fact of technological capability – in the colonial period the navigation of the seas with optical instruments, astronomic knowledge and ships, and today the electronic monitoring of movements on the sea with drones and integrated computer systems. The Portuguese aerospace industry is therefore presented as a cultural heritage that continues earlier technological achievements that became instruments to set up a global empire.

    The lack of any mention about the start of the drone surveillance programme does not only demonstrate that border surveillance goes largely unquestioned in Europe, but also that the sums spent for surveillance and defence by EU agencies create incentives to engage more in the defence and surveillance industry. This goes all the more for countries that have been hit hard by austerity and deindustrialisation, such as Portugal. The recent increase of 9.3 billion Euros for the period 2021 to 2027 for border surveillance funding in the EU with the creation of the #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund focused on border protection, is a telling example of the focus of current EU industrial policies. For the same period, the European Commission has earmarked 2.2 billion Euro for Frontex in order to acquire, operate and maintain surveillance assets like drones, cameras, fences, and the like. In this situation, the political consensus among EU governments to restrict migration reinforces the economic interests of the defence industry and vice versa, and the interest of national governments to attract #high-tech investment adds to this. Those lock-in effects could probably only be dismantled through a public debate about the selective nature of the entrepreneurial state whose funding has decisive influence on which industries prosper.

    While the Portuguese government does not currently have a single helicopter operating in order to control and fight forest fires that have caused more than 100 deaths in the past two years, much EU and national public funding goes into technology aimed at the control of racialized bodies and the observation of earth from space. At the same time, there is considerable concern among experts that surveillance technology used for military means and border security will be rolled out over the entire population in the future for general policing purposes. For this reason, it remains important to keep an eye on which technologies are receiving large public funds and what are its possible uses.


    https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/02/drone
    #drones #contrôles_frontaliers #frontières #technologie #complexe_militaro-industriel #technologie_de_la_surveillance #externalisation #business #algorithme #colonialisme #néo-colonialisme #impérialisme #héritage_culturel #austérité #désindustrialisation

    ping @daphne @marty @albertocampiphoto @fil

    • Des drones en renfort dans l’#opération_Sophia

      Pour renforcer la surveillance aérienne, après le départ des navires, l’opération Sophia déployée en Méditerranée (alias #EUNAVFOR_Med) va bénéficier d’un renfort d’au moins un drone #Predator de l’aeronautica militare.

      L’#Italie a indiqué sa disponibilité à fournir un drone à l’opération Sophia, selon nos informations confirmées à bonne source. Ce pourrait être un #MQ-9A Predator B, la version la plus avancée et la plus récente du drone, d’une longueur de 10,80 m avec une envergure de plus de 20 mètres, qui peut voler à 445 km / heure. De façon alternative, selon les moyens disponibles, un MQ-1C Predator A, plus modeste (longueur de 8,20 m et envergure de 14,80 m), pouvant voler à 160 km/heure, pourrait aussi être déployé.

      http://www.bruxelles2.eu/2019/04/09/des-drones-en-renfort-dans-loperation-sophia
      #operation_Sophia

  • Action fiche of the #EU_Trust_Fund to be used for the decisions of the Operational Committee

    Discussions have been ongoing for a number of months about possible support to the Libyan coastguards for better patrolling and rescuing at sea. The situation remains critical also at the Libyan southern border, where authorities have very limited capacity.The European Council of 22-23 June has called for action. It specifically mentioned that "training and equipping the Libyan Coast Guard is a key component of the EU approach and should be speeded up"and that “cooperation with countries of origin and transit shall be reinforced in order to stem the migratory pressure on Libya’s and other neighbouring countries’ land borders”.Italy has come forward in May 2017 with a major proposal for integrated border and migrationmanagement in Libya which responds to the above mentioned priorities.

    The dual objective of this action is to improve the Libyan capacity to control their borders and provide for lifesaving rescue at sea, in a manner fully compliant with international human rights obligations and standards. This #Action_Fiche covers the first phase of support. Additional funding should be envisaged in 2018 for its completion (for which the current estimate stands at EUR 38 million).

    https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-noa-ly-04_fin_11.pdf
    #Trust_Fund #Libye #frontières #externalisation #asile #migrations #réfugiés #gardes-côtes #gardes-côtes_libyens #contrôles_frontaliers

    La même chose, mais pour la #Maroc:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/763541

    • Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya – First phase

      Summary

      The programme aims to strengthen the capacity of relevant Libyan authorities in the areas of border and migration management, including border control and surveillance, addressing smuggling and trafficking of human beings, search and rescue at sea and in the desert.
      Main objectives

      The specific objectives of the project are: 1) to enhance operational capacity of the competent Libyan authorities in maritime surveillance, tackling irregular border crossings, including the strengthening of SAR operations and related coast guard tasks; 2) to set up basic facilities in order to enable the Libyan guards to better organise their SAR, border surveillance and control operations; 3) to assist the concerned Libyan authorities in defining and declaring a Libyan SAR Region with adequate SAR Standard Operation Procedures, including finalising the studies for fully fledged operational rooms; and 4) to develop operational capacity of competent Libyan authorities in land border surveillance and control in the desert, focusing on the sections of southern borders most affected by illegal crossings.

      https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-first-phase_en
      #integrated_border_management

    • Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya - Second phase

      Summary

      The Overall Objective of the programme is to develop the overall capacity of the relevant Libyan authorities and strengthen institutional reform in the areas of land and sea border control and surveillance; addressing smuggling and trafficking of human beings; Search & Rescue at sea (SAR); and on land contributing to a human response of the migration crises in respect of international and human right laws.
      Main objectives

      The specific objectives of the project are as follows:
      1. Capacity development and institutional strengthening of the relevant authorities (including #LCGPS and #GACS) covering all sea and land borders including the development SOPs of land and sea based SAR operations;
      2. Further development of the capacity and the integration of the LCGPS and GACS fleets by supply of new SAR vessels as well as an accompanying maintenance programme;
      3. Development of the MRCC communication network along the coast through a step by step approach;
      4. Further development of the land border capacity of the relevant authorities and the engagement through community based engagement and cross border programs, particularly in the West and South.

      Additional cross-cutting objectives of the activities will be:
      – The improvement of the operational cooperation between the relevant Libyan agencies and bodies as well as the cooperating with UN agencies and their partners on coordination of activities, information sharing, processing and SOPs;
      – The improvement of the human rights situation for migrants and refugees, particularly for women and children, including through ensuring that the Libyan authorities targeted by this action comply with human rights standards in SOPs in SAR operations;
      – The concern for the environment, in particular for the hygienic and living environment for migrants in the detention centres and for the reutilisation of oil and the maintenance protocols of the ships.

      https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/north-africa/libya/support-integrated-border-and-migration-management-libya-second-phase_en

  • J’essaie de compiler ici des liens et documents sur les processus d’ #externalisation des #frontières en #Libye, notamment des accords avec l’#UE #EU.

    Les documents sur ce fil n’ont pas un ordre chronologique très précis... (ça sera un boulot à faire ultérieurement... sic)

    Les négociations avec l’#Italie sont notamment sur ce fil :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/600874
    #asile #migrations #réfugiés

    Peut-être qu’Isabelle, @isskein, pourra faire ce travail de mise en ordre chronologique quand elle rentrera de vacances ??

    • Ici, un des derniers articles en date... par la suite de ce fil des articles plus anciens...

      Le supplice sans fin des migrants en Libye

      Ils sont arrivés en fin d’après-midi, blessés, épuisés, à bout. Ce 23 mai, près de 117 Soudanais, Ethiopiens et Erythréens se sont présentés devant la mosquée de Beni Oualid, une localité située à 120 km au sud-ouest de Misrata, la métropole portuaire de la Tripolitaine (Libye occidentale). Ils y passeront la nuit, protégés par des clercs religieux et des résidents. Ces nouveaux venus sont en fait des fugitifs. Ils se sont échappés d’une « prison sauvage », l’un de ces centres carcéraux illégaux qui ont proliféré autour de Beni Oualid depuis que s’est intensifié, ces dernières années, le flux de migrants et de réfugiés débarquant du Sahara vers le littoral libyen dans l’espoir de traverser la Méditerranée.

      Ces migrants d’Afrique subsaharienne – mineurs pour beaucoup – portent dans leur chair les traces de violences extrêmes subies aux mains de leurs geôliers : corps blessés par balles, brûlés ou lacérés de coups. Selon leurs témoignages, quinze de leurs camarades d’évasion ont péri durant leur fuite.

      Cris de douleur
      A Beni Oualid, un refuge héberge nombre de ces migrants en détresse. Des blocs de ciment nu cernés d’une terre ocre : l’abri, géré par une ONG locale – Assalam – avec l’assistance médicale de Médecins sans frontières (MSF), est un havre rustique mais dont la réputation grandit. Des migrants y échouent régulièrement dans un piètre état. « Beaucoup souffrent de fractures aux membres inférieurs, de fractures ouvertes infectées, de coups sur le dos laissant la chair à vif, d’électrocution sur les parties génitales », rapporte Christophe Biteau, le chef de la mission MSF pour la -Libye, rencontré à Tunis.

      Leurs tortionnaires les ont kidnappés sur les routes migratoires. Les migrants et réfugiés seront détenus et suppliciés aussi longtemps qu’ils n’auront pas payé une rançon, à travers les familles restées au pays ou des amis ayant déjà atteint Tripoli. Technique usuelle pour forcer les résistances, les détenus torturés sont sommés d’appeler leurs familles afin que celles-ci puissent entendre en « direct » les cris de douleur au téléphone.

      Les Erythréens, Somaliens et Soudanais sont particulièrement exposés à ce racket violent car, liés à une diaspora importante en Europe, ils sont censés être plus aisément solvables que les autres. Dans la région de Beni Oualid, toute cette violence subie, ajoutée à une errance dans des zones désertiques, emporte bien des vies. D’août 2017 à mars 2018, 732 migrants ont trouvé la mort autour de Beni Oualid, selon Assalam.

      En Libye, ces prisons « sauvages » qui parsèment les routes migratoires vers le littoral, illustration de l’osmose croissante entre réseaux historiques de passeurs et gangs criminels, cohabitent avec un système de détention « officiel ». Les deux systèmes peuvent parfois se croiser, en raison de l’omnipotence des milices sur le terrain, mais ils sont en général distincts. Affiliés à une administration – le département de lutte contre la migration illégale (DCIM, selon l’acronyme anglais) –, les centres de détention « officiels » sont au nombre d’une vingtaine en Tripolitaine, d’où embarque l’essentiel des migrants vers l’Italie. Si bien des abus s’exercent dans ces structures du DCIM, dénoncés par les organisations des droits de l’homme, il semble que la violence la plus systématique et la plus extrême soit surtout le fait des « prisons sauvages » tenues par des organisations criminelles.

      Depuis que la polémique s’est envenimée en 2017 sur les conditions de détention des migrants, notamment avec le reportage de CNN sur les « marchés aux esclaves », le gouvernement de Tripoli a apparemment cherché à rationaliser ses dispositifs carcéraux. « Les directions des centres font des efforts, admet Christophe Biteau, de MSF-Libye. Le dialogue entre elles et nous s’est amélioré. Nous avons désormais un meilleur accès aux cellules. Mais le problème est que ces structures sont au départ inadaptées. Il s’agit le plus souvent de simples hangars ou de bâtiments vétustes sans isolation. »

      Les responsables de ces centres se plaignent rituellement du manque de moyens qui, selon eux, explique la précarité des conditions de vie des détenus, notamment sanitaires. En privé, certains fustigent la corruption des administrations centrales de Tripoli, qui perçoivent l’argent des Européens sans le redistribuer réellement aux structures de terrain.

      Cruel paradoxe
      En l’absence d’une refonte radicale de ces circuits de financement, la relative amélioration des conditions de détention observée récemment par des ONG comme MSF pourrait être menacée. « Le principal risque, c’est la congestion qui résulte de la plus grande efficacité des gardes-côtes libyens », met en garde M. Biteau. En effet, les unités de la marine libyenne, de plus en plus aidées et équipées par Bruxelles ou Rome, ont multiplié les interceptions de bateaux de migrants au large du littoral de la Tripolitaine.

      Du 1er janvier au 20 juin, elles avaient ainsi reconduit sur la terre ferme près de 9 100 migrants. Du coup, les centres de détention se remplissent à nouveau. Le nombre de prisonniers dans ces centres officiels – rattachés au DCIM – a grimpé en quelques semaines de 5 000 à 7 000, voire à 8 000. Et cela a un impact sanitaire. « Le retour de ces migrants arrêtés en mer se traduit par un regain des affections cutanées en prison », souligne Christophe Biteau.

      Simultanément, l’Organisation mondiale des migrations (OIM) intensifie son programme dit de « retours volontaires » dans leurs pays d’origine pour la catégorie des migrants économiques, qu’ils soient détenus ou non. Du 1er janvier au 20 juin, 8 571 d’entre eux – surtout des Nigérians, Maliens, Gambiens et Guinéens – sont ainsi rentrés chez eux. L’objectif que s’est fixé l’OIM est le chiffre de 30 000 sur l’ensemble de 2018. Résultat : les personnes éligibles au statut de réfugié et ne souhaitant donc pas rentrer dans leurs pays d’origine – beaucoup sont des ressortissants de la Corne de l’Afrique – se trouvent piégées en Libye avec le verrouillage croissant de la frontière maritime.

      Le Haut-Commissariat pour les réfugiés (HCR) des Nations unies en a bien envoyé certains au Niger – autour de 900 – pour que leur demande d’asile en Europe y soit traitée. Cette voie de sortie demeure toutefois limitée, car les pays européens tardent à les accepter. « Les réfugiés de la Corne de l’Afrique sont ceux dont la durée de détention en Libye s’allonge », pointe M. Biteau. Cruel paradoxe pour une catégorie dont la demande d’asile est en général fondée. Une absence d’amélioration significative de leurs conditions de détention représenterait pour eux une sorte de double peine.

      http://lirelactu.fr/source/le-monde/28fdd3e6-f6b2-4567-96cb-94cac16d078a
      #UE #EU

    • Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the joint press conference with Sven Mikser, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Estonia
      Mogherini:

      if you are asking me about the waves of migrants who are coming to Europe which means through Libya to Italy in this moment, I can tell you that the way in which we are handling this, thanks also to a very good work we have done with the Foreign Ministers of the all 28 Member States, is through a presence at sea – the European Union has a military mission at sea in the Mediterranean, at the same time dismantling the traffickers networks, having arrested more than 100 smugglers, seizing the boats that are used, saving lives – tens of thousands of people were saved but also training the Libyan coasts guards so that they can take care of the dismantling of the smuggling networks in the Libyan territorial waters.

      And we are doing two other things to prevent the losses of lives but also the flourishing of the trafficking of people: inside Libya, we are financing the presence of the International Organisation for Migration and the UNHCR so that they can have access to the detention centres where people are living in awful conditions, save these people, protect these people but also organising voluntary returns to the countries of origin; and we are also working with the countries of origin and transit, in particular Niger, where more than 80% of the flows transit. I can tell you one number that will strike you probably - in the last 9 months through our action with Niger, we moved from 76 000 migrants passing through Niger into Libya to 6 000.

      https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26042/remarks-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-joint-press
      #Libye #Niger #HCR #IOM #OIM #EU #UE #Mogherini #passeurs #smugglers

    • Il risultato degli accordi anti-migranti: aumentati i prezzi dei viaggi della speranza

      L’accordo tra Europa e Italia da una parte e Niger dall’altra per bloccare il flusso dei migranti verso la Libia e quindi verso le nostre coste ha ottenuto risultati miseri. O meglio un paio di risultati li ha avuti: aumentare il prezzo dei trasporti – e quindi i guadagni dei trafficanti di uomini – e aumentare a dismisura i disagi e i rischi dei disperati che cercano in tutti i modi di attraversare il Mediterraneo. Insomma le misure adottate non scoraggiano chi vuole partire. molti di loro muoiono ma non muore la loro speranza di una vita migliore.

      http://www.africa-express.info/2017/02/03/il-risultato-dellaccordo-con-il-niger-sui-migranti-aumentati-prezzi

    • C’était 2016... et OpenMigration publiait cet article:
      Il processo di esternalizzazione delle frontiere europee: tappe e conseguenze di un processo pericoloso

      L’esternalizzazione delle politiche europee e italiane sulle migrazioni: Sara Prestianni ci spiega le tappe fondamentali del processo, e le sue conseguenze più gravi in termini di violazioni dei diritti fondamentali.

      http://openmigration.org/analisi/il-processo-di-esternalizzazione-delle-frontiere-europee-tappe-e-conseguenze-di-un-processo-pericoloso/?platform=hootsuite

    • Per bloccare i migranti 610 milioni di euro dall’Europa e 50 dall’Italia

      Con la Libia ancora fortemente compromessa, la sfida per la gestione dei flussi di migranti dall’Africa sub-sahariana si è di fatto spostata più a Sud, lungo i confini settentrionali del Niger. Uno dei Paesi più poveri al mondo, ma che in virtù della sua stabilità - ha mantenuto pace e democrazia in un’area lacerata dai conflitti - è oggi il principale alleato delle potenze europee nella regione. Gli accordi prevedono che il Niger in cambio di 610 milioni d’ euro dall’Unione Europea, oltre a 50 promessi dall’Italia, sigilli le proprie frontiere settentrionali e imponga un giro di vite ai traffici illegali. È dal Niger infatti che transita gran parte dei migranti sub-sahariani: 450.000, nel 2016, hanno attraversato il deserto fino alle coste libiche, e in misura inferiore quelle algerine. In Italia, attraverso questa rotta, ne sono arrivati 180.000 l’anno scorso e oltre 40.000 nei primi quattro mesi del 2017.


      http://www.lastampa.it/2017/05/31/esteri/per-bloccare-i-migranti-milioni-di-euro-dalleuropa-e-dallitalia-4nPsLCnUURhOkXQl14sp7L/pagina.html

    • The Human Rights Risks of External Migration Policies

      This briefing paper sets out the main human rights risks linked to external migration policies, which are a broad spectrum of actions implemented outside of the territory of the state that people are trying to enter, usually through enhanced cooperation with other countries. From the perspective of international law, external migration policies are not necessarily unlawful. However, Amnesty International considers that several types of external migration policies, and particularly the externalization of border control and asylum-processing, pose significant human rights risks. This document is intended as a guide for activists and policy-makers working on the issue, and includes some examples drawn from Amnesty International’s research in different countries.

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol30/6200/2017/en

    • Libya’s coast guard abuses migrants despite E.U. funding and training

      The European Union has poured tens of millions of dollars into supporting Libya’s coast guard in search-and-rescue operations off the coast. But the violent tactics of some units and allegations of human trafficking have generated concerns about the alliance.

      https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/libyas-coast-guard-abuses-desperate-migrants-despite-eu-funding-and-training/2017/07/10/f9bfe952-7362-4e57-8b42-40ae5ede1e26_story.html?tid=ss_tw

    • How Libya’s #Fezzan Became Europe’s New Border

      The principal gateway into Europe for refugees and migrants runs through the power vacuum in southern Libya’s Fezzan region. Any effort by European policymakers to stabilise Fezzan must be part of a national-level strategy aimed at developing Libya’s licit economy and reaching political normalisation.

      https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/179-how-libyas-fezzan-became-europes-new-border
      cc @i_s_

      v. aussi ma tentative cartographique :


      https://seenthis.net/messages/604039

    • Avramopoulos says Sophia could be deployed in Libya

      (ANSAmed) - BRUSSELS, AUGUST 3 - European Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos told ANSA in an interview Thursday that it is possible that the #Operation_Sophia could be deployed in Libyan waters in the future. “At the moment, priority should be given to what can be done under the current mandate of Operation Sophia which was just renewed with added tasks,” he said. “But the possibility of the Operation moving to a third stage working in Libyan waters was foreseen from the beginning. If the Libyan authorities ask for this, we should be ready to act”. (ANSAmed).

      http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/politics/2017/08/03/avramopoulos-says-sophia-could-be-deployed-in-libya_602d3d0e-f817-42b0-ac3

    • Les ambivalences de Tripoli face à la traite migratoire. Les trafiquants ont réussi à pénétrer des pans entiers des institutions officielles

      Par Frédéric Bobin (Zaouïa, Libye, envoyé spécial)

      LE MONDE Le 25.08.2017 à 06h39 • Mis à jour le 25.08.2017 à 10h54

      Les petits trous dessinent comme des auréoles sur le ciment fauve. Le haut mur hérissé de fils de fer barbelés a été grêlé d’impacts de balles de kalachnikov à deux reprises, la plus récente en juin. « Ils sont bien mieux armés que nous », soupire Khaled Al-Toumi, le directeur du centre de détention de Zaouïa, une municipalité située à une cinquantaine de kilomètres à l’ouest de Tripoli. Ici, au cœur de cette bande côtière de la Libye où se concentre l’essentiel des départs de migrants vers l’Italie, une trentaine d’Africains subsahariens sont détenus – un chiffre plutôt faible au regard des centres surpeuplés ailleurs dans le pays.

      C’est que, depuis les assauts de l’établissement par des hommes armés, Khaled Al-Toumi, préfère transférer à Tripoli le maximum de prisonniers. « Nous ne sommes pas en mesure de les protéger », dit-il. Avec ses huit gardes modestement équipés, il avoue son impuissance face aux gangs de trafiquants qui n’hésitent pas à venir récupérer par la force des migrants, dont l’arrestation par les autorités perturbe leurs juteuses affaires. En 2014, ils avaient repris environ 80 Erythréens. Plus récemment, sept Pakistanais. « On reçoit en permanence des menaces, ils disent qu’ils vont enlever nos enfants », ajoute le directeur.

      Le danger est quotidien. Le 18 juillet, veille de la rencontre avec Khaled Al-Toumi, soixante-dix femmes migrantes ont été enlevées à quelques kilomètres de là alors qu’elles étaient transférées à bord d’un bus du centre de détention de Gharian à celui de Sorman, des localités voisines de Zaouïa.

      On compte en Libye une trentaine de centres de ce type, placés sous la tutelle de la Direction de combat contre la migration illégale (DCMI) rattachée au ministère de l’intérieur. A ces prisons « officielles » s’ajoutent des structures officieuses, administrées ouvertement par des milices. L’ensemble de ce réseau carcéral détient entre 4 000 et 7 000 détenus, selon les Nations unies (ONU).

      « Corruption galopante »

      A l’heure où l’Union européenne (UE) nourrit le projet de sous-traiter à la Libye la gestion du flux migratoire le long de la « route de la Méditerranée centrale », le débat sur les conditions de détention en vigueur dans ces centres a gagné en acuité.

      Une partie de la somme de 90 millions d’euros que l’UE s’est engagée à allouer au gouvernement dit d’« union nationale » de Tripoli sur la question migratoire, en sus des 200 millions d’euros annoncés par l’Italie, vise précisément à l’amélioration de l’environnement de ces centres.

      Si des « hot spots » voient le jour en Libye, idée que caressent certains dirigeants européens – dont le président français Emmanuel Macron – pour externaliser sur le continent africain l’examen des demandes d’asile, ils seront abrités dans de tels établissements à la réputation sulfureuse.

      La situation y est à l’évidence critique. Le centre de Zaouïa ne souffre certes pas de surpopulation. Mais l’état des locaux est piteux, avec ses matelas légers jetés au sol et l’alimentation d’une préoccupante indigence, limitée à un seul plat de macaronis. Aucune infirmerie ne dispense de soins.

      « Je ne touche pas un seul dinar de Tripoli ! », se plaint le directeur, Khaled Al-Toumi. Dans son entourage, on dénonce vertement la « corruption galopante de l’état-major de la DCMI à Tripoli qui vole l’argent ». Quand on lui parle de financement européen, Khaled Al-Toumi affirme ne pas en avoir vu la couleur.

      La complainte est encore plus grinçante au centre de détention pour femmes de Sorman, à une quinzaine de kilomètres à l’ouest : un gros bloc de ciment d’un étage posé sur le sable et piqué de pins en bord de plage. Dans la courette intérieure, des enfants jouent près d’une balançoire.

      Là, la densité humaine est beaucoup plus élevée. La scène est un brin irréelle : dans la pièce centrale, environ quatre-vingts femmes sont entassées, fichu sur la tête, regard levé vers un poste de télévision rivé au mur délavé. D’autres se serrent dans les pièces adjacentes. Certaines ont un bébé sur les jambes, telle Christiane, une Nigériane à tresses assise sur son matelas. « Ici, il n’y a rien, déplore-t-elle. Nous n’avons ni couches ni lait pour les bébés. L’eau de la nappe phréatique est salée. Et le médecin ne vient pas souvent : une fois par semaine, souvent une fois toutes les deux semaines. »

      « Battu avec des tuyaux métalliques »

      Non loin d’elle, Viviane, jeune fille élancée de 20 ans, Nigériane elle aussi, se plaint particulièrement de la nourriture, la fameuse assiette de macaronis de rigueur dans tous les centres de détention.

      Viviane est arrivée en Libye en 2015. Elle a bien tenté d’embarquer à bord d’un Zodiac à partir de Sabratha, la fameuse plate-forme de départs à l’ouest de Sorman, mais une tempête a fait échouer l’opération. Les passagers ont été récupérés par les garde-côtes qui les ont répartis dans les différentes prisons de la Tripolitaine. « Je n’ai pas pu joindre ma famille au téléphone, dit Viviane dans un souffle. Elle me croit morte. »

      Si la visite des centres de détention de Zaouïa ou de Sorman permet de prendre la mesure de l’extrême précarité des conditions de vie, admise sans fard par les officiels des établissements eux-mêmes, la question des violences dans ces lieux coupés du monde est plus délicate.

      Les migrants sont embarrassés de l’évoquer en présence des gardes. Mais mises bout à bout, les confidences qu’ils consentent plus aisément sur leur expérience dans d’autres centres permettent de suggérer un contexte d’une grande brutalité. Celle-ci se déploie sans doute le plus sauvagement dans les prisons privées, officieuses, où le racket des migrants est systématique.

      Et les centres officiellement rattachés à la DCMI n’en sont pas pour autant épargnés. Ainsi Al Hassan Dialo, un Guinéen rencontré à Zaouïa, raconte qu’il était « battu avec des tuyaux métalliques » dans le centre de Gharian, où il avait été précédemment détenu.

      « Extorsion, travail forcé »

      On touche là à l’ambiguïté foncière de ce système de détention, formellement rattaché à l’Etat mais de facto placé sous l’influence des milices contrôlant le terrain. Le fait que des réseaux de trafiquants, liés à ces milices, peuvent impunément enlever des détenus au cœur même des centres, comme ce fut le cas à Zaouïa, donne la mesure de leur capacité de nuisance.

      « Le système est pourri de l’intérieur », se désole un humanitaire. « Des fonctionnaires de l’Etat et des officiels locaux participent au processus de contrebande et de trafic d’êtres humains », abonde un rapport de la Mission d’appui de l’ONU en Libye publié en décembre 2016.

      Dans ces conditions, les migrants font l’objet « d’extorsion, de travail forcé, de mauvais traitements et de tortures », dénonce le rapport. Les femmes, elles, sont victimes de violences sexuelles à grande échelle. Le plus inquiétant est qu’avec l’argent européen promis les centres de détention sous tutelle de la DCMI tendent à se multiplier. Trois nouveaux établissements ont fait ainsi leur apparition ces derniers mois dans le Grand Tripoli.

      La duplicité de l’appareil d’Etat, ou de ce qui en tient lieu, est aussi illustrée par l’attitude des gardes-côtes, autres récipiendaires des financements européens et même de stages de formation. Officiellement, ils affirment lutter contre les réseaux de passeurs au maximum de leurs capacités tout en déplorant l’insuffisance de leurs moyens.

      « Nous ne sommes pas équipés pour faire face aux trafiquants », regrette à Tripoli Ayoub Kassim, le porte-parole de la marine libyenne. Au détour d’un plaidoyer pro domo, le hiérarque militaire glisse que le problème de la gestion des flux migratoires se pose moins sur le littoral qu’au niveau de la frontière méridionale de la Libye. « La seule solution, c’est de maîtriser les migrations au sud, explique-t-il. Malheureusement, les migrants arrivent par le Niger sous les yeux de l’armée française » basée à Madama…

      Opérations de patrouille musclées

      Les vieilles habitudes perdurent. Avant 2011, sous Kadhafi, ces flux migratoires – verrouillés ou tolérés selon l’intérêt diplomatique du moment – étaient instrumentalisés pour exercer une pression sur les Européens.

      Une telle politique semble moins systématique, fragmentation de l’Etat oblige, mais elle continue d’inspirer le comportement de bien des acteurs libyens usant habilement de la carte migratoire pour réclamer des soutiens financiers.

      La déficience des équipements des gardes-côtes ne fait guère de doute. Avec son patrouilleur de 14 mètres de Zaouïa et ses quatre autres bâtiments de 26,4 mètres de Tripoli – souffrant de défaillances techniques bien qu’ayant été réparés en Italie –, l’arsenal en Tripolitaine est de fait limité. Par ailleurs, l’embargo sur les ventes d’armes vers la Libye, toujours en vigueur, en bride le potentiel militaire.

      Pourtant, la hiérarchie des gardes-côtes serait plus convaincante si elle était en mesure d’exercer un contrôle effectif sur ses branches locales. Or, à l’évidence, une sérieuse difficulté se pose à Zaouïa. Le chef local de gardes-côtes, Abdelrahman Milad, plus connu sous le pseudonyme d’Al-Bija, joue un jeu trouble. Selon le rapport du panel des experts sur la Libye de l’ONU, publié en juin, Al-Bija doit son poste à Mohamed Koshlaf, le chef de la principale milice de Zaouïa, qui trempe dans le trafic de migrants.

      Le patrouilleur d’Al-Bija est connu pour ses opérations musclées. Le 21 octobre 2016, il s’est opposé en mer à un sauvetage conduit par l’ONG Sea Watch, provoquant la noyade de vingt-cinq migrants. Le 23 mai 2017, le même patrouilleur intervient dans la zone dite « contiguë » – où la Libye est juridiquement en droit d’agir – pour perturber un autre sauvetage mené par le navire Aquarius, affrété conjointement par Médecins sans frontières et SOS Méditerranée, et le Juvena, affrété par l’ONG allemande Jugend Rettet.

      Duplicité des acteurs libyens

      Les gardes-côtes sont montés à bord d’un Zodiac de migrants, subtilisant téléphones portables et argent des occupants. Ils ont également tiré des coups de feu en l’air, et même dans l’eau où avaient sauté des migrants, ne blessant heureusement personne.

      « Il est difficile de comprendre la logique de ce type de comportement, commente un humanitaire. Peut-être le message envoyé aux migrants est-il : “La prochaine fois, passez par nous.” » Ce « passez par nous » peut signifier, selon de bons observateurs de la scène libyenne, « passez par le réseau de Mohamed Koshlaf », le milicien que l’ONU met en cause dans le trafic de migrants.

      Al-Bija pratiquerait ainsi le deux poids-deux mesures, intraitable ou compréhensif selon que les migrants relèvent de réseaux rivaux ou amis, illustration typique de la duplicité des acteurs libyens. « Al-Bija sait qu’il a commis des erreurs, il cherche maintenant à restaurer son image », dit un résident de Zaouïa. Seule l’expérience le prouvera. En attendant, les Européens doivent coopérer avec lui pour fermer la route de la Méditerranée.

      http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/08/16/en-libye-nous-ne-sommes-que-des-esclaves_5172760_3212.html

    • A PATTI CON LA LIBIA

      La Libia è il principale punto di partenza di barconi carichi di migranti diretti in Europa. Con la Libia l’Europa deve trattare per trovare una soluzione. La Libia però è anche un paese allo sbando, diviso. C’è il governo di Tripoli retto da Fayez al-Sarraj. Poi c’è il generale Haftar che controlla i due terzi del territorio del paese. Senza contare gruppi, milizie, clan tribali. Il compito insomma è complicato. Ma qualcosa, forse, si sta muovendo.

      Dopo decine di vertici inutili, migliaia di morti nel Mediterraneo, promesse non mantenute si torna a parlare con una certa insistenza della necessità di stabilizzare la Libia e aiutare il paese che si affaccia sul Mediterraneo. Particolarmente attiva in questa fase la Francia di Macron, oltre naturalmente all’Italia.

      Tra i punti in discussione c’è il coinvolgimento di altri paesi africani di transito come Niger e Ciad che potrebbero fungere da filtro. Oltre naturalmente ad aiuti diretti alla Libia. Assegni milionari destinati a una migliore gestione delle frontiere ad esempio.

      Ma è davvero così semplice? E come la mettiamo con le violenze e le torture subite dai migranti nei centri di detenzione? Perché proprio ora l’Europa sembra svegliarsi? Cosa si cela dietro questa competizione soprattutto tra Roma e Parigi nel trovare intese con Tripoli?

      http://www.rsi.ch/rete-uno/programmi/informazione/modem/A-PATTI-CON-LA-LIBIA-9426001.html

    • Le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique adopte un programme de soutien à la gestion intégrée des migrations et des frontières en Libye d’un montant de 46 millions d’euros

      À la suite du plan d’action de la Commission pour soutenir l’Italie, présenté le 4 juillet, le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique a adopté ce jour un programme doté d’une enveloppe de 46 millions d’euros pour renforcer les capacités des autorités libyennes en matière de gestion intégrée des migrations et des frontières.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2187_fr.htm

    • L’Europe va verser 200 millions d’euros à la Libye pour stopper les migrants

      Les dirigeants européens se retrouvent ce vendredi à Malte pour convaincre la Libye de freiner les traversées de migrants en Méditerranée. Ils devraient proposer d’équiper et former ses gardes-côtes. Le projet d’ouvrir des camps en Afrique refait surface.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/020217/leurope-va-verser-200-millions-deuros-la-libye-pour-stopper-les-migrants

      –-> pour archivage...

    • Persécutés en Libye : l’Europe est complice

      L’Union européenne dans son ensemble, et l’Italie en particulier, sont complices des violations des droits humains commises contre les réfugiés et les migrants en Libye. Enquête.

      https://www.amnesty.fr/refugies-et-migrants/actualites/refugies-et-migrants-persecutes-en-libye-leurope-est-complice

      #complicité

      Et l’utilisation du mot « persécutés » n’est évidemment pas été choisi au hasard...
      –-> ça renvoie à la polémique de qui est #réfugié... et du fait que l’UE essaie de dire que les migrants en Libye sont des #migrants_économiques et non pas des réfugiés (comme ceux qui sont en Turquie et/ou en Grèce, qui sont des syriens, donc des réfugiés)...
      Du coup, utiliser le concept de #persécution signifie faire une lien direct avec la Convention sur les réfugiés et admettre que les migrants en Libye sont potentiellement des réfugiés...

      La position de l’UE :

      #Mogherini was questioned about the EU’s strategy of outsourcing the migration crisis to foreign countries such as Libya and Turkey, which received billions to prevent Syrian refugees from crossing to Greece.

      She said the situation was different on two counts: first, the migrants stranded in Libya were not legitimate asylum seekers like those fleeing the war in Syria. And second, different international bodies were in charge.

      “When it comes to Turkey, it is mainly refugees from Syria; when it comes to Libya, it is mainly migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the relevant international laws apply in different manners and the relevant UN agencies are different – the UNHC

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/libya-human-bondage-risks-overshadowing-africa-eu-summit
      voir ici : http://seen.li/dqtt

      Du coup, @sinehebdo, « #persécutés » serait aussi un mot à ajouter à ta longue liste...

    • v. aussi:
      Libya: Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants

      In recent years, hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants have braved the journey across Africa to Libya and often on to Europe. In response, the Libyan authorities have used mass indefinite detention as their primary migration management tool. Regrettably, the European Union and Italy in particular, have decided to reinforce the capacity of Libyan authorities to intercept refugees and migrants at sea and transfer them to detention centres. It is essential that the aims and nature of this co-operation be rethought; that the focus shift from preventing arrivals in Europe to protecting the rights of refugees and migrants.

      https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/document/?indexNumber=mde19%2f7561%2f2017&language=en
      #rapport

    • Amnesty France : « L’Union Européenne est complice des violations de droits de l’homme en Libye »

      Jean-François Dubost est responsable du Programme Protection des Populations (réfugiés, civils dans les conflits, discriminations) chez Amnesty France. L’ONG publie un rapport sur la responsabilité des gouvernements européens dans les violations des droits humains des réfugiés et des migrants en Libye.

      https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/l-invite-de-6h20/l-invite-de-6h20-12-decembre-2017
      #responsabilité

    • Accordi e crimini contro l’umanità in un rapporto di Amnesty International

      La Rotta del Mediterraneo centrale, dal Corno d’Africa, dall’Africa subsahariana, al Niger al Ciad ed alla Libia costituisce ormai l’unica via di fuga da paesi in guerra o precipitati in crisi economiche che mettono a repentaglio la vita dei loro abitanti, senza alcuna possibile distinzione tra migranti economici e richiedenti asilo. Anche perché in Africa, ed in Libia in particolare, la possibilità concreta di chiedere asilo ed ottenere un permesso di soggiorno o un visto, oltre al riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato da parte dell’UNHCR, è praticamente nulla. Le poche persone trasferite in altri paesi europei dai campi libici (resettlement), come i rimpatri volontari ampiamente pubblicizzati, sono soltanto l’ennesima foglia di fico che si sta utilizzando per nascondere le condizioni disumane in cui centinaia di migliaia di persone vengono trattenute sotto sequestro nei centri di detenzione libici , ufficiali o informali. In tutti gravissime violazioni dei diritti umani, anche subito dopo la visita dei rappresentanti dell’UNHCR e dell’OIM, come dichiarano alcuni testimoni.

      https://www.a-dif.org/2017/12/12/accordi-e-crimini-contro-lumanita-in-un-rapporto-di-amnesty-international

    • Bundestag study: Cooperation with Libyan coastguard infringes international conventions

      “Libya is unable to nominate a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC), and so rescue missions outside its territorial waters are coordinated by the Italian MRCC in Rome. More and more often the Libyan coastguard is being tasked to lead these missions as on-scene-commander. Since refugees are subsequently brought to Libya, the MRCC in Rome may be infringing the prohibition of refoulement contained in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This, indeed, was also the conclusion reached in a study produced by the Bundestag Research Service. The European Union and its member states must therefore press for an immediate end to this cooperation with the Libyan coastguard”, says Andrej Hunko, European policy spokesman for the Left Party.

      The Italian Navy is intercepting refugees in the Mediterranean and arranging for them to be picked up by Libyan coastguard vessels. The Bundestag study therefore suspects an infringement of the European Human Rights Convention of the Council of Europe. The rights enshrined in the Convention also apply on the high seas.

      Andrej Hunko goes on to say, “For two years the Libyan coastguard has regularly been using force against sea rescuers, and many refugees have drowned during these power games. As part of the EUNAVFOR MED military mission, the Bundeswehr has also been cooperating with the Libyan coastguard and allegedly trained them in sea rescue. I regard that as a pretext to arm Libya for the prevention of migration. This cooperation must be the subject of proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, because the people who are being forcibly returned with the assistance of the EU are being inhumanely treated, tortured or killed.

      The study also emphasises that the acts of aggression against private rescue ships violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Nothing in that Convention prescribes that sea rescues must be undertaken by a single vessel. On the contrary, masters of other ships even have a duty to render assistance if they cannot be sure that all of the persons in distress will be quickly rescued. This is undoubtedly the case with the brutal operations of the Libyan coastguard.

      The Libyan Navy might soon have its own MRCC, which would then be attached to the EU surveillance system. The European Commission examined this option in a feasibility study, and Italy is now establishing a coordination centre for this purpose in Tripoli. A Libyan MRCC would encourage the Libyan coastguard to throw its weight about even more. The result would be further violations of international conventions and even more deaths.”

      https://andrej-hunko.de/presse/3946-bundestag-study-cooperation-with-libyan-coastguard-infringes-inter

      v. aussi l’étude:
      https://andrej-hunko.de/start/download/dokumente/1109-bundestag-research-services-maritime-rescue-in-the-mediterranean/file

    • Migrants : « La nasse libyenne a été en partie tissée par la France et l’Union européenne »

      Dans une tribune publiée dans « Le Monde », Thierry Allafort-Duverger, le directeur général de Médecins Sans Frontières, juge hypocrite la posture de la France, qui favorise l’interception de migrants par les garde-côtes libyens et dénonce leurs conditions de détention sur place.

      https://www.msf.fr/actualite/articles/migrants-nasse-libyenne-ete-en-partie-tissee-france-et-union-europeenne
      #hypocrisie

    • Libye : derrière l’arbre de « l’esclavage »
      Par Ali Bensaâd, Professeur à l’Institut français de géopolitique, Paris-VIII — 30 novembre 2017 à 17:56

      L’émotion suscitée par les crimes abjectes révélés par CNN ne doit pas occulter un phénomène bien plus vaste et ancien : celui de centaines de milliers de migrants africains qui vivent et travaillent depuis des décennies, en Libye et au Maghreb, dans des conditions extrêmes d’exploitation et d’atteinte à leur dignité.

      L’onde de choc créée par la diffusion de la vidéo de CNN sur la « vente » de migrants en Libye, ne doit pas se perdre en indignations. Et il ne faut pas que les crimes révélés occultent un malheur encore plus vaste, celui de centaines de milliers de migrants africains qui vivent et travaillent depuis des décennies, en Libye et au Maghreb, dans des conditions extrêmes d’exploitation et d’atteinte à leur dignité. Par ailleurs, ces véritables crimes contre l’humanité ne sont, hélas, pas spécifiques de la Libye. A titre d’exemple, les bédouins égyptiens ou israéliens - supplétifs sécuritaires de leurs armées - ont précédé les milices libyennes dans ces pratiques qu’ils poursuivent toujours et qui ont été largement documentées.

      Ces crimes contre l’humanité, en raison de leur caractère particulièrement abject, méritent d’être justement qualifiés. Il faut s’interroger si le qualificatif « esclavage », au-delà du juste opprobre dont il faut entourer ces pratiques, est le plus scientifiquement approprié pour comprendre et combattre ces pratiques d’autant que l’esclavage a été une réalité qui a structuré pendant un millénaire le rapport entre le Maghreb et l’Afrique subsaharienne. Il demeure le non-dit des inconscients culturels des sociétés de part et d’autre du Sahara, une sorte de « bombe à retardement ». « Mal nommer un objet, c’est ajouter au malheur de ce monde » (1) disait Camus. Et la Libye est un condensé des malheurs du monde des migrations. Il faut donc les saisir par-delà le raccourci de l’émotion.

      D’abord, ils ne sont nullement le produit du contexte actuel de chaos du pays, même si celui-ci les aggrave. Depuis des décennies, chercheurs et journalistes ont documenté la difficile condition des migrants en Libye qui, depuis les années 60, font tourner pour l’essentiel l’économie de ce pays rentier. Leur nombre a pu atteindre certaines années jusqu’à un million pour une population qui pouvait alors compter à peine cinq millions d’habitants. C’est dire leur importance dans le paysage économique et social de ce pays. Mais loin de favoriser leur intégration, l’importance de leur nombre a été conjurée par une précarisation systématique et violente comme l’illustrent les expulsions massives et violentes de migrants qui ont jalonné l’histoire du pays notamment en 1979, 1981, 1985, 1995, 2000 et 2007. Expulsions qui servaient tout à la fois à installer cette immigration dans une réversibilité mais aussi à pénaliser ou gratifier les pays dont ils sont originaires pour les vassaliser. Peut-être contraints, les dirigeants africains alors restaient sourds aux interpellations de leurs migrants pour ne pas contrarier la générosité du « guide » dont ils étaient les fidèles clients. Ils se tairont également quand, en 2000, Moussa Koussa, l’ancien responsable des services libyens, aujourd’hui luxueusement réfugié à Londres, a organisé un véritable pogrom où périrent 500 migrants africains assassinés dans des « émeutes populaires » instrumentalisées. Leur but était cyniquement de faire avaliser, par ricochet, la nouvelle orientation du régime favorable à la normalisation et l’ouverture à l’Europe et cela en attisant un sentiment anti-africain pour déstabiliser la partie de la vieille garde qui y était rétive. Cette normalisation, faite en partie sur le cadavre de migrants africains, se soldera par l’intronisation de Kadhafi comme gardien des frontières européennes. Les migrants interceptés et ceux que l’Italie refoule, en violation des lois européennes, sont emprisonnés, parfois dans les mêmes lieux aujourd’hui, et soumis aux mêmes traitements dégradants.

      En 2006, ce n’était pas 260 migrants marocains qui croupissaient comme aujourd’hui dans les prisons libyennes, ceux dont la vidéo a ému l’opinion, mais 3 000 et dans des conditions tout aussi inhumaines. Kadhafi a signé toutes les conventions que les Européens ont voulues, sachant qu’il n’allait pas les appliquer. Mais lorsque le HCR a essayé de prendre langue avec le pouvoir libyen au sujet de la convention de Genève sur les réfugiés, Kadhafi ferma les bureaux du HCR et expulsa, en les humiliant, ses dirigeants le 9 juin 2010. Le même jour, débutait un nouveau round de négociations en vue d’un accord de partenariat entre la Libye et l’Union européenne et le lendemain, 10 juin, Kadhafi était accueilli en Italie. Une année plus tard, alors même que le CNT n’avait pas encore établi son autorité sur le pays et que Kadhafi et ses troupes continuaient à résister, le CNT a été contraint de signer avec l’Italie un accord sur les migrations dont un volet sur la réadmission des migrants transitant par son territoire. Hier, comme aujourd’hui, c’est à la demande expresse et explicite de l’UE que les autorités libyennes mènent une politique de répression et de rétention de migrants. Et peut-on ignorer qu’aujourd’hui traiter avec les pouvoirs libyens, notamment sur les questions sécuritaires, c’est traiter de fait avec des milices dont dépendent ces pouvoirs eux-mêmes pour leur propre sécurité ? Faut-il s’étonner après cela de voir des milices gérer des centres de rétention demandés par l’UE ?

      Alors que peine à émerger une autorité centrale en Libye, les pays occidentaux n’ont pas cessé de multiplier les exigences à l’égard des fragiles centres d’un pouvoir balbutiant pour leur faire prendre en charge leur protection contre les migrations et le terrorisme au risque de les fragiliser comme l’a montré l’exemple des milices de Misrata. Acteur important de la réconciliation et de la lutte contre les extrémistes, elles ont été poussées, à Syrte, à combattre Daech quasiment seules. Elles en sont sorties exsangues, rongées par le doute et fragilisées face à leurs propres extrémistes. Les rackets, les kidnappings et le travail forcé pour ceux qui ne peuvent pas payer, sont aussi le lot des Libyens, notamment ceux appartenant au camp des vaincus, détenus dans ce que les Libyens nomment « prisons clandestines ». Libyens, mais plus souvent migrants qui ne peuvent payer, sont mis au travail forcé pour les propres besoins des miliciens en étant « loués » ponctuellement le temps d’une captivité qui dure de quelques semaines à quelques mois pour des sommes dérisoires.

      Dans la vidéo de CNN, les sommes évoquées, autour de 400 dinars libyens, sont faussement traduites par les journalistes, selon le taux officiel fictif, en 400 dollars. En réalité, sur le marché réel, la valeur est dix fois inférieure, un dollar valant dix dinars libyens et un euro, douze. Faire transiter un homme, même sur la seule portion saharienne du territoire, rapporte 15 fois plus (500 euros) aux trafiquants et miliciens. C’est par défaut que les milices se rabattent sur l’exploitation, un temps, de migrants désargentés mais par ailleurs encombrants.

      La scène filmée par CNN est abjecte et relève du crime contre l’humanité. Mais il s’agit de transactions sur du travail forcé et de corvées. Il ne s’agit pas de vente d’hommes. Ce n’est pas relativiser ou diminuer ce qui est un véritable crime contre l’humanité, mais il faut justement qualifier les objets. Il s’agit de pratiques criminelles de guerre et de banditisme qui exploitent les failles de politiques migratoires globales. On n’assiste pas à une résurgence de l’esclavage. Il ne faut pas démonétiser l’indignation et la vigilance en recourant rapidement aux catégories historiques qui mobilisent l’émotion. Celle-ci retombe toujours. Et pendant que le débat s’enflamme sur « l’esclavage », la même semaine, des centaines d’hommes « libres » sont morts, noyés en Méditerranée, s’ajoutant à des dizaines de milliers qui les avaient précédés.

      (1) C’est la véritable expression utilisée par Camus dans un essai de 1944, paru dans Poésie 44, (Sur une philosophie de l’expression), substantiellement très différente, en termes philosophiques, de ce qui sera reporté par la suite : « Mal nommer les choses, c’est ajouter aux malheurs du monde. »

      http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2017/11/30/libye-derriere-l-arbre-de-l-esclavage_1613662

    • Quand l’Union européenne veut bloquer les exilé-e-s en Libye

      L’Union européenne renforce les capacités des garde-côtes Libyens pour qu’ils interceptent les bateaux d’exilé-e-s dans les eaux territoriales et les ramènent en Libye. Des navires de l’#OTAN patrouillent au large prétendument pour s’attaquer aux « bateaux de passeurs », ce qui veut dire que des moyens militaires sont mobilisés pour empêcher les exilé-e-s d’atteindre les côtes européennes. L’idée a été émise de faire le tri, entre les personnes qui relèveraient de l’asile et celles qui seraient des « migrants économiques » ayant « vocation » à être renvoyés, sur des bateaux ua large de la Libye plutôt que sur le sol italien, créant ainsi des « #hotspots_flottants« .

      https://lampedusauneile.wordpress.com/2016/07/15/quand-lunion-europeenne-veut-bloquer-les-exile-e-s-en-lib

    • Le milizie libiche catturano in mare centinaia di migranti in fuga verso l’Europa. E li richiudono in prigione. Intanto l’Unione Europea si prepara ad inviare istruttori per rafforzare le capacità di arresto da parte della polizia libica. Ma in Libia ci sono tante «guardie costiere» ed ognuna risponde ad un governo diverso.

      Sembra di ritornare al 2010, quando dopo i respingimenti collettivi in Libia eseguiti direttamente da mezzi della Guardia di finanza italiana a partire dal 7 maggio 2009, in base agli accordi tra Berlusconi e Gheddafi, si inviarono in Libia agenti della Guardia di finanza per istruire la Guardia Costiera libica nelle operazioni di blocco dei migranti che erano riusciti a fuggire imbarcandosi su mezzi sempre più fatiscenti.

      http://dirittiefrontiere.blogspot.ch/2016/05/le-milizie-libiche-catturano-in-mare.html?m=1

    • Merkel, Hollande Warn Libya May Be Next Big Migrant Staging Area

      The European Union may need an agreement with Libya to restrict refugee flows similar to one with Turkey as the North African country threatens to become the next gateway for migrants to Europe, the leaders of Germany and France said.

      http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-07/merkel-hollande-warn-libya-may-be-next-big-migrant-staging-area
      #accord #Libye #migrations #réfugiés #asile #politique_migratoire #externalisation #UE #Europe

    • Le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique adopte un programme de 90 millions € pour la protection des migrants et l’amélioration de la gestion des migrations en Libye

      Dans le prolongement de la communication conjointe sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale et de la déclaration de Malte, le fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique a adopté ce jour, sur proposition de la Commission européenne, un programme de 90 millions € visant à renforcer la protection des migrants et à améliorer la gestion des migrations en Libye.

      http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-951_fr.htm

    • L’Europa non può affidare alla Libia le vite dei migranti

      “Il rischio è che Italia ed Europa si rendano complici delle violazioni dei diritti umani commesse in Libia”, dice il direttore generale di Medici senza frontiere (Msf) Arjan Hehenkamp. Mentre le organizzazioni non governative che salvano i migranti nel Mediterraneo centrale sono al centro di un processo di criminalizzazione, l’Italia e l’Europa stanno cercando di delegare alle autorità libiche la soluzione del problema degli sbarchi.

      http://www.internazionale.it/video/2017/05/04/ong-libia-migranti

    • MSF accuses Libyan coastguard of endangering people’s lives during Mediterranean rescue

      During a rescue in the Mediterranean Sea on 23 May, the Libyan coastguard approached boats in distress, intimidated the passengers and then fired gunshots into the air, threatening people’s lives and creating mayhem, according to aid organisations Médecins Sans Frontières and SOS Méditerranée, whose teams witnessed the violent incident.

      http://www.msf.org/en/article/msf-accuses-libyan-coastguard-endangering-people%E2%80%99s-lives-during-mediter

    • Enquête. Le chaos libyen est en train de déborder en Méditerranée

      Pour qu’ils bloquent les flux migratoires, l’Italie, appuyée par l’UE, a scellé un accord avec les gardes-côtes libyens. Mais ils ne sont que l’une des très nombreuses forces en présence dans cet État en lambeaux. Désormais la Méditerranée devient dangereuse pour la marine italienne, les migrants, et les pêcheurs.


      http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/enquete-le-chaos-libyen-est-en-train-de-deborder-en-mediterra

    • Architect of EU-Turkey refugee pact pushes for West Africa deal

      “Every migrant from West Africa who survives the dangerous journey from Libya to Italy remains in Europe for years afterwards — regardless of the outcome of his or her asylum application,” Knaus said in an interview.

      To accelerate the deportations of rejected asylum seekers to West African countries that are considered safe, the EU needs to forge agreements with their governments, he said.

      http://www.politico.eu/article/migration-italy-libya-architect-of-eu-turkey-refugee-pact-pushes-for-west-a
      cc @i_s_

      Avec ce commentaire de Francesca Spinelli :

    • Pour 20 milliards, la Libye pourrait bloquer les migrants à sa frontière sud

      L’homme fort de l’Est libyen, Khalifa Haftar, estime à « 20 milliards de dollars sur 20 ou 25 ans » l’effort européen nécessaire pour aider à bloquer les flux de migrants à la frontière sud du pays.

      https://www.rts.ch/info/monde/8837947-pour-20-milliards-la-libye-pourrait-bloquer-les-migrants-a-sa-frontiere-

    • Bruxelles offre 200 millions d’euros à la Libye pour freiner l’immigration

      La Commission européenne a mis sur la table de nouvelles mesures pour freiner l’arrivée de migrants via la mer méditerranée, dont 200 millions d’euros pour la Libye. Un article de notre partenaire Euroefe.

      http://www.euractiv.fr/section/l-europe-dans-le-monde/news/bruxelles-offre-200-millions-deuros-a-la-libye-pour-freiner-limmigration/?nl_ref=29858390

      #Libye #asile #migrations #accord #deal #réfugiés #externalisation
      cc @reka

    • Stuck in Libya. Migrants and (Our) Political Responsibilities

      Fighting at Tripoli’s international airport was still under way when, in July 2014, the diplomatic missions of European countries, the United States and Canada were shut down. At that time Italy decided to maintain a pied-à-terre in place in order to preserve the precarious balance of its assets in the two-headed country, strengthening security at its local headquarters on Tripoli’s seafront. On the one hand there was no forsaking the Mellitah Oil & Gas compound, controlled by Eni and based west of Tripoli. On the other, the Libyan coast also had to be protected to assist the Italian forces deployed in Libyan waters and engaged in the Mare Nostrum operation to dismantle the human smuggling network between Libya and Italy, as per the official mandate. But the escalation of the civil war and the consequent deterioration of security conditions led Rome to leave as well, in February 2015.

      http://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/stuck-libya-migrants-and-our-political-responsibilities-16294

    • Libia: diritto d’asilo cercasi, smarrito fra Bruxelles e Tripoli (passando per Roma)

      La recente Comunicazione congiunta della Commissione e dell’Alto rappresentante per la politica estera dell’UE, il Memorandum Italia-Libia firmato il 2 febbraio e la Dichiarazione uscita dal Consiglio europeo di venerdì 3 alla Valletta hanno delineato un progetto di chiusura della “rotta” del Mediterraneo centrale che rischia di seppellire, di fatto, il diritto d’asilo nel Paese e ai suoi confini.

      http://viedifuga.org/libia-diritto-d-asilo-cercasi-smarrito-fra-bruxelles-e-tripoli

    • Immigration : l’Union européenne veut aider la Libye

      L’Union européenne veut mettre fin à ces traversées entre la Libye et l’Italie. Leur plan passe par une aide financière aux autorités libyennes.

      http://www.rts.ch/play/tv/19h30/video/immigration-lunion-europeenne-veut-aider-la-libye?id=8360849

      Dans ce bref reportage, la RTS demande l’opinion d’Etienne Piguet (prof en géographie des migrations à l’Université de Neuchâtel) :
      « L’Union européenne veut absolument limiter les arrivées, mais en même temps on ne peut pas simplement refouler les gens. C’est pas acceptable du point de vue des droits humains. Donc l’UE essaie de mettre en place un système qui tient les gens à distance tout en leur offrant des conditions acceptables d’accueil » (en Libye, entend-il)
      Je m’abstiens de tout commentaire.

    • New EU Partnerships in North Africa: Potential to Backfire?

      As European leaders meet in Malta to receive a progress report on the EU flagship migration partnership framework, the European Union finds itself in much the same position as two years earlier, with hundreds of desperate individuals cramming into flimsy boats and setting off each week from the Libyan coast in hope of finding swift rescue and passage in Europe. Options to reduce flows unilaterally are limited. Barred by EU law from “pushing back” vessels encountered in the Mediterranean, the European Union is faced with no alternative but to rescue and transfer passengers to European territory, where the full framework of European asylum law applies. Member States are thus looking more closely at the role transit countries along the North African coastline might play in managing these flows across the Central Mediterranean. Specifically, they are examining the possibility of reallocating responsibility for search and rescue to Southern partners, thereby decoupling the rescue missions from territorial access to international protection in Europe.

      http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/new-eu-partnerships-north-africa-potential-backfire

    • Migration: MSF warns EU about inhumane approach to migration management

      As European Union (EU) leaders meet in Malta today to discuss migration, with a view to “close down the route from Libya to Italy” by stepping up cooperation with the Libyan authorities, we want to raise grave concerns about the fate of people trapped in Libya or returned to the country. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been providing medical care to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers detained in Tripoli and the surrounding area since July 2016 and people are detained arbitrarily in inhumane and unsanitary conditions, often without enough food and clean water and with a lack of access to medical care.

      http://www.msf.org/en/article/migration-msf-warns-eu-about-inhumane-approach-migration-management

    • EU and Italy migration deal with Libya draws sharp criticism from Libyan NGOs

      Twelve Libyan non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have issued a joint statement criticising the EU’s latest migrant policy as set out at the Malta summit a week ago as well as the Italy-Libya deal signed earlier which agreed that migrants should be sent back to Libya and repartiated voluntarily from there. Both represented a fundamental “immoral and inhumane attitude” towards migrants, they said. International human rights and calls had to be respected.

      https://www.libyaherald.com/2017/02/10/eu-and-italy-migration-deal-with-libya-draws-sharp-criticism-from-libya

    • Libya is not Turkey: why the EU plan to stop Mediterranean migration is a human rights concern

      EU leaders have agreed to a plan that will provide Libya’s UN-backed government €200 million for dealing with migration. This includes an increase in funding for the Libyan coastguard, with an overall aim to stop migrant boats crossing the Mediterranean to Italy.

      https://theconversation.com/libya-is-not-turkey-why-the-eu-plan-to-stop-mediterranean-migration

    • EU aims to step up help to Libya coastguards on migrant patrols

      TUNIS (Reuters) - The European Union wants to rapidly expand training of Libyan coastguards to stem migrant flows to Italy and reduce deaths at sea, an EU naval mission said on Thursday, signaling a renewed push to support a force struggling to patrol its own coasts.

      https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya/eu-aims-to-step-up-help-to-libya-coastguards-on-migrant-patrols-idUSKCN1GR3

      #UE #EU

    • Why Cooperating With Libya on Migration Could Damage the EU’s Standing

      Italy and the Netherlands began training Libyan coast guard and navy officers on Italian and Dutch navy ships in the Mediterranean earlier in October. The training is part of the European Union’s anti-smuggling operation in the central Mediterranean with the goal of enhancing Libya’s “capability to disrupt smuggling and trafficking… and to perform search-and-rescue activities.”

      http://europe.newsweek.com/why-cooperating-libya-migration-could-damage-eus-standing-516099?rm
      #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Europe #UE #EU #Libye #coopération #externalisation #Méditerranée #Italie #Pays-Bas #gardes-côtes

    • Les migrants paient le prix fort de la coopération entre l’UE et les garde-côtes libyens

      Nombre de dirigeants européens appellent à une « coopération » renforcée avec les garde-côtes libyens. Mais une fois interceptés en mer, ces migrants sont renvoyés dans des centres de détention indignes et risquent de retomber aux mains de trafiquants.

      C’est un peu la bouée de sauvetage des dirigeants européens. La « coopération » avec la Libye et ses légions de garde-côtes reste l’une des dernières politiques à faire consensus dans les capitales de l’UE, s’agissant des migrants. Initiée en 2016 pour favoriser l’interception d’embarcations avant leur entrée dans les eaux à responsabilité italienne ou maltaise, elle a fait chuter le nombre d’arrivées en Europe.

      Emmanuel Macron en particulier s’en est félicité, mardi 26 juin, depuis le Vatican : « La capacité à fermer cette route [entre la Libye et l’Italie, ndlr] est la réponse la plus efficace » au défi migratoire. Selon lui, ce serait même « la plus humaine ». Alors qu’un Conseil européen crucial s’ouvre ce jeudi 28 juin, le président français appelle donc à « renforcer » cette coopération avec Tripoli.

      Convaincu qu’il faut laisser les Libyens travailler, il s’en est même pris, mardi, aux bateaux humanitaires et en particulier au Lifeline, le navire affrété par une ONG allemande qui a débarqué 233 migrants mercredi soir à Malte (après une semaine d’attente en mer et un blocus de l’Italie), l’accusant d’être « intervenu en contravention de toutes les règles et des garde-côtes libyens ». Lancé, Emmanuel Macron est allé jusqu’à reprocher aux bateaux des ONG de faire « le jeu des passeurs ».

      Inédite dans sa bouche (mais entendue mille fois dans les diatribes de l’extrême droite transalpine), cette sentence fait depuis bondir les organisations humanitaires les unes après les autres, au point que Médecins sans frontières (qui affrète l’Aquarius avec SOS Méditerranée), Amnesty International France, La Cimade et Médecins du monde réclament désormais un rendez-vous à l’Élysée, se disant « consternées ».

      Ravi, lui, le ministre de l’intérieur italien et leader d’extrême droite, Matteo Salvini, en a profité pour annoncer mercredi un don exceptionnel en faveur des garde-côtes de Tripoli, auxquels il avait rendu visite l’avant-veille : 12 navires de patrouille, une véritable petite flotte.

      En deux ans, la coopération avec ce pays de furie qu’est la Libye post-Kadhafi semble ainsi devenue la solution miracle, « la plus humaine » même, que l’UE ait dénichée face au défi migratoire en Méditerranée centrale. Comment en est-on arrivé là ? Jusqu’où va cette « coopération » qualifiée de « complicité » par certaines ONG ? Quels sont ses résultats ?

      • Déjà 8 100 interceptions en mer
      À ce jour, en 2018, environ 16 000 migrants ont réussi à traverser jusqu’en Italie, soit une baisse de 77 % par rapport à l’an dernier. Sur ce point, Emmanuel Macron a raison : « Nous avons réduit les flux. » Les raisons, en réalité, sont diverses. Mais de fait, plus de 8 100 personnes parties de Libye ont déjà été rattrapées par les garde-côtes du pays cette année et ramenées à terre, d’après le Haut Commissariat aux réfugiés (le HCR). Contre 800 en 2015.

      Dans les écrits de cette agence de l’ONU, ces migrants sont dits « sauvés/interceptés », sans qu’il soit tranché entre ces deux termes, ces deux réalités. À lui seul, ce « / » révèle toute l’ambiguïté des politiques de coopération de l’UE : si Bruxelles aime penser que ces vies sont sauvées, les ONG soulignent qu’elles sont surtout ramenées en enfer. Certains, d’ailleurs, préfèrent sauter de leur bateau pneumatique en pleine mer plutôt que retourner en arrière.

      • En Libye, l’« abominable » sort des migrants (source officielle)
      Pour comprendre les critiques des ONG, il faut rappeler les conditions inhumaines dans lesquelles les exilés survivent dans cet « État tampon », aujourd’hui dirigé par un gouvernement d’union nationale ultra contesté (basé à Tripoli), sans contrôle sur des parts entières du territoire. « Ce que nous entendons dépasse l’entendement, rapporte l’un des infirmiers de l’Aquarius, qui fut du voyage jusqu’à Valence. Les migrants subsahariens sont affamés, assoiffés, torturés. » Parmi les 630 passagers débarqués en Espagne, l’une de ses collègues raconte avoir identifié de nombreux « survivants de violences sexuelles », « des femmes et des hommes à la fois, qui ont vécu le viol et la torture sexuelle comme méthodes d’extorsion de fonds », les familles étant souvent soumises au chantage par téléphone. Un diagnostic dicté par l’émotion ? Des exagérations de rescapés ?

      Le même constat a été officiellement dressé, dès janvier 2017, par le Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme de l’ONU. « Les migrants se trouvant sur le sol libyen sont victimes de détention arbitraire dans des conditions inhumaines, d’actes de torture, notamment de violence sexuelle, d’enlèvements visant à obtenir une rançon, de racket, de travail forcé et de meurtre », peut-on lire dans son rapport, où l’on distingue les centres de détention officiels dirigés par le Service de lutte contre la migration illégale (relevant du ministère de l’intérieur) et les prisons clandestines tenues par des milices armées.

      Même dans les centres gouvernementaux, les exilés « sont détenus arbitrairement sans la moindre procédure judiciaire, en violation du droit libyen et des normes internationales des droits de l’homme. (…) Ils sont souvent placés dans des entrepôts dont les conditions sont abominables (…). Des surveillants refusent aux migrants l’accès aux toilettes, les obligeant à uriner et à déféquer [là où ils sont]. Dans certains cas, les migrants souffrent de malnutrition grave [environ un tiers de la ration calorique quotidienne minimale]. Des sources nombreuses et concordantes [évoquent] la commission d’actes de torture, notamment des passages à tabac, des violences sexuelles et du travail forcé ».

      Sachant qu’il y a pire à côté : « Des groupes armés et des trafiquants détiennent d’autres migrants dans des lieux non officiels. » Certaines de ces milices, d’ailleurs, « opèrent pour le compte de l’État » ou pour « des agents de l’État », pointe le rapport. Le marché du kidnapping, de la vente et de la revente, est florissant. C’est l’enfer sans même Lucifer pour l’administrer.

      En mai dernier, par exemple, une centaine de migrants a réussi à s’évader d’une prison clandestine de la région de Bani Walid, où MSF gère une clinique de jour. « Parmi les survivants que nous avons soignés, des jeunes de 16 à 18 ans en majorité, certains souffrent de blessures par balles, de fractures multiples, de brûlures, témoigne Christophe Biteau, chef de mission de l’ONG en Libye. Certains nous racontent avoir été baladés, détenus, revendus, etc., pendant trois ans. » Parfois, MSF recueille aussi des migrants relâchés « spontanément » par leurs trafiquants : « Un mec qui commence à tousser par exemple, ils n’en veulent plus à cause des craintes de tuberculose. Pareil en cas d’infections graves. Il y a comme ça des migrants, sur lesquels ils avaient investi, qu’ils passent par “pertes et profits”, si j’ose dire. »

      Depuis 2017, et surtout les images d’un marché aux esclaves diffusées sur CNN, les pressions de l’ONU comme de l’UE se sont toutefois multipliées sur le gouvernement de Tripoli, afin qu’il s’efforce de vider les centres officiels les plus honteux – 18 ont été fermés, d’après un bilan de mars dernier. Mais dans un rapport récent, daté de mai 2018, le secrétaire général de l’ONU persiste : « Les migrants continuent d’être sujets (…) à la torture, à du rançonnement, à du travail forcé et à des meurtres », dans des « centres officiels et non officiels ». Les auteurs ? « Des agents de l’État, des groupes armés, des trafiquants, des gangs criminels », encore et encore.

      Au 21 juin, plus de 5 800 personnes étaient toujours détenues dans les centres officiels. « Nous en avons répertorié 33, dont 4 où nous avons des difficultés d’accès », précise l’envoyé spécial du HCR pour la situation en Méditerranée centrale, Vincent Cochetel, qui glisse au passage : « Il est arrivé que des gens disparaissent après nous avoir parlé. » Surtout, ces derniers jours, avec la fin du ramadan et les encouragements des dirigeants européens adressés aux garde-côtes libyens, ces centres de détention se remplissent à nouveau.

      • Un retour automatique en détention
      Car c’est bien là, dans ces bâtiments gérés par le ministère de l’intérieur, que sont théoriquement renvoyés les migrants « sauvés/interceptés » en mer. Déjà difficile, cette réalité en cache toutefois une autre. « Les embarcations des migrants décollent en général de Libye en pleine nuit, raconte Christophe Biteau, de MSF. Donc les interceptions par les garde-côtes se font vers 2 h ou 3 h du matin et les débarquements vers 6 h. Là, avant l’arrivée des services du ministère de l’intérieur libyen et du HCR (dont la présence est autorisée sur la douzaine de plateformes de débarquement utilisées), il y a un laps de temps critique. » Où tout peut arriver.

      L’arrivée à Malte, mercredi 27 juin 2018, des migrants sauvés par le navire humanitaire « Lifeline » © Reuters
      Certains migrants de la Corne de l’Afrique (Érythrée, Somalie, etc.), réputés plus « solvables » que d’autres parce qu’ils auraient des proches en Europe jouissant déjà du statut de réfugiés, racontent avoir été rachetés à des garde-côtes par des trafiquants. Ces derniers répercuteraient ensuite le prix d’achat de leur « marchandise » sur le tarif de la traversée, plus chère à la seconde tentative… Si Christophe Biteau ne peut témoigner directement d’une telle corruption de garde-côtes, il déclare sans hésiter : « Une personne ramenée en Libye peut très bien se retrouver à nouveau dans les mains de trafiquants. »

      Au début du mois de juin, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU (rien de moins) a voté des sanctions à l’égard de six trafiquants de migrants (gel de comptes bancaires, interdiction de voyager, etc.), dont le chef d’une unité de… garde-côtes. D’autres de ses collègues ont été suspectés par les ONG de laisser passer les embarcations siglées par tel ou tel trafiquant, contre rémunération.

      En tout cas, parmi les migrants interceptés et ramenés à terre, « il y a des gens qui disparaissent dans les transferts vers les centres de détention », confirme Vincent Cochetel, l’envoyé spécial du HCR. « Sur les plateformes de débarquement, on aimerait donc mettre en place un système d’enregistrement biométrique, pour essayer de retrouver ensuite les migrants dans les centres, pour protéger les gens. Pour l’instant, on n’a réussi à convaincre personne. » Les « kits médicaux » distribués sur place, financés par l’UE, certes utiles, ne sont pas à la hauteur de l’enjeu.

      • Des entraînements financés par l’UE
      Dans le cadre de l’opération Sophia (théoriquement destinée à lutter contre les passeurs et trafiquants dans les eaux internationales de la Méditerranée), Bruxelles a surtout décidé, en juin 2016, d’initier un programme de formation des garde-côtes libyens, qui a démarré l’an dernier et déjà bénéficié à 213 personnes. C’est que, souligne-t-on à Bruxelles, les marines européennes ne sauraient intervenir elles-mêmes dans les eaux libyennes.

      Il s’agit à la fois d’entraînements pratiques et opérationnels (l’abordage de canots, par exemple) visant à réduire les risques de pertes humaines durant les interventions, et d’un enseignement juridique (droit maritimes, droits humains, etc.), notamment à destination de la hiérarchie. D’après la commission européenne, tous les garde-côtes bénéficiaires subissent un « check de sécurité » avec vérifications auprès d’Interpol et Europol, voire des services de renseignement des États membres, pour écarter les individus les plus douteux.

      Il faut dire que les besoins de « formation » sont – pour le moins – criants. À plusieurs reprises, des navires humanitaires ont été témoins d’interceptions violentes, sinon criminelles. Sur une vidéo filmée depuis le Sea Watch (ONG allemande) en novembre dernier, on a vu des garde-côtes frapper certains des migrants repêchés, puis redémarrer alors qu’un homme restait suspendu à l’échelle de bâbord, sans qu’aucun Zodiac de secours ne soit jamais mis à l’eau. « Ils étaient cassés », ont répondu les Libyens.

      Un « sauvetage » effectué en novembre 2017 par des garde-côtes Libyens © Extrait d’une vidéo publiée par l’ONG allemande Sea Watch
      Interrogée sur le coût global de ces formations, la commission indique qu’il est impossible à chiffrer, Frontex (l’agence de garde-côtes européenne) pouvant participer aux sessions, tel État membre fournir un bateau, tel autre un avion pour trimballer les garde-côtes, etc.

      • La fourniture d’équipements en direct
      En décembre, un autre programme a démarré, plus touffu, financé cette fois via le « Fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique » (le fonds d’urgence européen mis en place en 2015 censément pour prévenir les causes profondes des migrations irrégulières et prendre le problème à la racine). Cette fois, il s’agit non plus seulement de « formation », mais de « renforcement des capacités opérationnelles » des garde-côtes libyens, avec des aides directes à l’équipement de bateaux (gilets, canots pneumatiques, appareils de communication, etc.), à l’entretien des navires, mais aussi à l’équipement des salles de contrôle à terre, avec un objectif clair en ligne de mire : aider la Libye à créer un « centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime » en bonne et due forme, pour mieux proclamer une « zone de recherche et sauvetage » officielle, au-delà de ses seules eaux territoriales actuelles. La priorité, selon la commission à Bruxelles, reste de « sauver des vies ».

      Budget annoncé : 46 millions d’euros avec un co-financement de l’Italie, chargée de la mise en œuvre. À la marge, les garde-côtes libyens peuvent d’ailleurs profiter d’autres programmes européens, tel « Seahorse », pour de l’entraînement à l’utilisation de radars.

      L’Italie, elle, va encore plus loin. D’abord, elle fournit des bateaux aux garde-côtes. Surtout, en 2017, le ministre de l’intérieur transalpin a rencontré les maires d’une dizaine de villes libyennes en leur faisant miroiter l’accès au Fonds fiduciaire pour l’Afrique de l’UE, en contrepartie d’un coup de main contre le trafic de migrants. Et selon diverses enquêtes (notamment des agences de presse Reuters et AP), un deal financier secret aurait été conclu à l’été 2017 entre l’Italie et des représentants de milices, à l’époque maîtresses des départs d’embarcations dans la région de Sabratha. Rome a toujours démenti, mais les appareillages dans ce coin ont brutalement cessé pour redémarrer un peu plus loin. Au bénéfice d’autres milices.

      • L’aide à l’exfiltration de migrants
      En même temps, comme personne ne conteste plus l’enfer des conditions de détention et que tout le monde s’efforce officiellement de vider les centres du régime en urgence, l’UE travaille aussi à la « réinstallation » en Europe des exilés accessibles au statut de réfugié, ainsi qu’au rapatriement dans leur pays d’origine des migrants dits « économiques » (sur la base du volontariat en théorie). Dans le premier cas, l’UE vient en soutien du HCR ; dans le second cas, en renfort de l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM).

      L’objectif affiché est limpide : épargner des prises de risque en mer inutiles aux réfugiés putatifs (Érythréens, Somaliens, etc.), comme à ceux dont la demande à toutes les chances d’être déboutée une fois parvenus en Europe, comme les Ivoiriens par exemple. Derrière les éléments de langage, que disent les chiffres ?

      Selon le HCR, seuls 1 730 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile prioritaires ont pu être évacués depuis novembre 2017, quelques-uns directement de la Libye vers l’Italie (312) et la Roumanie (10), mais l’essentiel vers le Niger voisin, où les autorités ont accepté d’accueillir une plateforme d’évacuations de 1 500 places en échange de promesses de « réinstallations » rapides derrière, dans certains pays de l’UE.

      Et c’est là que le bât blesse. Paris, par exemple, s’est engagé à faire venir 3 000 réfugiés de Niamey (Niger), mais n’a pas tenu un vingtième de sa promesse. L’Allemagne ? Zéro.

      « On a l’impression qu’une fois qu’on a évacué de Libye, la notion d’urgence se perd », regrette Vincent Cochetel, du HCR. Une centaine de migrants, surtout des femmes et des enfants, ont encore été sortis de Libye le 19 juin par avion. « Mais on va arrêter puisqu’on n’a plus de places [à Niamey], pointe le représentant du HCR. L’heure de vérité approche. On ne peut pas demander au Niger de jouer ce rôle si on n’est pas sérieux derrière, en termes de réinstallations. Je rappelle que le Niger a plus de réfugiés sur son territoire que la France par exemple, qui fait quand même des efforts, c’est vrai. Mais on aimerait que ça aille beaucoup plus vite. » Le HCR discute d’ailleurs avec d’autres États africains pour créer une seconde « plateforme d’évacuation » de Libye, mais l’exemple du Niger, embourbé, ne fait pas envie.

      Quant aux rapatriements vers les pays d’origine des migrants dits « économiques », mis en œuvre avec l’OIM (autre agence onusienne), les chiffres atteignaient 8 546 à la mi-juin. « On peut questionner le caractère volontaire de certains de ces rapatriements, complète Christophe Biteau, de MSF. Parce que vu les conditions de détention en Libye, quand on te dit : “Tu veux que je te sorte de là et que je te ramène chez toi ?”… Ce n’est pas vraiment un choix. » D’ailleurs, d’après l’OIM, les rapatriés de Libye sont d’abord Nigérians, puis Soudanais, alors même que les ressortissants du Soudan accèdent à une protection de la France dans 75 % des cas lorsqu’ils ont l’opportunité de voir leur demande d’asile examinée.
      En résumé, sur le terrain, la priorité des États de l’UE va clairement au renforcement du mur de la Méditerranée et de ses Cerbère, tandis que l’extraction de réfugiés, elle, reste cosmétique. Pour Amnesty International, cette attitude de l’Union, et de l’Italie au premier chef, serait scandaleuse : « Dans la mesure où ils ont joué un rôle dans l’interception des réfugiés et des migrants, et dans la politique visant à les contenir en Libye, ils partagent avec celle-ci la responsabilité des détentions arbitraires, de la torture et autres mauvais traitements infligés », tance un rapport de l’association publié en décembre dernier.

      Pour le réseau Migreurop (regroupant chercheurs et associations spécialisés), « confier le contrôle des frontières maritimes de l’Europe à un État non signataire de la Convention de Genève [sur les droits des réfugiés, ndlr] s’apparente à une politique délibérée de contournement des textes internationaux et à une sous-traitance des pires violences à l’encontre des personnes exerçant leur droit à émigrer ». Pas sûr que les conclusions du conseil européen de jeudi et vendredi donnent, à ces organisations, la moindre satisfaction.

      https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/280618/les-migrants-paient-le-prix-fort-de-la-cooperation-entre-lue-et-les-garde-

    • Au Niger, l’Europe finance plusieurs projets pour réduire le flux de migrants

      L’Union européenne a invité des entreprises du vieux continent au Niger afin qu’elles investissent pour améliorer les conditions de vie des habitants. Objectif : réduire le nombre de candidats au départ vers l’Europe.

      Le Niger est un pays stratégique pour les Européens. C’est par là que transitent la plupart des migrants qui veulent rejoindre l’Europe. Pour réduire le flux, l’Union européenne finance depuis 2015 plusieurs projets et veut désormais créer un tissu économique au Niger pour dissuader les candidats au départ. Le président du Parlement européen, Antonio Tajani, était, la semaine dernière dans la capitale nigérienne à Niamey, accompagné d’une trentaine de chefs d’entreprise européens à la recherche d’opportunités d’investissements.
      Baisse du nombre de départ de 90% en deux ans

      Le nombre de migrants qui a quitté le Niger pour rejoindre la Libye avant de tenter la traversée vers l’Europe a été réduit de plus de 90% ces deux dernières années. Notamment grâce aux efforts menés par le gouvernement nigérien avec le soutien de l’Europe pour mieux contrôler la frontière entre le Niger et la Libye. Mais cela ne suffit pas selon le président du Parlement européen, Antonio Tajani. « En 2050, nous aurons deux milliards cinq cents millions d’Africains, nous ne pourrons pas bloquer avec la police et l’armée l’immigration, donc voilà pourquoi il faut intervenir tout de suite ». Selon le président du Parlement européen, il faut donc améliorer les conditions de vie des Nigériens pour les dissuader de venir en Europe.
      Des entreprises françaises vont investir au Niger

      La société française #Sunna_Design, travaille dans le secteur de l’éclairage public solaire et souhaite s’implanter au Niger. Pourtant les difficultés sont nombreuses, notamment la concurrence chinoise, l’insécurité, ou encore la mauvaise gouvernance. Stéphane Redon, le responsable export de l’entreprise, y voit pourtant un bon moyen d’améliorer la vie des habitants. « D’abord la sécurité qui permet à des gens de pouvoir penser à avoir une vie sociale, nocturne, et une activité économique. Et avec ces nouvelles technologies, on aspire à ce que ces projets créent du travail localement, au niveau des installations, de la maintenance, et de la fabrication. »
      Le Niger salue l’initiative

      Pour Mahamadou Issoufou, le président du Niger, l’implantation d’entreprises européennes sur le territoire nigérien est indispensable pour faire face au défi de son pays notamment démographique. Le Niger est le pays avec le taux de natalité le plus élevé au monde, avec huit enfants par femme. « Nous avons tous décidé de nous attaquer aux causes profondes de la migration clandestine, et l’une des causes profondes, c’est la #pauvreté. Il est donc important qu’une lutte énergique soit menée. Certes, il y a les ressources publiques nationales, il y a l’#aide_publique_au_développement, mais tout cela n’est pas suffisant. il faut nécessairement un investissement massif du secteur privé », explique Mahamadou Issoufou. Cette initiative doit être élargie à l’ensemble des pays du Sahel, selon les autorités nigériennes et européennes.

      https://mobile.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/en-direct-du-monde/en-direct-du-monde-au-niger-l-europe-finance-plusieurs-projets-p
      #investissements #développement #APD

    • In die Rebellion getrieben

      Die Flüchtlingsabwehr der EU führt zu neuen Spannungen in Niger und droht womöglich gar eine Rebellion im Norden des Landes auszulösen. Wie Berichte aus der Region bestätigen, hat die von Brüssel erzwungene Illegalisierung des traditionellen Migrationsgeschäfts besonders in der Stadt Agadez, dem Tor zur nigrischen Sahara, Zehntausenden die Lebensgrundlage genommen. Großspurig angekündigte Ersatzprogramme der EU haben lediglich einem kleinen Teil der Betroffenen wieder zu einem Job verholfen. Lokale Beobachter warnen, die Bereitschaft zum Aufstand sowie zum Anschluss an Jihadisten nehme zu. Niger ist ohnehin Schauplatz wachsenden jihadistischen Terrors wie auch gesteigerter westlicher „Anti-Terror“-Operationen: Während Berlin und die EU vor allem eine neue Eingreiftruppe der Staatengruppe „G5 Sahel“ fördern - deutsche Soldaten dürfen dabei auch im Niger eingesetzt werden -, haben die Vereinigten Staaten ihre Präsenz in dem Land ausgebaut. Die US-Streitkräfte errichten zur Zeit eine Drohnenbasis in Agadez, die neue Spannungen auslöst.
      Das Ende der Reisefreiheit

      Niger ist für Menschen, die sich aus den Staaten Afrikas südlich der Sahara auf den Weg zum Mittelmeer und weiter nach Europa machen, stets das wohl wichtigste Transitland gewesen. Nach dem Zerfall Libyens im Anschluss an den Krieg des Westens zum Sturz von Muammar al Gaddafi hatten zeitweise drei Viertel aller Flüchtlinge, die von Libyens Küste mit Ziel Italien in See stachen, zuvor das Land durchquert. Als kaum zu vermeidendes Nadelöhr zwischen den dichter besiedelten Gebieten Nigers und der Wüste fungiert die 120.000-Einwohner-Stadt Agadez, von deren Familien bis 2015 rund die Hälfte ihr Einkommen aus der traditionell legalen Migration zog: Niger gehört dem westafrikanischen Staatenbund ECOWAS an, in dem volle Reisefreiheit gilt. Im Jahr 2015 ist die Reisefreiheit in Niger allerdings durch ein Gesetz eingeschränkt worden, das, wie der Innenminister des Landes bestätigt, nachdrücklich von der EU gefordert worden war.[1] Mit seinem Inkrafttreten ist das Migrationsgeschäft in Agadez illegalisiert worden; das hatte zur Folge, dass zahlreiche Einwohner der Stadt ihren Erwerb verloren. Die EU hat zwar Hilfe zugesagt, doch ihre Maßnahmen sind allenfalls ein Tropfen auf den heißen Stein: Von den 7.000 Menschen, die offiziell ihre Arbeit in der nun verbotenen Transitreisebranche aufgaben, hat Brüssel mit einem großspurig aufgelegten, acht Millionen Euro umfassenden Programm weniger als 400 in Lohn und Brot gebracht.
      Ohne Lebensgrundlage

      Entsprechend hat sich die Stimmung in Agadez in den vergangenen zwei Jahren systematisch verschlechtert, heißt es in einem aktuellen Bericht über die derzeitige Lage in der Stadt, den das Nachrichtenportal IRIN Ende Juni publiziert hat.[2] Rangiert Niger auf dem Human Development Index der Vereinten Nationen ohnehin auf Platz 187 von 188, so haben die Verdienstmöglichkeiten in Agadez mit dem Ende des legalen Reisegeschäfts nicht nur stark abgenommen; selbst wer mit Hilfe der EU einen neuen Job gefunden hat, verdient meist erheblich weniger als zuvor. Zwar werden weiterhin Flüchtlinge durch die Wüste in Richtung Norden transportiert - jetzt eben illegal -, doch wachsen die Spannungen, und sie drohen bei jeder neuen EU-Maßnahme zur Abriegelung der nigrisch-libyschen Grenze weiter zu steigen. Das Verbot des Migrationsgeschäfts werde auf lange Sicht „die Leute in die Rebellion treiben“, warnt gegenüber IRIN ein Bewohner von Agadez stellvertretend für eine wachsende Zahl weiterer Bürger der Stadt. Als Reiseunternehmer für Flüchtlinge haben vor allem Tuareg gearbeitet, die bereits von 1990 bis 1995, dann erneut im Jahr 2007 einen bewaffneten Aufstand gegen die Regierung in Niamey unternommen hatten. Hinzu kommt laut einem örtlichen Würdenträger, dass die Umtriebe von Jihadisten im Sahel zunehmend als Widerstand begriffen und für jüngere, in wachsendem Maße aufstandsbereite Bewohner der Region Agadez immer häufiger zum Vorbild würden.
      Anti-Terror-Krieg im Sahel

      Jihadisten haben ihre Aktivitäten in Niger in den vergangenen Jahren bereits intensiviert, nicht nur im Südosten des Landes an der Grenze zu Nigeria, wo die nigrischen Streitkräfte im Krieg gegen Boko Haram stehen, sondern inzwischen auch an der Grenze zu Mali, von wo der dort seit 2012 schwelende Krieg immer mehr übergreift. Internationale Medien berichteten erstmals in größerem Umfang darüber, als am 4. Oktober 2017 eine US-Einheit, darunter Angehörige der Spezialtruppe Green Berets, nahe der nigrischen Ortschaft Tongo Tongo unweit der Grenze zu Mali in einen Hinterhalt gerieten und vier von ihnen von Jihadisten, die dem IS-Anführer Abu Bakr al Baghdadi die Treue geschworen hatten, getötet wurden.[3] In der Tat hat die Beobachtung, dass Jihadisten in Niger neuen Zulauf erhalten, die Vereinigten Staaten veranlasst, 800 Militärs in dem Land zu stationieren, die offiziell nigrische Soldaten trainieren, mutmaßlich aber auch Kommandoaktionen durchführen. Darüber hinaus beteiligt sich Niger auf Druck der EU an der Eingreiftruppe der „G5 Sahel“ [4], die im gesamten Sahel - auch in Niger - am Krieg gegen Jihadisten teilnimmt und auf lange Sicht nach Möglichkeit die französischen Kampftruppen der Opération Barkhane ersetzen soll. Um die „G5 Sahel“-Eingreiftruppe jederzeit und überall unterstützen zu können, hat der Bundestag im Frühjahr das Mandat für die deutschen Soldaten, die in die UN-Truppe MINUSMA entsandt werden, auf alle Sahelstaaten ausgedehnt - darunter auch Niger. Deutsche Soldaten sind darüber hinaus bereits am Flughafen der Hauptstadt Niamey stationiert. Der sogenannte Anti-Terror-Krieg des Westens, der in anderen Ländern wegen seiner Brutalität den Jihadisten oft mehr Kämpfer zugeführt als genommen hat, weitet sich zunehmend auf nigrisches Territorium aus.
      Zunehmend gewaltbereit

      Zusätzliche Folgen haben könnte dabei die Tatsache, dass die Vereinigten Staaten gegenwärtig für den Anti-Terror-Krieg eine 110 Millionen US-Dollar teure Drohnenbasis errichten - am Flughafen Agadez. Niger scheint sich damit dauerhaft zum zweitwichtigsten afrikanischen Standort von US-Truppen nach Djibouti mit seinem strategisch bedeutenden Hafen zu entwickeln. Washington errichtet die Drohnenbasis, obwohl eine vorab durchgeführte Umfrage des U.S. Africa Command und des State Department ergeben hat, dass die Bevölkerung die US-Militäraktivitäten im Land zunehmend kritisch sieht und eine starke Minderheit Gewalt gegen Personen oder Organisationen aus Europa und Nordamerika für legitim hält.[5] Mittlerweile dürfen sich, wie berichtet wird, US-Botschaftsangehörige außerhalb der Hauptstadt Niamey nur noch in Konvois in Begleitung von nigrischem Sicherheitspersonal bewegen. Die Drohnenbasis, die ohne die von der nigrischen Verfassung vorgesehene Zustimmung des Parlaments errichtet wird und daher mutmaßlich illegal ist, droht den Unmut noch weiter zu verschärfen. Beobachter halten es für nicht unwahrscheinlich, dass sie Angriffe auf sich zieht - und damit Niger noch weiter destabilisiert.[6]
      Flüchtlingslager

      Hinzu kommt, dass die EU Niger in zunehmendem Maß als Plattform nutzt, um Flüchtlinge, die in libyschen Lagern interniert waren, unterzubringen, bevor sie entweder in die EU geflogen oder in ihre Herkunftsländer abgeschoben werden. Allein von Ende November bis Mitte Mai sind 1.152 Flüchtlinge aus Libyen nach Niger gebracht worden; dazu wurden 17 „Transitzentren“ in Niamey, sechs in Agadez eingerichtet. Niger gilt inzwischen außerdem als möglicher Standort für die EU-"Ausschiffungsplattformen" [7] - Lager, in die Flüchtlinge verlegt werden sollen, die auf dem Mittelmeer beim Versuch, nach Europa zu reisen, aufgegriffen wurden. Damit erhielte Niger einen weiteren potenziellen Destabilisierungsfaktor - im Auftrag und unter dem Druck der EU. Ob und, wenn ja, wie das Land die durch all dies drohenden Erschütterungen überstehen wird, das ist völlig ungewiss.

      [1], [2] Eric Reidy: Destination Europe: Frustration. irinnews.org 28.06.2018.

      [3] Eric Schmitt: 3 Special Forces Troops Killed and 2 Are Wounded in an Ambush in Niger. nytimes.com 04.10.2017.[4] S. dazu Die Militarisierung des Sahel (IV).

      [5] Nick Turse: U.S. Military Surveys Found Local Distrust in Niger. Then the Air Force Built a $100 Million Drone Base. theintercept.com 03.07.2018.

      [6] Joe Penney: A Massive U.S. Drone Base Could Destabilize Niger - And May Even Be Illegal Under its Constitution. theintercept.com 18.02.2018.

      [7] S. dazu Libysche Lager.

      https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/news/detail/7673

      –-> Commentaire reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop :

      La politique d’externalisation de l’UE crée de nouvelles tensions au Niger et risque de déclencher une rebellion dans le nord du pays. Plusieurs rapports de la région confirment que le fait que Bruxelle ait rendu illégal la migration traditionnelle et de fait détruit l’économie qui tournait autour, particulièrement dans la ville d’Agadez, porte d’entrée du Sahara nigérien, a privé de revenus des dizaines de milliers de personnes. Les programmes de développement annoncés par l’UE n’ont pu aider qu’une infime partie de ceux qui ont été affectés par la mesure. Les observateurs locaux constatent que une augmentation des volontés à se rebeller et/ou à rejoindre les djihadistes. Le Niger est déja la scène d’attaques terroristes djihadistes ainsi que d’opérations occidentales « anti-terreur » : alors que Berlin et l’UE soutiennent une intervention des forces du G5 Sahel - les soldats allemands pourraient être déployés au Niger - les Etats Unis ont étendu leur présence sur le territoire. Les forces US sont en train de construire une base de #drones à Agadez, ce qui a déclenché de nouvelles tensions.

      #déstabilisation

    • Libya: EU’s patchwork policy has failed to protect the human rights of refugees and migrants

      A year after the emergence of shocking footage of migrants apparently being sold as merchandise in Libya prompted frantic deliberations over the EU’s migration policy, a series of quick fixes and promises has not improved the situation for refugees and migrants, Amnesty International said today. In fact, conditions for refugees and migrants have largely deteriorated over the past year and armed clashes in Tripoli that took place between August and September this year have only exacerbated the situation further.

      https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/9391/2018/en
      #droits_humains

      Pour télécharger le rapport:
      https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1993912018ENGLISH.pdf

    • New #LNCG Training module in Croatia

      A new training module in favour of Libyan Coastguard and Navy started in Split (Croatia) on November the 12.
      Last Monday, November the 12th, a new training module managed by operation Sophia and focused on “Ship’s Divers Basic Course” was launched in the Croatian Navy Training Centre in Split (Croatia).

      The trainees had been selected by the competent Libyan authorities and underwent a thorough vetting process carried out in different phases by EUNAVFOR Med, security agencies of EU Member States participating in the Operation and international organizations.

      After the accurate vetting process, including all the necessary medical checks for this specific activity, 5 Libyan military personnel were admitted to start the course.

      The course, hosted by the Croatian Navy, will last 5 weeks, and it will provide knowledge and training in diving procedures, specifically related techniques and lessons focused on Human Rights, Basic First Aid and Gender Policy.

      The end of the course is scheduled for the 14 of December 2018.

      Additionally, with the positive conclusion of this course, the threshold of more than 300 Libyan Coastguard and Navy personnel trained by #EUNAVFOR_Med will be reached.

      EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia continues at sea its operation focused on disrupting the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers, contributing to EU efforts for the return of stability and security in Libya and the training and capacity building of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard.


      https://www.operationsophia.eu/new-lncg-training-module-in-croatia

    • EU Council adopts decision expanding EUBAM Libya’s mandate to include actively supporting Libyan authorities in disrupting networks involved in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism

      The Council adopted a decision mandating the #EU_integrated_border_management_assistance_mission in Libya (#EUBAM_Libya) to actively support the Libyan authorities in contributing to efforts to disrupt organised criminal networks involved in smuggling migrants, human trafficking and terrorism. The mission was previously mandated to plan for a future EU civilian mission while engaging with the Libyan authorities.

      The mission’s revised mandate will run until 30 June 2020. The Council also allocated a budget of € 61.6 million for the period from 1 January 2019 to 30 June 2020.

      In order to achieve its objectives EUBAM Libya provides capacity-building in the areas of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice. The mission advises the Libyan authorities on the development of a national integrated border management strategy and supports capacity building, strategic planning and coordination among relevant Libyan authorities. The mission will also manage as well as coordinate projects related to its mandate.

      EUBAM Libya responds to a request by the Libyan authorities and is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to support the transition to a democratic, stable and prosperous Libya. The civilian mission co-operates closely with, and contributes to, the efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

      The mission’s headquarters are located in Tripoli and the Head of Mission is Vincenzo Tagliaferri (from Italy). EUBAM Libya.

      https://migrantsatsea.org/2018/12/18/eu-council-adopts-decision-expanding-eubam-libyas-mandate-to-include-

      EUBAM Libya :
      Mission de l’UE d’assistance aux frontières (EUBAM) en Libye


      https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya_fr

    • Comment l’UE a fermé la route migratoire entre la Libye et l’Italie

      Les Européens coopèrent avec un Etat failli, malgré les mises en garde sur le sort des migrants dans le pays

      L’une des principales voies d’entrée en Europe s’est tarie. Un peu plus de 1 100 personnes migrantes sont arrivées en Italie et à Malte par la mer Méditerranée sur les cinq premiers mois de l’année. Un chiffre en fort recul, comparé aux 650 000 migrants qui ont emprunté cette voie maritime ces cinq dernières années. Le résultat, notamment, d’une coopération intense entre l’Union européenne, ses Etats membres et la Libye.

      En 2014, alors que le pays est plongé dans une guerre civile depuis la chute du régime de Kadhafi, plus de 140 000 migrants quittent ses côtes en direction de l’Italie, contre quelque 42 000 l’année précédente pour toute la rive sud de la Méditerranée centrale. Cette dernière devient, deux ans plus tard, la principale porte d’entrée sur le continent européen.

      Inquiète de cette recrudescence, l’Italie relance en mars 2016 ses relations bilatérales avec la Libye – interrompues depuis la chute de Kadhafi –, à peine le fragile gouvernement d’union nationale (GNA) de Faïez Sarraj installé à Tripoli sous l’égide de l’ONU. Emboîtant le pas à Rome, l’UE modifie le mandat de son opération militaire « Sophia ». Jusque-là cantonnée à la lutte contre le trafic de migrants en Méditerranée, celle-ci doit désormais accompagner le rétablissement et la montée en puissance des gardes-côtes libyens.

      Dans cette optique, dès juillet 2016, l’UE mandate les gardes-côtes italiens pour « assumer une responsabilité de premier plan » dans le projet de mise en place d’un centre de coordination de sauvetage maritime (MRCC) à Tripoli et d’une zone de sauvetage à responsabilité libyenne dans les eaux internationales. C’est une étape majeure dans le changement du paysage en Méditerranée centrale. Jusque-là, compte tenu de la défaillance de Tripoli, la coordination des sauvetages au large de la Libye était assumée par le MRCC de Rome. Les migrants secourus étaient donc ramenés sur la rive européenne de la Méditerranée. Si Tripoli prend la main sur ces opérations, alors ses gardes-côtes ramèneront les migrants en Libye, même ceux interceptés dans les eaux internationales. Une manière de « contourner l’interdiction en droit international de refouler un réfugié vers un pays où sa vie ou sa liberté sont menacées », résume Hassiba Hadj-Sahraoui, conseillère aux affaires humanitaires de Médecins sans frontières (MSF).

      Les premières formations de gardes-côtes débutent en octobre 2016, et les agences de l’ONU sont mises à contribution pour sensibiliser les personnels au respect des droits de l’homme. « C’est difficile d’en mesurer l’impact, mais nous pensons que notre présence limite les risques pour les réfugiés », estime Roberto Mignone, l’ancien représentant du Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés en Libye.

      Au sein de l’UE, tous les outils sont mobilisés. Même les équipes du Bureau européen d’appui à l’asile sont sollicitées. Un fonctionnaire européen se souvient du malaise en interne. « Le Conseil a fait pression pour nous faire participer, rapporte-t-il. On n’était clairement pas emballés. C’était nous compromettre un peu aussi dans ce qui ressemble à une relation de sous-traitance et à un blanc-seing donné à des pratiques problématiques. »
      Le travail des ONG entravé

      Le pays est alors dans une situation chaotique, et les migrants en particulier y encourent de graves violences telles que le travail forcé, l’exploitation sexuelle, le racket et la torture.

      Mais l’Europe poursuit son plan et continue de s’appuyer sur l’Italie. Le 2 février 2017, le gouvernement de gauche de Paolo Gentiloni (Parti démocrate) réactive un traité d’amitié de 2008 entre Rome et Tripoli, avec l’approbation du Conseil européen dès le lendemain. Des moyens du Fonds fiduciaire de l’UE pour l’Afrique sont fléchés vers les enjeux migratoires en Libye – 338 millions d’euros jusqu’à aujourd’hui –, bien que l’Union fasse état de « préoccupations sur une collusion possible entre les bénéficiaires de l’action et les activités de contrebande et de traite ».

      A cette époque, les Nations unies dénoncent l’implication des gardes-côtes de Zaouïa (à 50 km à l’ouest de Tripoli) dans le trafic de migrants. En mai 2017, Marco Minniti, ministre italien de l’intérieur (Parti démocrate), remet quatre bateaux patrouilleurs à la Libye. Trois mois plus tard, Tripoli déclare auprès de l’Organisation maritime internationale (OMI) qu’elle devient compétente pour coordonner les sauvetages jusqu’à 94 milles nautiques au large de ses côtes.

      Le travail des ONG, lui, est de plus en plus entravé par l’Italie, qui les accuse de collaborer avec les passeurs et leur impose un « code de conduite ». S’ensuivront des saisies de bateaux, des retraits de pavillon et autres procédures judiciaires. L’immense majorité d’entre elles vont jeter l’éponge.

      Un tournant s’opère en Méditerranée centrale. Les gardes-côtes libyens deviennent à l’automne 2017 les premiers acteurs du sauvetage dans la zone. Ils ramènent cette année-là 18 900 migrants sur leur rive, presque quarante fois plus qu’en 2015.

      Leur autonomie semble pourtant toute relative. C’est Rome qui transmet à Tripoli « la majorité des appels de détresse », note un rapport de l’ONU. C’est Rome encore qui dépose en décembre 2017, auprès de l’OMI, le projet de centre libyen de coordination des sauvetages maritimes financé par la Commission européenne. Un bilan d’étape interne à l’opération « Sophia », de mars 2018, décrit d’ailleurs l’impréparation de Tripoli à assumer seule ses nouvelles responsabilités. La salle d’opération depuis laquelle les sauvetages doivent être coordonnés se trouve dans « une situation infrastructurelle critique »liée à des défauts d’électricité, de connexion Internet, de téléphones et d’ordinateurs. Les personnels ne parlent pas anglais.

      Un sauvetage, le 6 novembre 2017, illustre le dangereux imbroglio que deviennent les opérations de secours. Ce jour-là, dans les eaux internationales, à 30 milles nautiques au nord de Tripoli, au moins 20 personnes seraient mortes. Une plainte a depuis été déposée contre l’Italie devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Des rescapés accusent Rome de s’être défaussé sur les gardes-côtes libyens.« Un appel de détresse avait été envoyé à tous les bateaux par le MRCC Rome, relate Violeta Moreno-Lax, juriste qui a participé au recours. L’ONG allemande Sea-Watch est arrivée sur place quelques minutes après les gardes-côtes libyens. C’est Rome qui a demandé aux Libyens d’intervenir et à Sea-Watch de rester éloignée. »

      Les gardes-côtes présents – certains formés par l’UE – n’ont alors ni gilets ni canot de sauvetage. Sur les vidéos de l’événement, on peut voir l’embarcation des migrants se coincer sous la coque de leur patrouilleur. Des gens tombent à l’eau et se noient. On entend aussi les Libyens menacer l’équipage du Sea-Watch de représailles, puis quitter les lieux en charriant dans l’eau un migrant accroché à une échelle.

      Tout en ayant connaissance de ce drame, et bien qu’elle reconnaisse un suivi très limité du travail des gardes-côtes en mer, la force navale « Sophia » se félicite, dans son bilan d’étape de mars 2018, du « modèle opérationnel durable » qu’elle finance.

      L’année 2018 confirme le succès de cette stratégie. Les arrivées en Italie ont chuté de 80 %, ce qui n’empêche pas le ministre de l’intérieur, Matteo Salvini (extrême droite), d’annoncer à l’été la fermeture de ses ports aux navires humanitaires.
      « Esclavage » et « torture »

      L’ONU rappelle régulièrement que la Libye ne doit pas être considérée comme un « port sûr » pour débarquer les migrants interceptés en mer. Les personnes en situation irrégulière y sont systématiquement placées en détention, dans des centres sous la responsabilité du gouvernement où de nombreux abus sont documentés, tels que des « exécutions extrajudiciaires, l’esclavage, les actes de torture, les viols, le trafic d’être humains et la sous-alimentation ».

      La dangerosité des traversées, elle, a explosé : le taux de mortalité sur la route de la Méditerranée centrale est passé de 2,6 % en 2017 à 13,8 % en 2019.

      https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/05/07/comment-l-ue-a-ferme-la-route-entre-la-libye-et-l-italie_5459242_3210.html

  • Attivarsi ovunque contro le frontiere assassine

    Guido Viale, presidente dell’#Osservatorio_solidarietà della #Carta_di_Milano, ha aperto i lavori della conferenza Solidarietà attraverso i confini, il 25 marzo a Fa’ la cosa giusta, illustrando semplicemente che la viva voce dei tanti protagonisti presenti avrebbe dato il senso dell’iniziativa oggi ancora più importante dopo il sequestro della nave di Proactivia Openarms operato in dispregio delle leggi italiane e internazionali come atto intimidatorio contro chi nel pieno rispetto delle leggi e dei Diritti umani è impegnato per salvare vite umane che i governi della Fortezza Europa, Italia in testa, vorrebbero si concludessero senza clamore in fondo al mare nostrum. Dopo una sintetica illustrazione di Daniela Padoan delle attività dell’Osservatorio solidarietà e una poesia di Ahmed, letta da Denise Rogers, una ragazza argentina che ha dato voce ai tanti migranti morti, si sono susseguite le testimonianze da Ventimiglia, Bolzano, Lesbo, Atene, Como formando un quadro tragico della situazione ma dimostrando anche che c’è un’Europa della solidarietà e dei diritti che lotta contro leggi e governi custodi implacabili di frontiere assassine.

    https://ecoinformazioni.wordpress.com/2018/03/25/attivarsi-ovunque-contro-le-frntiere-assassine

    #solidarité #mer #terre #Méditerranée #Alpes #frontière_sud-alpine #criminalisation_de_la_solidarité #délit_de_solidarité #sauvetage

    J’aimerais ici reprendre les propos de Charles Heller, qui ont été publié dans une interview dans Libé :

    Ceux qui ont imposé le contrôle des frontières de l’espace européen utilisent le terme de #integrated_border_management, la « #gestion_intégrée_des_frontières » : il ne suffit pas de contrôler la limite de la frontière territoriale, il faut contrôler avant, sur et après la frontière. La violence du contrôle s’exerce sur toute la trajectoire des migrants. De la même manière, les pratiques de solidarité, plus ou moins politisées, s’exercent sur l’ensemble de leur trajectoire. On pourrait imaginer une « #solidarité_intégrée », qui n’est pas chapeautée par une organisation mais qui de fait opère, petit bout par petit bout, sur les trajectoires.

    https://www.pacte-grenoble.fr/sites/pacte/files/files/liberation_20171215_15-12-2017-extrait.pdf
    cc @isskein

    • Crimes of solidarity. Migration and containment through rescue

      ‘Solidarity is not a crime.’ This is a slogan that has circulated widely across Europe in response to legal prosecutions and municipal decrees, which, especially in Italy and France, have been intended to act against citizens who provide logistical and humanitarian support to transiting migrants. Such criminalisation of individual acts of solidarity and coordinated platforms of refugee support is undertaken both in the name of national and European laws, in opposition to the facilitation of irregular entries, and through arbitrary police measures. In Calais on the French coast, for example, locals have been prohibited from allowing migrants to take showers in their homes or to recharge their mobile phones, while in the Roya Valley at the Italian-French border, many locals have been placed on trial, including the now famous ploughman Cedric Herrou. Responding to accusations that he has been one of the main facilitators along the French-Italian underground migrant route, Herrou has replied that ‘it is the State that is acting illegally, not me’, referring to the French State’s own human rights violations. 1

      ‘Crimes of solidarity’, to use the expression employed by activists and human rights organisations, are defined and prosecuted according to the 2002 EU Directive which prevents and penalises ‘the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence’ of migrants. In both Italy and France there are national laws that criminalise the facilitation and the support of ‘irregular’ migration; what in France activists call ‘délit de solidarité’. Notably, citizens who help migrants to cross national borders are prosecuted in Italy under the same law that punishes smugglers who take money from migrants. In France, the ‘humanitarian clause’, which exempts from sanctions citizens who support migrants whose life, dignity and physical integrity is at risk, is often disregarded. Nonetheless, the expression ‘crimes of solidarity’ should not lead us to overstate the legal dimension of what is at stake in this. Indeed, the ‘crime’ that is posited here goes well beyond the legal boundaries of European law, as well as national ones, and acquires an ethical and political dimension. In particular, the criminalisation of individuals and groups who are facilitating the crossing of migrants, without making a profit from doing so, opens up the critical question of exactly ‘who is a smuggler?’ today. Significantly, the very definition of ‘smuggling’ in European and international documents is a fairly slippery one, as the boundaries between supporting migrants for one’s own financial benefit or for ‘humanitarian’ reasons are consistently blurred. 2

      In a 1979 interview, Michel Foucault stressed the potential strategic role that might be played by ‘rights’ to ‘mark out for a government its limit’. 3 In this way, Foucault gestured towards an extralegal conceptualisation and use of rights as actual limits to be set against governments. In the case of crimes of solidarity, we are confronted less, however, with the mobilisation of rights as limits to states’ action than with what Foucault calls ‘infra-legal illegalisms’; 4 namely, with practices of an active refusal of states’ arbitrary measures that are taken in the name of migration containment, regardless of whether or not the latter are legally grounded or in violation of the law.

      NGOs and independent organisations that undertake search and rescue activities to save migrants in the Mediterranean have also been under attack, accused of collaborating with smuggling networks, of constituting a pull-factor for migrants, and of ferrying them to Europe. Three years after the end of the military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum, which was deployed by the Italian Navy to save migrant lives at sea, the Mediterranean has become the site of a sort of naval battle in which the obligation to rescue migrants in distress is no longer the priority. The fight against smugglers and traffickers has taken central stage, and the figure of the shipwrecked refugee has consequently vanished little by little. Today, the war on smugglers is presented as the primary goal and, at the same time, as a strategy to protect migrants from ‘traffickers’. The criminalisation of NGOs, like Doctors without Borders, Save the Children and SOS Mediterranee, and of independent actors, including Sea-Eye, Sea-Watch, Jugend-Rettet and Arms Pro-Activa, who conduct search and rescue operations, started with the simultaneous implementation of the Libyan mobile sea-barrier, which charges the Libyan Coast Guard with responsibility for intercepting migrant vessels and bringing them back to Libya. As a consequence of this agreement, being rescued means being captured and contained.

      Following the signing of a new bilateral agreement between Libya and Italy in March 2017, in July, the Italian government put pressure on one of the three Libyan governments (the one led by Fayez al-Serraj) demanding better cooperation in intercepting and returning migrants who head to Europe by sea. In order to accelerate this process, Italy sent two Navy ships into Libyan national waters, with the purpose of ‘strengthening Libyan sovereignty by helping the country to keep control of its national waters’. 5

      Far from being a smooth negotiation, however, the Libyan government led by General Khalifa Haftar threatened to shoot in the direction of the Italian ships if they were to violate Libya’s sovereignty by entering their national territory. 6

      Overall, the ‘migration deal’ has been made by the EU and Italy in the context of different asymmetric relationships: on the one hand, with a ‘rogue state’ such as Libya, characterised by a fragmented sovereignty, and on the other, with non-state actors, and more precisely with the same smugglers that Europe has supposedly declared war on. Indeed, as various journalistic investigations have proved, Italy has paid Libyan militias and smuggling networks to block migrants’ departures temporarily in exchange for fewer controls on other smuggling channels, specifically those involving drugs and weapons. In this way, smugglers have been incorporated into a politics of migration containment. Governing migration through and with smugglers has become fully part of the EU’s political agenda. As such, a critical appraisal of the criminalisation of migrant smuggling requires undoing the existing narrative of a war on smugglers, as well as challenging those analyses that simply posit smugglers as the straightforward enemies of society.

      The naval battle in the Mediterranean has not been an exclusive affair of Italy and Libya. On the contrary, it is within this type of geopolitical context that the escalating criminalisation of sea rescue is more broadly taking place. 7 On July 31, at the request of the European Commission, the Italian Home Office released a ‘Code of Conduct’ that NGOs have been asked to sign if they want to continue search and rescue activities. Given that the code of conduct imposes on NGOs the obligation to have armed judicial police on board, 8 some organisations, including Doctors without Borders, Sea Watch and Jugend Rettet, have refused to sign, arguing that through the enforcement of the Code of Conduct, and under pressure from the European Commission, Italy has turned towards a militarisation of humanitarianism and of independent actors. As a consequence of the refusal to sign, their ships have been prevented from docking in Italian ports and the rescuers of the Jugend Rettet are currently on trial, accused of collaborating with Libyan smugglers. On August 11, Libya traced new virtual restrictive sea borders for NGOs, declaring that search and rescue ships will not be allowed to get closer than one hundred miles from the Libyan coast. The humanitarian scene of rescue has been shrunk.

      In such a political context, two interrelated aspects emerging from the multiplication of attacks against refugee support activities and against search and rescue operations are worth considering. The first concerns a need to unpack what is now meant by the very expression ‘crime of solidarity’ within the framework of this shift towards the priority of fighting smugglers over saving migrants. This requires an engagement with the biopolitical predicaments that sustain a debate centered on the question of to what extent, and up to which point, rescuing migrants at sea is deemed legitimate. The second, related point concerns the modes of containment through rescue that are currently at work in the Mediterranean. One consequence of this is that the reframing of the debate around migrant deaths at sea has lowered the level of critique of a contemporary politics of migration more generally: the fight against smugglers has become the unquestioned and unyielding point of agreement, supported across more or less the entire European political arena.

      The criminalisation of NGOs, accused of ferrying migrants to Europe, should be read in partial continuity with the attack against other forms of support given to migrants in many European countries. The use of the term ‘solidarity’ is helpful in this context insofar as it helps to highlight both actions undertaken by citizens in support of refugees and, more importantly, the transversal alliances between migrants and non-migrants. In fact, acting in solidarity entails supporting migrant struggles – for example, as struggles for movement or struggles to stay in a certain place – more than it does acting in order to save or bring help to them. 9 As Chandra Mohanty argues, practices of solidarity are predicated upon the recognition of ‘common differences’, 10 and in this sense they entail a certain shared political space and the awareness of being governed by the same mechanisms of precaritisation and exploitation. 11 In other words, solidarity does not at all imply a simple politics of identity, but requires building transversal alliances and networks in support of certain struggles. The reduction of migrants to bodies to be fished out of the water, simultaneous with the vanishing of the figure of the refugee, preemptively denies the possibility of establishing a common ground in struggling for freedom of movement and equal access to mobility.

      Despite the many continuities and similarities between the criminalisation of refugee support activities on the mainland and at sea, if we shift the attention to the Mediterranean Sea, what is specifically at stake here is a biopolitics of rescuing or ‘letting drown’. Under attack in the Mediterranean scene of rescue and drowning are what could be termed crimes of humanitarianism; or, that is, crimes of rescue. Humanitarianism as such, precisely in its acts of taking migrants out of the sea through independent search and rescue operations that exercise an active refusal of the geographical restrictions imposed by nation states, has become an uncomfortable and unbearable mode of intervention in the Mediterranean.
      Geographies of ungrievability

      The criminalisation of alliances and initiatives in support of migrants’ transit should not lead us to imagine a stark opposition between ‘good humanitarians’, on the one side, and bad military actors or national authorities, on the other. On the contrary, it is important to keep in mind the many entanglements between military and humanitarian measures, as well as the role played by military actors, such as the Navy, in performing tasks like rescuing migrants at sea that could fall under the category of what Cuttitta terms ‘military-humanitarianism’. 12 Moreover, the Code of Conduct enforced by the Italian government actually strengthens the divide between ‘good’ NGOs and ‘treacherous’ humanitarian actors. Thus, far from building a cohesive front, the obligation to sign the Code of Conduct produced a split among those NGOs involved in search and rescue operations.

      In the meantime, the figure of the refugee at sea has arguably faded away: sea rescue operations are in fact currently deployed with the twofold task of not letting migrants drown and of fighting smugglers, which de facto entails undermining the only effective channels of sea passage for migrants across the Mediterranean. From a military-humanitarian approach that, under Mare Nostrum, considered refugees at sea as shipwrecked lives, the unconditionality of rescue is now subjected to the aim of dismantling the migrants’ logistics of crossing. At the same time, the migrant drowning at sea is ultimately not seen any longer as a refugee, i.e. as a subject of rights who is seeking protection, but as a life to be rescued in the technical sense of being fished out of the sea. In other words, the migrant at sea is the subject who eventually needs to be rescued, but not thereby placed into safety by granting them protection and refuge in Europe. What happens ‘after landing’ is something not considered within the framework of a biopolitics of rescuing and of letting drown. 13 Indeed, the latter is not only about saving (or not saving) migrants at sea, but also, in a more proactive way, about aiming at human targets. In manhunting, Gregoire Chamayou explains, ‘the combat zone tends to be reduced to the body of the enemy’. 14 Yet who is the human target of migrant hunts in the Mediterranean? It is not only the migrant in distress at sea, who in fact is rescued and captured at the same time; rather, migrants and smugglers are both considered the ‘prey’ of contemporary military-humanitarianism.

      Public debate in Europe about the criminalisation of NGOs and sea rescue is characterised by a polarisation between those who posit the non-negotiable obligation to rescue migrants and those who want to limit rescue operations in the name of regaining control over migrant arrivals, stemming the flows and keeping them in Libya. What remains outside the order of this discourse is the shrinking and disappearing figure of the refugee, who is superseded by the figure of the migrant to be taken out of the sea.

      Relatedly, the exclusive focus on the Mediterranean Sea itself contributes to strengthening geographies of ungrievability. By this I mean those produced hierarchies of migrant deaths that are essentially dependent on their more or less consistent geographic distance from Europe’s spotlight and, at the same time, on the assumption of shipwrecked migrants as the most embodied refugee subjectivities. More precisely, the recent multiplication of bilateral agreements between EU member states and African countries has moved back deadly frontiers from the Mediterranean Sea to the Libyan and Niger desert. As a consequence, migrants who do not die at sea but who manage to arrive in Libya are kept in Libyan prisons.
      Containment through rescue

      On 12 August 2017, Doctors without Borders decided to stop search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean after Libya enforced its sea-barrier by forbidding NGOs to go closer than about one hundred miles from the Libyan coast, and threatening to shoot at those ships that sought to violate the ban. In the space of two days, even Save the Children and the independent German organisation Sea-Eye declared that they would also suspend search and rescue activities. The NGOs’ Mediterranean exit has been presented by humanitarian actors as a refusal to be coopted into the EU-Libyan enforcement of a sea barrier against migrants. Yet, in truth, both the Italian government and the EU have been rather obviously pleased by the humanitarians’ withdrawal from the Mediterranean scene of drown and rescue.

      Should we therefore understand the ongoing criminalisation of NGOs as the attempt to fully block migrant flows? Does it indicate a return from the staging of a ‘good scene of rescue’ back to an overt militarisation of the Mediterranean? The problem is that such an analytical angle risks, first, corroborating the misleading opposition between military intervention and humanitarianism in the field of migration governmentality. Second, it re-instantiates the image of a Fortress Europe, while disregarding the huge ‘migration industry’ that is flourishing both in Libya, with the smuggling-and-detention market, and on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean. 15 With the empty space left by the NGOs at sea, the biopolitics of rescuing or letting drown has been reshaped by new modes of containment through rescue: migrants who manage to leave the Libyan coast are ‘rescued’ – that is, intercepted and blocked – by the Libyan Coast Guard and taken back to Libya. Yet containment should not be confused with detention nor with a total blockage of migrants’ movements and departures. Rather, by ‘containment’ I refer to the substantial disruptions and decelerations of migrant movements, as well as to the effects of more or less temporary spatial confinement. Modes of containment through rescue were already in place, to some extent, when migrants used to be ‘ferried’ to Italy in a smoother way, by the Navy or by NGOs. Indeed, from the moment of rescue onward, migrants were transferred and channelled into the Hotspot System, where many were denied international protection and, thus, rendered ‘illegal’ and constructed as deportable subjects. 16 The distinction between intercepting vessels sailing to Europe and saving migrants in distress has become blurred: with the enforcement of the Libyan sea barrier, rescue and capture can hardly be separated any longer. In this sense, visibility can be a trap: if images taken by drones or radars are sent to Italian authorities before migrants enter international waters, the Italian Coast Guard has to inform Libyan authorities who are in charge of rescuing migrants and thus taking them back to Libya.

      This entails a spatial rerouting of military-humanitarianism, in which migrants are paradoxically rescued to Libya. Rather than vanishing from the Mediterranean scene, the politics of rescue, conceived in terms of not letting people die, has been reshaped as a technique of capture. At the same time, the geographic orientation of humanitarianism has been inverted: migrants are ‘saved’ and dropped in Libya. Despite the fact that various journalistic investigations and UN reports have shown that after being intercepted, rescued and taken back to Libya, migrants are kept in detention in abysmal conditions and are blackmailed by smugglers, 17 the public discussion remains substantially polarised around the questions of deaths at sea. Should migrants be saved unconditionally? Or, should rescue be secondary to measures against smugglers and balanced against the risk of ‘migrant invasion’? A hierarchy of the spaces of death and confinement is in part determined by the criterion of geographical proximity, which contributes to the sidelining of mechanisms of exploitation and of a politics of letting die that takes place beyond the geopolitical borders of Europe. The biopolitical hold over migrants becomes apparent at sea: practices of solidarity are transformed into a relationship between rescuers and drowned. 18

      The criminalisation of refugee support activities cannot be separated from the increasing criminalisation of refugees as such: not only those who are labelled and declared illegal as ‘economic migrants’, but also those people who are accorded the status of refugees. Both are targets of restrictive and racialised measures of control. The migrant at sea is presented as part of a continuum of ‘tricky subjectivities’ 19 – which include the smuggler, the potential terrorist and the refugee – and as both a ‘risky subject’ and a ‘subject at risk’ at the same time. 20 In this regard, it is noticeable that the criminalisation of refugees as such has been achieved precisely through the major role played by the figure of the smuggler. In the EU’s declared fight against smuggling networks, migrants at sea are seen not only as shipwrecked lives to be rescued but also as potential fake refugees, as concealed terrorists or as traffickers. At the same time, the fight against smugglers has been used to enact a further shift in the criminalisation of refugees, which goes beyond the alleged dangerousness of migrants. Indeed, in the name of the war against the ‘illegal’ smuggling economy, as a shared priority of both left- and right-wing political parties in Europe, the strategy of letting migrants drown comes, in the end, to be justified. As Doctors without Borders have pointed out, ‘by declaring Libya a safe country, European governments are ultimately pushing forward the humanitarianisation of what appears at the threshold of the inhuman.’ 21

      The migrant at sea, who is the subject of humanitarianism par excellence, is no longer an individual to be saved at all costs, but rather the object of thorny calculations about the tolerated number of migrant arrivals and the migrant-money exchange with Libya. Who is (in) danger(ous)? The legal prosecutions and the political condemnation of ‘crimes of rescue’ and of ‘crimes of solidarity’ bring to the fore the undesirability of refugees as refugees. This does not depend so much on a logic of social dangerousness as such, but, rather, on the practices of spatial disobedience that they enact, against the restrictions imposed by the European Union. Thus, it is precisely the irreducibility of migrants to lives to be rescued that makes the refugee the main figure of a continuum of tricky subjectivities in a time of economic crisis. Yet, a critical engagement with the biopolitics of rescuing and drowning cannot stick to a North-South gaze on Mediterranean migrations. In order not to fall into a Eurocentric (or EU-centric) perspective on asylum, analyses of crimes of solidarity should also be articulated through an inquiry into the Libyan economy of migration and the modes of commodification of migrant bodies, considering what Brett Neilson calls ‘migration as a currency’; 22 that is, as an entity of exchange and as a source of value extraction.

      Crimes of solidarity put in place critical infrastructures to support migrants’ acts of spatial disobedience. These infra-legal crimes shed light on the inadequacy of human rights claims and of the legal framework in a time of hyper-visible and escalating border violence. Crimes of solidarity consist of individual and collective active refusals of states’ interventions, which are specifically carried out at the very edges of the law. In this way, crimes of solidarity manage to undo the biopolitics of rescuing and letting drown by acting beyond the existing scripts of ‘crisis’ and ‘security’. Rather than being ‘rescued’ from the sea or ‘saved’ from smugglers, migrants are supported in their unbearable practices of freedom, unsettling the contemporary hierarchies of lives and populations.
      Notes

      See the interview with Herrou in l’Humanité, accessed 30 September 2017, https://www.humanite.fr/cedric-herrou-cest-letat-qui-est-dans-lillegalite-pas-moi-629732. ^

      Economic profit is an essential dimension of ‘smuggling’, as it is defined by the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime (2000). However, it is not in the 2002 EU Council Directive defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. ^

      Michel Foucault, ‘There can’t be societies without uprisings’, trans. Farès Sassine, in Foucault and the Making of Subjects, ed. Laura Cremonesi, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 40. ^

      See Michel Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973, trans. Graham Burchell (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 2015). ^

      See ‘Il governo vara la missione navale, prima nave italiana in Libia’, La Stampa, 18 July 2017, http://www.ilsecoloxix.it/p/italia/2017/07/28/ASBvqlaI-parlamento_missione_italiana.shtml. ^

      See, for example, the report in Al Arabiya, 3 August 2017, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2017/08/03/Haftar-instructs-bombing-Italian-warships-requested-by-Fayez-al-S ^

      See Liz Fekete, ‘Europe: crimes of solidarity’, Race & Class 50:4 (2009), 83 – 97; and Eric Fassin, ‘Le procès politique de la solidarité (3/4): les ONG en Méditerranée’ (2017), Mediapart, accessed 30 September 2017, https://blogs.mediapart.fr/eric-fassin/blog/170817/le-proces-politique-de-la-solidarite-34-les-ong-en-mediterranee ^

      The Code of Conduct can be found at: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/codice_condotta_ong.pdf; see also the transcript by Euronews, 3 August 2017, http://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrant-rescue ^

      Sandro Mezzadra and Mario Neumann, ‘Al di la dell’opposizione tra interesse e identità. Per una politica di classe all’altezza dei tempi’ (2017), Euronomade, accessed September 30 2017, http://www.euronomade.info/?p=9402 ^

      Chandra Mohanty, “‘Under western eyes’’ revisited: feminist solidarity through anticapitalist struggles’, in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28:2 (2003), 499-–535. ^

      As Foucault puts it, ‘In the end, we are all governed, and in this sense we all act in solidarity’. Michel Foucault, ‘Face aux gouvernement, les droits de l’homme’, in Dits et Ecrits II (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), 1526. ^

      P. Cuttitta, ‘From the Cap Anamur to Mare Nostrum: Humanitarianism and migration controls at the EU’s Maritime borders’, in The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: Enhancing Protection in Times of Emergency, ed. Claudio Matera and Amanda Taylor (The Hague: Asser Institute, 2014), 21–-38. See also Martina Tazzioli, ‘The desultory politics of mobility and the humanitarian-military border in the Mediterranean: Mare Nostrum beyond the sea’, REMHU: Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana 23:44 (2015), 61-–82. ^

      See Lucia Ciabarri and Barbara Pinelli, eds, Dopo l’Approdo: Un racconto per immagini e parole sui richiedenti asilo in Italia (Firenze: Editpress, 2016). ^

      Gregoire Chamayou, ‘The Manhunt Doctrine’, Radical Philosophy 169 (2011), 3. ^

      As a matter of fact, the vessels of the EU naval operation EU Navfor Med and the vessels of the Frontex operation ‘Triton’ were increased in number a few days after the pull-out of the NGOs. ^

      Nicholas De Genova, ‘Spectacles of migrant “illegality”: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36:7 (2013), 1180-–1198. ^

      See, for instance, the UN Report on Libya (2017), accessed 30 September 2017,http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1711623.pdf. ^

      Tugba Basaran, ‘The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of security’, Security Dialogue 46:3 (2015), 205 – 220. ^

      Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, ‘The Biopolitical Warfare on Migrants: EU Naval Force and NATO Operations of migration government in the Mediterranean’, in Critical Military Studies, forthcoming 2017. ^

      Claudia Aradau, ‘The perverse politics of four-letter words: risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking’, Millennium 33:2 (2004), 251-–277. ^

      Interview with Doctors without Borders, Rome, 21 August 2017. ^

      Brett Neilson, ‘The Currency of Migration’, in South Atlantic Quarterly, forthcoming 2018.

      https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/crimes-of-solidarity

      signalé par @isskein sur FB

  • #vidéo La #stratégie_nationale_de_gestion_intégrée_des_frontières (#IBM)

    Par arrêté du 2 février 2011, le Conseil fédéral a institué un groupe stratégique interdépartemental interne à l’administration auquel sont également associés les cantons. Ce groupe est chargé de mettre au point la stratégie nationale de gestion intégrée des frontières. Le Conseil fédéral répond ainsi à une recommandation extraite de l’évaluation des frontières extérieures suisses réalisée juste avant la mise en œuvre opérationnelle de l’association à Schengen.

    Le 1er juin 2012 le Conseil fédéral a pris note de la stratégie de gestion intégrée des frontières élaborée conjointement par la Confédération et les cantons. Cette stratégie sert de cadre pour toutes les activités menées par la Confédération et les cantons afin de lutter contre la #migration_irrégulière, le trafic organisé de migrants et la criminalité transfrontalière. Elle permet également de veiller à ce que les entrées régulières se déroulent de manière optimale. Un groupe de travail élabore désormais un plan d’action assorti de mesures concrètes.

    Les autorités fédérales et cantonales doivent faire face au défi que représentent la migration irrégulière, le trafic organisé de migrants et la #criminalité_transfrontalière. Lutter efficacement contre ces phénomènes nécessite une collaboration et une coordination intensives allant au-delà des domaines de responsabilité de chacun. La stratégie de « gestion intégrée des frontières » permet de garantir que les différentes autorités de la Confédération et des cantons travailleront encore plus étroitement ensemble que par le passé, ce qui aura pour effet de renforcer la #sécurité intérieure. Qui plus est, les ressources disponibles seront engagées de manière plus efficace et mieux ciblée et favoriseront une réactivité accrue.

    La stratégie met l’accent sur l’amélioration de l’échange d’informations, l’analyse de la situation ainsi que sur l’optimisation et l’harmonisation de la formation, de l’équipement et des infrastructures. Elle vise également à améliorer la coopération à l’échelle internationale et avec les acteurs non étatiques.

    Le Conseil fédéral a mis en place un groupe de travail pour mettre en œuvre cette stratégie. Il l’a chargé d’élaborer un plan d’action qui permette de définir de coordonner les mesures prises par les autorités fédérales et cantonales concernées. Après la prise de connaissance du plan d’action par la Confédération et les Cantons, la signature d’une convention-cadre entre le Département fédéral de justice et police (DFJP) et la Conférence des directrices et directeurs des départements cantonaux de justice et police(CCDJP) et prévue en novembre 2014. Cela avec le but de souligner la volonté commune de mettre en œuvre le plan d’action rapidement.


    https://www.bfm.admin.ch/bfm/fr/home/themen/einreise/ibm.html

    #Suisse #frontière #gestion_frontalière

    • Réaction d’un collègue sur cette vidéo : C’est le modèle dominant au niveau européen. Une de ses formulations les plus claires, ici par l’ancien directeur de Frontex, Ilkka Laitinen.
      http://eapmigrationpanel.org/page33693.html

      Borders represent more than dividing lines between nations; they represent the meeting of worlds, of people and of cultures. For this reason, the twin security aspects of border control and border surveillance cannot be seen in isolation. Relations with third countries, international agreements, visa regulations and an effective deterrent against illegal entry are all vital elements in the solution dubbed #Integrated_Border_Management (IBM). In other words, activities before the border, at the border, across the border and behind the border are all crucial elements in effective border control.